PR Firm strategy needed to regain the public trust?

[Chas2019]

I just heard that Boeing has hired a PR firm to rebuild/repair the public's trust in the 737 MAX series. To the guru's of this forum, what strategy might they employ to convince the public this aircraft is now safe? I was just wondering could work? I am new to this forum so hope my question is not naive.

[yellowtriumph]

haha! no I did not get a contract nor do I have a PR firm. i was just wondering what strategy a PR firm would use?

I would venture to suggest that the flying public heavily associate flying with the airlines they've booked with - pretty obviously. Since money always talks perhaps Boeing and 737 Max users could come up with a pretty hefty ticket discounting plan to lure people back? Personally I'm happy that if the pertinent authorities say its safe to fly the plane again I wouldn't hesitate to get on it and I would think that's the case with most people - generally we trust the 'experts'.

[mcdhu]

I bet they change the name in some way from "Max" to something else?
mcdhu

[DaveReidUK]

I bet they change the name in some way from "Max" to something else?

That's not as daft as it sounds (actually, it doesn't sound daft at all).

I wouldn't be surprised if Boeing take advantage of the fact that the aircraft are certificated simply as the 737-8 and 737-9 ("Max" being purely a marketing designation and only mentioned in a footnote on the TC) and just ditch the Max name completely.

After all, it kind of worked with the DC-10 and MD-10.

[AviatorDave]

I just heard that Boeing has hired a PR firm to rebuild/repair the public's trust in the 737 MAX series. To the guru's of this forum, what strategy might they employ to convince the public this aircraft is now safe? I was just wondering could work? I am new to this forum so hope my question is not naive.

The problem with „convincing the public“ is that noone can be trusted in this case. Not authorities, not „experts“, not PR agencies, and certainly not Boeing. There is too much at stake: cash, employment, an American icon. Much action will be going on in the background to sort this out favorably for Boeing.
The public knows this, and hence they will be very suspicious about anyone giving them a show about a now safe airplane.
Just renaming the MAX into something else won‘t do here.

Trust can only be restored slowly. Let the MAX fly cargo, FAA and Boeing people for a year, crewed with average line pilots, not some Boeing test pilot hotshots. If it turns out that it stays airborne and the public doesn‘t get headlines about one coming down every month, regular airline operations might be considered again.

[etudiant]

Only a small fraction of the passengers know what model airplane they are flying on. Even the kerfluffle about the Max has not changed that.
Unless one is interested, the flight experience is shuffling through a gate and a tunnel into a tube to watch a so so movie and then to reverse the procedure.
So imho Boeing could rename the Max all they want, it will not have any impact on the large majority of the public.

[OldnGrounded]

Only a small fraction of the passengers know what model airplane they are flying on. Even the kerfluffle about the Max has not changed that.

Not sure about that. In our world of ubiquitous, instant communications and amplification by social media, many more pax seem to be paying attention to equipment type than was once the case. And it would be very hard for them not to be exposed to news about the MAX.

In the wake of the UA-191 crash on departure from ORD, there was a rather long period during which pax were reluctant to fly the DC-10. (Of course, there were other DC-10 incidents that contributed to the reputation, notably the multiple cargo door failures.) For quite a long time after the Chicago crash, airlines were removing DC-10s from the more lucrative routes and advertising "747s only" between popular city pairs. The DC-10 ultimately overcame the bad reputation, but it took a while.

I expect the MAX to have a tough time with public perception for some time to come.

[Water pilot]

Um, do exactly what they have been doing? A big helping of "blame the pilots" with a side of "third world airline" (*) and a dash of American exceptionalism.

One of the problems is that now people realize what an ancient aircraft the 737 is. Safety procedures that can tear the skin off of the pilot's hand or break his knee do not exactly shout out "modern technology." The plus side of such old technology is that it is tested and proven, but then two crash due to software bugs.

I think Boeing has bigger problems with perception than the 737 MAX at this point, but as far of the MAX goes they have really messed up since their primary customers are overseas. The US is probably easier to deal with because of the exceptionalism bubble; you can see it in the posts here. People still say that US pilots don't make errors, despite two hull losses by US airlines since the Lion Air crashed.

