Who Speaks for the Dead ? [Archive]

Lordflasheart

27th Apr 2019, 20:13

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“Cost cutting by MoD is blamed for 100 deaths.” Headline for ten column inches on page 3 of last Tuesday’s Times (23 April 2019) by Lucy Fisher.

A new book by David Hill. – “Breaking the Military Covenant: .why British servicemen are dying unnecessarily” is to be published in mid May, available from the usual watery souq.

This dire subject will go on being ‘done to death’ on PPRuNe until the MoD wakes up. Numerous threads about usually fatal but mostly avoidable accidents that result from unreasonable or irresponsible decisions made, not in the haste of operational necessity, but in the calm protection of the office. For such decisions, probably the most immediate threat is of an adverse report or a backwater posting, if one doesn’t toe the line.

Cost cutting is only half the problem. It is a simplistic convenience, because it avoids the dirty complicated side of this long-standing problem. The other half is comprised of dodgy airworthiness, unfitness for purpose, inadequate regulation and restricted investigation. There is regrettably, no evidence that any lessons (especially those relating to honesty) have yet been learned by the powers responsible for or complicit in the resulting accidents and deaths. Worse, no lessons seem to have been preserved, to provide guidance to previously uninvolved participants who find themselves presiding in good faith, over the subsequent soviet-style suppression of the truths of each successive case or fatality.

Nearly twenty years passed before the MoD was forced to admit the truth about Chinook ZD576, as chronicled in “Their Greatest Disgrace” by the same author. It seems even now, that this miserable culture remains unchanged at the upper levels of MoD. It is still going on because the flawed system still depends on self-regulation, denial, covert influence and oppression, and the improper assignment of blame to lower levels or other agencies.

The author should be applauded and publicly commended for his determination to bring to light the otherwise hidden truths of these unnecessary deaths. There are others, less well known, who also fight against the MoD’s shamefully routine and repeated efforts to conceal the real causes and guilt from the public and from the grieving families.

An MoD spokesman kinda gave the game away, again -

“…we put safety right at the heart of our procurement activities and in the event of a fatality or major loss of equipment a thorough independent investigation is undertaken by the Defence Safety Authority.”

LFH

.......

oldmansquipper

27th Apr 2019, 21:11

LFH.

The 'soviet style suppression' of which you talk is not confined to the aforementioned disgraceful goings on.

Witness the 20,000 vets on bikes that DIDN'T close down London on the 19th or the similar number of 'foot soldiers' who DIDN'T march on parliament, Didn't halt in front of the House of Clowns, didn't react to the command to 'about turn', turning their backs on politicians who have turned their backs on them, didn't march down the Mall, didn't halt in front Buck House and didn't sing the national anthem to the "Boss". (I gather nothing will be happening at Media city next month either).

Apparently, There was a pink boat and some people using superglue ...but nothing of the above demonstrations. Or, if something did happen but was not reported, was it a case of 'soviet style suppression' by the politicians and/or corporate censorship by the complicit but allegedly independent 'meejah' ? You may think so, but I couldn't possibly comment.

Geobbels would be proud.

Best of luck with your latest book, David. I rather feel you will need it...again.

Lordflasheart

27th Apr 2019, 23:04

.....
Here's the full article referred to above -
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"Cost cutting by MoD is blamed for 100 deaths - The Times, 23 April 2019, by Lucy Fisher

A hundred British military personnel have died in the past 35 years because of “avoidable” accidents linked to government maladministration, a new book claims.

David Hill, a former avionics project manager at the Ministry of Defence, has accused it of repeatedly cutting costs at the expense of safety, which he said had contributed to fatal aircraft crashes. He said that he had witnessed in Whitehall how bungled departmental procurement decisions had entailed cash being wasted on obsolete items, prompting a squeeze in the budget for crucial safety training and equipment.

Mr Hill, who retired in 2004, sets out his argument in Breaking the Military Covenant: why British servicemen are dying unnecessarily, to be published next month.

Among the 11 military accidents he examined was the collision of two Sea King Mk7 helicopters in the Gulf in 2003 in which six British personnel and one US crew member were killed. The programme to upgrade the helicopters to the Mk7 had been compromised two years earlier, he said, “allowing known risks to manifest themselves” on the day of the crash. Among the factors he highlights was the failure to provide night vision goggles for the pilots.

Mr Hill also criticised the MoD’s “failure to maintain airworthiness” of an RAF Nimrod surveillance aircraft that crashed in Afghanistan in 2006 after a fire. All 14 crew died. An independent review’s recommendations are yet to be implemented, he said.

Mr Hill told The Times that accidents were “going to happen again because the MoD are not learning lessons. The MoD now understand that something has to be done, but they don’t have the resources in terms of money. Neither do they have experienced staff because of rampant privatisation. People aren’t trained any more. They don’t recognise what’s not being done.”

An MoD spokesman said the department “takes the safety of all personnel extremely seriously. To ensure that our equipment operates at the highest standards we put safety right at the heart of our procurement activities and in the event of a fatality or major loss of equipment a thorough independent investigation is undertaken by the Defence Safety Authority.”

In 2011 Nick Harvey, then the armed forces minister, met Mr Hill to discuss the issues he had raised."
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Comments(50)

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cost-cutting-by-mod-is-blamed-for-100-deaths-vj5fvrp09

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Melchett01

28th Apr 2019, 10:07

Of course we don’t learn lessons. And we almost take a bizarre level of pride in that fact. As I discovered during my time in purgatory, sorry, posting to JHC HQ where I was asked to design and implement an operational lessons system.

