Hawk XX204 Service Inquiry [Archive]

rlsbutler

11th Oct 2019, 02:13

What I do not understand is why R3 ever selected the flaps. If he meant to go round at 300 feet agl, he never needed to meet the “contract” requirement to select flaps down.

In deploying them, he washed all the speed margin he had. That left him at the bottom end of the recommended range of 170-150 Kts. That was made significant by the fact of his aircraft being so heavy.

A basic rule of glide approaches is to keep your speed up. What ever sort of landing you are destined for, you must harbour some energy with which to control the event. R3 seems, in effect if inadvertently, to have accepted the temptation to stretch his glide. Should he have trimmed nose down while he selected the flaps and did he forget ?

The SI sought to find human factors to explain his mistakes. They could still have wondered about the HF that is commonly called press-on-itis. If R3 felt he was rusty and had consciously set himself a difficult exercise, he really should have better prepared his escape plan – meaning he should have been ready to go around as soon as the exercise got difficult, rather than at the statutory 300 feet.

What the SI might have noticed is that, as he got to 300 feet, R3 had nearly met all the parameters of the “contract”, even as he lost control of his aircraft.

jungleismassive

11th Oct 2019, 06:55

rlsbutler,

What I do not understand is why R3 ever selected the flaps. If he meant to go round at 300 feet agl, he never needed to meet the “contract” requirement to select flaps down. He'd never have got around finals without them. As the report says.
In deploying them, he washed all the speed margin he had. That left him at the bottom end of the recommended range of 170-150 Kts. That was made significant by the fact of his aircraft being so heavy. That's why it's a range.
A basic rule of glide approaches is to keep your speed up. What ever sort of landing you are destined for, you must harbour some energy with which to control the event. R3 seems, in effect if inadvertently, to have accepted the temptation to stretch his glide. Should he have trimmed nose down while he selected the flaps and did he forget? The report is clear, he was at the very bottom end of the energy state required to complete the manoeuvre.
The SI sought to find human factors to explain his mistakes. They could still have wondered about the HF that is commonly called press-on-itis. If R3 felt he was rusty and had consciously set himself a difficult exercise, he really should have better prepared his escape plan – meaning he should have been ready to go around as soon as the exercise got difficult, rather than at the statutory 300 feet. It wasn't difficult. Report says so. And all service pilots are aware they can abandon approaches however dynamic in nature before the last contract/dh/stable gate/decision call. What the SI might have noticed is that, as he got to 300 feet, R3 had nearly met all the parameters of the “contract”, even as he lost control of his aircraft. He did indeed.

Please actually read the report before commenting incorrectly.

lsh

11th Oct 2019, 07:45

On the day of the accident, the first thing that struck me was:
Practise emergencies in the SIM, immediately afterwards practise an emergency in the real a/c early in the flight.
The use of emergency selections for gear / flap around the time of the ATC call ("distraction") might tend to confirm a capture of the wrong environment.
(Would those selections affect a go-around? eg Do those EMG selections now override normal selections?)
Clearly, there was overload and, as said above, an escape plan (simple gate?) would surely have helped.

lsh

longer ron

11th Oct 2019, 07:54

(Would those selections affect a go-around? eg Do those EMG selections now override normal selections?)
lsh

One would not be able to retract Gear or flaps after the 'blow downs' were operated by pulling the EMG (stby) handles.

Distant Voice

11th Oct 2019, 09:35

I have two questions relating to the death of Cpl Jonathan Bayliss.

Who authorised the carrying of passengers in the rear seat, when the command ejection system only operates from that position and is always selected OFF?

Who authorised the execution of 'live' emergency drills whilst carrying a passenger?

I my opinion, the risk associated with both conditions was not ALARP. Perhaps that will be brought out at the inquest when the ODH is called to give evidence iaw RA 1210.

DV

Timelord

11th Oct 2019, 09:50

Cpl Bayliss was Supernumary Crew, not a passenger. Rules for passengers are different.

Distant Voice

11th Oct 2019, 10:41

Cpl Bayliss was Supernumary Crew, not a passenger. Rules for passengers are different.

The carrying of the 'circus' in the back seat was a cheap way of getting 'crew chiefs' from 'A' to 'B'. In no way could Cpl Bayliss be regarded as Supernumerary Air Crew. You can call him what you want the questions remain the same.

DV

Distant Voice

11th Oct 2019, 11:11

Timelord. I note that RA 2340 list the aircrew categories and states,

"Supernumerary Crew. A Supernumerary Crewmember is an individual, military or civilian, who is employed on an Air System and authorized to carry out a specific duty (that does not require an Aircrew qualification) while in flight or ground taxiing. This specific duty is to have an active role in achieving the purpose of the authorized flight and may involve the operation of Air System equipment/systems or authorized Equipment Not Basic to the Air System (ENBAS)2 under the supervision of the Air System’s Aircrew."

I am sure that the coroner will determine if Cpl Bayliss had undergone the necessary training for the authorized flight.

DV

Timelord

11th Oct 2019, 12:10

SI 1-4-84 to 1-4-119 discusses this in depth and makes recommendations.

Capt Scribble

11th Oct 2019, 12:35

70deg AoB less than 600ft, through the centreline, 4000ft/min RoD, slow, throttle closed, Above Ave QFI. Must be our old friend Cognitive Impairment but not mentioned in nearly 150 pages.

Distant Voice

11th Oct 2019, 12:48

SI 1-4-84 to 1-4-119 discusses this in depth and makes recommendations.

Just been reading the same paragraphs. On the face of it appears that Cpl Bayliss had not completed his SC training and should be regarded as a passenger.

DV

oldengtech117

11th Oct 2019, 14:31

On hearing of this accident my first questions were exactly as Distant Voice.

Why would such a risky drill be carried out whilst carrying someone who was without doubt a passenger (even though categorised as SC) on only their second flight in a Hawk, and why if that was to be the case was the PIC not flying from the rear seat, where command eject could be selected?

During my time as an engineer on Hawks at Chivenor this would never have been allowed. It would appear that the carrying of engineers on board should only be authorised on transit flights and not on any that impose additional risk to ground personnel who, not being pilots themselves, will have little or no situational awareness for which they are not trained. I get the strong feeling on reading the SI that the rules for the carrying of engineers on RAFAT have been allowed to erode to such an extent that they are almost considered to be aircrew -but of course they are not.

Dominator2

11th Oct 2019, 16:48

longer ron

11th Oct 2019, 19:09

. Why would such a risky drill be carried out whilst carrying someone who was without doubt a passenger (even though categorised as SC) on only their second flight in a Hawk, and why if that was to be the case was the PIC not flying from the rear seat

That would not be possible in a Hawk T1 - passengers have to fly backseat for a couple of reasons.
I do agree though that an inexperienced pax should not be on board during turnbacks/efato etc.

Homelover

11th Oct 2019, 20:04

DV
You are quoting the current definition of Supernumerary Crew which was published on 30 Sept 19. But that was not the definition of Supernumerary crew on the day of the accident. I’m not sure whether it’s relevant to whatever point you are trying to make but I think it’s important to get your facts right.

Distant Voice

11th Oct 2019, 22:43

Supernumerary Crew.(Prior to 30th Sept 19) Supernumerary crew are not classified as passengers. A supernumerary crewmember is an individual, military or civilian, who is temporarily attached to an air system crew for the purpose of carrying out a specific duty not involved with flying/operating the air system, as authorized by the appropriate Aviation Duty Holder or AM(MF).

DV

M1key

12th Oct 2019, 02:24

Thank you to all the Mr Hindsights who could have done better and can’t believe this happened; it did.

There’s an obsession with the outcome instead of dealing with the “Gorilla in the room”....Distraction and Tiredness (the word Fatigue is incorrectly used in the Report). These are the things we need to mitigate.
This is simply about Risk Management and Good Decision-Making; however, the system is, and never will be, perfect as long as we have humans involved in it.
A sad loss of life.

falcon900

12th Oct 2019, 12:24

Another SI riddled with instances of non compliance with the services own regulations and procedures, some relevant to the incident, some not, but indicative of institutionalised lack of operational discipline.

The section regarding electronic authoriSations ( rather than the American authoriZations as used throughout the document) is frankly comical, with individuals able to use electronic copies of others' signatures to approve critical documentation. This, as does much in the report, illustrates a fundamental inability to understand what controls are for. The comments regarding the difficulties and delays in obtaining documentation from other parts of the RAF are more than a little concerning too.

The report goes to great pains to explain how the onset of the stall could well have been barely perceptible to the pilot without exploring what looks like being the unfortunate reality that he could not have escaped from the position he was in even if he hadn't stalled. The manoeuvre was botched from an early stage and should have been aborted long before it was. The background to why the pilot felt the need to press on as far as he did would be relevant, and I cant help thinking there might be some clues in the redacted comments. There seems to be something inferred regarding his sense of how he was perceived within The Arrows.
The Human Factors comments about fatigue from being overworked from, inter alia, collecting the packed lunches, tidying the kitchen, and making sure the IT works do not inspire confidence, or build credibility in a supposedly elite echelon of a 21st century air force.

c52

12th Oct 2019, 12:54

I am reminded of all the times when as a well-paid professional I was drafted in to pick up litter and so on. They saved paying for litter-pickers, but were paying me several times as much to do the job in an untrained manner. My time not spent on my professional job did not appear on the bottom line, but the money they saved from employing people to do less-skilled job did.

rlsbutler

12th Oct 2019, 13:46

Let us consider the para 1.4.201 HSTF analysis.What a difference it would make if the text was NOT “while landings were achieved on a few occasions” BUT “more than one landing was achieved” - and if the text was NOT “On almost every occasion the HSTF showed indications of stall” BUT “occasionally there were no indications of stall”.

The panel seems to regard the “contract” parameters as critical to their investigation. It is however clear that the “contract” is only incidental to the exercise that R3 was conducting. It should be appreciated that the “Contract” is for the instruction of students and for the guidance of experienced Hawk pilots.

The panel might have examined the possibility that the “contract” actually interfered with R3’s safe execution of the exercise. Have the simulations discussed in para 1.4.201 and the successful landings achieved been fully reported to, at least, the Red Arrows ?

The new rule of 1400ft at the final turn, deemed essential to meeting the “contract” terms, could not be met by R3 and might almost never be met by the Arrows. The Arrows presumably risk an EFATO on every launch and still brief for it, on the clear understanding that the “contract” cannot apply. I expect that even to land on the launch runway would still be briefed, if there was no alternative and since the simulations have shown it can be done.

jungleismassive

12th Oct 2019, 14:01

Let us consider the para 1.4.201 HSTF analysis.What a difference it would make if the text was not “while landings were achieved on a few occasions” but “more than one landing was achieved” and if the text was not “On almost every occasion the HSTF showed indications of stall” but “occasionally there were no indications of stall”.

The panel seems to regard the “contract” parameters as critical to their investigation. It is however clear that the “contract” is only incidental to the exercise that R3 was conducting. It should be appreciated that the “Contract” is for the instruction of students and for the guidance of experienced Hawk pilots. How many UK Hawk students have been taught PFLs or PEFATOs airborne in the last 15 years? Zero. The contract is critical. To the qualified Hawk pilots who fly it.
The panel might have examined the possibility that the “contract” actually interfered with R3’s safe execution of the exercise. Have the simulations discussed in para 1.4.201 and the successful landings achieved been fully reported to, at least, the Red Arrows ? You don't know enough to be dangerous.
The new rule of 1400ft at the final turn, deemed essential to meeting the “contract” terms, could not be met by R3 and might almost never be met by the Arrows. The Arrows presumably risk an EFATO on every launch and still brief for it, on the clear understanding that the “contract” cannot apply. I expect that even to land on the launch runway would still be briefed, if there was no alternative and since the simulations have shown it can be done.
Not a rule! There's no rules in the 3225H. It's guidance. As the report says! When you fly a single engine aircraft be it a C152, a Cirrus Jet, a Hawk or an F35 you risk an EFATO that will result in a generally downwards trend.

If you'd like to phrase your questions as questions I'd be more than inclined to answer or ignore them. Unfortunately you're making statements and those statements are incorrect.

H Peacock

12th Oct 2019, 15:28

There’s an obsession with the outcome instead of dealing with the “Gorilla in the room”....Distraction and Tiredness (the word Fatigue is incorrectly used in the Report). These are the things we need to mitigate.
This is simply about Risk Management and Good Decision-Making; however, the system is, and never will be, perfect as long as we have humans involved in it.

So are you saying R3 should not have been in the cockpit that day flying a PEFATO? Was he too tired/distracted to complete the task safely?

LOMCEVAK

12th Oct 2019, 16:05

A very long and detailed report, however, no mention that had the Hawk been retro fitted with an AoA system there would not need to be discussion about IAS, g, weight and configuration. Would be far safer and more relevant to the aircraft of today. I do accept that it would give the QFIs far less to talk about

I totally agree with the findings concerning the Command Eject system. Fundamentally flawed to cater for all different front/rear seat combinations. BAEs was naive to say the least and should have learnt from other 2 seat fast jets.

D2, I am afraid that I have to disagree with your first point. Whilst AOA indications could/should have given cues to avoid stalling, the height loss during the go-around is strongly a function of IAS, bank angle, weight and configuration (ie. rate of descent, angle to roll through and pitch attitude change). Therefore, they are all very relevant.

On your second point regarding command ejection systems, when the Hawk T1 entered service (1977), none of the other RAF/RN ejection seat equipped two-seat aircraft had a command ejection system (Phantom, Buccaneer, Jaguar T2, Harrier T4, Lightning, Hunter, Jet Provost). Therefore, British Aerospace (as it was then) were not naïve but were taking a positive step forwards with what they installed, and it was to satisfy the required mission of the aircraft. The fact that better systems now exist and the Hawk T1 has not been modified is not down to the OEM per se but to customers not requesting a modification.

There are two items that were not discussed in the report that I felt should have been. First, the 150 KIAS minimum speed during PFLs. I consider this to be only applicable once you are wings level on the runway centreline and is dictated by the minimum speed at which you can commence the first stage flare without the risk of stalling. I have always practiced and taught that the gear down glide speed of 170/165 KIAS was a minimum as well as a target until rolled out wings level. The Aircrew Manual is not clear on this point and I believe clarification is needed on this. I cannot recall whether this was taught to me formally when I started flying the Hawk in 1978, whether it was just 'sage advice' or whether I worked it out for myself but I do apply this rigidly. Secondly, one aspect that was not considered when analysing what R3 did with the stick during the finals turn is the strong nose up trim change that occurs when the flaps are lowered. This would have occurred at a high bank angle when a significant aft stick force would be required prior to flap selection. When the flaps were lowered a push force would then have been required to maintain the g/turn rate, and applying nose down trim*would have been the normal response when flaps are lowered wings level but would probably have seemed counter-intuitive when turning. This would have resulted in further workload and distraction and a degradation in flight path control. This may not have been a significant contributory factor but I would have expected it to be discussed.

H Peacock

12th Oct 2019, 16:46

Or, stop doing PEFETOs and just mandate a height/speed criteria below which one flies straight ahead only and above which low key is a certainty?

