75th Anniversary Operation Market Garden

[Chugalug2]

Today was the main commemorative drop, and like that of D-Day a veteran in his 90's took part in it. The way into this battle, designed to outflank the Siegfried Line/West Wall, was straightforward enough as all such Ops often are. However, again as often happens in war, it started to unravel from the start.

The courage of those who held the bridge at Arnhem and those who desperately tried to reinforce them is well known. In the end the survivors were either captured or escaped in a hastily planned withdrawal across the river downstream. Here is the account of 25th September 1944:-

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/featured/operation-market-garden-september-25th-1944.html

and of the commemoration at Down Ampney:-

https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/operation-market-garden-75th/

Lest we forget...

[tdracer]

I was pretty much unaware of Market Garden before I saw the movie "A Bridge Too Far" (with my dad, shortly after it was released), despite my having considerable interest in WWII history. Granted, I'd paid more attention to the Pacific war (where my dad had served in the US Army Infantry - part of the Americal Division, bronze star and purple heart during his time on Guadalcanal), but still I was surprised how little attention Market Garden got (at least on this side of the pond). 'A Bridge Too Far' remains one of my favorite WWII movie, and seeing it the first time really peaked my interest in Market Garden and I've read quite a bit about it (even lucked into an autographed first edition of the Cornelius Ryan book of the same name at a used book store).

On a business trip to the UK about 10 years ago, I spent a few days in London. One of the pubs I visited while there had a limited run of "Hell's Highway" beer to commemorate Market Garden and XXX Corps.

[Easy Street]

Many will be familiar with arguments on the tactical details of Market Garden (eg, selection of landing zones) but there is an equally interesting historical debate on campaign-level aspects that is of continuing relevance today. It’s all about politics: the changing dynamics between alliance partners; the need to consider the ‘home front’ in terms of public perception; differences of view between generals; and the compromises which the supreme commander had to make to balance those things out. On such a massive canvas, the detail of the actual operation was easily overlooked.

Perhaps the most interesting point is the issue of ‘exquisite’ capabilities. Having kept thousands of troops in England for airborne operations, there was understandable organisational pressure to use them before the front line moved out of range (which would have forced the troops to be deployed to the continent, as some said should have happened all along, causing severe loss of face for others). Market Garden was the third such plan, hastily drawn up as earlier iterations were overtaken by events as the front advanced northeast. This was pretty much the last chance to use them from England, and one has to suspect optimism bias in the reaction to intelligence reports of the presence of German reserve armour. The lesson: beware the ‘use it or lose it’ mentality.

[FantomZorbin]

So true ES, so very true.

[falcon900]

I read Max Hastings book "Armageddon", about the last year of the War recently, and it opened my eyes to several aspects of the relationship between the allies which had hitherto passed me by.
The politics and squabbling amongst allied commanders did few of them any credit, with Montgomery a serial offender, and none emerging with entirely clean hands. Market garden was one of a series of what might be called unforced errors which cost lives, and in some cases prolonged the war.
A particularly pointed allegation from the book which I had not heard before is that Bomber Harris ignored direct orders to attack German oil production facilities, preferring to continue attacks on German cities, and it was only his public profile which prevented him from being removed.

[Chugalug2]

In retrospect (a vital tool for all armchair warriors!) this strategic thrust was doomed from the start. Intelligence, Comms, DZ locations, Logistics, all were found wanting from Day 1. However, even if there were better preparations made, it all came down to one road and its various bridges that XXX Corps had to traverse to a very tight schedule if they were to get to 1st Airborne in time. We concentrate perhaps too much on the Battle of Arnhem itself when down that vital road things were going awry. Perhaps more attention should be focussed instead on the Nijmegen Bridge and the town itself. This from Wiki:-

