Harrier Demise - Help!

[Wingless Walrus]

Out of curiosity as to what was the 'nuts and bolts' of the decision to remove Harrier, I poked around online looking at parliamentary records and various reports and articles.

Using online public sources to get this kind of detail is like trying to play the piano wearing boxing gloves. You can generate some noise that will vaguely resemble the right tune, if you are lucky.

Given the choice to remove Harrier or Tornado, I think it likely that any air force would have acted to keep its larger fleet of aircraft, so I didn’t focus on that issue. I tried to get an idea about the prevailing circumstances that led to the need for this decision.

Having pieced together more details of the story it provoked several questions I was unable to answer. I made some FOI's but not all were able to be answered. I would like to ask for help from people here if they can shed some light on my questions. The MOD spending strategy is one question I have.

The desire to save money was the reason put forward for removing Harrier. According to parliament figures (Nov. 2010) Harrier cost £100 million per year (0.3% of defence budget of about £37 billion).

In 2008 the practice of delaying projects to reduce short term spending was used on some projects.

A decision to delay the QE carriers was taken that reduced the MOD spend by £450 million in the next four years but increased the MOD spend after that by about £1,124 million. Additional costs of £650 million were identified, making a total net cost increase due to the delay of £1,324 million.

Figures in the Main Project Reports 2009 and 2010 were used to estimate the costs due to delays and the saving of £450 million. I don’t know if these figures were later revised.

I did a very ‘rough and ready’ calculation comparing the cost of delay to the cost of borrowing (hopefully I got my sums right; my ‘noggin’ aint worth much these days).

Had the £450 million been borrowed instead of delaying the QE carriers, a ten year interest only loan (as an example) to 2018 would have cost interest in 2018 real terms of about £168 million, using historical figures for government interest payments and the Bank of England inflation data.

Borrowing costs of £168 million, compared to costs due to delay of £1,324 million (this figure is a conservative estimate and likely to be larger in real terms at 2018), gives a saving in the region of £1,156 million (£918 million in 2010 terms).

Even at a fixed rate of 5% interest it would have been cheaper to borrow rather than delay.

While these figures may not be precise they give an idea of magnitude. Borrowing would have been significantly cheaper and with no need to delay the carriers by several years.

The large saving could have paid to keep Harrier or carrier strike going for a further several years.

Does anyone know why in 2008 borrowing instead of delaying the QE carriers was not considered?

[NutLoose]

It comes down to two basic things, the Country is being Governed by halfwits and f*ckwits.

[Buster15]

It comes down to two basic things, the Country is being Governed by halfwits and f*ckwits.

The fact that they were even contemplating scrapping Tornado at that time proves your point.

[Kiltrash]

Delaying saved £m for the current Gov/ PM. The higher cost was to be paid after the next Election, whoever that would be

[Treble one]

Wasn't it something as fundamental as the variety and amount of ordinance Tornado could carry compared to Harrier?

[Auxtank]

I mourned deeply the demise of the Harrier as much as the next man.
One of the reasonable reasons I've been told is that she was unable to be retro-fitted with the next gen of armaments and avionics and still be able to perform to the best of her (uniqueish) abilities.

That and the above mentioned Gov halfwits and f*ckwits sealed her fate.

[orca]

The only discriminators were Storm Shadow and RAPTOR, and there is a compelling argument to suggest that those are key.
I don’t think that there is any truth to the lack of upgrade potential - indeed at Cap EA the Harrier was Saturn capable and had a path to a MIDS capability.
For a time the jet could carry 6 x PW4 plus Sniper whereas the Tornado could carry fewer - I think because the SMS had an issue born out of its original KRET functionality.
At the end of the day though it matters not!!

[Auxtank]

The only discriminators were Storm Shadow and RAPTOR, and there is a compelling argument to suggest that those are key.
I don’t think that there is any truth to the lack of upgrade potential - indeed at Cap EA the Harrier was Saturn capable and had a path to a MIDS capability.
For a time the jet could carry 6 x PW4 plus Sniper whereas the Tornado could carry fewer - I think because the SMS had an issue born out of its original KRET functionality.
At the end of the day though it matters not!!

