Byron Bailey, The Australian, MCAS

[megan]

From Fridays paper, headlined "Boeing 737 MAX Most Tested Jet and Very Safe".Indeed there have been several incidences of MCAS activation on US B737 MAX aircraft but experienced American pilots recognised the problem, which just required treating it as a pitch trim runaway, and turned the switches off.On R & N Takwis, who is a US based 737 pilot going by his profile, says,It raises a lot of questions. Why is he the only source? No official notices, from FAA or airlines or pilot unions, have mentioned this. What was the cause of MCAS activation? Did it activate for it's intended function, or because of some malfunction? Why have none of these pilots spoken out? Why has Boeing not said, "See, pilots can do this!"? Why hasn't someone else said, "See, it malfunctions all the time!"?

I would say, generously, that this is very unlikely to be true.Like to see Byron's evidence re US MCAS activations, no one else seems to know about them, in Boeings PR pay?

[LeadSled]

Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta.
I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do.
Tootle pip!!

[MickG0105]

Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta.
I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do.
Tootle pip!!

Megan is bang on the money, there's no evidence that any US crew ever experienced an erroneous MCAS activation, leave alone ran the Runaway Stab NNC. There were a couple of reports after Lion Air 610 that US MAX crews had encountered an unusual nose down trim command but because they had occurred with the AP engaged none were ever connected to MCAS. Moreover, there's no record of any US crew that had encountered said unusual nose down trim commands using the Runaway Stab NNC; the AND trim command was momentary and correctable. One of the incidents was written up on the ASRS by both the Captain and FO as ACNs 1597286 and 1597380.

With regards to the Lion Air 43 crew, the one with the extra crew in the jump seat, there's no evidence that they actually treated that as a runaway and ran the relevant NNC. They listed the NNCs that they had run (Airspeed Unreliable and ALT DISAGREE) and Runaway Stab wasn't mentioned.

It would appear that Byron is back to his old trick of just making stuff up.

[Bend alot]

Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta.
I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do.
Tootle pip!!
Might want to re-check that - it is required to be reported to the FAA and requires a Tech Log entry, none reported of the 5 or 6 were an MCAS events.

"uncommended stab trim check list" = "Runaway Trim check list" correct?

[Global Aviator]

Conspiracy theorists???

If it was that simple the fleet would not be grounded and REMAIN GROUNDED!!!!!

Believe what you will, have a look for the article on the Boeing gets pilots that took 8000’ to get the failure under control. These pilots knew what was coming and still............

Ah but let’s just blame sub standard pilots eh, the western world is so good!

More to it than meets the eye!

[Fluke]

I don’t think anyone is blaming substandard pilots , just the substandard selection and training of pilots.

[mrdeux]

I note that Byron also suggests that engaging the autopilot would have fixed the issue. I suspect that with the control force that was being applied such engagement would have been unlikely.

[V-Jet]

Byron also said that on talkback radio - I nearly stopped talking on my phone while driving to call them up and say ‘what the...’. The point in the interview that he made was pilots can’t fly. He omitted to mention the AP will always be over ridden by force!

[Lookleft]

Boeing will be full throttle on trying to discredit the crew of the MAX. The PIC of the Ethiopian had 8000 hours so was not a newbie. Of course they will have their willing accomplices to be their mouthpieces. Cash for comment is not limited to radio broadcasters. This aircraft is seriously flawed otherwise the FAA would have had it back in the air months ago.

[Fly Aiprt]

From the other thread mentioning Bailey's articles, it seems the alledged Aviation Week articles are nowhere to be found.

[Lookleft]

So LS you are prepared to agree with Byron Bailey but are you prepared to disagree with this bloke:

Letter to the Editor
Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
New York Times Magazine
Published in print on October 13, 2019

In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

​​​​​​​Sully states what most reasonable thinking pilots know, the 737 Max is a fatally flawed aircraft.

[Stickshift3000]

This article comes along at the same time as Alan Joyce is in discussion with Boeing regarding future purchase, to soften up public reaction...

[TBM-Legend]

Remember its Virgin that has an order for Max 8 jets, but I guess QF is a bigger target for some

[George Glass]

Sully is , dare I say it , only partly right.
The sequence of events did start out as an Airspeed Disagree event ,caused by an angle of attack indicator failure, but the crew failed to complete the Non - Normal checklist correctly.
The first items on the checklist are DISCONNECT autopilot and autothrottle. Fly the aircraft.
The unintended consequence of the angle of attack failure led to the activation of the MCAS ,which led to to stab. trim motion ,which led to the loss of control. Completing the Runaway Stabilizer Non-Normal checklist would have resolved the issue.
The failure of the angle of attack indicator ultimately led to TWO Non-normal checklists having to be completed correctly and promptly.
Neither were.
As a long time B737 Pilot I sympathise with the crew. The situation they found themselves in was extremely difficult. I’ve been there.Boeing checklists are difficult to run simultaneously with multiple failures. But the fact remains that completing both checklists correctly would have salvaged the situation.
The B737MAX is not a fatally flawed design.
That’s where Langewiesche’s article is closer to the whole truth.
Training issues for new start airlines in third world countries will be an ongoing nightmare for Boeing AND Airbus for the foreseeable future, regardless of the outcome of the current investigation.

[CurtainTwitcher]

Not quite correct George. If we want to go down that path, the crews, had to complete the 1) Approach To Stall Non-Normal Manoeuvre MEMORY items after wheels off the ground (first item do this immediately at the first indication of stick shaker), 2) Airspeed Unreliable NNC MEMORY items & QRH Performance inflight for pitch/thrust 3) IAS Disagree NNC, and 4) then in the middle it all, observe a Stabilizer partial runaway only when the Flap Leading Edge transit light extinguished after selecting flaps to UP.

I'm not the only one who thinks this is beyond the realm of us mere mortals. That is why the aircraft is still grounded. See also Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System Joint Authority Technical Review (JATR), October 11, 2019 report (https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/Final_JATR_Submittal_to_FAA_Oct_2019.pdf) that does not cast Boeing or the FAA in a pleasing light.

While contemplating this post, comprehend that each crew also had to deal with this background noise.


https://youtu.be/TrjTUvhpBlE

[LeadSled]

George Glass,
Well put.

Curtain Twitcher,
Have you ever been confronted with multiple conflicting warnings at a critical stage of flight?? I have, and involving a failed AOA vane.

In my opinion, various who have pointed to pilot (or lack thereof) training as a major issue (like FAA and now ICAO) as a major contributor are heading in the right direction.

This is even recognised by Airbus in the A350 syllabus, which starts in the sim phase with just "flying the aeroplane".

After all, the Lion Air aircraft was safely flown the evening before the loss, by a suitable experienced crew.

Tootle pip!!

​​​​​​​PS: CT --- that was just a stick shaker ---- it gets far more distracting than that with a whole bunch going off at once.