To their north, the 82nd arrived with a small group dropped near Grave securing the bridge. They also succeeded in capturing one of the vitally important bridges over the Maas-Waal canal, the lock-bridge at Heumen. The 82nd concentrated their efforts to seize the Groesbeek Heights instead of capturing their prime objective, the Nijmegen bridge. The capture of the Groesbeek Heights was to set up a blocking position on the high ground to prevent a German attack out of the nearby Reichswald and to deny the heights to German artillery observers. Browning, the commander of the 1st Airborne Army agreed with the assertions of Gavin, the commander of the 82nd, that Groesbeek Heights are the priority. Gavin wanted to occupy the Grave and Maas (Meuse)-Waal canal bridges before Nijmegen bridges. He would only send troops when these bridges were secure releasing troops to seize the Nijmegen bridge. Before the operation on 15 September Gavin verbally ordered Lt-Col Linquist of the 508th to send a battalion to the Nijmegen bridge after landing. He had decided that there were enough troops for the other objectives. Linquist later said he understood he should send a battalion after his regiment had completed their earlier assigned targets. Linquist's battalion approached the bridge that evening delaying the seizure of the bridge. The battalion was stopped by a SS unit that had driven south from Arnhem. A part of the SS unit returned to Arnhem but found the northern end of the Arnhem bridge occupied by the British 1st Airborne. In an attempt to cross the bridge most of the SS unit was killed including the commander.

If the force sent to the Groesbeek Heights (there was no serious German threat from there) had instead taken the Nijmegen Bridge, the SS would have been kept out and the way to Arnhem secured much sooner. Easy to say of course, but on such choices battles and even wars are won or lost.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nijmegen

[skydiver69]

The Tank Museum has sent some of its collection to Holland to help the Dutch Army museum remember Market Garden. They are making a videos showing some of the vehicles taking part which can be found here https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChl-XKVVBAzoEVsnbOfpcqw

[Ken Scott]

I did a Staff Ride to Arnhem at the time of the 70th, we started at Joe’s Bridge, the point where XXX Corps began their advance up Hell’s Highway. We visited the significant places on the way up to Nijmegen where we spent the night, then on to Arnhem...... which we reached in 2 days, which was the same schedule for XXX Corps, but without the opposition from the Germans. It was a comfortable schedule for us but a totally unrealistic one for them.

It was interesting to see the drops over the Heath & to meet some of the veterans but the crowds did rather get in the way of exploring all the locations. One of my great uncles was on Urquhart’s Staff in Oosterbeek, I’d always wanted to visit but found it difficult to look around there were so many people.

[tdracer]

I read Max Hastings book "Armageddon", about the last year of the War recently, and it opened my eyes to several aspects of the relationship between the allies which had hitherto passed me by.
The politics and squabbling amongst allied commanders did few of them any credit, with Montgomery a serial offender, and none emerging with entirely clean hands. Market garden was one of a series of what might be called unforced errors which cost lives, and in some cases prolonged the war.

An interesting thought experiment for 'armchair warriors' is to put Patton in charge of Market Garden instead of Monty, although the effect would be strongly dependent on your opinion of Monty and Patton.
Part of what makes Market Garden so perplexing is that it was so out of character for Monty but would have been the sort of thing you'd expect from Patton.

[Tankertrashnav]

Interesting. Isn't there a bit in the film where some German top brass are wondering who is running the operation and decide it must be Patton? Two contrasting possibilities if Patton had run the show - either the allies would have taken the bridge or it would have been an even bigger disaster for them in terms of lives lost. All entirely academic of course

[SASless]

Ignore your Intelligence showing Panzer Divisions in the area....run your entire attack up a single two lane road across a bunch of bridges (any one of which if lost or destroyed shoots your whole plan in the ass), take three days to get all your forces dropped into the battle area, and you want to drag Patton into it somehow?

There was an Airborne Army sitting around looking for work thus a "plan" was devised to put it to use....in Montgomery's area of operations of course.

Eisenhower should have been a mite less diplomatic I am thinking.

Deal with reality.....Montgomery was a proper Knob on this one and a great many brave Man died because of his gross failure.