When I asked about resources I was told well at the moment it’s just you, so you’ll have to split your time between your Ops role and this Lessons Identified position. There might be a Clerk somewhere in the system to manage the database once you get it set up. When I asked about the gapped Lessons Learned post who was supposed to work alongside me implementing what I had uncovered, they said they couldn’t resource it, but it probably wouldn’t matter as we never learn lessons anyway, just as long as we identify then.

The worrying thing is that I don’t think this was in anyway unusual. But I don’t think it was necessarily an approach born of negligence. Resourcing and prioritisition to get Ops done is obviously.part of this, but it is also symptomatic of the very linear and unidirectional approach we take, marching onwards to the next thing without ever stopping to think and reflect on what we have just done. Until that unidirectional mindset is broken, this will continue. And I suspect to break that mindset and introduce the capacity for reflection will mean more resource, more time and fewer knee-jerk reactions that ‘something must be done and done now’. And that comes directly in the direction from the top of the shop. We say all the right things but that’s where it ends.

melmothtw

29th Apr 2019, 07:56

Apparently, There was a pink boat and some people using superglue ...but nothing of the above demonstrations. Or, if something did happen but was not reported, was it a case of 'soviet style suppression' by the politicians and/or corporate censorship by the complicit but allegedly independent 'meejah' ? You may think so, but I couldn't possibly comment.

So how do you know about it?

teeteringhead

29th Apr 2019, 11:37

I remember the cynical chuckling when I was last in the Ministry when we changed "Lessons Learned" to "Lessons Identified" ....

..... spot the difference! Answers on a postcard please.....

Melchett01

29th Apr 2019, 16:33

I remember the cynical chuckling when I was last in the Ministry when we changed "Lessons Learned" to "Lessons Identified" ....

..... spot the difference! Answers on a postcard please.....

Lessons learned actually requires you to do something rather than just talk about it!

oldmansquipper

29th Apr 2019, 17:49

So how do you know about it?

If I told you,........etc

Chugalug2

29th Apr 2019, 18:49

Good spot, LFH, thank you. Lest anyone console themselves with the thought that these 100 deaths while regrettable are essentially historic, think again! The attack on UK Military Airworthiness commenced in the late 1980's. It has spread throughout the fleets like a canker because once you subvert the system, once you order the Regulations to be suborned, once you rid the system of the experience and expertise of those who will not comply, then the continuous process of safety auditing which is the very foundation of airworthiness is lost. The only way then to regain that lost airworthiness is to face up to what has happened, why it has happened, and to reform the system so that it cannot happen again.

What happened? Short term savings were made at the expense of safety. Who ordered that? RAF VSOs. Why did they do that? Because they could, and because they desperately needed the previously ring fenced Air Safety funds to counter Supply based financial losses caused by the ineptness of a certain RAF VSO. Why hasn't the system been reformed yet? Because it would reveal that ineptness and the illegal orders of RAF VSOs who are now protected by a continuous cover up since by succeeding RAF VSOs.

The RAF remains dishonoured and compromised until and unless these issues are faced up to and proper reform instituted. The gross lack of airworthiness in the UK Military Airfleets will go on claiming victims until that happens. And all for protecting the reputations of a handful of old men!

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!

Chugalug2

29th Apr 2019, 21:49

High Spirits, I understand your anger. I don't like having to write posts as above. I may not have any connection with the modern day RAF other than to want to see it flourish and succeed in every way. I'm certain that those who work in Air Safety these days take Airworthiness seriously and don't go to work to suborn it (that was done long ago).

The fact remains though that a safety system design that has remained in service since before I joined the RAF let alone left it had been compromised to the extent that it took life instead of preserving it. Why? Because the RAF's corporate memory had forgotten how to do up a nut! That same loss of memory accounts for so many of the other tragedies that are subject threads in this forum. That memory loss is because of the actions of certain VSOs, which were to UK Military Airworthiness what Pol Pot was to the people of Cambodia. Both shared a Year Zero. Neither turned out well!

The Old Fat One

30th Apr 2019, 04:54

HS

Well said, but you are wasting your time.

tucumseh

30th Apr 2019, 06:45

High Spirits & TOFO

I think you have to read the book to understand Chug's comments. (Many here have, as it was available last year). It doesn't make unfounded accusations against MoD staff at any level. It collates a series of MoD reports into fatal accidents, and places in them in context alongside the Nimrod Review and personal experiences. In these reports, MoD admitted most of the failings mentioned. Haddon-Cave reiterated the rest, based on warnings by the RAF Director of Flight Safety. You will also read (HS) that the book is kind to the MoD staff you mention, and agrees with what you say. It only takes a few bad eggs. They are well-known and knew exactly what the outcome of their actions would be. And it cites the correspondence telling them, which was largely provided by MoD under FOI. And MoD cleared the book for publication. Trying to prevent unnecessary deaths can never be a waste of time. Or, at least, not in my book.

tucumseh

30th Apr 2019, 08:41

I think this extract from the book illustrates well where the likes of Chug and I are coming from. Look at the dates and ask yourself who briefed Adam Ingram and Bob Ainsworth. Precisely the same prior direct warnings (i.e. face to face, at 2 Star level) were provided that could have prevented (e.g.) Tornado ZG710, Sea Kings XV650 & 704, Kajaki Dam (it isn't just about aircraft) and many others. The point is, it's still happening. As an aside, this makes a nonsense of the claim 'We've asked some difficult questions. That's why we were created' (MAA Technical Director, 13 July 2014). No you didn't. Junior staff in MoD pointed out the failings and provided the answers - from 1988 (the point at which I believe the failings became systemic). DFS listed the same failings from 1992-98. Haddon-Cave in 2009. Lord Philip in 2011, although obliquely. A succession of Coroners. Internal MoD auditors. Members of the public. This isn't just a couple of old hands shouting from the sidelines on an internet forum. The book tries to make sense of voluminous data already in the public domain, supplemented by what was omitted in official reports. And money isn't an issue. In each case it was faster, cheaper and better to do the right thing in the first place.

