UH-1H missing from Coffs Harbour 6th Sept 2019

[John Eacott]

Helicopter missing after disappearing from radar on NSW north coast (https://www.9news.com.au/national/nsw-news-helicopter-missing-after-it-disappeared-from-flight-radar-near-newcastle-friday-night/9e73b77e-cf5f-43a5-a867-6caf8575f6a7)

A search is underway for a private helicopter after it disappeared from flight radar near Newcastle last night.

Police say they haven't heard from the aircraft since it faded off the radar about 6.30pm yesterday.
The search is being co-ordinated by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority in the Anna Bay area in Port Stephens.
Water police and a rescue helicopter are assisting, with emergency workers still trying to confirm how many people were on board.

An Australian Maritime Safety Authority spokesperson said initial reports suggest there were four people on board but this has not been confirmed.
Westpac Rescue Helicopter Service said one of its helicopters was in the air at the time.
"Our aircraft is still up in the air in that area after the report of an aircraft crash," a spokesman said last night.
"There was a call through air traffic control at Williamtown that they'd lost contact with an aircraft."
A severe weather warning was in place last night for destructive winds with peak gusts in excess of 125km/h in the area.
Any one with information is asked to contact Triple Zero. © Nine Digital Pty Ltd 2019

[belly tank]

The Challenger SAR jet out of Melbourne was there last night for quite some time. Now two rescue machines searching this morning.

[John Eacott]

Four believed dead after helicopter used as an army chopper in movies crashes after disappearing off the radar as wind gusts hit 125kmh (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7435623/Four-killed-helicopter-crashes-disappearing-radar.html)


As many as four people are feared dead after a helicopter used for movies disappeared from radar in wild weather.

The helicopter was last heard from when the pilot requested a routine visual flight rule navigation half an hour before disappearing from radar at 6.49pm on Friday near Anna Bay in Port Stephens.

The VH-UVC had flown from Coffs Harbour and was expected in the Hunter Valley for refuelling but when it disappeared from radar a search was launched by police, the Westpac Rescue Helicopter and Volunteer Marine Rescue.

It disappeared only 26 minutes after taking off.

A spokesman for Australian Maritime Safety Authority confirmed to The Daily Telegraph (https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/anna-bay-four-believed-dead-in-helicopter-crash/news-story/7c6ff5e9d50014763962c5f6d52515f7) they had found debris but no people have been found.

Flight tracking data has indicated the helicopter was travelling at 70 knots and 3500ft before falling at 154 knots.

A Westpac Rescue Helicopter Service spokesman told the Newcastle Herald (https://www.newcastleherald.com.au/story/6372017/massive-search-underway-after-aircraft-faded-off-radar-near-anna-bay/?cs=12&utm_source=website&utm_medium=home&utm_campaign=latestnews) they had continued their search well after sunset.

'Our aircraft is still up in the air in that area after the report of an aircraft crash,' he said at 9pm.

'There was a call through air traffic control at Williamtown, that they'd lost contact with an aircraft.'

At the time of the disappearance peak wind gusts of up to 125km/h were being recorded in the area along with an average wind speed of 80km/h to 90km/h.




https://youtu.be/HHXVxoMK55Y

[mickjoebill]

Brisbane Times reporting submerged main body and tail spotted and so police are now in recovery mode. :(

Owner of the company is reported as the pilot, three other males and one female on board.

mjb

[John Eacott]

Wreckage spotted in search for missing helicopter with five on board (https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/nsw/wreckage-spotted-in-search-for-missing-helicopter-with-five-on-board-20190907-p52oxr.html)
Wreckage has been spotted in the search for a private helicopter that is believed to have crashed in waters near Port Stephens after going missing with five people on board on Friday.The helicopter was travelling from Brisbane to Bankstown on Friday when police were advised it had disappeared from the Williamtown flight radar (https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/link/follow-20170101-p52owa) around 6.15pm.Police have now confirmed the tail rotor and the main airframe of the helicopter have been spotted by aerial assets about 8 km south of Fingal Bay, however no significant wreckage has been recovered due to adverse weather.Four men and a woman were on board the Bell uh-1/B205 aircraft that goes by the nickname "Huey", including the helicopter's owner and pilot David Kerr of Brisbane Helicopters.There have been no sightings of the passengers and a search and rescue operation led by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority has been suspended.A spokeswoman confirmed NSW Police would continue to search the area.Emergency services began looking for the aircraft in waters off Anna Bay on Friday night and continued until 12.50am on Saturday, before beginning again at 7am.It has covered about 150 square nautical miles where the radar signal was lost.
On Saturday AMSA said weather in the area at the time the aircraft went missing was "poor with strong winds and reduced visibility.""Air traffic control indicated that the aircraft was rapidly losing altitude when contact was lost, there were no detected emergency beacons signals or Mayday calls," it said.NSW Police Marine Area Command, Port Stephens-Hunter Police District, Westpac Rescue Helicopter, NSW Marine Rescue and other aerial support are assisting with the search.A NSW Police vessel and the Westpac Rescue Helicopter Westpac 1 each sighted the two parts of the wreckage between 8.45 and 9.30 on Saturday morning.An observer on Westpac 1 witnessed the airframe sink a short time later before it could be reached.AMSA said it was suspending search and rescue operations at midday on Saturday due to "expert medical advice and the discovery of the damaged airframe.NSW Police will commence recovery operations with the support of AMSA’s Challenger Jet.The Bureau of Meteorology had issued a severe weather warning on Friday for the region where the helicopter lost contact in Anna BayIt predicted damaging, locally destructive winds with peak gusts in excess of 125km/h and average gusts of 80km/h-90km/h.

It said a strong cold front from the west was sweeping across the state, generating the vigorous westerly winds.A video published on Brisbane Helicopters' YouTube channel in December last year advertised "Huey Warbird" flights on the aircraft, with "co-pilot, observer, troop and gunner" seats.

[Cedrik]

VFR over water at night hard work

[Heliringer]

VFR over water at night hard work


Then throw in a severe weather warning just to keep it interesting.

Same mistakes over and over again.

[hueyracer]

The helicopter was last heard from when the pilot requested a routine visual flight rule navigation half an hour before disappearing from radar at 6.49pm on Friday near Anna Bay in Port Stephens.

I don't know the local weather and daylight hours... But 6:49 pm is hardly "VFR at night", or is it dark around that time of the year already at down under?

[Heliringer]

.

I don't know the local weather and daylight hours... But 6:49 pm is hardly "VFR at night", or is it dark around that time of the year already at down under?


Last light was around 1810.

[rickyknee]

Last light Williamtown (from NAIPS) 1802.
Sudden dropoff from FlightRadar24 ADSB tracking at 1813 consistent with media reports that it faded from ATC radar about 1815.
Ten plus minutes after last light. Fully dark by then.
A terrible tragedy

[physicus]

(updated ADS-B data with 10s interval data. A note on that: not every interval provides a full complement of the data. The only reliable indicator that data is fresh is if it has changed from the last timestamp. Keep that in mind when inferring conclusions from this.)

Here's some data for the last ~20 minutes of this flight. Background is false colour infrared satellite image with blue color indicating cloud top temperatures -40C consistent with a significant frontal system in the area. YWLM METAR (see screenshot) would indicate they were in VMC the entire time, and gusts to 29kts were reported on the ground.
Significant ground speed variations of up to 30kts magnitude, as well as altitude excursions of several hundred feet between the 30 second data intervals and prior to the apparent onset of a problem would indicate turbulent conditions. This GSP variability increased to 60kts just prior to the rapid descent. There's a distinct turn towards Williamstown about 4 minutes before the descent, that might suggest something happened that prompted intent to divert. As seen in the ADS-B data:

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1653/screenshot_2019_09_07_08_18_25_533ddc0ad727156c0c47031da540e dfbc80a6372.jpg


UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:14:17: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:14:07: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:57: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:47: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:37: TRK: 121.0 GSP: 152.0 ALT: 2200.0 V/S: -8768.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:27: TRK: 121.0 GSP: 152.0 ALT: 2200.0 V/S: -8768.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:17: TRK: 121.0 GSP: 152.0 ALT: 2200.0 V/S: -8768.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:07: TRK: 192.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3250.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:12:57: TRK: 192.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3250.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:12:47: TRK: 211.0 GSP: 76.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -384.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:12:37: TRK: 211.0 GSP: 76.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -384.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:12:27: TRK: 210.0 GSP: 95.0 ALT: 3300.0 V/S: 1216.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:12:17: TRK: 210.0 GSP: 95.0 ALT: 3300.0 V/S: 1216.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:12:07: TRK: 223.0 GSP: 94.0 ALT: 3050.0 V/S: 320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:11:57: TRK: 223.0 GSP: 94.0 ALT: 3050.0 V/S: 320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:11:47: TRK: 283.0 GSP: 65.0 ALT: 3050.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:11:37: TRK: 283.0 GSP: 65.0 ALT: 3050.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:11:27: TRK: 283.0 GSP: 65.0 ALT: 3050.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:11:17: TRK: 287.0 GSP: 70.0 ALT: 3100.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:11:07: TRK: 287.0 GSP: 70.0 ALT: 3100.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:10:57: TRK: 282.0 GSP: 71.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:10:47: TRK: 282.0 GSP: 71.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:10:37: TRK: 271.0 GSP: 67.0 ALT: 3350.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:10:27: TRK: 271.0 GSP: 67.0 ALT: 3350.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:10:17: TRK: 289.0 GSP: 64.0 ALT: 3475.0 V/S: -192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:10:07: TRK: 289.0 GSP: 64.0 ALT: 3475.0 V/S: -192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:09:57: TRK: 282.0 GSP: 61.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 1920.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:09:47: TRK: 282.0 GSP: 61.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 1920.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:09:37: TRK: 272.0 GSP: 76.0 ALT: 3025.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:09:27: TRK: 272.0 GSP: 76.0 ALT: 3025.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:09:17: TRK: 272.0 GSP: 76.0 ALT: 3025.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:09:07: TRK: 238.0 GSP: 86.0 ALT: 3100.0 V/S: -896.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:08:57: TRK: 238.0 GSP: 86.0 ALT: 3100.0 V/S: -896.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:08:47: TRK: 238.0 GSP: 91.0 ALT: 3325.0 V/S: -192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:08:37: TRK: 238.0 GSP: 91.0 ALT: 3325.0 V/S: -192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:08:27: TRK: 252.0 GSP: 87.0 ALT: 3325.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:08:17: TRK: 252.0 GSP: 87.0 ALT: 3325.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:08:07: TRK: 234.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 3250.0 V/S: -192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:07:57: TRK: 234.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 3250.0 V/S: -192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:07:47: TRK: 231.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3300.0 V/S: -384.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:07:37: TRK: 231.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3300.0 V/S: -384.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:07:27: TRK: 230.0 GSP: 105.0 ALT: 3500.0 V/S: -640.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:07:17: TRK: 230.0 GSP: 105.0 ALT: 3500.0 V/S: -640.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:07:08: TRK: 232.0 GSP: 99.0 ALT: 3475.0 V/S: 576.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:06:58: TRK: 232.0 GSP: 99.0 ALT: 3475.0 V/S: 576.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:06:48: TRK: 225.0 GSP: 112.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:06:38: TRK: 225.0 GSP: 112.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:06:28: TRK: 225.0 GSP: 113.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:06:18: TRK: 220.0 GSP: 102.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: 1216.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:06:08: TRK: 220.0 GSP: 102.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: 1216.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:05:58: TRK: 218.0 GSP: 104.0 ALT: 3200.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:05:48: TRK: 218.0 GSP: 104.0 ALT: 3200.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:05:38: TRK: 221.0 GSP: 107.0 ALT: 3250.0 V/S: 128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:05:28: TRK: 221.0 GSP: 107.0 ALT: 3250.0 V/S: 128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:05:18: TRK: 218.0 GSP: 108.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:05:08: TRK: 218.0 GSP: 108.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:04:58: TRK: 190.0 GSP: 136.0 ALT: 3425.0 V/S: -512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:04:48: TRK: 190.0 GSP: 136.0 ALT: 3425.0 V/S: -512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:04:38: TRK: 205.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:04:28: TRK: 205.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:04:18: TRK: 205.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:04:08: TRK: 206.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:03:58: TRK: 206.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: -320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:03:48: TRK: 213.0 GSP: 113.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:03:38: TRK: 213.0 GSP: 113.0 ALT: 3525.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:03:28: TRK: 206.0 GSP: 115.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:03:18: TRK: 206.0 GSP: 115.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:03:08: TRK: 206.0 GSP: 115.0 ALT: 3400.0 V/S: 256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:02:58: TRK: 208.0 GSP: 106.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: 576.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:02:48: TRK: 208.0 GSP: 106.0 ALT: 3275.0 V/S: 576.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:02:38: TRK: 203.0 GSP: 114.0 ALT: 2925.0 V/S: 320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:02:28: TRK: 203.0 GSP: 114.0 ALT: 2925.0 V/S: 320.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:02:18: TRK: 218.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 2900.0 V/S: 256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:02:08: TRK: 218.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 2900.0 V/S: 256.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:01:58: TRK: 222.0 GSP: 105.0 ALT: 2925.0 V/S: -1408.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:01:48: TRK: 222.0 GSP: 105.0 ALT: 2925.0 V/S: -1408.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:01:38: TRK: 227.0 GSP: 99.0 ALT: 3325.0 V/S: -1216.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:01:28: TRK: 227.0 GSP: 99.0 ALT: 3325.0 V/S: -1216.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:01:18: TRK: 234.0 GSP: 96.0 ALT: 3625.0 V/S: -896.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:01:08: TRK: 234.0 GSP: 96.0 ALT: 3625.0 V/S: -896.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:00:58: TRK: 234.0 GSP: 96.0 ALT: 3625.0 V/S: -896.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:00:48: TRK: 226.0 GSP: 106.0 ALT: 3725.0 V/S: -704.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:00:38: TRK: 226.0 GSP: 106.0 ALT: 3725.0 V/S: -704.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:00:28: TRK: 229.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 3725.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:00:18: TRK: 229.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 3725.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:58:58: TRK: 228.0 GSP: 102.0 ALT: 2525.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:58:48: TRK: 228.0 GSP: 102.0 ALT: 2525.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:58:38: TRK: 228.0 GSP: 102.0 ALT: 2525.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:58:28: TRK: 228.0 GSP: 102.0 ALT: 2525.0 V/S: -128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:58:18: TRK: 223.0 GSP: 109.0 ALT: 2575.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:58:08: TRK: 223.0 GSP: 109.0 ALT: 2575.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:57:58: TRK: 226.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 2400.0 V/S: 448.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:57:48: TRK: 226.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 2400.0 V/S: 448.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:55:28: TRK: 229.0 GSP: 111.0 ALT: 2775.0 V/S: -1536.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:55:18: TRK: 229.0 GSP: 111.0 ALT: 2775.0 V/S: -1536.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:55:08: TRK: 229.0 GSP: 111.0 ALT: 2775.0 V/S: -1536.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:54:59: TRK: 229.0 GSP: 111.0 ALT: 2775.0 V/S: -1536.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:54:19: TRK: 236.0 GSP: 104.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: -1728.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:54:09: TRK: 235.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:53:59: TRK: 235.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:53:49: TRK: 235.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:53:39: TRK: 235.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:53:29: TRK: 235.0 GSP: 103.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:53:19: TRK: 232.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 3925.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:53:09: TRK: 232.0 GSP: 100.0 ALT: 3925.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:52:59: TRK: 225.0 GSP: 109.0 ALT: 3925.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:52:49: TRK: 225.0 GSP: 109.0 ALT: 3925.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:52:39: TRK: 217.0 GSP: 116.0 ALT: 3900.0 V/S: -64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:52:29: TRK: 217.0 GSP: 116.0 ALT: 3900.0 V/S: -64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:52:19: TRK: 215.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3975.0 V/S: -64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:52:09: TRK: 215.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3975.0 V/S: -64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:51:59: TRK: 214.0 GSP: 120.0 ALT: 3975.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:51:49: TRK: 212.0 GSP: 116.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:51:39: TRK: 212.0 GSP: 116.0 ALT: 3950.0 V/S: 512.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:51:29: TRK: 205.0 GSP: 122.0 ALT: 3800.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:51:19: TRK: 205.0 GSP: 122.0 ALT: 3800.0 V/S: 64.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:51:09: TRK: 203.0 GSP: 121.0 ALT: 3800.0 V/S: 128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:50:59: TRK: 203.0 GSP: 121.0 ALT: 3800.0 V/S: 128.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:50:49: TRK: 197.0 GSP: 129.0 ALT: 3675.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:50:39: TRK: 197.0 GSP: 129.0 ALT: 3675.0 V/S: 192.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:50:29: TRK: 188.0 GSP: 142.0 ALT: 3625.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:50:19: TRK: 188.0 GSP: 142.0 ALT: 3625.0 V/S: 0.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 07:50:09: TRK: 188.0 GSP: 142.0 ALT: 3625.0 V/S: 0.0

[hueyracer]

Last light was around 1810

Interesting.. Thx!

[Autonomous Collectiv]

Last light at YWLM yesterday night was 1802 however, vis reducing to 4000 in Blowing dust and a fast approaching front from the west with low cloud and rain showers. It would've been "dark" a while before they turned the corner following the VFR route and found they couldn't see Newcastle ahead.

[captpugwash]

It looks like the aircraft turned away from the Williamtown control zone just prior to entry. Due to the extreme conditions I hope the aircraft crew were given every assistance/ clearance and not denied as other GA aircraft have in the past with catastrophic consequences ☹️

[Cedrik]

I have been held in severe turbulence near Newcastle for 30 minutes before being cleared North coastal.

[Dick Smith]

So sad

I wonder if it was held orbiting like many are -surely not!

[physicus]

Dick Smith as you can see on the screenshot above they were not circling, but rather turning towards Williamtown before they descended in a sharp left turn. Assuming the Huey has a counterclockwise turning main rotor like all US products, loss of tail rotor / tail rotor effectiveness would have resulted in a clockwise turn, not counterclockwise. Loss of control due other reasons would appear more likely. Descent rates, two reported at 8000+ and 9000+ fpm is severe, far higher than autorotation. Something catastrophic must have occurred.

[Twist & Shout]

Was the aircraft certified IFR, or NVFR?
Was the Pilot qualified and current on IF or NVFR?

The answers have to be yes to both, NVFR at a minimum to be legal, surely. IFR to be sensible/safe, in my opinion.
Did the forecast indicate VMC?

It’s a terrible result.

[belly tank]

Was the aircraft certified IFR, or NVFR?
Was the Pilot qualified and current on IF or NVFR?

The answers have to be yes to both, NVFR at a minimum to be legal, surely. IFR to be sensible/safe, in my opinion.
Did the forecast indicate VMC?

It’s a terrible result.




https://www.google.com.au/amp/s/amp.news.com.au/national/nsw-act/major-search-operation-after-helicopter-goes-missing-off-the-radar/news-story/682ed2fc286b4c510685acafa9b2b748
Firstly condolences to the families.

My observations of the TAF at YWLM after a colleague told me about the accident was that it was blowing dust with a front moving through and gusting 48kts (due to high winds state wide it was carrying dust from the western regions of NSW farmlands to the coast ).

The information I have was that the pilot was not IFR and I’m not certain if he had NVFR or not ? it was a UH-1H VH- UVC and I’m not aware of what instrumentation was fitted but I believe it hadn’t flown much since a rebuild.

The route he was flying takes him into the Williamtown military zone and requires clearance. At night it’s awfully dark up that way on the coast with some small coastal town lighting until you reach Newcastle city which was about 15nm from where the accident happened. If you were planning to fly into NVFR conditions normally you would be at 4500’ heading south given LSALT considerations. The accident took place about 10-15 mins after last light.

RIP

[Cedrik]

How far offshoredid the machine hit? You wouldn't go VFR over water on a dark night by choice if you had the option of tracking down the beach or heads.

[industry insider]

I may be wrong but should there have been 5 POB (4 pax) on an ex mil aircraft?

[gulliBell]

The FAA Type Certificate for UH-1H states:
"No person may be carried in this helicopter during fight unless that person is essential to the purpose of the flight".
Unless they had an alternative way around that, which they might with CASA. Don't know. Doesn't help them now, regrettably.

[megan]

No person may be carried in this helicopter during fight unless that person is essential to the purpose of the flightDon't know how they get around it, but many UH-1H are used in the US to give rides to the public. Crew chief from my old unit has one and gives rides, financial side no idea.I’m not aware of what instrumentation was fitted If the instrumentation was as originally fitted and serviceable the aircraft was quite capable of IMC flight, goes without saying the driver needs to be up to the task.should there have been 5 POB (4 pax) on an ex mil aircraftThe operator aimed to use the aircraft to give warbird joyrides to the public. An ad from the video.Bell UH1H Huey Warbird flights. Get to da Choppa Book your seats now for our upcoming Huey flights Co Pilot seat Observer seats Troop seats Gunner seats

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHXVxoMK55Y

[Nescafe]

https://www.casa.gov.au/part132

If operated in a ‘limited’ category, as some pictures indicate, there are allowances to take pax.

Part 132 of CASR sets out the requirements for limited category aircraft operations. It preserves the requirements under previous regulations (262AN and 262AM of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988) but contains some important administrative and safety enhancements.

Overall, Part 132 sets out:

the conditions under which various limited category aircraft operations may be conducted
the responsibilities of persons involved in limited category aircraft operations
the offences that relate to breaching the conditions for limited category aircraft operations.

This Part provides flexibility and certainty around recreational use of warbirds and limited category historic or replica aircraft. It permits air racing and glider towing, and provides authorisation for personal flights. It also permits the limited category aircraft with any of the following to be eligible for a limited category certificate for personal flights (not adventure flights for payment or reward) as long as these are not conducted over populous areas:

unapproved major modifications
expired airframe fatigue life
life limited components that have exceeded their life limits.

Safety requirements include:

an extra safety briefing at the point of sale for any adventure flight as well as before boarding
limits to passenger numbers
conditions for flights over populous areas.

[Twist & Shout]

Wasn’t it a B205 (Civilian)- painted up and used in movies as a UH1H?

[Nescafe]

Register says it was a UH-1H

https://www.regosearch.com/aircraft/au/UVC

[megan]

Definitely UH-1H

https://www.helicopterbuyer.com/userfiles/files/1965_UH-1H_-_65-10100_-_5144_-_Sales_Spec(1656).pdf

[havick]

Definitely UH-1H

https://www.helicopterbuyer.com/userfiles/files/1965_UH-1H_-_65-10100_-_5144_-_Sales_Spec(1656).pdf

Wow, if that’s the avionics fit then it wouldn’t have even been NVFR capable let alone IFR two pilot.

