Centaurus
28th Oct 2018, 06:15
Browsing Pprune and saw this post from October 2006. It was a Bristol Britannia of the Royal Air Force incident.
Quote: "The picture of the Brit at Changi reminds me of when one of our squadron pilots was returning to the UK ex-tour. The aircraft had started its take off roll when this stalwart stands up and shouts that the aircraft has to stop or it will crash. A loadmaster buzzes the cockpit and passes it on so the crew slam on the anchors and stop it.
When asked what the panic was he states that the controls were not connected as both ailerons were hanging down.
They kept him out of the way of the other pax during the twenty-four hours or so whilst they were fiddling about with brake units and tyres" Unquote
............................................................ ............................................................ ............................................................ ..
I had a similar situation as a passenger in the last row of seats on an RAF Britannia taking off from Changi, Singapore in the 1950's. Taxiing for take off I noticed the ailerons of both wings happened to be hanging down and thought that was a bit odd. I didn't know that roll control was by balance (?) tabs attached to the ailerons and that it was normal for both sets of ailerons to droop while taxiing.
The cabin staff were up the front so I could not ask them.
I was tempted to spring to my feet and warn them but was too embarrassed in case it was nothing to worry about. I made the decision to sit fast and see what happens. I was close to the rear exit door so that helped if there was a prang. There was no time to coldly evaluate if the ailerons were unserviceable or if operations were normal because one would feel a right twit if I shouted at the cabin staff up front to inform the captain.
Of course everything was OK but I sweated out the lift off and initial climb. I can therefore identify how the frightened pilot passenger must have felt when he saw both ailerons hanging down before take off.
At least he was an action man while I sat in my seat and crossed my fingers.. As a pilot passenger for example and you had never flown in a Britannia and saw what we saw, I wonder what your reaction would have been?. https://www.pprune.org/images/statusicon/user_offline.gif https://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/report.gif (https://www.pprune.org/report.php?p=4584653)
RHSandLovingIt
28th Oct 2018, 21:27
As a pilot passenger for example and you had never flown in a Britannia and saw what we saw, I wonder what your reaction would have been?.
Most likely the same reaction I have whenever I pax on aircraft for which I have zero/limited systems knowledge... "huh, that's odd... must remember to investigate that when we land".
Much like the first time I flew on an A320 and the PTU started making all those lovely noises during pushback :eek:
clark y
28th Oct 2018, 21:40
B717s' elevators do their own thing on the ground. I've heard other pilots query it when a B717 is at the holding point with one elevator up and the other down.
Also heard a pilot sitting behind an A320 at the holding point telling ATC that the A320 had an open panel on the lower part of the fuselage. Turned out it was part of the outflow valve sticking out. Quite normal when it is open (on the ground).
As for pax, I know of a couple of cases where they were justified, fortunately both during boarding. Both involved RPT jets. One was damage to the horizontal stab, the other was for a G-clamp on a nacelle.
megan
29th Oct 2018, 00:13
Correct Koda, also a F-28 in Canada where deadheading crew saw ice contaminated wings on taxi and said nothing out of professional courtesy to the operating crew. The take off ended as bad as it's possible to get. So, you're not alone Centaraus, gives us all pause what we might do if placed in the same situation. We can be a weird lot.
https://reports.aviation-safety.net/1989/19890310-1_F28_C-FONF.pdf
I thought it worth extracting from the report and posting here, from page 1,081,
In his testimony, Captain Berezuk offered a further and cogent explanation for his passivity in not communicating his concerns to any crew members on March 10. In so doing he identified what I perceive to be an absence of guidelines to off-duty air crew members travelling as airline passengers in circumstances such as occurred at Dryden . Captain Berezuk stated:
A. If I was an outside observer looking at an aircraft, there is no written-down procedure or set of rules that I could refer to on how to and when I should express my concern or state my observation to a crew member of that aircraft . There is nothing concrete.
Captain Berezuk also adverted to a so-called "pilot professional courtesy" or "pilot-respect" theory within the professional pilot community, which purports to preclude an off-duty airline pilot, flying on board as a passenger, from drawing to the attention of the cockpit crew an observed safety concern . Because of the serious potential consequences of such a theory finding acceptance among professional pilots, relevant portions of Captain Berezuk's testimony are set out hereunder:
Q. Now when questioning you about the crew of an aircraft, you stated in your evidence as follows, and I will just summarize it, but you - whether you knew the pilots in the front of the aircraft or not, it could have been one - it could have been one of 10,000 pilots, you wouldn't have changed your mind about not going up front, is that correct ?
