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View Full Version : Qantas B744 stick shaker event near Hong Kong


markfelt
27th Mar 2019, 06:51
Australian Aviation - Qantas B744 stick shaker event near Hong Kong (http://australianaviation.com.au/2019/03/atsb-releases-final-report-on-qantas-747-stick-shaker-incident/)

Capn Bloggs
27th Mar 2019, 07:20
While descending towards BETTY, the aircraft’s speed reduced below both the target speed of 225 kt and the minimum manoeuvring speed
Why was this? No mention of autothrottle modes...

industry insider
27th Mar 2019, 07:51
Regrettably, this is another incident which highlights the need to fly and monitor the aircraft. This crew was obviously some way mentally behind the aircraft and its automation having little idea what it was going to do in response to FMS input.

josephfeatherweight
27th Mar 2019, 12:51
From The Age
Pilots flying a Qantas plane that experienced a roller-coaster descent into Hong Kong two years ago struggled to respond to the incident because of a lack of training, an investigation has found.

The in-flight "upset" left four cabin crew and two passengers with minor injuries, and has prompted Qantas to retrain all of its Boeing 747 pilots and update training for its other Boeing pilots.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's final report into the incident, released on Wednesday, found the pilots at the controls of the 747-400 from Melbourne manually over-rode the flight computer's flight speed when preparing to enter a holding pattern around Hong Kong International Airport on April 7, 2017.

The pilots then failed to increase their speed when directed to enter the holding pattern at a higher altitude than expected. The ATSB said the aircraft slowed to below the necessary speed while descending but the flight crew did not notice because they were busy reading flight documents and looking out the window for other air traffic.

Shortly after, the aircraft started experiencing pre-stall buffeting. The pilot took recovery action to stop the buffeting, but failed to complete the full stall-recovery procedure.

This led to further "stick shaker" stall warnings – indicating the aircraft could be about to lose altitude. That prompted the pilot to force the plane's nose down several times, resulting in the violent oscillations that saw several crew and passengers hit the cabin's roof.

The ATSB found that while the pilots had been trained in stall recovery in low altitudes, they had not had instructions on how to handle the problem at higher altitudes.

"The opportunity for flight crew to practice their high altitude manual handling skills was limited," the report says.

As a result, the flight crew did not adequately respond to the initial buffet and probable stick shaker activation, leading to the in-flight upset."

Qantas has since updated its training for pilots across its fleet of 747s, Boeing 787 Dreamliners and Boeing 737s.

“We take these incidents very seriously and use them as an opportunity to reinforce procedures
and improve safety," a Qantas spokesman said.

"In correcting the aircraft’s path, the crew was very conscious they were operating in congested airspace and had limited room to manoeuvre, which added to the sense of turbulence in the cabin.“

compressor stall
27th Mar 2019, 15:31
How about you lot reference the report not the journos' interpretations.

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5775793/ao-2017-044_final.pdf

lucille
27th Mar 2019, 20:25
This is a rumour network! We simply cannot allow facts to get in the way of a good story.

josephfeatherweight
27th Mar 2019, 21:17
How about you lot reference the report not the journos' interpretations.

How about we pool together the collective information, which includes articles from the media, which also includes classic comments from Qantas PR such as this:
"In correcting the aircraft’s path, the crew was very conscious they were operating in congested airspace and had limited room to manoeuvre, which added to the sense of turbulence in the cabin.“
This was also "behind the paywall" that so many of you get upset with, hence my posting of The Age article here.

Reference: We simply cannot allow facts to get in the way of a good story.
Having read the report the following appears to be FACT:
- the crew were not aware of the required holding speed above FL200
- the aircraft was allowed to slow below minimum maneuvering speed
- in the "stall recovery" the wings were not leveled in order to "remain within the protected airspace of the hold" - @ FL220??
- following the minimalist "stall recovery", the captain "pulled back on the control column to increase the pitch angle to prevent further descent." ??
- when the stick shaker was again (predictably) activated the captain "again pushed forward on the control column to reduce the aircraft’s pitch angle and increased thrust slightly." Slightly!?!?