(*) Any airline based in a country that USians can't locate on a map, which is pretty much anywhere.

[Rated De]

You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing, after they have exhausted everything else -Winston Churchill
They could dispense with the BS and simply be accountable and responsible.

[jimtherev]

Nah, too expensive. No-one's got that deep pockets.

[CurtainTwitcher]

Nah, too expensive. No-one's got that deep pockets.
That was the attitude that got them into the predicament Boeing are in...It's some kind of sad recursive joke.

Unfortunately, my anecdotal observation is the ideologies of both communism and capitalism end up at the same ultimate destination: giant monopolies that that are laws unto themselves, and everyone just to accept whatever comes out of the sausage machine. Most importantly the, customer becomes the product, that is the customer is in the service of the monopoly, not the other way around.

What was the old Soviet joke? We used to pretend to work, and they used to pretend to pay us?

[Loose rivets]

The plus side of such old technology is that it is tested and proven, but then two crash due to software bugs.

Someone on one of the threads said, MCAS did what it was supposed to do. This could only be correct if one accepts it was indeed a flawed program. I'll go on a moment from an almost philosophical viewpoint.

I don't look upon this issue as 'bugs' per se, it is more a fundamental inadequacy in programming logic. If I understand correctly, the main issue was that the system can allow the failure of a solitary measuring device to become potentially 'catastrophic' by triggering inputs to the most powerful control surface, and that its jackscrew inputs go too far, too fast.
The UAS etc., are just further miserable consequences, but the above is the prime issue.

The cold reality is that if this aircraft had used three vanes, or had a comparator with logical 'most likely' decision-making, it would probably have flown for decades without even being realised. Sadly, the 'lessons learned' are pretty certain to be the most expensive in aviation history.

However, when you analyse the overall picture, the fact that it's a double catastrophe is as much a part of a bewildering coincidence as it is of what I termed the prime programming issues. The Vane failures are almost certainly very different technically. Boeing doesn't make the AoA Vanes.

[Water pilot]

It is beginning to feel to me like the MAX may be a zombie that just doesn't know that it is dead yet. I have a hard time seeing how Boeing can charge the premium that they need to cover their development costs for this plane, and I have a hard time seeing how any fleet manager is going to be excited about upgrading their fleet. One more crash of a MAX for any reason and it is all over, so who wants to be sitting on a huge fleet of them that may be grounded again? Perhaps if Boeing had responded with something other than "we have complete confidence in the MAX" after the first crash and kept it up after the second, things would be different. What they really need now is a way to say they have fixed the problem and the process that created the problem, but they are too afraid to admit any liability (why?) and their baby steps in that direction always end up blaming the pilots. Total bluff may work in Trump world but not the rest of the world, and that is where they are selling these things. "We have replaced all of the doors and now they are safe" works, "Ignore the fact that two planes crashed, nothing to see here" doesn't.

Unfortunately for Boeing (but perhaps fortunately for the public) the grounding happened before any fleets were completely committed to the MAX. The schedule disruptions are painful but can be worked around, so nobody other than Boeing needs the MAX program to be successful. China will probably not let it fly again for a whole bunch of reasons unless Boeing sweetens the pot to some unreasonable level (large scale manufacturing moved to China) that Boeing would be foolish to accede to. So who knows. I think Boeing survives but they have to pull their heads out of the sand first, and probably axe a number of executives if for no other reason than to placate the people who report to those executives and are probably pretty pissed off right now.

[Free Range]

-800 Classic’

[slf4life]

I keep seeing '360 hours, 207 test flights' - as though this means something in itself to us the uninformed. So what? MCAS1.0 logged thousands of uneventful hours.Tell me you've done 207 replications of the accident scenarios and how MCAS2 is different.
Low hour/inexperienced/tired/otherwise situationally challenged pilots and their bean counting employers aren't going anywhere by June, July or Christmas 2025. My assurance will come not so much from necessary (re)training, PR campaigns etc, but primarily from the knowledge this aircraft will no longer itself actively add to precursor technical challenges and/or any very human errors made addressing them.

