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View Full Version : Boeing falsified records for 787 jet sold to Air Canada. It developed a fuel leak


TeachMe
28th Jun 2019, 13:05
Title says it all

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-air-canada-jet-fuel-leak-1.5193550

Apologies if posted already. Source CBC, June 28 2019

TME

roybert
28th Jun 2019, 13:14
And this is why Manufacturers shouldn't be allowed to self certify

aterpster
28th Jun 2019, 13:29
And this is why Manufacturers shouldn't be allowed to self certify
Who else would certify their complex aircraft?

DaveReidUK
28th Jun 2019, 13:44
Title says it all

The title refers to two separate events. While they may be connected, the article doesn't do a very good job of demonstrating a link between them.

Aircraft can develop fuel leaks without falsification of tech records.

Cheltman
28th Jun 2019, 15:45
The question is did the company knowingly falsify that some corrective action had been done when it had not. I doubt it, but if proven should be difficult discussion
If however its a system error that caused the release without the work being done then the process and the approval of people involved need a review. The FAA should ensure that the system is in place. The company ensures that it is being followed on a daily basis.

And fuel leaks are not that unusual!

Sunamer
28th Jun 2019, 16:00
Title says it all

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-air-canada-jet-fuel-leak-1.5193550

Apologies if posted already. Source CBC, June 28 2019

TME

The biggest mistake is to read the title and assume that something in that article corraborates that title. Journalism is almost nonexistent nowadays, and the art of journalism was sold for the art of creating click-bait titles that lead nowhere. However they do generate clicks and ad revenue, this is the biz model we stuck with...

Sunamer
28th Jun 2019, 16:06
And this is why Manufacturers shouldn't be allowed to self certify

who else would have the intimate knowledge of the systems tho? If the aircraft crashes and it is proven it was manufacturer's fault, who pays in court? The manufacturer. So, it is an incentive for them to try to be as thorough as possible, while still pushing the envelop to stay competitive.
On the other hand the people in the govt does not care if the govt gets sued for incorrectly done certification, because the govt uses YOUR money to pay for any lawsuit and any compensatory damages will come from the taxes.

Speed of Sound
28th Jun 2019, 17:02
who else would have the intimate knowledge of the systems tho?

That makes as much (or as little) sense as saying that banks and financial institutions should regulate themselves as they have the most intimate knowledge of their systems.

BDAttitude
28th Jun 2019, 17:05
This is more about morale on the shop floor than about certification business. No good though.

capngrog
28th Jun 2019, 17:47
The biggest mistake is to read the title and assume that something in that article corraborates that title. Journalism is almost nonexistent nowadays, and the art of journalism was sold for the art of creating click-bait titles that lead nowhere. However they do generate clicks and ad revenue, this is the biz model we stuck with...

I agree. I'm not sure I understand this sentence, which seems to be the heart of the article: "The records stated that manufacturing work had been completed when it had not." Does this mean that "work" was never completed, or that "work" was not completed on the date recorded? The article never did describe the "work" that caused the fuel leak or how the faulty documentation covered up the improperly performed "work". Does anyone on this forum have information on the Air Canada 787 fuel leak?

Cheers,
Grog

Speed of Sound
28th Jun 2019, 17:48
This is more about morale on the shop floor than about certification business. No good though.

That is a fair point. Someone not completing a job and a supervisor signing it off as having been done, is something that could happen in any workplace. It is only really a Boeing thing if Boeing either encouraged it or knew about it and took no action.

There is plenty to criticise Boeing for at the moment without going after spurious claims.

roybert
28th Jun 2019, 19:00
Who else would certify their complex aircraft?

aterpster I understand your point but at the same time who says that the complex aircraft that Boeing and Airbus are creating are safe in the first place. As in all things as the systems become more complex the people who use and approve them need to develop and advance in their understanding of the systems and programs. This would or should be true with the individuals doing the certification of these aircraft and pilots. In my current position I can't design a process and then approve it as being acceptable so why should Manufacturers be permitted to do this.
Roybert

pax2908
28th Jun 2019, 19:39
Who else would certify their complex aircraft?
Customers should be told when the Regulator could not be bothered to go into details.

slack
28th Jun 2019, 21:07
right on the money Sunamer. I have never seen a media report, either print or TV present a story correctly. As you say anything to sell. Mostly sleeze balls starting with cnn.

slack
28th Jun 2019, 21:16
Pax 2908 Absolutely correct. Was a boeing fan big time. Flew 37 and 67. Now I see boeing for what they are just another money grubbing big corp. Happily retired . Not enough money in the world to bring me back. Just keep the pension check coming. LOL

FlightlessParrot
29th Jun 2019, 00:26
right on the money Sunamer. I have never seen a media report, either print or TV present a story correctly. As you say anything to sell. Mostly sleeze balls starting with cnn.
Another wonder of the modern age brought to you by unregulated capitalism. It is universally agreed on Pprune that journalism has been corrupted by the search for profit; why should aircraft manufacturing be different?