This appears to have been written off as a "but we weren't trained how to do high altitude stalls." but the airmanship and handling skills displayed by the crew was pretty lackluster...

downdata
27th Mar 2019, 21:33
And CASA allows this crowd to fly in Australia...? Oh wait

T-Vasis
27th Mar 2019, 22:47
A pairing of 24,000 and 16,000 hours and a mistake like this. Who was flying the aircraft?... Pretty concerning. Everyone is fallible.

machtuk
27th Mar 2019, 23:04
"..........."Qantas never crash"..........the SkyGods are a protected species remember, the general public will believe the QF PR machine watered down version of events & justification of their actions, contrary to actual industry standards! This event reminds me of Kendell incident some years ago when the drivers lost control whilst in a holding pattern, who was minding the shop in both cases?
Hopefully something positive can come out of this but at the very least it's a wake up call that we pilots can F**k it up at any time,

zanthrus
28th Mar 2019, 01:47
Remember QF1? Captain allowed the crash. Captain is responsible for EVERYTHING that happens on his/her aircraft. QF should have written the hull off as uneconomical to repair but were so bloody minded about their reputation they spent more than a new aircraft to fix it. Shame Skygods Shame!This is the truth, QF and Little Gay Al will do anything to safeguard their reputation rather than admit fault.

Capt Fathom
28th Mar 2019, 01:59
Remember QF1?

How could anyone forget it?

tio540
28th Mar 2019, 03:23
The investigation states on Page 2, a 'glass ceiling' contributed to the event.

donpizmeov
28th Mar 2019, 05:18
A pairing of 24,000 and 16,000 hours and a mistake like this. Who was flying the aircraft?... Pretty concerning. Everyone is fallible.

On checking, I have found both crew members were human . It would seem it's a human trait that allows them to make an error . Add the startle of something happening, when nothing has ever happened in the previous 20k hours, the decision making and handling skills you believe you have when reading a report, are sometimes different to those you have when starring in a report .

It is rare to find someone that has manoeuvred an aircraft without autopilot about 10000 feet these days . And no, following FDs in a climb is not manoeuvring. it is even more rare to have such a large aircraft at so low a speed .Procedures are designed to prevent this right? So when it does happen on your watch, it takes a while to understand why? What is happening? Did I do it? Have I lost my job? Etc etc . So when recovery commences, you are already at a high state of anxiety, much much more than you have had during SIM training (nothing goes wrong in aeroplanes anymore right?), so things aren't going to be as pretty as they are in the SIM . During the recovery, you will rationalise that it's only a stall warning, not a stall, so does that procedure really apply .You will not want ATC asking why you are deviating from ALT etc .

Lots to learn from reports like this .

Veruka Salt
28th Mar 2019, 06:07
Well said Don.

Capn Rex Havoc
28th Mar 2019, 06:23
Great post Don.

Have people forgotten that the sim isn’t fitted with an adrenaline drip, nor does negative g too well.

Ive seen first hand in the aircraft how the startle affect, and fear of job loss, degrades performance.

OnceBitten
28th Mar 2019, 07:02
Well said Don.

Shame there are so many Monday morning quarterbacks and plane spotters with expert analysis.

Best advice is to just read the report and learn from it.

Centaurus
28th Mar 2019, 12:58
:Add the startle of something happening

Ah! Yes!. The dreaded "startle factor" is the new get out of jail free card.

donpizmeov
28th Mar 2019, 14:42
:

Ah! Yes!. The dreaded "startle factor" is the new get out of jail free card.

No centaurus, it's not a get out of jail free card .it's the name of a condition which prevents people from acting in an optimal manner . In WW1 troops who suffered startle were shot for cowardice. Luckily we have moved on .It's the reason why I can always make the perfect decision of what someone should have done, and how they should have done it when I read an incident report . And also why I might not always walk the walk if in the operating seat. No-one goes to work wanting to have an incident . Nor had this crew until it happened .
As I said, there is lots to learn from reports like this . But to learn from them you need to read them in a “How could this have occurred” mindset . To just say no-one was minding the shop is missing the whole point .
Anyone, good or bad can have a bad day. Learning from others having a bad day out is far better than learning first hand.

KABOY
28th Mar 2019, 16:51
.No centaurus, it's not a get out of jail free card .it's the name of a condition which prevents people from acting in an optimal manner

Acting at less than 'optimal performance' in a situation that is non normal due to poor pilot input I think sums this up. This event occurred due to poor airmanship and the recovery demonstrates this.