[George Glass]

Curtaintwitcher, I have had an airspeed disagree event and can confirm that simultaneous over speed clacker and stickshaker is disconcerting to say the least. That’s why I have sympathy for the crew. But the fact remains that you can disconnect everything on a B737 and it will still fly. An instructor once demonstrated that in the simulator by taking us to 30,000 ft. and switching every switch on the overhead panel off. It still flew. I don’t think too many do that sort of stuff anymore. Just fly it like a C172. Personally I will never fly domestically in Indonesia. Ever. Seen too much scary stuff over there.
P.S. Don’t see the need for Approach to Stall recalls. Go straight for Airspeed Disagree.

[CurtainTwitcher]

Leadsled, fortunately I haven't had multiple conflicting warnings, that is my point. The fact that a single point of failure can generate so many bells and whistles speaks to the poor engineering & design that took a 1960's airframes and allowed Boeing to bypass most of the the modern certification. Boeing essentially ignoring all the lessons & human factors discoveries about the fragility of human performance under unexpected duress.

As time goes on we learn just how inadequate humans are in the chain for any degree of complex decision making with conflicting data. The research doesn't say we are getting better, we've never been good, and the engineering should reflect that, not fit the human in as primitive EICAS/ECAM.

You mention the crew that experienced the MCAS activation and landed successfully, guess what, they had a third set of eyes. Nobody can say if there would have been a different outcome with just two crew.

It is actually a true testament to skill and abilities of the global 737NG pilots that the accident rate is so remarkable low. Is this because globally 737NG pilots are inadequately trained? With 100+ million departures, I don't know how we can sustain that argument. Given the part number for the AoA vane is the same in both the NG and the MAX, there is likely no change in the rate of sensor failure rates.

This Boeing data was produced in October 2018, covering the period to the end of 2017, so the MAX shows 0 fatalities. The chart below is stunning to me, the safety of the 737NG operation is remarkable. Boeing & the industry did something right to sustain that level of safety since 1997.

What could possibly explain the difference between the NG and MAX? The pilots, Training or the aircraft itself?

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1493/screen_shot_2019_09_28_at_5_42_21_pm_21cbef47414c1f4a362813c 55794751e1f922b9d_08ba09cbc8cb899a60b96edc9a9bf5fff6a9cb52.p ng
Source: Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents Worldwide Operations | 1959 – 2017 (http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf)

[Lookleft]

But the fact remains that you can disconnect everything on a B737 and it will still fly.

GG and LS you are talking about an analogue only aircraft. I have flown a 737 in full manual reversion and it was a non-event. What you are not considering is that MCAS is a digital system that applies a control input independent of the pilots. Pilots who were not told about the existence of the system or the full failure modes of it. To just dump it on the crew does not explain why the thing has been grounded and even then they have found other issues with MCAS. LS Airbus have included the" fly the aircraft" in their Golden Rules since they introduced FBW so the A350 is nothing special in that regard. Interestingly the A330 was not grounded after a legacy carrier crew put one into a stall and killed all on board and the A320 was not grounded after the Air Asia fatal accident off Surabaya. So there must be a lot more going on than you are willing to acknowledge. Boeing through their shortcuts and corporate greed have presented a product to market that has killed over 300 people. Therein lies the issue.

[Global Aviator]

Max has been grounded for how long now? Max ain’t getting its wings back any time soon or they would not be being ferried to storage facilities. Max obviously has serious issues. Yes the previous Lion Air flight had issues, was it the same fault? What did engineers do to it overnight? Nothing is as simple as it seems.

It does not matter how good you are, if an aircraft is uncontrollable it doesn’t matter how good you are.

I have said it before, I have crashed a sim when over zealous instructor put an non flyable situation of failures into the box! It is not a nice feeling and that’s a sim where the whoops freeze button is hit and a erm sorry ensues.........

I’ve read many articles on Max.

The most interesting one was the Boeing test pilots that took 8000’ to correct the MCAS activation/failure whatever you call it. Now how high were Ethiopian and Lion?

[Bend alot]

After all, the Lion Air aircraft was safely flown the evening before the loss, by a suitable experienced crew.



Got any details you are willing to share - including the jump seater?

Thanks in advance.

[LeadSled]

GG and LS you are talking about an analogue only aircraft. I have flown a 737 in full manual reversion and it was a non-event. What you are not considering is that MCAS is a digital system that applies a control input independent of the pilots. Pilots who were not told about the existence of the system or the full failure modes of it. To just dump it on the crew does not explain why the thing has been grounded and even then they have found other issues with MCAS. LS Airbus have included the" fly the aircraft" in their Golden Rules since they introduced FBW so the A350 is nothing special in that regard. Interestingly the A330 was not grounded after a legacy carrier crew put one into a stall and killed all on board and the A320 was not grounded after the Air Asia fatal accident off Surabaya. So there must be a lot more going on than you are willing to acknowledge. Boeing through their shortcuts and corporate greed have presented a product to market that has killed over 300 people. Therein lies the issue.
Lookleft,
Just a couple of points:
(1) If you place the stab trim cutout switches to OFF, you have full manual control, leaving you without any complicating input ---- nothing to do with analogue v. digital.
(2) Go read what Airbus, themselves, had/has to say about the redesigned syllabus introduced with the A350, it aint't the same as "years ago" --- and all as a result of the demonstrated fall in manual flying standards --- for which Airbus has a major responsibility.
Tootle pip!!

PS: High hours does not equal high competence, any more than low hours means the reverse ---- as I have found out over a career.

[Lookleft]

(1) If you place the stab trim cutout switches to OFF, you have full manual control, leaving you without any complicating input ---- nothing to do with analogue v. digital.

then you don't understand MCAS

This is even recognised by Airbus in the A350 syllabus, which starts in the sim phase with just "flying the aeroplane".

Same as every Airbus

High hours does not equal high competence, any more than low hours means the reverse ---- as I have found out over a career.

So your unsubstantiated claim on the R&N MCAS thread that pilots in the US have successfully coped with MCAS events while the Asians and Africans haven't has nothing to do with their ethnic background?

BTW I am enjoying the shellacking your claims and statements are getting on the other thread, especially your doubts about Sulley's understanding of the 737 systems.

[Lead Balloon]

My inexpert reading of all of the currently-available evidence leads me to conclude that systems design was a causally relevant factor in a couple of accidents that have resulted in Max 8 hull loss and consequential loss of life. But I’m a nobody amateur.

Given my amateur understanding, it saddens me that some would try to attribute blame to the pilots. So many accidents and their investigated outcomes tend not to support a ‘blame the pilot’ approach. This was a lesson that was supposed to have been learned a long time ago.

[neville_nobody]

(1) If you place the stab trim cutout switches to OFF, you have full manual control, leaving you without any complicating input ---- nothing to do with analogue v. digital.then you don't understand MCAS



Do you know something that is not publically available? The official line is by moving the stab trim cut off to off will stop the trim wheel from moving electrically.

[Bend alot]

[left]



Do you know something that is not publically available? The official line is by moving the stab trim cut off to off will stop the trim wheel from moving electrically.
Just be sure you are lightning quick - or that manual trim wheel will be - not your friend!