KRUSTY 34
29th Jun 2019, 00:31
who else would have the intimate knowledge of the systems tho? If the aircraft crashes and it is proven it was manufacturer's fault, who pays in court? The manufacturer. So, it is an incentive for them to try to be as thorough as possible, while still pushing the envelop to stay competitive.
On the other hand the people in the govt does not care if the govt gets sued for incorrectly done certification, because the govt uses YOUR money to pay for any lawsuit and any compensatory damages will come from the taxes.

Well, I guess Boeing’s abomination they called MCAS was a shining example of the integrity of that “intimate knowledge”!

BlankBox
29th Jun 2019, 01:45
Well, I guess Boeing’s abomination they called MCAS was a shining example of the integrity of that “intimate knowledge”!


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers?srnd=premium-asia

...this doesn't help...:ooh:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-boeing-investigatio/u-s-prosecutors-subpoena-records-on-boeing-787-production-seattle-times-idUSKCN1TT360

...Boeing "things" heating up?

Sqwak7700
29th Jun 2019, 02:16
Another wonder of the modern age brought to you by unregulated capitalism.

Why are you blaming Capitalism? Government protectionism and suppression of competition is not Capitalism.

If Capitalism where allowed to flourish there would be 5 or 6 major manufacturers out there competing for airline’s business, one upping each other to build the best airliner.

Instead, we get a bloated, heavily regulated and protected company that is “too big to fail” and operates accordingly.

You want to blame something, blame government interventionists and their ever increasing size.

Old Dogs
29th Jun 2019, 02:21
That makes as much (or as little) sense as saying that banks and financial institutions should regulate themselves as they have the most intimate knowledge of their systems.


Exactly!! 🙄

epc
29th Jun 2019, 02:40
who else would have the intimate knowledge of the systems tho? If the aircraft crashes and it is proven it was manufacturer's fault, who pays in court? The manufacturer. So, it is an incentive for them to try to be as thorough as possible, while still pushing the envelop to stay competitive.
On the other hand the people in the govt does not care if the govt gets sued for incorrectly done certification, because the govt uses YOUR money to pay for any lawsuit and any compensatory damages will come from the taxes.

The purpose of regulations is to make sure the product (food, drugs, airplanes, etc) is safe for public. It is never about the profit / loss of a manufacturer. If you think the payout from a liability is an incentive for a manufacturer to adhere to regulations, then what will a manufacturer do, if the accountant calculates the cost of regulatory compliance (in dollars terms, because that's all you are considering) is higher than the payout?

Old Dogs
29th Jun 2019, 02:43
The purpose of regulations is to make sure the product (food, drugs, airplanes, etc) is safe for public. It is never about the profit / loss of a manufacturer. If you think the payout from a liability is an incentive for a manufacturer to adhere to regulations, then what will a manufacturer do, if the accountant calculates the cost of regulatory compliance (in dollars terms, because that's all you are considering) is higher than the payout?
PRECISELY!!!

Longtimer
29th Jun 2019, 02:54
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/federal-prosecutors-issue-subpoena-for-boeing-787-dreamliner-records/ (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/federal-prosecutors-issue-subpoena-for-boeing-787-dreamliner-records/)
DOJ probe expands beyond Boeing 737 MAX, includes 787 Dreamliner

Federal prosecutors have subpoenaed records from Boeing relating to the production of the 787 Dreamliner in South Carolina, where there have been allegations of shoddy work, according to two sources familiar with the investigation.

The subpoena was issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the sources said. DOJ is also conducting a criminal investigation into the certification and design of the 737 MAX after two deadly crashes of that jetliner.

The 787 subpoena significantly widens the scope of the DOJ’s scrutiny of safety issues at Boeing.

The two sources who revealed the subpoena spoke on condition of anonymity because of the confidential nature of the inquiries.

A third source said a handful of subpoenas were issued in early June to individual employees at Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner production plant in North Charleston, South Carolina.

DOJ spokesman Peter Carr, in Washington, D.C., declined to comment Friday. A Boeing spokesman said, “We don’t comment on legal matters.”

It wasn’t clear if the subpoena served on the company was issued by the same prosecutors overseeing the 737 MAX investigation. But the third source, also speaking on condition of anonymity because of the confidentiality of the inquiries, said the subpoenas to employees at the South Carolina plant came from the “same group” of prosecutors involved in the 737 MAX investigation, including DOJ trial attorneys Cory Jacobs and Carol Sipperly in the Fraud Section.

Boeing divides its Dreamliner production between the South Carolina assembly plant, which rolled out its first plane in 2012 (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/south-carolina-is-ambitious-for-more-boeing-work/), and the sprawling Everett facility where it has built jets for decades. The 737 MAX is built in Renton.

Federal prosecutors in Washington, D.C., have been looking into the development of the 737 MAX, including a new flight-safety control system known as MCAS (https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/), after one crash on Oct. 29 off Indonesia and another in Ethiopia on March 10. Those disasters killed 346 people and led to worldwide grounding of the plane.

The grand-jury investigation into the MAX has been cloaked in secrecy, but some of the Justice Department’s activities have become known as prosecutors issued subpoenas for documents. The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General and the FBI are working with the DOJ.

A Seattle Times story in (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/)March detailed how Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers pushed its engineers to delegate more of the certification process for the 737 MAX to Boeing itself. The Times story also detailed flaws in an original safety analysis that Boeing delivered to the FAA.