I recall saying in an old thread that it would take the MAA 10 years to implement Haddon-Cave's recommendations. It's almost 10 years now..... And then everything regressed 20 years after the Cunningham case last year. (But that's another book).

In my submission to the (Nimrod) Review, I stated:‘The causes of this accident are rooted in MoD’s systematic failure to implement the regulations designed to ensure airworthiness, despite many warnings of the consequences over a long period.

On 15 September 2005 I wrote to my MP, who passed the letter to Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces: “In my experience, this ambivalent attitude towards safety is compelling evidence of a lack of robustness in the application of procedures within the MoD, which I have known to result in critical safety problems”.

On 17 May 2007 Mr Ingram replied: “Mr Hill has stated that although the MoD has a robust airworthiness regulatory framework it is not applied robustly. I contend that the framework is applied robustly”. (His emphasis). Please note the delay between my letter and Ingram's reply. Nimrod XV230 crashed on 2 September 2006.

I tried again, to his successor Bob Ainsworth MP. “I contend that cultural traits and organisational practices which are contrary to sound engineering practice and detrimental to safety have been allowed to develop. Effective communication of critical safety information, and intelligent debate, is stifled. There is a lack of integrated management and oversight across programs and often an informal and uninformed chain of command and decision-making process exists outside the formal airworthiness and safety delegations”. On 2 August 2008, Minister repeated his position’.

Messrs Ingram and Ainsworth were, tragically, proved wrong. Neither has apologised, and no action has been taken against those who misled them.

Chugalug2

30th Apr 2019, 18:47

tuc, well said. You are not wasting your time!

Chugalug2

30th Apr 2019, 19:55

HS. The seat that killed Sean Cunningham lacked a Safety Case. It was unairworthy, hence his aircraft was too. Just how up to date an example of lack of airworthiness do you want? The ACO gliding fleet was grounded because such basic and simple aircraft were unairworthy. Other than a few exceptions (total rebuilds?) that remains the case today. This is a direct result of ignoring the specific warnings and predictions itemised by tucumseh.

I stand by what I say. The RAF is dishonoured by the cover up perpetrated by its High Command of illegal and reckless acts by certain of their predecessors. It is compromised by the lack of airworthiness infecting its fleets. No matter how dedicated and resolute the present generation of those mandated to provide for and maintain UK Military Airworthiness are, they have been handed a poison chalice. Any system or aircraft has to have an unbroken verified audit trail to justify a claim of airworthiness. The examples I give failed that test. What else is waiting to reveal the same?

Airworthiness not only has to be done, it has to be seen to be done. When Regulator and Operator become one then that is no longer the same. Regulator, Investigator, and Operator have to be separate and independent of each other to ensure both confidence and transparency. Until that happens no amount of hard work and dedication will suffice. Those who manned your desks in the late 80s were just as dedicated. They were simply replaced by those who did as they were bid. If it happened then it can happen again. There is nothing special about today, it is simply tomorrow's yesterday.

weemonkey

30th Apr 2019, 20:54

Sorry, but I call BS. This isn’t the organisation that I recognise or work for. One that takes airworthiness extremely seriously and whose personnel don’t walk into work of a morning to suborn regulation. And no, I’m not senior.

Please stop trashing those who are doing their best. You clearly don’t have any connection with the modern day RAF.

Well that is NOT the impression I gained from ALL ranks.

The biggest complaint by far was... self aggrandisement has left the RAF lower and middle management comprised of yes men who WILL throw anyone under the bus to improve their personal outlook...

tucumseh

1st May 2019, 06:21

I accept your claims on what might have happened.

Facts, accepted by legal reviews, Government and (most of) MoD.

Your opinion on the present day is grossly out.

I guess it's time, then, to write to the new Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, to ask if he agrees with his last 4 or 5 predecessors that refusing to obey an order to make a false declaration about airworthiness is an offence, and issuing the order is not. The last confirmation was on 28 October 2014, from the late Sir Jeremy Heywood, upholding a 22-year old ruling. Not a one-off aberation then. One briefed to him by MoD's DE&S Secretariat at AbbeyWood.

orca

1st May 2019, 06:42

Hi Chug, Tuc,

I lost mates in the 849 crash - but I do wonder (if I’ve got this right) whether a 22 year old ruling is relevant to the everyday activities within the UK Air Forces?
Is the MAA really that bad? Does the system actually lead to more fatals than any other?
Can you point at one risk today (prob of x impact of) that is greater because of ‘the system’ or any system...just to help me out and contextualise the point?
Are the accusations (backed by facts or otherwise) about RAF officers analogous to similar situations in the RN and AAC?
I’m coming at this from a (probably historically inaccurate) perspective of there once being a time where aircraft seemed to be raining to the ground and I can’t think of a Typhoon accident as a case study, or a C-17...or a non camera related Voyager...you get the point.
I can assure you (FWIW and without being able to prove it) that I am one of few who have read every single syllable of the Nimrod Review - as opposed to being one of those that trots out the ‘post Haddon-Cave’ war cry as part of any sentence to do with risk.
Just want to understand the issue wrt everyday, modern day, ops of the RAF, FAA and AAC.

Many thanks.

Orca.

falcon900

1st May 2019, 08:23

I think the only real bone of contention here arises due to the extremely broad and sweeping language being used to suggest, basically, that the entirety of the RAF and MoD are complicit in rendering everything un-airworthy in every respect. I don't see anyone disputing that there were, and no doubt still are, issues, some of them serious, nor disputing the gravity of the findings in the particular cases highlighted.
IMHO, it does not follow that everything is bad, and in so far as something was bad, it could have changed by now.
The reality is, in any large organisation, that rules are followed to differing degrees and discretion is used in day to day operations to "keep the show on the road". Some managers are able to make good choices, and some get caught out. Where aircraft are involved, the consequences can be fatal, but if it is perfection we want, then we shouldn't expect there to be terribly much flying going on.
I do not wish to seem in any way complacent, but a slightly more forensic approach is required, as a sledgehammer will not crack the nut of organisational safety culture.

