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faheel
28th Sep 2018, 02:16
An airport official from the Federated States of Micronesia’s Division of Civil Aviation confirmed that an Air Niugini (http://www.airniugini.com.pg/) plane crash landed in Chuuk this morning.

Thirty six passengers are all safe, according to Jimmy Emilio, Chuuk airport manager.The flight was attempting to land at the airport in Weno, Emilio said. Instead, it landed in the lagoon in front of the air strip. According to Air Niugini, the airline started twice weekly air services between Port Moresby and the FSM in December 2016.

TWT
28th Sep 2018, 02:33
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/760x658/5bad7b75074e2_image_0973f26d91704e7ceaf11848e6725e726aee88c5 .png


https://www.postguam.com/news/local/air-niugini-plane-crash-in-chuuk-confirmed/article_f889e4b6-c2b7-11e8-9ac9-c7d0716bea7b.html

markis10
28th Sep 2018, 02:35
Oh dear

https://www.postguam.com/news/local/air-niugini-flight-crashes-in-chuuk-faa-confirms/article_f889e4b6-c2b7-11e8-9ac9-c7d0716bea7b.html

The Federal Aviation Administration's Guam office has confirmed that an Air Niugini plane crashed in waters in Chuuk state after it may have overshot a runway earlier today.

No serious injury has been reported.

Air Niugini Flight 73 was scheduled to take off at 9:55 a.m. from the airport on Weno island in Chuuk state, in the Federated States of Micronesia. It was bound for Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea.

Koan
28th Sep 2018, 02:35
Breaking story ABC reports pax and crew safe.

Plane overshoots runway in Micronesia and lands in ocean - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-28/flight-lands-in-a-lagoon-off-micronesia/10316434)

witwiw
28th Sep 2018, 02:51
Is Chuuk grooved, was it wet? Was it raining at the time, the position of the F/O's wiper in the photo in Post 2 might be a clue?

The background weather looks a bit ominous.

.https://amp.rnz.co.nz/article/88577992-e7a4-49a5-804f-7778bdc77ce8

tail wheel
28th Sep 2018, 02:55
Plane overshoots runway in Micronesia and lands in ocean - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-28/flight-lands-in-a-lagoon-off-micronesia/10316434)

krismiler
28th Sep 2018, 03:06
I'm sure many people saw this coming given the recent turmoil in ANG. Not a case of if but when.

olderairhead
28th Sep 2018, 03:07
Been advised crew OK Capt, minor injuries and able to speak to the CEO

Kiwiconehead
28th Sep 2018, 04:09
able to speak to the CEO

That will reassure him then, a nice chat with King Julien.

The first thing he asked me after I had been robbed in the PX Hangar carpark - "was it a real gun"

Duck Pilot
28th Sep 2018, 04:52
Looking at the current and recent weather at Chuuk, the weather at the time was absolutely crap, pretty deep low pressure system in the area spinning up a lot of moisture and wind.

Have a look on Windy TV you will see what I mean.

The Pirate
28th Sep 2018, 04:57
PTKK is 1833 m long and grooved. Direction 04/22. So not a long runway........

TBM-Legend
28th Sep 2018, 05:59
Air Niugini Press Statement issued at 12.30PM today

Advises that P2-PXE landed "short" of the runway so the stuff about being a short runway isn't correct

Magnetomick
28th Sep 2018, 06:53
BUGGER, Okey dokey I’ve just changed to QF for tomorrow Brisbane POM

gulliBell
28th Sep 2018, 07:15
36 passengers wouldn't make it a very profitable route. Dropping the balus in the tide make it even less so.

So a salvage team is on the way from NZ. Good luck with that, she totally buggerup. Just drag it to deeper water and turn it into a dive wreck.

witwiw
28th Sep 2018, 07:23
Is there a link to the Press Release?

TWT
28th Sep 2018, 07:27
There's a press statement on Air Niugini's website.

gulliBell
28th Sep 2018, 07:32
There's a press statement on Air Niugini's website.

Yeah, and at the bottom of the press release, this....

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/479x155/screen_shot_2018_09_28_at_14_31_35_d0b000d649a0e046c4861d3cb 10ce82f9baff84b.png

tpng conehead
28th Sep 2018, 10:21
Madang was an overshoot, Chuuk to short.
Averages out.
Bet this brings a response.

tpng conehead
28th Sep 2018, 10:27
Once the salt water enters the wiring, forget it.

chimbu warrior
28th Sep 2018, 11:11
In the interests of accuracy it should be pointed out that Chuuk is 550 nm south east of Guam, and in another country albeit with very strong links to the US.

Anyhow, frees up a bit of tarmac space for APEC.

krismiler
28th Sep 2018, 11:32
Being reported as landing short of the runway, which given the weather, makes it very similar to Lionair in Bali

Air Niugini Aircraft Crashes Short of the Runway in Micronesia (http://aviationtribune.com/safety/air-niugini-aircraft-crashes-short-of-the-runway-in-micronesia/)

Another site is listing it as an overshoot, but the video interview with a survivor indicates coming in very low, landing hard and seeing water entering the cabin which would imply landing short.

https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/national/survivor-of-air-niugini-plane-crash-speaks-of-fear-after-aircraft-overshot-chuuk-runway/video/3d945808a39530f33d689c913dbd6491

gulliBell
28th Sep 2018, 11:44
well, I wouldn't imply anything from that....my money is landing long on 04 and going off the end into the sea, ending up more-or-less pointing in the direction it was going.

TBM-Legend
28th Sep 2018, 12:37
Another site is listing it as an overshoot, but the video interview with a survivor indicates coming in very low, landing hard and seeing water entering the cabin which would imply landing short.


Air Niugini press statement says it landed short...

megan
28th Sep 2018, 14:13
You need to read all the press chaps. Some say it occurred during take off. :sad:

tripelapidgeon
28th Sep 2018, 14:19
Oh dear Pixes newest aircraft bites the dust . (2005)

Other 800 (2001). Rest of fleet ancient.

Wondering if PX have the approvals to do RNAV approaches.

Rumour has crew were doing them anyway (RPLL) as the minima was much lower than the VOR.

All will be revealed if a proper investigation is carried out. All the rest is speculative rumour perhaps based on some fact as above.

​​​​​​Seen on other forums the crew being called incompetent. Perhaps not the crew that was broken but the PX system.

lucille
28th Sep 2018, 16:54
Oh dear Pixes newest aircraft bites the dust . (2005)

Other 800 (2001). Rest of fleet ancient.

Wondering if PX have the approvals to do RNAV approaches.

Rumour has crew were doing them anyway (RPLL) as the minima was much lower than the VOR.

All will be revealed if a proper investigation is carried out. All the rest is speculative rumour perhaps based on some fact as above.

​​​​​​Seen on other forums the crew being called incompetent. Perhaps not the crew that was broken but the PX system.

In no way am I justifying operating without approvals, but performing a published RNAV approach is unlikely to have been the primary cause of this incident.

To date no one knows if it was an undershoot or an overrun.Eitherway, unless there has been a systems malfunction, it does not look good for the crew.

The greater systems malfunction may well be the entire airline’s culture amd ethos brought about by two years of brutal pilot bashing by its senior management.

Time will tell.

TBM-Legend
29th Sep 2018, 01:27
Air Nuigini - Press StatementBulletin Number 3 issued at 6:00pm (POM TIME), Date: 28.09.2018Air Niugini further advises that it has scheduled a special flight for company personnel tomorrow morning to take airline management to provide assistance to passengers and crew who were on PX 073, the Boeing 737-800 aircraft that landed short at Chuuk International airport runway today.

This will include the company doctor to assist with treatment of few passengers who had injuries from the incident.

The special flight will be available to allow those passengers who wish to complete their trip to Port Moresby and onward to their final destinations.

Air Niugini has also arranged hotel accommodation for the other 27 passengers and 12 crew members.

We will provide more information as it becomes available.

Following are the media call centre numbers.

PNG Media Call Centre: (675) 327 3378/ 327 3221
International Media Call Centre: +1 407 205 1814
Email: [email protected]

Corporate Communications Department
Friday 28th September 2018

tripelapidgeon
29th Sep 2018, 02:25
I was not intimating that doing an RNAV without approval in anyway contributed to this accident but it certainly opens up a legal can of worms.

A bit like the PX Boeing fleet office giving tasid approval to conduct Autolands in POM below the CAT 1 minima in preference to diverting.

As we all know conducting LVO operations involves far more than just aircraft capability. Not withstanding the POM ILS is only CAT 1.

All in the name of getting the job done.

And yes I agree time will tell.

Traffic_Is_Er_Was
29th Sep 2018, 04:04
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/760x658/5bad7b75074e2_image_0973f26d91704e7ceaf11848e6725e726aee88c5 .png


https://www.postguam.com/news/local/air-niugini-plane-crash-in-chuuk-confirmed/article_f889e4b6-c2b7-11e8-9ac9-c7d0716bea7b.html


Depending on how high it was initially floating in the water, I'm amazed they managed to get that door open against the pressure of the water outside.

Pastor of Muppets
29th Sep 2018, 05:05
I hope this is not more “deselecting speed is dangerous son, the thrust levers might advance after you land”

Bend alot
29th Sep 2018, 05:40
One must assume that they did not open the over wing exits if they were under water!

Rumour is they exited over wing and FWD exits.

nzaviate
29th Sep 2018, 06:42
In Saturday NZHerald on line

Max Tow
29th Sep 2018, 07:53
Will the Mods ever get round to correcting the title of this thread? It was neither an "overun" (sic) nor at Guam.

PigsArse
29th Sep 2018, 08:25
I hope this is not more “deselecting speed is dangerous son, the thrust levers might advance after you land”
You need a certain auto throttle mode in order to fly an airplane?
It still wouldn’t of prevented the aircraft landing short.

rog747
29th Sep 2018, 08:38
Over on the Pprune R & N forum most folk there are still pontificating after 3 pages of posts whether the accident was an undershoot, overshoot or an RTO...

In my mind it's always been an undershoot - as stated by the passengers and the airline, plus as AVHerald reports.

Can anyone here in the Antipodes enlighten the Western world please?

Pastor of Muppets
29th Sep 2018, 09:15
Thanks PigsArse, nice to cop another hefty dose of agrogance!
No, I don’t “need” an auto-throttle to fly an airplane but it certainly helps unload a busy situation, particularly when the reason for switching it off makes little sense.
Yes, I believe leaving auto-throttle active (for under-speed protection) could HAVE helped in a couple of cases, we shall see if this another.

Ken Borough
29th Sep 2018, 09:29
12 crew members

Why so many on a B737-800?

Max Tow
29th Sep 2018, 10:01
Perhaps to do with previous night's diversion same aircraft from same airport if FR24 is correct?

Dewa_Gede_70
29th Sep 2018, 10:37
Why so many on a B737-800?

Just in case they need to do an emergency evacuation due to a water landing 😜

zanzibar
29th Sep 2018, 11:54
Depending on how high it was initially floating in the water, I'm amazed they managed to get that door open against the pressure of the water outside.

Not really. As soon as the handle is rotated, the door actually moves in (in this case it would be helped to do so by the water pressure) and exposes gaps all around the perimeter.
With the gap at the bottom and lower sides, water would enter and the pressure soon equalise - more or less.

An old 4WD piece of common sense in river crossings if things go pear shaped and you need to get out - let the water in first so that you are not trying to open the door against the water pressure. In the car it is a case of opening a window to achieve this, then evacuate. Getting the door off the stops in a 737 would have the same effect.

Oakape
29th Sep 2018, 20:51
Depending on how high it was initially floating in the water, I'm amazed they managed to get that door open against the pressure of the water outside.

Traffic Is Er Was - The door sill is above the water when the aircraft is floating, as shown in other footage. The photo in your post shows the aircraft well after it has begun to sink.

lucille
29th Sep 2018, 21:07
I was not intimating that doing an RNAV without approval in anyway contributed to this accident but it certainly opens up a legal can of worms.

A bit like the PX Boeing fleet office giving tasid approval to conduct Autolands in POM below the CAT 1 minima in preference to diverting.

As we all know conducting LVO operations involves far more than just aircraft capability. Not withstanding the POM ILS is only CAT 1.

All in the name of getting the job done.

And yes I agree time will tell.

My apologies. I misunderstood.

Autolands in POM in sub Cat 1 conditions? Yikes.Now that is a seriously stupid way to try and save the cost of a diversion.

So according the PX press release, so it looks like it was an undershoot and a near perfect water landing that even Sully would have been proud of.🤪

The Banjo
29th Sep 2018, 21:44
Maybe they tried an autoland off the RNAV approach....