A. Correct.
Q. And you further stated that you were a pilot and they were pilots and you trusted them with your life and the life of the family and the passengers?
A. Yes.
Q. And you further stated you expected the same courtesy, respect and authority given to you as a pilot in command of your aircraft as you owed to the other pilots in the profession of aviation?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, am I correct in saying then that it was out of professional courtesy that you did not go forward or advise a flight attendant of your concern about the snow on the wings?
A. Not as a fact of courtesy but, again, respect.
Q. Out of respect for the competency and capability of that frontend crew?
A. Yes.
Q. So, is it fair to say that in your mind on March 10, 1989, this courtesy and respect, that imputed or regarded in the crew, outweighed your concerns for the amount of snow on the wings?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, is it fair to say then that you were placing this courtesy and respect for the crew before the safety of the aircraft and your safety on March 10, 1989 ?
A. Can you repeat the question?
Q. Is it fair to say that you place this courtesy and this professional respect before your safety and the safety of the aircraft when you saw the snow on the wings .
A. Yes.
The most obvious inference that could be drawn from this evidence is that professional courtesy and respect among pilots are more important than safety. If true, this would represent a dangerous attitude and one that common sense would demand be expunged in no uncertain terms. However, later in cross-examination, Captain Berezuk displayed obvious discomfort with this statement . What he really meant, he indicated, was that he trusted Captain Morwood and that, as a pilot, he had a reluctance to interfere and to offer advice to another pilot who was actually flying the aircraft . He admitted his view of "professional respect" to be his own, and that he was not speaking for other pilots. As a captain, he personally favoured an open flight-deck environment and welcomed information from other crew members, including flight attendants:
Q. Now, I take it, Captain, that, in your mind, as one goes through the training to become even a basic pilot, you go through a rite of passage at the point in time at which you become licensed as a pilot in Canada, and you're something different at that point than you are before ; is that right?
A. I guess it is a feeling that I had, yes .
Q. .. . Even if you're a nervous passenger in a plane, because you're a pilot and because you know the person flying the plane is a pilot, you're reluctant to interfere and offer him advice about flying the airplane
A. Yes.
Q. - generally? And that's kind of, in your mind, an ethic that pilots have?
A. I don't know if any other pilot feels that, but I guess I do.
Q. Now, on the one hand, you feel reluctant to offer advice to another pilot, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. On the other hand, you told my friend Mr Wells that you personally encourage an open-cockpit - I should say an openflight-deck environment; is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. You welcome the flow of information from other members of your flight crew, including flight attendants, about matters of safety; is that right?
A. Yes.
Captain Haines expressed the opinion that pilot respect or professional courtesy should not prevent a professional pilot passenger from drawing the attention of the cockpit crew to a safety problem . In his view there is no unwritten code of pilot respect or courtesy that prevents one pilot from communicating information to another pilot in matters affecting flight safety. He stated:
Q. And I believe you said the professional courtesy would be to tell the pilot what you know that could affect the safety of this flight?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel that most pilots would be of the same mind?
A. I hope so.
Given his stated belief that it was appropriate to do so, the obvious question is why Captain Haines himself did not do anything to draw Captain Morwood's attention to his professional opinion, unequivocally expressed in his testimony, that there was no way the F-28 would successfully take off with the wings contaminated as they were .