Surely not! We keep 'dumbing down' every time we have an accident. I'm not convinced that R3 ever had the energy to effectively complete his heavyweight glide cct. Ironic that R3 clearly had ample energy to complete a traditional Turnback (i.e. jink left then reverse right) onto the reciprocal rwy 13, or simply a teardrop to the right onto rwy 01. I'm guessing the practice of these was progressively banned following accidents. I'm sure that when I was a stude a Valley in the 80s we would practice these, although briefed to eject rather than attempt them when solo.

Dominator2

12th Oct 2019, 17:18

LOMCEVAK
I am afraid that I have to disagree with your first point. Whilst AOA indications could/should have given cues to avoid stalling, the height loss during the go-around is strongly a function of IAS, bank angle, weight and configuration (ie. rate of descent, angle to roll through and pitch attitude change). Therefore, they are all very relevant.

On your second point regarding command ejection systems, when the Hawk T1 entered service (1977), none of the other RAF/RN ejection seat equipped two-seat aircraft had a command ejection system (Phantom, Buccaneer, Jaguar T2, Harrier T4, Lightning, Hunter, Jet Provost).

My point about displayed AoA is that if used correctly on finals one should never get into the position R3 found himself. Yes, I agree there were many other "gates" and clues that were ignored that fateful day. Obviously height loss in a banked go-around at high weights can be significantly increased. In my day the first time that this was taught was at TWU for A/G dive recoveries. There was no mention (as far as I recall) at 4FTS. I do recall, however, "If its not right- throw it away and try again (having analysed errors made and corrections required "

As for Command Eject, my memory may be fading but I'm sure it was fitted at ALL models of F4. The implementation in the K/M was different to the D/E/F/G, however, they all had a Command Selector Valve?

LOMCEVAK

12th Oct 2019, 17:27

As for Command Eject, my memory may be fading but I'm sure it was fitted at ALL models of F4. The implementation in the K/M was different to the D/E/F/G, however, they all had a Command Selector Valve?

D2, I think that you have much more experience on the F4 than I do so you are more likely to be correct and it may be my memory that fails me. I just don't remember them (J/K/M/N)having such a system, possibly because I never flew in the back seat.

Fonsini

12th Oct 2019, 18:23

Hoping Bob V. is willing to chime in on this.

Condolences to the family of the engineer.

H Peacock

12th Oct 2019, 19:48

As for Command Eject, my memory may be fading but I'm sure it was fitted at ALL models of F4.

Dom2. I didn't think anything in the RAF inventory had command eject when the Mk10 in the Hawk/Tornado came into service . I know the MB Mk7 seat was retrofitted with a command option, but don't believe the RAF used it. I recall an F4 pilot being lost in the late 80s with a medical issue in flight. The nav stayed with him for a while but then ejected when he stopped getting any response from the front seat. Surely if they had command eject they'd have used it!

The first truly universal command eject was not until the Harrier T10 which had universal front-to-back, back-to-front, both and off selection options.

Easy Street

12th Oct 2019, 21:31

Only just started reading the SI report but already I feel compelled to note that para 1.3.3 footnote 5 uses vatsim.com (an online multiplayer ATC simulation game) as its reference for the description of the "Lichfield Radar Visual Corridor". Maybe if the panel had used (say) the UK Mil AIP as their reference, they would have found that it is a "Radar Corridor". Tantamount to citing Wikipedia, I find this astonishingly unprofessional in a document of public record.

I sincerely hope that this trivial example isn't indicative of the quality of investigation and research to come. But it does make one wonder.

Rhino power

12th Oct 2019, 21:37

No command selector valve in the FG.1 or FGR.2...
FG.1
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1200x900/fg1_1778b4ad2e42140fed9fd1bb0861d56deea20595.jpg
FGR.2
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1200x900/fgr2_d4e16136708e416b26e2a658230f6fafe98ecc9c.jpg
And the tragic loss of XT908, which H Peacock referred to...
XT908 accident summary (http://www.ukserials.com/pdflosses/maas_19890109_xt908.pdf)

-RP

Two's in

13th Oct 2019, 03:50

The Terms of Reference for this Service Inquiry are pretty much verbatim as they have been for many others:

The purpose of this SI is to investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident and to make recommendations in order to prevent recurrence.

It's the "...in order to prevent a recurrence..." bit that drives the board down every rabbit hole that presents itself, with nary a thought for the context or prevalence of the factor being presented. This confused smorgasbord of factors, facts, policies and regulations almost deliberately avoids stating the obvious. On the day, circumstances conspired to put an experienced aviator into a deadly trap as old as flying itself, and him being part of the RAFAT didn't make a blind bit of difference to the tragic outcome. Of course all the other organizational issues amplified the consequences, specifically carrying out the manoeuvre with a passenger (he clearly was NOT supernumerary crew, despite some convenient and disingenuous institutionalized attempts to redefine that role) but there was no mystery as to the root cause. There may be a huge corporate reluctance to admit it, but it is a salutary lesson indeed to demonstrate that even with the level of experience and and skill available in the cockpit, he was not immune from the terrible consequences of getting it wrong on the day. You're only ever as good as your last flight.

orca

13th Oct 2019, 07:57

I don’t disagree with your point Two’s In but would add that you really only address the first of three criteria present that make this an accident; that of the lost aeroplane (neither here nor there really IMHO for the reason you state and with which I agree). The second would be the pilot’s unfortunate broken leg (possible learning point for ejecting in time but at the end of the day he ejected in time). The third is the tragic fatality - and I know we all know that - but that puts the board in the position of having to look at why the deceased was where he was/ doing what he was - and whether either or both were a bright idea etc.

Reserving my opinion on the above - I always feel that HF likes to ‘talk a good game’ in lectures and courses but stay on safe middle ground when it comes to reports. Hence you get ‘fatigue and distraction’ in reports but not the variety of biases that may have occurred - which spawns the inevitable ‘why didn’t the board look at’ questions. The answer is probably that they did but weren’t allowed to publish anything likely to be challenged even if only put forward as a possibility.

Dominator2

13th Oct 2019, 08:18

LOMCEVAK, and Rhino power, First apologies and second thanks. My memory clearly is failing. After your pictures and further investigation the EJECT LIGHT bought it back to me. No Command Eject on the F4K/M.

The first time that I flew with Command Eject was on the D/E models in the USA.

Remember well that the Wild Weasel Wing sent a detachment to Jever. At the end of the long transit from California the General decided to descend through cloud as a 6 ship for a flypast!! Two of the aircraft had a mid air and were lost. One of the WSOs initiated the Ejection and ejected himself and pilot from the ac. At the subsequent BOI the pilot stated that he thought that his aircraft MAY have been flyable. The General retired soon after as a Colonel!!

Our Wing Commander immediately sparked a near mutiny be trying to ban the use of Command Eject with WSOs in the rear seat as they were (in his opinion) unable to make the correct decision. After a heated Wing Meeting he was forced to rescind his decision. For the majority of flights in the USAF and GAF the Command Eject was set to Both.

AnglianAV8R

13th Oct 2019, 10:17

H Peacock,

The ‘dumbing down’ is simply accepting reality. There is not an unlimited pot for CT. And I’m almost certain more people have died practicing engine failures than aircraft have been saved by having practiced them.

Is it really worth it?

Have to agree. My experience of PFLs, albeit in a piston engine aircraft, is of picking the field and executing a safe approach with the fear that when the instructor says "that's a goodun" and opens up the throttle....The engine splutters and dies. Result would be one aircraft sans undercart in a field, or worse, for no good reason.

LOMCEVAK

13th Oct 2019, 11:00

Althouth this is thread drift, following on regarding F4 Commam Ejection systems, I have just had a reliable source tell me that the F4J(UK) had a command ejection system. However, it’s entry into service post-dated the Hawk T1 by quite a few years.

Timelord

13th Oct 2019, 11:53

The thing that strikes me about this is that an experienced and above average Hawk QFI screwed up an exercise he was patently capable of completing safely. Why? The report seems to hint at him being under self induced pressure but also under pressure from a multitude of trivial administrative tasks. If that is what it is like for a RED ARROWS pilot, what must it be like on a bog standard squadron?

The first film I saw called “ Distractions “ featured a Javelin crew! When will the lesson be learned?

Rhino power

13th Oct 2019, 13:08

...I have just had a reliable source tell me that the F4J(UK) had a command ejection system

Correct, the below extracts taken from the F-4J(UK) AP101...

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/900x1200/csv_1_copy_797643163016c13895269a5c25b5519872a9acbf.jpg
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1200x480/csv_2_35b0d6e456318efd27a653a0b3dacc05f17d0dc8.jpg

(Apologies for the continued thread drift)

-RP

Blackfriar

13th Oct 2019, 15:14

Have to agree. My experience of PFLs, albeit in a piston engine aircraft, is of picking the field and executing a safe approach with the fear that when the instructor says "that's a goodun" and opens up the throttle....The engine splutters and dies. Result would be one aircraft sans undercart in a field, or worse, for no good reason.

It might be better for everyone's flying if a bit of gliding was part of basic training. Every landing is a "forced" landing whether into the airfield or a farmer's field. I'm talking real gliders and not piston engined aircraft with long wings. Try 30 winch launches in 3 days on 3 minute circuits. It worked for Sully - commit to landing "out", pick the landing site (preferably a field, not the Hudson) and fly a circuit/approach looking out of the canopy and judging speed and height by the mark one eyeball. A lot safer than the PFLs described above.

H Peacock

13th Oct 2019, 15:31

It worked for Sully - commit to landing "out", pick the landing site (preferably a field, not the Hudson) and fly a circuit/approach looking out of the canopy and judging speed and height by the mark one eyeball. A lot safer than the PFLs described above.

Well Sully wasn't exactly committed to making the threshold of a runway! I know there were some obstructions on the Hudson, but he 'simply' had to fly Green Dot speed until he arrived at 70ft or so over the water. Admittedly he didn't hold it off too long and stall as often happens, but I'm not sure he was using the constant sightline technique!

If we did always avoid putting ourselves in a position where, if we opened a closed throttle andThe engine splutters and dies. then we'd be only doing aeros in the overhead of the field! The art of safely landing an engineless aircraft has always been taught during RAF pilot training. For any given type there are specific 'gates' (i.e. min speeds, max bank etc) to be met/maintained to ensure a safe outcome is likely. Admittedly if you had a seat you could always level the wings, convert speed for less RoD and jump out, but as a QFI I was expected to be able to make a sensible attempt at flying a turn back in the Tucano. I didn't always manage to get them in (back onto a rwy), and occasionally you'd completely misjudge it, but you knew what speed/bank/load/height combination were to be avoided and hence when to throw a practice away.

LOMCEVAK

13th Oct 2019, 16:05

It might be better for everyone's flying if a bit of gliding was part of basic training. Every landing is a "forced" landing whether into the airfield or a farmer's field. I'm talking real gliders and not piston engined aircraft with long wings.

There is a fundamental difference between 'real gliders' and an aeroplane like a Hawk; glide angle (L/D ratio). You are acclimatised to a shallow glide angle plus spoilers to increase the angle on finals if you need to. When you have a much steeper glide angle, and for some types with gear and flaps down it is around 10 degrees, and no spoiler option to increase it if you need to, the required judgement is much different. Yes, you can sideslip some aircraft but it doesn't work in the Hawk. Your TAS is much higher and minimum turn radius much greater in a Hawk so if you realise that your sightline is too low then you have few options for varying ground track to correct it.

However, I am sure that few would turn down the opportunity to go gliding but I am not convinced it would really help judgement in higher drag aircraft.

Meester proach

13th Oct 2019, 16:05

So what happens now ? Is the pilot likely to be court martialled ?

flighthappens

13th Oct 2019, 17:00

There is a fundamental difference between 'real gliders' and an aeroplane like a Hawk; glide angle (L/D ratio). You are acclimatised to a shallow glide angle plus spoilers to increase the angle on finals if you need to. When you have a much steeper glide angle, and for some types with gear and flaps down it is around 10 degrees, and no spoiler option to increase it if you need to, the required judgement is much different. Yes, you can sideslip some aircraft but it doesn't work in the Hawk. Your TAS is much higher and minimum turn radius much greater in a Hawk so if you realise that your sightline is too low then you have few options for varying ground track to correct it.

However, I am sure that few would turn down the opportunity to go gliding but I am not convinced it would really help judgement in higher drag aircraft.

agree with the above, also highlighting that comparing a (big handful rounded numbers only) 400lb aircraft that will stall at around 40kts with a 1:20+ glide ratio to a 8000lb aircraft, stalling at 145kts with a 1:10 glide ratio is a very different exercise in energy management. Personally I don’t believe they will directly compare!

Capt Scribble

13th Oct 2019, 17:32

The emphasis during a Forced landing in my day was the final judgement as to whether you would throw it away (PFL), or in the real case, eject in a controlled manner if you were not going to land in a reasonable place on a suitable surface. Although it is nice for a student to ‘get in’ it was this final critical decision that determined whether the student was safe to attempt a PFL/AFL whilst solo. No amount of gliding experience is going to prevent press-on-itis as evidenced by the parameters in this final turn.

LOMCEVAK

13th Oct 2019, 17:54

In addition to what I said earlier, gliders try to find lift to increase altitude/potential energy. When a high speed aircraft such as a Hawk loses the engine, for real or practise, the only way to increase potential energy is an exchange with kinetic energy. Alternatively, excess kinetic energy (speed) can be used to travel across the ground at constant potential energy. This is another fundamental difference.

With respect to glide angles, most aircraft such as the Hawk will glide gear and flaps up at about 2nm/1000 ft which, as flighthappens has said, is a still air glide ratio of 1:12. Once the gear and flaps are down, this reduces to about 1nm/1000 ft or 1:6.

rlsbutler

13th Oct 2019, 20:08

As a brand new pilot officer arriving at my Canberra squadron, I happened to have more than 100 hours of gliding under my belt. I had not thought of gliding my bomber – perhaps I had not been near any glider for the last eight months or so. The squadron QFI (Flt Lt Johnny Walker – excellent officer) thought the new pilot on his first check ride would be flummoxed by an unbriefed simulated double-flameout at night.

Sully had more airmanship built into him than many pilots. We universally recognise it. Some of that was an extensive understanding of what we might call one-time critical low speed energy management. The Sully model worked for me. The lessons would be relevant to a Hawk pilot and were essential, however little they actually controlled their falling meteor, to the pilots of Apollo. R3 did not have it in his armoury.

BVRAAM

14th Oct 2019, 04:05

Does anybody know how Flt Lt Stark is doing in his recovery? Has he returned to work? Is he flying again?

And most importantly, is he receiving psychiatric help? This is going to take a long time to recover from, psychologically. He may never fully recover from it - psychological trauma is tough, as I know all too well, myself. My thoughts are with him and of course the Bayliss family, and all of their friends and colleagues at this difficult time.