[Kerosene Kraut]

PR is not helpful now. Get the issue sorted out first. This is not about the packaging but about the content. The early spin doctoring backfired massively and upset many customers.

[Bend alot]

With the NG now getting dragged in on the manual trim issue, PR is a very big requirement.

Imagine if China grounds the NG due to the change of tail plane area and reduced trim wheel and the deficiencies of the simulator characteristics (under simulated), then a few other regulators in "third world" under trained pilots countries also following China (Asia and Africa).

PR is a big issue not just for Boeing but equally so for the FAA (remember FAA act on data before grounding). The NG fails the data test on a "under" realistic simulator - so where is the FAA?

[groundbum]

give 10 MAXes to a ATPL training school and see how they do for a year..

G

[Trav a la]

My suggestion.

They could get the FAA to certify it to fly domestically while the rest of the world looks into the whole 'can of worms' certification process for themselves. Then, in about a years time, we would all have a pretty good idea if the modifications being made by B, and the grandfather certification process etc etc are acceptable. Oh, and they could rename it the MaxUS;)

[Dee Vee]

PR is not helpful now. Get the issue sorted out first.

That's a typical type response from Boeing.

Declare its not helpful to discuss the problem now and try and shut down any current discussion/bad press.
When there is a fix, declare the problem is now fixed, so there's nothing to discuss now and lets just move on. So try and shut down any discussion after the fact too.

[safetypee]

KK,
“PR is not helpful now. Get the issue sorted out first. This is not about the packaging but about the content. The early spin doctoring backfired massively and upset many customers. is not helpful now. Get the issue sorted out first. This is not about the packaging but about the content. The early spin doctoring backfired massively and upset many customers.”
:ok:

‘… making superficial or cosmetic changes is a futile attempt to disguise the true nature of a product or person.’

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lipstick_on_a_pig

[Kerosene Kraut]

That's a typical type response from Boeing.

Declare its not helpful to discuss the problem now and try and shut down any current discussion/bad press.
When there is a fix, declare the problem is now fixed, so there's nothing to discuss now and lets just move on. So try and shut down any discussion after the fact too.

LOL. My point was that Boeing must solve the problem instead of starting PR campaigns. I did not claim anything is fixed and I did not try to shut down any discussion.

[LowObservable]

Only a small fraction of the passengers know what model airplane they are flying on.

Anecdotally - I agree with OldnGrounded here. Internet-famous is not the old famous. The Max has gone viral, and understandably: much of today's traveling public doesn't even remember when so many aircraft were grounded. (When the 787 had its battery problem there were only 50 aircraft in service worldwide, and of course the incidents were non-fatal.)

And in the days of steam media, Linotypes and dead trees, stories had a definite half-life. Even the DC-10 had a brief flutter of notoriety but then dropped out of the news. Nobody bought many more of them, in any event, but the same went for the L-1011.

Boeing has more digging-out to do than it knows about. Pointing fingers at the pilots - in any way, from the FTFA-fundies unleashed on online fora to talking about "a chain of events" - is hugely counterproductive, because then you're casting doubt not just on the Max, but the process that trains and certifies every pilot in the industry.

One way or another, it's hard to argue that Boeing's response to Lion Air was unaffected by complacency or denial; Ethiopian was clear evidence that it was inadequate.

[OldnGrounded]

Pointing fingers at the pilots - in any way . . . is hugely counterproductive, because then you're casting doubt not just on the Max, but the process that trains and certifies every pilot in the industry.


Yes, absolutely. A truly terrible approach.

USA Today, yesterday: On autopilot: 'Pilots are losing their basic flying skills,' some fear after Boeing 737 Max crashes (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/05/25/boeing-737-max-8-autopilot-automation-pilots-skills-flying-hours-safety/1219147001/)

If there is a problem with lack of hand-flying skills and experience, and there may well be, it clearly must be addressed. OTOH, focusing on the crew in cases like the MAX crashes, where the vast majority of knowledgeable observers agree that the root causes were a hardware failure and a system design flaw, undermines confidence in the industry as a whole for no useful purpose.