That is public and well known - just not in the required documents or simulated correctly in the simulators!!! FACT

It is critical to cut the stab trim cut offs - but more critical that it is in a correct part of available use of what is left to control the aircraft.

[LeadSled]

:
Sully states what most reasonable thinking pilots know, the 737 Max is a fatally flawed aircraft.
Lookleft,
Clearly, I am not afraid to NOT go along with the majority opinion

If your statement above is the case, every civil jet aircraft Boeing has ever built is fatally flawed; Why would I say that ---- because the MCAS system is a stability aid, these in one form or another, have been on every aircraft since the B707. Yaw dampers are another example of a stability aid --- in early days pilots in bulk did not trust yaw dampers --- unless they could disconnect them, like early B707.

As a relevant example, the B707 had a auto mach trim to counter mach tuck, and it was a continuous source of niggles, and, Murphy's law being what it is, a mach trim runaway was almost always nose down.. It was distinguished from a main electric stab runaway by the speed of movement ---- quite slow, like the MCAS. Lightning reflexes, no, but don't muck around, either.

The fact remains, as was demonstrated by Lion Air Bali to Djakarta, an MCAS malfunction in the hands of an adequately trained crew (actioning the un-commanded stab trim checklist --- whatever its current B737 QRH name) does not/should not result in the loss of the aircraft.

By the Sullenberger yardstick, the Vickers VC-10 should never have been certified --- if you know something about its natural aerodynamic characteristics. Likewise probably the MD-11.

Tootle pip!!

PS: Lookleft, please let us know what experience/knowledge. you have on relevant aircraft.

[Dora-9]

PS: Lookleft, please let us know what experience/knowledge. you have on relevant aircraft.

Yes, I'm wondering the same thing after this line:

I have flown a 737 in full manual reversion and it was a non-even

Anyone with any time on the B737 will know that the expression "full manual reversion" refers to flying the thing without any hydraulics to the flight controls, which has NOTHING to do with the pitch trim. Having instructed on this sequence both in the sim and the aeroplane, and had it actually happen to me requiring a lurching return, I can assure you that it's not a mere "non event", as he claims. But maybe he's an ace - I'm certainly not.

[Lookleft]

Dora-9 it was a post maintenance flight and yes we were flying without the benefit of hydraulics to the controls. In no way am I claiming to be an ace but LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefore his knowledge of the 737 (and Airbus apparently) is absolute although he has never flown either and he still does not understand what MCAS does. He also doesn't seem to understand the difference between aerodynamic difficulties worked through on prototypes and pre-production aircraft that are subsequently certified and documented by the authorities and the MCAS system that was installed on an existing design with minimal oversight and deliberate obfuscation by Boeing. Boeing even went so far as to make a warning light that told the crew MCAS was operating an optional extra! I'm sure Sully is keen to chat to LS so that he can glean some crumbs of aviation knowledge that might fall from LS rather bloated table.

[krismiler]

there have been several incidences of MCAS activation

The MCAS is supposed to activate and lower the nose if the pitch becomes excessive, it's hardly headline news when a system like this does what it's supposed to do. If the stall warning activates then it's notifiable and an investigation will be undertaken to determine how the aircraft got onto that situation in the first place.

The pilots couldn't be expected to report on the activation of something that they didn't know was installed in the first place. Flight data monitoring may have picked it up similar to how it would record an unstable approach or a limit being exceeded.

Did he mean to say that there had been previous incidents where the MCAS had malfunctioned in a similar way to the two disasters but the pilots had managed to prevent an accident ?

[das Uber Soldat]

Lookleft,If your statement above is the case, every civil jet aircraft Boeing has ever built is fatally flawed; Why would I say that ---- because the MCAS system is a stability aid, these in one form or another, have been on every aircraft since the B707. Yaw dampers are another example of a stability aid --- in early days pilots in bulk did not trust yaw dampers --- unless they could disconnect them, like early B707.
False equivalence. Did any of these preceding Boeing aircraft suffer a series of fatal accidents in a very short space of time due to the failure of these 'stability aids'? Stability aids is a broad term that does not make the various forms contained within that umbrella equitable.

The fact remains, as was demonstrated by Lion Air Bali to Djakarta, an MCAS malfunction in the hands of an adequately trained crew (actioning the un-commanded stab trim checklist --- whatever its current B737 QRH name) does not/should not result in the loss of the aircraft.
"Does not?" I know of 346 people who would probably disagree with that statement if they were able. Regulators worldwide also appear to share this view, which is why the max is currently located in the only safe operating environment that exists for it.

By the Sullenberger yardstick, the Vickers VC-10 should never have been certified --- if you know something about its natural aerodynamic characteristics. Likewise probably the MD-11.
So because aircraft with potentially fatal handling characteristics were certified 50 years ago or more, then we should simply accept this in the modern era and sign off on the same now? Do you not remember that after a series of identical accidents during landing that the software for the flight control system was modified by Boeing? I thought we were trying to improve air safety over time, not use the template of past failure to ensure we repeat it.


Personally I think it smacks of arrogance to dismiss as negligent the efforts of these crew as who died fighting an aircraft actively trying to murder them. That an excellent crew in the past saved a similar situation does not obviate the aircraft of blame in this incident, lest you also believe that Sullys successful handling of a double engine failure at 3000 in the middle of a dense city means all future crew who fail to deliver the same result should be considered incompetent.

These crew did not suffer a simple MCAS failure in isolation. They had to deal with all manner of unreliable speed indications, a non stop stick shaker and the fact MCAS is masked within these failures, and does not behave like a 'vanilla' stab trim runaway. Not to mention of course they were never told about MCAS, trained on its failure modes or had an opportunity to witness this failure, one that was clearly inevitable given the stupidity of Boeing's design to include a single data input. Further, given the speed at which it operates (with everything else going on), you can disconnect the trim switches and no longer have that spurious input, yet in a very short space of time it wont make a difference as the forces required to rectify the out of trim situation are too significant to overcome anyway, as the Ethiopian crew found out.

Boeing needs to build a plane that can be safely operated by all crew, not just the Ace of the Base such as yourself.

[LeadSled]

Dora-9 it was a post maintenance flight and yes we were flying without the benefit of hydraulics to the controls. In no way am I claiming to be an ace but LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefore his knowledge of the 737 (and Airbus apparently) is absolute although he has never flown either and he still does not understand what MCAS does. He also doesn't seem to understand the difference between aerodynamic difficulties worked through on prototypes and pre-production aircraft that are subsequently certified and documented by the authorities and the MCAS system that was installed on an existing design with minimal oversight and deliberate obfuscation by Boeing. Boeing even went so far as to make a warning light that told the crew MCAS was operating an optional extra! I'm sure Sully is keen to chat to LS so that he can glean some crumbs of aviation knowledge that might fall from LS rather bloated table.
Lookleft,
With your superior knowledge of the B737 ( as opposed to other Boeing aircraft) could you please explain to me how the MCAS keeps the stab running, if the two stab trim cutout switches have cut all power to the stab motors --- you have me really intrigued.