Blackfriar

14th Oct 2019, 05:46

agree with the above, also highlighting that comparing a (big handful rounded numbers only) 400lb aircraft that will stall at around 40kts with a 1:20+ glide ratio to a 8000lb aircraft, stalling at 145kts with a 1:10 glide ratio is a very different exercise in energy management. Personally I don’t believe they will directly compare!
I totally agree with disparity between fast jet and gliders but I was responding to a comment about PFL in a Cessna or similar Primary training aircraft where the engine might cut or fail to respond when the throttle was opened. Much better to gain a lot of practice on an actual airfield (literally field not runway) where there you can practice safely. Otherwise why do PFL at all if it is dangerous? Plus it’s great fun.

Homelover

14th Oct 2019, 06:49

Does anybody know how XXX is doing in his recovery? Has he returned to work? Is he flying again?

And most importantly, is he receiving psychiatric help?.

BVRAAM, are you really so naive to think someone will actually discuss another person’s psychological state with you on a public forum? You have a lot to learn....

RetiredBA/BY

14th Oct 2019, 08:58

rlsbutler

14th Oct 2019, 11:50

Another turnback fatality. In the JP environment, ( where I was trained and instructed) back in the late 60s we stopped them after a number of accidents practising for an exceptionally unlikely event, in fact I can’t recall a single efato. .

Time to consign such practice, but not PFL, to the sim. ?

This case is not a turnback if, as I think, it is defined as an attempt to land on the reciprocal of the take-off runway.

Never mind. It is a serious exercise of skill, not as seriously risky as the late, long and expensive habit of practising for the loss of a Meteor or Canberra engine.

Yours is an answer to the existential question for a dedicated military pilot. I felt it was my business to be completely on top of my aircraft. Poking about in the dodgy corners of its performance was part of my job. That is an alternative answer.

I regret my feeling that the modern RAF thinks it can legislate away risk. The Hawk SI seems to be more concerned with its "contract" parameters than with failures of essential airmanship. Do its senior officers believe that its fighting assets will never be at risk ? As a civil transport pilot, do you really think that is a valid military policy ?

RetiredBA/BY

14th Oct 2019, 12:44

I was not speaking as a transport pilot, but as a former RAF standards QFI.
I , too, wanted and tried hard to be, right on top of handling my jet, “just” a JP but CFS decided the risk of turnbacks was not worth the gain.

That may have changed.

.....and yes, as a former Canberra pilot, I had a sound grasp of, and excellent training on, asymmetric ops. such that on my two engine failures, both in b. awkward situations, we survived but long after the Canberra came into service asymmetric training was still being refined and being made safer. Perhaps less risky might be a better description, as the Wyton (IIRC) station commander was killed on an asymmetric accident almost at the end of Canberra service. The Canberra was a big JP on two engines ( except for the PR9) but on one it had to be flown with great care.

.. of course military aircraft will always have a risk factor far greater than in civil aviation, but I believe, even those risks must be measured against gain.

Distant Voice

14th Oct 2019, 14:07

So what happens now ? Is the pilot likely to be court martialled ?

Most unlikely. But I sincerely hope that the 2* ODH is called by the coroner to justify his ALARP statement which covered emergency egress from the rear seat.

DV

Lordflasheart

14th Oct 2019, 14:51

Distant Voice

14th Oct 2019, 15:57

Lordflasheart

In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he was 'scorched' by the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft. That is why it is important for the rear seat to go first.

Again, in my honest opinion, the answer to Q2 is 'Yes'. Cpl Bayliss would have gone first.

I am sure that the coroner, who will apply the 'balance of probability' test, will come to the same conclusions.

This case has the same sickening theme, regarding risk assessment/management, as the 2012 Tornado accident. In that case the root cause was not the lack of CWS but the fact that the ODH signed off to say the risk was ALARP without it. Now we have a ODH signing off to say ALL risks are ALARP, even though the emergency egress system was connected 'arse about face' for the task in hand. At lease the command ejection system in the Tornado had Front/Rear/Both options.

DV

longer ron

14th Oct 2019, 16:04

...
Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?

Possibly a Hawk experienced pax with some civvy flying experience might have put a hand onto the seat pan handle once full flap was selected and the AOB was approaching 70deg with the a/c overshooting the rwy centre line and with the ROD increasing - when I was young and switched on I would like to think I might have.However if the backseater did 'bang out' uncommanded - would they then take at least part of the blame for the ensuing crash ?

Q 2. If this aircraft had been fitted with command ejection under the control of the aircraft captain, would it have made any difference to the actual outcome of this specific crash ?

Possibly but in this case it would have been a very close call due to the ultra late/low ejection decision.

LFH
...

minimum text to allow posting.

DODGYOLDFART

14th Oct 2019, 16:20

Was Cpl Bayliss ordered to eject? I could see no mention of this in the report and this leaves me somewhat puzzled. Way back in the 1950's when things were far more relaxed, groundcrew and other lucky people who got to have a ride in a Vampire or Hunter T7 got a thorough briefing on what to expect and what to do/not do. Paramount was on the command "eject, eject" immediately pull legs back against the seat and reach up and pull red handle. If you say "what" you will get not reply because I would have already gone. I cannot help wondering if this is what happened in this case as the pilot got out awfully late.

Distant Voice

14th Oct 2019, 16:37

DODGYOLDFART

1.4.352. Verbal Warning. The command to a passenger to initiate an ejection is "eject, eject, eject". The engineer had been briefed that if a hazardous situation occurred from which it was required to abandon the aircraft, he would be given the command to eject. R3 recalled stating a short warning, but not 'eject' x 3, and instinctively pulled the ejection handle; he was uncertain if he said it prior to or as he pulled the handle. The Panel considered that if R3's warning was made during the ejection sequence there was a possibility that the engineer did not hear it as the pilot's intercom may have been separated from the main aircraft. Furthermore, and in the Panel's opinion, even if the engineer had heard the warning there was insufficient time for him to react before the aircraft hit the ground. Having heard it he would have been required to recognise the meaning and act appropriately.

DV

DODGYOLDFART

14th Oct 2019, 16:42

Thanks DV, don't know how I missed it! Must have been another attack of advanced fuddyitus!

Typhoondriver

14th Oct 2019, 16:55

The section in the report entitled ‘Work Routine’ should IMHO, act as a red flag for Senior Officers.

Most of you will be aware how ‘2ndary Duties’ have morphed over the last 20 years. What once was considered a minor / non-onerous duty intended to aid the day to day running of a Sqn, has in most instances, become a gargantuan duty, worthy of a full time job in itself. Sadly, the reality is that 2ndary duties are now used to make up for the enormous deficiencies in resource and personnel allocated to most flying units.

As an example, all of the JP’s on my most recent unit were quite literally working ‘balls to the wall’, and even in peacetime / non-op periods, working 60+ hour weeks, rising to the order of 80+ hours after a day in the ‘shed’ was factored in. That’s an incredible ask of our JP cadre, but to a man, they accept and deliver exceptional results without complaint. But that doesn’t make it right.

18 years ago, a JP would land, debrief, and then have time to study the RTS, Tactics Manual, SOPs, Threat and other documents which allowed them to become better at their primary duty. Nowadays, the majority of guys land, debrief and are straight into their 2ndary duties. I don’t blame them for this, rather, it’s a toxic outcome of a system which no longer rewards excellence in the flying role, and places primacy on 2ndary duties.

If you don’t believe me, have a look round your respective fleets and ponder. How many of those who have been promoted are actually ‘Above Average’ in the air? I’d suggest its way less than 50%. The reality of the current promotion system is, that exceptional aviators are deemed subservient to individuals that have completed high profile 2ndary duties.

So what?

In 1.4.292 - ‘R3 felt he lacked the opportunity to apply as much thought as he would have liked pre and post sorties to consider what he had done or was going to do next; the only time he sat down was in a brief, debrief or in an aircraft.’ I’d say the same could currently be said of every single pilot on every current FJ Sqn. (NB I don’t intentionally mean to single out FJ as being ‘special’ or working harder than other fleets, but it’s the only thing I have direct experience of and feel able to comment on).

1.4.294 - ‘RAFAT was busy and all persons worked hard; there was acknowledgement that flying was intense but that secondary duties should be achievable within the working day’. I’d say this phrase represents the collective ‘head in sand’ policy adopted by most SO’s and FHQ’s. It’s a total leadership failure by those in a position to recognise that 2ndary duties cannot actually be completed within an acceptable working day, but by saying that they think it should, somehow absolves them of any responsibility.

1.4.298 - ‘Specialist HF advice counselled that a high level of workload reduced the readiness of personnel by acting as a stressor and so reduced the ability to gather information, influencing decision making, and reducing capacity for undertaking her tasks.’ Once again a sentence that when extrapolated, means that every pilot on every current FJ Sqn is working at a reduced capacity.

1.4.301 - ‘The Sqn CoC maintained oversight of personnel fatigue and held the view that as the aircrew worked closely together they could have identified if anyone appeared to be stressed or tired; crew rest regulations were adhered to.’ Crew rest as defined in GASO’s has become a target to work to, not a rule to prevent infrequent overwork. What was once considered ‘surge’ is now considered the ‘normal’ tempo. HQ’s are fully aware of the current unacceptable task and working tempo, yet persist with the 'head in sand' approach whilst resisting all efforts to monitor and log the number of hrs actually spent in work by their personnel each week. Personnel that have previously tried to highlight inconsistencies with the Working Time Regulations(1998) have essentially been ‘persona non grata’d’ from the Force.

1.4.306 - ‘R3 was working hard in a high tempo environment and as a consequence was experiencing a degree of fatigue. Every pilot, on every FJ Sqn currently in the RAF.

I could go on, but the bottom line is that if statements made in this report are to be taken at face value, then it would be very easy to argue that every single FJ pilot in the RAF is currently suffering from chronic stress and fatigue. And if I’m being honest, I actually believe that to be the case.

Given this report is signed off by DG DSA, I hope measures are currently being put in place to alleviate the factors causing chronic stress and fatigue to aircrew.

Perhaps the first place to start would be by alleviating highly trained pilots of non essential tasks by:-

1./ Ensuring that Stn Catering Flt take all responsibilities for Sqn Rations.
2./ Ensuring Sqn MSF Flt take all responsibilities for day to day Flight Scheduling and Mission Planning.
3./ Ensuring Stn Ops Flt take all responsibilities for Trail planning.
4./ Ensuring Stn Intelligence Flt take all responsibilities for providing intelligence functions and threat briefs.
5./ Ensuring Stn MT Flt take all responsibilities for Sqn vehicles.
6./ Ensuring Stn Admin start assisting Sqn personnel in all welfare and allowance matters.

This event was a horrific tragedy resulting in the loss of a fine young Airman.

R3 was not able to function at the top of his game, in part, because he was busy dealing with the Sqn sandwiches.

Similar sets of circumstances are conspiring to distract the current generation of RAF pilots from their primary duty, on every single RAF FJ Sqn currently in existence.

Just This Once...

14th Oct 2019, 17:00

In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he was 'scorched' by the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft. That is why it is important for the rear seat to go first.

Emotive hyperbole is not warrantied and the suggestion that Cpl Bayliss suffered scorching from the front seat is both macabre and technically dubious.

Bob Viking

14th Oct 2019, 17:19

Excellent post.

The only thing I would add is Admin Orders and Op Orders. Why are pilots writing them when we have Admin Officers and Ops Officers?

Actually, I could go on. But I won’t.

BV

Distant Voice

14th Oct 2019, 18:49

JTO
Emotive hyperbole is not warrantied and the suggestion that Cpl Bayliss suffered scorching from the front seat is both macabre and technically dubious.

Everything associated with Cpl Bayliss's death was macabre, which tends to get lost amongst all the talk about safe altitudes, bank anglles, air speed etc. I suggest you read para 1.3.19 of the Sean Cunningham accident, "Two RAFAT engineering personnel suffered minor injuries due to canopy fragmentation, and their proximity to the efflux from the ejection seat rocket pack". And they were outside the aircraft.

DV

Homelover

14th Oct 2019, 22:16

Distant Voice

You are wrong. The occupant in the rear seat is unlikely to be injured by the front seat rocket motor firing because there is a blast screen between the cockpits in a Hawk T1 and the rear canopy would remain intact until the rear seat firing handle was pulled.
In Sean Cunningham’s accident the RAFAT engineers were outside the aircraft and therefore not protected to the same extent as the occupant of the rear cockpit would be. And your ‘scorching’ comments are distasteful.

k3k3

14th Oct 2019, 22:48

Fortissimo

14th Oct 2019, 23:26

The Hawk canopy is one piece covering front and rear seats, there is no rear canopy. The blast screen is only there to protect the back seater, who sits higher than the pilot in front from the slipstream, in case of loss of canopy.

If you look at the XX177 SI report, para 1.3.14 Fig 2, it shows the empty front seat, the ejection gun rod, the missing front canopy section and an intact rear canopy and blast screen.

Bob Viking

15th Oct 2019, 03:29

I find it upsetting when individuals post in threads, especially emotive ones like this, with ‘facts’ that are blatantly wrong.

If a thread is not in your area of expertise why state, as fact, something about which you know very little?

For clarification, the MDC trip arm (initiated by the seat moving up the rail) will only fire the MDC for the specific cockpit. Canopy fracture handles (they are located inside and outside the cockpit) will blow all the MDC. This is a fact. I even checked an aircrew manual to be sure.

I could rant on about other facts but I won’t. Don’t even get me started on gliding versus Hawk PFLs/PEFATOs. I have done both.

BV

Just This Once...

15th Oct 2019, 06:56

JTO I suggest you read para 1.3.19 of the Sean Cunningham accident..

DV

The Hawk canopy is one piece covering front and rear seats, there is no rear canopy. The blast screen is only there to protect the back seater, who sits higher than the pilot in front from the slipstream, in case of loss of canopy.

BV has covered this already but I implore posters to stay within their field of knowledge. A man has died in the worst of circumstances - this is not your moment to guess how a particular fast jet works or what injuries may have been imparted.

Like many on here I have flown the Hawk T1, including the tail number involved in this accident. I have also experienced a front seat canopy loss at around 480kts. Quite any event for the front seat but relatively benign for me in the intact rear cockpit. The Hawk was designed to protect the rear seat instructor / occupant from a front-seat ejection sequence.

Distant Voice

15th Oct 2019, 09:50

BV and JTO

In the end the cause of Cpl Bayliss's death, and the circumstances surrounding it, will be determined by HM Senior Coroner for North West Wales, based on the balance of probability. I suspect the coroner has little on type experience, but like Andrew Walker at the Nimrod inquest, has meaningful investigators skills to offer. Sometimes you can stand too close to the coal face.

DV

Bob Viking

15th Oct 2019, 10:01

You made a statement, about a very emotive subject, that was factually incorrect and clearly upset people.

You don’t get to pretend to be the grown up and then use your supposed wealth of experience to tell us what happens next without first offering an apology.

I thought you were better than that.

BV

Just This Once...

15th Oct 2019, 12:37

Yep, as above.

k3k3

15th Oct 2019, 12:51

Apologies, it has been a long time and I just had the normal opening of the canopy uppermost in my memory. I had forgotten about the separate MDCs.

Homelover

15th Oct 2019, 14:35

Bob Viking

Well said mate. But I bet we won’t get an apology from him. :*

Distant Voice

15th Oct 2019, 14:45

You don’t get to pretend to be the grown up and then use your supposed wealth of experience to tell us what happens next without first offering an apology.

