Air Astana flight serious problems over Lisbon

[ETOPS]

This doesn't look good..................

https://www.flightradar24.com/KZR1388/1e84fc24

[sejo]

https://www.liveatc.net/search/?icao=lppt

Some unconfirmed reports on twitter about planning a sea ditching

https://twitter.com/FlightIntl/status/1061627123532730368

[Smott999]

Looks a bit straighter now.
....those corkscrews brought Sioux City to mind. Yikes.

[ETOPS]

Diverting to LPBJ Beja Airport

[ETOPS]

Portuguese Airforce F-16 alongside now

[ETOPS]

Now descending for landing and changed to Beja TWR. Having reported control difficulties I'm hoping they can land safely.

[Smott999]

Not seeing movement now. Oh geez.

[Smott999]

Gone from tracker

[ChazR]

No longer visible on public flight tracking. Last position was north of Beja, heading 240 at 3000.

[Smott999]

It landed 19R Beja, hope correct!

[SliabhLuachra]

http://prntscr.com/lgzybt landed safely

[Smott999]

reports are this was a test flight

[meleagertoo]

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/591x378/screenshot_2018_11_11_at_15_22_01_7de9e5182cd41bd4b1993546c8 8cd90f6fe21420.png

Ouch! Imagine having to contend with that for an hour and a half!

[ETOPS]

Phew - glad they made it :ok:

I listened to most of this on Lisbon APP via Live ATC - crew sounded pretty calm in view of what happened but repeated that they needed to remain VMC and had severe control difficulties.

A big thank you is due to the Portuguese F-16 pilot who was exemplarary. Very cool and spoke slowly and clearly as the language barrier was not helping. The write up is going to be something !!

[Smott999]

What does that flight path tell our experts here?
Elevator issues I guess? Noticing the constant left turn/corkscrews I wondered about rudder, and/or engine thrust....

But what a harrowing ride! So glad all safe.

[Feathers McGraw]

FR24 reporting that the tracking was using MLAT so it's possible that the flight was not quite as unstable as shown.

[JanetFlight]

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1500x853/rui_cambraia_beja_mayday_11_11_18_173f512e83763a98af46905daa 88a16ed228eb35.jpg
According a friend in Beja AFB, some crew guys are receiving medical assistance due some minor issues...wow, what an hell of a rollercoaster.
People around Santarem area (district around Alverca, where it departed) reported a strange plane in the sky doing some sharp turns and weird ups and downs....that above graphic tends to confirm it,,,,great air manship and awesome team work by portuguese ATC, Portugal AF and Scramble F16 pilots.
FPL towards Minsk at Belarus for a stop onwards to Kazak. She did a C-Check at Alvercas OGMA and it was the ferry flight to its base, six onboard.
Pic by Rui Cambraia just after landing at LPBJ...later ill try to post a video of her "crazy" landing.

[JanetFlight]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvgvIxpNMn0

Any remembrance...

[oldchina]

No Acceptance Flight ?
So they set off on their ferry flight home with six people on board without anyone having conducted an acceptance flight ?
Anyone know if that's normal ?

[JanetFlight]

Im not saying she didnt make an acc flt before...

[The_Steed]

Video of the landing: https://youtu.be/_JiaQ-DShsk

[India Four Two]

I've just spent a fascinating 90 minutes listening to the ATC recordings and I've put a summary below.

Very impressive considering all involved were non-native English speakers. I thought it commendable that Lisbon approach rapidly transferred all other traffic to another frequency. I thought the F-16 pilot's English was remarkably good, but I do feel that the pilot of 1388 was confused as to who he was talking to and the F-16 should have turned the transponder off, as he closed on 1388


LiveATC 1330Z:
http://archive-server.liveatc.net/lppt/LPPT-App-1191-2-Nov-11-2018-1330Z.mp3

02:40 MAYDAY
11:30 First ditching statement
13:00 ATC offers "the river"
17:55 "Completely uncontrollable"
20:00 Request for VMC
21:50 6 POB "Completely uncontrollable. Flight control problem" Planning a sea ditching
23:55 ATC suggests southbound heading to better weather.
27:10 Confirming planning to ditch
29:10 Controller change

LiveATC 1400Z:
http://archive-server.liveatc.net/lppt/LPPT-App-1191-2-Nov-11-2018-1400Z.mp3

04:50 "Improved our conditions" ?
06:42 "Request vectoring to the sea" Discussion about river and "weather below us"
09:30 Requested confirmation that they could reach the sea on present heading
11:50 Still planning ditching. "Completely uncontrollable"
15:45 "We are in thunderstorm now"
18:58 "In this heading, can we reach the sea?"
19:30 "There's a couple of F-16 fighters. They are flying your way, to assist you with your navigation". 1388 does not understand the transmission.
21:30 ATC points out a river dam.
24:21 "You have the F-16 fighters reaching your position now". No response.
25:50 Very stressed transmission
26:15 Transmission from F-16 c/s "Portuguese Air Defence"
27:05 "Cannot maintain heading". "Climbing and descending all the time"
28:48 F-16 transmission "Can you get a lock on me?" Probably talking to a military controller.
29:15 Very stressed transmission
30:30 "If you fly south or southwest, you'll reach the sea"

LiveATC 1430Z
http://archive-server.liveatc.net/lppt/LPPT-App-1191-2-Nov-11-2018-1430Z.mp3

Initially some duplication from the previous tape

02:50 "Eastbound cannot take you to the sea". "Fly westbound"
04:02 F-16 "... maintain two miles"
04:40 Calls to and from F-16. 60 miles north, planning to intercept and offering assistance. 1388 confirms intention to ditch.
06:30 Request heading to sea for ditching
06:50 F-16 "Faro is Victor Mike Charlie. Confirm you are unable to reach Faro?" 1388 confirms ditching
09:05 "If you continue that heading, you have an aerodrome, civilian aerodrome, 13 miles"
10:58 "The maintenance officer from [?] will try and contact you on this frequency as well"
11:45 "You are flying away from the sea. You are flying into Spanish territory."
12:05 "You'll probably find better weather if you move further east"
"Aircraft is now controllable"
"Roger. Confirm intentions?"
12:30 "We need closest airport with good weather"
12:45 "You have aerodrome with good weather, south of your position 135 miles. Can you fly that?"
13:10 F-16 offering to intercept and guide to the aerodrome. 1388 accepts.
13:35 F-16 requests confirmation from Lisbon that Faro will be the diversion.
13:50 F-16 advises that Beja is a closer aerodrome, 70 miles south.
14:15 F-16 requests confirmation from Lisbon that Beja will be suitable.
14:30 Lisbon confirms Beja is suitable and 1388 is expected
15:40 1388 requests runway information at Beja
16:00 Lisbon asks the F-16 if he can escort 1388 to Beja. F-16 reports 19 miles to intercept and VMC
16:50 F-16 advises a turn to line up with Runway 19 at Beja
17:35 F-16 10 miles out, offers to formate and guide 1388
18:55 1388 confirms under control, repeats that they need an airport with good weather - indicates some issue with flight controls.
19:25 Lisbon passes Beja information
19:45 F-16 reports formating.
1388 requests F-16 transponder off due to TCAS
20:30 F-16 gives heading and altitude
21:55 1388 confirms they can see the F-16 but they would prefer control from ATC.
22:15 Lisbon suggests following the F-16
23:45 Lisbon advises 45 miles to Beja. Requests a call when visual.
24:00 1388 requests airport spelling again
24:40 F-16 requests maintain VMC and passes ILS information
26:30 Discussion about 19R
27:15 Lisbon advises 9 mile final
27:35 Lisbon passes Beja weather
28:50 Lisbon passing information, 23 miles from field but no recorded response.
30:50 Lisbon tranfers 1388 to Beja