It is true I have never been endorsed on the B737, but I have a representative sample of Boeing products, and the basic design philosophy of the stab trim system has a family history dating back to the B-47.. I have also spent some years involved in technical development of Level D/D+ simulators, but that was all B737NG, not Max, so I am not unfamiliar with the B737 in general.

As for Captain Sullenberger, he did a magnificent job in ditching in the Hudson, placed in a near impossible situation, but nobody is perfect, he and his mate missed the ditching switch (whatever Airbus call it) , but that great effort and outcome does not make him an instant expert on all things aviation. Although the demands of the speaker circuit push him that way. It certainly does not make him an expert on certification of Boeing aircraft.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but having had a bit of experience internally with Boeing airworthiness people, I am certain they thought the way the aerodynamic characteristic that MCAs was directed at solving was a reasonable engineering solution at the time.

Tootle pip!!

PS:1 "----- LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefor ------" You really are a twit --- are you suggesting that a normal response to a Non-Normal procedure is somehow to be criticised, because it hasn't happened to you. Given you aeronautical wisdom, suggest what we should have done, to avoid being classified as aces --- which traditionally means 5 or more combat victories. Perhaps you see dueling opinions on Pprune as some sort of moral (as opposed to mortal) combat.

PS2: If the B707 was to be certified today, it would need something like the MCAS, to prevent the pitch UP in the stall on Flap 50. "Back in the day", we coped.

[LeadSled]

The MCAS is supposed to activate and lower the nose if the pitch becomes excessive, it's hardly headline news when a system like this does what it's supposed to do. If the stall warning activates then it's notifiable and an investigation will be undertaken to determine how the aircraft got onto that situation in the first place.

The pilots couldn't be expected to report on the activation of something that they didn't know was installed in the first place. Flight data monitoring may have picked it up similar to how it would record an unstable approach or a limit being exceeded.

Did he mean to say that there had been previous incidents where the MCAS had malfunctioned in a similar way to the two disasters but the pilots had managed to prevent an accident ?
krismiler,
You have got it right.
The reports in AW&ST (in the bodies of technical articles, not headline news) were in the context of occurrences that were logged for maintenance to look at, but were only realised to be possibly MCAS related in retrospect.
They have come to light during the MAX investigation.
Tootle pip!!

[MemberBerry]

as a relevant example, the b707 had a auto mach trim to counter mach tuck, and it was a continuous source of niggles, and, murphy's law being what it is, a mach trim runaway was almost always nose down.. it was distinguished from a main electric stab runaway by the speed of movement ---- quite slow, like the mcas.
MCAS actually runs 50% faster than the main electric trim. Are you sure that you and the journalist you don't always agree with are not the same person? You seem to have a similar tendency of inventing random facts.

[Global Aviator]

Ahhhh the Sully factor... Remember the experts recreating the scenario and making it to the airport... until what the fark factor introduced.

No matter what anyone says on here, there but for the grace of god. I would hate to be in the position of the fatal Max crews. The airplane trying to kill you, screaming at you, shaking at you, no matter what you do it may fix for a second then all hell breaks loose again.

I am now trying to find the actual piece on the Boeing test flight where the test pilots knowing what was to come took 8000’ to get out of Max ****e!!!

Oh never flown a Boeing.

Ps As I’ve stated many times, how many times has anyone here done ****e in the sim due to over zealous instructors putting in un flyable scenarios??? If it ain’t gunna fly it ain’t gunna fly!

[Lookleft]

krismiler,
You have got it right.
The reports in AW&ST (in the bodies of technical articles, not headline news) were in the context of occurrences that were logged for maintenance to look at, but were only realised to be MCAS related in retrospect.
They have come to light during the MAX investigation.

krismiler was referring to your assertion LS that pilots in the US experienced the same conditions as Lion Air and Ethiopian, Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta.

thats what he meant by this: Did he mean to say that there had been previous incidents where the MCAS had malfunctioned in a similar way to the two disasters but the pilots had managed to prevent an accident ?

You cant even keep up with your own gibberish. For your benefit though I have included a good web article that might help you understand MCAS better and why it is so different to any of the irrelevant examples that you have cited. Of particular note is the number of warnings a crew would face in the event of an AoA failure and the activation of MCAS.

737 MAX - MCAS (http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm)

[gchriste]

How is it that every single thread in the Australian forums ends up in a slanging match from the same usual suspects. :ugh:

[ZFT]

Lookleft,
With your superior knowledge of the B737 ( as opposed to other Boeing aircraft) could you please explain to me how the MCAS keeps the stab running, if the two stab trim cutout switches have cut all power to the stab motors --- you have me really intrigued.

It is true I have never been endorsed on the B737, but I have a representative sample of Boeing products, and the basic design philosophy of the stab trim system has a family history dating back to the B-47.. I have also spent some years involved in technical development of Level D/D+ simulators, but that was all B737NG, not Max, so I am not unfamiliar with the B737 in general.

As for Captain Sullenberger, he did a magnificent job in ditching in the Hudson, placed in a near impossible situation, but nobody is perfect, he and his mate missed the ditching switch (whatever Airbus call it) , but that great effort and outcome does not make him an instant expert on all things aviation. Although the demands of the speaker circuit push him that way. It certainly does not make him an expert on certification of Boeing aircraft.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but having had a bit of experience internally with Boeing airworthiness people, I am certain they thought the way the aerodynamic characteristic that MCAs was directed at solving was a reasonable engineering solution at the time.

Tootle pip!!

PS:1 "----- LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefor ------" You really are a twit --- are you suggesting that a normal response to a Non-Normal procedure is somehow to be criticised, because it hasn't happened to you. Given you aeronautical wisdom, suggest what we should have done, to avoid being classified as aces --- which traditionally means 5 or more combat victories. Perhaps you see dueling opinions on Pprune as some sort of moral (as opposed to mortal) combat.

PS2: If the B707 was to be certified today, it would need something like the MCAS, to prevent the pitch UP in the stall on Flap 50. "Back in the day", we coped.

leadSled

Pardon my ignorance. What is a B737NG D+ simulator?

Thanks

[Lookleft]

How is it that every single thread in the Australian forums ends up in a slanging match from the same usual suspects.

Because one of the usual subjects is an arrogant puffed up Colonel Blimp who thinks that everyone should bow before his knowledge and experience and the other one is just pointing that out. You decide which one is which.

[George Glass]

Lookleft, It would help if posters had at least some idea of what they were talking about. But that’s the internet isnt it?

[George Glass]

In complete contact is the thread on this site regarding B737 picklefork failures. Lots of hugely qualified people in serious discussion. This thread? Not so much.

[Stickshift3000]

Lots of hugely qualified people in serious discussion. This thread? Not so much.

Hardly surprising given the few Aussies that have flown the Max.

[Fly Aiprt]

In complete contact is the thread on this site regarding B737 picklefork failures. Lots of hugely qualified people in serious discussion. This thread? Not so much.

Quite normal, considering the subject of the thread : discussion about some controversial articles by some 'aviation expert' journalist in Australia.