[Twist & Shout]

1. OK, UH-1H
2. In the “comments” section of the news link Bellytank supplied, it is suggested they landed, then subsequently took off again. This was a feature of a previous tragic weather related crash in the Newcastle area.

If individuals are to learn/gain anything from this latest crash (regardless of what the cause eventually turns out to be. Or if this reported landing did occur.) It should be: that if you land enroute - do not take off again unless the reason for the landing has been mitigated significantly. Convenience should not be a factor. Sitting in a helicopter, in a field all night, would be a small price to pay to avoid a fatal crash.

[zzodr]

Very sad news. Had seen this UH1H around in SE Qld. The thought of being up in that wind on Friday with a teetering rotor system gives me the willies. I wonder if it mast bumped or chopped the tail off.
Something very bad and sudden happened that's for sure, no mayday call was received.
RIP to the pilot and passengers.

[rottenjohn]

.

I don't know the local weather and daylight hours... But 6:49 pm is hardly "VFR at night", or is it dark around that time of the year already at down under?
If you don't know the hours of daylight its hardly worth commenting that its hardly night is it.

[John Eacott]

Skip the first few minutes for some video in and around the UH-1H, and from 3:20 there is a scan across the panel. It looks to me like an iPad in the centre of the pilot’s side, and a single turn and slip underneath plus an AH on the left panel.

Is there some sort of app for the iPad to represent a suitable set of instruments for NVFR :confused:

https://youtu.be/tXMrpahOQoU

[zhishengji751]

From the youtube link from John.

https://i.imgur.com/x7fa0UU.png

[industry insider]

Very sad news. Had seen this UH1H around in SE Qld. The thought of being up in that wind on Friday with a teetering rotor system gives me the willies.

Just a breeze, plenty of Bell 212s have spent years and thousands of hours flying shuttles in the Northern North Sea and working in other places in far worse weather conditions than this.

But the pilots were IFR and more importantly night IMC trained for it and the aircraft were IFR equipped and certified.

Even then, we lost an aircraft and an outstanding group of 6 brave men on a night SAR mission.

[Squawk7700]

Is there some sort of app for the iPad to represent a suitable set of instruments for NVFR :confused:

There are devices available however none are approved, TSO’ed or certified in any way unless I’m horribly mistaken.

iLevil and Aeleous Talon are a couple and they would be wired into the dash with pitot and static connected, then wirelessly connected to the WiFi.

[Twist & Shout]

Looks like an AH on the left side of the instrument panel.
Probably certified NVFR.
Trying to keep it upright with that in the scan, under difficult conditions, would, in my estimation, be “challenging”.

If an iPad were used as a primary instrument...... words fail me. (Well, nice words)

[hueyracer]

From my experience :

Just because something is installed in a helicopter does not mean it's actually working.. (Especially in a utility helicopter or a private use/restricted category one)....

​​​​​​

[Fareastdriver]

The IPad in the picture has two clips on the left hand corners and a retaining clip on the right hand side. The IPad could be removed and the normal instrumentation would be visible.

[Squawk7700]

The IPad in the picture has two clips on the left hand corners and a retaining clip on the right hand side. The IPad could be removed and the normal instrumentation would be visible.

Ummm no, sorry. The instruments behind the iPad have been blanked out and the layout has been changed completely, presumably to fit the iPad in the middle. You can see where they used to be fitted, quite clearly. The AH on the left is a bloody long way away from the pilot.

[Old Farang]

The search continues for a pilot and four passengers who are feared dead after a helicopter crashed into waters off the NSW coast, with authorities seeking out witnesses who could have seen the aircraft in distress.

Police are spearheading the recovery operation after the Bell UH1 helicopter dropped off the radar near Anna Bay, north of Newcastle, early on Friday night.

The aircraft belonged to Brisbane Helicopters owner and pilot David Kerr, who is believed to have been flying it at the time.

https://au.news.yahoo.com/anna-bay-helicopter-crash-rescue-071939495.html

Queenslanders Jamie Ogden and Grant Kuhnemann, and NSW couple Jocelyn Villanueva and Gregory Miller are also believed to have been on board.

NSW Police has called for anyone who may have seen the helicopter in distress, and anyone who filmed or photographed the aircraft on Friday night to come forward.

The Australian Defence Force on Sunday confirmed Mr Miller was an employee but said he was not on duty at the time of the crash.

The force is engaging with authorities to help with recovery efforts, a spokesperson told AAP in a statement on Sunday.

Mr Ogden's brother Darren has reportedly flown to Nelson Bay from Queensland after hearing about the crash.

[gulliBell]

The iPad installation does seem odd to me. Hardly in keeping with the facade of an original war bird. The instruments that would be behind the iPad in the original no doubt would be expensive to maintain or replace now (were they self contained in the original UH-1 or remotely connected to Tarsyn's?). And are they armoured crew seats, or replica armoured seats? Looks like they're stuffed with pink batts and not steel plates. No N2/NR indicator or HSI on the co-pilot side, so it's not a full-on 2 pilot instrumented ship. Not something I'd choose to be stooging around in bad weather at night.

[MickG0105]

It wouldn't be the first time that I haven't been able to see something right in front of me but where is the Heading Indicator on that panel?

[Dick Smith]

Captainplugwash

I agree. Being held outside the control zone at Willy is a common occurrence.
Was the zone active at the time? If an IFR planned aircraft was arriving at the same time it would have most likely resulted in the VFR being held OCTA.

[zhishengji751]

Slightly different arrangement of the instrument panel, showing what looks to be an INOP VSI, in light of Huey Racer's comment. Not sure what is the most recent image.

https://i.imgur.com/r0Gt3Ms.jpg

[Squawk7700]

Slightly different arrangement of the instrument panel, showing what looks to be an INOP VSI, in light of Huey Racer's comment. Not sure what is the most recent image.



Theres another VSI on the far right.

[SASless]

Lots of variations to the Instrument Panel layouts but this is the Standard Panel that most old Hueys had in their Army Service.


https://duckduckgo.com/?q=Huey+Helicopter+Cockpit+Instrument+Panel&t=osx&iax=images&ia=images&iai=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.digitalcombatsimulator.com%2Fimages%2Fp roducts%2Fhuey%2FHuey-14.jpg


http://www.williammaloney.com/Aviation/NavalAirStationWildwoodAviationMuseum/BellUH1HueyHelicopter/images/02HueyInstrumentPanel.jpg

[Fareastdriver]

Move the T&S up one sector and it becomes a standard Royal Air Force instrument panel.

[SuperF]

The iPad was probably just being used as a moving map. Very common in Utility aircraft down this end of the world.

No idea about the rest.

[EMS R22]

The iPad was probably just being used as a moving map. Very common in Utility aircraft down this end of the world.

No idea about the rest.

I agree. All our machines have iPads on the dash now with moving map and our Cirro software.

[RickNRoll]

Slightly different arrangement of the instrument panel, showing what looks to be an INOP VSI, in light of Huey Racer's comment. Not sure what is the most recent image.

https://i.imgur.com/r0Gt3Ms.jpg

Did the passengers read the warning message on the bottom left of the picture?

[F.Nose]

Taking out an AH in any aircraft is playing with fire IMO. The Pilot of this aircraft may well have planned his trip to be conducted fully in day VMC. Un-forecast or un planned for head winds and before you know it you have a race with the sun. Failing light, blowing dust, gusty turbulent conditions and all of a sudden the AH is your best friend.

Everybody has been caught out at some stage.

No excuse for not landing and sitting it out but in so doing you are subject to an uncomfortable embarrassing night with your pissed off passengers.....There is a lot of pressure to keep going particularly when so close a place of comfort....in this case William Town.

Not saying that is what happened because I don’t know anymore than anyone else, but it sure doesn’t look to me like this helicopter should have been flying in the reported conditions.

[gulliBell]

Yep, wait it out in the Bell Hotel, done that a few times before. Nothing to be embarrassed about.

[industry insider]

Part 132 of CASR sets out the requirements for limited category aircraft operations. It preserves the requirements under previous regulations (262AN and 262AM of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988) but contains some important administrative and safety enhancements.

Overall, Part 132 sets out:

the conditions under which various limited category aircraft operations may be conducted
the responsibilities of persons involved in limited category aircraft operations
the offences that relate to breaching the conditions for limited category aircraft operations.

This Part provides flexibility and certainty around recreational use of warbirds and limited category historic or replica aircraft. It permits air racing and glider towing, and provides authorisation for personal flights. It also permits the limited category aircraft with any of the following to be eligible for a limited category certificate for personal flights (not adventure flights for payment or reward) as long as these are not conducted over populous areas:

unapproved major modifications
expired airframe fatigue life
life limited components that have exceeded their life limits.

Safety requirements include:

an extra safety briefing at the point of sale for any adventure flight as well as before boarding
limits to passenger numbers
conditions for flights over populous areas.



Good to see clear, unambiguous rules from CASA, no room for confusion there when compared with the FAA.

[Ascend Charlie]

It also permits the limited category aircraft with any of the following to be eligible for a limited category certificate for personal flights (not adventure flights for payment or reward) as long as these are not conducted over populous areas:

unapproved major modifications
expired airframe fatigue life
life limited components that have exceeded their life limits.


This is the really scary bit - flights can be approved in time-expired airframes with time-expired components and unapproved MAJOR modifications.

[tartare]

Interesting point from a previous poster about North Sea Ops, compared to the winds on the night this happened.
At what wind speed would you consider not going flying in a UH-1H?

[John Eacott]

Interesting point from a previous poster about North Sea Ops, compared to the winds on the night this happened.
At what wind speed would you consider not going flying in a UH-1H?

The shut down/start up limits were the main factor, but unexpected wind increases could catch us out and then we'd just have to keep flying until the wind dropped back down for a safe shut down. Brent Field Bell 212 ops we'd often catch 50kts+ winds, worst I had was ~80kts for an hour or two. Downwind was pretty darn quick but getting back into wind at 20-30kts groundspeed was tedious :p

However we had rotor brakes, whereas the UH1 VH-UVC hasn't/hadn't. This should be factored in to any trip to ensure a safe shut down (and start up) can be achieved without blade sailing and TRDS/boom/MRB damage.

[Nescafe]

At what wind speed would you consider not going flying in a UH-1H?

That would depend upon whether it was 2 experienced IFR rated pilots in an IFR approved fit UH1H, or a private/low hour pilot that is/was relatively inexperienced in adverse condition operations.

Other factors would be what’s the urgency of the mission? Deliver your mates to Sydney?

[Squawk7700]

This is the really scary bit - flights can be approved in time-expired airframes with time-expired components and unapproved MAJOR modifications.

You’re reading that the wrong way in terms of the unapproved modifications.

As the manufacturers aren’t likely to be around any more, a major modification might be a positive one, Ike a turbine replacing a radial.

It may be time expired in terms of what the manufacturer says, however as far as the industry, engineers and experts say, it may be fine.

[Autonomous Collectiv]

Rumour has it the PIC was not night rated either.

[[email protected]]

It’s not the wind speed I would be concerned with in teetering head helicopter but the gusts and severe turbulence.

Combine poor references and severe turbulence and a bad mast bumping event is a distinct possibility.

The age of the helicopter might be a factor in turning mast bumping into rotor separation.

It it would explain the sudden disappearance from radar.

[physicus]

The age of the helicopter might be a factor in turning mast bumping into rotor separation.

It it would explain the sudden disappearance from radar.