Allegations relating to the 787 Dreamliner have centered on shoddy work and cutting corners at the company’s South Carolina plant.

While there are differences in the 737 and 787 matters, prosecutors are likely looking into whether broad cultural problems run throughout the company, according to the third source and a person in South Carolina, who also spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the matter.

That could include pressure to sign off on faulty work to avoid delays in delivering planes to customers, the source said.

The New York Times reported in April (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/business/boeing-dreamliner-production-problems.html) that the North Charleston plant has been plagued by production issues and weak oversight that threatened to compromise safety.

Production ran years behind schedule, due to manufacturing and supplier problems, before the plane entered service in 2011.

The newspaper, citing a review of hundreds of pages of internal emails, corporate documents and federal records, as well as interviews with current and former employees, described a culture that often valued production speed over quality. Confronting manufacturing delays at the plant, Boeing pushed its workforce to quickly turn out Dreamliners, at times ignoring issues raised by employees, the newspaper reported.

The Dreamliner, introduced in 2007 and billed as Boeing’s most important new plane in a generation, featured lightweight carbon-fiber fuselage and advanced technology.

Initially assembled just in Everett, it was popular with airlines, prompting Boeing to break ground on a second Dreamliner plant in 2009 in South Carolina, which has the lowest percentage of union members of any state in the country.

Last year (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-re-creating-local-plants-in-sc/) the Everett plant produced 55% of the 145 Dreamliners that Boeing delivered, while the South Carolina factory delivered the rest. The biggest 787, the -10 model, is assembled only in South Carolina.

The entire fleet was grounded in January 2013 after two battery-overheating incidents: a battery fire on an empty 787 parked at the gate at Boston airport, then a smoldering battery on a flight in Japan that forced an emergency landing. The FAA lifted the grounding in April 2013 after Boeing modified the jets with beefed-up batteries, containment boxes and venting tubes.

In the 737 MAX investigation, prosecutors appear to be getting information from someone with inside knowledge of the plane’s development based on the questions they are asking, the third source said.

bud leon
29th Jun 2019, 06:41
That makes as much (or as little) sense as saying that banks and financial institutions should regulate themselves as they have the most intimate knowledge of their systems.






No it's not really the same. While some areas of banking especially in derivatives can be quite complex, most financial auditors have the same level of skills as the bankers. Unethical banking activities are easily managed with robust procedures, a strong back office, and reviews of management. Banks self-regulate all the time. That is how banking risk is managed, and those processes can be externally audited.

In the same way proper oversight of self-certification can occur with rigorous auditing of the self-certification procedures and documentation, combined with technical testing. It is feasible if it is properly overseen. One very effective way is to require full time auditors to work inside Boeing but are independent of Boeing. Shipping has been doing that for a long long time and bank in the US are doing it. Just because self-certification may have failed in this instance it doesn't mean that self-certification is a failure. It's just been poorly implemented. External certification can be just as fallible.

Gove N.T.
29th Jun 2019, 08:28
That is a fair point. Someone not completing a job and a supervisor signing it off as having been done, is something that could happen in any workplace. It is only really a Boeing thing if Boeing either encouraged it or knew about it and took no action.

There is plenty to criticise Boeing for at the moment without going after spurious claims.

“Immediate corrective action was initiated for both the Boeing mechanic and the Boeing inspector involved.”

I think one can deduce that this might not have been a “spurious claims”
Whatever was at the root of the issue reported may not be made public but the word “falsified” is perhaps the only word which is contentious.

Speed of Sound
29th Jun 2019, 11:33
I think one can deduce that this might not have been a “spurious claims”


I wasn’t calling the individual incident a ‘spurious claim’, I was calling the implication that this kind of incident is both widespread and systemic at Boeing as spurious, as there is no evidence for it.

MemberBerry
29th Jun 2019, 19:48
there is no evidence for it.

I kept hearing that that too on MAX thread, when people suggested the stabilizer trim thumb switches might not work under some circumstances.

Although there has been circumstantial evidence that it may have happened on the accident flights, other people were very vocal contesting that claim, along the lines of: "there is no evidence that those switches can fail to work properly, the MAX issues have been under thorough investigation for months, if there was anything to suggest that those switches could fail to work we would have heard about it by now".

Ironically, just a couple of days after those claims of "lack of evidence", evidence came out that it may have indeed been possible, since such a condition was discovered in a simulator test performed by FAA pilots.

Reality seems to have a particular habit of soon proving wrong people that claim large amounts of smoke is not evidence of a fire. And there has been a lot of smoke in the last decade about Boeing trying to deliver aircraft as fast as possible, and disregarding quality issues because of that. Now that there is concrete evidence about a bit of fire, it's not unreasonable to assume that most of the smoke may have been caused by fire as well.

capngrog
29th Jun 2019, 20:55
I kept hearing that that too on MAX thread, when people suggested the stabilizer trim thumb switches might not work under some circumstances.

Although there has been circumstantial evidence that it may have happened on the accident flights, other people were very vocal contesting that claim, along the lines of: "there is no evidence that those switches can fail to work properly, the MAX issues have been under thorough investigation for months, if there was anything to suggest that those switches could fail to work we would have heard about it by now".