[fox niner]

They should get a medal for this.

[theNotoriousPIC]

From the landing video it looks like the aircraft was flying in direct mode. Just because of the way it was twitching about on landing and the ground spoilers did not deploy. However the right thrust reverser deployed so no issue with hydraulics (assuming they deployed the left one as well.)

It will be very interesting the read the full report on this.

[JanetFlight]

Landing successfully only at third attempt FYI.

[ORICHETTI]

"Wonder what did that and how they regained control all of a sudden"

I have exactly the same question. I don´t know this plane but sounds strange situation. Hopefully in 1 year we will have a report.

[SigWit]

"Wonder what did that and how they regained control all of a sudden"

I have exactly the same question. I don´t know this plane but sounds strange situation. Hopefully in 1 year we will have a report.


Well, being an Embraer 190 pilot myself, I think they probably turned it off and on again. That usually fixes any problem on the plane ;)

[2dPilot]

VASAviation have it on YouTube (already) : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIc8Rr-cKd8&t=329s

[meleagertoo]

VASAviation have it on YouTube (already) : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIc8Rr-cKd8&t=329s
Bloody hell!
That recording is terrifying!

[Nomad2]

Embraer:

Every
Mechanical
Breakdown
Requires
An
Electrical
Reset.

No idea what happened here, but a fellow Broomstick Flyer offers his respect.
Great job guys.

Edit to add:
Air Astana have very high training standards. These guys were likely better equipped to deal with their situation than other E-190 pilots might have been.

Perhaps, this made the difference between the outcome that happened, and the outcome that could have happened.

Top marks.

[Smdts]

You can hear the bank angle warnings in the background around 10:45
Not a great day at work for them.

[ORICHETTI]

A lot of things went terribly wrong. How many time the pilot on the radio asks for a vector (15) ?
And who can explain why they where out of control for so many time and then suddenly they where able to fly and land?

[giggitygiggity]

A lot of things went terribly wrong. How many time the pilot on the radio asks for a vector (15) ?
And who can explain why they where out of control for so many time and then suddenly they where able to fly and land?

They said they were IMC for a long time, if they had no attitude information they wouldn't know what was going on at all, once they became visual, perhaps they managed to stabilise the flight reasonably then and come up with a plan to get it down.

[VH-MLE]

I was a bit surprised there were no emergency services following the aircraft at the end of the landing roll - at least that I could see anyway...

[meleagertoo]

If they got into a degraded flight control law (eg something similar to A320 direct law) and were in IMC they could well end up in a pickle like that, all the more so if instrumentation was degraded too as might happen with a big electrical failure, only regaining control when in better visual conditions. Their situational awareness was so poor loss of instrumentation to a significant degree must be a strong contender. If they were in degraded f/c law on standby instruments - that's a tuly nasty place to be in an Airbus, and I imagine in any other type too.
No doubt we'll soon know.

[Loose rivets]

My mind's wide open on the actual cause but I added the dialogue into the equation when assessing their state of brain function. Stress may indeed have played a part in the continued repeating of the requests, but I'm suspicious that the crew did not tell the admirably calm ATC that they were not able to physically navigate towards the Atlantic, except by repeating the question. ATC in fact told them they were continuing to turn left, and the response to that was not normal, even taking into account language and stress. Of course, at that point they may well have been really fighting the aircraft, and may even have had the echoes of the Jakarta flight rattling around in their minds. But they want a big area to splash in, that they're determined about, but where a sheltered river would have given a much greater chance of survival at and after the ditching. However, changing horses on my bet again, they may well have been dutifully trying to keep the population safe thinking they were going to be throwing their charge at the water with very crude control and their minds going from two disparate but horrible scenarios.

So, deeply stressed or affected brains? All bets off now.

[Icarus2001]

From the landing video it looks like the aircraft was flying in direct mode

If they got into a degraded flight control law (eg something similar to A320 direct law)

I would like to hear from an Embraer 170/190 pilot as to whether they even have that.

They said they were IMC for a long time, if they had no attitude information they wouldn't know what was going on at al

You do know that all modern jet aircraft have a completely independent standby attitude reference system right? How long do you think they would last in IMC without attitude reference?

http://www.aviaddicts.com/wiki/ejet:iess

[giggitygiggity]

My mind's wide open on the actual cause but I added the dialogue into the equation when assessing their state of brain function. Stress may indeed have played a part in the continued repeating of the requests, but I'm suspicious that the crew did not tell the admirably calm ATC that they were not able to physically navigate towards the Atlantic, except by repeating the question. ATC in fact told them they were continuing to turn left, and the response to that was not normal, even taking into account language and stress. Of course, at that point they may well have been really fighting the aircraft, and may even have had the echoes of the Jakarta flight rattling around in their minds. But they want a big area to splash in, that they're determined about, but where a sheltered river would have given a much greater chance of survival at and after the ditching. However, changing horses on my bet again, they may well have been dutifully trying to keep the population safe thinking they were going to be throwing their charge at the water with very crude control and their minds going from two disparate but horrible scenarios.

So, deeply stressed or affected brains? All bets off now.
Stressed certainly, but I agree, if they had said they were unable to maintain headings or judge them, ATC would have been able to help in a very different way. I wondered if they keep turning in one direction unknowingly therefore can't know when to rollout towards the sea. Also wondered if they thought that they couldn't maintain a straight flight, at least the sea would give them the best option as they might have thought they'd be unable to line up with a runway. This is certainly going to be interesting, although I assume it will boil down to some maintenance mistakes and perhaps injudicious flight control tests before departure. I'm not blaming the crew but it is odd to suddenly lose those systems after departure when hydraulics are seemingly fine and the plane looks undamaged (according to the landing video).