[diginagain]

In Antony Beever's work in Arnhem it is noted that the route constituted one of the key questions in the Dutch Army Staff College exams, and those candidates who planned to advance from Nijmegen straight up the main road to Arnhem were failed on the spot.

[Tankertrashnav]

tdracer is not "dragging Patton into it" - he merely wondered how things would have panned out if he had run the show, a valid question I would have thought.

[Lingo Dan]

You are right, SASless: Montgomery indeed ignored intelligence about the presence of SS Panzer divisions in the area. However, these badly-mauled formations had recently retreated from the Falaise Pocket and were more in regimental strength, than full-strength divisions. What was not grasped was the extraordinary ability of the German military to reinforce and re-equip these divisions, driven by Generalfeldmarshall Model.

Had the XXX Corps had been led by a commander with Patton's drive, rather than by Lt Gen Horrock, (who was in poor health, but a favourite of Monty's,) progress down the road to Arnhem might have been faster.

Diginagain: I wonder what was the Dutch Staff College DS solution was to the Nijmegen-Arnhem route?

[Easy Street]

Part of what makes Market Garden so perplexing is that it was so out of character for Monty

My reading is that Monty was responding to earlier pressures from London to drive the pace. On top of the well-known issues of manpower shortage and the need to show British ‘pluck’ to keep spirits up on the home front, there was concern over Stalin’s intent. By this stage of proceedings, Churchill had identified the potential for post-war tension and a strategy of beating the Soviets to Berlin had been discussed in London. (The same logic explains Churchill’s seeming obsession with the Mediterranean theatre long after it ceased to be critical to the Nazis’ defeat).

The Americans had other strategic concerns. So when Monty agitated for support from London for his ‘rapid thrust’ idea, which he thought was aligned to Churchill’s intent, he was surprised by the tepid response. The political realities of coalition-keeping had taken hold without Monty being aware. Churchill had gone to view the Mediterranean landings in person and Brooke was left to break it to Monty that he would have to play nicely under Ike’s Alliance-friendly ‘broad front’ strategy. Logistics were insufficient for two rapid thrusts across Europe, while a single thrust would have to be led either by the British or the Americans, which neither would countenance.

Eisenhower approved Market Garden essentially as a sop to Monty: a chance to begin a ‘single thrust’ approach without risking everything and to see what came of it. Even this limited ambition outraged Patton, desperate for fuel to continue eastward, but Bradley had the good sense to recognise that he had to cooperate so that Monty (and by extension the British public) couldn’t blame the US for any failure. And that calculation just about worked. As an exercise in leadership and coalition management by Eisenhower, it was expensive but effective. The mind boggles as to the scale and impact of the decisions he had to take.

[Dockers]

Diginagain: I wonder what was the Dutch Staff College DS solution was to the Nijmegen-Arnhem route?
According to Foot & Wigglesworth in Holland at War Against Hitler: Anglo-Dutch Relations, 1940-1945
"I was told that on Dutch Staff College exercises based on Groesbeck, between the wars, when the task set was an advance on Arnhem from Nijmegen, a solution involving the use of that road got no marks at all. The preferred solution was an advance in a north-westerly direction to force a crossing over the Lek lower down and then to move in on Arnhem from the west."

[Asturias56]

I had the honour to talk to both Hackett and an officer (who picked up a medal) in the Guards Armoured on separate occasions in the early 90's - both in very odd circumstances I have to say

They both described it as a gamble - probably worth taking originally but far too risky when the intelligence was in - but they were never sure who actually saw that intelligence in detail

At the end of the day everyone did their best but it was never going to work....

I was astonished how phlegmatic they were about it TBH - they just kept on repeating how lucky they'd been as individuals to come through when so many of their men and mates didn't

[SASless]

Armored units and mechanized Infantry against lightly armed airborne troops....odd how that would turn out when the Airborne Troops are forced to concentrate in discrete defensive positions.

Not to mention that the Piat anti armor weapon was at best pitiful....the American 3.5 Inch Bazooka was not much better.