The common thread in the evidence of Constable Swift, Mrs Hartwick, Captain Berezuk, and Captain Haines was their expression of reliance on the professionalism of the pilots in the face of perceived danger. There was an assumption by each of them that the cockpit crew was aware of the condition of the wings and that they were dealing with the situation in a proper and safe manner. There is, however, a curious difference between the actions of Constable Swift and those of Captain Berezuk and Captain Haines. Constable Swift, who was not a professional pilot, did not hesitate to make his concerns known to both of the cabin crew members. In contrast, neither Captain Berezuk nor Captain Haines, the professional pilot passengers, made mention of their concerns to either of the flight attendants. Post crash, however, both of these captains testified that, in similar circumstances in future, they would take a different course of action. This is suggestive, in my view, of the validity of Captain Berezuk's notion of an unwritten code of professional courtesy or respect among at least some pilots that militates against the communication of even a perceived life-threatening safety concern to the cockpit crew. There are, however, at least four other factors that could influence an off-duty airline pilot on board an aircraft from making known to the captain his perceived safety concerns: a simple act of faith in the professionalism of the captain; the fear of offending the captain and possible rebuke for unsolicited advice; the fear of embarrassment in the event that the concern expressed proved groundless ; and a reluctance to interfere in the obviously busy cockpit routine prior to takeoff . Whatever the reason, the evidence before this Inquiry points unerringly to the existence of a general reluctance on the part of the cabin crew and the off-duty airline pilot passengers on flight 1363 to intervene in any way with the conduct of the operation of the aircraft by the operating pilots, even in the face of apprehended danger . Evidence was also heard vvith respect to several other unrelated occurrences in which there was a reluctance to communicate information to the cockpit crew . In other incidents, the operating pilots viewed information communicated to them with great scepticism or chose not to act upon it. Mr David Adams recounted his personal experience on board an aircraft shortly after he had participated in the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) investigation at the crash site at Dryden. Mr Adams, who was en route from Thunder Bay to Toronto, boarded an Air Canada 727 aircraft that had been sitting at the gate overnight. On looking out a window prior to takeoff he noted that the wings had approximately a half inch of wet snow on them. He was extremely disturbed by this observation, but was initially hesitant to raise the issue with either of the flight attendants or the pilots . Finally, he spoke to a flight attendant, requesting her to ask the captain when de-icing would occur . The flight attendant complied with his request. and, approximately one and a half minutes later, an announcement was made that the aircraft would be delayed while de-icing took place . It is of some significance that an experienced aircraft accident investigator felt an initial reluctance to deal quickly and assertively with what he perceived to be a dangerous situation. To amplify the point further, Mr Adams referred in his evidence to the crash of a Boeing 737-400 on January 8, 1989, at Kegworth in the United Kingdom. The aircraft had developed an engine vibration and the pilots inadvertently shut down the wrong engine . The aircraft was, as a result, left flying on the engine that was actually experiencing a malfunction . The cabin attendants and a number of passengers on board the aircraft watched sparks, flames, and pieces of the engine being spewed out the rear of the malfunctioning engine, yet no one took the initiative to notify the captain. The aircraft crashed and a number of passengers were killed. Mr Adams aptly summed up a problem that has been identified in several aviation accidents, including that at Dryden: "[I]t's one of those issues where . .. the information to correct the situation is perceived accurately by somebody on board the aircraft, but is not brought to the attention of the people who can do something about it". In order to remove any possible vestige of doubt about the matter, I believe the time has come for air carriers to counsel their pilots that it is appropriate for off-duty airline pilots on board an aircraft as passengers to draw any perceived safety concern to the attention of the captain. In fact, the time has come for all components of the aviation industry, be they regulators, carriers, or industry associations, to support the notion that it is not only acceptable but expected that off-duty airline pilots on board an aircraft as passengers communicate perceived safety concerns without fear of rebuke . Later in the hearings, Captain Charles Simpson, vice-president of flight operations for Air Canada, was asked whether an ethic existed that might inhibit a pilot from expressing a concern . He responded in the negative, and expressed the view that a pilot was obliged, as part of his responsibility as a citizen, to report his concern:
A. No, I think that - I think in fact, I think it's an obligation of a pilot to do that. It's a little like what is the responsibility of a citizen. I think there is a definite responsibility there.
It was refreshing to hear a respected senior officer of a major airline make such a clear and unequivocal statement of principle on a subject I consider to be of great importance to the advancement of aviation safety. Based on the evidence I have heard, and considering the complexity and the size of jet aircraft flying today, there can be little doubt that the cockpit crew can benefit from the eyes and ears of all aboard an aircraft, but especially from those possessing special skills . I will now outline what I perceive to be the most effective solution to the basic flight crew communications problem identified during the hearings of this Inquiry. According to the evidence, an environment of near-complete separation of cabin crew and cockpit crew responsibility appears to have been fostered by Air Ontario management and by some Air Ontario pilots . As a result, flight attendants were discouraged from becoming involved in operational matters and were led to believe they should simply trust the pilots to deal with any operational problems that arose in flight . Mr Adams offered some insight into this ill-advised and short-sighted attitude:
A. If you look at almost any company, you will usually find that the cabin attendants and the flight crew are very very clearly separated. They work for different branches of the company in separated. They work for different branches of the company in most cases. The culture is one of almost complete separation . Yet the fact of the matter is, in a safety situation, these two sections of the company have to work together. And the consequences of not efficiently working together quite often means a bunch of people get killed.