[JanetFlight]

LPBJ-Beja for those unfamiliar its the official base of portuguese acmi outfit HiFly, where its based all their 330, 340, 345 and even the recent 380, so of course it has RFFS in this case given by Portuguese Air Force, a base shared with civilian company ANA-Vinci airports of Portugal.
For your info there was also some real tonneaux made by our Embraer as well, hence the injuries!!!
Also quoted from a member on other aviation board, seems HiFly Crew:
"It Was going back home after a C-check in Alverca.
Swapped aileron controls (so when a right input, the a/c would turn left and vice-versa). Only elevators, rudder and thrust available to control the aircraft. As far as I've heard from someone who talked to the crew when things were settled down on ground, no issues when the autopilot was connected, but as soon as they would disconnect it, the controls were lost everytime. One of the four tonneaux ended at around 4000ft on a 90º nose down attitude. Adding to these awkward conditions, the wheather here in Lisbon area have been awfull the whole day with pouring rain, heavy clouds and low ceiling, so they had no visual geographic references, plus they were unfamiliar with the terrain and there's where the F-16s came in, to guide the E190 to a safer place. After "learning" to control the plane, all calmed down a little bit, but they needed an airport with better weather/visual conditions and Beja was the best(first option was sunny Algarve's Faro), which is also in a sparsely populated (thus the lowest FR24 coverage, adding to the fact that the a/c doesn't have ADS-B and only shows up in MLAT) area so in case of a crash, the possibility of having victims on the ground was much lower.
On the first landing attempt, the aircraft wasn't well aligned to the runway so a go around was performed. On the second attempt they were a bit too high and went around again, before finally successfully landing on the third attempt. Of the 6 pob, two were taken to a local hospital with minor injuries and a third person, someone from the administration of Air Astana was reporting some heart issued ans was also taken to the hospital, which all three left by the beginning of the evening."

[Sikpilot]

Whatever it was that happened, they managed to land it and no one got hurt. Great job by the crew. The CVR will be very interesting to hear.

[DaveReidUK]

One of the four tonneaux ended at around 4000ft on a 90º nose down attitude.

I'm guessing that you're using "tonneaux" in the French sense of "barrel" (i.e. roll) and/or "somersault". Sounds extremely scary.

Swapped aileron controls (so when a right input, the a/c would turn left and vice-versa)

In the good old days of cable-and-pulley flying controls, after a few similar events systems were designed so that it was physically impossible to connect them in a reversed sense. It sounds like in today's FBW world, Murphy is alive and well and back in business.

[Icarus2001]

In the good old days of cable-and-pulley flying controlsWell you will pleased to know that the Embraer 190 uses "conventional" control cables to the ailerons.

The original Fly By Wire.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1200x900/stainless_steel_wire_coil_a7e194ab298b02634d41a95c1dd75054bc 67a18a.jpg

[SigWit]

I would like to hear from an Embraer 170/190 pilot as to whether they even have that.



You do know that all modern jet aircraft have a completely independent standby attitude reference system right? How long do you think they would last in IMC without attitude reference?

Aviaddicts ? ejet:iess (http://www.aviaddicts.com/wiki/ejet:iess)


Yes, the E190 can revert to direct mode, where it translates control inputs to fixed control surface deflections.

[Icarus2001]

Thank you. So there are none of the more exotic flight modes that seem to cause so much confusion "occasionally"on the Airbus ? My understanding was that Embraer followed the Boeing model.

[IcePack]

Being an Airbus pilot, some time ago we learnt a lot about control checks, How & at what point they should be done due this https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/maintenance-errors-cripple-a320-27985/ (sorry could not find on aaib uk)

Does the Embraer have maintenance modes for the flight controls as the reported symptoms seem similar.

[Klimax]

If it was actually an aileron revers direction situation, I would have thought this would have been displayed on the synoptics during the flight controls check. Does the E190 aircraft not have a clear synoptic display for flight controls? Does the E190 synoptic display indicate actual deflection of the surfaces?

[SigWit]

Thank you. So there are none of the more exotic flight modes that seem to cause so much confusion "occasionally"on the Airbus ? My understanding was that Embraer followed the Boeing model.

There are two modes: Normal mode, where the Flight Control Modules process the flight control inputs and provides the processed inputs to the Actuator Control Electronics.
And then there is Direct mode, where the FCM's are left out of the equation and the flight control inputs are send unprocessed to the ACE's

[Nomad2]

Flight controls check is part of the after start checks on every startup. Reversed ailerons would show up very clearly.
Ailerons are conventional cables with hydraulic power, but the tail is FBW.

[Icarus2001]

Reversed ailerons would show up very clearly.

Indeed. As would pitot covers on an Airbus 330 sitting on the ramp but one must look...

[Sqwak7700]

Don’t know if the 190 suffered from the same issue as the 145 series, but being that they where probably light weight and high thrust TO, I wonder if they flew out of the trim motor’s capabilities.

Eagle Flight 230 out of ORD back in late 2000 or 2001. Have a read of that accident report. The ATC tape with radar data is floating around as well. Very similar with gyrations and several climbs and descents trying to control the aircraft. FAA almost grounded the type since after powering down all components worked just fine and “could not duplicate”.

Basically, crew late to trim the stab after TO, the control force by then strong enough to disable the main trim. Crew quick to try the standby trim, before reducing airspeed to reduce control load, so now standby trim also disabled. The 145 series ended up with a placard to ensure trimming after takeoff before getting too fast.

[SigWit]

Flight controls check is part of the after start checks on every startup. Reversed ailerons would show up very clearly.
Ailerons are conventional cables with hydraulic power, but the tail is FBW.

The spoilers are also FBW.

[Capn Bloggs]

Swapped aileron controls (so when a right input, the a/c would turn left and vice-versa)
Now I suppose you lot know how to fly in this scenario? Say the Captain is PF: he leans over and grabs the inside horn of the opposite pilot's yoke with his right hand, and grabs his own inside horn with his left hand, then steers normally ie to bank right, left hand up, right hand down. You could do that in the Embraer, even with those silly angled control columns...

NB: not applicable to Scarebus.

[411A NG]

Didn't a reverse-aileron cabling issue almost bring down a Lufthansa A320 some time ago?
I believe one of the sidesticks was wired wrongly to its ELAC, resulting in inversed aileron control (but correct spoiler activation?). Basically a screw-up during maintenance where the plug of the sidestick got rewired.
PNF took control after PF noticed the issues shortly after takeoff with not a lot of height remaining.
I believe since then, the flight control check procedure was modified as a result.

[Icarus2001]

Very difficult to believe that this was "just" a case of reversed roll sense, especially looking at the altitude excursions.