[Green-dot]

Install taller Main Landing Gears and position the MLG trunnions further outboard in the wing compared to present location. For example, a B757 MLG redesign with a two wheel assembly, instead of a four wheel bogie should solve the issue, fitting the wheels nicely into the unchanged fuselage wheel wells.
Reposition the LEAP engines to the correct location with a pylon redesign to restore aerodynamic stability, comparable to the earlier B737 generations.
Remove MCAS software all together.
Then for PR reasons, if so desired, change MAX into MIX . . . . .

[pattern_is_full]

Sometimes the job of a PR firm is not to create or massage the message, but to advise and correct the messengers. A form of psychological counseling for the client's attitude or corporate culture (in this case, Boeing), not for the attitudes of the audience. In effect, CRM training for the corporate cockpit - and beyond.

A few examples of strategic PR advice for a "trust" issue:
- Don't be defensive. Don't see any question or adverse comment from the outside as an attack to be deflected or a justification for anger. Take it as an opportunity to engage with the outsider and develop a mutual and non-adversarial understanding.
- Go into meetings with stakeholders (regulators, legislators, airline customers, the flying public) with a question - "What do we need to do and say to make this right and restore your trust?" Don't tell them what you've decided to do - find out what you need to do. And don't bitch about the cost or other problems their answer may imply - save that for internal deliberations. One of the things a PR firm can do for you is ask such questions of "derived customers" - i.e., the flying public, who don't buy your product directly, and whom you will rarely meet face-to-face yourself (although there is a time and place for that) - but can have a strong influence on your success and survival.
- Compartmentalize: Don't let the stresses of your responsibilities to one stakeholder "put your back up" or spill over when dealing with another stakeholder. Your problems are not the stakeholders problem - you're the one paid to manage things. Kick over the trashcan in your private office, if you need to let off stress.

In short, convert the old saw of "Always be sincere, whether you mean it or not," to "Always be sincere, whether you mean it or not!" And back it up with attitude as well as actions.

Back in the 1950s, the local New York VW dealers decided to hire a joint ad agency. At their first meeting with the fledgling Doyle Dane Bernbach, one of the agency guys said "You know, your problem isn't the size or the power or the odd shape of the VW - it's that you're trying to sell a Nazi car in a Jewish town!" Comfort with the car was as important as comfort inside the car. Similarly, when brainstorming ads for Panasonic as it entered the US market, one "creative" jump up and said, "I can see the headline now! 'From the People who brought you Pearl Harbor....! ' "

In both cases, the understanding of the comfort-problem defined the strategy - not a bunch of engineering mumbo-jumbo and corporate-speak, but the development of trust through humor and personality. Along with good engineering to maintain that trust.

[Rated De]

Sometimes the job of a PR firm is not to create or massage the message, but to advise and correct the messengers. A form of psychological counseling for the client's attitude or corporate culture (in this case, Boeing), not for the attitudes of the audience. In effect, CRM training for the corporate cockpit - and beyond.

A few examples of strategic PR advice for a "trust" issue:
- Don't be defensive. Don't see any question or adverse comment from the outside as an attack to be deflected or a justification for anger. Take it as an opportunity to engage with the outsider and develop a mutual and non-adversarial understanding.
- Go into meetings with stakeholders (regulators, legislators, airline customers, the flying public) with a question - "What do we need to do and say to make this right and restore your trust?" Don't tell them what you've decided to do - find out what you need to do. And don't bitch about the cost or other problems their answer may imply - save that for internal deliberations. One of the things a PR firm can do for you is ask such questions of "derived customers" - i.e., the flying public, who don't buy your product directly, and whom you will rarely meet face-to-face yourself (although there is a time and place for that) - but can have a strong influence on your success and survival.
- Compartmentalize: Don't let the stresses of your responsibilities to one stakeholder "put your back up" or spill over when dealing with another stakeholder. Your problems are not the stakeholders problem - you're the one paid to manage things. Kick over the trashcan in your private office, if you need to let off stress.