[cessnapete]

Personally I think it smacks of arrogance to dismiss as negligent the efforts of these crew as who died fighting an aircraft actively trying to murder them. That an excellent crew in the past saved a similar situation does not obviate the aircraft of blame in this incident, lest you also believe that Sullys successful handling of a double engine failure at 3000 in the middle of a dense city means all future crew who fail to deliver the same result should be considered incompetent.

These crew did not suffer a simple MCAS failure in isolation. They had to deal with all manner of unreliable speed indications, a non stop stick shaker and the fact MCAS is masked within these failures, and does not behave like a 'vanilla' stab trim runaway. Not to mention of course they were never told about MCAS, trained on its failure modes or had an opportunity to witness this failure, one that was clearly inevitable given the stupidity of Boeing's design to include a single data input. Further, given the speed at which it operates (with everything else going on), you can disconnect the trim switches and no longer have that spurious input, yet in a very short space of time it wont make a difference as the forces required to rectify the out of trim situation are too significant to overcome anyway, as the Ethiopian crew found out.

Boeing needs to build a plane that can be safely operated by all crew, not just the Ace of the Base such as yourself.

The speed at which the crew were unable to retire the aircraft in the ET accident.?
Probably didn't help that the crew in the ET accident missed the basic action of reducing from TOGA power after takeoff.
Take off power remained set the whole of the short flight until hitting the ground. Basic Airmanship missing in their training somewhere.

[Fly Aiprt]

missed the basic action of reducing from TOGA power after takeoff.
Take off power remained set the whole of the short flight until hitting the ground. Basic Airmanship missing in their training somewhere.

Basic airmanship : what does an aircraft do when you reduce power ?

[Bend alot]

Basic airmanship : what does an aircraft do when you reduce power ?


Or a more simple question - what do you do if controls are not working (correctly) and you want to descend?

A) Advance the power lever
B) Retard the power lever
C) Invert the aircraft

Basic airman-ship only question.

Now if you wish to not descend what would/should you do?

[das Uber Soldat]

The speed at which the crew were unable to retire the aircraft in the ET accident.?
Probably didn't help that the crew in the ET accident missed the basic action of reducing from TOGA power after takeoff.
Take off power remained set the whole of the short flight until hitting the ground. Basic Airmanship missing in their training somewhere.
No doubt TOGA sealed their fate. And yes, I'm sure in time we'll identify a number of failures by the crew.

What drove me to post however is a fundamental disagreement with LS' position. He seems almost proud of the fatal handling characteristics of past aircraft, and dismisses potential pitfalls in the Max as nothing more than triviality for a 'skillful' crew. It reads almost like a pissing competition.

"Back in the day", we coped."

That entire attitude belongs in the sea in my books. As I said originally, Boeing has a responsibility to build an aircraft that is safe to operate for all crew, not just the pprune test pilot network. We're not all rockstars, I know i'm not. And while I would hope that given the situation these 2 crews faced, that I could safely resolve it, I'm reticent to sit here and monday morning quarterback them to the point where I dismiss the role Boeings design failures played and instead heap all blame on the crew, labeling them nothing but incompetent.

[George Glass]

I suppose its futile at this stage to reiterate for the umpteenth time...
Airspeed Disagree Non Normal Checklist
Autopilot.......Disengage
Autothrottle......Disengage

TOGA didn’t seal anybody’s fate

Know your aircraft

Fly your aircraft

Thats what you are paid the big dollars for

Its not that f@#king difficult

[Fly Aiprt]

Know your aircraft

Fly your aircraft

Thats what you are paid the big dollars for

Its not that f@#king difficult

It seems that American test pilots and many CAAs' worldwide feel differently.

[Lookleft]

Know your aircraft

That really is the problem George, it is difficult to know your aircraft when the manufacturer doesn't even disclose what they have put into the aircraft. I'm sure if the Lion Air crew and the Ethiopian crew were given simulator training on what MCAS was all about they probably would have flown out of the problem. The fact is no MAX crew were given that level of training as Boeing had convinced the FAA that extra sim training was not required. Two fatal accidents, similar crew response same aircraft type. Explain to us all why the MAX has been grounded for so long if the accidents were caused simply by the mishandling of some B team pilots?

Lookleft, It would help if posters had at least some idea of what they were talking about. But that’s the internet isnt it?

​​​​​​​Couldn't agree with you more George

[George Glass]

Ok, we are going round and round.
As a 20,000 hour airline Pilot I will put my last, my very last, 2 cents worth in on this topic.
Every B737 Pilot worth his or her salary thinks they would have done better in both of this crash scenarios.
We can go round and round as much as you like but after many, many years of simulator exercises with Unusual Attitudes , Airspeed Disagree etc. etc. I am convinced that 98% plus of properly trained mainline crew with major legacy carriers would NOT have managed these events ending in a hole in the ground. Whatever the finding of the enquire into MCAS it will not be the end. The expansion of third world low cost carriers is a huge training and standards issue and isn’t going away. Just wait for the next shoe to drop.

[das Uber Soldat]

I suppose its futile at this stage to reiterate for the umpteenth time...
Airspeed Disagree Non Normal Checklist
Autopilot.......Disengage
Autothrottle......Disengage

TOGA didn’t seal anybody’s fate

Know your aircraft

Fly your aircraft

Thats what you are paid the big dollars for

Its not that f@#king difficult
The pprune test pilot alliance are out in full force tonight!

I'm interested as to how the ET crew remaining in TOGA didn't seal their fate. Given that their airspeed was in the ballpark of 380 kts during their ordeal, a speed such that manual trimming was impossible resulting in them reactivating the trim cutout switches as a last resort, love to hear your enlightened thoughts.

[George Glass]

das, are you actually a Pilot? It’s pretty tedious arguing with people who clearly clueless but are chock full of ego.
What is your experience?
Why do do you feel the need to comment?
Where does your grievance come from?
TOGA is an autothrottle mode.
D I S C O N N E C T the autothrottle.
Its what the recall items say.
What is it about that that you don’t understand?

[das Uber Soldat]

das, are you actually a Pilot? Yes
It’s pretty tedious arguing with people who clearly clueless but are chock full of ego.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Irony is dead.

What is your experience?
20 years.

Why do do you feel the need to comment?
I don't like self proclaimed 'aviation gods'. You're free to your opinion, its as worthless as mine, but the manner in which you go about asserting it, despite the fact its at odds with every regulatory agency on the face of the planet irks me. You don't get to just write this off as 'brown people can't fly planes'.

Where does your grievance come from?
Refer above

TOGA is an autothrottle mode.
D I S C O N N E C T the autothrottle.
Its what the recall items say.
What is it about that that you don’t understand?
The ET crew didn't disconnect the AT. As a result, it stayed in TOGA. TOGA make plane go fast!.... Which is what sealed their fate, precisely as I said.
"What is it about that that you don’t understand?"


I did enjoy the ad hominem though. Thanks for playing.

[The name is Porter]

George, das has form, wait til the big words come out!

who died fighting an aircraft actively trying to murder them.