Chugalug2

1st May 2019, 11:28

Orca, falcon, I'll try to field a response. Firstly, my posts may be sweeping, if so I apologise. I am trying to summarise a very complex, arcane, and long drawn out affair that has resulted in the present day state of UK Military Air Safety. They rather assume that others have read the various airworthiness related fatal accident threads in this Forum. They also refer to the contents of David Hill's various books relating to the consequences of the late80s/early 90s subversion of UK Military Air Safety by certain RAF VSOs.

I would recommend reading those books (rather more than reading the entire Haddon-Cave report, Orca!) They are the personal testimony of someone who refused to suborn the regs when so ordered, and has attempted to expose the quite deliberate subversion of Air Safety for short term financial saving. The results are still with us and will remain with us until real reform is carried out.

The MAA as presently constituted does not do that. On the contrary it is based on a lie, that the early 90's were a 'Golden Period' of UK Military Air Safety (recognise the phrase, Orca? You should it is from Haddon-Cave and illustrates how the official record is distorted and altered to throw focus away from that original subversion of UK Military Air Safety). I assume that you both know how airworthiness works, that every aircraft and every aircraft system has to be fully audited continuously throughout its existence, from start to finish. No matter how assiduously today's personnel go about doing that, if their predecessors didn't, then that aircraft, that system, is unairworthy (witness the loss of Sean Cunningham). Rather like pregnancy you can't be half airworthy. You are or you are not. I contend that the latter is the case in the main today.

I regret if I have not answered your questions and points satisfactorily, especially your list of specific ones, Orca. No doubt tuc will do much better. My point is that UK Military Air Safety has a big problem which can only be satisfactorily addressed if past events are honestly addressed. If they are then the way ahead is to prevent such things happening again. That requires real independence of the MAA and the MilAAIB (or whatever its latest incarnation) both of the MOD and of each other. Then and only then can the long and painful path back to attaining full airworthiness of the UK Military Airfleet begin.

tucumseh

1st May 2019, 14:35

Orca

I do wonder (if I’ve got this right) whether a 22 year old ruling is relevant to the everyday activities within the UK Air Forces?It is, if it has been enforced and upheld regularly, has led directly to avoidable deaths, and the regulatory authority still briefs against those who insisted on doing the right thing (i.e. met legal obligations instead of obeying orders not to). I’ve said before, the day MoD/MAA admits this ruling is wrong, is the day I’ll happily walk away. It refuses, and you’ve got to ask why. Who benefits? Is the MAA really that bad? Does the system actually lead to more fatals than any other? Chug mentioned the Red Arrows’ Cunningham case. The Service Inquiry report, issued by the MAA, sets out the MAA’s direct involvement in a root cause. That was a bit of a shock because hitherto I’d have said theirs was an oversight failure. Had warnings been heeded and regulations followed, neither the inadvertent ejection nor the release mechanism jamming would have occurred. The MAA provided the Prosecution’s ‘star witness’ (Prosecution’s words) in the certain knowledge the allegation against Martin-Baker was false, and MoD was sitting on the information it claimed never to have had, but had instructed staff not to use it. That’s not an allegation. The video is there for all to see, in addition to written and verbal evidence. And precisely the same maintenance error killed Flt Lt Simon Burgess in a Hawk in 1996. (Funny how no-one mentions that). Additionally (and luckily no fatalities) the same Type Airworthiness Authority was responsible for Air Cadet Gliders.
Can you point at one risk today (prob of x impact of) that is greater because of ‘the system’ or any system...just to help me out and contextualise the point?I know what you mean, but I’m not sure MoD uses such a ‘risk score’ anymore? The same Red Arrows case illustrated that it populated the risk register with known standing risks only after the accident. So, the standing risk (certainty) of MoD managing airworthiness poorly remains; and one would be justified in thinking it worse in certain areas given the Hawk teams didn’t have valid safety cases, even after ‘rigorous’ MAA audit. However, admittedly, one project team involved sought to correct this in 2014 by issuing a tender to provide 62 (sixty-two) safety cases and certifications for safety equipment alone – including the Tornado main parachute. I should emphasise that I do not wish to denigrate MAA staff here – it is a very few senior staff whose default position is to deny and deflect. Why do otherwise sane men act this way? I see them as almost political posts, divorced from the reality of day-to-day safety management. Certainly, they pay no heed to the Military Covenant.
Are the accusations (backed by facts or otherwise) about RAF officers analogous to similar situations in the RN and AAC?The legal reviews (and Government acceptance of them) speak for themselves. Unfortunately, the few are allowed to judge their own case. To them, I’d add certain senior civilians who were given prior warnings (same as those given to Ministers, above). Their names are well-known. I cannot speak for the AAC.

The RN? Different beast to the RAF (from my viewpoint). Same excellent engineering training, but far less of an admin bias. (I’ve never known the RN to issue an edict that all administrative grades are senior to any engineer. Quickly jumped on and rescinded, but it was the same senior officers who were gleefully shutting down airworthiness management at the same time, and this was an attempt to shut down the engineers who were complaining). The ‘savings at the expense of safety’ policy of June 1987 arguably still persists. One need only point to what would have negated 95% of BoI/SI recommendations. RAF engineers railed against the policy, as did the Director of Flight Safety and, for example, FONAC. But the Senior Service doesn’t escape altogether. When IPTs were reformed in 1999, the very first question put to the Sea King IPTL, a senior RN Captain, was whether a mandated airworthiness policy, whose sole aim was to resolve safety critical problems ASAP, would be implemented. He immediately said NO. No hesitation. (He didn’t understand the question but wouldn’t admit it). He was ignored and contracts let, but some were cancelled by a non-engineer deputy to save money. Their primary output? A maintained Build Standard and safety case, without which one cannot sign the Master Airworthiness Reference.