[Afasa]

Everything happens during the passage of a weather front in the area, althought not seeing very aggressive CBs the visibility should be very bad because it was a high moisture tropical air mass with persistent clouds and rain

I dont have permissions to publish links, so please add https stuff at the beginning
(and maybe someone can re-publish the links)

Weather radar:
i.imgur.com/BbJzRfM.gif

An Airforce video of the landing:
www.publico.pt/2018/11/12/video/imagens-f16-forca-aerea-aterragem-emergencia-beja-20181112-120548

[SigWit]

Large altitude excursions are due to 90 degrees bank angle or possible barrel rolls. It happens to me to know that it's not a problem to re-learn to fly with inverse controls. The huge problem is to understand what it's happening, before the crash.


Flying with inverted controls is extremely difficult.
Try riding your bike and crossing your arms on the steer, let us know how that went down ;)

[golfyankeesierra]

Lufthansa had it once on an A320 after maintenance on a sidestick.
I believe the connectors didn’t fit so the engineer made them fit...
cross-wired-controls-almost-bring-down-lufthansa-a320 (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cross-wired-controls-almost-bring-down-lufthansa-a320-130318/)

[Klimax]

Lufthansa had it once on an A320 after maintenance on a sidestick.
I believe the connectors didn’t fit so the engineer made them fit...
cross-wired-controls-almost-bring-down-lufthansa-a320 (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cross-wired-controls-almost-bring-down-lufthansa-a320-130318/)


Wow. reading that article, it states that pilots usually only check for deflection, but not direction... Really? Really? Is that what professional pilots do? I don't think so. A mistake (as in mistakenly overlooking) is one thing, but to actually intentionally only look for deflection, is not what a pro commercial pilot does!

[The Ancient Geek]

Easily done with one man looking and one man on the stick - expecting what you expect to see.

[JanetFlight]

With so many G forces suffered, really doubt will ever fly again...
On another hand, some rwy edge lights gone upon td...heres a clip taken from our F16s.
https://www.facebook.com/diariodoalentejo/videos/2205785863025836/?refid=52&ref=m_notif&notif_t=feedback_reaction_generic&__tn__=R-R

[Raul Oprita]

giggitygiggity;

The EGPS will not work without information from the IRS, so that they had NAV info, but looks like they really lost control. First they had to fly the airplane and after to navigate. I assume that in the high stress environment they had, was easier to ask vectors than to look for some FMS settings or for MAPS.

[wideman]

Bloody hell!
That recording is terrifying!

The second part is out and is every bit as amazing. As I'm listening to the pilot sounding more and more disoriented, I'm thinking there's no way on earth this man is going to put this plane on the ground in one piece:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evYLkhxoP3U

[ORICHETTI]

With all my respects (i am a pilot myself) does Air Astana have CRM principles on their cockpits? or is the old russian school?

[Airbus2012]

Yes, Air Astana practices CRM, its no longer old Russian school.

[spoon84]

The second part is out and is every bit as amazing. As I'm listening to the pilot sounding more and more disoriented, I'm thinking there's no way on earth this man is going to put this plane on the ground in one piece:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evYLkhxoP3U

It is amazing all the effort put to help the pilots in this situation. well done to everyone! I think that the pilots sound very disorientated and resigned to ditch the aircraft, but at the end they solve it. From what it can be hear in the registration, I think they also had instrument problems, they couldn't really fly heading (they always ask if heading was good) and in IMC they had more trouble keeping control of the plane.

[Porky Speedpig]

The second part is out and is every bit as amazing. As I'm listening to the pilot sounding more and more disoriented, I'm thinking there's no way on earth this man is going to put this plane on the ground in one piece:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evYLkhxoP3U

Chilling. Not the afternoon the Astana guys, the ATCO or the F16 crews were expecting. Hats off.

[txl]

Some pieces of information from local news sources: Cockpit crew are Russian/Kazakh. Also on board was a British engineer, 54, who along with 37yo Kazakh required medical assistance due to stress symptoms after the incident, both have been released from hospital after a few hours. Other crew consisted of four airline engineers or three engineers, one additional pilot, according to varying reports. Successful landing on third attempt. Two go-arounds because of banking and sudden altitude loss on finals.

Local news station has some shaky footage of aborted landing and go-around:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6n4mQvO4-tE

While initial reports say the aircraft had been in Alverca for its C-Check, local sources now report the aircraft's electronics had displayed erratic behaviour before. Airline says aircraft was in Portugal for C-Check. Flight said to be ferry to home base after repair job in Portugal.

[WHBM]

Both the UK's immediate postwar 4-engined prototypes were lost shortly after takeoff on test flights due to controls being misassembled.

The Handley Page Hermes prototype crashed on its maiden flight in December 1945, killing the key Handley Page test pilot team, due to the elevators being misconnected.

The Avro Tudor prototype crashed in August 1947, killing among others the Avro chief designer, Roy Chadwick, who had designed the Lancaster, the Tudor itself, and various other Avro types. The aileron cables had been reversed following overnight work.

[Onceapilot]

Both the UK's immediate postwar 4-engined prototypes were lost shortly after takeoff on test flights due to controls being misassembled.

The Handley Page Hermes prototype crashed on its maiden flight in December 1945, killing the key Handley Page test pilot team, due to the elevators being misconnected.

The Avro Tudor prototype crashed in August 1947, killing among others the Avro chief designer, Roy Chadwick, who had designed the Lancaster, the Tudor itself, and various other Avro types. The aileron cables had been reversed following overnight work.

Unfortunately, Murphy's Law states that those who do not check that their controls work in the correct sense are the ones who have incorrectly functioning controls.

OAP

[Perrin]

All my engineering life as a LAE I used to kid pilots saying if flying was hard engineers would do it. After listening to the radio recording and reading the story I bow my head to these involved in this event.

very very well done.
Peter

[Alpine Flyer]

Scary stuff.

There are two modes: Normal mode, where the Flight Control Modules process the flight control inputs and provides the processed inputs to the Actuator Control Electronics.
And then there is Direct mode, where the FCM's are left out of the equation and the flight control inputs are send unprocessed to the ACE's
At least on the SIM there's not much of a difference to be felt between the two modes flying around in the pattern.
On the SIM the A/C is demonstrated to be flyable without any aileron input at all, just using elevator and rudders.

According to lore the aircraft was originally supposed to have three-axis FBW but a deadline for delivery to JetBlue could only be met by using conventional ailerons. Aileron control quadrants are rather prominently placed inside the main gear wheel wells with the aileron servo just forward of the left wheel well.

As for the control check, you always try to be vigilant but with a little distraction ailerons moving the opposite way could escape detection.

Will be very interesting to learn what happened.