The peurile comment posted above should give you the headsup you require.

He does have 3 or 400 hours as an FO on an airbus afterall, show some respect.

[The name is Porter]

ad hominem

Whuurp, it's started, first come the medium big words.

Oh, and George, watch out, he'll find out your identity and post it online for all to see.

[das Uber Soldat]

edit. Removing post to attempt to get thread back on track.

[The name is Porter]

The 20 years 'experience' he mentions is in a C172 outa Bankstown, mis-representing himself to be an experienced RPT pilot.

[The name is Porter]

I suppose the irony of accusing me of being puerile, whilst you engage in precisely that behavior by following me all over the forum like a faithful little lapdog is lost on you. No matter.

Don't flatter yourself, I happened to be reading fairly informed comment on this thread, not contributing, as you'd noticed (because I'm not experienced in the subject matter) and then guess who popped up? calling all and sundry idiots?

I haven't received a breathless PM threatening me with legal action in a few days though, getting a bit behind schedule aren't we?

Mate, give me an excuse. See how your employer would enjoy having one of their most inexperienced right seat warmers exposed for calling experienced aviators idiots etc.

murder............what a moronic statement. Boeing will find you hiding behind your $3.75 a month firewall mate.

[JPJP]

I'm interested as to how the ET crew remaining in TOGA didn't seal their fate.

I think the issue you’re having is this; you’re using terminology that you don’t understand. Amusing, given the lashing you’ve attempted to deal out.

The MAX had its flaps retracted. TOGA is a mode. A mode that had nothing to do with the aircrafts state at the time. Nor it’s mode. Nothing.

The power setting was CLIMB. The vertical FMA was VNAV SPD, or less likely MCP SPD. The autrothrottle FMA was N1. If it was in TOGA, it would say so in big letters.

That’s why every time you repeat ‘TOGA’, it sounds like you don’t know what you’re talking about. Here’s a picture to help you. Enjoy.


https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x948/dd2d6ef6_dec8_4a83_9698_b150c5e991d9_b18f0873551122481c6bd42 51d44561ccbbf593b.jpeg

MAX FMA Takeoff profile.

[j3pipercub]

Mr Macintosh,

This is a thread for transport jet pilots discussing transport jet issues.

This is not a thread for you to attempt to settle scores from a previous thread.

This is also not a 'I misplaced my RV-10 at Bacchus Marsh, had anyone seen it?' thread.

Please go away.

j3

[j3pipercub]

So JPJP, I am pretty sure the crew did not disconnect the A/T in the ET accident? They left it auto? Anyone who has flown a 73 knows that almost all the memory items consist of either disconnecting AP and AT or the opposite. So why didn't they?

[TURIN]

PS2: If the B707 was to be certified today, it would need something like the MCAS, to prevent the pitch UP in the stall on Flap 50. "Back in the day", we coped.

Back in the day, I don't think the 707 was designed to have the same handling characteristics as the aircraft it replaced. You coped because you knew the aircraft would handle in a certain way and trained for it.

The problem with the MAX is Southwest's insistance that the aircraft be 'similar' to the 737 NG. So similar in fact that minimal training was required on type.
Perhaps the best solution is to remove the MCAS completely and just accept that the MAX has different handling characteristics to the NG. Southwest won't be happy though.

[JPJP]

So JPJP, I am pretty sure the crew did not disconnect the A/T in the ET accident? They left it auto? Anyone who has flown a 73 knows that almost all the memory items consist of either disconnecting AP and AT or the opposite. So why didn't they?

I don’t know if they left the A/T on. I suspect you’re correct. You’re also correct that the UAS and STR items all call for both to be off.

As to the ‘why ?’ The NTSB will give us the best answer. My guess is task saturation and loss of situational awareness. The PF had an ASI reading that was wildly incorrect, a stick shaker and a clacker going off (stall and over speed). Incorrect altitude, etc. Without a cross check he may not have an awareness of his speed. As we know; they had two separate and serious conditions with multiple alerts.

The irony is this; if the PF has asked for ‘Flap 1’ and said “your airplane”. It would have been over - No more MCAS event. The right side of the cockpit was operating normally and they would have had full access to trim. I’m not advocating this as a solution, or a procedure. However, it does starkly emphasize the difference between a secret system, with no training or understanding versus an understood system. And hindsight being 20/20.

[das Uber Soldat]

I think the issue you’re having is this; you’re using terminology that you don’t understand. Amusing, given the lashing you’ve attempted to deal out

Fair point, I'm shoehorning Airbus terminology where it doesn't belong. Correct the term, my point remains the same.

[Sunfish]

I’m not qualified technically to discuss MCAS or cockpit procedures but I strongly object to the “badly trained brown skinned pilot” excuse shamefully advanced by Boeing’s friends in the New York Times and elsewhere.

My objection is based on the reverse of the “badly trained browns” theory. If anything, third world people (except the Vietnamese) accept the idea subliminally that Western (American) technology and training is superior to their own skills and as a result, trusted Boeing and the training system, manuals, etc. far more than westerners do. I suggest that as a result, the pilots in both Indonesia and Ethiopia are starting to try to resolve the problem from behind the eight ball in that the thought of a rogue system would have been furthest from their minds.

To put that another way, they did not perhaps have the healthy skepticism of automation that they should have - for cultural as well as political and marketing reasons. I believe one crew were still looking in the manual for a solution when they crashed. Their trust in Boeing was pathetic.

[LeadSled]

I’m not qualified technically to discuss MCAS or cockpit procedures but I strongly object to the “badly trained brown skinned pilot” excuse shamefully advanced by Boeing’s friends in the New York Times and elsewhere.

My objection is based on the reverse of the “badly trained browns” theory. If anything, third world people (except the Vietnamese) accept the idea subliminally that Western (American) technology and training is superior to their own skills and as a result, trusted Boeing and the training system, manuals, etc. far more than westerners do. I suggest that as a result, the pilots in both Indonesia and Ethiopia are starting to try to resolve the problem from behind the eight ball in that the thought of a rogue system would have been furthest from their minds.

To put that another way, they did not perhaps have the healthy skepticism of automation that they should have - for cultural as well as political and marketing reasons. I believe one crew were still looking in the manual for a solution when they crashed. Their trust in Boeing was pathetic.


Sunfish,
In a previous post, somebody made the point that many of us are criticising the training of current pilots, and the very positive discouragement of any hand flying, and the results. Not making "racial" criticisms.

Ethiopian, in particular, has long had a reputation for very high standards of both operations and maintenance, as their long term record shows ---- but in recent years they have had loss of control accidents that many of us suggest would have been far less likely in the G.O.Ds when every pilot did lots of hand flying.

Indonesia has all the usual problems, plus some individual local problems, that have been publicly acknowledged by the local aviation authority

"Lack (or loss) of piloting skills" (aka hand flying) has long been in the top three of FAA's concerns.

Tootle pip!!

PS: These concerns are not "old codgers" pining the good old days, they are well found concerns, based not only on the headline accident record, but the far more extensive incident record, most of which is not public.