OK Bob I take your point and apologise to those people I have offended, it was a genuine mistake. My intention was to highlight the hopelessness of Cpl Bayliss's situation. I suspect that he trusted the system, and the system let him down.

My post would have been better had it read,

"In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he saw the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft".

DV

DV

Distant Voice

15th Oct 2019, 14:49

Well said mate. But I bet you won’t get an apology from him.

Homelover, if you have a problem with me I suggest you write to me.

DV

Homelover

15th Oct 2019, 15:01

DV
Apology accepted.

RetiredBA/BY

15th Oct 2019, 17:00

Does anyone have any statistics as to the number of flameouts shortly after take off on Hawks ?

Homelover

15th Oct 2019, 19:05

Retired BA/BY

There was one accident involving a colleague at Valley in Feb 2002. The aircraft suffered a bird strike shortly after take off which caused an engine surge. The pilot attempted an AFL but ejected when he judged he wouldn’t make it back to the airfield. Aircraft was Cat5 but pilot suffered only minor injuries. BBC News | WALES | Jet crashes near RAF base (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/1821998.stm)
I don’t know of any others in the UK.

Mortmeister

15th Oct 2019, 19:18

Bob Viking

16th Oct 2019, 03:57

It does you both credit that you were able to accept my message in the spirit it was intended. No hard feelings on my part. My message was also a wider one to anyone reading this.

I believe all of us should be wary of commenting on subjects where our knowledge is either lacking or out of date. Especially instances such as this.

As an example I have flown the Tucano (135 hours as a student), but not since 2001. If we were to be discussing a Tucano incident I would refrain from getting involved with any technical aspects of the conversation since I accept that my offerings could not be guaranteed to be correct.

Sorry to get all ‘preachy’.

BV

LincsFM

16th Oct 2019, 06:56

Chugalug2

16th Oct 2019, 09:08

Distant Voice

16th Oct 2019, 09:33

Cpl Bayliss should not have been in the back as the pilot intended to do a practice engine failure esp with no command eject available. He did not have the training or knowledge when confronted with this situation.

Based on my experience with inquest and Fatal Accident Inquiries, I believe that this is a conclusion that could be reached by the coroner, whose main task it is to determine the cause of death not the accident.

I note that one contributing factor that is common to this accident, the one involving XX179 (Aug 2011) and the one involving XX233/XX253 (March 2010) is an inadequate risk register. The SI refers to 'Bow Tie' analysis, this does not replace the risk register. As someone who is familiar with this 'tool' I can say that if the newly developed Bow Tie for the Red Arrows is similar to that developed for Tornado MAC then it is of little use.

Despite all this the ODH was happy to sign off to say that risks associated with the operation of RAFAT Mk1 Hawk aircraft were Tolerable and ALARP. This is the statement that he should be called on to justify at the inquest.

DV

teeteringhead

16th Oct 2019, 09:52

Despite all this the ODH was happy to sign off to say that risks associated with the operation of RAFAT Mk1 Hawk aircraft were Tolerable and ALARP. This is the statement that he should be called on to justify at the inquest. Agreed. And the ODH is (?) AOC 22 Gp? Or does it go all the way to C-in-C or CAS?

LincsFM

16th Oct 2019, 10:06

Based on my experience with inquest and Fatal Accident Inquiries, I believe that this is a conclusion that could be reached by the coroner, whose main task it is to determine the cause of death not the accident.

I note that one contributing factor that is common to this accident, the one involving XX179 (Aug 2011) and the one involving XX233/XX253 (March 2010) is an inadequate risk register. The SI refers to 'Bow Tie' analysis, this does not replace the risk register. As someone who is familiar with this 'tool' I can say that if the newly developed Bow Tie for the Red Arrows is similar to that developed for Tornado MAC then it is of little use.

Despite all this the ODH was happy to sign off to say that risks associated with the operation of RAFAT Mk1 Hawk aircraft were Tolerable and ALARP. This is the statement that he should be called on to justify at the inquest.

DV

Good post. I imagine the Reds carrying of groundcrew as Supernumerary crew will also be looked at . As RA2340 quotes "The Supernumerary Crew Certificate of Competence will provide auditable evidence that the individual has achieved the level of competency required by ADH/AM(MF) orders to operate/be employed on the Air System"

Distant Voice

16th Oct 2019, 10:23

Agreed. And the ODH is (?) AOC 22 Gp? Or does it go all the way to C-in-C or CAS?

The ODH is AOC 22 Gp. He is the one who makes the ALARP (Safety) statement.

DV

orca

16th Oct 2019, 11:53

Reading para 1.4.106 and the paras leading up to it - the case for Circus to be carried was strong; the case to be considered as SC was in my opinion weak, and the means by which they achieved SC and were endorsed was not - to me - thorough.
I also note that the lack of the 2017 simulator sorties was not elevated to DDH, let alone ODH.

Is it not the case that the ODH could reasonably expect his aircrew to operate the Hawk T1 in a manner that didn’t involve straying into the parameters noted in the report, whilst conducting simulated low level emergencies, on a sortie with a rear seat occupant whose training was, as had already been said, inappropriate for the situation he faced?

I acknowledge the panel’s finding that a comprehensive command eject system may (with the caveats as published) have saved both aircrew.

plastic_bonsai_again

16th Oct 2019, 12:27

On a different tack...

I am curious as to how the Hawk Simulator fitted into all this. The pilot flew the emergency in the simulator a couple of times less than 2 hours before the accident. The simulator staff didn't find any noteable faults with his exercises though presumeably they hadn't pick up the new changes to the PEFATO profile. In the absence of any recordings of the exercises, the accident investigators didn't appear to check that the simulator could have given any false cues or perceptions in this kind of manoeuvre.

I'm not having a go at the simulator, I actually worked on it's development, and thought it would be a great training aid and have uses in accident investigations as well but that doesn't seem to be so in this instance.

RetiredBA/BY

16th Oct 2019, 13:20

Rear seat occupant or not it seems to me that a more stringent approach to this form of training is required.

I would suggest that it should be a requirement that if low key cannot be made at the required minimum height or greater with reasonable spacing then it IS to be discontinued.

For example, many years ago, several transport aircraft crashed in low vis ops when going right down to minimums or below even when vis or rvr was BELOW that required.

The rules were changed so that descent below minimums plus 500 feet ( IIRCC) was prohibited when rvr/ vis was below that required.

I would suggest that the above could very easily and quickly implemented with no operational detriment and far easier than implementation of command ejection.

lsh

16th Oct 2019, 14:38

This incident appears to bear some striking resemblance to that which occurred to Hawk T1A XX334 on 19(R) Sqn at 2TWU in September 1992.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=55475
In this instance, the person that died was I believe, an experienced Hawk QFI, participating in a QWI course. He was in the rear cockpit, with the Captain in the front cockpit.
This incident still haunts me to this day and I wonder were the lessons learned adequately promulgated around the Hawk community of today?

I speak only as an armourer on the squadron that was 'back-seat qualified' and on shift at the time of the crash. I/we flew many times in the rear cockpit, sometimes to deploy to Coningsby or Leuchars for a small '2-ship' Det. and on occasion, just for fun in the weather ship or a target tug. The practice was actively encouraged by our aircrew and the guys and girls the squadron loved it. But let's be clear, we were passengers, not supernumerary crew.
To the best of my knowledge, EFATO was never practiced when ground crew were being carried in the rear cockpit. We were however always meticulously briefed, each trip, on the possibility and procedure for ejection. Always challenged to confirm that the Command Selector Valve in the rear cockpit was 'down and off' during taxi, even though the pilot would have checked it when we got to the aircraft.

Fair to say that I had a very good understanding of the ejection seat, but I'm not sure that I would have ever initiated ejecting without being instructed to do so; maybe if I knew that the pilot had been incapacitated by something like a birdstrike, but highly unlikely. If an engine failure had ever occurred on take-off (and I don't recall any during my six years on the Hawk), the only thing I would have done is sit tight, keep quiet and wait for instructions!
For us ground crew minions, we place our trust in our pilots and accept the risk.

I'm sure that Cpl Bayliss was like I, was just pinching himself at how lucky he was to be able to have such an experience. RIP mate....

You have written a post describing my thoughts far better than I could have done, using a valid accident to illustrate them.
I too have been in your situation and almost certainly would not have recognised that a PFL exercise had gone awry, until far too late.
Indeed, hearing the engine start to spool-up may have reassured me that we were overshooting?
Like you, I felt I did have enough knowledge to deal with an obvious situation, if presented.

There are times when we are totally reliant on the skills of others - thus sensible rules are written for our protection.
As an example, over the years, the rules on carrying ATC Cadets on helicopters were made more stringent, much limiting the exercises cleared with them on board.
They may have enjoyed being there, but they did not need to be and almost certainly had no balanced view of the associated risks.

Having "contracts" is not a phrase I am familiar with, I learn.
However, it does seem to have many parameters to satisfy - looks good on paper, but is it clear enough in a dynamic situation?
A simple gate might be easier?

lsh

Distant Voice

16th Oct 2019, 15:34

Posted By Orca
I also note that the lack of the 2017 simulator sorties was not elevated to DDH, let alone ODH.

I understand that it is the responsibility of the AOC to sign off, following a flying demonstration, that all aspects of pre-season operations are safe and ready. I respectfully suggest that this is not limited to how smart the crews and aircraft are, or whether smoke comes on at the right time, but all round training and associated paperwork. In the XX 149 SI report, dated 29th April 2012, it is recommended that the AOC 22 Group should, amongst several other things,

(1) Develop an effective Unified Risk Register in accordance with RA 1210.
(2) Conduct a risk assessment to ensure any work load associated risks from RAFAT tasking and flying rate, for all personnel, are suitably mitigated such that they are Tolerable and ALARP.

What did AOC 22 Gp do to comply with those recommendations, and how was it monitored? No need to have the risk elevated to him, the XX 149 had done that. Was his answer to simply arrange for 'risk register transition to BowTie analysis' (para 1.4.413). Well the effectiveness of such an action can be seem at para 1.3.8.

'In examining the RAFAT BowTies that were active at the time of the accident, the Panel could find no evidence of where the flying of SC or Circus had been considered, and consequently there was no evidence of the SC training syllabus having been used as a barrier within a threat line.'

DV

orca

16th Oct 2019, 19:22

I may have misunderstood but wouldn’t the sign off to which you refer in your first para be conducted after the display flying work up was complete?

I don’t disagree with your other points but wrt SC status and training - can an ODH not rely upon the assurance given by nominating Commandant CFS as ‘awarding authority’ for SC status?

tartare

16th Oct 2019, 22:59

Vendee

17th Oct 2019, 12:31

Having flown in the Hawk back seat as a civilian out of Valley - I wonder how many non-pilots might just freeze when presented with a time critical ejection decision.
The handle is there - but there'd be ground rush - a tremendous surge of Adrenalin and no doubt and instinctive reaction to brace for impact.

I had a couple of back seat fast jet trips back in the 80's including on a post major servicing Jaguar airtest. I know for certain that I would have done the same as the unfortunate Cpl Bayliss. I would have reacted to a call from the pilot to eject but only experienced aircrew could appreciate that the aircraft was heading rapidly towards the ground and initiated ejection independently of the pilot within the limited timescale.

Chugalug2

17th Oct 2019, 13:35

orca:-
can an ODH not rely upon the assurance given by nominating Commandant CFS as ‘awarding authority’ for SC status?

Well clearly not. The MAA seems to believe that by printing out reams of bumf like Regulatory Article 1020,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760702/RA1020_Issue_9.pdf

it can avoid avoidable accidents. The problem is the infamous Swiss Cheese model. Anyone, all or some, of those holding the many acronym denominated posts described therein can subvert the aim and hence enable the avoidable accidents to happen. No Air Safety system is 100% reliable, but one that has been drafted from scratch, because the previous one was put through the shredder and its proponents hounded from office, is doomed to failure.

What is needed is a Regulatory Authority with teeth which can and will bring to book those in the highest echelons that renege on their responsibilities. What is needed is an Air Accident Investigator that can find those causes identified and forecast years prior to the accident but not acted upon. In other words a Regulator and an Investigator independent of the MOD and of each other.

Distant Voice

18th Oct 2019, 08:40

can an ODH not rely upon the assurance given by nominating Commandant CFS as ‘awarding authority’ for SC status?

"If we had a fatality in the military tomorrow, I could give you the four names for any part of military defence who have accepted personal accountability for that. Perhaps I could refer to one of our Duty Holder letters from the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Andrew Pulford to Air Vice Marshal Turner,[AOC 22 Group] who is an Operating Duty Holder. Line 4 of the letter says: “You are personally legally responsible and accountable through the Secretary of State for air safety, the air systems and functional safety in your area of responsibility.” We are now crystal clear in the military about where that accountability lies and it is not at lower levels, but at pretty senior levels: Lieutenant Colonel up to Chief of the Air Staff in this instance, and above to the Secretary of State"- Air Marshal Richard Garwood (DG Defence Safety Authority) in oral evidence given to Defence Sub Committee on 26th Nov 2016.

It is the Operating Duty Holder who signs the ALARP safety statement.

At the time that Richard Garwood made that statement, and since the introduction of the Duty Holder concept, there had been the Tornado collision in 2012, Lynx - controlled flight into terrain in 2014, and Puma – wire strike in 2015, with a total loss of life of 12 in four years. No Duty Holder was held accountable; no Duty Holder has was called into a court to validate his ALARP case. Just words.

DV

tucumseh

18th Oct 2019, 13:15

JTO

What an excellent post. I recognise every word.

The common denominators between this XX204 report and that of XX177 (Flt Lt Cunningham, issued in 2012) will be blindingly obvious. The final act differs, but the underlying failures remain the same. Given MoD claimed the recommendations from 2012 were being implemented, one is entitled to ask why so little progress was made before March 2018.

Various office holders/DHs are the subject of recommendations. For example, AOC 22 Gp has eight. To implement them requires resources and trained staff. He (and others) will have staff who know what they want, but not necessarily how to go about it. He might even ask why those recommendations that are mandated policy have been ignored. He might get a sympathetic hearing from DE&S, but be told (a) no endorsed requirement, but in any case (b) we no longer employ sufficiently junior civil servants to do this stuff.

(If you’re interested, these were ‘special tasks’ handed out to staff who sat one below the MoD(PE) minima. Among other things, they identified the funding, or staffed the bid if it was a bit costly - say, over £20M - and generally managed the task. I say £20M, because it is formal policy in MoD that it is a ‘routine expectation’ of any technical grade to be able to identify up to that sum for such use, without degrading operational capability. Not that it’s enforced these days, but perhaps it should be. People should be given the opportunity to learn their limitations).

Straight away, the AOC is up against it, and I sympathise. Almost by definition, the current AOC will be long gone before anything is done, and his successor will say he has other ‘new’ problems; not realising that most are the same old problems. He generally finds out after the next accident. Meanwhile, if they’ve read these reports, aircrew and groundcrew are wondering WTF is going on. And, as we know, the typical Air Staff response is to dismiss feedback as ‘ …uninformed, crewroom level, emotive comment lacking substantive evidence and focus’. (Nimrod Review, p360). This, in reply to the RAF Director of Flight Safety (Air Cdre E.J. Black), who had fully supported the crewroom. That was in 1998, and the XX204 and XX177 reports are just two examples full of precisely the same ‘emotive comment’.