[netra]

Some pieces of information from local news sources: Cockpit crew are a Brit, 54, and a Kazakh, 37. Both required medical assistance due to stress symptoms after the incident, but have been released from hospital after a few hours. Other crew consisted of four airline engineers or three engineers, one additional pilot, according to varying reports.
nope. according Kazakh news (unfortunately I can't provide source due to post restriction) the flightcrew was 40 y/c Captain (he looks more Russian than Kazakh to me) and two Kazakh FOs. the Brit was one of 4 engineers on board.

[ORICHETTI]

They said they were IMC for a long time, if they had no attitude information they wouldn't know what was going on at all, once they became visual, perhaps they managed to stabilise the flight reasonably then and come up with a plan to get it down.


There is always a compass and an auxiliar attitude indicator on all paxs commercial plane. Once i had a totally screen failure and i flew with those two.

[b1lanc]

Decent write-up on AVH. Erratic roll control, even up to touchdown. Intended rwy was 19R but couldn't correct drift enough and wound up on 19L.

[fox niner]

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/750x801/e02f3118_b430_4c69_bcd1_44cd53972b66_9f28ea18f624a3324b63ed3 a12f9e44ca63bc433.jpeg
This photo is of the contol yoke, full right turn. On the synoptic page the flight contols deflection is shown. Ailerons show to be wrongly deflected. (Up/down on the wrong side) Thanks to the avHerald site for this photo. I hope the six on board will be able to recover from this experience.

[pattern_is_full]

Indeed - but the roll spoilers are operating in the correct direction?

[cappt]

Not an Embraer pilot, disconnecting the FCM and flying in direct mode as they did, would that have taken the spoilerons out of the loop leaving with them with just the reversed ailerons? Wow, what a fantastic flying job by this crew! I'm sure we will be studying this for years to come as an example of exceptional decision making and CRM.

[SteinarN]

I suppose this picture is taken on the ground after the landing?

[SigWit]

Indeed - but the roll spoilers are operating in the correct direction?

Roll spoilers are fbw, ailerons are cables. Might be they connected the cables the wrong way.

[Machinbird]

In the configuration pictured in the synoptic page, the spoilers would be creating adverse yaw, while the ailerons would be rolling the aircraft (the wrong way). On instruments, I suspect the adverse yaw would play with your mind and make it even harder to keep the wings level.
Good thing they didn't crash right after rotation and were thus able to eventually work out their problems sufficiently to calm down a bit and land the aircraft.

[Sikpilot]

Some real serious piloting went on during that flight!!!

What a great outcome.

[FE Hoppy]

Not an Embraer pilot, disconnecting the FCM and flying in direct mode as they did, would that have taken the spoilerons out of the loop leaving with them with just the reversed ailerons? Wow, what a fantastic flying job by this crew! I'm sure we will be studying this for years to come as an example of exceptional decision making and CRM.

In direct mode the spoilers will still operate for roll but at a fixed gain rather than speed sensitive.

[Vessbot]

In the configuration pictured in the synoptic page, the spoilers would be creating adverse yaw, while the ailerons would be rolling the aircraft (the wrong way). On instruments, I suspect the adverse yaw would play with your mind and make it even harder to keep the wings level.
Good thing they didn't crash right after rotation and were thus able to eventually work out their problems sufficiently to calm down a bit and land the aircraft.

The spoilers make proverse yaw, the way we want it. Yoke right, right spoilers up, more drag on the right side, right yaw.

[MountainSnake]

I guess the bank angle protection only made things way worse trying to level up but instead increasing the roll. What a nightmare...

[MartinAOA]

PPRUNE seems to be a credible source of information ;) : https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/air-astana-plane-pilots-lose-control-portugal-flightpath-embraer-190-a8629491.html (http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/air-astana-plane-pilots-lose-control-portugal-flightpath-embraer-190-a8629491.html)

[txl]

nope. according Kazakh news (unfortunately I can't provide source due to post restriction) the flightcrew was 40 y/c Captain (he looks more Russian than Kazakh to me) and two Kazakh FOs. the Brit was one of 4 engineers on board.
Thanks, Netra. Can you send me a PM with the link?

[EternalNY1]

If this was just out of maintenance, wouldn't a "free and correct" check of the controls be on the to-do list prior to departure?

I'm not putting the blame on the pilots ... it just seems like an omission that could have been easily spotted.

[robskye]

If this was just out of maintenance, wouldn't a "free and correct" check of the controls be on the to-do list prior to departure?

I'm not putting the blame on the pilots ... it just seems like an omission that could have been easily spotted.

well, it is not the first time someone take off with missed items...

[Machinbird]

The spoilers make proverse yaw, the way we want it. Yoke right, right spoilers up, more drag on the right side, right yaw.
Only problem is, on this aircraft, in the problem configuration, yoke right, aircraft rolls left, spoilers create right yaw. Somehow, that doesn't feel like balanced flight to me, therefore the reason for my statement.
The thought of bank angle protection operating in that environment scares me, and I'm relatively fearless.

[Chesty Morgan]

I guess the bank angle protection only made things way worse trying to level up but instead increasing the roll. What a nightmare...
It’s been a while but iirc there is no bank angle protection.

[SigWit]

Only problem is, on this aircraft, in the problem configuration, yoke right, aircraft rolls left, spoilers create right yaw. Somehow, that doesn't feel like balanced flight to me, therefore the reason for my statement.
The thought of bank angle protection operating in that environment scares me, and I'm relatively fearless.

The rollspoilers also create a roll tendency by reducing the lift of the wing.
So basicly, when using small inputs, the airplane will roll in the wrong direction because only the aileron actuates.
When using larger inputs the spoilers will have more authority than the aileron, reversing the roll in the right direction. Crazy flying.

[Nomad2]

'Bank Angle' is an alert only. There's no protection in roll. The wing will go down until you stop it.

I'm sure there is much more to this than "just" the aileron issue. Maybe weather, maybe crew, maybe something else.

Just giving thanks that they all survived.

[txl]

Here's the Kazakh report about the Captain (https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/izvestno-komandire-posadivshem-samolet-eyr-astanyi-357587/) (Russian) that Netra mentioned as well as a half decent Google translation (https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/izvestno-komandire-posadivshem-samolet-eyr-astanyi-357587/). According to another report (https://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=de&rurl=translate.google.de&sl=ru&sp=nmt4&tl=en&u=https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/v-eyr-astane-rasskazali-o-chp-s-samoletom-v-portugalii-357519/&xid=17259,15700021,15700124,15700149,15700186,15700191,15700 201&usg=ALkJrhixgW32kqGolpp1WxwoCYhAuxrPRQ) from the same source, the airline suspects errors during C-Check maintenance as a probable cause.