I think one of the main reasons making tech upgrades difficult was weight - the Harrier was tiny...

True though - it matters not.


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x958/gettyimages_832069038_1024x1024_f639ff87c87fddeb46a47db808b7 47018f527dc6.jpg

[orca]

It’s a lot further away!😉

[ExAscoteer]

Harrier's planned OSD was earlier than that of Tornado. Additionally it only had a limited RTS for single mode seeker Brimstone and no RTS for dual mode seeker Brimstone. Furthermore it could never carry Storm Shadow and its Sniper pod capability was far inferior to the Tornado's RAPTOR.

Ergo its weapons were effectively the CRV7 and PWIV.

If you were going to bin a capability to save £££ (and I'm not saying that was the right thing to do) then it made sense to keep Tornado and sack Harrier off.

[orca]

In fairness Harrier could carry both TV and IR Maverick.

And years in Afghanistan had (counter intuitively) extended the fatigue life.

Also Harrier was a far smaller fleet (74 ish in total) so a better candidate for savings.

Still - doesn’t matter!

[Wensleydale]

Harrier was a good aircraft with a unique capability. Unfortunately, the aircraft itself is not a weapons system - it could not carry a large enough payload over long distance and the Harrier was limited in this when compared to other platforms.

[ivor toolbox]

Think you'll find there was more than just weapons capability in the mix... ergo... go back a few years to when Typhoon was just being rolled out, the Mod had a large cache of blue collar workers, working under various guises, with associated pension costs, including a nice shiny new hangar at an airbase in south wales fixing aeroplanes, that they wanted to offload. Enter Bae with an offer to take on all the blue collar workers, if Mod agreed Bae could be sole maintenance provider for Harrier, Tornado, and Typhoon. So, the deal was done, and it was found that the hourly rate being charged by Bae, was over twice what it had been costing Mod directly. However the only way out of the contract and associated high maint costs without having to pay Bae a huge penalty clause was if the fleet was scrapped or otherwise disposed of.... or something like that.

[NutLoose]

Sounds about right, another bunch of Halfwits and f*ckwits writing contracts and signing them off.

[Wingless Walrus]

When I read that the MOD saved £450m but were happy to pay £1,124m to do so (with another £650m added later), my first reaction was that had they taken a Wonga loan it would have been cheaper. I thought I was missing something, but the answer appears a simple one!
Given comments here, plus other projects dealt with similar, sounds like industry had a field day.

[Easy Street]

The comments on Harrier and Tornado capability are on the mark, but I think the OP’s question is one of finance. The situation described was ‘ops normal’ for MOD in the 2000s, which is the only period I can speak for - it may have been true earlier. Unaffordability of each year’s programme was routinely dealt with by punting costs into later years, which worked for long enough to get 1* and 2* tours safely complete until 2010, by which time the whole edifice was on the point of collapse with a wave of expenditure that could be delayed no more, forcing radical decisions to cancel. Borrowing to fix it would have effectively endorsed the poor behaviours that got us to that sorry juncture. From the vantage point of almost 10 years on, SDSR 2010 simply forced some decisions that should have been taken years earlier... and I include binning of MRA4 in that. We wouldn’t have needed to have endured a decade-plus capability gap if that decision had been taken earlier.

Regrettably, things don’t look too dissimilar now.

[NutLoose]

Surely one of the main factors they never seem to mention is when you chop one asset early, the knock on effect is that you then screw up the planned lives / usages of your other assets, often shortening their planned end of service lives, increasing their usage to compensate for the lost asset and thus requiring expensive midlife updates etc or replacement which both cost financially and haven't been foreseen / planned for within the timeframe. Plus you then have a surplus of trained and qualified staff that need downsizing which again screws up your future manning planning.

[SASless]

So which aircraft was used to replace the Harrier?

The F-35 is just beginning to come on line so unless something filled the "gap" there was no additional use caused was there?

If you have a surplus number of Harrier Engineers and Pilots....can they not be cross trained for useful employment on other types?

Or were all those folks shown the door and made redundant?

Except for the Star studded bunch of course.