DGDSA says at the end of the report that he ‘agrees’ with all the recommendations. What does that mean? It isn’t a formal endorsement, so the DHs are no further forward, 19 months after the accident. If DGDSA has, as we’re told, the ear of Secy of State, what the DHs want to read is ‘I’ve briefed the Secy on what we need, he’s agreed and given his endorsement, I’ve briefed the personnel responsible for delivery and given them timescales, they’re cracking on and must report progress to the DHs every Friday’. Now, it’s a long time since I’ve done this and visited MB every Friday morning (that new-fangled e-mail thing might suffice these days) but, believe me, doors open when you have such a task. Of course, many of the recommendations can be satisfied by self-tasking. Or just doing what the regs say. Unfortunately, both are anathema to many.

The DHs have every right to ask why the common Causes, Factors, Observations and Recommendations from previous accidents haven’t been addressed. But that doesn’t absolve them of what JTO mentions - the ‘I didn’t know’ defence. Whatever happened to the old system of the 2 Stars’ primary task being a monthly assessment of the Top 10 risks in ‘his’ risk register(s)?

falcon900

18th Oct 2019, 13:27

All very depressing, but it would seem to be an integral part of human nature when it comes to the blame game. By the same token, we should recognise that there does not always need to be someone to blame when something bad happens.Unforeseen and unimagined things do happen. People do not always observe and adhere to rules and procedures, Errors of judgement can be made innocently and in good faith,

As the name suggests, Duty holders have a duty , which includes, inter alia, the duty to act diligently and professionally, to exercise their professional judgement to the best of their ability, and to pay due care and attention to the matters in their charge. You can pick different words if you wish, but there is no getting away from the fact that they cannot be expected to be perfect in every respect at every moment. It should also be recognised that decisions are rarely taken against the standard of achieving zero risk. ALARP is much bandied about, but stop and think what it means ; As Low As Reasonably Practicable.Clearly there is a degree of subjectivity involved, and reasonable people could easily differ as to what is reasonably practicable without acting unprofessionally or dishonestly.

Taking as an example the decision to require Hawk Pilots to perform PEFATO training on a regular basis. How might a reasonable duty holder have gone about reaching this decision? Obviously, as a single engined aircraft, loss of engine power at takeoff is a serious problem, and whilst with modern equipment far from an everyday occurrence, still a measurable risk of it happening. What are the consequences when the risk occurs? Best case, pilot manages to land safely, next best crew eject safely aircraft crashes into an empty field, worst case, aircraft crashes into a built up area with crew aboard. Clearly the last of these is catastrophic, whilst the first is but a minor drama, and an outcome whose probability can be dramatically increased by pilot training. The Duty holder diligently and properly arrives at the conclusion that pilot training is warranted, and next sets out to determine the form this might take.
Simulator training is attractive, as it can be undertaken without exposing the pilot or the aircraft to the real risks associated with reducing power in an airborne aircraft for a PEFATO drill, so simulator training is mandated.
The duty holder is however concerned that this is not enough, and agonises over whether "real" PEFATO drills should be mandated. Deeply mindful of the Meteor asymetric landing fiasco, they are faced with trying to evaluate whether the risks from the training are greater than the risks they are trying to mitigate. Any attempt at such an evaluation requires the duty holder to make an estimate of the likely number of engine failures at take off and compare it with the likely number of casualties from PEFATO training. Given the size of the Hawk fleet, its length of service, the frequency with which PEFATO drills would be flown, and the number of things which could go wrong, it is inconceivable that the duty holder could have concluded that there would be no casualties from the introduction of mandatory PEFATO training.
The fact that we are now dealing with just such a casualty does not automatically mean that there is a duty holder to blame. Rather, we may be looking at an accident which was anticipated when the decision was made to implement PEFATO training, and however tragic, it does not negate the validity of the original calculation.

As it happens, there is much about this particular incident which in my view calls the duty holders into question, but I did want to offset some of what I felt was a drift in this thread towards the position that there was always and automatically a duty holder to blame.

sharpend

18th Oct 2019, 15:16

This has been a very thorough and comprehensive report. As always the MOD has covered all aspects, though I suspect, given the high profile of the unit that suffered the accident, it was possibly more comprehensive that maybe some others. The bottom line for the summery is basically that the pilot made a significant error during a practice EFATO which led to a stall too close to the ground to recover. Ejection was then the only solution and that was initiated rather late. Very sadly, a valuable engineer lost his life. The report mentions lack of continuity training and possible over work and tiredness. But of course it still mentions that the pilot was more than capable of carrying out this manoeuvre. During my 1000+ hours on the Hawk, I did many PEFATOS. I still do so with my Bulldog, including turnbacks. When I misjudge them (as one does) I throw them away good and early. I just wonder if in this case the fact that the pilot was subconsciously thinking that he 'Was a Red Arrow' and thus did not want to fail. There are no old bold pilots. Were there here any similarities with the Shoreham crash? Just a thought.

treadigraph

18th Oct 2019, 17:00

I just wonder if in this case the fact that the pilot was subconsciously thinking that he 'Was a Red Arrow' and thus did not want to fail

I once saw one of the Reds go round during the stream landing at the end of their display at the Biigin Hill Air Fair. Good decision and I somehow doubt that attitude has changed. At least I hope it hasn't.

RetiredBA/BY

18th Oct 2019, 17:02

When I misjudge them (as one does) I throw them away good and early. .

.......and that, gentlemen, is EXACTLY why in an earlier post I was suggesting a. GATE at low key, but no-one seems to have taken that onboard.

Perhaps AOC 22 group, and Commandant CFS ( once my student, then AC Roy Crompton, on his refresher course) may care to consider it.

Forget all the other stuff, keep it clear and simple so everyone knows the drill, it you dont make low key you SHALL throw it away, just as we long in the tooth airline pilots captains called it a day if we did not see the lights at DH, no argument or indecision, a GA was carried out.

Have to disagree about gliding, gliding-a Blanik or whatever or a large jet ( I used to practice PFLS in Canberras) the principles are exactly the same, only the numbers change.Its all about energy management.

The captain who saved the AC B 767 at Gimli was an experienced glider pilot, ( as was the captain of the Air Transat A 330 in the Azores double flameout incident ) whichI believe greatly helped them get the jets down in one piece without seriously injuring a single person.

PPRuNeUser0211

18th Oct 2019, 17:07

.......and that, gentlemen, is EXACTLY why in an earlier post I was suggesting a. GATE at high key, but no-one seems to have taken that onboard.

Perhaps AOC 22 group, and Commandant CFS ( once my student ) may care to consider it.

Given that from an PEFATO one never makes it to high key on any type how exactly would that work? It is widely discussed in the report that even low key for a fast type is extremely variable depending on what kind of conditions are assumed (weather, start point etc).

phil9560

18th Oct 2019, 17:33

Would it be practical to only perform these drills with an equally qualified pilot in the backseat.One with the authority to throw it away if felt necessary ? A sort of second opinion ?

weemonkey

18th Oct 2019, 22:58

I had a couple of back seat fast jet trips back in the 80's including on a post major servicing Jaguar airtest. I know for certain that I would have done the same as the unfortunate Cpl Bayliss. I would have reacted to a call from the pilot to eject but only experienced aircrew could appreciate that the aircraft was heading rapidly towards the ground and initiated ejection independently of the pilot within the limited timescale.

I have to concur, having been briefed, my objectives were firstly, not foul the cockpit, and in extremis, listen to the jockey.
Absolutely no SA on closure rates or "my" how big the trees suddenly are etc.

RIP brother.

One of my buddies went for a spin,Leu to St M but ended up in the drink 1 minute or so from t/o.
I have no idea if Command Ejection was involved but the flight profile was "different" from expected I believe.

Fate is Indeed the Hunter.

RetiredBA/BY

19th Oct 2019, 04:29

Given that from an PEFATO one never makes it to high key on any type how exactly would that work? It is widely discussed in the report that even low key for a fast type is extremely variable depending on what kind of conditions are assumed (weather, start point etc).I corrected that to LOW KEY. On the JP that was 1500, guess the Hawk is around 2000 plus. I make the point that the low key is a minimum height, its a Decision Height as to whether to continue. After the low key is made, it then becomes a matter of judgement as ever was. .

BEagle

19th Oct 2019, 07:44

I don't recall having been taught turnbacks on the JP (1974) at RAFC or on the Gnat or Hunter. Neither do I recall having been taught turnbacks on the Hawk during my 4FTS refresher, but they were practised by staff pilots at Chivenor, although I don't think that they were included in student training.

Radar PFL to pick up the visual PFL pattern was quite common at Chivenor - even solo. Whereas on the Hunter, the 1-in-1 was preferable. Not on the Gnat though, due to the vagaries of the time it might take for the undercarriage to lock down. Horses for courses!

We taught turnbacks on the Bulldog, but with strict height gates and initial IAS / AoB requirements. But the aim was to land on the aerodrome, rather than necessarily on the RW. One of those exercises in which the QFI must take control instantly if the student starts to overcook it, or fails to keep the IAS / AoB until the turn has been completed.

However, due to the nature of their operations, RAFAT pilots are perhaps more likely to have a birdstrike close enough to the aerodrome to be able to fly some form of forced landing pattern from downwind. Other Hawk operators might suffer birdstrikes at low level and high IAS away from the aerodrome, but the main risk is probably from a shattered canopy and bird remains entering the cockpit - ask Sharpend AFC! So, horses for courses again, I can see the sense of RAFAT practising PEFATOs, although only down to a point from which a go-around will be flown - perhaps 200ft a.a.l.?. The wisdom of such practice with a non-pilot in the other seat or immediately after a simulator ride I leave to others to debate.

Easy Street

19th Oct 2019, 08:10

... low key is a minimum height, its a Decision Height as to whether to continue...

Not on a fast type like the Hawk it isn’t. If there was a stated gate height for the good weather case then it would routinely be broken in the poor weather case where a fast flat profile is flown below a simulated cloud base, washing off excess speed in level flight until intercepting the normal profile. As already stated, this makes low key extremely variable. Sure, there could be a number of different minimum speed and height gates to choose between, but what if you have excess speed for your low key height? You need to extend the ground track slightly, which introduces room for misjudgement at a later stage than low key. Protecting against that requires a single gate at a point sufficiently late in the profile that all variations are covered. I make no judgement on the contract parameters other than to say that they’ve served well for student flying, and would join others in being more concerned about a PEFATO being carried out with inexperienced pax aboard.

Bob Viking

19th Oct 2019, 11:29

I am deliberately staying well out of some elements of the discussion in this thread.

I would like to clear up a couple of things here though.

I believe some posters are blurring the lines between PFLs and PEFATOs.

Before I continue, some caveats:

I haven’t flown the T1 since 2011.

I am not and never have been a member of RAFAT so can’t speak for their SOPs and I doubt very much that any of their number are about to chime in.

I wasn’t at or near Valley at the time of the accident.

I have not chatted with the pilot since so I have no more idea than anyone else on here about the circumstances.

Circling PFLs consist of a high key at 4500’, crossing the upwind end of the runway (the exact point depends on the runway length) at 90 degrees whereupon the gear is usually selected down.

Low key is abeam the landing threshold at 2500’ on a reciprocal heading.

Down flap is selected on finals when landing is assured.

There are minimum speeds specified for every configuration but, since they would be slightly different to my current mark of Hawk, I won’t put my neck on the line here.

Pilots are trained to intercept the pattern at any point and to make a decision (the contract) no later than 500’. As mentioned by another poster, Radar PFLs are also flown to arrive at the threshold at various heights (1200, 800 and 500 for RAFAT) but with usually 300 knots. SOPs then allow the final turn to be intercepted with gear and flap deployed at suitable times.

This system has worked very well for at least as long as I first started flying the Hawk (2002).

PEFATOs on the T1 were usually to an alternate runway and ‘turn backs’ were not flown on the T1 during my time. Of course this has a distinct Valley slant to it.

‘Reciprocal PEFATOs’ are practised on the T2 with a minimum of 300 knots to initiate them.

I do not know what additional profiles are practised on RAFAT.

For interest the T2 is able to fly straight in PFLs in any weather due to its improved avionics. An MDH is used in case of IMC.

As for mandating gate heights I am actually against it.

As an example, an RCAF Hawk (with a foreign pilot) had a genuine engine emergency a few years ago and reached high key with several thousand feet to spare. Since the teaching there was to stick to gate heights he elected to orbit to lose height. You can guess what’s coming. He ejected just short of the runway despite having had height to spare in the first instance.

Constant sight line angle and a solid understanding of the ‘contract’ is a well established technique and is safe.

BV

RetiredBA/BY

19th Oct 2019, 17:47

OK, so do tell me , how many. EFATOs have been successfully concluded , and how many , airframes and lives, have been lost in training for this event ? Lets make a realistic comparison. ... and ROD of 4,700 fpm, 50 deg angle of bank, at 345 feet at 147 k. In a swept wing jet, seriously ? Never saw anything remotely like that even in the JP.

and Beagle never saw turnbacks in the JP, at Cranwell because we had stopped them long before 1974, the risk outweighed the potential benefits, too dangerous..

I’ ll leave you guys to it !

wiggy

19th Oct 2019, 19:47

.and Beagle never saw turnbacks in the JP, at Cranwell because we had stopped them long before 1974, the risk outweighed the potential benefits, too dangerous..

Just to be clear I assume you mean stopped doing them with students on board? As I recall it we were still teaching turnbacks to student QFIs at CFS on the MK 3 and MK 5 JP as late as ‘89, but as I recall it they were never to practised by QFIs at the BFTSs with a “real” student onboard.

This JP trivia has I am sure little if anything to do with the main thrust of the thread other than perhaps highlighting that there has always been some debate about the risk vs. benefits of practising some manoeuvres.

NutLoose

20th Oct 2019, 00:44

RetiredBA/BY

20th Oct 2019, 05:29

Just to be clear I assume you mean stopped doing them with students on board? As I recall it we were still teaching turnbacks to student QFIs at CFS on the MK 3 and MK 5 JP as late as ‘89, but as I recall it they were never to practised by QFIs at the BFTSs with a “real” student onboard.

This JP trivia has I am sure little if anything to do with the main thrust of the thread other than perhaps highlighting that there has always been some debate about the risk vs. benefits of practising some manoeuvres.

Trivia, really ?
They were not done at CFS or SORF even though our “ students” were all qualified pilots, some highly so. That was 1970 to 73..

Bob Viking

20th Oct 2019, 06:31

I don’t think anyone is trying to belittle your experience but maybe questioning the relevance a little.

You seem to think that the RAF of today is willfully ignoring years of hard won experience.

You also speak as if you were the only person to ever serve as a standards QFI.

I am about to start my sixth consecutive Hawk tour (on four different marks of Hawk in three countries). All of them have involved at least an element of serving as part of standards. I feel sure Wiggy can make similar claims.