Check out the ADSB data above - the vertical rates (those are barometric VSI derived, not GPS) are not indicative of a free-fall event.

[gulliBell]

-9000'/min is not something a B205 can ordinarily do.

[212man]

-9000'/min is not something a B205 can ordinarily do.

Impossible I would have thought.
the vertical rates (those are barometric VSI derived, not GPS) are not indicative of a free-fall event

I would imagine that a tumbling fuselage will induce all manner of pressure errors and the VSI (and IAS etc) data will be invalid.

[gulliBell]

The whole data set looks crazy to me, from beginning to end.

[havick]

-9000'/min is not something a B205 can ordinarily do.

true, if the aircraft is in a relatively stable/level attitude. Not so much if the aircraft is pointing at the ground and doing circles.

[henra]

-9000'/min is not something a B205 can ordinarily do.
Minus the Rotor head and in a tumbling motion that is about the order of magnitude which I would expect to see.
As some already wrote before: teetering head in up to 70kts of gusts at night over water in bad weather with questionable avionics suit for that purpose and unclear NVFR/IFR experience of the pilot.
What could possibly have gone wrong here?
Very tragic. But for sure I don't expect any novel cause of an accident in this particular case.

[[email protected]]

Physicus - your ADSB data doesn't seem accurate
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:14:17: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:14:07: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:57: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:47: TRK: 48.0 GSP: 127.0 ALT: 1450.0 V/S: -9024.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:37: TRK: 121.0 GSP: 152.0 ALT: 2200.0 V/S: -8768.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:27: TRK: 121.0 GSP: 152.0 ALT: 2200.0 V/S: -8768.0
UTC Time +/- 10s: 2019-09-06 08:13:17: TRK: 121.0 GSP: 152.0 ALT: 2200.0 V/S: -8768.0
In several places the Alt reading remains the same for 3 or 4 readings in a row whilst the VS is off the clock - they can't both be right so I wouldn't read too much into them other than a 9000'/min RoD is not indicative of a controlled situation, as others have said:ok:

[gulliBell]

Not only that, if it was in virtual free fall at -9000'/min it certainly wouldn't have a GSP of 127 kt. Simply impossible.

[Robbo Jock]

From Physicus' post with the data:
(updated ADS-B data with 10s interval data. A note on that: not every interval provides a full complement of the data. The only reliable indicator that data is fresh is if it has changed from the last timestamp. Keep that in mind when inferring conclusions from this.)

[[email protected]]

Robbo Jock - good point but that means very little of that information is reliable and he may as well have not posted it.

[Same again]

I flew in that area for many years and when it is dark it is very dark. There is also plenty of high ground along the coast which produces a lot of turbulence. I would not want to be flying there in that weather at night in a poorly equipped helicopter with no IFR experience and (if the rumours are correct) very little night experience either.

[[email protected]]

If you sieve out the data points where nothing changes you can certainly see it was a bumpy night and there was very little straight and level flight going on - he seems to have been trying to maintain about 3500' and a SSWesterly heading but there are some significant variations in height from a fraction under 4000' down to 2400' and changes in vertical speed of almost +/- 2000'/min at times.

The last few data points though are significantly different.

[physicus]

There always are two camps regarding tracking data release and accidents. I'm in the "some data is better than no data" camp - it provides a reference frame going beyond the obvious "it dropped off the radar". As [email protected] points out, the data does allow for valid statements to be made about the flying conditions prior to the incident. But gulliBell and 212man also have valid points that much of the last seconds of the data must be viewed cautiously due to the nature of how the data is collected. Static and pitot systems may not have been aligned for the designed air flow for correct measurements. The ground speed however is inferred from the GPS ground positions (in the on board GPS, not from the broadcast ground positions in post processing, it is an ADS-B field). It is clearly evident from the plots below that the aircraft turned with the wind, resulting in a corresponding increase in ground speed, which aligns with the ground track data.

Most importantly, it is evident from the pre-incident data points that both track hold and altitude hold were significantly perturbed, either due to the conditions encountered, or a lack of experience/workload on the pilot in dark conditions, resulting in significant departures in altitude and a steadily decreasing ground speed. Whether that was due to the aircraft penetrating increasing headwind and turbulence, or because of handling problems, is not possible to infer from this data. In the vertical speed plot, I derived the vertical speed based on the updated altitudes and they are in very good agreement with the ADS-B reported V/S. I've updated the plot with the last datapoint (not included above), showing the last altitude inferred V/S was -14400 fpm. This amounts to about 80m/s, which is approximately the terminal velocity for a body with a drag coefficient of 0.25 (see https://dspace-erf.nlr.nl/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11881/558/erf2013_025.pdf?sequence=1). The sharp left-hand turn at 8:13:07, along with this new V/S datapoint, would lend evidence to the possibility of a main rotor separation. The sudden loss of main rotor torque would lead to a left yaw moment caused by the tail rotor on a counter clockwise rotating main rotor.

Note that because these data are derived from a physical process, prior data points are causal to the next points, therefore connecting them with smoothed lines is not inherently wrong is it might be when connecting randomly moving parameters such as stock prices. But: do not use the smoothed lines inbetween data points for interpolation (as is evident between 7:55 and 7:58)!

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/600x1427/screenshot_2019_09_13_06_53_55_34fc603e2ce5cfe3471e194a0ae6b c5ceccc783f.png

[megan]

would lend evidence to the possibility of a main rotor separation. The sudden loss of main rotor torque would lead to a left yaw moment caused by the tail rotor on a counter clockwise rotating main rotorAll the main rotor separations (mast bumping) I've seen have resulted in the tail boom being chopped off just aft of the tail boom attachment point.

[physicus]

I was addressing a main rotor separation mostly in the context of what others have suggested, I personally think that is an unlikely scenario. But other than being a professional physicist, a greenhorn helicopter pilot, but seasoned fixed wing pilot having flown many different types from small to heavy (and corresponding professional level human factors involvement), I have little experience to contribute other than the physics behind this, and the (likely) human factors involved. The V/S rate deduced from the data points would indicate that main rotor separation remains a possibility though, but there are many ways to make an intact helicopter descend at a corresponding V/S in a more or less controlled state of flight. I have no idea what the site evidence says other than a news article stating the main body of the helicopter was found floating with the tail sticking out of the water.

Are there any non-Robinson aircraft included in your list of main rotor separations that resulted in sheared off tails?

[Ascend Charlie]

18 Aug 1981, a Huey had a separation, the blade came through the cockpit and bisected the left-seater, took off the left side fuel tanks (it was a Bravo) and then removed the tail boom. Freefall from 1500'. I had been the last person to fly this bird and survive. And no, I didn't break it - the T/R pitch change cable came off its pulley, wrapped around the driveshaft and put a ridiculous amount of pitch onto the T/R. It flapped and struck the vertical pylon, one blade came off, then the whole gearbox and remaining blade separated.

The cg change from losing 30kg from 30 feet back and the rapid yaw/roll caused the mast bump. Three fatalities.

[[email protected]]

One reason I supported the MR separation idea was this paragraph from the linked newspaper report in post #19
A major air and sea search operation spotted the tail rotor of the aircraft before 9am Saturday and the main airframe was sighted 30 minutes later, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) said. it seems strange that they use the phrase main fuselage without commenting on the main rotor when they have specifically mentioned the tail rotor.

A TR assembly won't float by itself but could if still attached to the tail boom - if the tail boom has detached from the main fuselage and there is no mention of the MR then it supports the idea of MR separation.

I still think that a combination of the poor references and the hideous turbulence are a perfect recipe for overcontrolling and creating a negative G situation that is so bad for teetering head helicopters.

Just before the data drops off a cliff there is a rapid climb which could result in a 'pushover' at the top leading to the aforementioned mast bumping.

[gulliBell]

Whatever theories might prevail until the wreckage is found, one thing is virtually certain. If the pilot had landed before last light instead of pressing on into an environment where he wasn't qualified to operate, in an aircraft that wasn't appropriately equipped to operate, we wouldn't be having this discussion.

[blakmax]

I have waited to respond to this thread until I saw some suggestions of MRB separation.

I am a specialist in adhesive bond failure forensics, having worked in the past as a scientist for the ADF. Prior to 2007 I was involved in a collaborative investigation with the NZ DTA into a severe cracking problem with one RNZAF UH1H MRB. I sincerely hope that this is not the case with this event.

The primary cause of the RNZAF occurrence was disbonding of the adhesive layer between the blade upper surface and the steel grip pad where the blade attachment fittings clamped onto the blade adjacent to the attachment pin. There were significant concerns in relation to how the adhesive bond design concept was developed. The grip pad is approximately 12mm thick and the end terminates at sharp angle of approximately 45 degrees. There is a common perception that adhesive bonds distribute load over the entire adhesive layer, with a uniform shear stress spread over the joint. Of the order of 76% of bonded structures in the US were found in 2004 to be designed on this basis. This has been known since 1938 to be incorrect. In an adhesive bond the shear stress peaks at the ends and all of the load is transferred just at the ends of the joint with no load whatsoever being transmitted in the centre of the joint. The larger the stiffness imbalance between the adherents, the higher the4 shear stress peak at the end of the joint. In the case of the grip pad bond, there is a very large and rapid increase in thickness and a large difference in elastic modulus (steel vs aluminium) meaning that the shear stresses at the end of the joint are very high.

In the case of the RNZAF blade, post event investigation showed that there was clear evidence of adhesive bond fatigue and environmental disbonding of the adhesive resulting in the entire bond failing as far back as the rotor attachment pin. The consequence of this disbonding was that all of the load that should have been transferred by the adhesive bond was now transferred by increased bearing loads at the attachment pin, and these increased bearing loads initiated fatigue cracking in the MRB. The cracking extended through about 90% of the D spar and extended well into the blade structure itself. It was only because of visual observations of the cracking by the flight crew in their walk around that disaster was avoided..

The RNZAF and ADF managed the problem by visual inspection of the paint layer at the outboard end of the bond. Any cracking in the paint was cause for further investigation. I am unaware of RNZAF findings from these observations but I am aware that a number of suspect blades were removed from service by the ADF and subjected to strip-down investigations that confirmed the presence of disbonds.

Like I have said, I just hope that this is not the cause of the Coffs Harbour incident.

Regards

Blakmax

[megan]

Are there any non-Robinson aircraft included in your list of main rotor separations that resulted in sheared off tailsSorry for not being clear, was referring to Hueys physicus.

[Autonomous Collectiv]

I think you'll find that a day VFR pilot in a day VFR aircraft turned away from any discernible horizon or attitude reference and lost control.

[Scardy]

Blakmax.

Sorry you lost me right after MRB SEPERATION HISTORY.

:p:p

[fdr]

Blakmax. Sorry you lost me right after MRB SEPERATION HISTORY. :p:p

"...Separation..."

Why would that have been an end to an intelligent discussion. BlakMax is a world renowned expert in an interesting field that gains relevance by the day. His treatise on bond physics is fascinating, and when considered in light of various kludge repairs that get done on composites or bonded metal structures is of more than passing interest. His Boron patches were pretty darn good... Following the physics of a bonded edge with "additional structural" rivets clears the mind on the state of the designs we fly.

For the subject UH1H event, the wreckage mapping will tell a story, as will detail analysis, but the conditions make rotor separation a possibility, to be disproved by the debris field analysis. The instrumentation is interesting, lots of possibilities there, however driving around dependent on geriatric gyros without comparators etc is not much worse off than an iphone or ipad taped to the panel with their own mems sensors or using a modern external AHRS sensor, all of which work well, until the batteries fail, you get an inbound call, the ipad times out.. etc. My little 2 seat jet has the same gyro that came out of the USSR in the middle of the Viet Nam war, and the ipad is a desirable safety enhancement to relying on a T&S to keep the blue side upper most.