[777boyo]

Am I correct in thinking that an A320 had a similar issue following maitnenance with reverse connected roll control surfaces on a pax flight out of LGW several years ago? Or is my memory at fault?
7B

[PAXfips]

Am I correct in thinking that an A320 had a similar issue following maitnenance with reverse connected roll control surfaces on a pax flight out of LGW several years ago? Or is my memory at fault?
7B
via AVH https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cross-wired-controls-almost-bring-down-lufthansa-a320-130318/

[atakacs]

Do we have any idea what happened (short of "maintenance error")?!

[Capn Bloggs]

No wonder they had control problems with a control column shaped like that! :{

[Paranoid]

Fantastic effort by the crew to 'recover' from this problem.:ok:
Maintenance Contractor may well have some awkward questions to answer.

[nicolai]

How many previous crossed-cable incidents happened on aircraft that also had roll spoilers? Most of the types mentioned above predate automated roll spoilers.

As noted above, if the sense of the controls is exactly reversed you might get used to it (for example using the one hand on each column method) but if the controls essentially reverse authority as you command more roll (due to the ailerons being overpowered by the roll spoilers) then you're in a very rarely explored situation. If there are some exceptional-airmanship awards being handed out, these guys should be near the front of the line.

[Icarus2001]

. If there are some exceptional-airmanship awards being handed out, these guys should be near the front of the line. Possibly. If we draw a line after the pre flight control check, post maintenance.

[DaveReidUK]

via AVH https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cross-wired-controls-almost-bring-down-lufthansa-a320-130318/

No, that's the Lufthansa Frankfurt incident, discussed in post #54 et seq.

The Gatwick incident that the previous poster asked about may be the Excalibur A320 in August 1993 that departed following maintenance with spoilers only operating on one wing.

[nicolai]

Possibly. If we draw a line after the pre flight control check, post maintenance.

Failing to use their superior judgement to avoid the situation where they had to use their superior skill did not prevent the Gimli Glider crew from receiving an award recognising them as superior pilots ( Fédération Aéronautique Internationale Diploma for Outstanding Airmanship).

(with apologies to Frank Borman)

[JanetFlight]

For example theres a ton of new generation aircraft flying out there in wich the "Aileron Cockpit Display/Aileron Synoptics" are not shown anymore.
AFAIK (i've seen it) Ryanair 738 (example here but others could be taken alongside Europe and Off-Europe) do not have that option, wich according some Operators and Manufacturer new philosofies, are getting outdated and non-useful anymore. (a kind of optional menu)
At before TO Check List you only need to check free and proper yoke/column movements, but nothing are displayed in the cockpit "screens" anymore, according them.
That relies mainly on the maintenance/enginnearing teams, and the trust they have between each other, pilots&enginners (a kind of that).
In some operators wich use modern "flying machines" having ECAM or EICAS with that synoptic, even when checking the proper free Yoke/Column movements (Boeing at least), not all operators&SOPs have the obligatoriness to open it (that ecran menu) when doing the free movement check.
However after this Astana incident, maybe things could revert to the old days and mandatory again to have that "option" on our cockpits.
I Stopped flying many moons ago, but would like to hear your wise and humble opinion about this :)

[Icarus2001]

JanetFlight, I think you need to draw a distinction between normal line operations and a just out of maintenance situation. The first flight is usually a functional test flight. If the aircraft flew in and turned up on the bay two hours before you walk on to it and no maintenance has been performed then it is pretty clear that the controls operated normally and in the correct sense. So the after start or before take-off control check is looking for full and free movement. That is also why we check the maintenance log/tech log/DL to see what maintenance has been done recently.
Now, if the aircraft has just come out of maintenance then the checks take on more importance as to correct sense for obvious reasons.
Normal procedure would be for one engineer to check and sign for work and being primary flight controls it would require a second visual inspection and signature. So it should have had two engineers looking at the rigging. Given the amount of fair leads and pulleys involved they did well to cross them over, if that is what actually occurred.

theres a ton of new generation aircraft flying out there in wich the "Aileron Cockpit Display/Aileron Synoptics" are not shown anymore. Can you give some examples?

Here is the 787...https://forums.x-plane.org/uploads/monthly_2018_05/1522775_X-Plane2018-05-1501-17-39-71.jpg.78ad8a24fd9a8b24924852c76b9cb782.jpg

[JanetFlight]

Hi Icarus, many tanx for your kind and attentious explanation.
Yeap, maybe i used the word "ton" in a "too much metaphoric" way, so please accept my apologies regarding that lil grammar typo (maybe b'cause english not my mother language).
However i've been told that almost all Ryanair fleet of 738s (wich are pretty big, lets say around 450 planes nowadays), and even other LCC using NG 737 are not equipped with that option on the cockpit displays ('i ve seen it too during some flightdeck visits). I dont know about their future MAX, but a great portion of their present 738's dont have it. (maybe a kind of optional, as also in other operators).
But as you wisely and correctly said, theres a fine line between normal day procedures and those coming out from the MROs and similar.

[EternalNY1]

Is this not something that could relatively "easily" be caught by the onboard warning systems?

If it can display the graphic showing the ailerons down but the spoilers up, it can alert a master caution that something is wrong with the flight controls.

In-flight, this would still be extremely confusing, but at least it might lend a bit of clarity as to WHY it's behaving incorrectly and what steps to take. My thoughts with this warning were actually while still on the ground, but that would require a flight surface check anyway, which either was not done here, or was not interpreted correctly.

[Icarus2001]

Is this not something that could relatively "easily" be caught by the onboard warning systems? How about the offboard warning system, two engineers and two pilots?

[ManaAdaSystem]

We have 737 versions with flight control displays and some without.
I used to fly for an airline that used regular line pilots to pick up aircraft after C checks. The acceptance flight was the flight back to base. No special checks done.

[Bergerie1]

If I remember rightly - it was a long time ago - when we did C of A air tests after major maintenance (VC10, 707 and 747), the flight engineer went outside with a headset and long lead while we checked the flight controls. He checked each of the control surfaces positions (ailerons and spoilers, elevators, rudder and stabilser) and coordinated his observations with the pilot doing the checks on the flight deck.

It pays to be thorough!

[Chesty Morgan]

On any and all of the post maintenance air tests I have flown there has been a requirement to stand outside and physically watch each and every flying control whilst you tell the guy in the flight deck which way to waggle the stick.

[Alpine Flyer]

Is this not something that could relatively "easily" be caught by the onboard warning systems?

It would be easy but the Embraer philosophy is rather minimalistic regarding alerts. E.g. if you switch a standby hydraulic pump from AUTO to ON for single-engine taxi-in you get a HYD PUMP NOT AUTO message. Turn it the wrong way to OFF will result in the same message rather than a HYD PUMP OFF. They don‘t program more than absolutely necessary and every extra warning mode would need to be verified and tested, making it harder to remain cheap.... hard to stomach, but it‘s the economy, stupid as they used to say.