Ironically, just a couple of days after those claims of "lack of evidence", evidence came out that it may have indeed been possible, since such a condition was discovered in a simulator test performed by FAA pilots.

Reality seems to have a particular habit of soon proving wrong people that claim large amounts of smoke is not evidence of a fire. And there has been a lot of smoke in the last decade about Boeing trying to deliver aircraft as fast as possible, and disregarding quality issues because of that. Now that there is concrete evidence about a bit of fire, it's not unreasonable to assume that most of the smoke may have been caused by fire as well.

I must have missed something in the latest FAA findings regarding the Boeing 737MAX. The reports of these findings seem to be unclear on the precise cause of a recently discovered problem with the MAX, but reports range from the trim switches not moving the stabilizer fast enough to the FAA test Pilots finding that the Boeing procedures did no allow sufficiently rapid recovery from the runaway trim condition. In none of these reports have I found any reference to the trim switches themselves failing to operate. On the other hand, the fact that the electric trim SYSTEM will not work in alleviating severe out of trim conditions under high aerodynamic loads has been well documented.

Cheers,
Grog

yoko1
29th Jun 2019, 20:58
I
Ironically, just a couple of days after those claims of "lack of evidence", evidence came out that it may have indeed been possible, since such a condition was discovered in a simulator test performed by FAA pilots.


Let's be fair here. The "evidence" you cite involved upgraded software/firmware that had not yet been certified for flight, much less installed on the accident aircraft, during a test that intentionally created a malfunction that was unrelated to MCAS. Until there are further details to the specifics of the test and the particular failure mode, there still is no evidence that there were any problems with the Main Electric Trim system on the accident aircraft. As you note, after many months of perhaps one of the most intense investigations in modern aviation history, not a single authority has suggested such a problem or called for any redesign work associated with this system.

yoko1
29th Jun 2019, 21:00
On the other hand, the fact that the electric trim SYSTEM will not work in alleviating severe out of trim conditions under high aerodynamic loads has been well documented.



Close, but not quite. The problem you are referring to involves the manual trim system (the trim wheel that the pilot manual crank), not the Main Electric Trim system (actuated by the yoke trim switches).

DaveReidUK
29th Jun 2019, 21:09
On the other hand, the fact that the electric trim SYSTEM will not work in alleviating severe out of trim conditions under high aerodynamic loads has been well documented.

Do you mean that electric trim will not (by design) get you into a severe out-of-trim condition ?

I don't recall any evidence that (assuming it's enabled) it won't get you back into trim from extreme AND configuration - only that it may be impossible to apply manual (wheel) trim under certain circumstances.

capngrog
29th Jun 2019, 21:45
yoko and Dave;

I may have been mistaken in that above statement, but somewhere in the deep recesses of the remnants of my memory, I thought I had read that under extreme circumstances, the electric trim jackscrew motor could stall due to high aerodynamic forces. As I age, I've noticed a tendency to remember things that didn't occur and forget things that did.

Cheers,
Grog

UltraFan
29th Jun 2019, 22:06
DOJ probe expands beyond Boeing 737 MAX, includes 787 Dreamliner
Good morning, DOJ! After two decades of ignoring numerous whistleblowers and "FAA inspection of the site found no abnormalities"'s, DOJ is finally waking up to the numerous problems in the aviation industry.

I remember Mary Schiavo's interview where she openly said: "If you want to be a whistleblower in the aviation industry, make sure you have another profession, because you will never work in aviation again". And that coming from no less than Inspector General of DOT. She then published a book "Flying blind, flying safe", an amazing expose that should have been taken into consideration with immediate action but it wasn't. Moreover, some Robert Pool, Jr. from CBS criticized her saying "her fundamental mistake is to argue that the FAA should pursue safety literally at all cost."

Look what came to bite them in the APU exhaust 20 years later.

MemberBerry
30th Jun 2019, 12:22
I must have missed something in the latest FAA findings regarding the Boeing 737MAX. The reports of these findings seem to be unclear on the precise cause of a recently discovered problem with the MAX, but reports range from the trim switches not moving the stabilizer fast enough to the FAA test Pilots finding that the Boeing procedures did no allow sufficiently rapid recovery from the runaway trim condition. In none of these reports have I found any reference to the trim switches themselves failing to operate. On the other hand, the fact that the electric trim SYSTEM will not work in alleviating severe out of trim conditions under high aerodynamic loads has been well documented.

Cheers,
Grog

I didn't mean to imply that the actual switches were broken, just that the commands may not have had expected result. By "fail to work" I meant "fail to work as designed". It is possible that they worked intermittently for example. Which could result in "not moving the stabilizer fast enough".

Aso
30th Jun 2019, 12:22
Watch this and you hear all the stuff you don't wanna hear....https://www.aljazeera.com/investigations/boeing787/

nonfrequentflyer_NCL
30th Jun 2019, 13:49
Watch this and you hear all the stuff you don't wanna hear....https://www.aljazeera.com/investigations/boeing787/

Well I just watched that and found myself shaking my head at some of the information divulged. To think my step daughter is flying on one of these 787's to Mexico soon is slightly worrying but in the grand scheme of things, I'm probably overthinking it.