A few 75MM Pack Howitzers for artillery and mortars against German 88's.....really?

[diginagain]

A few 75MM Pack Howitzers for artillery and mortars against German 88's.....really?
Plus 6-Pounder & 17 Pounder anti-tank guns.

https://arnhemjim.********.com/2012/10/the-17-pounder-anti-tank-guns-at.html

[ExAscoteer]

6 pounders carried in Horsas, 17pounders carried in Hamilcars.

Actually the PIAT was surprisingly effective (being able to penetrate upto 4" of armour) and it didn't produce a backblast, unlike the Bazooka, which lent to its use for FIBUA.The main problems with it were recoil and the difficulty in cocking it.

[etudiant]

6 pounders carried in Horsas, 17pounders carried in Hamilcars.

Actually the PIAT was surprisingly effective (being able to penetrate upto 4" of armour) and it didn't produce a backblast, unlike the Bazooka, which lent to its use for FIBUA.The main problems with it were recoil and the difficulty in cocking it.

No real evidence for its effectiveness that I know of, but the basic concept of using a small high pressure charge to push a larger lump of (possibly shaped charge) explosives to the target seems plausible.
The launcher was a lump unfortunately, think this is where the German Panzerfaust equivalents were much more practical. Of course, the Panzerfaust could not be reloaded afaik, so perhaps the UK bean counters saw the PIAT as more cost effective...

[India Four Two]

but the basic concept of using a small high pressure charge to push a larger lump of (possibly shaped charge) explosives to the target seems plausible.

... plus a 200 pound main spring, that you re-cocked with your feet!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk_vS-VdYas

[etudiant]

... plus a 200 pound main spring, that you re-cocked with your feet!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk_vS-VdYas

I owned one of those back in earlier days, cocking it was a doddle. Any fit yeoman could do it.

[India Four Two]

How many Panzers did you bag? :E

[etudiant]

How many Panzers did you bag? :E




None, the projectiles were hard to find in New Jersey.

[diginagain]

None, the projectiles were hard to find in New Jersey.
They were hard to find in Arnhem, too. :)

[ExAscoteer]

No real evidence for its effectiveness that I know of, but the basic concept of using a small high pressure charge to push a larger lump of (possibly shaped charge) explosives to the target seems plausible.


It fired a 2.5lb shaped charge warhead. There is plenty of evidence for its effectiveness once the initial problems with accuracy and warhead fusing were sorted out.

For eg there were 6 VCs awarded to PIAT operators which included killing Pazer IVs and at least one Panther.

During the Normandy campaign it was assessed that 7% of all German tanks destroyed by British forces were taken out using the PIAT (compared to 6% taken out by aircraft using RPs).

Furthermore a 1944/45 Canadian Army survey ranked the PIAT as the number one most “outstandingly effective” weapon, followed by the Bren gun.

[Asturias56]

I hefted one in a museum a while back

IMHO you deserve a VC for firing the beast never mind hitting anything

It's a monstrosity................

[hoodie]

No real evidence for its effectiveness that I know of

An example from Arnhem could be that of Maj Robert Henry Cain VC (https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/robert-henry-cain-victoria-cross.html)

[diginagain]

PIAT in use. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INa1rgqcxYY&feature=youtu.be

[Asturias56]

None, the projectiles were hard to find in New Jersey.

as were Tiger tanks.....

[Asturias56]

PIAT in use. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INa1rgqcxYY&feature=youtu.be


I doubt it - I understood it had to be fired from a prone position as the recoil would knock you back yards and do immense damage to you

[Wensleydale]

I hefted one in a museum a while back

IMHO you deserve a VC for firing the beast never mind hitting anything

It's a monstrosity................

Jeremy Clarkson's late father in law won a VC at Arnhem for his inspiration to the troops. His party trick was walking out into the open and firing a PIAT from the hip at German armour at close range.