And, of course, the ASaC Board of Inquiry you mention set out in great detail a raft of airworthiness failings. (Again, the likes of Chug and I are not alleging anything; merely quoting MoD itself, adding what has been omitted and pointing out linkages and recurrences). But it did not say they had been identified in 1994-6, contracts let to mitigate them, and cancelled by the same non-engineer. Not replaced with an alternative risk mitigation strategy. Just cancelled, as he said they weren’t risks in the first place so couldn’t materialise. They did, on 22 March 2003. The Board’s 3 main contributory factors wholly coincided with these known risks. When the President was advised by a family member, he claimed a ‘lack of involvement’; begging the question who was involved, if not the President. I know how you feel Orca – I knew 3 of them myself, and found it difficult explaining all this to the mother and father of a 4th. It’s 46 years since I first had to notify a family (I didn’t know) of a death in person, but explaining it for hours in fine detail is infinitely more difficult. Others may disagree, but either way it’s a crap task. I was asked to do this by their MP, as he (Sir Roger Gale) instinctively knew they’d been lied to. Again, by just a few, but that’s all it takes.The book being discussed here explains direct links to the Tornado ZG710 shootdown the following day. Same people, same decisions. MoD continues to support these actions.

Hope this helps.

Timelord

1st May 2019, 15:12

Tuc, Re Simon Burgess 1996. As I recall it an aileron was disconnected post maintenance. Are you saying that he would have survived but for the same overtightened nut that killed Sean Cunningham?

tucumseh

2nd May 2019, 08:57

Timelord. No, I'm referring the the failure to conduct Disturbed Systems Testing on both the disconnected ailerons and the disconnected parachute release mechanism. In the former, someone didn't work backwards through their actions, reconnect and check functionality. In the latter the shackles were reconnected, but incorrectly, and were not (could not be) checked for functionality. The former was an error of omission (I believe). The latter was directed.

Timelord

2nd May 2019, 09:02

Ah, OK. I understand, thanks.

Lordflasheart

10th May 2019, 16:06

..........
"Breaking the Military Covenant" is now out. Choice of various outlets - got mine already.

Every MP should read it. I will be sending mine a copy.
It provides all you need to know to question the integrity of the current processes.

LFH
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racedo

10th May 2019, 17:26

Chugalug2

10th May 2019, 17:55

Lordflasheart

10th May 2019, 18:27

....
Racedo,

I would respectfully suggest that if the ‘unnecessarily deceased’ and the ones who were left behind to grieve, had no idea that lies, concealment and denial would be freely used by the State to cover up the causes and covertly abuse the subsequent proceedings, it might be beneficial for this to be exposed, if only for further similar loss of life and sorrow to be avoided.

Can I send you a copy of the book as a gift ? No charge, no obligation to read it. If you are happy to provide me with an address by pm or email, I promise only to use it for this single purpose and to keep no record.

Kind regards, LFH

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beardy

10th May 2019, 19:07

Who speaks for the dead ?

The families and loved ones whom they left behind. Nobody else has the right, not the people who sent them there, they people who were with them, just the people in whose hearts they live forever.
You are so wrong on so many levels. We all have a responsibility to ensure that mistakes from the past never happen again.
On the most fundamental level of your rather crass comment: genocide should not be repeated, despite there being no families and loved ones left to grieve.

The Old Fat One

10th May 2019, 19:41

Thanks for the lecture Tuc, but I don't need it, because I recognise you are educated, informed and passionate about your subject, of which you know immeasurably more than I do. I therefore I defer to your view, which I always have.

It is your muppet acolyte that I ignore because of his incessant abuse of any one that disagrees with him, and his random attacks on many RAF people who will served their country well and to the best of their ability, to his crystal ball wizardry that allows him to determine the exact cause of so many accidents, when accident boards (and hundreds of informed military aviators) cannot determine even the probable cause, and most of all his annoying *****ing habit of signing off his posts with his ****ing catchphrase.

Who the **** does he think he is...Cato the ****ing Elder?

Ceterum autem censeo Carthaginem esse delendam

racedo

10th May 2019, 20:37

racedo, the greatest support for the reform of UK Military Airworthiness has come time and time again from the bereaved. Without their insistence that they wanted the cover up of the dysfunctional UK Military Air Safety system to be revealed and ended we would have lacked the essential moral authority they gave us. It is they who want us to speak out on behalf of their loved ones, so that others might be spared the anguish they have suffered. Are you saying we shouldn't?

Who speaks for the dead ?

The families and loved ones whom they left behind.

Not sure how that can be misinterpreted but it seems to have been.

I don't want some F***tard Political or Military figure claiming they speak for the dead. Giving speeches of "worthy sacrifice" when to them it is just cannon fodder and in many cases financial benefit to those higher up the food chain because they refused to provide equipment fit for purpose.

Any attempt at questioning how money supposedly spent on equipment has "disappeared" never gets highlighted with a compliant media and any parent demanding answers gets patronised as "suffering from grief" etc while those made wealthy just count their wealth.

Hell we just look at how nuch money was made on military housing yet it is still in many cases not fit for purpose.

I am happy with a robust Defence but question what part of Defense is it to be involved in dismembering countries to assist resource grabs by big business. Basically UK forces are someone elses Mercaneries, supposedly to protect UK is the line constantly spun but gave up believing that decades ago.