[orca]

SASless,

I think that it’s more a case of a capabilitybeing missing than ‘someone didn’t fill the gap’. Libya happened immediately afterwards and the Tornados and AH did some great work - but so would the Harriers have done. Obviously the target sets would have differed.
I think I’m right in saying that the vast majority of RN maintainers were found roles. A significant amount of the RN O3/O4 cadre walked (6 each) - as did a couple of O5 and one O6. (Bear in mind the cadre only supported 8 O5s).
I got the impression that the RAF manners did a good job of looking after the junior officer cadre on their side of the fence but that may not be how they viewed it themselves.
The seniors (O6 plus) in the RAF seem to have done alright.

[Davef68]

(1) Osborne was trying to reduce Government spending and borrowing, so borrowing money to sustain the Harrier was never an option.
(2) Binning Harrier also allowed them to bin Ark Royal (and vice versa) so the savings have to be seen in conjunction (A simplistic view, but these are politicians we are talking about)

[falcon900]

Sadly, this is an all too familiar tale of the type which pervades almost every branch of government finance.
Simplistically, ministries are told "Thou shalt not spend more that £x next year" Adding up the list of evisting commitments and new pet projects produces a figure greater than £x. Even after trimming back the existing commitments and killing off the frothier new pet projects, the answer is still greater than £x . Much grinding of teeth and sucking of gums.
Step forward the ever helpful service providers / contractors, who you had been in discussions with about how to reduce costs to meet the £x challenge. I say old boy, we could help you out of the jam: what if we were to take on the obligation, and charge it back to you in convenient annual instalments spread over the next Y years. Make the annual charge as small as you want, and we will just add a few years on to the contract. Oh, just a small point, we may need a little flexibility in terms of delivery and deliverables, but that shouldnt be a problem, should it?
Insert the name of the government ministry of your choice...... And ask yourself how many Ministers, officials, and officers made them selves look good by kicking the can down the road in this way.
As the years went by, it became not unlike a drug addiction; the first few experiences seemed uplifting and not harmful....the rest we know.
To the thread starters original point, yes, it would have been cheaper to borrow the money, but government borrowing is a separate function, and was already reaching very high levels.

[olddog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0jgZKV4N_A

This explains it all (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0jgZKV4N_A)

[1771 DELETE]

Sadly, the same questions can be applied to the grounding of the Nimrod fleet. At least the Tornado was available to cover most if not all the Harrier mission capability. However nothing was available to cover the Nimrod mission. Some senior officers have a lot to answer for but as is usual no one at that level is ever held accountable for their decisions.

[NutLoose]

And the Jag fleets early departure, they in my opinion stopped sending it out to the sandbox so they could show it hadn't really a useful role, easier to bin if it's not in active use.

[Bengo]

Sadly, the same questions can be applied to the grounding of the Nimrod fleet. At least the Tornado was available to cover most if not all the Harrier mission capability. However nothing was available to cover the Nimrod mission. Some senior officers have a lot to answer for but as is usual no one at that level is ever held accountable for their decisions.

At that level of change the decisions are political, not military. The VSO's can and do make the military case, but Treasury, Defence and Cabinet Office ministers make the choices and the PM then, usually, agrees.
Fighting the capabilityor personnel corner too hard as a VSO is merely a route to unemployment.

N

[Evalu8ter]

"However nothing was available to cover the Nimrod mission" - The RN claimed that the Merlin could deliver the ASW element of protecting the CASD and fleet (in concert with DD/FF and SSNs) and the RAF insisted that the C130 could fulfil our long range SAR commitment. The overland role of the Nimrod was, it seems, significantly understated and, allegedly, Cameron was quite angry when he found out what capability gaps the decision caused…...

[jindabyne]

IMV, I couldn't comprehend the decision to get rid of the Harrier at the time we needed to preserve both it and its 'carrier- expertise' (mainly on-deck stuff) for QE2 operations. Cameron - ********.