My recollection of the UH1 separation sequence is that it would end up with a strike through the cabin quite often. which is similar to the RHC mast bump cases. MR-tail boom impact other than blade sailing, seemed to be more prevalent with heavier single rotor designs where the TPP can alter rapidly and the fuselage pendulous response is slower, thinking of CH-53's and similar (not a mast bump case of course, they could get to stop pounding but not a characteristic mast bump as such).

Wasn't a nice day to go fly by the sounds of it.

[industry insider]

For the subject UH1H event, the wreckage mapping will tell a story

The wreckage is at the bottom of the sea. After 10 days, it will have moved around in the currents and tides enough that any mapping now will be irrelevant. While not doubting Blackmax's expertise, the statistical likelihood probably doesn't point towards blade separation.

[Autonomous Collectiv]

For six days after the crash the seas in the area were wild, at this point the wreckage could be anywhere and post crash damage done in those wild seas would be extensive.

[physicus]

A very interesting contribution, thanks blakmax ! I would imagine that bonding composites to non-composites has had a lot of research put into in the development of the latest Airbus and Boeing products. Although in a fixed wing aircraft I can't imagine that there are stresses remotely similar to those encountered in a rotor system, other than the vibration aspects (which EK learned the hard way with flap fairings near the engines that needed replaced at well below their design limits due to cracking of the attachment points).

[tartare]

Without intending to be morbid, having watched many RNZAF UH-1Hs as a lad, and twice riding in one as a pax in the outward facing transmission tunnel seat - am curious.
How does a main rotor separation sequence on a UH-1 end up with blade going through cabin?
Each blade is ~25 feet long - and the mast anchors to the transmission at the rear of the cabin.
I would have thought on separation the rotor's inertia would have meant it continued `flying' and the fuse just dropped.
Does this just happen if you are in forward flight at the time - mast snaps - airload on disc causes it to rapidly pitch extremely forward, at the same time as the fuselage momentum continues through the blade arc?
Forgive the naive question - I am just a humble plank driver...

[Ascend Charlie]

The mast might break, but the blade is still attached to pitch change links from the swash plate, which could cause some ridiculous pitch inputs as the blade leaves its normal orbit. Thus the path thru the cabin / tail boom.

[fdr]

The mast might break, but the blade is still attached to pitch change links from the swash plate, which could cause some ridiculous pitch inputs as the blade leaves its normal orbit. Thus the path thru the cabin / tail boom.

Was scratching my head on the TB strike case, the only ones I can recall occurred from CG shifts such as the loss of the TR and gearbox etc, or the HH3 tail fold faikure in flight. The retreating blade seems to most often rise. Just musing.

Loads on a rotor have highest peaks at any contact with ground from skid or wheels, and at entry into autorotation. The root strain there is much higher than any other time. Pitch link loads get high with the RTT type manoeuvre which is comparable to the conditions where jack stall can occur in one or two well known types. The blade loads otherwise are alleviated by hinges in the nain. The UH 1 rotor head is a robust structure although some in plane loads are absorbed by the structure and the coning loads out of plane are taken by the structure as well. TPP is damped by the counter weight input.. By comparison, those driving the elegant RHC 3 hinge heads in their ride should take care that the coning hinges have the right tension relative to the teeter hinge, the blade structure needs that relief, as does proper TPP control. If that head starts teetering from a coning hinge bad stuff can happen.

Just musin'

[megan]

tartare, the usual cause of rotor separation due to mast bumping is a result of low "G'. In this case the rotor hits the mast at the nine o'çlock position and separates. Because the blade on the right is travelling forward and that on the left is travelling rearwards there is a dissymmetry of lift between the two blades, the right having greater and the left less, the disc then rolls left with respect to the fuselage and impacts the tail boom 90° following separation ie .046 of a second after separation, rotor RPM being 324.

A video on the subject.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QkOpH2e6tM

Had the unpleasant experience of being on the side lines of a fatal mast bump in Vietnam. We had a formation of five aircraft for a troop lift, but on arrival only four were needed, me being #5 was delegated to suntan duty. I was on my second day of flying duty having just returned from ten days R&R in Hong Kong with my wife and anxious to get back into it, so tried to swap with #4 and let him suntan. Unable to persuade him he went off and some short time later he had a mast bump. One take off technique used was to accelerate to Vne on the tree tops and then cyclic (zoom to FW folk) climb to altitude. The push over at the top of climb was where you had to be careful not to get into a low "G" situation. Often used when you were heavy and/or likely to encounter gun fire. The wreckage was winched into the back of a Chinook and delivered home

The accident in question.

Information on helicopter 68-15568 (http://www.135ahc.net/135goldbook/68-15568.htm)

[[email protected]]

Great video - it highlights the reason for the roll in low G conditions which is the TR thrust producing a right roll around the C of G.

[tartare]

Thanks Megan - have seen this before, but watched it again - it is indeed a great video.
Poor buggers - I hope they find the wreckage soon.

[fdr]

the usual cause of rotor separation due to mast bumping is a result of low "G'. In this case the rotor hits the mast at the nine o'çlock position and separates. Because the blade on the right is travelling forward and that on the left is travelling rearwards there is a dissymmetry of lift between the two blades, the right having greater and the left less, the disc then rolls left with respect to the fuselage and impacts the tail boom 90° following separation ie .046 of a second after separation, rotor RPM being 324.



Megan, with you all the way up to the point of separation of the disc.

The disc is liberated from the mast usually at the 2nd strike of the shaft by the inner edge of the head, that is characteristic. At the instant the rotor mast fails, the disc is free to go it's own way. The wreckage I've reviewed has normally an intrusion of a blade into the cockpit, but not strikes on the boom. boom strikes and cutting of the boom have been seen with a gross cg shift from structural failure of the TR/TRGB. I've never seen any video of the instance of loss, if anyone has such video, it's probably not much fun for public presentation but would be worth looking at. I would suspect that the blade intrusion would occur from a pitch up of the fuselage due to the horizontal stab down force acting on the aircraft without the opposing nose down moment from the rotor.

Low g mast bump results from induced roll from the asymmetric thrust line of the TR which is above the CGz of the system. The low thrust results in increased flapping if opposing cyclic is applied to negate the roll, vs the correct recovery of loading the disk up with aft cyclic.

Not being difficult, just would be interested in any details that would otherwise describe why in mast bump cases blade impact into the cockpit is usually seen. Prouty, Johnson, Stepniewski & Keys, or Leishman give the dynamics for when there is a shaft connected, but nothing covers the disconnected case. Your comment on dissymmetry is definitely the case up to the point of failure, thereafter... best seen from a distance. If considered as a gyroscope, then the disc forward velocity would continue to give a different velocity to the advancing and retreating blades, which would suggest a precession outcome which would be a flap back of the disc. at the point of failure, as has also been suggested, the shift fails but the pitch links for a moment will remain attached until overloaded, and the input to the cyclic blade angle would be dependent on whether the control horns lead or lag the blade. The image below shows a blade and links, as does the photo of the head. if the head is released from the shaft, then then both pitch links are going to be reducing blade pitch by almost the same amount... The advancing blade will have higher resultant aerodynamic forces and going to a negative pitch is going to reverse the direction of flapping momentarily. musing out loud.. If the blade chops the tail off, then the flap back is the mechanism. If the blade goes through the overhead, then the pitchlink reversing flapping may be the process.




https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/324x176/1_s2_0_s1000936113001659_gr2_aac1bb0e2215f287f716356593b6a8a 9a0fcbe78.jpg

(Sun, Tan, Wang, 2013)




https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1460x1132/screen_shot_2019_09_19_at_7_39_00_pm_caa6a4ce2528b2ae8574f66 31f74054ae6918e32.png


Tao Sun, Jianfeng Tan, Haowen Wang, Investigation of rotor control system loads, Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, Volume 26, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 1114-1124, ISSN 1000-9361, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2013.07.029.

[Fareastdriver]

I'm glad I did 16,500 hrs. on fully articulated rotors.

[Ascend Charlie]

fdr, go back and read my post #76.

That separation was from firstly a huge yaw/roll input from the tail rotor, then a large cg change with nose down pitch as the whole TR and gearbox separated. The advancing blade came around the nose and sliced off the left side and tail boom.

[megan]

The wreckage I've reviewed has normally an intrusion of a blade into the cockpit, but not strikes on the boom. boom strikes and cutting of the boom have been seen with a gross cg shift from structural failure of the TR/TRGB. fdr, all I can say is that my experience has been quite the reverse. The accident detailed above there was only the tail boom chop and was not the result of gross CoG shift such as from from structural failure of the TR/TRGB . The aircraft landed flat on its skids with the cabin top being not much more than chest high, as though someone had stomped on the aircraft with an enormous boot. The original grey coloured interior now being blood red prompted me not to take photos, as did picking swatches of nomex flight suit with attached flesh off bolt heads in the two man compartment.

Of course you're correct in that it may come through the cabin, to quote an extract from one report, "As the fuselage continued into the right roll the main rotor blades sliced through the cabin 3 times; first severing the roof of the canopy, then the control panel, and then the cabin floor through the center. The accident wreckage revealed that the cyclic pushover must have been so abrupt that once the low-G situation was reached it would have been impossible to recover from".

Be interesting if anyone has written anything on rotor dynamics post separation, perhaps the combinations and permutations are so complex as to prevent any understanding.

[Twist & Shout]

I think you'll find that a day VFR pilot in a day VFR aircraft turned away from any discernible horizon or attitude reference and lost control.

This.

Based on the partial information and rumors available.

It’s likely, that if mast bumping and subsequent rotor separation occurred, it was the final result of the above, and had they been on board a fully articulated or rigid rotor system equipped AC, the outcome would have been similar. Just more likely the blades would have been attached as they hit the ocean.

Best we can do is learn from this seemingly avoidable tragedy.

In hindsight, a night in Coffs could have been a great night out.
As mentioned, a night in the “Bell Hotel” would have been unremarkable.
:(

[fdr]

fdr, go back and read my post #76.

That separation was from firstly a huge yaw/roll input from the tail rotor, then a large cg change with nose down pitch as the whole TR and gearbox separated. The advancing blade came around the nose and sliced off the left side and tail boom.


The B yaw control pickup by the TR drive shaft was one of the inflight tail boom chops that came to mind. I had missed your #76 post. You were most fortunate not to be on that flight. The photos that DAFS had at that time were sobering.

[JohnDixson]

Fdr, in addition, there is the gyroscopic behavior of the main rotor due to imposed angular rate.

[belly tank]

Human remains found from helicopter that crashed off Port Stephens three weeks ago (https://www.9news.com.au/national/port-stephens-helicopter-crash-human-remains-and-debris-found-anna-bay/769d1922-5d62-4272-ab0c-dc159d273b43)
Police have located debris and human remains from a helicopter believed to have ditched into the water off Port Stephens almost three weeks ago.
Late yesterday specialist divers located and retrieved debris from the aircraft, sitting approximately 30 metres under the surface off nearby Birubi Point.
The aircraft disappeared off radar about 6.30pm on Friday September 6 (https://www.9news.com.au/national/nsw-news-helicopter-missing-after-it-disappeared-from-flight-radar-near-newcastle-friday-night/9e73b77e-cf5f-43a5-a867-6caf8575f6a7), crashing into the water and killing five people onboard.