Watching and seeing body bags come home and mass migration because of these policies you wonder what kind of evil exists in the corridors of power.

racedo

10th May 2019, 20:45

You are so wrong on so many levels. We all have a responsibility to ensure that mistakes from the past never happen again.
On the most fundamental level of your rather crass comment: genocide should not be repeated, despite there being no families and loved ones left to grieve.

Correct

But you read something into my post that I didn't write.

The perpetrators of genocide including the financial backers should just be shot, however many of them in last and this century just launder their cash through the financial centres of the world and never worry.

The world policemen crap spouted in the west by a number of countrys rings hollow when 1/2 million people have died in Yemen and west supplies killers with arms / training and puts its own people in to assist in the carnage.

Chugalug2

10th May 2019, 21:07

TOFO:-
Thanks for the lecture Tuc, but I don't need it, because I recognise you are educated, informed and passionate about your subject, of which you know immeasurably more than I do. I therefore I defer to your view, which I always have.

It is your muppet acolyte that I ignore because of his incessant abuse of any one that disagrees with him, and his random attacks on many RAF people who will served their country well and to the best of their ability, to his crystal ball wizardry that allows him to determine the exact cause of so many accidents, when accident boards (and hundreds of informed military aviators) cannot determine even the probable cause, and most of all his annoying *****ing habit of signing off his posts with his ****ing catchphrase.

Who the **** does he think he is...Cato the ****ing Elder?

Ceterum autem censeo Carthaginem esse delendam

OK I get the gist, you don't like me and you don't like my posts. I guess you can't please all of the people some of the time (or is it the other way around?). We'll just have to live with that won't we? The thing is, this isn't about me or you, it's about peoples' lives and UK military airworthiness.

You say you defer to Tuc and believe what he says. Great! That's the important thing. I'm sure you believe in the importance of Air Power and the next 100 years of the Royal Air Force as much as I do. In which case ignore everything I say, put me on an ignore list if PPRuNe provides such a thing, if not simply stop reading my posts as they seem to be having a very detrimental effect on you. Instead take to heart what tuc says and fight for what he wants, an independent MAA and MilAAIB, both of each other and the MOD. That will suit me fine and I promise to support you in that to my utmost (although that might just put you off, so scratch that bit).

Oh, just for you TOFO,

Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!

beardy

10th May 2019, 21:45

Correct

But you read something into my post that I didn't write.

The perpetrators of genocide including the financial backers should just be shot, however many of them in last and this century just launder their cash through the financial centres of the world and never worry.

The world policemen crap spouted in the west by a number of countrys rings hollow when 1/2 million people have died in Yemen and west supplies killers with arms / training and puts its own people in to assist in the carnage.
Oh, but you did. We can all remember and change.

racedo

10th May 2019, 22:10

Oh, but you did. We can all remember and change.

Afraid not I have not changed a single word. If I had it would have time stamped the change, it didn't because I didn't make one.

You quoted me. Look at the quote and what I posted. It has not changed.

orca

11th May 2019, 04:50

Chug,

Apologies, I know that you’ll have stated this clearly somewhere; why do you feel that the MAA and MilAiB do not function independently?

I ask as my previous experience of (actual participation in) service inquiries leaves me with the opinion that they are quite distinct and function independently (save for a rather trivial secretariat role) wrt inquiries.

I am aware of the governance structure hence asking about functional independence as opposed to ‘can or can’t be connected on a wiring diagram’.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 05:45

Orca, how a regulator or accident investigator appears to be independent of each other or the operator is not the point. They are or they are not. How would it appear if a regulator had for instance allowed its functions to be carried out by say an aircraft manufacturer? If that manufacturer produced an aircraft that lacked airworthiness and then incorporated a badly compromised system in an attempt to ameliorate the symptoms of that lack of airworthiness, I would suggest that regulator lacked independence.

If there followed airworthiness related fatal accidents which were investigated by an air accident investigator that shared a 'rather trivial secretariat role' with the regulator, how objective would those investigations be, given that strong censure of the regulator would then seem to be appropriate?

I apologise for the heavy handed scenario I have painted above. It merely attempts to show that regulator and investigator must be free to point the finger at anyone, including each other. In the case of UK Military Air Safety, given previous interference in that process, such independence is vital. To have been compromised once is a misfortune, to then have it happen again...

beardy

11th May 2019, 06:00

racedo

11th May 2019, 10:13

Racedo

"The families and loved ones whom they left behind. Nobody else has the right"

You are wrong. We all have not just a right but a duty to speak for the dead and against the injustice that killed them, even for those who leave no families nor loved ones.

There are few who leave no family or loved ones behind.

People can speak out if they wish.

But in many cases from politicians it is done to make them look good in front of the electorate. They are happy to have dead "heroes" who they will talk of valuing their service and commitment but in reality don't give a toss about them. It is just another angle to get some power and personal prestige. Always too many vested interests in using deaths to make a name or feather their own nest.

The thread title is "Who speaks for the dead", to me it is those who they left behind because they understand the loss and when the door is closed and people move onto something else the person will still be alive in their hearts, prayers and memories.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 10:54

racedo, the thread title is the sub-title (found on the rear cover) of David Hill's new book "Breaking the Military Covenant". I hope I am not misrepresenting Lordflasheart's OP in saying that the thread is about that book and, inter-alia, UK Military Airworthiness (or the lack thereof). It is not, with respect, about more general shortcomings in the modern world, its governments, its arms salesmen, and those who die as a result of their joint incompetence and malevolent designs.

Let us unite to slay this one dragon at least. Your many dragons are acknowledged but they in turn can only be slain one at a time. A thousand mile march begins with one step (quite catchy that, I wonder if anyone else has ever said it?).