ThreeThreeMike
30th Jun 2019, 21:04
I remember Mary Schiavo's interview where she openly said: "If you want to be a whistleblower in the aviation industry, make sure you have another profession, because you will never work in aviation again". And that coming from no less than Inspector General of DOT. She then published a book "Flying blind, flying safe", an amazing expose that should have been taken into consideration with immediate action but it wasn't. Moreover, some Robert Pool, Jr. from CBS criticized her saying "her fundamental mistake is to argue that the FAA should pursue safety literally at all cost."



Considering Mary Schiavo as a competent and knowledgeable source is something very few in the aircraft manufacturing and airline world engage in. It's not just because of her adversarial positions.

Since her departure from the Department of Transportation, she has used hyperbole and exaggeration to keep her face in front of cameras and sell books, while doing very little to make meaningful change.

Imagegear
1st Jul 2019, 04:51
I am well aware of the corporate ethos that allows: "Ship it, and let the customers identify the problems after operations begin. We can do a fix when we have a better idea of the impact." The ship date of units are driven mostly by sales and marketing types who are watching the competition and their "window of opportunity", Since it takes a long time to bring a product to market, the delivery slots are virtually cast in concrete. It was extremely unlikely in my profession that this slot driven ethos was going to result in loss of life, but may cost a shed load of money or the demise of the program.

I hope I am wrong but knowing something of work force ethos, I am sceptical.

IG

Gove N.T.
1st Jul 2019, 08:26
Considering Mary Schiavo as a competent and knowledgeable source is something very few in the aircraft manufacturing and airline world engage in. It's not just because of her adversarial positions.

Since her departure from the Department of Transportation, she has used hyperbole and exaggeration to keep her face in front of cameras and sell books, while doing very little to make meaningful change.
Has history proved her to be right in many ways including her criticism of the FAA ?. In order to be honest about “Safety is our number 1 concern” the public needed someone who is not afraid to take on vested interests which perhaps don’t fully subscribe to their words.

krautland
1st Jul 2019, 08:36
Who else would certify their complex aircraft?


well, if the americans don't want to fund their FAA there is always the CAAC, which is happy to act to protect consumers. see max grounding.

point being: step up right or someone else will do it.

Luc Lion
1st Jul 2019, 18:21
I must have missed something in the latest FAA findings regarding the Boeing 737MAX. The reports of these findings seem to be unclear on the precise cause of a recently discovered problem with the MAX, but reports range from the trim switches not moving the stabilizer fast enough to the FAA test Pilots finding that the Boeing procedures did no allow sufficiently rapid recovery from the runaway trim condition. In none of these reports have I found any reference to the trim switches themselves failing to operate. On the other hand, the fact that the electric trim SYSTEM will not work in alleviating severe out of trim conditions under high aerodynamic loads has been well documented.
Only guessing here.
But when details will be available, I wouldn't be surprised if the test scenario is something like:
- create a set of events prone to overload the CPU1 of the active FCC
- decrease thrust so that STS activates with a trim down command
- check that using the trim rocker buttons or the control column cutout switches doesn't stop the STS
- possibly, check that when the conditions that should stop STS motion are reached (course limitation), STS continues because the CPU is not ready to evaluate the closing parameters.

And concerning the set of events that overwhelms the CPU, I wouldn't be surprised if it was simply a continuous activation of MCAS (high AOA on one side) which is continuously inhibited by the new condition checks aimed at preventing a mistaken activation. It is certainly more processing time demanding than the original MCAS software.

Mike Flynn
1st Jul 2019, 20:01
Only guessing here.
But when details will be available, I wouldn't be surprised if the test scenario is something like:
- create a set of events prone to overload the CPU1 of the active FCC
- decrease thrust so that STS activates with a trim down command
- check that using the trim rocker buttons or the control column cutout switches doesn't stop the STS
- possibly, check that when the conditions that should stop STS motion are reached (course limitation), STS continues because the CPU is not ready to evaluate the closing parameters.

Try explaining that to the worlds tabloid media.

Boeings big problem now is not getting the Max certified.

It is convincing people they should fly on an aircraft that has been bodged up to continue flying half a century after design so the company can make a nice profit.

Why were the pilots expected to upgrade to the Max using just an Ipad?

To save money on conversion and simulators.

As a retired Reuters journalist I can assure you the Max will not be flying before Easter next year.

Selling it will be interesting.

Luc Lion
1st Jul 2019, 20:27
Why would I try to convince tabloids or general public audience?
I am an IT engineer and a pilot.
I share with other pilots what I think is a reasonable guess.
If educated journalists want to read it and make their own educated guesses at what happened in this FAA simulator session ; fair enough.

Besides, I see commonalities between these 2 accidents and a bunch of others : Habsheim AirFrance 296, Athens Helios 522, Amsterdam Turkish Airlinek 1951, Adam Air flight 574 are just examples as there are many more.

Modern aircrafts are complex and in each of these accidents, the crew failed to understand that a system malfunctioned and failed to react appropriately, sometimes with lack of airmanship sometimes not.

Two possible explanations to this endless serie come to my mind:
1. pilots, on average, are rather stupid
2. Planemakers are making a bad job of explaining to pilots how these systems work. Possibly because they are convinced of 1.