Nobody is trying to ignore the lessons of the past. It’s just that, as aircraft types change and time progresses, some things will inevitably change. Not always for the worse, but not always for the better either.

You can also rest assured that the current generation take these things very seriously and do not rush to hasty decisions about any element of any profiles/SOPs/procedures.

BV

BEagle

20th Oct 2019, 07:14

CAEBr

20th Oct 2019, 07:25

I remember a crash 70-80's time period, possibly a Hawk and after a wire strike I think, the engineer ejected without pilot calling too and was killed.

Nutty,
Think you are referring to the RAFAT transit flight, where having got airborne with his circus engineer in the back (presumably as SC) he hit a wire, the engineer ejected and the pilot subsequently landed.
CAEBr

orca

20th Oct 2019, 07:48

Hi Beagle,

I would struggle to think of a PEFATO as a high risk exercise. From memory (of having messed up one in particular) you had to ‘get on with it’, sort your energy out and then make a couple of judgement calls as to where you were going to intercept the pattern, where to take gear and flap and when to curtail the exercise. I found all the emergency landings in a Hawk to be good exercises in the sense that they were a good work out, a useful handling exercise and allowed me to work on my airmanship. I never considered them to be high risk, but then my personal disposition was to chuck away an approach before attempting aggressive handling to rescue it. Just me but I was genuinely surprised to read the findings of the SI report.

RetiredBA/BY

20th Oct 2019, 10:35

I don’t think anyone is trying to belittle your experience but maybe questioning the relevance a little.

You seem to think that the RAF of today is willfully ignoring years of hard won experience.

You also speak as if you were the only person to ever serve as a standards QFI.

BV

No not at all, but just comparing my real world experience of how it WAS done, and why it was changed with the event in question.

It seems our opinions may differ but I got to the end of my career without breaking anything, ( well, not after my blamefree ejection ) !

Perhaps we can agree to disagree without you taking things out of context.

Back to the beach here in MRU !

H Peacock

20th Oct 2019, 10:49

In 2004, the RAF's last Canberra accident killed 2 pilots whilst they were practising a wholly unnecessary training event - a night asymmetric touch-and-go. With no representative simulator available, it would be quite reasonable for asymmetric full stop landings and asymmetric go-arounds from above VCH, but an asymmetric touch-and-go (asymmetric touchdown, take-off again under symmetric thrust) seems like a risk too far in my view.

Oh, so wrong Beagle!
When conducting Sim Asy flight in any jet aircraft, once you've closed the throttles in the flare, you are symmetric again. An Avon at idle needed care whenever it was accelerated, but not as a function of how long it had been at idle. If you had 2 Avons that were either side of the centreline then any T&G needed care; WJ866 crashed because of what happened after it landed from the Asy approach - not before! Furthermore, the Asy GA was the real handing issue. Whilst we had to complete many of these events as BCRs, it was the latter that was always the most demanding and therefore potentially dangerous exercise, especially IMC. That said, if you handled the Canberra iaw the Aircrew Manual, it would rarely let you down.

BEagle

20th Oct 2019, 13:40

You misunderstand. Just what real world event would cause any need to roll from a premeditated asymmetric landing - apart from saving time during training, which is hardly relevant.

Wander00

20th Oct 2019, 15:10

Roller from assymetric in the Canberra a bit of a bottom clencher as I recall

sycamore

20th Oct 2019, 20:40

I`m with Beags on that asymm. roller...Whoever dreamed that up should have been shot.....with a Canberra starter cartridge....!

Thud105

20th Oct 2019, 22:13

Is anyone on here familiar with the phrase 'practicing bleeding'? I think there's never been any future in 'practice turn backs' or 'asymmetric go-arounds'. More people die practicing for these rare occurrences, than in actual events. Furthermore, PEFATOs completely fail to factor in the 'startle factor'' when the PEFATO is instigated by the pilot. All IMHO of course.

Bob Viking

21st Oct 2019, 05:09

I would say the exact opposite. PEFATOs effectively remove the ‘startle effect’. I honestly feel that my reaction time in the event that I were faced with a real engine failure at just such a time would not be greatly increased. That is because of training.

I have had a few ‘moments’ whilst flying and on each occasion my instinctive reactions have been correct and almost immediate (the video in each case was great proof of this). Again, this is because of training.

I assume your thought process has been triggered slightly by Sullenberger’s actions over the Hudson and maybe even by a particular scene in the associated movie.

In his case the ‘startle effect’ was real because he probably hadn’t practised that exact scenario multiple times. Although I feel sure he would have practised other engine-out scenarios.

I am not the oracle on such matters but in my opinion PEFATOs are not inherently dangerous. Some people will make mistakes but that is true of many flight regimes.

On an annual basis there are possibly (I am not about to do an analysis of all accidents but I am basing this claim on my knowledge of recent accidents) more deaths worldwide due to air combat training than there are through landing accidents. Do we stop live air combat training as a result?

I have seen knee-jerk reactions to accidents in several Air Forces. Sometimes they are necessary, but mostly they are not.

We do a challenging job and part of the risk is that sometimes we make mistakes. Our first instinct should not always to be to stop doing the hard things. I believe that is a slippery slope.

People who question how many real EFATOs have been attempted vs the number of crashes practicing them have a valid point though. It’s a toughie and I don’t know the correct answer. Luckily, my job is not to make policy.

BV

orca

21st Oct 2019, 06:22

I always feel the ‘how many has it saved vs how many has it cost’ argument to be too simplistic.

No life is replaceable obviously but I do believe we would be better looking at ‘how many has the exercise benefitted’.

In slack handfuls my course would have flown siro 30 simulated engine out approaches in the Hawk each. Maybe more but that feels about right. There were 10 of us. That’s 300 training serials that taught us a lot, which passed without incident, and prepared us reasonably well (won’t overstate it) for something that thankfully never happened. A short time after I left Valley someone was faced with a EFATO situation and (from memory) did exactly the right thing which was to attempt a landing and eject in time.

To me it would appear odd not to train to save ones back from ejection and the local populace the chance of collecting a jet - with the obvious caveat that in both training and actual emergency one curtails the exercise at the appropriate point.

sharpend

21st Oct 2019, 09:10

Roller from assymetric in the Canberra a bit of a bottom clencher as I recall

Yup, agree. flash back to 1967. I rolled on a CFS trapper ride in a Canberra T4 at Akrotiri. He pulled the throttle on me just after take-off. We just missed the control tower by feet & he made me fly on one engine all the way to Nicosia. My leg hurt for a week.

Thud105

21st Oct 2019, 10:39

Two very well reasoned posts Bob and Orca, although I would still claim that if you instigate the PEFATO and you're solo, there is no startle factor at all. And of course, the Real Deal here is the aircraft. I've not flown a Hawk, but guess its quite benign (for a jet). Did the RAF do PEFATOs in Gnats and Jet Provosts? I'm guessing that in the JP it was do-able, but unwise in a Gnat? Similarly, I'm sure I've read somewhere that a big cause of the horrendous Meteor accident rate (almost one every other day in a particularly bad year) was down to practicing asymmetric flight near the ground in an aircraft with actually quite reliable engines. TOTALLY agree with avoiding kneejerk reactions though Bob, and also that flight training is a harsh environment and that, sometimes, a student does need to know fear - or at least profound concern. Otherwise they may not grasp the gravity of the situation! Finally I cannot argue with "the obvious caveat that in both training and actual emergency one curtails the exercise at the appropriate point." If we were in court Orca, you could quite easily say "the defence rests"!

roving

21st Oct 2019, 12:18

Wearing my lawyers wig I wonder whether in the case of single engined jet the acronym PEFATO (partial engine failure after take-off) is used accurately.. What is partial about powering down the only source of propulsion?

Isn't total EFATO. a more accurate description..

total EFATO,.]

Thud105

21st Oct 2019, 12:21

I thought the P meant 'practice'.

Chris Kebab

21st Oct 2019, 12:43

Me too. Partial?? I've aways though it was practice..and that's a long time!

RetiredBA/BY

21st Oct 2019, 12:53

To me it would appear odd not to train to save ones back from ejection and the local populace the chance of collecting a jet - with the obvious caveat that in both training and actual emergency one curtails the exercise at the appropriate point.

So how doe one define the appropriate point ?

My suggestion of low key as a “gate” ( and if you cant make the height for low key due cloud cover, extra speed at a lower height, similar total energy, would work) was jumped on by Viking.

If you dont make low key, go around. If you do, continue to, say, a min height before GA of 500. Two gates.

We civilian guys had a low key on EVERY approach, needing to be stable, configured etc., by 1000 feet or its a go around. Very little discretion there

Why not a similar stipulation for a PFL, it is after all, only training and presumably on a PRACTICE, the engine is still running making a go around routine.

Absolutely no need to stop training, but limit the risk, which, as this fatal accident has shown, does exist under the current procedures.

212man

21st Oct 2019, 12:59

Me too. Partial?? I've aways though it was practice..and that's a long time!

You are correct - of course - and it is in the Glossary table on page 1.1 - 4 in the report.

Wander00

21st Oct 2019, 14:40

EFATO, ISTR practised in Chipmunk, JP, Gnat and Canberra. Only one that potentially changed the colour of my trousers was in the Canberra, initially. After that, without being complacent, practice made perfect, or nearly so. Sadly, if you did get it wrong, it would kill you, and often the crew too.

Lordflasheart

21st Oct 2019, 15:37

....
I don't suppose the North-West Wales Coroner will be greatly bovvered by the loss of one of Her Majesty's forty-year-old Hawks. Nor I guess, will he be officially concerned with the near death experience of the pilot.

The Coroner's duty is presumably to take evidence and rule on the cause of death of Corporal Bayliss. I imagine he is not bound to investigate. His verdict may be a simple one-line finding, or a narrative, or (very unlikely) even be provided by a jury.

It will be interesting to see who turns up and says what, or not, to the Coroner, and what time-scale the Coroner expects to provide for the resumed inquest. Will he look beyond the simple words and authority of the SI ? Will there be legal representation for the interested parties ?

This time there doesn't seem to be a deus ex ejector seat machina to miraculously take the blame via an avenging HSE, but that doesn't mean that any possible contribution or blame will be correctly assigned, given the MoD's penchant for re-writing or concealing history.

We seem to have strayed from the OP's likely purpose in starting the thread but I have a feeling the tale has some way to run.

LFH

....

flown-it

21st Oct 2019, 15:47

Wander00.
Canberra and PEFATO.
Don't recall if you were at RAF Watton when a crew did a night PEFATO and the PF applied the wrong rudder? (He had his hand on the throttles and the instructor tweaked the one before pulling the other). Violent roll and the nav ejected and was killed. The back seats of the Canberra with that non-frangible hatch were not pleasant.

pettinger93

21st Oct 2019, 15:52

When the losses/deaths that result from practice exercises exceed those from the actual events practised for, you do have to wonder why they continue to practice. The RN submarine service used to practice escapes from submerged submarines, using emergency breathing apparatus in a 100 foot high water-filled tower at Portsmouth. They lost 1 or 2 submariners each year, either killed or permanently disabled, until they worked out that the last death from a RN submarine was in the 1950's, and they had lost more men practicing since then than had died in the last event.
So they stopped practicing in the tower, and worked out another way of getting the men out, from a greater depth than was possible before, by using a rescue sub.

BEagle

21st Oct 2019, 21:45

Once upon a time, 'practice' engine failure meant that the engine was shut down. If it was retarded to idle, that was known as a 'simulated' engine failure.

EFATO was certainly NEVER practised in the Gnat on my course. It wouldn't have been a question of just flying the jet; an engine failure would also require completion of the STUPRECC drill and continuing in 'manual'. For those who may not know, that would have been very difficult and highly unlikely to lead to anything except an ejection.

Fortissimo

21st Oct 2019, 22:33

....
I don't suppose the North-West Wales Coroner will be greatly bovvered by the loss of one of Her Majesty's forty-year-old Hawks. Nor I guess, will he be officially concerned with the near death experience of the pilot.

The Coroner's duty is presumably to take evidence and rule on the cause of death of Corporal Bayliss. I imagine he is not bound to investigate. His verdict may be a simple one-line finding, or a narrative, or (very unlikely) even be provided by a jury.

....

The Coroner is not bound to investigate. Direction given by the Lord Chief Justice after the Norfolk Coroner demanded the CVFDR from a helicopter accident (same sitting as West Sussex police wanting the AAIB’s Shoreham witness statements), was that Coroners should only conduct their own investigation if they had evidence that the specialist investigation was fundamentally flawed or incomplete.

Whatever your views on the independence of the DAIB, I don’t think you could make a legally defensible argument that the SI was fundamentally flawed in its conduct or conclusions, or that it was incomplete.

Bob Viking

22nd Oct 2019, 03:35

flighthappens

22nd Oct 2019, 04:40

What you’re suggesting is not vastly different from what is already done.

This accident was on a PEFATO where there would not normally ever be a low key. The 500’ contract decision (it really is not complicated like some on here believe) is the final decision point.

During a circling PFL pattern high and low key are gates of sorts but they are not, and do not need to be, mandatory. Pilots judgment and assessment of their energy state is sufficient. Varying the point at which gear and flaps are selected or adapting the ground track are all options. The contract is always there as the final check where a go around or an ejection (there should be sufficient energy to raise the nose to level flight first) can be made.

I don’t think we need to agree to disagree. I think we are basically in agreement.

BV

i have seen footage of a very similar incident (missed the ground by not much), also on a hawk, where the pilot got the visual cue wrong, which led to a false sense of energy. Instead of being at low key and ~2.5-3k they were half the distance from the runway and half the altitude. This led to them being low and “tight”, and in the end were very close to hitting the ground.

I must admit when I first read the numbers that R3 gave himself (as presented in the SI) I had a sharp intake of breath... it was not alluded to in the report however the visual cue, particularly in a non HUD aircraft could give one a false sense of where they are in time and space...

EXFIN

22nd Oct 2019, 08:31

I know Valley very well although my Hawk time was only AFT & TWU. Aircraft there regularly fly PEFATOs to R19/01 from the longer R13/31, the only time you tend to see a return to the take-off runway is with engine problems resulting in a fixed throttle setting approach, think in the ‘80s it was normally ‘low oil pressure’ etc. The report only mentions that the Sim duty was 45mins instead of the usual 1hr but I can’t help thinking that maybe part of it was either contentious or did not go to plan on an EFATO if flown in the Sim. Would it be a case of trying it out in the real aircraft to make sure that it would work? I flew numerous Pax on the Fin but never would contemplate carrying out simulated emergencies with them. Lastly, although we didn’t fly PEFATOs on the JP 5 we did do Glide Breaks which were probably the closest scenario I.e. on the break throttle idle until touchdown using energy management, configuring as required.

falcon900

22nd Oct 2019, 08:37

Sticking with the risk V reward theme, the number of PEFATO drills performed over the years compared with the apparent number of accidents would suggest that the way it is being carried out is not inherently or outrageously unsafe. The missing piece of data to conclude any assessment of risk V reward is the number of REAL engine failures at takeoff there have been. It would seem reasonable to extend the total to widen the definition to power loss at takeoff, to include birdstrike etc.. Can anyone hazard a guess as to an approximate number?
The more I reflect on this accident, and the contents of the SI, the more I am drawn to question something which isnt covered in the SI: what could have caused such an experienced pilot not abandon the manoeuvre sooner?
As well as what has been discussed re height and speed, by not flying the downwind leg parallel to the runway, he didnt have room to make the turn, even if he had had the energy; indeed trying to overcome this caused him to lose more energy. The human factors analysis doesnt address the question of whether the onset of press-on-itis was in any way caused by the fact that he was a newby Red Arrow. Were there any consequences, real or imagined from "screwing up" a piece of basic training? Had he had any difficulty with this manoeuvre in the past? Could he have repeated the manoeuvre that day, or would it have required another sortie to maintain / achieve currency? Did having an engineer in the back mean that word of a failed PEFATO would have been widespread in the squadron? These seem like very relevant human factors to me.