In short, convert the old saw of "Always be sincere, whether you mean it or not," to "Always be sincere, whether you mean it or not!" And back it up with attitude as well as actions.

Back in the 1950s, the local New York VW dealers decided to hire a joint ad agency. At their first meeting with the fledgling Doyle Dane Bernbach, one of the agency guys said "You know, your problem isn't the size or the power or the odd shape of the VW - it's that you're trying to sell a Nazi car in a Jewish town!" Comfort with the car was as important as comfort inside the car. Similarly, when brainstorming ads for Panasonic as it entered the US market, one "creative" jump up and said, "I can see the headline now! 'From the People who brought you Pearl Harbor....! ' "

In both cases, the understanding of the comfort-problem defined the strategy - not a bunch of engineering mumbo-jumbo and corporate-speak, but the development of trust through humor and personality. Along with good engineering to maintain that trust.

You cannot fake sincerity.-Anon

Boy they try.

[Loose rivets]

Green-dot

Install taller Main Landing Gears and position the MLG trunnions further outboard in the wing compared to present location. For example, a B757 MLG redesign with a two wheel assembly, instead of a four wheel bogie should solve the issue, fitting the wheels nicely into the unchanged fuselage wheel wells.
Reposition the LEAP engines to the correct location with a pylon redesign to restore aerodynamic stability, comparable to the earlier B737 generations.
Remove MCAS software all together.
Then for PR reasons, if so desired, change MAX into MIX . . . . .

Well, just the first bit would have cost a reported $Bazillion* to redesign the centre fuselage/wheel bay. My guess is, that's why they didn't do it.
Reposition the LEAP engines? Hmmm, very powerful engines and now with the original leverage arm giving a greater nose up pitch upon application of high power. Perhaps some software could be written that . . .


*Thinking about the figure. The R&N post told of a very high figure which I now tend to disbelieve. But there's no doubt it would have been a serious chunk of change. Very small change in hindsight.

[GlobalNav]

Maybe they should hire system safety engineering consultants instead, let some program managers go, and minimize the priority in the business plans for schedule, and maximize engineering excellence.

[thcrozier]

Not sure about that. In our world of ubiquitous, instant communications and amplification by social media, many more pax seem to be paying attention to equipment type than was once the case. And it would be very hard for them not to be exposed to news about the MAX.


I flew from LAX to Albuquerque and back this week on an 800 and a 700. Both flights full. I didn't see anyone but myself pull out the safety card and most talked through the briefings. Had they been MAX's, I doubt most would have noticed, but I could be wrong.

[Old Dogs]

Personally I'm happy that if the pertinent authorities say its (sic) safe to fly the plane again I wouldn't hesitate to get on it and I would think that's the case with most people - generally we trust the 'experts'.

But those same "pertinent authorities" said it was safe to fly the first time. 🤔

[kiwi grey]

If I was the PR agency asked to help Boeing out in this situation, the advice I would give would include:

Make some very public sacrifices, and I don't mean at the 'program manager' level, I mean right at the top of BCA - possibly the whole BCA executive team. That might be enough to save the Boeing Corp CEO & board
Ignore your lawyers' advice, admit liability and offer each victim's family enough money to make them not take Boeing to court. Openly cancel the share repurchase scheme to pay for it.
Walk away from the MAX, it is irretrievably tarnished. Resume NG production.
Make a big splash of starting the NSA program, and expedite it.

Boeing wouldn't take my advice, and probably wouldn't pay my bill either.

[Water pilot]

It is beginning to bit a bit harder now, the news is carrying stories of stranded passengers because of MAX cancellations.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/sunwing-cancelled-flight-compensation-family-1.5146793

The Juanima family's three-week vacation ended on a sour note. The ten family members spent their final days in a Toronto hotel, stressing over how they'd return home to Vancouver after Sunwing cancelled their flight — four days before departure and with no explanation.
Juanima said Sunwing offered the 10 family members two options: A refund for their tickets which had been booked in January, or they could wait nine days in Toronto — at the family's expense — for the next Sunwing flight to Vancouver.