Placing an aircraft in an unstable state and recovering like this crew did raises multiple questions on automation management and disciplined recovery techniques. Aviate, navigate, communicate is still a valid concept on modern airliners.

Pilot training was Boeings first defence in the MAX accidents, Airbus was the same following Air France. Airbus thankfully only suffered one unreliable airspeed that led to deaths, a second would have seen the same outcome as Boeing. It was only through pilot training, experience and correct recovery that prevented a second significant loss of life.

I am sickened by the Qantas PR spin that the FO had their head looking out at other traffic in the holding pattern to ensure separation , shame I can't do that in IMC.

There is no sugar coating what is effectively a loos of control by three pilots on the flight deck. Three pilots having a bad day leads to a lot of questions, drawing WW1 parallels is a long bow.

Dora-9
28th Mar 2019, 19:35
This event occurred due to poor airmanship and the recovery demonstrates this.


Didn't ANYBODY notice what the speed tape was doing?

donpizmeov
28th Mar 2019, 21:43
Didn't ANYBODY notice what the speed tape was doing?

Have a think about what happened and ask that question to yourself, and see if you can work out the answer. After you work that out, ask yourself why could this happen? Then you may end up with a lesson you can learn from .

machtuk
28th Mar 2019, 22:10
Acting at less than 'optimal performance' in a situation that is non normal due to poor pilot input I think sums this up. This event occurred due to poor airmanship and the recovery demonstrates this.

Placing an aircraft in an unstable state and recovering like this crew did raises multiple questions on automation management and disciplined recovery techniques. Aviate, navigate, communicate is still a valid concept on modern airliners.

Pilot training was Boeings first defence in the MAX accidents, Airbus was the same following Air France. Airbus thankfully only suffered one unreliable airspeed that led to deaths, a second would have seen the same outcome as Boeing. It was only through pilot training, experience and correct recovery that prevented a second significant loss of life.

I am sickened by the Qantas PR spin that the FO had their head looking out at other traffic in the holding pattern to ensure separation , shame I can't do that in IMC.

There is no sugar coating what is effectively a loos of control by three pilots on the flight deck. Three pilots having a bad day leads to a lot of questions, drawing WW1 parallels is a long bow.


well said -:) we could also add the human element of being punished, punitive actions and the consequences are forever in a pilots mind, I'd say this event shows exactly that by the way the Capt responded in his recovery actions by not wanting to go outside the Std Hldg pattern. Once an event happens like this there would be a high proportion of thought going into " oh sh1t we are in trouble now"!!
Humans only ever learn by their mistakes which we shall continue to do so for all time!

Capt Kremin
28th Mar 2019, 22:26
I am sickened by the Qantas PR spin that the FO had their head looking out at other traffic in the holding pattern to ensure separation , shame I can't do that in IMC.



Thats a direct quote from the ATSB report. You haven't read it well have you?

Dora-9
28th Mar 2019, 22:54
see if you can work out the answer.

The answer I keep coming up with is one that doesn't reflect well on the crew. Not only do you have the "barber pole" segment on the speed tape rushing up towards your current IAS, but the appearance of the Pitch Limit Indicators would be yet another clue. To say that they were "too busy" to notice is simply breathtaking. What's more important?

it is even more rare to have such a large aircraft at so low a speed .

Really? I've been out of this world for over 10 years now, and even then higher altitude holding wasn't rare.

Capt Kremin
28th Mar 2019, 23:48
The incident was a perfect storm of an aircraft 1000 feet almost directly below them on entering the hold, a large angle of bank commanded by the FMC, an adverse wind change, which all happened at the same time, coupled with the speed requirement not being generally forthcoming.

That they were caught out is not surprising, however the aircraft below them, which was not in sight, was the real concern to the crew and lead to the stall recovery actions being incorrectly handled.

Once again with the "SkyGods" fellas??

Grow up.

AerialPerspective
29th Mar 2019, 01:49
Remember QF1? Captain allowed the crash. Captain is responsible for EVERYTHING that happens on his/her aircraft. QF should have written the hull off as uneconomical to repair but were so bloody minded about their reputation they spent more than a new aircraft to fix it. Shame Skygods Shame!This is the truth, QF and Little Gay Al will do anything to safeguard their reputation rather than admit fault.