At Air Ontario, prior to the March 10, 1989, crash, the evidence shows that new flight attendants were taught simply to have confidence in the pilots. The report of the human factors and survivability group, introduced into evidence by Mr David Adams, refers to an interview with and a statement given by Mrs Ruthe-Anne Conyngham, manager of in-flight services for Air Ontario, who was responsible for flight attendant training. Mrs Conyngham was asked the following question : "There's been a lot of reports about the contamination on the wings of this aircraft. Would that be something that the flight attendants would look at?" Her reply is telling and sets out what I believe to be the reason for the lack of assertive action by Mrs Say and Mrs Hartwick with regard to the pre-takeoff concern about wing contamination. Both flight attendants, in the view of Mrs Conyngham, conducted themselves in precisely the manner expected of them, based on their training:
... It's just not the mind set that I would be in . I can't believe there would be many flight attendants that would be in the mind set where they would be looking at something like that ... I think it would be a very unusual thing for somebody to look out the window and say gee, I think there is too much something on this wing. It would be remarkable if somebody did that. Extremely exceptional ... I have a lot of confidence in these pilot[s] and the whole safety system in Canada, particularly in Canada . And I think that's instilled in, I instill it certainly in new flight attendants and you have to have, to have confidence in the team and that would be my second reason. That it would sort of be out of character unless something is tremendously blatant, for the flight attendant to question that confidence . .. Statements such as those made by Mrs. Conyngham indicate that Kathy Say and Sonia Hartwick did exactly what the system expected them to do. It also helps explain CA Hartwick's interpretation of Kathy Say's gesture to Officer Swift: "I don't know what that meant. I know what it meant in a way, but again, ITS NOT UP TO US."
WOS event 1991. Worried Observer Status.
As an Airbus pax. BIG heaps of fuel pissing out of the wingtip on a turn off the taxiway to the holding point.
Was going to press the call button but didnt. (very unusual, but what do I know abt 320 fuel vents)..could be an overflow vent due turn, surely the Tower would have seen THAT !
About an hour out, over the Gulf I see the evening sun swing about and commented ...'we are going elsewhere.'
The announcement was made. Back to the start as fuel could not be transferred and would cause an imbalance./upset. In the dark at the start point those that had fallen asleep thought they were in BKK already !
Early morning, 2am off we go again, and about an hour later ..about turn yet again.
Finally get a bunk in town at 6am. Late that arvo the airline called to say the aircraft had been test flown ( very pleased to hear that !) and was ready to go.. again. 3rd time lucky...no leaks, no turn back.!
sheppey
29th Oct 2018, 13:40
Many years ago, colleague of mine (DoT 747 Examiner of Airman) was passenger on a Continental B747 Sydney to Honolulu. Top of descent he heard and felt the power reduce. A few seconds later he felt strong buffeting which he diagnosed as a pre-stall buffet. He heard much power applied, the nose dropped and he again correctly diagnosed a stall recovery. He produced his ID to a cabin member and requested to talk to the captain.
The captain admitted there had been a cock-up and the 747 had indeed stalled. This was clearly a serious matter and the DoT Examiner formally notified the captain he would be subject to a report after landing. At least the DoT Examiner did not shirk from his responsibility to notify the appropriate FAA authority.
redsnail
29th Oct 2018, 14:11
One winter's day in Moscow I was "fortunate" enough to be booked on a Transaero flight from Moscow to London. My colleague said that he was taking the British Airways flight 2 hours later. If he had told me that he saw Aeroflot take off with snow on the wings a week earlier, I would have changed my mind.
As it were, I got on and saw some ice on the wings of the B737 around the engine pylon and the surrounding wing surface. I asked the FA if they were going to de-ice as there was ice on the wing. A few minutes later, she said that the crew said the controls were ok... By now we've pushed back... I think ok, they're going to remote de-ice. Before I could get off the aircraft, we took off... Fortunately the aircraft was only 1/3 full and there was no further precipitation.
After I wrote my safety report, the comments from my assistant chief pilot were not helpful. Nor were my concerns shared by the Safety dept. Note, if a pax of mine reported me taking off with ice on the wings, I suspect I would be fired....
Fortunately, Transaero went bust some time later and I have never flown on Aeroflot.