BTW, David Hill's book is available now as Lordflasheart states. It can be obtained from various outlets, often for less than the usual South American one. Google is your friend!

pulse1

11th May 2019, 11:54

The fact that so many people have died as a direct result of the mismanagement of safety by VSOs and MOD over many years is bad enough. The fact that, in at least one case, innocent victims of this policy were blamed for the resultant accident is appalling. The fact that it took a 13 year campaign initiated by the parents to clear their sons' names should bring shame on all those VSOs, Ministers and the MOD is absolutely disgraceful. It also justifies family members of existing military personnel having the right to speak out.

orca

11th May 2019, 12:52

Chug,

I think we disagree. I think that you can be and remain totally objective. You think that because a Service Inquiry shares a typing pool with someone else that they can be influenced by them?

Perhaps you could identify a couple of SI paragraphs that demonstrate the Panel didn’t remain objective due to a link to the MAA?

It’s a bit like saying that you need a QWI from another squadron to mark your boss’s weapon tape...which would of course be nonsense.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 13:12

Orca, it is not the sharing of typists that concerns me, it is the fact that typists, investigators, and regulators come under the same umbrella, ie the MOD! Before you point to your wiring diagram to show that they bypass the CoC and are answerable only to the very top of the tree, much the same was said of the old RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety. No-one in the CoC could intercept and subvert the safety system we were told. That held good until the Inspector ordered the various ARTs to be produced; Chinook, Tornado, Hercules, etc, etc, and uncovered severe airworthiness shortcomings across the RAF Airfleets. Somehow this supposedly inviolate system was violated, to the extent that the reports were pulped (but not entirely thanks to those who hung onto their copies) and the Inspectorate 'disappeared'. So much for notion of independence within the MOD!

orca

11th May 2019, 13:23

I understand your point Chug - I just disagree with you.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 14:30

Then I have not expressed myself clearly enough. Sorry! The most recent airworthiness related fatal air accident thread on this forum relates to Sean Cunningham's tragic death in a MB Mk10 seat. The SI to its credit determined that the seat (and all the others of that particular type) lacked a Safety Case. It did not then go on to reveal that it was therefore unairworthy. Nor did it reveal that as a consequence the aircraft it was fitted in was unairworthy.

I suggest that the lack of a Safety Case doesn't have the same impact as simply saying that both aircraft and seat were unairworthy. The former sounds as though some back office apparatchik had slipped up in their bureaucratic duties, the latter immediately points to the Air Regulator having failed in its duty. The SI didn't say so clearly though.

The wiring diagram this week puts the Defence AIB (DAIB) and the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) under the Defence Safety Authority:-

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-safety-authority

and thus both report to its Director General, although where an Accident Report reflects on the MAA then that must be referred to PuS MOD. That may mean they are independent of each other in MOD speak but others may differ. Interestingly this site says that the DAIB is actually a part of the MAA!

https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SKYbrary_Wiki:GoogleSearch_New?q=milaaib#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=milaaib&gsc.page=1

or was that last week?

racedo

11th May 2019, 16:15

racedo, the thread title is the sub-title (found on the rear cover) of David Hill's new book "Breaking the Military Covenant". I hope I am not misrepresenting Lordflasheart's OP in saying that the thread is about that book and, inter-alia, UK Military Airworthiness (or the lack thereof). It is not, with respect, about more general shortcomings in the modern world, its governments, its arms salesmen, and those who die as a result of their joint incompetence and malevolent designs.

OK get the point, my reading of thread title was different.

In relation to breaking the Military Covenant, the more in it the more wriggle room and yup have low view of politicians and military leaders.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 16:42

orca

11th May 2019, 20:03

Hi Chug,

Youre obviously someone who thinks or believes that if you keep on explaining your point then I will agree with you. I understand your point. I don’t agree with you.

I hold the honest belief that SIs and their Presidents are free to report as they wish and if there is a shortcoming in a report (finding, language or analysis) then I don’t believe it’s due to governance.

Feel free to make the same point again. I will understand it again.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 20:20

orca, you asked for an example where a lack of independence of the MilAAIB from the MAA was reflected in an SI finding. I gave you one in my last reply to you. By all means go on acknowledging such replies by repeatedly saying that you do not agree with me though you understand the points I make. Such condescension may be par for the course in your line of work, but I can't see how it allows for the lateral thinking required in the investigation of air accidents.

Perhaps that is another of my points that you understand but do not agree with?

orca

11th May 2019, 20:34

Chug,

You said that the SI report highlighted the lack of a safety case. It didn’t to your satisfaction explain that ergo the Hawk was not airworthy.

You have failed to attribute this to the link between the MAA to the MilAiB and then to the SI President.

Chugalug2

11th May 2019, 21:21

orca, you want an investigation into an investigation? Then so do we both! Not only of the Cunningham accident, but of the Mull of Kintyre, the Tornado blue on blue, and many others. It isn't my satisfaction that is needed but that of the NoK and other loved ones who have been lied to repeatedly by the MOD.

This isn't a game, a debating society wherein point scoring and bon mots win the day. This is about discovering the truth and then fearlessly exposing it, no matter how much it embarrasses the Star Chamber or HMG. This is about the saving of both life and treasure, and keeping the Service airworthy. You don't do that by holding back in an SI report, knowing that saying that the aircraft was unairworthy will mean the unwelcome involvement of the PuS.

Or was it simply an oversight? A lack of a safety case clearly implies the lack of airworthiness, doesn't it? No need to dot the I's. Job's a good'un. :ok:

orca

12th May 2019, 08:23

Hi Chug - it’s taken a very helpful PM, from someone else 😉, for me to understand that we may be arguing at cross purposes.