Traffic_Is_Er_Was
30th Sep 2018, 01:15
Traffic Is Er Was - The door sill is above the water when the aircraft is floating, as shown in other footage. The photo in your post shows the aircraft well after it has begun to sink.
Thanks, which is why I said "depending on how high it was initially floating".
Zanzibar - Thanks. I am aware of that 4WD (or any vehicle in water) tip. If however, that door is the only way for the water to get in, the water coming in will not level until it reaches the top of the door, given that the aircraft is sinking, not sitting on the bottom semi submerged) thus trying to push it open against any further resulting inrush as it opens further will be very difficult. I reckon it had to be opened prior to the sill going under.

45989
30th Sep 2018, 01:41
Probably a lesson for the children of the Magenta Line,

PigsArse
30th Sep 2018, 01:44
Hi Pastor of Muppets
I'm all for the use of automation to reduce pilot workload, however its limitations must be clearly understood and its performance monitored closely.
May I humbly suggest you read the reports of Asiana Airlines into SFO and Turkish Airlines into Amsterdam. Both which highlight the over reliance of crew that the auto throttle will protect them and the failure to monitor both it and the aircraft.
As to the use or lack there of of automation in this particular accident I'm not going to speculate.

Petropavlovsk
30th Sep 2018, 13:05
Does anyone know if the CVR and FDR have been recovered.?
Will they go to an independent laboratory for analysis?
Do the PX crew and aircraft have GNSS/P-RNAV/RNP App, etc, or are they reliant on ground based Navaids?

tripelapidgeon
1st Oct 2018, 02:24
Does anyone know if the CVR and FDR have been recovered.?
Will they go to an independent laboratory for analysis?
Do the PX crew and aircraft have GNSS/P-RNAV/RNP App, etc, or are they reliant on ground based Navaids?
The FAA assists the administration of Aviation Activities in the FSM. Therefore the NTSB will be the lead investigative authority.

ThereISlifeafterQF
1st Oct 2018, 02:34
The FAA assists the administration of Aviation Activities in the FSM. Therefore the NTSB will be the lead investigative authority.
AIC have had their own FDR / CVR download capability for a couple of years now. Not sure of how efficient they are at producing the reports, though I imagine that with the interest in this one - given the "APEC2018" on the side of the aircraft there might be a few attending nations that will want to find out what actually happened - before they start letting their staffers fly them....

gulliBell
1st Oct 2018, 03:04
Does anyone know if the CVR and FDR have been recovered.?


My guess, they're sitting in about 100' of water on the bottom of Truk lagoon, with all the other war relics.

Petropavlovsk
1st Oct 2018, 03:37
gulliBell,

This would be simple task for the US Navy Team with a gas axe and a pair of pliers. A 100' dive is nothing and a Google search will tell them where the devices are located.
It's more about PNG AIC getting hold of both these devices and "accidently" rendering them unreadable.... this is PNG and it's the land of the unexpected!

tripelapidgeon
1st Oct 2018, 03:49
gulliBell,

This would be simple task for the US Navy Team with a gas axe and a pair of pliers. A 100' dive is nothing and a Google search will tell them where the devices are located.
It's more about PNG AIC getting hold of both these devices and "accidently" rendering them unreadable.... this is PNG and it's the land of the unexpected!
It is not up to the PNG Authority . The accident did not occur in the Independent state of Papua New Guinea. The PNG AIC may be invited to observe.

Same as what happens in Australia if an incident/accident occurs it does not matter the state of registration of the Aircraft the ATSB does the investigation and owns the DFDR and CVR. Have a look at the ICAO articles of which PNG is a contracting state.

Buckshot
1st Oct 2018, 05:48
https://www.instagram.com/p/BoXh60-Ao79/?hl=en&taken-by=trafego_aereo

DaveReidUK
1st Oct 2018, 07:53
The FAA assists the administration of Aviation Activities in the FSM. Therefore the NTSB will be the lead investigative authority.

Annex 13 puts the responsibility for an accident investigation in the hands of the State of Occurrence - in this case, the FSM, who can, if they wish, delegate any or all parts of the investigation to another body such as the NTSB.

But protocol demands that any release of information from the investigation should come from, or with the permission of, the responsible authority. AFAIK the report on the last accident in the FSM (a runway overrun at PTPN by an Asia Pacific AL B722 freighter in 2008) is still awaited, so don't hold your breath.

Duck Pilot
1st Oct 2018, 19:49
According to information from the other thread running on PPRuNe the missing pax has been found in the aeroplane.

Media reports now confirm this, terrible outcome.

Centaurus
2nd Oct 2018, 03:22
It will be a long time before the full circumstances of this accident will be made public by the relevant State authorities. That said, reports appear to confirm the crew pressed on below the MDA in poor forward visibility caused by heavy rain showers. The circumstances were similar to the Lion Air crash into the water on short final at Bali. No doubt there have been countless similar accidents. One of which was at Kai Tak Airport Hong Kong on 31 August 1988 where CAAC Flight 301, a Hawker Siddeley Trident, crashed on short final for Runway 31 while landing in poor visibility. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAAC_Flight_301

That (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAAC_Flight_301That )report stated in summary that the cause of the accident was a combination of pilot error and bad visibility; A cause common to so many similar accidents.
In the 1950's the USAF Instrument Flying School conducted a series of trials using a North American Sabreliner See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Sabreliner . The purpose was to observe the pilots conduct in very low visibility approach and landings manually flown. It was found that in many earlier accidents involving poor forward visibility, both pilots went heads up approaching the DH and because both were staring through the windscreen trying to spot the runway, they not only failed to detect the aircraft going below the glide slope but also failed to detect a high sink rate caused sometimes by inappropriate power reduction by the PF .

The reason for both pilots going heads up seeking visual cues at low altitude was put down to a survival instinct syndrome. It takes discipline for the PM to stay heads down while the PF is looking ahead hoping to see enough to land safely. The PF is subject to visual illusions especially if heavy rain impinges on the windscreen and a false horizon is seen but not realised until too late. If the PM tries to sneak a glance up through the windscreen in an attempt to spot the runway when he should have the discipline to stay heads down to catch any unwanted descent below a glide slope or inadvertent increase in sink rate, the chances of both pilots being subject to a false horizon is very high. It becomes a case of who is minding the shop, so to speak

Many years ago, the former Ansett Airlines had a SOP where the PM was required to make a call at 500 feet on all approaches (visual or IMC) of the current height, airspeed and VSI (sink rate) reading. Hence a typical call could be: "500 feet - Bug plus five - Sink 800" Of course things could go awry below 500 feet and hopefully one of the two pilots would pick this up. But what that call did was to force the PM to go heads down to read the current state of the flight instruments. The PF would also be aware of his own instrument indications of course.

Having extensive experience at landing in heavy rain at several Pacific atolls, and aware of the insidious effect caused by false horizons in heavy rain, this writer had a personal SOP when approaching to land in heavy rain or poor forward visibility and that was a request for the PM to give an additional call-out at 200 feet agl of height, speed and sink rate. That was because by then as well as flying on instruments, I would be glancing up peering ahead looking for visual cues possibly through a rain affected windscreen and thus be subject to visual illusions. If the PM called an out of tolerance reading of his instruments at 200 feet, there would be enough reaction time and energy to make a go-around. While admittedly pure speculation, the precaution of a 200 feet agl call by the PM may have gone some way to preventing the Air Nuigini accident at Truk. As it was, its a good bet that both pilots were heads up looking for the runway in blinding rain at the time of impact with the water.

olderairhead
2nd Oct 2018, 03:44
PX is not having a good time. A Fokker just had an engine failure when lining up at Jackson's.

gulliBell
2nd Oct 2018, 05:04
PX is not having a good time. A Fokker just had an engine failure when lining up at Jackson's.

Which is the best place to have an engine failure if you're ever going to have one.

gulliBell
2nd Oct 2018, 05:17
It will be a long time before the full circumstances of this accident will be made public by the relevant State authorities. That said, reports appear to confirm the crew pressed on below the MDA in poor forward visibility caused by heavy rain showers. etc etc

I hear what you say. But the bottom line is, you get to the MAPT and you either have the required visual reference or you don't. The guy who is monitoring the approach is responsible for that call. If you have the required visual reference you can see where you're going and what's ahead of you and presumably therefore you don't fly it into the brine. If you don't have the required visual reference it gets called at that point and you execute the published missed. This whole unfortunate situation should have been resolved at 2.2nm from the runway with one of two standard calls "Visual, continue" or "Not visual, go around". There is no 3rd choice. You don't resolve it with both guys looking out the window through the pouring rain in search of a runway that should have been visible from a point well behind you.

DHC8 Driver
2nd Oct 2018, 05:59
It will be a long time before the full circumstances of this accident will be made public by the relevant State authorities. That said, reports appear to confirm the crew pressed on below the MDA in poor forward visibility caused by heavy rain showers. The circumstances were similar to the Lion Air crash into the water on short final at Bali. No doubt there have been countless similar accidents. One of which was at Kai Tak Airport Hong Kong on 31 August 1988 where CAAC Flight 301, a Hawker Siddeley Trident, crashed on short final for Runway 31 while landing in poor visibility. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAAC_Flight_301

That (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAAC_Flight_301That )report stated in summary that the cause of the accident was a combination of pilot error and bad visibility; A cause common to so many similar accidents.
In the 1950's the USAF Instrument Flying School conducted a series of trials using a North American Sabreliner See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Sabreliner . The purpose was to observe the pilots conduct in very low visibility approach and landings manually flown. It was found that in many earlier accidents involving poor forward visibility, both pilots went heads up approaching the DH and because both were staring through the windscreen trying to spot the runway, they not only failed to detect the aircraft going below the glide slope but also failed to detect a high sink rate caused sometimes by inappropriate power reduction by the PF .

The reason for both pilots going heads up seeking visual cues at low altitude was put down to a survival instinct syndrome. It takes discipline for the PM to stay heads down while the PF is looking ahead hoping to see enough to land safely. The PF is subject to visual illusions especially if heavy rain impinges on the windscreen and a false horizon is seen but not realised until too late. If the PM tries to sneak a glance up through the windscreen in an attempt to spot the runway when he should have the discipline to stay heads down to catch any unwanted descent below a glide slope or inadvertent increase in sink rate, the chances of both pilots being subject to a false horizon is very high. It becomes a case of who is minding the shop, so to speak

Many years ago, the former Ansett Airlines had a SOP where the PM was required to make a call at 500 feet on all approaches (visual or IMC) of the current height, airspeed and VSI (sink rate) reading. Hence a typical call could be: "500 feet - Bug plus five - Sink 800" Of course things could go awry below 500 feet and hopefully one of the two pilots would pick this up. But what that call did was to force the PM to go heads down to read the current state of the flight instruments. The PF would also be aware of his own instrument indications of course.

Having extensive experience at landing in heavy rain at several Pacific atolls, and aware of the insidious effect caused by false horizons in heavy rain, this writer had a personal SOP when approaching to land in heavy rain or poor forward visibility and that was a request for the PM to give an additional call-out at 200 feet agl of height, speed and sink rate. That was because by then as well as flying on instruments, I would be glancing up peering ahead looking for visual cues possibly through a rain affected windscreen and thus be subject to visual illusions. If the PM called an out of tolerance reading of his instruments at 200 feet, there would be enough reaction time and energy to make a go-around. While admittedly pure speculation, the precaution of a 200 feet agl call by the PM may have gone some way to preventing the Air Nuigini accident at Truk. As it was, its a good bet that both pilots were heads up looking for the runway in blinding rain at the time of impact with the water.

assuming they were doing an instrument approach in PTKK (NDB or RNAV) min visibility is 2.5 miles (4000m). If they didn’t have that visibility they shouldn’t have been continuing the approach. Simple as that.

Toruk Macto
2nd Oct 2018, 06:44
Do they have approach Bans ?

TBM-Legend
2nd Oct 2018, 07:21
Understand Capt is PNG national ex-military and F/O is an expat....

RetiredTooEarly
2nd Oct 2018, 08:41
The latest scuttlebuck coming back from the most reliable sources of all (The Crew Room) appear to confirm that the National Captain and Phillipino First Officer were both relatively inexperienced on type and had only flown into Chuuk once before ...... totally unconfirmed of course!

What does make more sense is that BOTH PILOTS were (supposedly) concentrating solely on trying to locate the runway ahead in heavy showers and NOBODY was watching inside to see how the airspeed/altitude were going!

The well known "are we visual or ain't we?" Of interest will be if the GPWS ever activated as it would have been on the 737 for sure, hopefully operational and should have provided more than adequate warning to the crew???

Also appears that the 737 was fully configured for landing and splashed down in quite shallow water - not a bad landing really all things considered!

Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all with the 737 yet to be decided maybe -and dare I say it but after 25 years with PX, I can assure you all that the C & T is a major concern to everybody in the pilot corp!