[Zeffy]

Accident: Astana E190 at Alverca on Nov 11th 2018, severe control problems (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4c04438e&opt=0)

On May 31st 2019 the GPIAA changed the classification of the occurrence from serious incident to accident. The GPIAA released their preliminary report and provided preliminary findings:

The left and right aileron surfaces control the rolling (lateral) movements of the aircraft with the actuation of the two control yokes or with the autopilot controls. The ailerons are assisted by the flight mode spoilers (roll spoilers).

The aileron control system is actuated by rotation of either the pilot or co-pilot aileron control yokes which are mechanically connected to each other and that through the cable circuit, the torque tubes and the quadrants, transmit these movement to the Power Control Unit - PCU which moves the aileron surface.

The PCUs are mechanically controlled through the cable system and are hydraulically powered.

The data collection during the initial investigation phase included a detailed examination of the aircraft flight controls and an incorrect ailerons control cable system installation was confirmed on both semiwings.

By introducing the modification iaw Service Bulletin 190-57-0038 during the maintenance activities, there was no longer the cable routing and separation around rib21, making it harder to understand the maintenance instructions, with recognized opportunities for improvement in the maintenance actions interpretation.

The message “FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH” was generated during the maintenance activities, which in turn originated additional troubleshooting activities by the maintenance service provider, supported by the aircraft manufacturer. These activities, which lasted for 11 days, did not identify the ailerons' cables reversal, nor was this correlated to the "FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH" message.

From the investigation process carried out so far, it also resulted in the identification of deviations to the internal procedures by the maintenance service provider, which led to the error not being detected in the various safety barriers designed by the regulators, aeronautical maintenance industry and within the maintenance service provider implemented system.

The ailerons incorrect operation caused by the control cables reversal, was not identified in the aircraft operational checks (flight controls check) by the operator crew.

The GPIAA reported the damage:

From the preliminary analysis to the condition of the aircraft after the event flight, significant structural damage in both semi-wing, fuselage and flight control surfaces was verified, which led the GPIAAF to change the initial classification of serious incident to accident, following ICAO Annex 13 recommendations.

The aircraft was returned to the operator on Jan 21st 2019, who is currently evaluating the aircraft and deciding about further action. The investigation has completed the collection of facts and is now engaging in analysis and drafting the final report.

[Yeehaw22]

11 days of troubleshooting and no one noticed an aileron reversal :eek:

[Sqwak7700]

Pretty shocking. And crew also did not notice during the flight control check. So completely unavoidable. Hard to believe these types of incidents are still happening.

[Eutychus]

Does this help explain why the aircraft initially kept heading east away from the sea when trying to ditch?

[esscee]

Problem with many "engineers" nowadays is that they have forgotten how a system functions and only go by FIM or TSM. Quite damning that nobody appeared to question why the ailerons were functioning in the incorrect "sense"!!! Have people forgotten the reason duplicate inspections used to exist precisely for Flying controls , landing gear and emergency/back up systems.Very lucky the crew managed to "steer" the aircraft away from Lisbon, dread to think what could have happened had it gone down in the city.

[DaveReidUK]

So completely unavoidable.

I suspect you mean the opposite. At least I hope you do.

[WHBM]

Well I guess that's one maintenance organisation Air Astana won't be using again. I wonder why they positioned the aircraft all the way from Almaty to Portugal and back for the check. Selected by the beancounters as being the low bidder ?

Air Astana from my experience (albeit only their 767s) came over as a pretty class act with traditional service standards, even in economy. Maybe not known is they are 50% owned by British Aerospace (that's BAe the aircraft manufacturer, not BA the airline), with some expat staff. So they should have more than a little background in aircraft engineering. The other 50% is owned by the Kazakh government.

[VH DSJ]

From what I've seen of the flight control schematics diagram on the MFD, a right control yoke deflection gave an indication of the right wing's roll spoilers deflected up and aileron deflected down. Shouldn't this raise alarm bells to the crew when doing a check of the flight controls before take-off? The fact that the flight control MFD indication was shown in 'green' also contributed to 'confirmation bias' that all was well with the flight controls. Perhaps Embraer should look at the colour schematics of the flight control checks where an obvious discrepancy between control yoke deflection and aileron control surface deflection should result in a caution or warning colour (eg, amber or red) rather than green?

[H Peacock]

Looks as though this was a similar handling issue to the Global Express that managed to recover to Berlin having had the roll spoilers reversed. Again not spotted on the pre-flight control check. I don't think the Global crew managed to disable the roll spoilers prior to their eventful arrival!

Post maintenance air-checking - you just have to be thorough!

[Yeehaw22]

Problem with many "engineers" nowadays is that they have forgotten how a system functions and only go by FIM or TSM

I take exception to that statement. Many engineering type courses nowadays are much shorter and go into much lesser detail on systems than they used to. The manufacturers want the "engineer" to follow the FIM or TSM. They actively enforce the fact. Would you prefer the "engineer" to act all gung ho and act outside of the manufacturer's documentation? In this day in age "engineers" work on numerous types. I regularly work on 4 or 5 different types and some with more than 1 engine manufacturer per type in one shift. Are we supposed to have a photographic and encyclopedic knowledge of all those systems?

In this instance it looks like a massive blunder by the MRO but there also has to be responsibility taken by the manufacturer and also the pilots doing the pre flight.

It's too easy to just blame the "engineer" just like in the numerous other threads on here that jump to the conclusion and blame the "pilot".

[Atlantic Explorer]

Well I guess that's one maintenance organisation Air Astana won't be using again. I wonder why they positioned the aircraft all the way from Almaty to Portugal and back for the check. Selected by the beancounters as being the low bidder.

This maintenance organisation is well known for its low prices. Some of the standards of post maintenance on aircraft being collected to ferry home has been dreadful. I have personal experience of this!

The engineers are reportedly to be on a very below average wage.

[Uplinker]

I take exception to that statement. Many engineering type courses nowadays are much shorter and go into much lesser detail on systems than they used to. The manufacturers want the "engineer" to follow the FIM or TSM. They actively enforce the fact. Would you prefer the "engineer" to act all gung ho and act outside of the manufacturer's documentation?

In this instance it looks like a massive blunder by the MRO but there also has to be responsibility taken by the manufacturer and also the pilots doing the pre flight.

It's too easy to just blame the "engineer" just like in the numerous other threads on here that jump to the conclusion and blame the "pilot".

I hear what you are saying. It would seem that to reduce costs, engineers as well as pilots are having shorter and less supervised training. So we end up with the situation that today’s new pilot can operate a computerised aircraft but hasn’t got basic stick and rudder skills, and it would seem that today’s new engineer can interrogate a computer and replace systems, but lacks basic engineering fault finding and resolution skills?