The age of an airplane design is not a problem. I am happily flying regularly in an airplane that was designed in 1959.
​​

UltraFan
1st Jul 2019, 20:56
Considering Mary Schiavo as a competent and knowledgeable source is something very few in the aircraft manufacturing and airline world engage in. It's not just because of her adversarial positions.

Since her departure from the Department of Transportation, she has used hyperbole and exaggeration to keep her face in front of cameras and sell books, while doing very little to make meaningful change.
Mary Schiavo is the reason we have a proper aviation parts system in place. Before she raised the problem, airplane parts were manufactured and sold by anyone who was clever enough to buy a shed for storage and get a telephone line. As a result of her investigations, forged parts were found on Air Force One, no less. The meaningful changes she pioneered made aviation MUCH safer today than it was 20 years ago. The only people who don't like her are the people she made accountable for safety. And of course the 150 people she sent to jail for an average of 5 years. I wish there were more people like her in the aviation industry.

4runner
2nd Jul 2019, 02:52
Why would I try to convince tabloids or general public audience?
I am an IT engineer and a pilot.
I share with other pilots what I think is a reasonable guess.
If educated journalists want to read it and make their own educated guesses at what happened in this FAA simulator session ; fair enough.

Besides, I see commonalities between these 2 accidents and a bunch of others : Habsheim AirFrance 296, Athens Helios 522, Amsterdam Turkish Airlinek 1951, Adam Air flight 574 are just examples as there are many more.

Modern aircrafts are complex and in each of these accidents, the crew failed to understand that a system malfunctioned and failed to react appropriately, sometimes with lack of airmanship sometimes not.

Two possible explanations to this endless serie come to my mind:
1. pilots, on average, are rather stupid
2. Planemakers are making a bad job of explaining to pilots how these systems work. Possibly because they are convinced of 1.

The age of an airplane design is not a problem. I am happily flying regularly in an airplane that was designed in 1959.
​​

so you’re a pilot and pilots are stupid. The airplane has faulty software and you’re a computer guy too. By your own logic, I’m surprised you can read and write.

Luc Lion
2nd Jul 2019, 05:06
4runner, I am not a professional pilot. And I am surprised that you can't recognise sarcasm when I suggest that pilot stupidness is a possible explanation for that category of accidents.

568
2nd Jul 2019, 05:36
4runner, I am not a professional pilot. And I am surprised that you can't recognise sarcasm when I suggest that pilot stupidness is a possible explanation for that category of accidents.Please share with the forum what aircraft types you have?I would not be as quick on the draw to assume anything about aviation!

568
2nd Jul 2019, 05:38
I don't think that the "MAX type" has been revoked.https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_certification/ (https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_certification/)

The Boeing 737 MAX Certification

The Boeing 737-8/9 Max design had minor changes to the 737 Next Generation (NG) design. For this reason, the FAA issued an Amended Type Certificate to the Max airplane, which was based on the Type Certificate of the 737NG. The FAA spent approximately five years certifying the Boeing 737 MAX. Boeing applied for certification in January 2012. The certification was completed in March 2017. Amended type certificates typically take 3-5 years to complete. By comparison, the certification of a new aircraft type can take between 5 and 9 years.