The new CEO (ex Qantas) will have his hands full pulling PX out of the ditch and will hopefully address the ever-worsening C & T situation plus what appears to be the usual rapid localization of national Pilots into the LHS!

PX! One day a rooster - the next a feather duster!

A true tragedy!

SIUYA
2nd Oct 2018, 09:23
Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade
Care to elaborate? :confused: ASN showing only 2 – PXY at Madang, and PXE at Chuuk. Airfleets.net showing one (PXY), but that’s not been updated to include PXE.Not too sure if the BBQ at Mendi can be attributed to PX either, because the aircraft was on the ground shut down at the time of the event, and from what I heard, the BBQ was beyond the control of PX. So I don’t really think that one counts. I’d really like to know about the other 3 in the last ten years though.

gulliBell
2nd Oct 2018, 10:01
..Of interest will be if the GPWS ever activated as it would have been on the 737 for sure

What logic would trigger a GPWS warning when the aircraft is in a landing configuration, and the aircraft position makes sense in relation to the runway and any surrounding obstacles? If you're barrelling along on final approach with the gear down and at the right speed and descent rate, but not being able to see where you're going, I bet you can splatter it on the runway, or just short of it, or just past it, without the GPWS logic being triggered.

mauswara
2nd Oct 2018, 11:33
Your suspicions are correct Gullibell, the NG gives NO alert "In shallow descent, in Landing configuration". But should have ( Mode 6) Aural RA callouts: "100,50,40,30,20 & 10" although might be hard to hear above the noise of (heavy?) rain & "thrashing" 73 wiper blades.

patagonianworelaud
2nd Oct 2018, 11:36
if the GPWS ever activated as it would have been on the 737 and without the GPWS logic being triggered

The EGPWS is generally inhibited in the landing configuration . You will get "glideslope" if you're high or low and have an ILS dialled up (or "too low flaps" if not configured properly) but otherwise nothing if things are put out correctly. If you're on slope/on speed and intentionally approaching the ground, why would you want an EGPWS alert?

gulliBell
2nd Oct 2018, 12:44
..If you're on slope/on speed and intentionally approaching the ground, why would you want an EGPWS alert?

Exactly...which is how I'm familiar with it working...(and I wasn't the one who suggested the GPWS may have provided some warning prior to splash down).

DHC8 Driver
2nd Oct 2018, 18:56
Do they have approach Bans ?

No one has permission to descend below the MDA without the required visibility and if you lose it below the MDA you’re supposed to go around. Nothing to do with approach bans.

Duck Pilot
2nd Oct 2018, 19:49
Approach bans aren’t implemented in the PNG regs, nor are they in any PNG operator’s SOPs to my knowledge.

Capt Fathom
3rd Oct 2018, 00:53
EGPWS / TAWS

There is a warning that ignores the fact you are configured for landing. It is based purely on the terrain database
around each airport and where you are in relation to the runway.

"TOO LOW TERRAIN" : alert issued when descending below a safe radio altitude while far from a runway.

In this case, they were probably too close to the runway for a warning to be issued!

TBM-Legend
3rd Oct 2018, 01:12
Looking at the picture of it in the water with the hills behind it on the left hand side it can only be on approach to Rwy 22. Check it out on Google Earth.

Vref+5
3rd Oct 2018, 02:27
Does the 737 EGPWS have the Terrain Clearance Floor function? It's designed to stop precisely this type of accident. I had it activate when I was landing on a new parallel runway, NDB had been updated so we had the approach, but the GPWS database hadn't been:

https://aerocontent.honeywell.com/aero/common/documents/Terrain_Clearance_Floor.pdf

fdr
3rd Oct 2018, 02:37
No one has permission to descend below the MDA without the required visibility and if you lose it below the MDA you’re supposed to go around. Nothing to do with approach bans.

And yet, there is now a new artificial reef in the lagoon, so apparently some groups didn't get that memo. Thing is, humans continuously breach rules in small and large extents, with best of intentions and for other reasons. Sometimes, the fact that humans do not follow rules well is the reason that outcomes are successful. The crew at PTKK probably didn't wake up in the morning thinking it was a great day to go swimming and revalidate their SEP's.

People bust rules, hardware just busts. Question is from a systems view how to harden the operation to assure outcomes don't include tears or repacking of liferafts.

splat72
3rd Oct 2018, 03:08
The problem at PX is greater than 1 crew possibly breaking minimum and crashing a plane,
Why after 5 years of having the 737 fleet are they not approved for GNSS, Why do Captains who struggled on the Fokker fleet now flourish in the 737 fleet, Why has the training department been slashed to a fraction of its previous budget.

A lot of the answers to these questions and many more are a result of the piss poor management practice of Foo and
Taufa.
Foo was warned directly 2 years ago that FSM was going to end in tears if they continued to cut corners.

They ignored it...........

neville_nobody
3rd Oct 2018, 03:21
Maybe it's time to bring back the rain repellent on the 737. After all that is what it was certified with originally.

TBM-Legend
3rd Oct 2018, 03:50
Swiss cheese methinks...

...still single
3rd Oct 2018, 04:10
Maybe it's time to bring back the rain repellent on the 737. After all that is what it was certified with originally.


I don't think repellent will cope with THAT much water, but maybe it would help it float some...

Stationair8
3rd Oct 2018, 04:43
In today’s The Australian, Australian aviation consultant Randal McFarlane said it was a “catastrophic accident “ for Air Niugini.

gulliBell
3rd Oct 2018, 04:58
Well yeah...loss of an aircraft and death of a passenger is catastrophic for any airline, particularly a National Carrier.

TBM-Legend
3rd Oct 2018, 05:31
What else is it if not catastrophic when your newest B737-800 crashes, a person killed and a big hit to a relatively small fleet?

FYSTI
3rd Oct 2018, 05:42
I'm glad the lack of rain repellent is mentioned, although the hydrophobic coating is better than nothing if it is fresh. Do PX have the coating? The B737 windscreen is difficult to see through with water on the windows in even moderate rain, the wipers only giving you a "flash" of vision as they sweep.

Actual forward visibility through the window vs stationary observer vis is another issue. A stationary observer measurement can meet the requirements without being concerned by rain on the windows. There are scenario's where you can get visual at the MAP on minimum visibility, but have not yet flown into the shower, then hit the "wall of water" and have the window obscured by the water and you lose visual reference suddenly. As pilots, we are concerned with actual forward vision through the window, not some stationary measurement.

At least with HUD equipped 737's the LHS should be getting a series of snapshots with the wiper sweep of the runway without having change their focus from inside to outside (takes a finite time to accommodate the focal length change, increases with age) at a crucial point with difficult forward vision.

I'm not suggesting these issues came into play in this accident, just the type of issues that the B737 has with its flat windows and rainfall in the visual segment.

tripelapidgeon
3rd Oct 2018, 06:30
The problem at PX is greater than 1 crew possibly breaking minimum and crashing a plane,
Why after 5 years of having the 737 fleet are they not approved for GNSS, Why do Captains who struggled on the Fokker fleet now flourish in the 737 fleet, Why has the training department been slashed to a fraction of its previous budget.

A lot of the answers to these questions and many more are a result of the piss poor management practice of Foo and
Taufa.
Foo was warned directly 2 years ago that FSM was going to end in tears if they continued to cut corners.

They ignored it...........


Yes Toofar , Simple Simon and the HR manager of the year have much to answer for . Of course they will never be held to account but I sincerely hope that the death of a passenger weighs heavily on their minds.

But it's not just them but the current CEO King Julien and the current EMFO CM who were an intricate part of the previous management team.

One could also add the top two in the Boeing fleet office GG and KR who allowed standards to slip and always bent in the breeze to managements whims. Never saying a word.

Congratulations one and all for a job well done I am sure you are celebrating.

olderairhead
3rd Oct 2018, 07:23
Let's just hope that when the investigation really gets underway that the fleet managers tell the truth about the constant interfering of senior management on who gets what job and who passes tests that they have really failed.

IMHO this interferance is the very start of the holes aligning.

We all knew it was occurring but nothing was ever done about it. We all knew there was an accident waiting to happen and and now it has. Will it be the last? Not if the current interferance continues.

Maybe, just maybe if people tell the truth there is a chance, but I doubt it.
​​​​​

DHC8 Driver
3rd Oct 2018, 07:38
And yet, there is now a new artificial reef in the lagoon, so apparently some groups didn't get that memo. Thing is, humans continuously breach rules in small and large extents, with best of intentions and for other reasons. Sometimes, the fact that humans do not follow rules well is the reason that outcomes are successful. The crew at PTKK probably didn't wake up in the morning thinking it was a great day to go swimming and revalidate their SEP's.

People bust rules, hardware just busts. Question is from a systems view how to harden the operation to assure outcomes don't include tears or repacking of liferafts.

I totally agree with you. That’s why aviation requires strict oversight, auditing and enforcement. If you want to find where the holes in the cheese start look at the regulator - so cozy in bed with the management at ANG. I just wish to top cats at ICAO would read this forum and decide to do a proper and thorough audit of PNG CASA. Then they would ban every PNG carrier from international operations.

DHC8 Driver
3rd Oct 2018, 07:40
[QUOTE=DHC8 Driver;10264633]

I totally agree with you. That’s why aviation requires strict oversight, auditing and enforcement. If you want to find where the holes in the cheese start look at the regulator - so cozy in bed with the management at ANG. I just wish the top cats at ICAO would read this forum and decide to do a proper and thorough audit of PNG CASA. Then they would ban every PNG carrier from international operations.

TBM-Legend
3rd Oct 2018, 11:01
It is said that they were doing a circling approach and lost sight of the runway...

DaveReidUK
3rd Oct 2018, 11:21
It is said that they were doing a circling approach and lost sight of the runway...

"It is said" - by whom ?

Section28- BE
3rd Oct 2018, 12:20
"In today’s The Australian, Australian aviation consultant Randal McFarlane said it was a “catastrophic accident “ for Air Niugini.

OMG- Struth/Wow... Really!!

S28....

C-19
3rd Oct 2018, 22:25
Care to elaborate? :confused: ASN showing only 2 – PXY at Madang, and PXE at Chuuk. Airfleets.net showing one (PXY), but that’s not been updated to include PXE.Not too sure if the BBQ at Mendi can be attributed to PX either, because the aircraft was on the ground shut down at the time of the event, and from what I heard, the BBQ was beyond the control of PX. So I don’t really think that one counts. I’d really like to know about the other 3 in the last ten years though.

Actually it should. PX had received reports of Civil Unrest at Mendi airport and actually cancelled the earlier flight for those reasons. A shift change later and someones decision to send the flight in question should be a case for negligence.

SIUYA
3rd Oct 2018, 23:16
C-19, the original statement which resulted in my query was:

Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all with the 737 yet to be decided maybe

My bolding.

You obviously know more than I do about Air Niugini, but I can't see how the Mendi hull loss event involved pilot error. Certainly it raises questions about Air Niugini's Security system and why it appears to have failed to meet the requirements of PNG CAR Part 108.53 (a), but to pin the event on the pilot seems a bit far-fetched. :ugh:

tripelapidgeon
4th Oct 2018, 02:25
As the original Tabubil Warrior taught us ; “Mr Sheen, Shaggs, Mr Sheen”, that along with a set of polarised sunglasses and it was as good as Synthetic Vision !

Does PX have FDM or QAR on the Boeing?


Yes PX has FDM and QAR Software analysis is Aerobytes.

neville_nobody
4th Oct 2018, 02:48
After it was banned by the greenies we used to use RAINEX bought at car shops. Before engine start you would open the pilots window and leaning out as far as possible rub the RAINEX on a piece of cloth on the window. It was better than the manufacturer supplied rain repellent and lasted longer. We carried a spare bottle in our nav bags.

Yes it is a pity that such a proactive approach would end in your dismissal these days. There are at least 2 incidents on the ATSB file where forward visibility in the 737 in rain has been an issue

TBM-Legend
4th Oct 2018, 02:55
Anyone read today's Australian article where a couple of pax describe the chaos? Couldn't find life jackets, crew didn't open emergency exits or take control of the situation etc etc just pure chaos it seems.

Duck Pilot
4th Oct 2018, 02:57
Did both those incidents happen to occur at Darwin by any chance Nev??

topend3
4th Oct 2018, 03:30
PX just announced body recovered, despite earlier reports that all pax and 12 crew survived. BTW what do 12 pax do on a 738 with 35 pax? Seems like a lean operation...

josephfeatherweight
4th Oct 2018, 11:30
BTW what do 12 pax do on a 738 with 35 pax?
The answer - evidently, not much, when it comes to an emergency.
If you haven’t already, check out the footage on the Rumours and News sub-forum, where the USN personnel race to the aircraft to find ONE overwing exit open (on the starboard side, anyway) and no great urgency to get off a 737 IN THE WATER! You can even see the pilots contemplating their careers (or the lack thereof) whilst the aircraft (note, not a BOAT) bobs in the water. When you ditch in the sea, get out via the front exits - quickly. Personally, I reckon this was appalling and the loss of life, given the numbers of crew and pax, inexcusable...