[AerocatS2A]

Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta.
I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do.
Tootle pip!!
It would be nice if you could quote those articles. The only mentions I've seen in the past were to issues that were clearly not MCAS due to the fact they were occurring with A/P engaged. They were bought up by journalists breathlessly trying to connect dots that shouldn't be connected.

[Lookleft]

Sunfish the problem with the 737 MAX is that no pilots, Western or otherwise, were told about the MCAS system. The 737 is not a FBW aircraft. It has traditional control cables connecting the control columns and rudder pedals to the flight controls with hydraulic systems to assist. The MCAS is a digital solution with connections to the stab to counter an aerodynamic issue. So the idea that they trusted the Boeing manuals and training system more than Western pilots is wrong as even the Western pilots would have been overwhelmed by all the warnings and noises activating if they had encountered an MCAS responding to false information from a single damaged AofA vane. Boeing did not want pilots , airlines or the FAA to know about MCAS as it would have required additional sim training as a minimum and re certification as the WCS. If you want an example of how Western pilots from a legacy carrier have coped with conflicting systems warnings which resulted in a hull loss then check out all the discussion on AF447. To head off any idea that it was all an Airbus problem also checkout the EK777 hull loss in Dubai.

[MickG0105]

Megan,Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, ...

Having had some time to work through your claim I can now say pretty much unequivocally that your recollection is most assuredly mistaken.

First, I systematically worked through every Aviation Week and Space Technology article on the B737 MAX MCAS saga. None of them mentioned a US crew ever having dealt with an erroneous MCAS activation, much less having dealt with same by running the Boeing recommended Runaway Stabilizer NNC.

In order to validate my review I contacted the editorial staff at Aviation Week and Space Technology and I was placed in touch with the MAX coverage leader at the magazine. He stated in unequivocal fashion,

'I can tell you with certainty that I have no knowledge of any other erroneous MCAS activation in line operations anywhere in the world besides the two fatal accident sequences, and certainly have not written about one.'

I also contacted lead writers from a number of other US publications to see if they were aware of any reporting of any US crews having dealt with any erroneous MCAS activations. The response was uniformly negative. A typical response was as follows,

'The author is mistaken. There have been no activations of MCAS except on Lion Air (both on the flight before the crash flight and the crash flight) and on Ethiopian Airlines.'

I suggest (once again) that you are confusing reporting of one US MAX crew that had experienced an unusual nose down movement during the climb out and another that had experienced a climb performance degradation during the climb out. Neither of those incidents was MCAS-related; the former occurred with the autopilot engaged and the latter was an autothrottle issue. In neither case was any NNC actioned.

[Lookleft]

Nice work Mick!.Looks like Leadsled might have Tootled his Pip with that assertion!

[LeadSled]

leadSled

Pardon my ignorance. What is a B737NG D+ simulator?

Thanks
ZFT,
The + is an FAA Level D with a few added enhancements, as I recall, live ATC is one. Hence known in the trade as D+.
See also ICAO Level 7.
Tootle pip!!

PS: MickGo105,
Looks like you have made Lookleft's day.
I thought what I had made clear was references in the body of articles to occurrences that, in retrospect, could have been MCAS activations. I assume that those have now been determined to not be MCAS related. What AW&ST has now stated in not really in conflict with what I have said.
One poster says that the MCAS runs the stab at twice the rate of the main electric activation ----- or the autopilot rate ----- is this really correct.

[ZFT]

ZFT,
The + is a FAA Level D with a few added enhancements, as I recall, live ATC is one.
See also ICAO Level 7.
Tootle pip!!

There is nothing in FAA part 60, EASA CS FSTD (A) or any other NAA regs that I can find which describes a level D+ qualification, hence my query. ICAO level 7 did indeed add a more immersive ATC environment but the technology isn't quite there yet

[LeadSled]

There is nothing in FAA part 60, EASA CS FSTD (A) or any other NAA regs that I can find which describes a level D+ qualification, hence my query. ICAO level 7 did indeed add a more immersive ATC environment but the technology isn't quite there yet
ZFT,
Quite correct, but it is common (informal) terminology, has been for quite a while, probably close to ten years, takes the regulations a while to catch up.
Personally, I think it would be much easier if we all used the ICAO definitions, FAR 60 is lagging badly.
Tootle pip!!

[ZFT]

ZFT,
Quite correct, but it is common (informal) terminology, has been for quite a while, takes the regulations a while to catch up.
Personally, I think it would be much easier if we all used the ICAO definitions, FAR 60 is lagging badly.
Tootle pip!!

Noted and in total agreement. Thanks

[Bend alot]

So to keep on track!

The agreement is OR is not

Never has a MCAS (non testing) ever been had by a US operated 737 MAX crew - again NEVER happened .

Any that say it has happened need to supply a creditable source.

[MickG0105]

Looks like you have made Lookleft's day.

I'm not out to make anyone's day, I'm simply keen on ensuring any discussion that I'm involved in stays facts-based.


I thought what I had made clear was references in the body of articles to occurrences that, in retrospect, could have been MCAS activations. I assume that those have now been determined to not be MCAS related. What AW&ST has now stated in not really in conflict with what I have said.

Well, it is now quite difficult to know exactly what you made clear or what you said as it appears that some of your relevant posts have strangely now been deleted.

But you did say;
The reports in AW&ST (in the bodies of technical articles, not headline news) were in the context of occurrences that were logged for maintenance to look at, but were only realised to be MCAS related in retrospect.
The reporting of the two incidents that I referred to were very promptly shown at the time they were reported (not now) to be unrelated to MCAS - so, you're mistaken there.

And you also previously wrote;
Megan,Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist ...
The crews involved did not run the Runaway Stabilizer checklist, neither incident required an NNC, so you were most assuredly also mistaken on that count.


One poster says that the MCAS runs the stab at twice the rate of the main electric activation ----- or the autopilot rate ----- is this really correct.
Regarding MCAS trimming speed, Boeing gave it maximum authority so, even though it operates only flaps retracted, it trims at the maximum flaps extended trimming rate of 0.27 degrees per second (about 50% faster than the Main Electric Trim speed for flaps retraced) and it can run the trim all the way to the flaps extended Main Electric Trim limit of 0.05 units.

[LeadSled]

Well, it is now quite difficult to know exactly what you made clear or what you said as it appears that some of your relevant posts have strangely now been deleted.

MickGO105,
I have not deleted anything, so I can't quote my original post, either.

But the gist of what I said, my interpretation of what I read in AW&ST, was that, in retrospect, in US, there has been several cases of stab problems that were being considered as possible MCAS incidents, although they were written up originally as stab or autopilot malfunctions.

I certainly did not state, or intend to imply, that whichever ones the article was talking about, had been confirmed as MCAS incidents in US.

What I have said, all along, is that it is my view, that treating the malfunction as a runaway stab should allow the aircraft to be hand flown, as was the case Bali - Djakarta the night before the Lion Air loss. That seems to have been the Boeing assumption at the original certification, that no special training was required because of MCAS. Simply, an MCAS malfunction should not have caused the loss of the aircraft.