Firstly, they did NOT spend more than a new airframe to fix it. Secondly, where do you think Qantas would have stood with every aviation hull insurer in the world if they'd knowingly put an aircraft back in the air that should have been written off... it doesn't take too much critical thinking to contradict that sort of uninformed bile being spewed in your comment. I happen to have worked with someone who was intimately involved with that incident and they are no lover of QF but have been adamant there is no way they could have gotten away with repairing the unrepairable.

I really wish idiots who have no idea what they are talking about would stop spreading this rubbish and that includes someone with an apparent axe to grind who repeated it in an otherwise lacklustre book... just stop it. Hate QF by all means if you wish but stop spreading BS.

Joker89
29th Mar 2019, 01:57
The incident was a perfect storm of an aircraft 1000 feet almost directly below them on entering the hold, a large angle of bank commanded by the FMC, an adverse wind change, which all happened at the same time, coupled with the speed requirement not being generally forthcoming.

That they were caught out is not surprising, however the aircraft below them, which was not in sight, was the real concern to the crew and lead to the stall recovery actions being incorrectly handled.

Once again with the "SkyGods" fellas??

Grow up.

actually I find it very surprising that the crew were still reviewing charts and trying to visually identify an aircraft that was properly separated instead of monitoring the altitude capture and entry into the hold. I think the real reasons this crew got caught out have not been adequately explained in the investigation.

Derfred
29th Mar 2019, 11:05
When I read an incident report like this, I try to imagine what the incident report could have looked like if the crew had reacted differently.

For example, when an incident report concludes that the pilot failed to follow the manufacturer’s published stick shaker response manoeuvre, the incident report omits the possibility that if the pilot had have followed the published manoeuvre, then it could have resulted in one of the world’s most tragic mid-air collisions.

Centaurus, you write a lot of good posts, and you are obviously a life-long student of aviation incidents and accidents, as we all should be. But please don’t be so dismissive of the “human factor” that is so prevalent as a contributing factor in many historical disasters. Yes, we should all know how to fly the fcking aircraft, but understanding our human limitations is crucial to continued safe flying. It’s not some dreamed-up lefty PC bullshit we use to excuse the Gen-Y’s. We used to say “toughen up princess”, but the planes kept crashing. We’re above that now, we’ve worked out that we’re humans. We can help prevent future disasters by studying and training the human element.

Although, according to a few other posters, it couldn’t possibly happen to them, because they are obviously aviation legends.

As for the “Sky God” comments from some, I work for Qantas. I consider myself very fortunate to do so. But not because Qantas made me a “Sky God”, in fact the opposite. Qantas taught me to be humble, recognise that my next flight could be my last, identify my weaknesses, learn from others, be conservative and safe, and never stop learning. They created a culture of self-reporting so that others can learn from my mistakes and I won’t be sacked unless I was reckless or rogue. They have a training/checking policy of training above checking, and the goal of a simulator session is to learn something rather than fear of failure. They don’t consider that to be perfect either, they constantly seek feedback on their training and checking, which they actually read. They certainly never taught me to think that I’m a better pilot than the next guy, but there seem to be a few others on this thread who think they are.

The reason bulk tax dollars are spent producing reports like this is so that we can all learn from them. I don’t see a lot of learning in this thread.

If I had a choice, I would prefer to fly with the crew from this incident over those legends on this thread who see fit to criticise their industry colleagues. Why do pilots do this? I’ve never witnessed a pilot gaining respect from their peers through self-promotion or deprecating others. (Edit: ok yeah there was this one QF guy who wrote a book, but most of us don’t drink with him).

KABOY
29th Mar 2019, 18:17
For example, when an incident report concludes that the pilot failed to follow the manufacturer’s published stick shaker response manoeuvre, the incident report omits the possibility that if the pilot had have followed the published manoeuvre, then it could have resulted in one of the world’s most tragic mid-air collisions.


Right, so he pitched down according to the report, but he failed to roll wings level. Last time I checked there was no holding pattern situated next to Betty, all traffic was holding in a vertical pattern(above and beneath). Maybe if he did roll wings level he would have removed the aircraft from a pattern where multiple aircraft were stacked. His actions in effect jeopardised the aircraft below him as he maintained the pattern laterally, but broke separation vertically.

Your sensationalist remark about avoiding a tragic mid air collision is sadly misguided and your defence of his actions only leads insult to your profession and that of Qantas's image.

