2008 Learjet 60 accident. Full reverse to uncommanded full forward thrust

[A37575]

The latest Business & Commercial Aviation magazine (October 2018) revisits the fatal accident to a Learjet 60 in USA. The aircraft was destroyed after a high speed aborted take off. The report forms part of an excellent article by James Albright entitled "Beating Murphy's Law."
The following link is applicable.
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/LJ60,_Columbia_SC_USA,_2008

[machtuk]

That's an interesting read. Just goes to show that all the training, the feel good crap we pilots have to endure in a class room every year doesn't mean a thing to some when the span really hits the fan! Self preservation kicks in meaning to stop at all costs!
Humans react differently under real pressure & no amount of training will ever stop that for some.
These sorts of events do at least bring it to ones mind as we do get complacent over time.

[Centaurus]

That's an interesting read. Just goes to show that all the training, the feel good crap we pilots have to endure in a class room every year doesn't mean a thing to some when the span really hits the fan!
B&CA have always had first class flight safety articles written around real events. The column Cause and Circumstance by aviation journalist Richard N. Aarons [email protected] can be compared to the wonderful writings of Macarthur Job of Aviation Safety Digest fame now available on the ATSB website.

The combination of individual events that all came together that resulted in the Learjet 60 crash - well you simply wouldn't read about it. That unfortunate combination of events reminded me of the accident to a B737-200 in Canada. The crew spotted a snow plough on the snow covered runway just as the aircraft had touched down and the pilot had selected full reverse thrust. The pilot quickly cancelled reverse thrust and opened up to full power to rotate and clear the snow plough. The air ground sensor (?) went from ground to air mode leaving one set of clam shell reverse thrust doors still trying to close. As speed increased the air flow forced open the doors on that side and the aircraft yawed and rolled and crashed. At least that was my vague recollection of the circumstances of the accident. Read: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19780211-0

and: https://wikivividly.com/wiki/Pacific_Western_Airlines_Flight_314

[Dora-9]

Centaurus - Isn't that why I was taught that once the reversers have been selected NEVER attempt a go-around?

[machtuk]

Centaurus - Isn't that why I was taught that once the reversers have been selected NEVER attempt a go-around?

That's true, I had that drummed into me years ago but as I mentioned we humans do odd things when under real duress, something you cannot change or train for. Plenty of highly qualified drivers have driven into the sides of mountains in serviceable flying machines. In a confusing situation I think we tend to block out a lot of common sense & react to give us an instant SOS result even if it's incorrect & or not going to work out. The B737 accident into the Potomac River many years ago was an amazing Eg of doing what you believed was right at the time. I recall years ago during a Sim session with a very experienced previous heavy machine skipper during a missed App he turned the wrong way even after we extensively briefed it, why? Who knows not even him, he just did!

[Dora-9]

we humans do odd things when under real duress, something you cannot change or train for.

No arguments from me on that one machtuck. However, one operator I flew for did actually cover this particular scenario (in the sim) quite often. Dirty pool perhaps, but it at least got you to pause before rushing in...

[Centaurus]

turned the wrong way even after we extensively briefed it, why? Who knows not even him, he just did!

Another example: 737-200 take off from a Pacific island runway where the end of the runway was a road and the sea. Wing Body overheat flashed on and off while taxiing for take off then extinguished as aircraft entered the runway. The captain briefed the F/O if the wing body overheat light came on below 80 knots he would abort. After 80 knots he would continue. Exactly as Boeing recommended procedure.

At V1 minus a few knots the wing body overheat and master caution illuminated. To the horror of the F/O the captain aborted and momentarily forgot to select manual speed brake. The 737 came to a stop with its nose wheel almost touching the road.

After shut down, the F/O asked the captain why he had aborted when he had briefed he wouldn't after 80 knots. It was a fair enough question because it had been a very close shave from disaster.
The captain thought for a moment before giving an honest reply. He said he didn't know why he decided to abort. That it was an instinctive reaction to a light coming on when least expected.
That honest answer was worth its weight in gold. Who knows not even him, he just did! Moral of the story? You can't always trust gut instinct. Any decision to abort at high speed must be cold, calculated and above all - disciplined.

[machtuk]

Centy as you would know the aviation annuls are full of "who knows, he just did" & will continue to be so as long as a human is at the controls, unavoidable really all we can do is hope that it doesn't happen to us:-) I'll admit one day many years ago just after taking off single pilot in a PA31 a type I was very famil with I forgot to pull the gear up, only realized it when the TWR said confirm Ops normal? Apart from feeling like a dick to this day I never did find a valid reason why I left the gear down...…….."I just did":-)

[MagnumPI]

OP, I'm not sure if this is covered in the Business & Commercial Aviation article as I don't have a copy of the magazine but I'm pretty certain that one of the two surviving accident passengers was the musician Travis Barker, drummer for Blink 182. Sadly, the other survivor went on to commit suicide (or OD) not too long after the crash.

I recall reading an interview with Barker about the crash. After you read his account of what happened I wouldn't blame him for not wanting to ever fly again. Very sad incident and tragic that the Captain did not listen to the FO who, I understand, was encouraging the Captain to continue the takeoff.

From the NTSB report:


The captain initiated the takeoff roll, and, at 2355:00.1,9 the first officer stated, “eighty knots. Crosscheck,” to which the captain replied, “check.” At 2355:10.5, the first officer reported, “V-one.” About 1.5 seconds later, the CVR captured the beginning of a loud rumbling sound. Postaccident sound spectrum and airplane performance studies10 indicated that the airplane’s position on the runway at the onset of the loud rumbling sound corresponded with the location where the first main landing gear (MLG) tire fragments were found. Four-tenths second after the beginning of the loud rumbling sound, the first officer stated, “go,” the captain stated something unintelligible, and, at 2355:13.0, the first officer stated, “go go go.” The CVR recorded a sound similar to a metallic click, and, at 2355:14.0, the captain stated, “go?” Postaccident sound spectrum and airplane performance studies estimated that, about this time, the airplane’s ground speed reached a peak of about 144 kts. The first officer then stated, “no? ar- alright. Get ah what the [expletive] was that?” The CVR recorded another metallic click sound, and, at 2355:17.0, the captain stated, “I don’t know. We’re not goin’ though.”