It is still unknown what led to the helicopter's crash.
Among the five killed were Sydney resident Jocelyn Villanueva and her fiancé Greg Miller, as well as Jamie Ogden and his best mates Grant Kuhnemann and pilot David Kerr.
The 53-year-old Bell UH1 helicopter they were travelling in was nicknamed "Huey", and had been restored back to operational capability.

Following its disappearance from radar, a massive multi-agency search was conducted with support provided from a Royal Australian Navy Coastal Minehunter vessel, the HMAS Huon.

No emergency beacons were activated and there were no mayday calls detected from the crew onboard.
HMAS Huon provided underwater search and reconnaissance assistance to locate and identify the debris.

Detectives from Marine Area Command are continuing investigations working closely with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
Police will prepare a report for the information of the Coroner.

[MickG0105]

A pretty well written update with some new information in today's Courier Mail here (https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/chopper-in-fatal-crash-not-equipped-for-risky-flying/news-story/825f040cbf1bfdff44ec95311eb3e0e9) (may be pay walled so reproduced sans pictures below)

One of the accompanying photos showing the iPad was being used as a moving map display.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1250/screenshot_2019_10_12_21_17_38_6331ceda0640550d283700563af7f ba230a6055d.png



Chopper in fatal crash not equipped for risky flying

The Vietnam War-era helicopter that crashed at night in severe winds killing five people was not equipped or certified to fly using equipment designed to survive low-visibility conditions.

EXCLUSIVE Kelmeny Fraser, The Courier-Mail

THE Vietnam War-era helicopter that plummeted into the ocean in darkness and during severe winds last month, killing all five people on board, did not have the technology to survive risky conditions.

Aviation sources close to Brisbane pilot David Kerr, who was killed in the September 6 crash, told The Courier-Mail neither he nor the helicopter was rated to fly under instrument flight rules, which are required when cloud and darkness reduces visibility to dangerous levels.

And there are strong doubts as to whether Mr Kerr was qualified to fly at night at all, even in clear weather, meaning he should have been on the ground at least 10 minutes before “last light”.

A Courier-Mail investigation can reveal the 1966-built, restored Bell UH-1H Iroquois helicopter, known as a Huey, was certified in mid-October last year for day flying only.

The Huey was flying after dusk in turbulent weather when it crashed into the sea near Anna Bay, south of Port Stephens in New South Wales.

All five people on-board were killed, including Mr Kerr’s friends – ex-police detectives Jamie Ogden and Grant Kuhnemann – and Sydney couple Jocelyn Villanueva and Gregory Miller, who was looking to buy the Huey.

The flight time and severe weather have raised the likelihood the pilot found himself in low visibility conditions that pushed him beyond his qualifications and the helicopter’s capabilities.

Photographs obtained by The Courier-Mail of the helicopter’s instrument panel from earlier this year appeared to be missing some night flying equipment, according to one pilot.

And the artificial horizon – a must for night flying – was on the wrong side, he said.

Adding to the mystery of the crash, another source close to Mr Kerr said the pilot of about eight years previously cancelled flights in bad weather and only flew by daylight.

Under Civil Aviation Safety Authority rules, aircraft not certified to fly at night must be on the ground 10 minutes before “last light” – the aviation term for after sunset.

Instrument flight rules kick in when poor light or cloud cuts visibility below safe levels. Pilots need to be qualified to fly in those conditions, primarily using instruments, and the aircraft needs to be certified.

Australian Warbirds Association chief executive Mark Awad said Mr Kerr’s Huey was certified a year ago for day flying only and documents showed it was at the time not intended for night flying.

The Association is responsible for issuing certificates of airworthiness for limited category ex-military aircraft, as well as vetting and approving warbird operators for commercial adventure flights.

“While we do not want to prejudice the investigation, we feel that it’s a reminder to all pilots that proper pre-flight planning can prevent serious mishaps and accidents like this,” Mr Awad said.

“It’s quite distressing that the accident occurred and there and there was such a substantial loss of life.”

Mr Kerr had a commercial helicopter licence, but was not approved for adventure flights.

BIG NIGHT OUT PLANNED

Mr Kerr had originally planned to stop over on the night of the flight in the Hunter Valley before flying to Sydney the next day for a boozy night with mates, sources said.

It was to be his last flight in the Huey, which he had sold and was ferrying to a new owner. The party planned to return on a commercial flight.

Minutes before last light, the Huey’s pilot asked air traffic control for clearance through Williamtown air space and to be allowed to climb higher to “keep the tailwind on me,” a recording of the radio call reveals.

A tailwind can boost the groundspeed of a helicopter, speeding up the flight.

Mr Kerr took off from Archerfield Airport about 2.30pm, refuelling at Coffs Harbour before flying into fading light and strong winds whipped up by a cold front.

He struck trouble while flying through controlled airspace near Williamtown, home to a Royal Australian Airforce base, which is co-located at Newcastle Airport.

Defence owns the runway, authorises flights to land and runs air traffic control.

At some stage, Mr Kerr decided to fly direct to Bankstown Airport near Sydney, 40 minutes away from the crash site, instead of stopping over in the Hunter Valley.

Air Traffic Control told the pilot to switch frequencies to request authorisation. He then called Clearance Delivery – the air traffic control agency responsible for issuing airways clearances – and asked to transit through the airspace along a coastal transit lane.

A Defence spokesman said the pilot was immediately issued the clearance and continued tracking into the base’s airspace via the requested coastal corridor.

But minutes later, the pilot requested and was granted an amended airways clearance to track from a position near the Tomaree Peninsula – about 12km from the crash site – direct to Bankstown Airport.

The spokesman said the pilot did not request to land at Newcastle Airport and was not held up. “Air Traffic Control did not issue any holding instructions to the pilot … or delay the aircraft,” she said.

Radar images indicate the Huey turned left out to sea off Birubi Point at Anna Bay before crashing, raising speculation the pilot was operating in darkness and rough weather.

“When you go over water it is pitch black and there is no reference to the horizon,” one pilot, who asked to remain anonymous told The Courier-Mail. “It is like driving down the M1 without lights.”

Flight tracking data indicates the helicopter was being thrown around in severe turbulence, with both its ground speed and altitude dramatically rising then falling before crashing. It ascended to more than 3500ft (1km) before falling at a catastrophic rate.

By 6.15pm – 13 minutes after last light at Williamtown and 14 minutes after his last radio call – the Huey had dropped off the radar.

MAST BUMP THEORY

CASA in 2015 tightened its rules around flying in night conditions in the wake of the shocking 2011 helicopter crash at Lake Eyre, which killed the pilot and two passengers filming an ABC documentary.

It found the pilot “probably became spatially disoriented” on a dark night.

A year later, a safety campaign warned that pilots who fly outside of their qualification into low-visibility condition that dictated “instrument flight rules” was a “prominent safety issue.”

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau had at the time recorded 111 instances in a decade, including 18 serious incidents.

But aviation sources have also questioned whether the stricken Huey became a victim of “mast bump”, a problem linked to the helicopter model.

That is where in severe turbulence causing low-G conditions, or during abrupt movements, excessive flapping of the blades is followed by the rotor mast and blades severing, breaking up the aircraft.

A police boat spotted the tail rotor of the Huey the morning after the crash, while a rescue helicopter spotted the main airframe of the helicopter 45 minutes later.

The tail boom has been recovered, and police divers have recovered debris and the remains from two bodies.

ATSB investigators are looking into the value of recovering any more of the wreckage and will release a preliminary report this month.

Even with a tailwind Coffs to Bankstown would have to have been a stretch.

[gulliBell]

So there was no reason for the deviation off the clearance with the left turn out to sea when it got dark. Can only be explained by a loss of SA in conditions the pilot was not authorized to operate in.

On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.

[Squawk7700]

Under Civil Aviation Safety Authority rules, aircraft not certified to fly at night must be on the ground 10 minutes before “last light” – the aviation term for after sunset.

Isn’t it “plan” to land 10 mins prior ? They planned for it and it didn’t work out. Doesn’t mean the helicopter will fall out of the sky ! Will be interesting to see if the mast-bump story pans out.

[MickG0105]

Isn’t it “plan” to land 10 mins prior ? They planned for it and it didn’t work out.
There's no evidence that they planned to land anywhere but Bankstown, a solid 45 minutes further away.

[Twist & Shout]

I’m sure it is “plan to be on the ground 10 mins before LL” and “Be on the ground before LL”
Well, “back in the day” (AKA Last time I looked.)

[[email protected]]

It's only the ASI that has a large (70Kt) discrepancy so there is clearly something wrong with the pitot system somewhere unless they are flying sideways.

The scan to that AI on the left had side would be a challenge for an experienced instrument pilot in difficult conditions let alone someone who isn't qualified.

Mast bumping or not, this seems like yet another easily avoidable accident caused by poor decision making.

[Hot and Hi]

On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.
Well spotted! For night flying, let alone IFR, an Artificial Horizon would really be useful. In many jurisdictions, for commercial VFR night ops an AH (or two, with independent power source) are part of the required minimum equipment.

[Fareastdriver]

That attitude indicator looks different to all the ones I have flown behind. Judging by the view outside the horizon bar should be slanted the other way.

[havick]

Well spotted! For night flying, let alone IFR, an Artificial Horizon would really be useful. In many jurisdictions, for commercial VFR night ops an AH (or two, with independent power source) are part of the required minimum equipment.

An attitude indicator amongst other things are required in Australia for NVFR

[Ascend Charlie]

If I was in that aircraft and had a sudden loss of visual reference, the only real choice is to look across the cockpit at the AI on the left. It is indicating a right turn. Next to it is an ASI showing 30kt. The response would be to roll left, and lower the nose.

The aircraft is already in a left turn and doing 90kt. The extra roll and lowering of the nose will lead to a spiral dive. Adding to the confusion is a turn indicator showing no turn. The feeling from the seat of the pants, the wind noise increasing, and the instrument discrepancies will lead to a complete loss of situational awareness and eventually loss of control.

[currawong]

So there was no reason for the deviation off the clearance with the left turn out to sea when it got dark. Can only be explained by a loss of SA in conditions the pilot was not authorized to operate in.

On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.

Going to call you on that, having made a shallow turn out to sea to escape mountain wave in the past.

Uncommanded ascent (several thousand feet) followed by an abrupt descent (causing everything to stick to the ceiling). If it was rotary I would probably not be here.

[gulliBell]

...Uncommanded ascent (several thousand feet) followed by an abrupt descent (causing everything to stick to the ceiling)..

Says who? The pitot-static system in that aircraft might have been all messed up (look at the 70 kt discrepancy between left and right side ASI). Meaning the data captured in those graphs, which I point out none of which made much sense when cross referenced across the parameters recorded, is all suspect. Assume those climb/descent/speed rates do not reflect reality.

[Cedrik]

An attitude indicator amongst other things are required in Australia for NVFR

Never used to be for NVFR AG, only requirement used to be airspeed, altimeter and turn and bank or turn coordinator. On a dark night out the middle of nowhere without turn lights a bit of a handfull. Have the requirements changed?