My view is that Service Inquiry Presidents are able to remain objective, but I agree that the wider implications of their reports are not necessarily identified and acted upon. I also think that it isn’t clear where a specific SI ends and a ‘wider implcation’ starts.

As I wasn’t there for the Cunningham SI I cannot say why (or if) the President invoked the clause in his TORs where it is addressed what he must do if he considers the MAA itself to be at fault. He may have tried and failed - I don’t know.

A useful (for me) analogy is provided by The Cunningham case - wherein the report it clearly states that RAFAT personnel were falsifying records. Not VSOs, squadron personnel. When I read the report (and ergo the Panel would long ago have gone back to their primary duties) I couldn’t see any alternative but Courts Martial. That didn’t happen. Are we to blame the Panel for not chasing that up or should we have relied upon the C-O-C? I would argue that anyone who submitted a final report in the knowledge that he or she was probably triggering Courts Martial within RAFAT had probably remained objective and not swayed by governance. I’m sure others will argue that it’s an indicator that we go after the little man and will find some way of justifying the behaviour itself!

I wish you well.

Orca.

falcon900

12th May 2019, 11:04

Chug,
Whilst I suspect that there would be little daylight between our respective views of the Cunningham report in particular, I must take issue with your assertion that the lack of a safety case for the seat demands an automatic conclusion that the Seat, and hence the aircraft are unairworthy. As a simple matter of logic, it does not.

Allow me to explain with an everyday, if in the circumstances somewhat arcane example. My car requires an MoT test each year, If I fail to submit the car for inspection, it is illegal for me to drive it on the road, as a matter of law due to the statutory requirement to have a valid test certificate. The question of whether the vehicle is roadworthy is an entirely separate one, and if it was roadworthy the day before the certificate expired, it is highly likely that it would still be roadworthy the day after, notwithstanding it was now illegal to drive it. Equally, it could have a valid test certificate and be unroadworthy due to the emergence of an issue during the year.
Were I to drive the car without a valid certificate and be apprehended, I would be guilty of driving without a valid certificate, but could only be prosecuted for driving with an unroadworthy vehicle if actual fault could be identified. The lack of the document does not of itself render the vehicle unroadworthy.

As far as the Cunningham case is concerned, I do not accept that the lack of the safety case per se automatically demands the conclusion that the aircraft was unairworthy. I do however accept that a reasonable person upon examining the particular reasons for the lack of a safety case should have concluded that the aircraft was unairworthy. A distinction without a difference perhaps in the circumstances of the Cunningham case, but an important distinction more generally.

tucumseh

12th May 2019, 12:08

Falcon

If I could just say, the point with the Cunningham case is that MoD could not produce the documentation its own regulations require to support the Master Airworthiness Reference. The SI stated this quite clearly.

In the circumstances you describe, a period of administrative lag is permitted, and there are ways of managing that depending on urgency. But on XX177, and Hawk in general, a rogue (forbidden by mandated regulations) Routine Technical Instruction was issued that had no supporting evidence whatsoever; meaning there was no valid Safety Case Report or Safety Case. The audit trail was badly compromised.

Of course, there is a matter of degree, but implementing the RTI rendered the seat unserviceable, but its paperwork was signed to say it was serviceable. The Service Inquiry's Convening Authority was full party to this root cause. (Again, the SI report). If Martin-Baker's servicing instructions had been followed, the release mechanism jam would not have occurred. The RTI bypassed these instructions. MoD claimed never to have them, but the RAF training video evidence proved otherwise. The Prosecution deemed this 'irrelevant', and advised the Judge so. It ain't M-B or the maintainers fault if MoD issues instructions to ignore that training. But the information DID exist within MoD, and not following it killed Sean Cunningham.

Chugalug2

12th May 2019, 12:12

orca, I am eternally grateful to the 'someone else' who pm'd you and for you so graciously pulling stumps on our increasingly unproductive exchanges. :ok:

Your point about those who deliberately falsified records, of whatever rank, and then not being subject to the taking of a Summary of Evidence (or are those consigned now to the dustbin of history?) and possible CM, is well taken. We are repeatedly told that all are equal in the eyes of the law, even military law. Experience tells us that some are more equal than others, but here it seems all are more equal, at least at RAFAT.

My sole purpose was to point out that the MAA is implicated in the Reds SI but was not stated as such in the findings. As you say we do not know why and it is that very anomaly that creates doubt when all should be clarity.
It is important that Accident Investigation not only be uninhibited but be seen to be so. If the MilAAIB (or whatever) were truly independent of the MOD and MAA that would be more clearly the case in my view.

Thanks again for your placatory words, which I return in full.

My warmest regards,

Chug

PS, just read tuc's response to falcon900 to which I can only add "What he said!".

racedo

12th May 2019, 13:42

Thanks Racedo, and I agree about the wriggle room effect. Nonetheless, the RAF High Command is in contravention of the Covenant, or its Duty of Care as I prefer to call it, by continuing the cover up of illegal orders and actions by some of its predecessors and that led to the deaths of approx. 100 people in airworthiness related fatal military air accidents..

The problem with taking action against this is that ALL the services will be impacted and it will show that there are officers who ignore direct orders and do their own thing. There would be two outcomes from this
1.) Officers will refuse to act in case they up on a CM unless it is a clear and direct order with zero ambiguity
2.) Officers will act even when order is incorrect and then go back to the "I was following a direct order" when challenged.

You then end up with a risk averse culture of people being too scared to act even when action is correct.

Witness what has occurred in Local Govt, culture is risk averse and it requires a committee before action, this didn't happen overnight but took 15-20 years to get there. The people 25 years ago who would act have retired and moved on, people replacing them are schooled in the "no risk and decision making culture". Danger is military would end up same way .