I don’t see a lot of learning in this thread.
I have learnt quite a bit from this incident, aviate first, regardless of aircraft or airline. Did Qantas tell you that his actions actually avoided a mid air collision saving hundred of lives, or you make that up?

It seems the ATSB don't agree with that assertion, otherwise failing to comply with a manufacturer's course of action WOULD have been mentioned as a mitigating circumstance.

donpizmeov
29th Mar 2019, 18:54
Is this the right room for an argument?

Willie Nelson
29th Mar 2019, 21:09
There’s plenty to learn from this incident report for all of us. I’m on the Bus with another carrier and this reminds me how capturing an altitude while commencing a holding pattern if the speed is left in managed mode could lead to precisely the same type of incident. If it’s not selected the speed drops to green dot while approaching the holding pattern and green dot is always the wrong speed at this time.

machtuk
29th Mar 2019, 23:17
Right, so he pitched down according to the report, but he failed to roll wings level. Last time I checked there was no holding pattern situated next to Betty, all traffic was holding in a vertical pattern(above and beneath). Maybe if he did roll wings level he would have removed the aircraft from a pattern where multiple aircraft were stacked. His actions in effect jeopardised the aircraft below him as he maintained the pattern laterally, but broke separation vertically.

Your sensationalist remark about avoiding a tragic mid air collision is sadly misguided and your defence of his actions only leads insult to your profession and that of Qantas's image.


I have learnt quite a bit from this incident, aviate first, regardless of aircraft or airline. Did Qantas tell you that his actions actually avoided a mid air collision saving hundred of lives, or you make that up?

It seems the ATSB don't agree with that assertion, otherwise failing to comply with a manufacturer's course of action WOULD have been mentioned as a mitigating circumstance.


again well said.

there will always be 'them & us'.

TimmyTee
29th Mar 2019, 23:49
Right, so he pitched down according to the report, but he failed to roll wings level. Last time I checked there was no holding pattern situated next to Betty, all traffic was holding in a vertical pattern(above and beneath). Maybe if he did roll wings level he would have removed the aircraft from a pattern where multiple aircraft were stacked. His actions in effect jeopardised the aircraft below him as he maintained the pattern laterally, but broke separation vertically.

Your sensationalist remark about avoiding a tragic mid air collision is sadly misguided and your defence of his actions only leads insult to your profession and that of Qantas's image.

I had the exact same thought on this rubbish protectionism of a fellow colleague.
When stalling in the hold, while in the turn, surely any 100hr+ pilot would come to the conclusion that straight ahead is the safest bet (to allow wings leveling and create space with traffic).

Maintaining the turn is nothing but 100% arse covering, and by far the most riskiest of the two options (both in not completing the stall recovery technique that Boeing and grade 3 instructors teach, and the loss of vertical separation).

If I was the crew simply going about their job safely below, having read this report, I’d be mighty miffed.

C441
29th Mar 2019, 23:55
….there will always be 'them & us'.
Sorry. Who's them and who's us?

Derfred
30th Mar 2019, 00:50
Would they have hit the other aircraft? No idea. But the report indicated that the pilot’s recovery actions were influenced by his concern about traffic 1000’ below.

A few years ago we were subjected to a simulator exercise involving a stall recovery at low level during a turning RNP-AR approach. Rolling wings level in that scenario would have taken the aircraft towards terrain. The point of the exercise was that a “one-size-fits-all” stall recovery manoeuvre is not always the most appropriate course of action.

I’m not defending this crew’s actions, I’m just disappointed by the level of criticism by fellow colleagues.

fdr
30th Mar 2019, 02:34
the FDR readout is interesting, the deceleration rate was not rapid, nor was there a high sink rate for the step from F230 to F220. The automation was responding reasonably for the setup, just with a low target speed. The automatic entry from the angle of intercept will often result in bank angles above the normal value, to the 32 degree roll angle. (that angle can be exceeded, but it takes some effort from the crew to engibeer, and not in a good way). on level off, the pitch increase coincident with the bank angle and low speed starts the ball rolling.Aircraft get to this exact point every day around the world, the difference between a wild ride and routine ops being the initial speed.

In the level off and roll on hold entry, the speed tape min speeds would respond to the loading, but there is not much time available to intervene with something as simple as heading hold, thrust lever manual advancement.... to avoid the event. once it the event, the recovery procedure is in the QRH and FCTM. At high altitudes, excess thrust is limited, but at F220, MLW or below, there is copious thrust available.