A friend’s Porsche would not rev beyond 4000rpm. The Porsche “specialist” garage with its computer diagnostics replaced the mass air flow meter but the problem remained. I had a look (without access to computer diagnostics), but using my ingrained troubleshooting experience, which is based on first principles; I first checked the power supply to the various engine components. The voltage of the feed to the fuel injectors was well below what it should have been, and I traced this to a bad earth. Once fixed with an alternative earthing point, the V8 was back to its free revving self.

Yes, of course today’s complex aircraft need computer diagnostic facilities, but the basic engineering skills are still needed to give an overview and ‘reasonableness’ check of what is being done, and whether the system is functioning correctly once fixed.

Something as fundamental as flight controls need special attention. Pilots in the cockpit cannot see their own control surfaces, and have to rely on cockpit displays - which might also be wrong. The only true check of flight controls after maintenance is with a third party external to the aircraft observing and confirming correct movement.

[Yeehaw22]

I hear and agree with what you are saying. It would seem that to reduce costs, engineers as well as pilots are having shorter and less supervised training. So we end up with the situation that today’s new pilot can operate a computerised aircraft but hasn’t got basic stick and rudder skills, and it would seem that today’s new engineer can interrogate a computer and replace systems, but lacks basic engineering fault finding and resolution skills?

In some ways yes with new engineers being brought up on modern Airbus, 787 etc rather than the previous generation of aircraft where you had to rely on proper hands on troubleshooting and fault finding. Its inevitable there's going to be a difference in approach. But in my opinion there should always be a basic underlying knowledge and initial troubleshooting ability present in any engineer.

BUT my main point and objection to the post by esscee is we are only human, we cant possibly remember the ins and outs of every system of every aircraft we work on. And to try and do so would be massively dangerous. That's why we have technical documentation to use and follow. But pilots and engineers alike, sometimes all that's needed is the mk1 eyeball.

[Bergerie1]

Uplinker,

I agree. When I used to do C of A air tests after any kind of major maintenance, we always did a flying control check which required one of the flight crew, usually the flight engineer, to go outside with a headset and long lead while one of the pilots moved the flight controls in a clearly defined sequence. Each of the control surface positions (ailerons and spoilers, elevators, rudder and stabiliser) were reported and correlated with the pilot who was manipulating the controls in the cockpit.

It pays to be thorough - you cannot, and must not, rely solely on the indications within the cockpit.

[Final 3 Greens]

Uplinker and Bergerie1

Agreed about the criticalilty of checking controls post maintenance on an aircraft where the controls are not visible from the pilots seats. I've only flown small stuff, where you could see the control surfaces, but would check full and free movement, in the correct sense, before taxi every flight and give the stick a good stir just before departure. Looking at the stakes involved, it seemed a very wise investment of a few seconds.

[Smythe]

What part of "FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH" was misunderstood?

[Bergerie1]

None - except that when it comes to electronic systems I prefer to believe the evidence of my own eyes. From which part of the control runs/systems (electrical, hydraulic, mechanical) does the input to that warning come? But I am ancient and have a deep distrust of such things. It stood me in good stead over the years.

[Smythe]

I agree. When I used to do C of A air tests after any kind of major maintenance, we always did a flying control check which required one of the flight crew, usually the flight engineer, to go outside with a headset and long lead while one of the pilots moved the flight controls in a clearly defined sequence. Each of the control surface positions (ailerons and spoilers, elevators, rudder and stabiliser) were reported and correlated with the pilot who was manipulating the controls in the cockpit.

Isnt that why the numbers and ticks are painted on the flaps and elevators?

[Bergerie1]

But to use those, you need to go outside and LOOK.

[DaveReidUK]

Those are rigging marks. You don't need them to check whether a surface is moving in the correct sense.

[VH DSJ]

What part of "FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH" was misunderstood?

This message was apparently unrelated to the aileron cable reversal issue. Although it was not clearly stated in the report, it appears the problem was cleared after troubleshooting involving consultation with the manufacturer. I doubt they (or any crew for that matter) would be silly enough to have attempted the flight if this message was still showing. Here's the quote from the report;

The message “FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH” was generated during the maintenance activities, which in turn originated additional troubleshooting activities by the maintenance service provider, supported by the aircraft manufacturer. These activities, which lasted for 11 days, did not identify the ailerons' cables reversal, nor was this correlated to the "FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH" message.

[esscee]

Not so much to do with "type" course technical training at all, my earlier post was pointing out the lack of "basic" technical training and understanding of Flying controls and their operation. Others have mentioned the point that experienced engineers who worked with and were accustomed to the "duplicate" inspection process would be aware of how to check correct operation of a flying control system and importantly in the CORRECT SENSE.

[Maninthebar]

From what I've seen of the flight control schematics diagram on the MFD, a right control yoke deflection gave an indication of the right wing's roll spoilers deflected up and aileron deflected down. Shouldn't this raise alarm bells to the crew when doing a check of the flight controls before take-off? The fact that the flight control MFD indication was shown in 'green' also contributed to 'confirmation bias' that all was well with the flight controls. Perhaps Embraer should look at the colour schematics of the flight control checks where an obvious discrepancy between control yoke deflection and aileron control surface deflection should result in a caution or warning colour (eg, amber or red) rather than green?

Is it known that the schematics were unaffected by whatever misalignment of cabling caused the underlying issue? Seems to me that it is POSSIBLE that whatever reversal of logic was built in by the maintenance activity might have had an equivalent effect on the display.

[MD80767 Driver]

There is always a compass and an auxiliar attitude indicator on all paxs commercial plane. Once i had a totally screen failure and i flew with those two.
Thats wonderful for you Ace. We've all landed like that - albeit most of us, only in the Simulator. And, I bet that you didn't have screwed up flight controls on top of your instrument failure Ace. Or?

[Nomad2]

It's certainly known that after they landed, the flight controls schematic was telling the truth. In other words was indicating the problem correctly, but the aileron that was deflecting in the wrong direction still showed in green.

Although the report says the aircraft was returned to the operator, I'm pretty confident it's stil in Portugal. I believe quite early on it was stated that it wouldn't rejoin the fleet. I hear it pulled well over 5G on several ocasions, which says a lot for the manufacturer.
Amazing that it stayed in one piece, and I fully understand their reluctance to accept it.

[Icarus2001]

Is it known that the schematics were unaffected by whatever misalignment of cabling caused the underlying issue? Seems to me that it is POSSIBLE that whatever reversal of logic was built in by the maintenance activity might have had an equivalent effect on the display.

The schematic page photo was shown earlier in this thread. It did show ailerons down and spoilers up on the right wing.

[Nick 1]

http://www.gpiaa.gov.pt/wwwbase/wwwinclude/ficheiro.aspx?tipo=0&id=10652&ambiente=WebSiteMenu