[Training Risky]

The only discriminators were Storm Shadow and RAPTOR, and there is a compelling argument to suggest that those are key.
I don’t think that there is any truth to the lack of upgrade potential - indeed at Cap EA the Harrier was Saturn capable and had a path to a MIDS capability.
For a time the jet could carry 6 x PW4 plus Sniper whereas the Tornado could carry fewer - I think because the SMS had an issue born out of its original KRET functionality.
At the end of the day though it matters not!!
I had the pleasure of working on both SS and RAPTOR after a tour on GR7 weapons during my Sqinto years. I think on balance both fleets should have been kept and the 2 x CVF made smaller to a CVS size to take a uprevved GR9/FA2 capability. (I know - cloud cuckoo land),

The most challenging project was getting the RAPTOR data-link kit to work in the heat and dust of Basra. Much sweat and tears were expended trying to keep a dark green portacabin full of servers cool in 40 Deg heat during a sortie...

[BEagle]

The BIG mistake was losing the SHAR F/A2 with AIM-120, Blue Vixen and Link 16. An exceptionally capable fleet defence fighter, whereas the plastic bomber, once operated on land, lost its unique selling point. When embarked it lacked the air defence capability of the Scimitar of previous generations.

[Wingless Walrus]

The documents I read about the practice of MOD spending echo what Easy Street / falcon900 say; it had become routine to get through ‘today’ by pushing more into ‘tomorrow’.
One parliamentary document pointed to the practice being done back in 1995.
Interesting to hear more detail on the inner workings.

My memory is vague now, but I think it was the legendary USAF fighter pilot, Robin Olds, who during ground duties in 1950s or 60s did a form of audit of the USAF bomber force and found that in fact at one point in time they had much less availability of aircraft/weapons than was being declared because some people were so reluctant to reveal missing their quotas that they ‘fiddled’ the figures to avoid revealing the true situation. I think it was stated that the prevailing culture at the time had contributed to this, i.e. it was repressive to anyone reporting otherwise, as well as due to individuals looking after their careers.

Regarding the QE carriers, initially the reason given for the delay was due to the delay of the JSF.

It appears that it was not clear about fundamental reason of the QE delay (i.e. to reduce spending in short term) and to put it as simply a result of the JSF delay.

What is important is that whoever was responsible for constraining borrowing for MOD projects, was aware of the consequences of that constraint in this case i.e. two major military assets delayed by up to two years and at £674m cost (£650m added to that initial estimate later). This could not be the case if it was not known what the cost implications were when the decision to delay was made. It implies that the decision was based solely on how much spend could be decreased now and not on how much spend would be increased later.

[Wingless Walrus]

In 2010, the DM Brimstone missile was well underway to being fitted to Harrier according to an article on Defence Codex website, March 2010. It covered missile manufacturer MBDA (maker of Brimstone and Storm Shadow) and interviewed the MBDA Future Systems Director regarding Dual Mode Brimstone (DMB). The website stated (at bottom): -
(https://web.archive.org/web/20100323105933/http://www.science.mod.uk/codex/issue5/features/features8.aspx (https://web.archive.org/web/20100323105933/http:/www.science.mod.uk/codex/issue5/features/features8.aspx))

“DMB is in-service on the Tornado GR4/4A and nearing completion for integration on the Harrier GR7 and GR9A aircraft.”

As the article appears to be from March 2010, is it possible that had Harrier not been removed from service and the Dual Mode Brimstone upgrade completed, that it could have been available for the start of the Libyan campaign that started one year later in March 2011?

[Wingless Walrus]

Prior to the general election of 2010, the government had intended to remove Tornado GR4 from service by 2015, ten years earlier than planned and use the savings from this to fund putting upgrades onto Typhoon. They also planned to keep carrier strike until the QE class carrier was ready and then embark the Harriers onto the new QE class carrier until F-35 was ready.

Defence Equipment 2008
“The MoD plans to keep the Harrier GR9 aircraft in service until around 2018 and to operate these aircraft from the new carriers.”

Defence Equipment 2009
“The second question you ask is what does that mean for the existing three carriers. The Invincible is already at some notice in fact; Ark Royal will probably be withdrawn from service before too long, in the course of the next few years, and we will need to have Illustrious certainly remain in-service until it is quite clear that the Queen Elizabeth has passed her sea trials and that her aircraft complement, whether they are still Harriers or JSFs at that stage, are fully worked up and operational."