Longtimer
2nd Jul 2019, 13:40
Appears the lack of work did result in the fuel leak.Boeing falsified records for 787 jet sold to Air Canada. It developed a fuel leak (https://canadianaviationnews.wordpress.com/2019/07/01/boeing-falsified-records-for-787-jet-sold-to-air-canada-it-developed-a-fuel-leak/)‎Yesterday, ‎July ‎1, ‎2019, ‏‎11:20:40 PM Canadian Aviation Newsres://ieframe.dll/feedarrowtrans.png (https://canadianaviationnews.wordpress.com/2019/07/01/boeing-falsified-records-for-787-jet-sold-to-air-canada-it-developed-a-fuel-leak/)News provided by CBC News – link to full story (https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-air-canada-jet-fuel-leak-1.5193550)Air Canada said only 1 plane affected and Boeing said ‘immediate corrective action was initiated’ Katie Nicholson · CBC News · Posted: Jun 28, 2019 Boeing staff falsified records for a 787 jet built for Air Canada which developed a fuel leak ten months into service in 2015.In a statement to CBC News, Boeing said it self-disclosed the problem to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration after Air Canada notified them of the fuel leak.The records stated that manufacturing work had been completed when it had not.Boeing said an audit concluded it was an isolated event and “immediate corrective action was initiated for both the Boeing mechanic and the Boeing inspector involved.”Boeing is under increasing scrutiny in the U.S. and abroad following two deadly crashes that claimed 346 lives and the global grounding of its 737 Max jets. On the latest revelations related to falsifying records for the Air Canada jet, Mike Doiron of Moncton-based Doiron Aviation Consulting said: “Any falsification of those documents which could basically cover up a safety issue is a major problem.” In the aviation industry, these sorts of documents are crucial for ensuring the safety of aircraft and the passengers onboard, he said. ‘Never a good scenario’ Doiron said even small fuel leaks are dangerous.The temperature on the internal parts of an aircraft’s turbine engine can reach around 700 degrees. With such high temperatures, it doesn’t take much for a flammable liquid like fuel to be ignited if there is a leak around the engine, Doiron said. “It’s never, never a good scenario,” he said of the leak. Air Canada said it inspected the rest of its 787 jets and did not find any other fuel leak issues. “All of our aircraft are subject to regular and thorough inspections and we maintain them in full accordance with all manufacturer and regulatory directives,” Air Canada spokesperson Peter Fitzpatrick said in an email to CBC News. Mike Doiron of Moncton-based Doiron Aviation Consulting said the falsification of documents by Boeing employees is a ‘major problem’ that ‘could basically cover up a safety issue.’ (CBC)Air Canada introduced the 787 Dreamliner to its fleet five years ago. According to its corporate website, it has 35 787s in its fleet.WestJet also has two different Dreamliner models in its fleet which it introduced in February. It said it has full confidence in the safety of those aircraft.Transport Canada evaluation In 2015, Boeing paid the FAA $12 million US to settle ongoing investigations. As a part of the five-year agreement, Boeing agreed to work with the agency to address safety oversight issues within the company.That agreement details an “obscure program” that delegates some safety checks to Boeing itself, said Michael Laris, a Washington Post reporter who has looked into many of Boeing’s safety issues that prompted the agreement with the FAA.An Air Canada Boeing 787 Dreamliner jet arrives at Halifax Stanfield International Airport in 2014. After the leak was detected, Air Canada said it inspected the rest of its 787 jets and did not find any other fuel leak issues. (Andrew Vaughan/The Canadian Press)After the devastating 737 Max crashes, Laris said questions are being raised about the effectiveness of Boeing’s oversight program.“Just how much authority should be delegated to the company? Just how independent are the Boeing employees and their managers?”Laris started digging into that agreement, and the investigations that prompted it, hoping to learn more about how the 737 Max was approved to fly.The FAA said it closely monitors and evaluates Boeing’s performance under the 2015 settlement agreement but cannot discuss it.Boeing said it has introduced formal training for staff on personal accountability in the manufacturing process which emphasizes why it is important to comply with regulations.Transport Canada said the incident involving falsified documents fell under the jurisdiction of the FAA.Transport Canada said it is evaluating how all of this new information emerging about Boeing will impact ongoing aircraft safety validation efforts.

Aso
3rd Jul 2019, 13:25
which was based on the Type Certificate of the 737NG Which was based on the CG which was based on the classic...

DaveReidUK
3rd Jul 2019, 13:38
Appears the lack of work did result in the fuel leak.

You have simply reproduced the article linked to in the OP's post. While the two things (falsified records and fuel leak) may be connected, the article doesn't do a very good job of demonstrating a causative link between them.

Aircraft can develop fuel leaks without falsification of tech records.

Astir 511
3rd Jul 2019, 14:00
Mary Schiavo is the reason we have a proper aviation parts system in place. Before she raised the problem, airplane parts were manufactured and sold by anyone who was clever enough to buy a shed for storage and get a telephone line. As a result of her investigations, forged parts were found on Air Force One, no less. The meaningful changes she pioneered made aviation MUCH safer today than it was 20 years ago. The only people who don't like her are the people she made accountable for safety. And of course the 150 people she sent to jail for an average of 5 years. I wish there were more people like her in the aviation industry.

Mary Schiavo has been a divisive character, much maligned in the Industry. However she failed to make a balanced representation of the risks. In order to gain greater funding she had to exacerbate the scale of the problem, painting the whole of the Parts Industry with the same brush. I've worked in the Parts industry for 30 years, and yes there are Crooks and Criminals who will break the rules to try to make a fast buck, just like in every other industry. However it was never as easy as buying a shed and starting to copy parts. I agree that the changes she implemented have improved the safety, but I believe her contribution to the "Positive" impact has been exaggerated. In essence the main reason for greater control is with the Operators and Maintainers being more proactive, implementing overarching SMS systems, and awareness for the Supply Chain personnel. Vigilance is the key,

EEngr
3rd Jul 2019, 14:53
And this is why Manufacturers shouldn't be allowed to self certify
This doesn't sound like a certification issue so much as a process compliance one. Someone skipped a manufacturing step involving the fuel system which resulted in a leak. And subsequent QA inspections didn't catch it. It's quite likely that the FAA reviewed Boeing's manufacturing and QA processes and signed off on them at one time. And they may have performed subsequent spot inspections. But QA is something that manufacturers do on their own.

The CBC article doesn't make it clear whether Boeing's self disclosure was made independently of the leak being discovered or as a result of it. Either way, right now might be a good time to have scrutiny increased on the shop floor. 737 MAX production is taking a hit right now and it might be better to take this opportunity to slow everything down and find out what else may be slipping through the cracks.

Skipness One Foxtrot
3rd Jul 2019, 15:30
Why were the pilots expected to upgrade to the Max using just an Ipad?
To save money on conversion and simulators.

Wasn't one of the significant causes of the British Midland BD092 crash involving a new B737-400 at Kegworth, exactly this? The differences between the -300 and -400 had been a very quick presentation (OHP vs PDF nowadays) and then back to line flying? And when the key differences between the two aircraft manifested in such a way that the pilots misdiagnosed a problem that led to a fatal crash.

sadtraveller
3rd Jul 2019, 15:30
Let's be fair here. The "evidence" you cite involved upgraded software/firmware that had not yet been certified for flight, much less installed on the accident aircraft, during a test that intentionally created a malfunction that was unrelated to MCAS.