[Arclite01]

I always think the PIAT was a typically English looking solution to a particular problem, large chunks of angle iron, designed to be built in a garden shed by someone who had been told what a bazooka looked like but had never seen one. And then paint the finished item green.................:)

The projectile itself was actually reasonably effective against the side and rear armour of most tanks. Front sloping or ERA - almost a waste of time. Pretty heavy to carry too - anyone who has had to heft the 84 around will understand that particular problem...................

Arc

[ExAscoteer]

The projectile itself was actually reasonably effective against the side and rear armour of most tanks. Front sloping or ERA - almost a waste of time.
Arc

No ERA during WWII. The major defences against a shaped charge were (as you say) sloped armour, and spaced armour (think StuG III and StuG IV side-plates).

[Arclite01]

No ERA during WWII. The major defences against a shaped charge were (as you say) sloped armour, and spaced armour (think StuG III and StuG IV side-plates).

Apologies meant spaced armour (doh - brain freeze)

Arc

[Wander00]

Wensleydale - weren't Maj Cain VC and Clarkson's F-I-L the same chap, and nobody in the family knew about the VC until a few years ago

[Wensleydale]

Wensleydale - weren't Maj Cain VC and Clarkson's F-I-L the same chap, and nobody in the family knew about the VC until a few years ago

the name escaped me, but I believe so. Clarkson stated that he did not know about the VC until after his FiL's death.

[ExAscoteer]

Frances Catherine Cain (daughter of Maj Robert Henty Cain VC) married Jeremy Clarkson in 1993 as his second wife. They divorced in 2014.

[goofer3]

Another Arnhem Dakota story from the EDP; https://www.edp24.co.uk/features/surviving-arnhem-how-norwich-s-heroic-harry-lived-through-famous-battle-1-6282266

[spitfirek5054]

Just read the above link,I think that the room was dusty.

[Dockers]

A history of another Dakota. FZ626 of 271 Sqn (https://www.fz626.com/)
A bit of personal interest in this one.

[Chugalug2]

Thanks for the link g3. Interesting that Lord had planned on becoming ordained before the war. The Rev. Lord would have had a quite a ring to it of course.
The bitter irony of the story is that the drop landed in German hands as they had already overrun the DZ. The crew of course had no way of knowing that.

A very nicely written piece of journalism, and a worthy reminder of those unsung heroes of supply dropping, the despatchers!

[India Four Two]

Going back to the PIAT, my dad, who was a tank driver, was taught about them during his training and said it was quite impressive, although I don’t know if he fired one. However he had nothing good to say about the PIAT’s predecessor, the Boys 0.55” Anti-Tank Rifle. He said he fired one once and that was quite enough!

Despite its recoil slide and rubber-cushioned buttpad, the recoil of the weapon (along with noise and muzzle blast) was said to be painful, frequently causing neck strains and bruised shoulders. Consequently, the Boys was almost never fired as a free weapon (that is, not affixed to a support) except in emergencies.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boys_anti-tank_rifle

I looked up the muzzle energy of the bullet. Depending which specific round was fired, it was about five to six times the muzzle energy of a 0.303 bullet! No wonder the recoil was hard to manage.

[etudiant]

Does anyone have the actual specifications of the PIAT system? It seemed to me to be a reinvention of the rifle grenade, but with a dedicated launcher.
I don't think that it would have been impossible to attach a similar projectile to an SMLE and get a much more usable weapon.
Apologies if this is silly, I'm no ordnance specialist, but if it is, please tell us why.

[Wander00]

as a scruffy CCF cadet I fired a thing ISTR was called the Inerga - small mortar type projectile that was fired from a spigot fitted on the muzzle of a SMLE No4 Mk1, helped on its way by a super powerful blank round - recoil such that seem to remember heel of butt of rifle was placed on the ground

[Chugalug2]

Energa evidently Wanders:-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA_anti-tank_rifle_grenade

As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.

Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?