I am also quite certain that, in hindsight, Boeing would have not treated the certification of MCAS as they did, as a minor enhancement ---- but I also don't understand why this one system addition should require a whole separate type endorsement --- see various comments about the alleged South West influence.

And I certainly don't agree with the view of a "very very well known North American based former airline Captain" that the whole aircraft is fatally flawed.

Tootle pip!!

[MickG0105]

From Byron's article this week,

Last week I wrote, as told to me several weeks ago by US pilots, about several instances of supposed MCAS events and recovery from the nose-down pitching by experienced US pilots. It now appears the events were not MCAS-related, ...

​​Of course, it only now appears to Captain Bailey that said events weren't MCAS-related because he failed to do any fact-checking. It was apparent to any other informed observer that neither of the two US B737 MAX climb out events were MCAS-related way back at the time that they were first reported.

[Global Aviator]

BB wrong... again... At least he kinda admits it...

Now why is max still grounded?

Seriously even a non aviation person could understand the fact that there is a major problem if aircraft are being flown to long term storage!

[megan]

Last week I wrote, as told to me several weeks ago by US pilots, about several instances of supposed MCAS events and recovery from the nose-down pitching by experienced US pilots. It now appears the events were not MCAS-related, ... Nice to see the statement, I wrote the paper on the day of its issue pointing out the error. Good on Byron for owning up.

[The name is Porter]

Ahem...............

Sunfish:


Mr Macintosh,

This is a thread for transport jet pilots discussing transport jet issues.

Please go away.

j3

Can you please (and anybody else who is not a jet transport pilot) remove yourself from this thread. Show some respect for the jet transport pilots (j3 in particular) especially the right seat warmers from generation outrage. They are the one's saving the planet.

[The name is Porter]

Well, it is now quite difficult to know exactly what you made clear or what you said as it appears that some of your relevant posts have strangely now been deleted.

Some other posts have been deleted, generation outrage dish out hysterical accusations of murder but when called on it, march out the 'I'm a jet transport pilot' hero status.

[Bend alot]

Ahem...............

Sunfish:




Can you please (and anybody else who is not a jet transport pilot) remove yourself from this thread. Show some respect for the jet transport pilots (j3 in particular) especially the right seat warmers from generation outrage. They are the one's saving the planet.
Many solid technical posts in R&R on the MAX seem to be not pilots but even current or recent Boeing Engineering staff or "people in the know"

Best they be banned - Pilots have MCAS sorted and always have - the proof is in the reports.

[Sunfish]

I’m not qualified to discuss technical or operational issues, but I am qualified to deal with issues surrounding training of non western technical professionals like pilots.

I’ll say it again. The “stupid third world pilot” explanation for these accidents is both evil and untrue.

[The name is Porter]

Yes Bend alot, but you are not a 'jet transport pilot'

Engineers, managers and human factors specialists have no place discussing flight safety, so get over yourself.

[Lookleft]

And CRM is for weak minded individuals who can't make a decision. SOPs are for the slow of mind who dont know how to get the job done faster and better. Minimas are for the gutless who cant back themselves in a tight spot. Anyone who thinks differently needs to get onboard or get out of the way.

[hans brinker]

Lookleft,
Clearly, I am not afraid to NOT go along with the majority opinion

If your statement above is the case, every civil jet aircraft Boeing has ever built is fatally flawed; Why would I say that ---- because the MCAS system is a stability aid, these in one form or another, have been on every aircraft since the B707. Yaw dampers are another example of a stability aid --- in early days pilots in bulk did not trust yaw dampers --- unless they could disconnect them, like early B707.

As a relevant example, the B707 had a auto mach trim to counter mach tuck, and it was a continuous source of niggles, and, Murphy's law being what it is, a mach trim runaway was almost always nose down.. It was distinguished from a main electric stab runaway by the speed of movement ---- quite slow, like the MCAS. Lightning reflexes, no, but don't muck around, either.

The fact remains, as was demonstrated by Lion Air Bali to Djakarta, an MCAS malfunction in the hands of an adequately trained crew (actioning the un-commanded stab trim checklist --- whatever its current B737 QRH name) does not/should not result in the loss of the aircraft.

By the Sullenberger yardstick, the Vickers VC-10 should never have been certified --- if you know something about its natural aerodynamic characteristics. Likewise probably the MD-11.

Tootle pip!!

PS: Lookleft, please let us know what experience/knowledge. you have on relevant aircraft.

I would guess that if you tried to get any of those aircraft certified today, they wouldn't pass. B is wrong to try to re-certify a 60 year old design instead of starting from scratch. tootle your pip all you want, you could not be more wrong.

[LeadSled]

I would guess that if you tried to get any of those aircraft certified today, they wouldn't pass. B is wrong to try to re-certify a 60 year old design instead of starting from scratch. tootle your pip all you want, you could not be more wrong.
hans brinker,
As they were 60 years ago, that is certainly true, but, in my opinion, updated designs that meet the certification criteria at the time is valid.
The cost of a clean sheet design, versus a supplementary type certificate for an updated design, makes operational and commercial sense.
After all, a high proportion of changed/upgraded certification criteria are as a result of hard won experience.
In a comment specifically directed at the 737 MAX, in what has been said so far, and in interpretation of what happened, reading transcripts etc., I would suggest over-reach of current approaches to CRM and two pilot procedures, things have morphed to a stage where they can inhibit required rapid reaction where rapid reaction is required.
This is not to suggest some reversion to some supposed "good old days", but a suggestion that too much talking and not enough action, when action is required, is at the very least, a contributor.
Tootle pip!!

[Lookleft]

updated designs that meet the certification criteria at the time is valid.
The cost of a clean sheet design, versus a supplementary type certificate for an updated design, makes operational and commercial sense.

As it did to Boeing but it was the commercial imperative that overrode any operational sense.

The first is how the organisational culture of Boeing had changed over the years since it acquired McDonnell Douglas, a failing aerospace contractor, in 1997. Boeing’s organisational culture is now radically different from its old engineering-led ethos. It’s now run by a board that seems driven more by marketers than by engineers – which may explain why it pressed for the Max not be be treated as a new aircraft (requiring thorough – and expensive – re-certification by the FAA) but merely as a modification.
From one of the many articles written on the subject. It certainly was cheaper to revamp the 737 rather than start with a clean sheet of paper but at what cost?

[LeadSled]

Folks,
In my opinion, the M in MD was the undoing of Douglas, the M in MD had had an inordinate and unsatisfactory engineering influence since the takeover of MD by Boeing --- that from old friends who are long time Boeing people ----- even allowing for their bias, I think they are correct.
But, to be fair, long before the above, Boeing made some booboos, I won't try to list them, but just two examples ---- the horizontal stab deficiencies of the 320 series 707, versus the original -300s, and the rudder control package on many. B737.
The ADs are a long read.
Tootle pip!!

[Sunfish]

The difference between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas engineering was like chalk and cheese, even to a young engineer in 1977. McD were always full of themselves, Boeing were the reverse - good listeners.