SIUYA
4th Oct 2018, 12:14
Retired too early said...

Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all with the 737 yet to be decided maybe -and dare I say it but after 25 years with PX, I can assure you all that the C & T is a major concern to everybody in the pilot corp!

I questioned that:

Care to elaborate? https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/confused.gif ASN showing only 2 – PXY at Madang, and PXE at Chuuk. Airfleets.net showing one (PXY), but that’s not been updated to include PXE.Not too sure if the BBQ at Mendi can be attributed to PX either, because the aircraft was on the ground shut down at the time of the event, and from what I heard, the BBQ was beyond the control of PX. So I don’t really think that one counts. I’d really like to know about the other 3 in the last ten years though.

C19 then bought into the thread:

Actually it should. PX had received reports of Civil Unrest at Mendi airport and actually cancelled the earlier flight for those reasons. A shift change later and someones decision to send the flight in question should be a case for negligence

My response:

C-19, the original statement which resulted in my query was:Quote:Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all with the 737 yet to be decided maybeMy bolding.

I also said: You obviously know more than I do about Air Niugini, but I can't see how the Mendi hull loss event involved pilot error. Certainly it raises questions about Air Niugini's Security system and why it appears to have failed to meet the requirements of PNG CAR Part 108.53 (a), but to pin the event on the pilot seems a bit far-fetched. https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies2/eusa_wall.gif

C19 - you need to substantiate your assertions. And Retired too Early too.....otherwise understand that your post(s) are going to be challenged?

Retired too Early STILL waiting on your evidence that PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all

:rolleyes:

tripelapidgeon
4th Oct 2018, 13:12
Retired too early said...



I questioned that:



C19 then bought into the thread:



My response:

C-19, the original statement which resulted in my query was:Quote:Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all with the 737 yet to be decided maybeMy bolding.

I also said: You obviously know more than I do about Air Niugini, but I can't see how the Mendi hull loss event involved pilot error. Certainly it raises questions about Air Niugini's Security system and why it appears to have failed to meet the requirements of PNG CAR Part 108.53 (a), but to pin the event on the pilot seems a bit far-fetched. https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies2/eusa_wall.gif

C19 - you need to substantiate your assertions. And Retired too Early too.....otherwise understand that your post(s) are going to be challenged?


Retired too Early STILL waiting on your evidence that

:rolleyes:

PX have lost 5 hulls in recent history
P2 PXE B737 September 2018
P2 ANX Dash 8 2018 Civil Unrest
P2 PXY 2013 a Wet leased ATR 42 Freighter Overrun Rejected Take off Madang Unable to rotate
​https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20131019-1​​​​​
P2- ANH F28-1000 1997Gear Collapse on Landing Lae Nadzab Airport
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19971116-02-ANB F28 - 1000
1995 Overrun on Landing in Heavy Rain Madang
​https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19950531-0
you could add a 6th
P2 ANA F28-100 ( Fokker 100) 2006 Mercury Leak in Hold MtHagen
http://paperlined.org/apps/wikipedia/offsite_content/AlHgAircraft.html

SIUYA
4th Oct 2018, 21:18
tripleapidgeon….

Original statement was:

Including the very recent DHC8 BBQ at Mendi, PX has now lost FIVE (5) hulls in less than a decade - pilot error in them all with the 737 yet to be decided maybe

My bolding.

Clearly your definition of a decade differs from mine if you are including events prior to 2009. :ugh:

I'm in no way defending Air Niugini (or LINK which was the operator of the Mendi aircraft), but trying to pin pilot error on the Mendi 'event' is far fetched. Probably also the landing gear event at Lae and the Mount Hagen mercury leak event.

Anyway, back to the 737 event...………….

ARPs
4th Oct 2018, 21:57
Pilot error may be the initial blame... but at the core of this is MANAGEMENT ERROR!!

Both of the latest two incidents can be put down to the Management group of PX. I can assure you the pilots of the Dash 8 in Mendi only went there once Op’s (their management) gave them the clearance to fly there. PX would often delay/cancel flights to areas of civil unrest and it was only once management had given the thumbs up to return would the pilots go, once the management decided the risk was at a manageable level. Except on this instance they got it wrong.

As for the pilots of PXE in Chuuk. Yes they were sitting up the front last Friday. But ever since the PX Management decided to restructure the pilot conditions in 2014, a huge amount of experience within their pilots ranks left PX for better jobs.
The number of resignations since 1st January 2015 has clicked over 50% of the pilot group at that time. Imagine QF, VA, CX, BA loosing half of their pilots in such a short time frame.

In the environment that PX operates, this is a huge hit.
Some have forecasted an accident like this occurring.

SIUYA
4th Oct 2018, 22:56
ARPs...

Pilot error may be the initial blame... but at the core of this is MANAGEMENT ERROR!!

Good response! :D

However, if you are referring to the Mendi 'event', were the passengers and crew onboard the aircraft when it was torched? Because if not then I don't think it can be considered an accident under the definition of accident in ICAO Annex 13:

Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked...

So let's all agree to disagree about the Mendi 'event' and concentrate on the recent 737 accident. :ok:

ARPs
4th Oct 2018, 23:45
ARPs...

Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked...

So let's all agree to disagree about the Mendi 'event' and concentrate on the recent 737 accident. :ok:

Thanks SIUYA, edited to reflect the incidents. I agree with your statement.

mauswara
4th Oct 2018, 23:54
"Management Error", Nail on the head there ARPS. Didn't the FOM ,@ that time famously say: "We don't need Experienced pilots, we've got automated aircraft" ( or something to that effect). Hows that working out? Very good chance the Chuuk 73 crew were "new" to type &/or FSM/wet season ops.Might be more 'cheese holes" lining up for this accident than usual.

tripelapidgeon
5th Oct 2018, 01:59
tripleapidgeon….

Original statement was:



My bolding.

Clearly your definition of a decade differs from mine if you are including events prior to 2009. :ugh:

I'm in no way defending Air Niugini (or LINK which was the operator of the Mendi aircraft), but trying to pin pilot error on the Mendi 'event' is far fetched. Probably also the landing gear event at Lae and the Mount Hagen mercury leak event.

Anyway, back to the 737 event...………….
Agreed I should have added that it is far fetched to involve Pilot error as one of the contributing factors to all but two or maybe three of those hull losses (ATR in Madang ????)
However the word hull losses has been thrown around and by definition those are the ones PX have had.
They certainly have not lost 5 hulls in the past decade which was the point I was trying to highlight.
I note that the government of the FSM has been quoted in the press as saying that they consulting with US Authorities re the investigation into the accident at Chuuk . One can only live in hope that a proper investigation is carried out Not a white wash and cover up .

SIUYA
5th Oct 2018, 03:26
All OK tripelapidgeon :ok:

US involvement in the investigation was assured anyway as the State of Manufacture.

E&H
5th Oct 2018, 05:14
Interested to know how the accident at Madang in P2-PXY was pilot error...?

Capn Bloggs
5th Oct 2018, 08:28
A fine contribution from a 7 year-old. Do you really think those two pilots went to work that day saying "let's stack it in the drink for something different!"?

Capn Bloggs
5th Oct 2018, 09:15
Nice editing after the fact there turkey...:=

SIUYA
5th Oct 2018, 09:27
What really frustrates me reading this thread is the fact that some of you posting here are obviously current and ex employees of the above mentioned company.

Not guilty.

ICAO Doc 9756 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part IV Reporting:

3.2.2 The determination of causes should be based on a thorough, impartial and objective analysis of all the available evidence. Any condition, act or circumstance that was a causal factor in the accident should be clearly identified. Seen together, the causes should present a picture of all the reasons why the accident occurred. The list of causes should include both the immediate causes and the deeper or systemic causes.

I think that might have been what ARPs was getting at :cool:

tripelapidgeon
7th Oct 2018, 14:37
Watch this space as to who will be the lead investigator of this accident.

Not much hope for a proper impartial report I am afraid.

Money, and politics talk.

For the sake of the long suffering travelling public and the remaining loyal employees of PX I hope the information is only a red herring but somehow I doubt it.

olderairhead
7th Oct 2018, 21:53
I wonder if the approach filmed by an engineer in the jumpseat will be used in the investigation?

lucille
7th Oct 2018, 22:18
I wonder if the approach filmed by an engineer in the jumpseat will be used in the investigation?
Do you know for a fact that this video exists?

olderairhead
7th Oct 2018, 23:24
The video is a very strong rumor doing the rounds.

mauswara
8th Oct 2018, 01:22
The latest update from Aviation Safety Network (07 Oct.) Metar @ 23:40Z (Approx. time of Arrival) PTKK 040/07 3sm SHRA B/000 OVC 008CB 26C 29.73 . . . . . . "PX state : 'A/C landed short of RWY" (ie R04?) . "Other reports suggest A/C overshot the RWY" (ie R22/NDB Approach ??) "* *The position of the A/C relative to the runway suggests the O/run to be a more plausible scenario". If a jump-seating engineer has a video,that would be "Very Handy" for the Investigators!!

mattyj
8th Oct 2018, 04:29
So: there were passengers on board, crew on board, witnesses on the ground and possibly a qualified person running the flight service?? Yet we still don’t know whether it was an undershoot or an overrun?!?

olderairhead
8th Oct 2018, 07:12
It was an undershoot as per the press release from PX

DaveReidUK
8th Oct 2018, 07:25
If a jump-seating engineer has a video, that would be "Very Handy" for the Investigators!!

The FDR and CVR arrived in Port Moresby, PNG on Friday for downloading and analysis, while the EGPWS and FMC have been sent to the NTSB in the US. Even if the suggested video doesn't exist, the undershoot/overshoot/overrun question is going to be resolved once and for all in the next day or so.

6I1mxWCjEfM

lucille
8th Oct 2018, 13:15
It was an undershoot as per the press release from PX
True!
Except passenger reports implied an over run. (Assuming the good doctor knows his port from his starboard!!)
As impossible as it may be, I’m starting to think that even the hapless crew had no idea whether it was an undershoot or otherwise.
The alleged video of the approach (if it exists) will make interesting viewing and will be a wonderful training tool in the future.

Loud Handle
8th Oct 2018, 13:41
Why do Captains who struggled on the Fokker fleet now flourish in the 737 fleet?


An extremely salient question.

BewareOfTheSharklets
8th Oct 2018, 14:19
Has the airframe been fished out of the Lagoon yet?

gulliBell
8th Oct 2018, 15:53
..Except passenger reports implied an over run...

Not implied. Very specifically. It was an over run and the tail hit the end of the runway.

https://www.thenational.com.pg/air-niugini-crash-survivor-tells-of-how-he-helped/

gulliBell
8th Oct 2018, 15:57
Has the airframe been fished out of the Lagoon yet?

Why would they want to go to the expense of fishing it out of the lagoon? It would be better for the local economy and more useful as a diving attraction for tourists than any value or information they might salvage from it.

UnderASouthernSky
8th Oct 2018, 17:35
Not implied. Very specifically. It was an over run and the tail hit the end of the runway.

https://www.thenational.com.pg/air-niugini-crash-survivor-tells-of-how-he-helped/

Not sure I'd trust the account of someone if he made sure he picked up his hand luggage before opening the emergency exit!

zanzibar
9th Oct 2018, 00:03
told The National that he deserved a pat on the back for what he and colleague did when the passengers and crew were looking for an escape route after the crash

and

I need to be commended for the bravery I displayed at that time in utilising my skills to save lives.

Makes you wonder why airlines bother training cabin crew at all with people like this around :rolleyes:

DHC8 Driver
9th Oct 2018, 00:22
and



Makes you wonder why airlines bother training cabin crew at all with people like this around :rolleyes:


The guy in the video who is apparently a reporter for some local rag is an absolute tosser and a prime example of why the media has lost all credibility!

Capt Fathom
9th Oct 2018, 01:53
They need to get it out of the lagoon as it poses an environmental hazard.

There is fuel, oil and hydraulic fluid onboard. Unless it has all leaked out already?

troppo
9th Oct 2018, 10:03
They need to get it out of the lagoon as it poses an environmental hazard.