The family needed to return to their jobs or school, but they weren't prepared to pay the estimated $5,000 total it would cost them — on top of their refund — to purchase last-minute flights on another airline.

Sunwing apologized for the family's inconvenience and said the flight was cancelled due to it extending the grounding of its four Boeing 737 Max jetliners.

Of course, to put it in perspective there are over 300 other pax and crew who are never going to make it home, but it does seem like a rather raw way to deal with customers.

[fotoguzzi]

Call it the 737 MACS.

[FullWings]

I think it’s a bit premature for PR as in “get people happy to fly on the MAX”: it’s still grounded and the full accident reports haven’t come out yet. Anecdotal but everybody I meet that knows or finds out I’m a pilot makes it the first topic of conversation and this is from a large selection of people across a wide range of interests. The MAX is going to be famous for a lot more than 15 minutes.

Everyone even remotely connected with engineering I have come across are aghast at what appear to be simple, fundamental errors in the design and certification, leading to grave doubts about modern Boeings, full stop. That is going to take a bit more than PR to dispel...

[Pali]

I did indeed some consulting for companies where trust of customers have been shattered for some reasons. The rundown is rather simple (yet hard and unforgiving):
1. It must be said frankly that 80% of the focus must be to deliver a perfect product. Resolve any flaws and test test, test it until it is more than perfect.
2. Find out who are the opinion leaders (in this case there are two levels = a. airlines, b.PAX of airlines) for the public.
3. Show the opinion leaders what have been done, how good, effective and safe the product is now and get genuine trust of them.
4. Let the opinion leaders speak out on their behalf and check how it works with a. + b. public with surveys.
5. Now the product in question must go into real life and show reliability and class. Use opinion leaders again to speak about it.
6. Don't even try to use classic marketing and promotion if opinion leaders didn't "approve" your product as a worthwhile solution yet.

The problem is that opinion leaders who have real power to influence the public and they must be "your friends" before you face any crisis because if you try to befriend with them after the fact it may be quite a show stopper. Well, you want to work with real experts and pro's who are authorities, not prostitutes. You don't use any lies, your methods must be straight and honest. Old school, I would say.

This works in any industry or area, even in politics, believe or not (when I helped future mayors of cities, their biggest cognition was: "So I have to honestly find out what the public really need and want for better life and I have to deliver and let opinion leaders talk about it, don't I?"). :)

I tell you it is hard work...

[AviatorDave]

I think it’s a bit premature for PR as in “get people happy to fly on the MAX”: it’s still grounded and the full accident reports haven’t come out yet. Anecdotal but everybody I meet that knows or finds out I’m a pilot makes it the first topic of conversation and this is from a large selection of people across a wide range of interests. The MAX is going to be famous for a lot more than 15 minutes.

Everyone even remotely connected with engineering I have come across are aghast at what appear to be simple, fundamental errors in the design and certification, leading to grave doubts about modern Boeings, full stop. That is going to take a bit more than PR to dispel...

This. Also, the flying public is a lot more aware and interested these days; more than Boeing and some PR folks might think.

[Water pilot]

One possibility would be to replace all of the AoA sensors, preferably with a model that is improved somehow. (The vane is held in place with a set screw? Really???) It doesn't address the underlying problems but it would be a good talking point (PR). Improved software probably doesn't cut it in today's world, we all have too much experience with that.

[Green-dot]

Well, just the first bit would have cost a reported $Bazillion* to redesign the centre fuselage/wheel bay. My guess is, that's why they didn't do it.
Reposition the LEAP engines? Hmmm, very powerful engines and now with the original leverage arm giving a greater nose up pitch upon application of high power. Perhaps some software could be written that . . .