[lsh]

Was the Bazooka better?
Could we have used that?
Curious.

lsh
:E

[SASless]

Well....for a start...ignoring the intelligence from multiple sources to include ULTRA and local resistance groups combined with RAF Recce photos that German Armor Units were present.....and banishing the Intelligence Officer who was trying his professional best to argue against that decision....there were a few other issues.

Boy Browning should have been hung for his conduct and Horrocks should have been hoisted under a big Oak Tree for halting his column for 18 Hours while brave Men were fighting and dying waiting for the Armor to arrive as promised.

The concept of running an attack of this magnitude up a single two lane road.....without being able to maneuver to the flanks...and then having to cross far too many bridges in the process.....lunacy when the truth is considered....that the Montgomery, Browning, and others KNEW they were ignoring the Intelligence Data.

Eisenhower had pursued the Broad Front Strategy right up until this Operation and for some reasons yet fully articulated elected to allow Montgomery to proceed.

One cannot defend Montgomery and Browning for their direct responsibility in the failure of the Operation....as they knowingly proceeded knowing the concept was fatally flawed.

One thing for sure is if it had been Patton instead of Horrocks....there would have been no halt ordered until the Tanks rolled into Arnhem and relieved the British Para's holding the other end of the Bridge.

Take note of his conduct during the Battle of the Bulge when he had already had his Ops Officers readying a plan to turn Third Army around from its advance in the south and ready it to turn 180 degrees and attack to relieve Bastogne.

He arrived at the meeting with Eisenhower with a plan in hand in anticipation of what would be needed.On the Allied side, intelligence reports, ULTRA radio intercepts and messages from the Dutch resistance indicated the German troop movements as well as mentioned the arrival of armored forces in the area. These caused concerns and Eisenhower dispatched his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, to speak with Montgomery. Despite these reports, Montgomery refused to alter the plan. At lower levels, Royal Air Force reconnaissance photos taken by No. 16 Squadron showed German armor around Arnhem. Major Brian Urquhart, the intelligence officer for the British 1st Airborne Division, showed these to Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Brereton's deputy, but was dismissed and instead placed on medical leave for "nervous strain and exhaustion."




Energa evidently Wanders:-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA_anti-tank_rifle_grenade

As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.

Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?

[ExAscoteer]

Was the Bazooka better?


The warhead fired by the early Bazooka M1 of 1942 and M1A1 of 1943 had a lower armour penetration than did that of PIAT (3" as opposed to 4"). It wasn't until the advent of the M9 in October 1943 that the warhead became equivalent in effect to that of PIAT. Additionally the warheads fired by the M1 and M1A1, owing to their pointed shape, had a nasty habit of bouncing off the target at low impact angles; this was addressed on the M9 by having a much blunter shaped projectile.

The advantage of the bazooka was that the munition was rocket propelled so it had a slightly better DF range than PIAT (150yd as opposed to 115yd). However the bazooka had a noticeable backblast which would immediately give away the firer's position. Additionally said backblast made the weapon almost useless for FIBUA.

Bazookas were supplied to UK troops under the lend-lease program.

[ExAscoteer]

Does anyone have the actual specifications of the PIAT system? It seemed to me to be a reinvention of the rifle grenade, but with a dedicated launcher.
I don't think that it would have been impossible to attach a similar projectile to an SMLE and get a much more usable weapon.


PIAT was 39" long and weighed 32lbs. It fired 3.3" calibre munition containing a 2.5lb shaped charge warhead capable of penetrating 4" of armour plate.

It utilised the 'Spigot Mortar' principle, but using a sprung loaded moving spigot as opposed to a fixed spigot, thereby cutting down the recoil and also making the weapon lighter than a conventional mortar tube of the same calibre; if a fixed spigot had been used it would not have been possible to fire it from the shoulder.

The limitations were range (115yd Direct Fire / 350yd Indirect Fire), weight, and the fact that the sprung loaded spigot was difficult to cock (although my late Father who was a Glider Pilot and a mere 5'6" used the PIAT in anger on the Rhine Crossing with no problems).