There is fuel, oil and hydraulic fluid onboard. Unless it has all leaked out already?

funny you should mention that...in other recent reading it seems nogat plenti moni for the last 70 years to raise wrecks in Chuuk lagoon of all places
Chuuk (http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-11/newcastle-couple-buy-a-warship/9992160?pfmredir=sm)

Icarus2001
9th Oct 2018, 10:45
https://thorfinn.net/truk-lagoon/truk-history/ (thorfinn.net/truk-lagoon/truk-history/)

Mmmm there are one or two there already. The fuel will float and then evaporate probably.

73qanda
9th Oct 2018, 12:07
I imagine there is more fuel/oil leaking out of ships every second into the ocean than is contained in that 737.

DaveReidUK
9th Oct 2018, 12:33
They need to get it out of the lagoon as it poses an environmental hazard.

Not to mention an ongoing embarrassment to the airline. :\

I can't see the salvage operation being particularly challenging technically. There were reports within a day or so of the event, probably a tad premature, that a salvage team was on its way from New Zealand.

I suspect that after a bit of the usual wrangling from the insurers, the aircraft will be lifted within the next couple of weeks.

Duck Pilot
9th Oct 2018, 13:27
Whats the value in bringing it up if the cause of the accident was pilot error?

Environmental issues? Certainly however is the impact going to be worth the hassle. In the grand scheme of things I don’t think it will hurt if it was to be left down there to Rest In Peace.

Capn Bloggs
9th Oct 2018, 14:20
Duck pilot, are you serious?

DaveReidUK
9th Oct 2018, 14:29
Environmental issues? Certainly however is the impact going to be worth the hassle. In the grand scheme of things I don’t think it will hurt if it was to be left down there to Rest In Peace.

It's an aeroplane. It doesn't have a soul.

I'm struggling to think of any jet airliner that has gone down in relatively shallow waters in recent years and has been left there.

HANOI
16th Oct 2018, 04:00
Was it an undershoot or overrun?

Pinky the pilot
16th Oct 2018, 07:54
I'm struggling to think of any jet airliner that has gone down in relatively shallow waters in recent years and has been left there.

Unless I'm mistaken, a number of years ago there was one Ecec type Jet left where it had ditched.:hmm:

No idea why, but others may.

DaveReidUK
16th Oct 2018, 08:01
Was it an undershoot or overrun?

Yes, almost certainly, discounting the RTO theory floated (npi) earlier.

Bend alot
16th Oct 2018, 08:24
Was it an undershoot or overrun?
They are obviously still deciding what the FDR & CVR should contain as to an overrun being called an undershoot (due I expect wind shear) or it's best that the black boxes contain no data.

Angle of Attack
16th Oct 2018, 11:12
I can pretty much guarantee it crashed short of 04 as both pilots went head free. Overrun doesn’t cut it in my mind. If it over ran the runway it would be nose first into the water off the wall end. I reckon they were doing a go around as well just as they impacted the water. Time will tell.

73qanda
16th Oct 2018, 12:24
The brace call mentioned earlier makes me think it was an over-run. I can’t see someone getting one out in an undershoot.

Capt Fathom
16th Oct 2018, 12:30
The brace call mentioned earlier makes me think it was an over-run. I can’t see someone getting one out in an undershoot.
The brace call probably came after they hit the water!

Kagamuga
16th Oct 2018, 23:52
It's an Overrun!
You can't keep staff quiet forever with Twitter and Facebook... No matter what spin PX try to use..

73qanda
17th Oct 2018, 04:15
The brace call probably came after they hit the water!
It wouldn’t actually surprise me with this one!

Derfred
17th Oct 2018, 23:53
The brace call probably came after they hit the water!

In my airline it would be SOP for the cabin crew to call BRACE in the event of an unexpected ditching.

And so they should... it could save lives in the event of a subsequent impact (such as with a rock wall).

DaveReidUK
18th Oct 2018, 14:23
In my airline it would be SOP for the cabin crew to call BRACE in the event of an unexpected ditching.

And so they should... it could save lives in the event of a subsequent impact (such as with a rock wall).

Yes, it would be reasonable to expect that, if an aircraft hits something that clearly isn't the runway, the instinctive reaction of the crew will be to call "brace!".

Unfortunately that doesn't really help to resolve the conflicting reports from passengers who reported, variously, that the sequence of events was "impact->brace call->impact" or simply "impact->brace call".

Duck Pilot
22nd Oct 2018, 13:00
So what’s the latest - approach or overrun? Wreck been recovered yet?

Icarus2001
23rd Oct 2018, 02:14
Unfortunately that doesn't really help to resolve the conflicting reports from passengers who reported, variously, that the sequence of events was "impact->brace call->impact" or simply "impact->brace call".

I don't see any conflict there at all. The cabin crew react to what they sense is an abnormal situation by calling brace. Either way it is inconsequential to how the aircraft ended up in the water.

DaveReidUK
23rd Oct 2018, 07:22
I don't see any conflict there at all. The cabin crew react to what they sense is an abnormal situation by calling brace. Either way it is inconsequential to how the aircraft ended up in the water.

Read my post again.

The cabin crew called brace after the aircraft hit something. Every one of the passenger interviews published so far agrees on that. Then, after the CC had called brace, there was either a subsequent impact, or there wasn't. That's where there's a conflict between different passengers' accounts.

I'd say that determining which accounts are correct was extremely relevant to how the aircraft ended up in the water.

olderairhead
23rd Oct 2018, 07:26
Looking on the bright side at least the tech crew were able to exit via the cockpit door unlike a recent incident where the FO could not get back into the cockpit for 30 minutes until the Captain was finally able to kick in the lower half of the door. Even the on board engineer could not open it.

Angry guvment pax making quite a bit of noise about it.

Maintenance....... what maintenance?

Lucky new CEO. 😂

Icarus2001
23rd Oct 2018, 08:01
I'd say that determining which accounts are correct was extremely relevant to how the aircraft ended up in the water.

Sorry but I disagree, I will put my trust in the FDR and CVR not passenger accounts.

DaveReidUK
23rd Oct 2018, 09:32
Sorry but I disagree, I will put my trust in the FDR and CVR not passenger accounts.

Well yes, obviously.

But the investigation won't just focus on the recorders, it will include witness testimony from the cabin crew and passengers.

Whether the brace call came before or after the aircraft finally impacted the water won't be revealed by the FDR or CVR (the clue's in the name). The two possibilities each represent a very different sequence of events.

HANOI
23rd Oct 2018, 22:10
Surely by now it can be confirmed, undershoot or overrun! !!.

balusnomore
24th Oct 2018, 12:13
FMD,

I can't take it any more!!!!!!!!

the freaken operator has put out a press release saying its aircraft did not make the runway, and you still ask the god damn question!!!!

Some of you must simply be waiting for Elvis P to come and post here and tell you what freakeN happen.

Geeeezus...it didn't make the runway...TASOL.

FMD

Car RAMROD
24th Oct 2018, 12:32
the freaken operator has put out a press release saying its aircraft did not make the runway, and you still ask the god damn question!!!!



They also put out a press release saying everyone got out alive too. It was incorrect.

Mach E Avelli
24th Oct 2018, 22:43
FFS stop this childish chatter. It was a freaking unplanned water landing.

longlegs
24th Oct 2018, 22:48
Home (http://www.kpress.info/) One survivor’s firsthand account of the crash of Air Niugini PX 073 (http://www.kpress.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1119:one-survivor-s-firsthand-account-of-the-crash-of-air-niugini-px-74&catid=8&Itemid=103)By Bill Jaynes

The Kaselehlie Press

October 10, 2018

FSM—On Friday morning, September 28, Air Niugini flight PX 073 crash landed in the lagoon short of the runway in Chuuk. I was aboard. It was the worst experience in my life but I am glad to be alive, thanks in large part to Chuukese locals who risked their own lives to save us passengers.

“I” is a very strange letter when it stands alone in a news article. “I”’m not sure I know how to handle that particular letter as a journalist but then “I”’ve never been involved in a plane crash before. “I” still don’t know how to handle that fact, neither in my life nor in this article. Still, “I” know, and have heard from many, that despite the fact that my face and voice were all over international news for almost a week, people will want to hear from me, though “I” most certainly was not the only passenger aboard nor even close to the most significant. I just ended up being one of the most visible. It’s such a strange situation in so many ways and I’m not sure I know how to handle it. Maybe I never will.

From the Top

I’ll start at the beginning.

The Indonesian government, who recently reached out to the FSM after many years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, invited me and a few other Pacific Islands journalists for an informational tour of their country. I was heading to Indonesia when I boarded Air Niugini, flight PX 073 on the morning of September 28 after finally having received my flight arrangements only a day and a half earlier.

I was the last passenger through the security checkpoint before they said it would close. The flight crew started arriving ten to fifteen minutes later. The flight was scheduled to depart at 8:50 but at that time, boarding hadn’t even begun.

Once aboard, my seat, 24F on the right side of the rear of the plane was comfortable and the flight attendants were courteous and pleasant. The safety briefing was pretty much like every safety briefing I’ve ever heard with one variance from my experience. Instead of instructing passengers on how to use the exit doors, the briefing said that a crew member would open the doors in the event of an emergency. I thought that was odd at the time but didn’t think much more of it.

Descent begins

When one of the cockpit crew members made the announcement that we were beginning our descent into Chuuk, the flight attendants immediately had the passengers open their window shades, fasten seatbelts and put seats in the upright position. It seemed quite a bit early as there was still 25 minutes left in the flight at that point but it took nothing to comply.

As the Chuuk lagoon islands began to appear among aqua sea set against blue sky and white fluffy clouds, I began to search the lagoon for white caps. The evening before my flight a friend posted a weather report for Chuuk on Facebook that indicated a low pressure system with possible cyclonic activity so I was vigilant. It carried a travel advisory for boaters. I don’t know what I thought I’d do if I saw white caps but the lagoon was calm so I relaxed into the descent.

As we approached the runway, ominous grey clouds appeared and I watched the vapor trails coming off of the wing. I could clearly see the lagoon islands in the distance and spotted the Truk Stop dock as we continued to descend, and descend and descend. I had just thought that we were much lower over the water than on any of my many previous landings in Chuuk when the left wing dipped a little bit as, in my experience sometimes happens as pilots adjust to cross winds on approach to the runway.

Suddenly there was impact, an extremely hard impact, and an amazingly quick stop. My first thought was that we had just experienced the hardest landing and fastest braking I’d ever experienced on any runway but I couldn’t reconcile the rending, tearing sounds in my mind. I was stunned and looked around. When I saw a hole in the other side of the plane across the aisle, I knew we hadn’t made the runway. Water was coming in fast, rushing from the nose of the plane toward the rear. The water initially ran out through the hole but very quickly water also started coming in from there as well.

Some have said that there was an announcement to “brace” before the impact came, but if there was, I never heard it or if I did hear it, it was not sufficient for me to have understood that we had been about to crash land and I cleared it from my memory. The cockpit recorder will tell that part of the story.

Exit stage left

I reached under my seat for a life preserver but could not find one. As I got up from my seat and started walking in what was then thigh deep water, deeper on those people who are not 6’4” tall, there was pandemonium. Some passengers were trying to retrieve their bags from the overhead compartments, an absolute no no during an emergency evacuation as it slows evacuation. Some passengers scrambled over the tops of the seats. Flight attendants in my section of the plane were screaming for people to calm down. It wasn’t working. Meanwhile the attendants were running back and forth in the aisles, pushing passengers out of the way. I checked under three other seats on my way out but still could not find a life preserver. I can’t speak to the experience of others but I was not the only passenger who did not have a life preserver when we went out the exit.

A young man of Asian descent who was behind me as I tried to walk toward the exit while making way for passengers who were more injured than I began to push hard. I turned around and grabbed his shoulders. Making eye contact with him I asked him to calm down. I told him that we would get out but only if we did it calmly. He did calm down, though I’m not sure if he actually understood my words.

By the time I arrived at the exit door, the pathway was clear. I stepped out onto the wing where the water was approximately waist deep. A raft was waiting there and people were jumping into it. I stood aside so that others could get in first. Someone finally yelled at me to get into the raft and I complied. As two passengers I didn’t identify carried a Chinese man, who I later learned had a broken pelvis, to the raft, a female Chuukese passenger turned to me and asked in a panicked voice if she had her life preserver on correctly. After it inflated, she was having a hard time breathing as it pushed her head backward. Others experienced the same problem and none of us could figure out how to let a bit of air out of them to give them some relief. Another man in the raft who had passed me as I stood on the wing seemed to have a broken forearm.

Chuukese heroes

As I lay on the bottom of the raft wondering what would happen next and wondering what had happened to my passport that had been in my shirt pocket, I looked at the plane which at the time was only half submerged. I incorrectly thought that we were in shallow water and that during the recovery effort, after we were all safe, someone would be able to retrieve all of my camera gear and laptop from the overhead baggage compartment in working order. I had no idea that we were in approximately 90 feet of water and that the plane was in danger of sinking at any time. Had I known, I may easily have been one of those who panicked. I didn’t have time to notice that the plane was sinking because within no more than two minutes of getting into the raft, a boat driven by a local who had seen the crash nudged the raft.