Let us indeed be fair here. The upgraded software/firmware that Boeing delivered to the FAA is by far the most important project that Boeing has undertaken in years, and its success may even be essential for the long-term viability of the company's commercial aircraft division (i.e. to salvage the MAX and the company's reputation). One might assume, therefore, that Boeing has spared absolutely no resources or personnel on developing this software fix (to contemplate otherwise would result in an even more frightening assessment of the competence of Boeing management).

This means, therefore, that even Boeing's best engineers, when provided with unlimited resources, could not develop a safe fix for the MAX on the first try.

Ian W
3rd Jul 2019, 16:34
Let us indeed be fair here. The upgraded software/firmware that Boeing delivered to the FAA is by far the most important project that Boeing has undertaken in years, and its success may even be essential for the long-term viability of the company's commercial aircraft division (i.e. to salvage the MAX and the company's reputation). One might assume, therefore, that Boeing has spared absolutely no resources or personnel on developing this software fix (to contemplate otherwise would result in an even more frightening assessment of the competence of Boeing management).

This means, therefore, that even Boeing's best engineers, when provided with unlimited resources, could not develop a safe fix for the MAX on the first try.

It is more likely that the requirements were changed by the (now extremely cautious) FAA certification process that required a regression back to analysis and design and all the associated rework including new certification tests for all changes and all the associated formal documentation then regression certification testing of associated systems.

This will not be a simple C# program.

Gove N.T.
3rd Jul 2019, 17:01
Please share with the forum what aircraft types you have?I would not be as quick on the draw to assume anything about aviation!
I doubt Luc Lion is making any assumptions. He's made two possible suggestions of which the first is obviously sarcastic simply because we all know that to be a commercial pilot one has to have brains and common sense.
However,
perhaps his second suggestion may not be too far from the mark.

Gove N.T.
3rd Jul 2019, 17:09
It is more likely that the requirements were changed by the (now extremely cautious) FAA certification process that required a regression back to analysis and design and all the associated rework including new certification tests for all changes and all the associated formal documentation then regression certification testing of associated systems.

This will not be a simple C# program.
How often have we seen those in authority trying to cut corners in the pursuit of profit.
I wonder what happened to the wiser folk who cautioned against going the way the management has

k.h.p.
3rd Jul 2019, 21:07
Is it possible to discuss more about the possible documentation issues of this 787 here in a thread with 787 in the title, and leave the 737 MAX comments in a different thread, perhaps with 737 in the title?

568
4th Jul 2019, 00:14
Which was based on the CG which was based on the classic...Yes indeed.Which didn't work for the MAX!

BFSGrad
4th Jul 2019, 00:28
Is it possible to discuss more about the possible documentation issues of this 787 here in a thread with 787 in the title, and leave the 737 MAX comments in a different thread, perhaps with 737 in the title?
A good indication that the original topic had very little meat on the bone.

tdracer
4th Jul 2019, 00:37
Wasn't one of the significant causes of the British Midland BD092 crash involving a new B737-400 at Kegworth, exactly this? The differences between the -300 and -400 had been a very quick presentation (OHP vs PDF nowadays) and then back to line flying? And when the key differences between the two aircraft manifested in such a way that the pilots misdiagnosed a problem that led to a fatal crash.

Not really. There were two primary contributors to the misdiagnosis of which engine had failed. One was that there was smoke on the flight deck, the pilot thought all the flight deck air came from the right hand engine so he figured that the problem was with the right hand engine. Problem was that was only true on the 737-1/200 - the change to mixed bleed air was not unique to the -400, it was that way on all -3/4/500 aircraft. The second issue was a change to the engine vibration gauges - with the smoke and vibration the pilots were unable to see the gauges clearly and not realizing the gauges had changed misinterpreted what the gauges were telling them. I can't recall now if the gauge change was an 'and-on' change or if it was a customer option, but it wasn't specific to the -400 variant.

568
5th Jul 2019, 03:59
Not really. There were two primary contributors to the misdiagnosis of which engine had failed. One was that there was smoke on the flight deck, the pilot thought all the flight deck air came from the right hand engine so he figured that the problem was with the right hand engine. Problem was that was only true on the 737-1/200 - the change to mixed bleed air was not unique to the -400, it was that way on all -3/4/500 aircraft. The second issue was a change to the engine vibration gauges - with the smoke and vibration the pilots were unable to see the gauges clearly and not realizing the gauges had changed misinterpreted what the gauges were telling them. I can't recall now if the gauge change was an 'and-on' change or if it was a customer option, but it wasn't specific to the -400 variant.Slight correction, if I may:If memory serves me well, then there wasn't much smoke in the cockpit, so the vib gauges were not obscured by smoke.Secondly, the vib pointer on the gauge for the left engine went "off scale" so the pointer wasn't at all visible to the F/O.

sadtraveller
5th Jul 2019, 04:44
It just struck me to wonder: was the aircraft with the fuel leak also one of the production numbers with defective fire handles and, if so, did Boeing "self-disclose" the fraudulent maintenance records before or after the discovery of the defective fire handles?