[Autonomous Collectiv]

C.A.O. 20.18 appendix VIII quoted below, different appendix for Ag ops:-

Appendix VIII
Instruments required for night V.M.C. flight in helicopters except while engaged in agricultural operations
1 The flight and navigational instruments required are:
(a) an airspeed indicating system; and
(b) a sensitive pressure altimeter; and
(c) (i) a direct reading magnetic compass; or
(ii) a remote indicating compass and a standby direct reading magnetic compass; and
(d) an accurate timepiece indicating the time in hours, minutes and seconds. This may be carried on the person of the pilot or navigator; and
(e) an outside air temperature indicator; and
(f) an attitude indicator (artificial horizon); and
(i) standby attitude indicator; or
(ii) turn indicator; and
(g) a heading indicator (directional gyroscope); and
(h) a slip indicator; and
(i) a vertical speed indicator; and
(j) means of indicating whether the power supply to the gyroscopic instruments is working satisfactorily.
2 For operations onto vessels or platforms at sea by night an instantaneous vertical speed indicator is required in place of the vertical speed indicator specified at paragraph 1 (i) of this Appendix.
3 The attitude indicator and standby attitude indicator or turn indicator as specified in paragraph 1 (f) of this Appendix, must have separate and independent power sources.
4 A gyro-magnetic type of remote indicating compass installed to meet the requirements of subparagraph 1 (c) (ii) of this Appendix may be considered also to meet the requirement for a heading indicator specified in paragraph 1 (g) of this Appendix, provided that such installation complies with the power supply requirements of
clause 3 of this Appendix.
28
Authorised Version F2017C01115 registered 04/12/20

[currawong]

Says who? The pitot-static system in that aircraft might have been all messed up (look at the 70 kt discrepancy between left and right side ASI). Meaning the data captured in those graphs, which I point out none of which made much sense when cross referenced across the parameters recorded, is all suspect. Assume those climb/descent/speed rates do not reflect reality.

Says me. Read the post again.

Not referring to the accident aircraft, or the tracking data provided.

Referring to an event I experienced that looks somewhat similar to this event.

[gulliBell]

You made an intentional decision for operational reasons that seem sensible in the circumstances, despite the interesting ride that came of it. Where-as the accident aircraft here, there does not seem to be an operational reason for doing what they did, turning out to sea, most likely losing all external visual references in doing so, and not having internal references to compensate for lost external references, and contrary to their assigned clearance.

[nigelh]

And there are strong doubts as to whether Mr Kerr was qualified to fly at night at all, even in clear weather, meaning he should have been on the ground at least 10 minutes before “last light”.
are

Are the rules different there as In EASA land last light is 30 mins after sunset ?

[currawong]

You made an intentional decision for operational reasons that seem sensible in the circumstances, despite the interesting ride that came of it. Where-as the accident aircraft here, there does not seem to be an operational reason for doing what they did, turning out to sea, most likely losing all external visual references in doing so, and not having internal references to compensate for lost external references, and contrary to their assigned clearance.

Hit the nail on the head. The turn towards the black hole. Why?

Avoiding/ escaping something? Or was control already lost?

[gulliBell]

In crap weather, couldn't see outside, he might not even had known he turned and was heading out to sea. Fair chance the loss of control came after the loss of situation awareness, and because of it. The only thing he needed to avoid was darkness, and the solution to that is usually pretty simple in a helicopter.

[currawong]

Wx that day was what we here call a "dry change", that is a front with little cloud and negligible precipitation. "Crap weather" in as much as it was very windy and rough.

Anna Bay, shore side of the accident, population around 4000, well lit. One of five such settlements within a 5 Nm radius.

To the immediate front at 15 Nm, Newcastle, population 320,000, also well lit. About 7 Nm wide viewed from the NE, a horizon in its own right.

I would respectfully suggest a VFR clearance through the zone would not have been available, had VMC conditions not been conducive.

Did I fly that day? Nope. Too rough. And I wasn't even downwind of the Blue Mountains.

[Autonomous Collectiv]

And there are strong doubts as to whether Mr Kerr was qualified to fly at night at all, even in clear weather, meaning he should have been on the ground at least 10 minutes before “last light”.
are

Are the rules different there as In EASA land last light is 30 mins after sunset ?
Officially night when the centre of the sun is 6 degrees below the horizon as I recall. Happy to be corrected as that may just be NZ

[Ascend Charlie]

Last light was early that day, due lots of dust in the air covering the lights.

[[email protected]]

Autonomous - sunset is when the upper limb of the sun dips below the horizon - then you have civil twilight until it is 6 degrees below the horizon, then nautical twilight until it is 12 degrees below and finally astronomical twilight until it is 18 degrees below.

Night is usually defined as the end of civil twilight.

[nigelh]

What a load of nonsense . How do I know what degrees it is !! I think you will find that for legal purposes VFR day stops 30 mins after the stated sunset in your area . Maybe I am wrong .....

[nomorehelosforme]

Regardless of which night time rule you want to follow from reports and comments this flight had the opportunity to land but carried on, I wonder at what point others on board might have started having concerns?

[Twist & Shout]

Regardless of which night time rule you want to follow from reports and comments this flight had the opportunity to land but carried on, I wonder at what point others on board might have started having concerns?

It would appear from all the “evidence” that this flight was clearly illegal regards “flying at night”, and not even “close”. (EG would have been on the ground 5 min after LL)

Your comment about “others on board” strikes a chord: They were relying on a professional pilot to do the right thing and keep them safe. Most pax would have no idea about the risks associated with low visibility/loss of “horizon” situations.
It would appear the pilot shirked that responsibility, and let them down badly.

The “point” when the pax started “having concerns” - probably not until the pilot started swearing or screaming, or they were subjected to unusual G forces and “floating” against their harnesses.

Terrifying to think about.
Easily avoided.

[nomorehelosforme]

It would appear from all the “evidence” that this flight was clearly illegal regards “flying at night”, and not even “close”. (EG would have been on the ground 5 min after LL)

Your comment about “others on board” strikes a chord: They were relying on a professional pilot to do the right thing and keep them safe. Most pax would have no idea about the risks associated with low visibility/loss of “horizon” situations.
It would appear the pilot shirked that responsibility, and let them down badly.

The “point” when the pax started “having concerns” - probably not until the pilot started swearing or screaming, or they were subjected to unusual G forces and “floating” against their harnesses.

Terrifying to think about.
Easily avoided.

Twist & Shout,

Agreed on many points, but according to the reports a couple on board were/or had purchased the aircraft so must assume some previous experience so possibly major concerns ...

As you said easily avoided, terrible for all.

[John Eacott]

What a load of nonsense . How do I know what degrees it is !! I think you will find that for legal purposes VFR day stops 30 mins after the stated sunset in your area . Maybe I am wrong .....



This accident happened in Australia, and as such Australian conventions for Last Light apply. Somewhat variable when compared to the UK since we have such a vast country and standard approximations just don't cut it. Before smart phones and apps there was a graph in the AIP which was used to calculate Last Light but these days most drivers either go to NAIPS or use apps such as OzRunways to get Last Light. The iPad in front of the UH-1 pilot would have undoubtedly had such a facility.

FWIW, NAIPS gives Last Light on the 6th September at Williamtown as 18:02 local, and sunset was 17:38 local.


https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/750x1334/fullsizeoutput_515b_c985ece5646a64c40a323ce9946ffbfc80848f0e .jpeg


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/750x1334/img_3103_34eb3ed4aec85748a295105f61f436dae85b8a41.png

[MickG0105]

The discussion about last light is interesting but in the case of VH-UVC's last flight probably not all that relevant. The accident aircraft left Coffs mid-afternoon for Bankstown. Under no circumstance was that flight not going to include flight under Night VFR. After last light and in at least 'challenging conditions' the opportunity to land at Williamtown presented itself and was passed over. The definition of last light and the rules relevant to Night VFR did not appear to be in any way a factor in the planing or execution of the flight.

[[email protected]]

What a load of nonsense . How do I know what degrees it is !! I think you will find that for legal purposes VFR day stops 30 mins after the stated sunset in your area . Maybe I am wrong .... hardly nonsense Nigel, even if you are from Yorkshire - simply the definition of the events which happen at the end of every day. The 30 mins you refer to equates to the period between sunset and the end of civil twilight.

Education surely isn't a dirty word, even oop North;)

[[email protected]]

And this is from the CASA documents definitions page where 'last light' doesn't existNight - That period of time between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil twilight.

Can you guess what the definition of day is yet???:ok:

[John Eacott]

The discussion about last light is interesting but in the case of VH-UVC's last flight probably not all that relevant. The accident aircraft left Coffs mid-afternoon for Bankstown. Under no circumstance was that flight not going to include flight under Night VFR. After last light and in at least 'challenging conditions' the opportunity to land at Williamtown presented itself and was passed over. The definition of last light and the rules relevant to Night VFR did not appear to be in any way a factor in the planing or execution of the flight.

Yes, but it's so much fun casting a bit of burley into the waters and seeing what comes rising to the bait ;)

How about this, the 'old' AIP manual technique: part of the exam IIRC?

https://vfrg.casa.gov.au/pre-flight-planning/preparation/daylight-and-darkness/

[Twist & Shout]

Twist & Shout,

Agreed on many points, but according to the reports a couple on board were/or had purchased the aircraft so must assume some previous experience so possibly major concerns ...

As you said easily avoided, terrible for all.

Excellent, and slightly “sobering” point.
The Pax might have had major concerns for much longer than my initial thoughts - discounted the possible experience of some pax.

[nigelh]

The point I was really making was that in the UK at least we take 30 min as being the average time between the two .... which even is easy for a Crab to work out . Trying to determine degrees off the horizon etc is not always that simple especially if you are in a valley in Yorkshire.... however I agree it is irrelevant!

[[email protected]]

‘Night’ is that period between the end of the evening civil twilight and the beginning of the morning civil twilight. For all intents and purposes, first light should be construed as the beginning of civil twilight and last light as the end of civil twilight. The terms ‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ have no relevance when calculating daylight operating times for the VFR pilot. So instead of using a simple event that is clearly defined you have to go through a series of calculations to get an extra couple of minutes at each end of the day using terms that are not officially defined?
Way to go...

[heliduck]

By the level of interest generated in last light calculations maybe a separate topic is warranted where definitions from various jurisdictions can be compared & debated?
On the subject of the accident in question, at the time the aircraft was reported missing I was talking to a friend on the phone who lives in Newcastle. He told me that there was a search underway so I opened the BOM website radar & had a look, there was a definite band of heavy showers oriented approximately North/South moving out to sea off the coast of Newcastle.
Even if it was still "daylight" (which it wasn't), over water in showers with fading or no light would have made it difficult to remain VFR, as mentioned several times previously. The reasons behind the decision to turn left instead of land may never be known, but I hope that the "holes in the cheese" which lined up & led to this decision are determined as it might help the rest of us avoid a similar fate.

[Fareastdriver]

Maybe the pilot had a heart attack and collapsed. The other occupants, having either no experience in piloting the Huey, or at night, lost control and it crashed.

[MickG0105]

Yes, but it's so much fun casting a bit of burley into the waters and seeing what comes rising to the bait ;)

Oh, yes, isn't it just. Dualing jurisdictions playing the my definition is better than yours game.

When it comes down to brass tacks, we can probably thank ICAO (let's blame them, they haven't been mentioned yet):

ICAO definition found in Annex 6 Part I:

Night. The hours between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil twilight or such other period between sunset and sunrise, as may be prescribed by the appropriate authority. Note.— Civil twilight ends in the evening when the centre of the sun’s disc is 6 degrees below the horizon and begins in the morning when the centre of the sun’s disc is 6 degrees below the horizon.