Recovery involving a PIO is not surprising, during the event thrust changes are altering pitch moments and speed changes alter trim requirements, Unless hand flying of such cases are done in recurrent training, the PIO is not unexpected.

3 trained crew had a bad day, from an operator with a well established CRM/HF and cyclic training program, all speaking the same language... worthwhile lesson to them and any other operators of the potential to have a bad day.

George Glass
30th Mar 2019, 07:23
I know that this is an open forum, but do we really need to put up with clowns nursing a grievance and who have never commanded anything bigger than a row boat?
Holding, especially at the end of a long flight, is a high threat environment.
One day, if I have the presence of mind, I’ll make a recording of an arrival into Sydney on a bad day. The number of heading instructions/speed changes/ holding entry altitude requirements/ departure from hold instructions then MORE heading instructions etc. etc. is beyond a joke. It would make an interesting Utube clip.
Only an idiot who has never been in that environment would ever think anything other than “ there but for the grace of God go I”
Incidentally, hardening up the speed in the FMC hold page is usually a defensive measure AGAINST get too slow. The FMC commands a minimum speed, not a practical speed. LNAV follows the path regardless of bank angle. Add an altitude change, distraction etc. and bingo! You’re on the front page.
Know-nothing trolls with a grievance against QF need to move on.

ivan ellerbai
30th Mar 2019, 09:35
where do you think Qantas would have stood with every aviation hull insurer in the world if they'd knowingly put an aircraft back in the air that should have been written off.

Should have been written off economically, yes, but not due to the extent of the damage. QF wanted to avoid a hull loss so would have spent a heap of their own money to avoid that. Pretty much the same with a car that the insurers want to write off because it's uneconomic to repair but you can take their pay out, add some off your own moolah, and get it repaired.

Do you think they'd have put it back in the air if it wasn't insurable after the repairs? That it went back into the air means QF's standing with the aviation hull insurers was pretty good.

Mach E Avelli
30th Mar 2019, 10:12
George Glass tells it how it is.
At the end of a long day none of us are at our best.
The ATSB report states that fatigue was not considered a factor. But does not provide a summary of how many days worked in last month, duty hours in last week, preceding rest, time of sign on etc.

The Banjo
30th Mar 2019, 11:28
George Glass tells it how it is.
At the end of a long day none of us are at our best.
The ATSB report states that fatigue was not considered a factor. But does not provide a summary of how many days worked in last month, duty hours in last week, preceding rest, time of sign on etc.

maybe the poor buggers in recent B737 crashes were "not at their best" and most definitely work longer and harder than most, but the keyboard warrior attitude toward them has been less forgiving than in this particular case.
It seems if a non caucsasian has an incident it is pilot error (black and white-pun intended) and if a white man fxxks up it is caused by some mythical phenonema that calls for a PhD thesis study.

Just sayin'....

tio540
30th Mar 2019, 15:09
[QUOTE
Do you think they'd have put it back in the air if it wasn't insurable after the repairs? That it went back into the air means QF's standing with the aviation hull insurers was pretty good.[/QUOTE]

$100 million to repair, couldn’t be sold in 2012, then scrapped. Ouch.

KABOY
30th Mar 2019, 16:32
I know that this is an open forum, but do we really need to put up with clowns nursing a grievance and who have never commanded anything bigger than a row boat?
Holding, especially at the end of a long flight, is a high threat environment.

Nice quote George. "I am a QF pilot I have had a long day, and I to need to hold??" absolves this pilots actions?

You my friend have just added to the ignorance of what was a serious incident.

Is Sydneeey.... any different to Heathrow, JFK, Hong Kong or Shanghai?

By criticising what I believe is constructive pilot input adds to the pilot big QF big jet syndrome. This is a stuff up, accept that, accept the criticism and move on.
The more I read the defence of this incident only reaffirms my belief that Australia is living under a big fish, small pond syndrome.

This was a serious incident, now we need to justify the circumstances because it was QF?