The OSD for GR4 was 2025 and logistic support of GR4 from April 2011 was put at £4.8 billion, in Nov. 2010.

The savings from removing carrier strike (including Harrier) were put at £1.6 billion; the savings specifically from removing Harrier were put at £0.9 billion to 2018.

The saving from retiring Tornado GR4 early could have paid for carrier strike to be maintained, by extending the OSD of at least one carrier and maintaining Harrier until JSF was available. It also would have left a considerable sum to pay costs of Typhoon air to surface upgrades (Storm Shadow and DMS Brimstone for example; later included with other upgrades in Project Centurion costing about £425m).

The pre-2010 plan to maintain carrier strike and update Typhoon by retiring GR4 in 2015 looks a reasonable option financially.

[tucumseh]

The BIG mistake was losing the SHAR F/A2 with AIM-120, Blue Vixen and Link 16.

Well said. I suppose I'm odd, as I worked on Blue Vixen before managing Blue Fox ILIC/AnderWave, but both were the dog's bollix and other countries were queuing up to buy Fox from us when Vixen was coming in. Still far too advanced, and it wasn't permitted.

But the demise of SHAR came as no surprise to us. The writing was on the wall from around 91. Perhaps changing designation from FRS2 to F/A2 was a clue; others would know more than I. But there was just a lack of interest, almost a resignation. AMSO were either pouring vast amounts of RN funding down the drain, or robbing it for the RAF. (Same thing in many ways). A 15-year spares buy for Fox six months shy of complete disposal. What genius approved that? Actually I know. His reply was the RN can go take a jump. At least he replied, the RN didn't. The funding line simply said 'Sea Harrier radar', so there was nothing left for Vixen support. And AMSO/AML never did grasp the concept of support at sea for 6 months, their assumption being that a CVS would immediately fly home any unserviceable LRU; and a C-130 would land-on to deliver it back a year later. (Not a replacement - the same LRU. Only let a repair contract when you're got an outstanding demand. New policy as of Oct 1990). RN HQ didn't give a toss. Individuals did, of course, but my abiding memory is that important parts of the RN didn't fight too hard.

[insty66]

Extending Harrier to 2018? I think fatigue life might have been against that.
It might have seemed financially sensible but from a practical point of view, how would Harrier completed Herrick, Ellamy Shader etc? There were simply not enough airframes to go around and IIRC the Harrier fleet was pretty tired when it was replaced in Herrick.

[Wingless Walrus]

Insty66 -
I read that Harrier fatigue was less than normal during Afghanistan, thus extending its fatigue life; see also comment from orca. Possibly due to the nature of the flying not involving as much ‘G’?

The Harriers were expected to be capable of operating until 2020; according to a parliamentary report a senior officer stated in December 2009 that Harrier could be kept flying until at least the end of the next decade. Similar statements were made in the House of Commons claiming that Harriers could be used beyond the planned 2018 removal date.

The early 2010 government plan was to keep both GR4 and Harrier until Typhoon updated with key GR4 capability. House of Lords, Nov. 2010:

“to withdraw them [GR4] as and when we were able to upgrade the Typhoon with a ground support capability, with a full suite of weapons, with Paveway IV, Brimstone or its successor, with Storm Shadow and with a sensor equivalent of the Raptor, which has done so well in the Tornado. That was why, last year, we put more money into the Typhoon enhancement programme. I was hoping to be able to withdraw the Tornados by 2014 or 2015. There would have been a considerable saving there, but we would have continued to have a carrier strike capability right the way through.”

Under this plan GR4 would have been kept until around 2015 or until Typhoon had the key GR4 capability. This implies that until around 2015 there would have been more aircraft available for operations, as Harrier would have been maintained beyond 2010.

Harrier numbers were significant, about 72 were sold to USMC in 2011 (see also orca comment). I don’t know their condition but published figures for 1st April 2010 put the Harrier FAF at 32, down from 52 in 2009. No indication given of the status of non-FAF aircraft. The 40% FAF reduction may have been part of plans to use Harrier mainly for carrier strike.