And as for the all conquering, crystal clear, never to be misinterpreted Pommie definition,

CAP 393

“Night” means the time from half an hour after sunset until half an hour before sunrise (both times inclusive), sunset and sunrise being determined at surface level;

Sunrise and sunset, of course, aren't defined. Civil, nautical, astronomical? ICAO at least define it.

What's next? Angels on the head of a pin?

[MickG0105]

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/355x355/images_12__71db35160cd516b2160b13765dfb9e04654524ca.jpeg
Maybe add a reading to this precision instrument:

Can't see it ... Night

[[email protected]]

Some people seem very sensitive about having their precious CASA questioned - I thought Aussie were supposed to be thick skinned and laid-back:)

Sunrise and sunset, of course, aren't defined. Civil, nautical, astronomical? ICAO at least define it. don't go confusing sunset/sunrise with the 3 varieties of twilight :ok:

[Twist & Shout]

Some people seem very sensitive about having their precious CASA questioned - I thought Aussie were supposed to be thick skinned and laid-back:)

don't go confusing sunset/sunrise with the 3 varieties of twilight :ok:

You are thinking of “Pre Nanna’s Australia” - we are all getting thin skinned these days. Legislated into cotton wool.
Still a fair way from thinking CASA is “precious” though, I’d suggest!

Most of us would prefer an “Authority” that had some sort of interest in Aviation.

Keep smiling, and leaving a margin everyone.

[MickG0105]

Some people seem very sensitive about having their precious CASA questioned - I thought Aussie were supposed to be thick skinned and laid-back:)

I doubt whether anyone is sensitive about having CASA questioned. A two minute scan of pprune would reveal that questioning CASA could be classified as the hobby for many contributors and the full-time occupation of some.

When it comes to Poms telling us that they know best, that's a different story. There's probably some historical perspective to that.

[Twist & Shout]

Just to be clear*:

”Sunset” 17:38
”Aviation Last Light” 18:02 (Australian definition)
”Disappeared from radar” 18:49
Destination 40min+ away.

Definitions or methods of calculating “night” are irrelevant in this case.
Only a politician could claim the crash occurred during the “day”.

* Info from this thread - not confirmed

[megan]

Can you guess what the definition of day is yet???Sure can Crab, December has 31 of them, a year 365, not counting leap year. Anything else you're not clear on? :p

[[email protected]]

Somewhat variable when compared to the UK since we have such a vast country and standard approximations just don't cut it Looking comparatively and differences between first light and sunrise and then between sunset and last light at different locations in Australia and UK:

We find the variation is between 22 and 27 mins FL to SR and the same SS to LL in Australia - perhaps an average of 25 mins?

In UK it is presently 36 to 37 mins FL to SR and 30 to 38 SS to LL - perhaps an average of 35 mins.

In Australia you have to use a calculator or app to establish LL times for VFR flight when the national average is about 25 mins.

In UK we just use 30 mins after sunset as the cutoff.

Who is making mountains out of molehills?

Tuilagi vs Kerevi in the midfield will be interesting

[Fareastdriver]

Who is making mountains out of molehills?
#
Crabb: As I found out when I was acquiring my Australian ATPL, There are so many barmy politically correct selective questions that you wonder about the mental state of the originators.

[megan]

you wonder about the mental state of the originatorsAmen, don't know if it's still the case but for a ATPL(H) you had to do pressurisation and Boeing 767 glass cockpit, who has pressurisation?

[havick]

Amen, don't know if it's still the case but for a ATPL(H) you had to do pressurisation and Boeing 767 glass cockpit, who has pressurisation?

don’t forget the INS with drift rates and great circle tracks.

[John Eacott]

Amen, don't know if it's still the case but for a ATPL(H) you had to do pressurisation and Boeing 767 glass cockpit, who has pressurisation?

Nothing unique there; for my UK CAA ATPL/H I had to do a trans-Atlantic plot in a 707 :p

And on the other end of the scale, the same syllabus required to go back to air-driven gyro instruments after 6 years on Sea Kings ;)

[megan]

don’t forget the INS with drift rates and great circle tracksWith the average range of the average helo I wonder what the maximum difference could be had vis a vis rhumb and great circle. When I first started commercial offshore all you had was a clock and compass and when the ATPL(H) was introduced it was a take as long as you like exam Reg Trenewick (Sp?) had hand written.

[Super Cecil]

Pedantic's derailing the thread, it was dark, enough of the hair splitting.

[JustinHeywood]

Pedantic's derailing the thread....

Hey, there is no apostrophe in pendantics!
:)

[Twist & Shout]

Any update on the claim they landed in a field, then took off again for the fatal segment?

[nomorehelosforme]

Any update on the claim they landed in a field, then took off again for the fatal segment?

Twist & Shout, I thInk there is some tracking info on here prior to the loss, not sure about landing in a field?

[MickG0105]

The preliminary on VH-UVC's crash is out.

Preliminary report published 7 November 2019The information contained in this investigation update is derived from the initial investigation of the occurrence. Readers are cautioned that there is the possibility that new evidence may become available that alters the circumstances as depicted in the report.

What happened
On 6 September 2019, at 1430 Eastern Standard Time,[1] the pilot of a UH-1H helicopter registered VH‑UVC (UVC) departed Archerfield Airport, Queensland, with four passengers on board. The pilot was conducting a private flight for the purpose of repositioning the helicopter to Bankstown Airport, New South Wales.

At about 1600, the pilot landed at Coffs Harbour, New South Wales to refuel the helicopter. Following refuelling, the pilot departed at about 1648 and tracked to the south. At 1755, the pilot made contact with Williamtown Tower, requesting clearance to track south via the Visual Flight Rules[2] lane. The pilot also requested a climb to higher altitude, to take advantage of favourable winds. The Williamtown Tower controller advised the pilot to contact Williamtown Approach (Approach) for clearance.

At 1757, the pilot of UVC made contact with Approach and requested clearance. At 1758, the Approach controller identified UVC’s position as 7.4 km (4 nautical miles) to the north-east of Broughton Island (Figure 1), and advised the pilot he could operate at whatever altitude was required provided it was not below 2,400 ft. The pilot responded with a request to operate between 3,000 and 3,500 ft. At 1758 UVC was cleared to track coastal southbound at a block altitude between 3,000 and 3,500 ft.

At 1759, following an inquiry from the Approach controller, the pilot advised that Bankstown was his intended destination. At 1800, the pilot was advised that if any further track and altitude changes were required to advise accordingly. While no response was required, the pilot did not acknowledge the transmission. At 1801, the controller again contacted UVC to offer alternative tracking if required. The pilot responded requesting to remain on the eastern side of the romeo five seven eight alpha (R578A) restricted area. The controller clarified this request and, in response, the pilot advised if it was not available he would continue on the VFR coastal route. The pilot was then cleared to track as required for Bankstown Airport. The track clearance was acknowledged by the pilot at 1802.

At 1805, the Approach controller contacted the pilot to confirm that operations were normal, having observed that the altitude of UVC had dropped to 2,700 ft. The pilot acknowledged the altitude drop, commenting on a sudden wind gust affecting the helicopter’s altitude. The controller responded by providing clearance for the pilot to operate between 2,400[3] and 3,500 ft. This was acknowledged by the pilot who also commented on the turbulent conditions that were being experienced. The controller acknowledged the conditions and made a further offer of assistance should the pilot require it.

UVC was later observed on Williamtown Air Traffic Control radar to make a left turn to the south, depart the coastal VFR lane and head offshore. According to Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B)[4] data supplied by Airservices Australia, the helicopter’s position at the beginning of the turn at 1811, was 2.3 km west-south-west of Anna Bay.[5]

The aircraft continued to track offshore to the south-west for about 1 min 20 sec, maintaining between 3,000 and 3,600 ft before commencing a rapidly descending, left turn. Surveillance data showed that the aircraft commenced this descent from 3,400 ft at about 1812:56, and the last data point identified the aircraft passing 525 ft at 1813:18. Figure 2 shows the final flight segment based on ADS-B data, including the turn out to sea.

Two attempts by the Approach controller to contact the pilot at 1813 were unsuccessful. The controller then broadcast advice to the pilot that surveillance identification had been lost and to immediately check altitude. Further advice of the area’s QNH[6], the lowest safe altitude in the area, and an instruction to climb immediately were broadcast. The controller followed that transmission with several more unsuccessful attempts to contact the pilot.

Recorded data

The aircraft was fitted with a Mode S transponder that broadcast ADS-B data. This information included the position and altitude of the aircraft and was received by Airservices Australia as well as other third‑party ADS‑B receivers (Aireon and FlightRadar24) and provided to the ATSB.Also on board were two mobile devices with the OzRunways application installed. This application provides the option for live flight tracking by transmitting the device’s position and altitude and that information was also obtained by the ATSB.

Site and wreckage

Initial indications of the possible location of the helicopter were found on the evening of 6 September at 1917. Search personnel in aircraft reported an oil slick on the sea surface, about 5.5 km to the south-south-west of Anna Bay. Two more oil slicks were observed that night in the same vicinity.There were numerous reported sightings of possible helicopter wreckage that evening and the following morning with a small piece of floating wreckage, identified as part of the rear cabin lower bulkhead, retrieved by officers on a New South Wales Police Force search vessel on 7 September.

Two items that were also identified as wreckage from the helicopter subsequently washed ashore on Stockton Beach, and were collected by police on 18 September.Following an extensive sea search, hampered by poor sea and weather conditions, the helicopter wreckage field was located on 26 September 2019. The wreckage field was situated about 5.4 km to the south-west of Anna Bay, in about 30 metres of water. A large section of the helicopter tailboom was recovered from the wreckage field for further examination (Figure 3).

Pilot details

The pilot held Private and Commercial Pilot (Helicopter) Licences and was qualified to fly by day under the Visual Flight Rules. The pilot also held a single-engine helicopter class rating and a gas turbine engine design feature endorsement. The pilot last conducted a single-engine helicopter flight review in October 2018 that was valid until 31 October 2020. His logbook indicated he had a total of 1,440.5 flying hours experience.

The pilot held a Class 1 aviation medical certificate that was valid until 26 Apr 2020.

Weather and available light

Forecast meteorological conditions for the Williamtown area for 6 September 2019 included moderate to severe turbulence and wind gusts up to 38 knots from the north-west from 1000. From 1800, severe turbulence was forecast with wind gusts up to 45 knots occurring from the west-north-west and layers of scattered[7] cloud at 4,000 ft and broken[8] cloud at 12,000 ft above ground level. Light showers of rain were also forecast.

Comments between Williamtown Approach and Tower controllers at 1753 made reference to visibility in the area, which was noted to be about 6‑7 km.Last light[9] for the Anna Bay area, was calculated to occur at 1801 however, the presence of cloud cover, dust or masking terrain to the west would have resulted in last light occurring at an earlier time.

[Lude-og]

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-050/

[junior.VH-LFA]

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5779863/ao-2019-050-final.pdf

[Cloudee]

What the ATSB foundThe ATSB found that the pilot continued to fly after last light without the appropriate training and qualifications, and then into dark night conditions that provided no visual cues. That significantly reduced the pilot's ability to maintain control of the helicopter, which was not equipped for night flight.

Once visual references were lost, the pilot likely became spatially disorientated and lost control of the helicopter, resulting in a collision with water.

Further, the pilot did not disclose on-going medical treatment for significant health issues to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. That prevented specialist consideration and management of the on‑going flight safety risk the medical conditions and prescribed medications posed.

[gulliBell]

The ADS-B flight data plot is almost identical to the N72EX accident.