Mach E Avelli
30th Mar 2019, 22:00
I don’t think anyone is defending these guys because they are the Great QF. And other than headline grabber journos like BB and GT, not many have attempted to play the racial issue, by claiming Caucasians are better pilots. Some have rightly called into question training standards in certain countries, but that is not so much a racial issue as a corporate cultural issue. Also in those places where corruption and nepotism is accepted there should be serious concerns about standards. I have seen enough poor performing Caucasian pilots in my time to know that ability is not exclusive to any race.
When there is a major screw up, the old Swiss cheese thingie tells us that usually more than one factor was causal. Fatigue is often played down by the ATSB because they don’t have the science to quantify it, or perhaps are reluctant to cross the mighty Qantas.

maggot
30th Mar 2019, 22:15
What speed should the FMS have flown? Ie. How much different to the expected hold speed at F160?
not familiar with that jet

machtuk
31st Mar 2019, 05:19
Nice quote George. "I am a QF pilot I have had a long day, and I to need to hold??" absolves this pilots actions?

You my friend have just added to the ignorance of what was a serious incident.

Is Sydneeey.... any different to Heathrow, JFK, Hong Kong or Shanghai?

By criticising what I believe is constructive pilot input adds to the pilot big QF big jet syndrome. This is a stuff up, accept that, accept the criticism and move on.
The more I read the defence of this incident only reaffirms my belief that Australia is living under a big fish, small pond syndrome.

This was a serious incident, now we need to justify the circumstances because it was QF?

KABOY I think you are wasting yr time with some in here remember it's QF, they have a LOT of QF FanBoyz who can do no wrong!
There are NO excuses for this event, there a reasons for sure, two different things that some seem to confuse!

Capn Bloggs
31st Mar 2019, 05:30
What speed should the FMS have flown? Ie. How much different to the expected hold speed at F160?
not familiar with that jet
Nor, it would seem, is the ATSB, nor did it attempt to find out (or at least explain in the report) WTF the ATS was (not) doing with the speed. Where's the throttle position chart? What was the purpose of disengaging the ATS (apart from "that's what Boeing said to do"? Would that have actually achieved anything given the PF increased thrust anyway? Did the ATS try to pull the power back? Is pussy-footing around with the thrust when in the shaker really a big issue in the 747?

So many questions, so few answers...

blow.n.gasket
31st Mar 2019, 05:31
The cause could just as probably been having a crusty old Captain counting the days till retirement , teamed with a permanent F/O , simples ! ��

TimmyTee
31st Mar 2019, 05:34
Surprised no one has posted a picture of a burnt out EK 777 with the attached caption "Fly Qantas for safety"..

Capt Fathom
31st Mar 2019, 06:42
So many questions, so few answers...

Yes, the ATSB report seems a little thin on details.

1. A hard speed was put in the FMC. That speed was too slow for the HOLD they were eventually cleared for.
2. The monitoring of the HOLD entry and ALT capture was deficient.
3. The recovery from the low speed condition was not initially effective.

Why? There were three very experienced pilots onboard, so why indeed?

The only good to come from all this mud slinging is everyone here will be more vigilant in future when entering holding patterns. Not because they’re scared of the boss, because they don’t want to suffer the wrath of PPRuNe! :}

donpizmeov
31st Mar 2019, 09:48
Surprised no one has posted a picture of a burnt out EK 777 with the attached caption "Fly Qantas for safety"..

That is unfair. Only the FO of that aeroplane was QF .The Capt was EK .

George Glass
31st Mar 2019, 23:32
Yeah, good on you TimmyTee. See my previous post. Like to see you say that face to face with the F/O involved.
Miserable troll.

TimmyTee
1st Apr 2019, 04:41
Errr, it was a tongue in cheek crack at a certain well known “secretive” fb group who did just that last week (with an attached photo of a burnt out EK 777)..?

George Glass
1st Apr 2019, 06:04
Ok, Tim. If that is the case I apologise. Just getting a bit tired of the crap on some of these threads. Especially when you know people involved. The internet needs a shakeup. I think I’ll give it a rest for a while.

AerialPerspective
2nd Apr 2019, 05:03
There is precisely ZERO evidence of this, it is a figment of anti-QF propaganda. The A380 cost more than $100m to repair too... if the 747 cost that much, a new one at the time was between $200-300M so obviously economic to repair rather than replace.

AerialPerspective
2nd Apr 2019, 05:06
Couldn't be sold??? How many ex QF 747-400s have been sold... one of them was donated to HARS... the aeroplanes are not saleable generally now other than as freighters so the assertion that it couldn't be sold is irrelevant. Many of it's sister ships were broken up/scrapped as well.