People helped the very injured man into the boat, and again, I stood back knowing that the raft would keep me safe and that others needed to be evacuated more quickly than I. By that time there were several boats surrounding the plane. I could have taken another boat but the boat driver would not take no for an answer and I boarded as the last passenger aboard that boat.

I will never forget the efforts of the Chuukese locals who, either foolishly, or bravely immediately rushed out to the downed plane to help get us safely to shore. A week and a half later, I still get tears of gratitude in my eyes whenever I think of their selflessness and bravery, and I have thought of it many times every day since the morning of Friday, September 28.

Unfortunately, since that time, some have tried to make an issue of whether or not Chuukese locals or US Navy Seabees were the first to arrive on the scene. Quite frankly, from videos I later saw, I believe it was the Seabees who were there first but if so it was only by moments. I don’t know. I never saw them. I quite frankly, don’t care. All of the responders were heroes and calling one group of responders heroes does not at all minimize the heroics of another group. For me, on that day, it was Chuukese locals who whisked a boat load of wet and frightened passengers, me included, to the Transco dock in Weno.

Passenger heroes

Since we are on the subject of heroes, now would be the time to talk about two passenger heroes I will never forget. One is Adam Milburn, an Australian who currently lives in Pohnpei. He will not call himself a hero but I watched his calm demeanor as he assisted passengers through the exit door. In the video of the US Navy response to the crash, Mr. Milburn is the man in the blue wind breaker, calmly standing on the wing at the exit door helping passengers out. He also re-entered the plane to help make sure that there were no passengers left aboard but by then, the tail section of the plane was head high underwater. Only after he did that did he decide to go ahead and grab his own bag from the baggage compartment. It had not been safe to do so while passengers were evacuating.

I didn’t learn of another hero until later in the day when I met Rodney Nogi of Papua New Guinea at the Truk Stop hotel where Air Niugini had placed some of the passengers. He very quietly and reluctantly told me that he had been the one to open the exit door when flight attendants didn’t do so. He mentioned that he also mobilized and inflated the raft from that door. Milburn later told me that when he got onto the wing, the raft had been mobilized and that it had been Nogi who had done it and who also made sure that it stayed where it could be useful and didn’t float away. Nogi said that he had been to a fisheries university where he had been taught sea rescue techniques and those techniques helped him.

On that Friday evening he was humble and unassuming about his role though that could have been because he was sharing a table with a man 33 years his senior. We’ve all gone through changes since that day and if a story in PNG’s The National newspaper is accurate, he is now saying that Air Niugini owes him a pat on the back. I don’t know if Air Niugini will ever give him that pat on the back but I certainly will.

Efficient medical response

Once at the Transco dock, I could hear sirens in the distance. They took a while to get there but that was a function of the roads in that area and of the snarled traffic. As far as I am concerned, the response was immediate. I used the time to call my wife as I always do when I land in Chuuk, the last place where my FSMTC cell phone will usually work on my travels. My wife was effervescent when she heard my voice. She hadn’t yet heard the news. I was glad to be able to tell her that I had survived before she heard that the plane had crashed.

On a triage basis, ambulances whisked passengers to the Chuuk State Hospital. I didn’t feel I needed to go but didn’t know where else to go so took the free ride in the ambulance to the hospital. The scene there was truly incredible to watch in every positive way I can think to describe it. Temporary cots had been placed in the waiting room and the place was a flurry of activity as doctors, nurses and others attended to passengers. Again, I have nothing but good things to say about the hospital response in Chuuk. I’ll be honest and admit that I was pleasantly surprised to see it and experience it.

As I nearly always do during times of stress, I laughed and joked with those who were able and inquired about the health of every passenger I met even if they couldn’t understand me, even if just to give a questioning “thumbs up”. I met and talked to passengers from Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, China, Chuuk, Australia, the United States, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines, all with various levels of injury and all in various states of shock. Outside the hospital I gave an interview with my first impressions which, I was told ran on television, radio and newspapers around the world on that day. I was NOT the only passenger aboard. I wasn’t even close to the most significant. I did end up being one of the most visible because of that interview and on that basis alone, I assume.

Human after all

Any other good journalist would have remembered that he had a cell phone in his pocket, albeit underwater, and would have tried to snap photos or take video. It never even occurred to me. I almost never use my cell phone for news purposes and it rarely crosses my mind even for personal purposes. I almost always shoot with DSLRs but those are now gone.

I didn’t speak with the pilots or crew at the hospital nor at the airport as they were getting ready to leave on Saturday morning’s rescue flight to Port Moresby. As a human and not a journalist, I found myself unable to even look at them, much less speak to them. I regret that lost opportunity, especially after I confirmed with US Navy Seabees that the rumor spread by a passenger that the cockpit crew was the first off the plane was completely false. The members of the cockpit crew were in fact, nearly the last off the plane and were hesitant to leave even then.

At the Truk Stop Hotel where some of us were placed, I found it nearly impossible to be alone for any period of time. I only went to my room when there was no one left awake to talk to. I listened to eyewitness accounts from passengers, the US Navy Seabees crew who saw the plane go down, and everyone who had an opinion to share. Where there were rumors, and there were many, I spent time during the next few days trying to substantiate them with proper authorities and eyewitnesses rather than relying on second hand information. Most of the rumors were complete fabrications.

Home again

After a series of miscommunications with Air Niugini, I finally arrived home in Pohnpei on Monday, October 1 aboard United Airlines flight UA 155 having entirely missed the purpose for my trip and probably having mashed the armrests of my seat as we landed smoothly in text book fashion.

Since I carried only a small plastic bag containing two shirts I’d bought in Chuuk, and a pair of zorries, I was one of the first through the exit door at the Pohnpei International Airport where my wife waited for me. I had already cried on seeing Pohnpei for the first time since my plane went down in the Chuuk lagoon as I have done many times since. But when I saw my wife I was a goner and the waterworks flowed again freely as we hugged each other tightly in the airport.

We went to Joy Restaurant for lunch after which she dropped me at the office where I immediately began responding to emails and trying to correct erroneous news reports I had not been able to see in Chuuk where for two days, I had little to no internet access.

That afternoon I learned that the body of Eko Cahyanto Singgih had been found on board the wreckage of the fuselage that had finally been located 90 to 100 feet below the surface of the water. The young man had been returning to his home in Indonesia after having worked as a fisherman aboard a Luen Thai fishing vessel. I had earlier learned that he had been sitting only a couple of rows in front of me. A diver from Pohnpei told me that he had recovered his body only two rows in front of where I had been sitting. We may never know precisely what happened to him but it haunts me in my quiet moments to think that I may have walked by him without seeing him as I was escaping the plane.

Cause of crash and investigation

Many people have asked me my opinion about what caused the water landing. I do have a strong opinion about that based on my observations. At no time did I feel a sudden drop indicating loss of lift. There was just that one small dip of the left wing and then we were down. I am not a pilot in any way shape or form but as a passenger, my opinion is that the pilot came down at the wrong vertical angle of approach and was far too low. I believe that, realizing that error, he then did the best he could do in a very bad situation. Because he landed in the water instead of trying to pull up and try again, I believe he averted a worse tragedy that would have resulted in many more deaths had he hit the headwall at the beginning of the runway.

I’m told that the pilot said that it was raining so hard that his windshield wipers couldn’t keep up with it, and that the visibility was low. My observations do not bear that out. It was not raining when passengers were evacuating and visibility, at least at water level was fine as all of the photos I have seen of the response show.

FAA inspectors have confirmed that all runway strobes were properly working at the time.

All of the various recording tools aboard the aircraft have now been recovered. As of this writing, the chips in the black box are still being dried at a lab in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea so data has not yet been recovered for analysis. FSM Investigator-in-Charge, Master Halbert is on the scene in Port Moresby. He has said that the FSM anticipates having its preliminary report out by the end of the month. Meanwhile, he will be releasing press releases as needed through The Kaselehlie Press. Those can be found at The Kaselehlie Press Facebook page, our easiest way of posting those press releases quickly. As of today, there have been six.

Investigatory arms of the FSM, the United States, and Papua New Guinea are involved in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the crash.

I cannot speak to whether or not Air Niugini has contacted other passengers regarding compensation arrangements. As of today, I have had no contact from them since I left Chuuk for Pohnpei.

topdrop
25th Oct 2018, 00:54
LongLegs, I really enjoyed reading your first hand account, informative and not sensationalist - well done. Enjoy the rest of your life, it's not everyone that survives a plane crash.

Recidivist
25th Oct 2018, 02:34
Wow! Thank you longlegs for sharing your personal and incredible experience. I'm sure everyone wishes you a total recovery from the shock. All the best.

MickG0105
25th Oct 2018, 04:03
I'm not sure how we've ended up with two threads for the same accident but as I said on the other thread, thanks to Bill Jaynes' eye witness account (seated in 24F and observing the Truk Stop dock out of his window on approach) I think that it is now pretty clear that this was indeed an undershoot for RWY04.

Bend alot
25th Oct 2018, 09:34
MickG0105;10291819]I'm not sure how we've ended up with two threads for the same accident but as I said on the other thread.

Possible that the posters on this thread have not logged out to read the other thread.

After watching a few ditching inc the Sully and the way the aircraft change direction, I stick with the overrun group.

DaveReidUK
25th Oct 2018, 18:17
I'm not sure how we've ended up with two threads for the same accident but as I said on the other thread, thanks to Bill Jaynes' eye witness account (seated in 24F and observing the Truk Stop dock out of his window on approach) I think that it is now pretty clear that this was indeed an undershoot for RWY04.

And equally there are eyewitnesses who describe more than one impact. Here's one:

When his Air Niugini flight crashed into the waters of a lagoon on Weno island in Chuuk state Friday morning, Dr. Victor Wasson said, "The first thing in my mind was, 'Thank God, I'm still alive.'"

His next thought was, "I got to get the hell out of here."

Wasson was seated on the right side of the plane, near the wing when, he believes, the plane struck the end of the runway at Chuuk International Airport.

"We had more than one impact," said Wasson, who described "one big thud" and "then the second one, and then we stopped."

"It's highly likely that the back part of the plane hit the edge of the rocks at the end of the runway," he said.

Seconds before the plane hit the water, Wasson said one of the flight attendants "shouted out, 'Brace for impact!' Before she finished her sentence, we hit the water." He said the plane crashed "about 150 meters from the rocks."

Wasson is a psychiatrist at Pohnpei State Hospital and the national psychiatrist for the government of the Federated States of Micronesia.
Arguing about which eyewitness to believe simply illustrates why we have flight recorders. https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/embarass.gif

longlegs
25th Oct 2018, 23:38
And from another passenger. Please note I am an interested observer and was not a passenger on the flight in question.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-25/aussie-hero-says-he-evacuated-passengers-crashed-niugini-plane/10424356 Aussie 'hero' says he evacuated passengers from crashed plane after crew panicked7.30 (https://www.abc.net.au/7.30/)

By Michael Atkin (https://www.abc.net.au/news/michael-atkin/5778984) and Nadia Daly (https://www.abc.net.au/news/nadia-daly/6564026)

An Australian man who evacuated passengers from a sinking Boeing 737 after it crash-landed in Micronesia last month claims some of the Air Niugini crew panicked and left passengers to escape by themselves.

An Indonesian man died in the crash (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-02/passengers-body-found-after-air-niugini-plane-crash/10327378) despite Air Niugini initially announcing all 47 passengers and crew were safely evacuated.

It took a full day before the airline announced one passenger was missing and the body of Eko Cahyanto Singgih was later found by US Navy divers.

The cause of the crash is currently being investigated by the Federated States of Micronesia with support from the Papua New Guinea and USA governments, with a preliminary report expected by the end of the month.

Adam Milburn, a former Australian Navy clearance diver who lives in Micronesia, was on board flight PX 73 when it undershot the runway by 145 metres, landing in Chuuk Lagoon (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-28/flight-lands-in-a-lagoon-off-micronesia/10316434).

He has been described as "heroic" for getting passengers to safety.

He told 7.30 he was shocked when he realised the plane was in the water.

"I was like everyone, kind of floundering. 'How did we get here? What's happening? What are we doing right now in a plane that's floating on the water?'" he said.

Mr Milburn said that after the crash the crew yelled at passengers to remain seated.

"They were shouting, and I think I would have been in their situation as well. There was panic in their voices, you could hear the panic," he said.

He said he waited in his seat, but there were no further instructions so he grabbed his life jacket and helped others before heading to the exit.