Timelord

22nd Oct 2019, 09:52

Whilst the discussion of the risks / merits / techniques of this PEFATO apply only to single engine fast jets, and since I somehow can’t see them practicing this in the F35, this debate is strictly a Hawk debate. The HF issues apply to every type, and I am sure that every type experiences the sort of administrative overload that, at least partly, affected R3. I recently heard of pilots on an operational deployment being used to guard the gate IN ADDITION to their op flying , and of a pilot on a course having nowhere to sleep because the accommodation booking process was too labarynthine for him to complete in the time he had. Does the catering on Op Shader yet manage to provide a hot meal before a 7 hour trip?

These issues need need to be addressed across the whole RAF by people that understand the requirements of an op tempo flying program before everyone leaves or, heaven forbid, has more accidents. It may cost money, but training pilots costs more.

Thud105

22nd Oct 2019, 09:56

Beagle's post re the STUPRECC drill in the Gnat (had to Google it!) has raised some interesting points in my mind. Essentially a PEFATO is NOT an EFATO, and could actually lead a pilot into believing turning back after the engine quits is a good idea, when it really isn't. Firstly, with the engine idling all the systems still work and secondly, at flight idle the engine must be producing some thrust. Not a lot, but possibly just enough to be the difference between a hard landing in the undershoot and a ball of flame in the approach lights. All IMHO of course.

Bob Viking

22nd Oct 2019, 10:03

I am only speaking for Hawk here but you needn’t worry. All the required systems will still be fully available. Hydraulics, electrics, avionics (such as they are in the T1 - the T2 has an APU and hence all avionics would be available after a short delay) would all be available via back up systems.

The engine at idle does produce a minimal amount of thrust but not enough to really notice. A ceased engine may produce more drag but a windmilling engine would not.

All of this means that the aircraft will still fly and, whilst performance will not be identical, the practice will be very similar to the real thing.

The techniques and rules will be exactly the same. Instead of a go around decision at 500’ it becomes an ejection decision. The minimum speed that pilots fly will provide enough energy to level the aircraft and eject if initiated at the correct point.

BV

beardy

22nd Oct 2019, 11:09

. The engine at idle does produce a minimal amount of thrust but not enough to really notice. A ceased engine may produce more drag but a windmilling engine would not.

That's interesting. I always thought that a windmilling engine had more drag than a seized engine since it is extracting energy from the airstream.

Bob Viking

22nd Oct 2019, 11:21

You may be correct. I’m just going on what I have been told and have never really applied too much thought as to whether it was true or not.

If I am ever unlucky enough to find out I will let you know.

BV

Thud105

22nd Oct 2019, 11:59

Thanks Bob, although I still think you may be surprised by the difference that an idling engine (which is producing thrust) and a windmilling engine (which produces drag) makes.

sycamore

22nd Oct 2019, 14:46

Some basic figures might help ; 180kts ,45*bank,Vs 137kts(115 basic)180* turn diameter 5800ft,G1.4,Time 30secs.
50*Vs143kts G1.6,D 4840 ft, T25 secs;/; 55* Vs152 Kts ,G 1.7 ,D 4100 ft, T21 secs;/;60*Vs 163kts, D 3330 ft, T 18 secs;/;63* Vs 172 kts, G 2.2, D 3000 FT,T15 secs..These figures are taken from a website and Nomogram of `Turning Performance`,and for level flight,but close enough for 8-10* glide angles.
At the start of the d/w leg R3 was 5000 +_ 100 ft from RW31; at the end ,commencing the turn ,he was appx 4300 ft displaced,with an approx. G/S of 190 kts,and a x/wind.,both of which had not been compensated for,unless he was using aggressive bank angles,and an increase in airspeed to compensate. Putting the gear/flaps down was the end-game.....
IF otoh he had turned for a L/H D/W for R/W 01,it would have been `easy`,and may have also worked for r/w 31,as his `offset`track would be approx. 5300ft.... Speed is life.....lower the nose in gliding turns....
OK,bonedome on,nose down, avoiding incoming ,!!

Easy Street

22nd Oct 2019, 14:54

beardy

22nd Oct 2019, 16:00

Seized jet engines definitely create more drag than windmilling. Think of the windmilling engine as offering less resistance to the passage of air; it only extracts enough energy from the airflow to overcome rotational friction (= not a lot at windmilling RPM). The seized engine effectively presents a flat plate to the airflow, so while there is no work done on the shaft, there is plenty done on the whole airframe by the intake-sized airbrake thus ‘extended’. I’ve suffered both types of failure (fortunately in twin-engined aircraft) and the difference in thrust requirement from the remaining engine was very noticeable.
Interesting to hear of your experiences. I suppose the rotational friction includes the ancillaries (pumps, generators etc..) and of course the compressor.
I wonder what the procedure was when ferrying the 5th engine on the 747? But I suppose they may have had problems lubricating the shafts. Similarly for dead engine ferry flights.

Vendee

22nd Oct 2019, 17:14

Interesting to hear of your experiences. I suppose the rotational friction includes the ancillaries (pumps, generators etc..) and of course the compressor.
I wonder what the procedure was when ferrying the 5th engine on the 747? But I suppose they may have had problems lubricating the shafts. Similarly for dead engine ferry flights.

Don't know about 747 etc but going back to the BAe 146/RJ engines, both spools were gagged for ferry flights to combat the lubrication issues you mention.

Distant Voice

23rd Oct 2019, 10:52

The Coroner is not bound to investigate. Direction given by the Lord Chief Justice after the Norfolk Coroner demanded the CVFDR from a helicopter accident (same sitting as West Sussex police wanting the AAIB’s Shoreham witness statements), was that Coroners should only conduct their own investigation if they had evidence that the specialist investigation was fundamentally flawed or incomplete.

Whatever your views on the independence of the DAIB, I don’t think you could make a legally defensible argument that the SI was fundamentally flawed in its conduct or conclusions, or that it was incomplete.

The coroner will determine the cause of death, which is outside the ToR for the SI. He may also call the ODH for justification of the ALARP safety statement. Also, inquests are Article 2 compliant, SIs are not.

DV

SATCOS WHIPPING BOY

24th Oct 2019, 14:20

I have finally caught up with all discussion here and am truly disheartened to read that report. what strikes me is that the post #64 by Typhoondriver sums up my thoughts. It is so sad that past lessons regarding secondary duties and distraction have not be heeded.

Over twenty years ago I saw on a regular basis niff naff and triv taking someone's mind off their primary task.

The first was a young and newly qualified ATC Director coming on to shift. As Sup I knew the afternoon was going to be busy and asked what was on his mind. He had just had a bollocking from the PMC for not getting the Mess Minutes distributed on time and that he (the PMC) wanted them by close of play. I told him not to worry and that I would sort it, which I did pointing out to said PMC that it was wholly unacceptable to put people under undue pressure, especially when their primary role involved flight safety. The PMC seemed to have no concept of what was at stake and I told him as much. I got 1/2 a bollocking from SATCO and 1/2 praise too for standing up and speaking my mind. It wasn't the only time I had to step in and bring some sanity / reality back to the situation. (it was how I got the Whipping Boy monicker).

The second was at a pre-flight briefing involving a few jags and some visiting aircraft (might have been when the migs came over) Anyhow, we were just about to start and one of the JP's came running in a tad flustered. OC Ops tapped his watch and asked what the delay was. The JP had just been contacted by an admin in PSF asking for some paperwork or such and that it was needed by OC PSF by the end of the day as the admin assistant was going on leave. OC Ops apologised to the group, picked up the phone and ripped said admin a new one. He told them their leave was cancelled and that he expected them in his office first thing in the morning for a "chat".

We all had our fair share of secondary duties and sometimes you had to make it known that they were "secondary" and unimportant; if it was important then it should be someone else's Primary duty. It is extremely sad that here we have a loss of a life, a pilot's career in the balance and an aircraft lost ...for what? Just because the services saved a few quid on employing someone to do the basic admin tasks - as Typhoondriver succinctly put it - counting the sandwiches. Personally I think it is shameful.

dmcg

24th Oct 2019, 19:46

BM are advertising for FTRS roles to assist in carrying out some associated duties. Hopefully, this will allow controllers to get back on console and do what they do best. I hope the initiative is successful, however, as highlighted on other threads, FTRS has its issues.

condor17

25th Oct 2019, 07:50

Beardy and Vendee ,
Seem to remember VC10s had a streamlining nose cone for 5th Pod , possibly the 747 ; but not sure on 74 .

2 engine ferryflight on a HS Trident , yes it did happen I still have the tie !
The dead engine was '' Spragged '' or was it '' Sragged '' [ broom handle bolted thru' from front to back to stop rotation . Not sure if drag , or oil pressure reasons ] .
V1, V2 calcultations interesting ; as was our ''escape route '' , down the river Bollin valley from Manch's old rwy 24. Then G/A point , technique and assured landing at LHR .

rgds condor .

beardy

25th Oct 2019, 16:13

Bob Viking

25th Oct 2019, 16:49

beardy

25th Oct 2019, 17:10

I am certainly not claiming to be the expert on the matter and am still open to persuasion either way. However, the report you quote is for turbojet engines at high mach numbers from the 1950s.

What I am saying is that there are too many discrepancies to convince me just yet.

BV
Look at the graphs, the drag measurements start at .2 Mach. Even a high bypass engine has, at its core, a turbojet. So I think that the results can be applied to modern jet engines.
Even as far back as the 1950`s physics was the same as now, the date is not relevant.

just another jocky

25th Oct 2019, 18:00

...a windmilling engine is high drag, higher than idle thrust or a seized engine.

Must admit, that's always been my understanding.

The incoming airflow has to drive the engine to rotate which creates a lot of drag, whereas at idle, some of the turning force is taken up by the engine's idle thrust. In a seized engine, there are no moving parts for the airflow to turn so it passes through with drag only from the stationary parts.

Bob Viking

25th Oct 2019, 18:10

beardy

25th Oct 2019, 19:04

When I opened the link I didn’t get all that information.

I will take your word for it and hope I never have to find out for real.

What I would add is that, having practiced gliding in a variety of aircraft fits, the maintenance of a constant sight line angle and careful energy management will let you know how you’re getting on. Therefore I believe that even a more draggy engine would be no worse than gliding in a heavy fit and sensible decisions can be made in any case.

BV
You are absolutely correct about constant sight line angle. As you point out it is important to practice with a variety of weights, speeds and starting positions and IMHO drag conditions. All too frequently the exercise is initiated close to the promulgated minima with little regard to reality, it becomes a challenge to succeed rather than decide what is the safe option.
It became apparent from a friend who landed a propeller driven aircraft that a stopped prop gave a much longer glide after round out than he had anticipated. He was lucky he had a runway, not a field. The Hawk is not as heavily laden a wing as a true swept wing aircraft and would glide very well with a seized engine. At what speed would it cease to windmill?

It's good to have time, without secondary duties, to think about these things.

DCThumb

25th Oct 2019, 19:24

I’m fairly sure that my memory is correct in that on the JP5, during PFLs, some QFIs used the airbrakes to simulate the drag of a failed engine..... one assumes (dangerous I know) that this was based on experience?

LOMCEVAK

25th Oct 2019, 20:09

One other factor that influences energy management and sightline angle and which has not yet been mentioned is wind. When we cleared the Tucano to fly in a 40 kt surface wind one of the most interesting points was that when using the normal 1500 ft Low Key abeam the Initial Aim Point it was not possible to make a touchdown at the IAP; a 2000 ft Low Key was required, almost independent of the wind direction.

When the Hawk T1 entered service the bad weather engine failure profile taught was the '1 in 1' profile of the Hunter whereby you were vectored towards the runway centreline and when established on it and the range to touchdown in nms equaled the height in thousands of feet then you lowered the landing gear . Airspeed was then varied around the nominal glide speed (165 KIAS) to stay on the '1 in 1' slope and when visual with the runway the flaps were lowered when required to make the desired touchdown point. However, although this worked satisfactorily with idle thrust, at some stage it was realised/identified/confirmed that with a windmilling engine the drag was too high and it could not maintain the '1 in 1' profile. The result was that the radar Forced Landing pattern was developed. I am not sure precisely when but the radar FL/PFL was not taught when I was a student at Valley on the Hawk in early 1978.

Most engine problems for real do not require an engine shutdown nor involve a total loss of thrust which often makes diagnosis difficult and choosing the optimum course of action difficult. In some cases, what is needed from the engine is to drive the electrical and/or hydraulic system more than to generate thrust. Typically, a low power setting will load an engine less than a high one such that the engine may be kept running for longer at idle, or a little above it, and favouring a precautionary forced landing pattern to a fixed power approach if feasible (although this is very type specific). This becomes a critical decision following an EFATO; do you turn back to the reciprocal of the take-off runway, climb to/decelerate towards low key or fly a fixed power approach? The best decision will be on a case-by-case basis but practising all options will give you the best chance of success. However, if you lose more aircraft practising some of the more marginal profiles such as turnbacks than you will save if you get it right for real then the practise is, perhaps, not justified. The pros and cons of practising EFATOs, turnbacks, low energy PFLs etc is not black and white.

Easy Street

25th Oct 2019, 21:54

This was supplied on the tech log forum :

Windmilling drag (http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/report.php?NID=5103)

So when practicing a turnback be aware that in the real case a windmilling engine is high drag, higher than idle thrust or a seized engine.