*Thinking about the figure. The R&N post told of a very high figure which I now tend to disbelieve. But there's no doubt it would have been a serious chunk of change. Very small change in hindsight.
If you had read my post correctly very little or no center fuselage/wheel bay redesign would be needed. Wing yes: taller gear moved outward with 737 twin wheel assembly retracting into the current wheel bay and a pylon to bring the engine more aft and lower where it should be to make the aircraft aerodynamically stable (at higher AoA) without the need of a "band-aid" named MCAS.

Indeed a very small change in hindsight when compared to the present situation.

[DaveReidUK]

Indeed a very small change in hindsight when compared to the present situation.

No.

position the MLG trunnions further outboard in the wing compared to present location

Far from "a very small change", whatever you compare it to.

[PAXboy]

kiwi grey
If I was the PR agency asked to help Boeing out in this situation, the advice I would give would include:

Make some very public sacrifices, and I don't mean at the 'program manager' level, I mean right at the top of BCA - possibly the whole BCA executive team. That might be enough to save the Boeing Corp CEO & board
Ignore your lawyers' advice, admit liability and offer each victim's family enough money to make them not take Boeing to court. Openly cancel the share repurchase scheme to pay for it.
Walk away from the MAX, it is irretrievably tarnished. Resume NG production.
Make a big splash of starting the NSA program, and expedite it.

Boeing wouldn't take my advice, and probably wouldn't pay my bill either.
Agreed - a fine place to start BUT masculine default is to say, "It wasn't me!" The masculine is usually the corporate default. We see this start in very small children when caught out. Once that line has been taken it takes very large cohones to walk it back. In corporate life? The only retraction tends to happen in court or by 'out of court settlement with no admission of guilt'.

It is a problem that has bevilled corporate, political and family life for (I suspect) as long as homo sapiens has been around. In recent times - VW had this problem as they took a short cut on testing and had to be hauled through court. They were very lucky as no direct deaths could be pinned on them. Look back to the 1970s Ford Pinto and check if the corporate behaviour was the same.

As many have pointed out, the biggest single change is the Internet. An example is that, I was not sure which American car was famous for catching fire in the 1970s but it only took a minute for a search and Wikipedia to confirm which it was. I agree that many do not know what a/c they are flying on (Mrs PAXboy among them) but there will be younger generations, children of, or friends of - who will know.

Lastly, what the boys at B's top table forgot was that - currently - the USA is not liked so much around the world as it was 25 years ago. The reasons do not matter but 'American' is no longer desirable to so many and the sheer arrogance and effrontery of the Board confirms that. I say 'not liked' but 'loathed' is probably closer to the mark.

Tragically, The Tombstone Imperative (book by Andrew Weir) still rules .

[Rated De]

When there is very little financial upside in being transparent and honest, then, as Charlie Munger asserts "show me the incentive, I show you the outcome"

Until a watershed occurs and society accepts that there are other virtues, far more important than increasingly large profits from a finite planet, then companies, politicians and the society in which they exist will require 'brand experts' to tell them what and what not to say. All said with the best legal minds ensuring no admission ever results in a financial loss through litigation.

In times of Universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act-George Orwell.

[Ancient Observer]

I think the PR firm should re-name the plane. Get rid of Max.

Try FGBeng.

Nearly short for Great Big Engine..................

[Green-dot]

No.



Far from "a very small change", whatever you compare it to.
Compared to the loss of lives which no money can buy and to definitely prevent a similar accident from ever happening again, it would be a very small change.
Different times and circumstances but outcome the same (two aircraft crashed, no survivors): reminds me of the L.E.A.P. actions Lockheed took with regards to the L-188 Electra. Once the true cause was revealed regarding the "whirl mode", no half measures were taken to solve the problem.

[LowObservable]

This is getting way beyond PR but there are some interesting observations here:

https://leehamnews.com/2019/05/27/pontifications-compensation-claims-against-boeing-beginning-to-ramp-up/#more-30181Muilenburg’s MCASI was at the Airbus Innovation Days last week with more than 130 global journalists. Naturally, the Boeing MAX crisis was the subject of a lot of sideline talk among us.