The British rifle grenade of WWII was the No 68 AT. It was a shaped charge munition (likely the first ever shaped charge / HEAT munition) that had an effective range of upto 100yd with a maximum penetration of 2" of armour. So significantly worse than PIAT and with far less accuracy.

PIAT replaced the Boys Anti Tank Rifle in 1943. The Boys fired a .55" round capable of penetrating just under 1" of armour at 100yd (based on a 90 degree strike) and about 3/4" at 500yd. It weighed more than the PIAT at 39lbs with no 5 rnd magazine fitted and had a far more fearsome recoil (and muzzle blast) than did PIAT, leading to its use as mainly vehicle mounted.

BTW SMLE refers to the Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle of WWI. During WW2 we were using the Lee Enfield No 4 rifle, a descendent of, but a somewhat different beast to the SMLE.

[Chugalug2]

SASless, the rather purple language about hanging Generals doesn't help the discussion much. I notice that they are British. This was an Allied Operation that went wrong, no doubt thanks to poor leadership, but that leadership was Allied. The Bridge too far/late wasn't at Arnhem but at Nijmegen. It should have been taken by the 82nd on Day 1. It wasn't, which allowed the Wehrmacht to occupy it and the town of Nijmegen instead. It wasn't until XXX Corps tanks got there that it was fully in Allied hands, despite the Little Omaha bloody sacrifices of the 504th. Tanks need infantry to advance, and Horrocks's infantry were now in Nijmegen town clearing out German troops that needn't have been there in the first place. To leave them there would have allowed them to sever XXX Corps advance in two.

Of course it was a gamble, but it was a gamble that required a non-stop advance by XXX Corps straight to Arnhem. Nijmegen stymied that and cost the Operation's success more than anything else in my view. Yes about Ultra, Resistance, and Photo Recon evidence of Panzers but those Panzers needed time to react to stop the advance. They got it thanks to Nijmegen.

There is a tendency to judge outcomes in black and white terms. Eisenhower carried a letter around on D-Day to take full responsibility should it fail. He might well have had to do so were it not for Fortitude and Allied Air Power. Even so, it was a damn close run thing!

[Wander00]

Well. "I"nerga was pretty close after nearly 60 years. Now when was, no what is, breakfast?

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Thank you for the link to the Eastern Daily Press story. My dad joined on 7 Dec 1941 as a volunteer and went to Canada on the training scheme, then stayed on as what we later called a creamie. His time in Canada came to an end after Market Garden, when 271 and other squadrons urgently needed Battle Casualty Replacements. Dad joined them in time for the crossing-of-the-Rhine ops, which were far better-managed than those of the previous year - still good for a story or 2, though.

[PapaDolmio]

Thanks for the link g3. Interesting that Lord had planned on becoming ordained before the war. The Rev. Lord would have had a quite a ring to it of course.
The bitter irony of the story is that the drop landed in German hands as they had already overrun the DZ. The crew of course had no way of knowing that.

A very nicely written piece of journalism, and a worthy reminder of those unsung heroes of supply dropping, the despatchers!

There was another remarkable Lord at Arnhem: RSM J C Lord of 3 Para.
After acting as GOC 1ABN's bodyguard for a while following the virtual annihilation of 1st Para Bde, Lord remained in the perimeter and was captured by the Germans. He was sent, along with other members of the Division to a PoW camp near Fallingbostel. The camp was poorly run, overcrowded, morale was poor and contained many OR's who had been captured in 1940 ( remember that Officers and OR's were kept in separate camps). Lord immediately took command, demanded (and got) regular meetings with the Commandant who was calling him Mr Lord within a few weeks. He improved the organisation, introduced parades, PT and other 'activities' and it was known for him to pull up the guards for slovenly dress.
The end result being that when the 8th Hussars arrived to liberate the camp in 1945 they were greeted on arrival by Lord, presiding over an immaculate Guardroom at the camp entrance, complete with Orderly Sgt, Corporal of the Guard and full Guard, all correctly turned out in battledress, blanco'd webbing and bulled boots.