The study considers internal drag of the engine only and acknowledges that overspill of air from the intake can affect airframe drag. As airflow through the windmilling engine is reported as 3x greater than the seized engine, that’s potentially a lot of air to redirect. In a podded engine with aerodynamically shaped lips I can quite imagine that a ‘blob’ of slower air in the intake would act as quite an effective fairing to divert surplus airflow around the nacelle in streamlined fashion. What I know from experience is that the angular, aerodynamically-complex maw of the Tornado didn’t like having a seized engine inside it... probably not helped by most of the spilled air immediately colliding with the external stores and landing gear (admittedly not as much of a problem for the Hawk, but probably still more than for a podded type).

sycamore

25th Oct 2019, 22:37

DCT,T/O flap was used on JPs to simulate drag; airbrakes destroy the lift and you resemble a slightly streamlined brick..
Even NACA cant do the maths ..3.5 sq ft gives 56 lib drag /sq.ft ,not 5.6....engine would be about similar to Strikey or Dominie Viper....
LOM,from memory of the Hunter ,210 clean to 3nm on a 1:1,gear,to 175/180, flap about 1.5, then start heaving...as it would be all in manual of course......

beardy

26th Oct 2019, 07:22

The study considers internal drag of the engine only and acknowledges that overspill of air from the intake can affect airframe drag. As airflow through the windmilling engine is reported as 3x greater than the seized engine, that’s potentially a lot of air to redirect. In a podded engine with aerodynamically shaped lips I can quite imagine that a ‘blob’ of slower air in the intake would act as quite an effective fairing to divert surplus airflow around the nacelle in streamlined fashion. What I know from experience is that the angular, aerodynamically-complex maw of the Tornado didn’t like having a seized engine inside it... probably not helped by most of the spilled air immediately colliding with the external stores and landing gear (admittedly not as much of a problem for the Hawk, but probably still more than for a podded type).
It's rare for modern engines to seize without damage, any damage would affect the internal drag!
At least in the Tornado there wouldn't have been excessive asymmetry.

LOMCEVAK

26th Oct 2019, 10:43

LOM,from memory of the Hunter ,210 clean to 3nm on a 1:1,gear,to 175/180, flap about 1.5, then start heaving...as it would be all in manual of course......

Hunter: glide clean at 210 KIAS, on intercepting the 1 in 1 slope select gear down and fly a nominal 210 KIAS, varying between 180 and 240 KIAS to stay on the 1 in 1 slope. Select flap in the latter stages to reduce speed to 170 KIAS as you start the flare. For practise, to simulate windmilling engine drag select 2 notches/23 deg flap and 5500 RPM (T7/Avon 100) or 5300 RPM (F6/Avon 200).

Lordflasheart

26th Oct 2019, 23:12

...
High Approach or Low Approach ? It would seem from the narrative in 1.3.6 onwards, that this expression refers to whether the practice is terminated early or late on the approach, as opposed to completing the exercise with perhaps a runway touchdown.

Explanatory footnote 11 at the bottom of page 1.3 -2 quotes Valley Flying Orders as "....if a PFL is not planned to touch-and-go, a high approach should be initiated by 300 ft QFE. .."

Question -

Is 'initiated' a typo for 'terminated' ? Or are there some other words missing from Note 11 ?
For instance '... if a PFL is not planned to touch-and-go, a go-around from a high approach should be initiated by 300 ft QFE ...'
Or is the FOB quote actually correct ?

LFH
...

Lordflasheart

2nd Nov 2019, 22:40

...
Ground track diagrams -

I can't find any reference to, or mention of the information sources used to determine the quite precise ground track diagrams exhibited in the SI.

Nothing seemingly relevant (such as a recorded radar track) seems to be listed at " 1.4.10 " The Panel had access to the following evidence: ...."

Request - Can anyone kindly point me to anywhere in the SI, or otherwise explain where the information comes from that allows these excellent diagrams to be drawn and exhibited, or are they ABG ?

LFH

....

sycamore

3rd Nov 2019, 11:24

Think it is a combination of radar track,txpdr,and aircraft GPS....

rlsbutler

3rd Nov 2019, 15:02

Lordflasheart #173 - 2 Nov 23:40

Ground track diagrams -

I can't find any reference to, or mention of the information sources used to determine the quite precise ground track diagrams exhibited in the SI.

Nothing seemingly relevant (such as a recorded radar track) seems to be listed at " 1.4.10 " The Panel had access to the following evidence: ...."

Request - Can anyone kindly point me to anywhere in the SI, or otherwise explain where the information comes from that allows these excellent diagrams to be drawn and exhibited, or are they ABG ?

LFH

Where in the report so much ponderous self-evident detail can be found, it is surprising that area radars and local radars get not a mention. ADR and (in three cases only) GPS do get a mention, but with no discussion of them as systems.

I assume that the nearest area radar never saw the aircraft in its PEFATO, while any airfield radar had no data recording or was simply off. The report should have said that much.

The answer to your question is in para 1.4.187. “Downwind leg - lateral displacement. Interpretation of the ADR data and pilot's Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled a Graphical Data Analysis System (GDAS) replication of XX204's estimated ground track to be generated”.

1.4.4 tells us “XX204 was fitted with an Accident Data Recorder (ADR) … therefore … the Panel were able to establish the aircraft's flight profile”. 1.4.218 tells us “XX204's ADR data and flight characteristics were analysed by ATEC Test Pilots and Flight Test Engineers”.

Just by the way, may I guess that you have trouble wading through the report as given to us by the link at the beginning of the thread ? For what it is worth, I have speeded up my progress in and about the report by (a) copying the .PDF file to my own computer, thus avoiding the delays between my computer and the web, (b) using the FIND mechanism to visit (for instance) all 66 mentions of “ADR/adr” and just the 3 mentions of “GPS” and (c) generating an annotated word.doc index of section 1.4 to fit my .PDF version of the report.

tucumseh

19th Mar 2020, 10:10

Rumour has it that the Coroner may have agreed to this NOT being an Article 2 Inquest. In other circumstances this may have passed without comment, but he has form. The family of a Tornado airman who died in an accident almost 8 years ago awaits an Inquest, but he has shown no inclination.

rolling20

21st Mar 2020, 12:13

This incident appears to bear some striking resemblance to that which occurred to Hawk T1A XX334 on 19(R) Sqn at 2TWU in September 1992.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=55475
In this instance, the person that died was I believe, an experienced Hawk QFI, participating in a QWI course. He was in the rear cockpit, with the Captain in the front cockpit.
This incident still haunts me to this day and I wonder were the lessons learned adequately promulgated around the Hawk community of today?

I speak only as an armourer on the squadron that was 'back-seat qualified' and on shift at the time of the crash. I/we flew many times in the rear cockpit, sometimes to deploy to Coningsby or Leuchars for a small '2-ship' Det. and on occasion, just for fun in the weather ship or a target tug. The practice was actively encouraged by our aircrew and the guys and girls the squadron loved it. But let's be clear, we were passengers, not supernumerary crew.
To the best of my knowledge, EFATO was never practiced when ground crew were being carried in the rear cockpit. We were however always meticulously briefed, each trip, on the possibility and procedure for ejection. Always challenged to confirm that the Command Selector Valve in the rear cockpit was 'down and off' during taxi, even though the pilot would have checked it when we got to the aircraft.

Fair to say that I had a very good understanding of the ejection seat, but I'm not sure that I would have ever initiated ejecting without being instructed to do so; maybe if I knew that the pilot had been incapacitated by something like a birdstrike, but highly unlikely. If an engine failure had ever occurred on take-off (and I don't recall any during my six years on the Hawk), the only thing I would have done is sit tight, keep quiet and wait for instructions!
For us ground crew minions, we place our trust in our pilots and accept the risk.

I'm sure that Cpl Bayliss was like I, was just pinching himself at how lucky he was to be able to have such an experience. RIP mate....
I knew the poor rear seater in the September 92 accident, having started my flying training with him. He was, as mentioned on other threads here, 'a top bloke'. I and others could not believe that he did not eject. IIRC the report at the time recommend the continuing of the manoeuvre, to save a valuable aircraft and protect the local population if an ejection took place. There was however no indication as to how many aircraft or civilians the manoeuvre had ever saved

tucumseh

22nd Mar 2020, 08:07

Rolling 20 / Mortmeister

I know nothing of the 1992 accident, but the general point (recurrence) is well made and is one reason why this should be an Article 2 Inquest. Another reason, and perhaps better known, is that this XX204 accident shares (according to MoD) twelve common factors with that of Flt Lt Cunningham in 2011. The Coroner is required to ask why.

Chugalug2

22nd Mar 2020, 13:20

Reference tuc's comments on Sean Cunningham's avoidable death in 2011, could I remind member's of the excellent book Red5 presently available in Kindle form at the very reasonable price of £3.99 from you know where :-

https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B07VTN8NVZ

More details and background here :-

https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/

Lordflasheart

20th Apr 2021, 20:57

...
I am told that the inquest into the death of Corporal Jonathan Bayliss RAF will be resumed on 14th May, under the auspices of the new Senior Coroner for North West Wales.
...

Lordflasheart

14th May 2021, 10:42

...
Pre-Inquest (remote) Hearing takes place today, May 14th.

LFH
...

Background Noise

14th May 2021, 17:06

https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/north-wales-news/death-red-arrows-airman-raf-20599854

tucumseh

15th May 2021, 09:28

I wonder if the Bayliss family has been shown the evidence the Coroner chose not to refer to when agreeing with MoD that there were no systemic failings. In doing so, she was fully aware that she was disagreeing with other Coroners, and evidence in MoD's own hand. I wonder if the family solicitor even mentioned it?

Chugalug2

15th May 2021, 12:41

Same old, same old! The dead hand of the MOD hovers over Coroners, Police Commissioners, QCs, MPs, Lords, Family Solicitors, as well as its own Provost Marshals, Military Air Accident Investigators, and of course the 'Independent' MAA. In particular the High Command of the Royal Air Force leads this race to the bottom, busily protecting VSOs' reputations from their illegal actions while abrogating its Duty of Care to subordinates who have suffered, along with the bereaved, from the continuing inevitable consequences of those actions. The good name of a proud Service is sullied by the moral vacuum that is the present leadership of the Royal Air Force. Does anyone of them care for anybody other than themselves?

Lordflasheart

16th May 2021, 06:24

...
Thank you for the link BGN.

https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/north-wales-news/death-red-arrows-airman-raf-20599854

MoD barrister says in effect - 'Nothing to see here, move on please'. Of course he would.

Are the pilot and the deceased's family legally represented ? Are they having to pay for their legal representation, including a three or four day actual court hearing that might become adversarial - and expensive. Or are they trusting in the honest officers of the MoD and the Coroners Service to arrive at the correct conclusions.

Given that the article was posted on the day of the pre-inquest hearing, some glitches are perhaps understandable. Notwithstanding - One thing seems clear from the quotes in the article -

The family of Corporal Bayliss seems to be under a fundamental misunderstanding (and therefore legal disadvantage) about the seating and ejection arrangements for the Red Arrows aircraft. There is no reason to suggest the quotes were invented, so why ?

This subject must have been discussed in agonising detail with many agencies, in the three years since the crash. How is it that the family can apparently still be unaware of the simple facts of the Red Arrows Hawk Mk 1 unique seating requirements and inappropriate command ejection arrangements ?

LFH
...

ASRAAMTOO

16th May 2021, 12:04

Ther Command Eject on the Hawk was set up based upon the needs of a 2 seat training aircraft, with the instructor in the rear seat able to initiate it. Its a relatively simple system with hot gas from the rear seat used to initiate the front seat via pipes.

I believe there is a need for the RAFAT to carry their engineers in the back seat when deploying away from base so it would make sense for their jets to receive a mod that allows front seat initiation of command eject. In theory of course this should be straight forward and relatively inexpensive. I suspect however that between British Aerospace, Martin Baker and the RAF the cost would escalate to the extent that it would prove cheaper to provide a support Herc for every deployed display. Oops, cost just going up a wad as it would have to be a support A400!

create_it83

16th May 2021, 18:10

.... it would have to be TWO support A400s!

Fixed that for you.:)

CAEBr

16th May 2021, 18:32

ASRAAMTOO, you’re quite right about the TMk1 seat set up. The same system - which is the responsibility of MBA - is fitted to all Hawks built over the years, with the exception of the 200 series which only have the rear seat position, the front having been used for the avionics bay behind the radar, and as a single seat aircraft have no need for it.

It is not however just a simple modification. With command ejection selected, the rear seat instructor is able to operate their seat, which in turn sequences and subsequently operates the front seat. With a modified system selected to front command, the front seat occupant would pull their handle after which the system would pause the front seat while the rear seat is then signalled and operated, after which the front seat would then fire, thus preserving the need for the rear seat to leave the aircraft first. The pause in front seat sequencing and the need to prove its operation would make the qualification and certification of what would be a major modification a more challenging process than simply adding a couple of pipes and wires.

While the path to RAFAT OSD, previously 2030, is unclear after the latest announcements, a modification would be unlikely to be in place before the retirement of the rest of the TMk1 fleet, thus leaving the same passenger concerns in place for continued FAC training on 100 Sqn.

It is worth noting that the T45 Goshawk (Douglas/McDD/Boeing responsibility) does have a system selectable from either cockpit. It is however fitted with the Mk14 NACES seat, not the Mk10B used in the Hawk.

tucumseh

17th May 2021, 05:26

The same system - which is the responsibility of MBA -

MBA are the Design Authority for the seat. The design, as used in Hawk, is based on MoD's Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. MBA's Safety Case is based on this.

Does the SOIU state that an untrained member of the groundcrew will fly in the rear seat? If so, then all Safety Cases will highlight the risk should the pilot decide they need to eject. MBA would propose in mitigation the modification you describe; and no doubt have.

It would seem, from MoD reports, that the chosen ‘mitigation’ placed far too much faith in an inexperienced groundcrewman reacting properly, even if given sufficient warning – which he wasn’t.

If the SOIU does not include this concept of use, that is nothing to do with MBA, except that they would be required to point out the risk as soon as they realised MoD was violating its own regulations, and hadn’t reduced it to ALARP.

The question is: can the Duty Holder (and his many predecessors) justify acceptance of the risk in his ALARP statement? Only a court can decide this. The Coroner’s ruling effectively lets the Duty Holder off the hook, although I note she left the door slightly ajar.

And it bears repeating, if only because MoD denied it in court - the SI report repeats 12 (twelve) failures noted in the 2011 XX177 (Cunningham) report. In 2014 MoD assured the XX177 Coroner that all were being addressed.

ASRAAMTOO

17th May 2021, 11:18

ASRAAMTOO, you’re quite right about the TMk1 seat set up. The same system - which is the responsibility of MBA - is fitted to all Hawks built over the years, with the exception of the 200 series which only have the rear seat position, the front having been used for the avionics bay behind the radar, and as a single seat aircraft have no need for it.

It is not however just a simple modification. With command ejection selected, the rear seat instructor is able to operate their seat, which in turn sequences and subsequently operates the front seat. With a modified system selected to front command, the front seat occupant would pull their handle after which the system would pause the front seat while the rear seat is then signalled and operated, after which the front seat would then fire, thus preserving the need for the rear seat to leave the aircraft first. The pause in front seat sequencing and the need to prove its operation would make the qualification and certification of what would be a major modification a more challenging process than simply adding a couple of pipes and wires..

Whilst I completely agree that the system you describe is the ideal solution it is as you say not straightforward. My recollection albeit very hazy is that the Hawk front and rear seat trajectories are divergent. Its therefore worth looking at how sequencing currently works in an unplanned ejection with the captain in the front and a pax in the back.

Front seater says 'eject, eject' and pulls the handle, rear seater hears call and pulls handle. Probability is therefore that no planned sequencing exists and we are reliant on divergence to prevent seat collision..

I think its therefore safe to say that a solution that involves the front seat gasses firing the rear set WITHOUT any sequencing offers an improvement on current arrangements and is not quite as complicated. The problem with this of course is that is no longer the individuals fault if the seats collide!