[msbbarratt]

... I think on balance both fleets should have been kept and the 2 x CVF made smaller to a CVS size to take a uprevved GR9/FA2 capability. (I know - cloud cuckoo land).

The one thing MoD does finally seem to have accepted is that building smaller ships always ends up costing more in the long run. Hulls are surprisingly cheap, longer ships use less fuel than shorter ones, and it's easier to upgrade something that's already got heaps of space. Plus there's more bunkerage, stores, munitions, fewer RASes, fewer port calls on the way to wherever.

[Not_a_boffin]

Harrier numbers were significant, about 72 were sold to USMC in 2011 (see also orca comment). I don’t know their condition but published figures for 1st April 2010 put the Harrier FAF at 32, down from 52 in 2009. No indication given of the status of non-FAF aircraft. The 40% FAF reduction may have been part of plans to use Harrier mainly for carrier strike.

The "72" were all that remained. 50 of them still at AMARC (in bits), the rest RTP at MCAS Cherry Point. The 40% FAF reduction most likely a salami-slicing measure that didn't survive first contact with SDSR10.

[Bigpants]

Political answer is very simple, the coalition and in particular George Osborne came into power with a financial plan. On Day 1 George found a note on his desk from Liam saying "sorry chum their is no money left" and on Day 2 Sir Humphrey from MOD and the usual senior officer suspects admitted they had something to confess...... Ask Lord West why the RN were punished by Osborne?

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/mar/23/defence-spending-36-billion-blackhole

[msbbarratt]

In the unlikely circumstances that folk here aren't aware of the SHAR flying privately in the USA, here's a comforting series of vids about a former USMC pilot with a good taste in aircraft: Art Nalls SHAR.

[Wingless Walrus]

No doubt, ‘Salami slicing’ it was.

The size of the ‘salami slice’ may have been limited by the pre-2010 policy to maintain carrier strike until JSF. A FAF of 32 (including OCU aircraft; 27x GR7/9 + 5x T10/T12) seems to be enough to maintain a carrier strike force.

A while ago I compiled a scrap book of ‘Harrier demise’ info when I had enough energy to run around parliamentary/official online records like a ferret in a rabbit warren.

If memory serves me right, the SDSR10 was done in record time, about 4-5 months; all others I think were longer, at least a year or more?

The reasons given for removing Harrier was that 1) money needed to be saved (to tackle the UK deficit and MOD ‘black hole’) which meant losing one FJ type, and 2) that carrier strike was deemed as ‘not essential’.

1) Money Saved

According to parliament debates in the Lords and Commons, Harrier cost was put as £100m annually (in 2010), which is less than 0.3% of the annual defence budget (around £35-£37 billion annually). An Invincible class carrier was put at £35m annually (0.1% of the annual defence budget).

Maintaining carrier strike cost £135m annually (less than 0.4% of the annual defence budget).

Opposition in Lords agreed cuts needed but queried the size and speed of the cuts.

2) Carrier Strike Not Essential

Judging something solely on whether it is essential could lead to not buying a hammer on the grounds that you can knock nails in with a brick and so it is not essential. Not essential but it is very useful, efficient and effective in certain tasks. If not destitute any person would buy the hammer.

SDSR10 got rid of a very useful capability for ten years and saved 0.4% of the defence budget.

Just months after binning carrier strike, up popped Libya, a scenario in which carrier strike would have been very useful, although not essential. Especially if DM Brimstone integration onto Harrier was completed (was ongoing in Mar 2010 according to one article; see comment #31).

I think USA, France and Italy all utilised carriers in this campaign, I cant remember if Spain used its carrier/Harriers (USA and Italy used Harriers, I think).

What difference would carrier strike have made to Libya? Would it have reduced the Tornado numbers or just added to them? I imagine GR4/RAPTOR and Harrier (10min away on a carrier; possibly also with DM Brimstone?) may have complemented each other well?

[NutLoose]

msbbarratt, you might be unaware that Art Nalls also purchased a Tmk8 Tbird recently to do Harrier training.

https://artnalls.com/recent-news/

https://artnalls.com/about-nalls-aviation/the-tmk-8-two-seat-harrier/


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