To a person, the journalists are appalled at Boeing’s handling of the communications and messaging, and of Muilenburg’s various statements.

Also to a person, we believe the corporate lawyers, not the corporate communications team, are calling the shots in the messaging.

One reporter likened Muilenburg’s we-own-it, no-the-pilots-did-it approach to his own MCAS.

First, Muilenburg’s nose would rise with the we-own-it approach.

Then his nose would fall with the-pilots-did-it claim.

Then repeat, over and over.

There was general eye rolling that Boeing would engage “celebrities” to help rebuild the MAX brand.

I suspect that Muilenburg will have to go. I'd also recommend hoisting some of the political window-dressing off the board and adding some engineers from critical-risk industries. If I was in charge, too, I'd be thinking of whether to tell the lawyers to get lost and establish a massive fund for victims' families. It might be cheaper than what might come out of discovery.

[A and C]

Pilots are very quick to criticise the appauling standard of journalists who report more often mis report aviation issues but are more than happy without any knowlage of the communications industry jump in with both feet making wlid assumptions.

Boeing will be engaging corporate communications experts, these people are the very opposite of PR people.

PR is all about hyping a product and selling, Corperate communications is about getting the correct and sometimes quite low key message in front of the public and counteracting the hysterical reports in the press that you get after any crisis that goes public.

What the corperate communications people will try to do for Boeing is a slow and subtle improvement of their public image, this has to be based in truth otherwise it will backfire very badly and further damage the brand image.

[Chas2019]

This is getting way beyond PR but there are some interesting observations here:

https://leehamnews.com/2019/05/27/pontifications-compensation-claims-against-boeing-beginning-to-ramp-up/#more-30181Muilenburg’s MCASI was at the Airbus Innovation Days last week with more than 130 global journalists. Naturally, the Boeing MAX crisis was the subject of a lot of sideline talk among us.

To a person, the journalists are appalled at Boeing’s handling of the communications and messaging, and of Muilenburg’s various statements.

Also to a person, we believe the corporate lawyers, not the corporate communications team, are calling the shots in the messaging.

One reporter likened Muilenburg’s we-own-it, no-the-pilots-did-it approach to his own MCAS.

First, Muilenburg’s nose would rise with the we-own-it approach.

Then his nose would fall with the-pilots-did-it claim.

Then repeat, over and over.

There was general eye rolling that Boeing would engage “celebrities” to help rebuild the MAX brand.

I suspect that Muilenburg will have to go. I'd also recommend hoisting some of the political window-dressing off the board and adding some engineers from critical-risk industries. If I was in charge, too, I'd be thinking of whether to tell the lawyers to get lost and establish a massive fund for victims' families. It might be cheaper than what might come out of discovery.

I think muilenburg's days as a CEO are numbered only he has not realized it yet.

[Rated De]

What the corperate (sic) communications people will try to do for Boeing is a slow and subtle improvement of their public image, this has to be based in truth otherwise it will backfire very badly and further damage the brand image.

That it has taken so long to even begin a discussion on what is the 'right' thing to do, tells the observer just how twisted, perverse and misaligned the modern corporate actually is.
It ought not need an outsider to re-direct a company. An outsider is needed because the moral compass of society is broken, and the corporation is merely a reflection.

[nevillestyke]

I did indeed some consulting for companies where trust of customers have been shattered for some reasons. The rundown is rather simple (yet hard and unforgiving):
1. It must be said frankly that 80% of the focus must be to deliver a perfect product. Resolve any flaws and test test, test it until it is more than perfect.
2. Find out who are the opinion leaders (in this case there are two levels = a. airlines, b.PAX of airlines) for the public.
3. Show the opinion leaders what have been done, how good, effective and safe the product is now and get genuine trust of them.
4. Let the opinion leaders speak out on their behalf and check how it works with a. + b. public with surveys.
5. Now the product in question must go into real life and show reliability and class. Use opinion leaders again to speak about it.
6. Don't even try to use classic marketing and promotion if opinion leaders didn't "approve" your product as a worthwhile solution yet.


How does this work with the tobacco industry?