"I remember I stepped out onto the wing and there was a gentleman there [another passenger] on his own, from memory, and he had the life raft but it hadn't been deployed," Mr Milburn said.

"He said, 'Can you find the inflation cord? I can't find the inflation cord.' So we were able to find the flap and inflate the life raft."

Mr Milburn said the pair then evacuated most of the 35 passengers who were on board, without crew assistance.

Local fishermen arrived with a flotilla of boats to help ferry the passengers to shore.

Mr Milburn said most passengers had head and neck injuries from hitting the front of their seat, and one was unconscious.

"The last two passengers that I remember were quite incapacitated, so then there was a challenge about trying to keep their head out of the water because by that stage there was probably water up to knees or waist," he said.

Mr Milburn said he did not see a cabin crew member do a headcount or check names against a flight manifest, but admits that does not mean it did not happen.

"I'm not sure of what the procedures should or shouldn't have been, but it was chaotic. It would have been really difficult to manage that," he said.

A group of sailors with the US Navy, who had been training nearby, were also key to the rescue, and Mr Milburn re-entered the sinking plane to help them search for survivors.

One Navy diver swam through the aircraft's interior to inspect it before they decided it was too dangerous and exited the plane.'Embarrassed to be called a hero'Mr Milburn said he had been replaying in his mind whether he could have done more to save the Indonesian man who died.

"If I'd just walked down there and got wet up to my shoulders and just felt around, perhaps I would have felt him and then you could have called for help, but hindsight is a great thing," he said.

"[His death] was hard to take. I was hoping beyond hope he was going to turn up somewhere.

"I literally touched everyone that came out the exit door on the left-hand wing, either assisted them into the life raft or physically carried them into the life raft, so no one was coming out and falling off the wing and drowning, I'm absolutely confident of that."

American journalist Bill Jaynes, editor of local paper the Kaselehlie Press, was on the flight and praised Mr Milburn for his actions.

"I know Adam and I know he would be the last person to call himself anything like a hero, [but] considering there was a plane in the water I would call it heroic," Jaynes said.

"Meanwhile flight attendants, in my section at any rate, were panicking and running up and down the aisles … and screaming for us to all calm down, which of course had the opposite effect.

"[Adam] was very calm throughout the whole situation. I can't recall if he actually took my hand as I stepped out of the plane or not. I just remember his demeanour.

"I remember him being very calm, which seemed to be a bit contagious, and other people kind of grabbed on to that."

Mr Milburn said he was "a bit embarrassed to be called a hero, because I don't think there was anything particularly heroic in what I did".

"I think one of the things that I came away from the crash with, just a real sense of optimism about humanity and human nature," he said.

Mr Milburn's wife Lauren was not on board but said she was concerned to hear his account of the evacuation.

"I still can't understand why it was my husband that was deploying the life raft and helping passengers into the life raft," she said.

"It does make you wonder what was going on in the aircraft."

Aviation consultant Neil Hansford said the accident raised serious questions.

"There is enough rafts and life jackets and everything else for it to have been handled without the intervention of the islanders, but thank God the islanders were there," he said.

"There was only 35 passengers."Investigation underwayThere are conflicting reports about weather conditions before the plane crashed. Air Niugini has said there was heavy rain, which caused poor visibility.

Investigators have access to information about the flight's final moments after the data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered.

Mr Hansford believes that will be a central part of the crash investigation, including whether pilot error was a factor.

"He only dropped it into the lagoon 145 metres short of the runway, so he was too low for a very long time and I think what was probably playing on his mind is, he only had 6,000 feet of runway and maybe he was realising he didn't know the condition," he said.

The Milburn family have been strong supporters of Air Niugini but they have decided to stop flying with the airline for now.

Ms Milburn said they are looking for answers about what went wrong.

"We're very keen, just personally, to understand what happened, to make sense of what happened, but also then for us to be able to make decisions about flying and who we fly with and who we feel comfortable flying with," she said.

"We're optimistic and hopeful that we get some good learning and some good information out of the investigation."

Mr Milburn added that he would like to see Air Niugini work hard to improve safety.

"What I'd like to see is a clear demonstration of what steps they're going to take to ensure that doesn't happen again," he said.

It is the first fatal accident in the 45-year history of Air Niugini, which had previously had a good safety record.

Air Niugini did not respond to 7.30's questions.

But in a public statement on October 5, the deputy chairman of the Air Niugini board, Andrew Nui, thanked local islanders and the US Navy team who helped passengers and crew.

"Their courage and quick thinking helped save lives and our thanks and gratitude goes out to all of them," he said.

Petropavlovsk
26th Oct 2018, 04:20
I would bet a 'sheep station' on Kagamuga's post of the 17th.
You cannot keep staff quiet forever.

Capt Fathom
26th Oct 2018, 04:43
I would bet a 'sheep station' on Kagamuga's post
You're not putting much at risk! :}

DaveReidUK
26th Oct 2018, 08:00
FFS stop this childish chatter. It was a freaking unplanned ditching.

The definition of a ditching is "a controlled emergency landing of an aircraft on water" (i.e. when you have run out of other options). Think Sully.

That's the one thing that pretty well everyone agrees that this wasn't. :ugh:

FFS indeed. :O

Capn Bloggs
26th Oct 2018, 08:17
FFS stop this childish chatter
Indeed. Why Dave do you insist on having that last word on every post on Prune?? This nonsensical on and on and on quibbling ruins Prune.

Sam Asama
26th Oct 2018, 15:58
Preliminary report is out. Undershoot.

Hopefully DaveReid and some others can now sleep soundly....

https://www.pprune.org/images/infopop/icons/icon7.gif

DaveReidUK
26th Oct 2018, 20:08
Hopefully DaveReid and some others can now sleep soundly....

Rest assured, I always do.

The advantage of not jumping to conclusions is that you're never surprised, whatever the outcome. :O

dodo whirlygig
27th Oct 2018, 02:24
Preliminary report is out. Undershoot.

Is there a link? I can only find news articles, one with an aerial view, but no report as such.

SIUYA
27th Oct 2018, 02:39
dodo whirlygig...

Here you go:

http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/PreRpts/TC&I%2018-1001%20%28AIC%2018-1004%20P2-PXE%29.pdf (http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/PreRpts/TC&I%2018-1001%20%28AIC%2018-1004%20P2-PXE%29.pdf)

Mach E Avelli
27th Oct 2018, 05:54
Dave Reid, thank you for pointing out the error of my ways. My last post amended to reflect the correct FAA terminology.

SIUYA
27th Oct 2018, 06:13
Mach E Avelli…

It was a freaking unplanned water landing.

Yes, so technically it was a Controlled Flight Into Terrain accident.

CFIT - accidents in which there was an in-flight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle, without indication of loss of control. ​​​The critical distinction in these types of accidents is the fact that the aircraft is under the control of the flight crew. Source: IATA.

Mach E Avelli
27th Oct 2018, 06:38
Siuya, agreed on the CFIT. It will be interesting to see whether the final report classifies it as such or an undershoot. Boeing would probably prefer it to be called a CFIT as it lays the blame squarely on the crew and not the equipment (i.e. poor visibility from the cockpit etc)..

dodo whirlygig
27th Oct 2018, 09:18
Thanks SIUYA but I can't open the link.

Can anyone else? This is the message I get.



Error 404: File Not Found

The requested page is not found. This may happen due to the following reasons:

Page or file is outdated, renamed, moved, or does not exist.
You typed the address incorrectly, like http://www.example.com/pgae.html instead of http://www.example.com/page.html
Please contact your webmaster if you are not sure what goes wrong.

DaveReidUK
27th Oct 2018, 09:23
Here's a link to ICAO's Occurrence Category taxonomy:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Documents/datafiles/OccurrenceCategoryDefinitions.pdf

Confusingly, while CFIT appears to fit the circumstances pretty closely - the aircraft was presumably under control, and it impacted terrain (which includes water for the purpose of the definition) - the ICAO CFIT definition contains the proviso "Do not use this category for occurrences involving runway undershoot/overshoot, which are classified as Undershoot/Overshoot (USOS)".

DaveReidUK
27th Oct 2018, 09:26
Thanks SIUYA but I can't open the link.

Working link: http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/PreRpts/TC&I%2018-1001%20(AIC%2018-1004%20P2-PXE).pdf

SIUYA
27th Oct 2018, 10:04
Dave,

Point take on the CFIT definition. However, you need consider USOS definition...….my bolding.

An undershoot/overshoot of a runway/helipad/helideck occurs in close proximity to the runway/helipad/helideck and includes offside touchdowns and any occurrence in which the landing gear touches off the runway/helipad/helideck surface.

I'm sticking with this being CFIT, as the touchdown was not really in close proximity to the runway - it was close, but I don't really think this event fits with the USOS definition. And because USOS is accepted to be in close proximity to the runway, that's why you don't use CFIT in that instancxe as you correctly point out.

CVR will obviously shed light on what was/wasn't happening immediately before the touchdown, and will probably clarify if it was CFIT or USOS.

Happy to be wrong on this though Dave... :ok:

Angle of Attack
27th Oct 2018, 11:30
Well it undershot the runway as I summarised a couple of weeks back on this thread, and I guess it could be called a CFIT as well, but either way it’s another non precision approach gone wrong that’s a definite point. Why it went wrong? No one will know until the report comes out.

Derfred
27th Oct 2018, 13:27
Siuya, agreed on the CFIT. It will be interesting to see whether the final report classifies it as such or an undershoot. Boeing would probably prefer it to be called a CFIT as it lays the blame squarely on the crew and not the equipment (i.e. poor visibility from the cockpit etc)..
The navigation and AFDS equipment delivered as standard on a 737NG would have been quite capable of delivering the aircraft to the touchdown zone on the runway, with or without visibilty. How can this not be CFIT?

CurtainTwitcher
27th Oct 2018, 21:06
The navigation and AFDS equipment delivered as standard on a 737NG would have been quite capable of delivering the aircraft to the touchdown zone on the runway, with or without visibilty.
There is a difference between the capabilities of the aircraft, the design of the approach and the FMC coding. Even an RNP 0.10 approach will have +/- 185m lateral & 125' Vertical allowed errors. Having said all that, a typical Actual Navigation Performance (ANP) is likely to have been around 0.03 to 0.05. Lateral tracking doesn't seem to be an issue in this accident. Vertical RNP error however is highly dependant upon the QNH source accuracy, and what is actually set in the aircraft.

I found the 04 GNSS (http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1811/02655R4.PDF) chart (looks like valid FAA info, more details (http://www.airnav.com/airport/PTKK),), which looks to have the MAP at HAMAX (assuming this is the approach they were flying) at 2.2nm from the threshold. Is the approach coded to the runway giving a valid path? If no path, what vertical flight director guidance or mode is provided beyond the MAP, or are they to be switched off?

The report (http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/PreRpts/TC&I%2018-1001%20%28AIC%2018-1004%20P2-PXE%29.pdf) shows an impact point 460m short of the runway, if you add the the TDZE (10') and a threshold crossing height of (51') and solving backward for 460m and 3°, I get a target altitude of about 140' above the impact point to be on path. Why were they 140' low at this point? Hopefully the full report will detail the reasons.

Playing the devils advocate, who is going to spend the money to have RNP approaches constructed for every approach to replace GNSS? Are all operators going to maintain the aircraft to the required certification, nav database integrity and train their crew to utilise these approaches? I suspect everyone throws their hands up and says why should it come out of my budget? This would be an enormous project to move the whole industry in lock step to these approaches. With GLS knocking on the door, everyone would likely argue to hold out for the better technology Real Soon Now™. In other words, nothing is likely to change any time soon, we will keep bumbling along until GLS becomes ubiquitous.

WannaBeBiggles
27th Oct 2018, 23:46
I'm not rated on the 737, but fly another modern EFIS jet. Does the 737 not also provide vertical guidance for VOR and NDB approaches? Notwithstanding company SOP or AOM limitations on how the profile should be monitored, one would assume they should have had an indication from their instrumentation as well as profile data on charts and GPWS that they were low on profile.

CurtainTwitcher
28th Oct 2018, 03:01
There is vertical guidance (VNAV) for VOR and NDB, and yes you can cross reference DME/ALT scale. However, how valid is a check 0.25 nm prior to the runway when a DME is rated +/- 2nm? The problem is on a GNSS approach you have no other reference to cross check.

Cross checks cease have much meaning that close to the runway, in reality once you are below the minima you are almost entirely dependant upon the visual picture to judge where you are relative to the runway, monitoring ROD & speed. In fluctuating visibility and passing showers resulting in a loss of vis close to the runway you are in no man's land. The only safe option is a missed approach.

The difficult one is the last couple of hundred feet in rain as the forward visibility deteriorates temporarily with the changes is rainfall intensity, the picture keeps coming and going as you pass in and out of the shower. I would not take long to get 140' low if the sink rate goes to a 1000~1200 fpm as you are continuously changing focus from inside to outside. It's only a bee's d!ck change in attitude or thrust to go from being right where you want to be to be low. A sudden reduction in the visual picture at just the wrong time can end up like this accident quickly.

There was no mention of who was the PF,.
I did note the FO only had 368 hours on type.
Were the runway lights on? The Airport info page (http://www.airnav.com/airport/PTKK) also makes the remark " Marking: precision, in fair condition". I wonder what it would have looked like under overcast and rainy conditions, quite grey, and similar to the water, making visual perception relative to the more difficult.
You are also dependant upon the support pilot to call deviations in ROD or speed.

You can see in the image the FO's windscreen wiper is stuck half way across the window, so it was likely on at the time of impact. Captains side not visible out of stowed position, however, without looking at the switch position, you can't conclusively say if it was on or off. But the fact the FO's was on indicates they had probably experienced rainfall during the later stages of the approach.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/534x534/92a7340f_7438_4db6_9e38_e0e5a0215470_benito1_e82e1016ea75e3a ee1f02b184869d5b0c2a3423d.jpg


Lots and lots and lots of ways that this type of approach can go wrong. Lots of questions.

Derfred
28th Oct 2018, 10:31
There is a difference between the capabilities of the aircraft, the design of the approach and the FMC coding.

Yes, you are correct. My mistake, I hadn’t seen that approach chart.

I don’t know how it’s coded in the FMC, but the chart certainly makes it look like a dodgy approach. I am lucky enough to fly in a part of the world where almost every RNP or RNAV GNSS approach is coded to the runway, or at least very close to it in the case of GNSS.

This approach has an MDA of 420 feet at 2.2NM from the threshold. If you need to get to 420 feet to get visual, it won’t work on a 3 degree slope. You would have to fly it as a dive-and-drive, which is not a recommended procedure in my part of the world. Presumably the surrounding terrain coupled with LNAV GNSS design criteria makes it impossible to get any closer. Flying that approach in my airline would be done at 3 degrees, with autopilot off and flight directors cycled by the MAP (if visual). Not something you would do if you couldn’t clearly see the runway.

Even without RNP-AR (which I have no idea if this airline is certified for), Australia has implemented LNAV/VNAV GNSS criteria at many airports, which gets the aircraft quite a bit lower/closer sometimes, and sometimes even lower than RNP-AR 0.10 (which I can’t work out).

They are possibly lucky they hit the water. Otherwise they might have hit one of those hills.

Obviously the flight crew should not be fudging the visibily requirements of the approach (if indeed they were), but it would be interesting if procedure design and/or the cost of a better procedure design is a contributing factor. It also could be possible that the terrain would limit even GLS from getting any lower at DA, but at least GLS can remain coupled to the threshold, and could prevent this type of accident. I can’t believe how slowly the world is adopting GLS. The FAA has apparently delayed GLS adoption indefinitely. It seems to be very expensive, and I don’t understand why that needs to be the case.

lucille
28th Oct 2018, 23:46
I’m looking at the truly minimum rest the crew had prior to that duty day and shaking my head.

Charley Farley
29th Oct 2018, 03:43
I’m looking at the truly minimum rest the crew had prior to that duty day and shaking my head.

Really ?
Let's see, 2100 local time arrival after two short sectors from base, followed by a departure at 0850 local the next morning for the two short sectors back to base. Crew hotel about 5-10 minutes from the airport.

So what would you consider to be an adequate rest period in Pohnpei for such an arduous duty ? 18 hours, 24 hours...........a few days perhaps ?? Just asking

Duck Pilot
29th Oct 2018, 10:00
Swiss cheese holes had been lining up for years.

Most of us said this was going to happen and it has, one only needs to search this forum to find the evidence.

And yes, I’m an ex PX Captain and it totally saddens me, like most others that the airline that was once regarded as being very safe particularly given the operating environment.

Seroius actions need to be taken immediately by the airline without politics involved to recover from the fallout from this accident if they are to rebuild their reputation let alone survive.

Ageing fleet, grubby aeroplanes and crappy inflight catering (compared to what it was 20 years ago) are only going to make things worse if they want to rebuild their commercial reputation.

Duck Pilot
29th Oct 2018, 10:28
How far can you reduce the RNP down to using the FMS is the 737?

When I was flying the Dash 8 with PX it was drilled into the SOPs that the FMS RNPs were set to 0.03 if I recall correctly? And we were encouraged/taught to manually set up the VNAV profile for every approach which were all pilot calculated, not published or approved. Lots of potential for error in that little excercise, I always monitored the shit like a hawk as it was fought with danger in my opinion.

Capn Bloggs
29th Oct 2018, 11:32
Duck, I wouldn't worry, the proper FMS aeroplanes are nothing like the Dash 8. That thing is a dinosaur from what I have seen in the descent profile department.

If the 737 is anything like what I fly, you don't select the Required Navigation Performance, in terms of accuracy of tracking; the aeroplane will track as accurately as it can at all times, which is pretty damn good and well within any RNP. It's called the ANP, Actual Navigation Performance. Now, if the ANP drifts out to the RNP (which is either coded into the approach or set by the crew) then you get a warning. As alluded to in a post by Derfred I think it was, the 737 is deadly accurate: at Mildura, Virgin did a Zero/Zero landing on the runway using only a bog-standard cheap charlie RNP LNAV approach (old GPS NPA), similar to that published at Chuuk. As also pointed out by Derfred, this particular approach is a curly one because the MAPt is hit well before the MDA if you are on the 3° slope to the runway. You either accept that on a 3° slope (that could be flown in VNAV/AP) you will never get to the MDA, or you duck below the 3° to get down to the MDA first before the MAPt.

lucille
30th Oct 2018, 06:08
Really ?
Let's see, 2100 local time arrival after two short sectors from base, followed by a departure at 0850 local the next morning for the two short sectors back to base. Crew hotel about 5-10 minutes from the airport.

So what would you consider to be an adequate rest period in Pohnpei for such an arduous duty ? 18 hours, 24 hours...........a few days perhaps ?? Just asking

According to the report. Capt had 5 hours sleep, and F/O had 6. How so?

Derfred
30th Oct 2018, 06:37
https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1365x745/ef1d9c0f_806a_448d_9c9e_4c1e9d0819f2_3894cec367e450e9f2b940c 2bfd4b0511f82eec3.jpeg

Just saying...


We have done a 10hPa altimiter error identical to your example in the simulator, and an EGPWS terrain caution was issued at around 200’ RA.

Capn Bloggs
30th Oct 2018, 06:43
I have heard of a nifty feature where a warning pops up if the crew don't set the QNH by Transition... That would be handy for NPAs...

TBL Warrior
30th Oct 2018, 10:53
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1220x712/f92e6e8a_09ef_4da8_b0fc_aca559bd71e1_78b1cc76cf456ea419cd5b8 2dad1fdc235c14b83.jpeg

78,77,73 logic same for Terrain warning...


We have done a 10hPa altimiter error identical to your example in the simulator, and an EGPWS terrain caution was issued at around 200’ RA.

Not possible according to EGPWS logic, unless flap was not set to landing or gear not down....

Bleve
30th Oct 2018, 14:49
Not possible according to EGPWS logic, unless flap was not set to landing or gear not down....

Yes it is possible. In Honeywell's EGPWS system, there is also a 'Terrain Clearance Floor' mode. From their EGPWS manual (my highlighting):

The Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) function (enabled with TAD) enhances the basic GPWS Modes by alerting the pilot of descent below a defined “Terrain Clearance Floor” regardless of the aircraft configuration. The TCF alert is a function of the aircraft’s Radio Altitude and distance (calculated from latitude/longitude position) relative to the center of the nearest runway in the database (all runways greater than 3500 feet in length).

On short finals the TCF is a sloping plane (100'/nm) starting anywhere from 0.25-2 nm from the threshold increasing to 400'AGL at 4.25-6nm from the threshold. The actual distance depends upon the accuracies of the runway's known position and the aircraft's ANP. Even if you are correctly configured and on a stable 3° descent, you can activate a 'Tow Low Terrain' warning if you are below the nominal 3° path and penetrate the TCF. Derfred's Simex with a 10hPa (300') error perfectly illustrates the TCF mode in action.

Capt Fathom
30th Oct 2018, 21:32
The ATSB report into the incident at Kosrae VH-NLK noted the TCF mode activated several times late in the approach. That was a 737-300.
Report AO-2015-066.

Bleve
31st Oct 2018, 00:53
... there is no reference in any Boeing manuals to ‘Terrain Clearance Floor' ...

That's true, but that doesn't mean TCF doesn't exist, just that the Boeing manuals don't fully describe the Honeywell EGPWS system. Maybe you should ask someone in your technical or training departments about it.

Bleve
31st Oct 2018, 01:27
Here's some (de-identified) slides from our GNSS training package for my Boeing aircraft:

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1500/tcf_1_39ff9b6aa8c840ad467e108dbdc1fa19a7c343f6.png
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/tcf_2_b5623e440e1f97f58e3b24d8d402e4a31eb91279.png
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1998x1501/tcf_3_80450f8673baab5e33bd0497e7a897056b6a46a9.png

Capn Bloggs
31st Oct 2018, 01:37
Shaggs, there is no reference in any Boeing manuals to ‘Terrain Clearance Floor’
This is what's in mine:
Enhanced Operation
Terrain Clearance Floor
The Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) alert function adds an additional element of
protection to the basic GPWS by creating an increasing terrain clearance envelope
around the airport runway. TCF alerts are based on current airplane location,
destination runway center point position and radio altitude. When the TCF
envelope is penetrated:
* TOO LOW TERRAIN voice warning is generated twice.
* Amber GROUND PROX message is displayed on PFD.
* Additional TOO LOW TERRAIN voice warning will be generated for every
additional loss of radio altitude of approximately 20%.
TCF is active during takeoff, cruise, and final approach. The TCF alerts add to the
existing Mode 4 protection by providing alerts based on insufficient terrain
clearance including landing configuration.

Square Bear
31st Oct 2018, 13:50
How does Boeings "Integrated Approach Navigation (IAN) " interact with "Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF)"?

And a further question...Is this TFC a standard fit, or a Boeing "add on"?

Asking as I have had never heard of TFC in the Boeing until reading it here....well aware of the VSD and also aware of the various modes of the EGPWS, but TCF??.

Capn Bloggs
31st Oct 2018, 14:52
Another function of the EGPWS: "Terrain Awareness":
Terrain conditions are displayed and annunciated as follows:
* Terrain caution - Displayed in solid amber on ND, amber flashing GROUND
PROX on PFD, and voice warning CAUTION TERRAIN, CAUTION
TERRAIN (TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD - option)

Qantas 737s have this, as mentioned in the report into the Canberra terrain incident in 2004.

Bleve
31st Oct 2018, 15:34
... a further question...Is this TFC a standard fit, or a Boeing "add on"? Asking as I have had never heard of TFC in the Boeing until reading it here....well aware of the VSD and also aware of the various modes of the EGPWS, but TCF??.

As far as I'm aware, it's not an 'add on', but a 'standard' part of the 'E' (ie Enhanced) bit of Honeywell's EGPWS. If you have EGPWS with the Terrain Alerting Display option enabled, you have TCF.

TBL Warrior
31st Oct 2018, 20:01
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1280x545/071a1e82_1cb9_4a24_9890_c93e567ffe7b_92f3065f2f6a1b15300b37b 7e00a1e27a9c8b54d.jpeg
How does Boeings "Integrated Approach Navigation (IAN) " interact with "Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF)"?

And a further question...Is this TFC a standard fit, or a Boeing "add on"?

Asking as I have had never heard of TFC in the Boeing until reading it here....well aware of the VSD and also aware of the various modes of the EGPWS, but TCF??.

‘IAN’ is option #25 for the 73, and PX doesn’t have the option. I think TCF may be an option too, further reading shows that the 76 has TCF, notability it is mentioned in Boeing’s FCOM for the 76, but not for the 77,78 or 73...

tripelapidgeon
1st Nov 2018, 06:26
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1280x545/071a1e82_1cb9_4a24_9890_c93e567ffe7b_92f3065f2f6a1b15300b37b 7e00a1e27a9c8b54d.jpeg


‘IAN’ is option #25 for the 73, and PX doesn’t have the option. I think TCF may be an option too, further reading shows that the 76 has TCF, notability it is mentioned in Boeing’s FCOM for the 76, but not for the 77,78 or 73...
Just FYI P2 PXE was fitted with IAN .However crews never received proper training in its use.