ASW and 1982 South Atlantic War

[Marcantilan]

And my new book (still a shock)!

A Carrier at Risk: Argentinean Aircraft Carrier and Anti-Submarine Operations Against Royal Navy's Attack Submarines During the Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982 (Latin America@War)

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[Stuff]

Not available on Kindle :(

at least, not yet...

[Davef68]

Look forward to reading that

[India Four Two]

Should be interesting. Shame about the cover picture.

[sandiego89]

I am always intrigued by the conflict and always great to hear things from all perspectives. I seem to recall lack of wind was cited as preventing the 25 de Mayo from launching what could have been the only carrier v. carrier action since WWII.

A quick internet search did not show ordering info? Subject wise I'm definitely interested, if price and ordering source seem right.

[Marcantilan]

I am always intrigued by the conflict and always great to hear things from all perspectives. I seem to recall lack of wind was cited as preventing the 25 de Mayo from launching what could have been the only carrier v. carrier action since WWII.

A quick internet search did not show ordering info? Subject wise I'm definitely interested, if price and ordering source seem right.

Yes, that is right. Lack of wind over deck prevented the launching of six A4Q with full bomb load (Snakeyes) at dawn. May 1st, 1982 night was called "Banzai Night" by the Carrier Air Wing crews. No one expected to survive.



Best regards,

[Davef68]

Added to my wishlist for post-Xmas spending!

[Wokkafans]

Any reason for Marcantilan's sudden banning?

[Pontius Navigator]

Any reason for Marcantilan's sudden banning?
Blatant breach of the rules I guess - advertising.

While he has been a mine of interesting information from the Argentinean perspective and has shared his research from British archive material he would inevitably have profitted from Pprune.I

Shame really as I think we gained much value from the insight he gave us and we will miss his contribution.

[Just This Once...]

I guess it did abrade the rules but does seem harsh on someone who has contributed so much and sought the contributions of so many in such an inclusive and thoughtful way. Hopefully his time served will be weighed against his high standing and he will return to these boards in the near future.

[Davef68]

I guess it did abrade the rules but does seem harsh on someone who has contributed so much and sought the contributions of so many in such an inclusive and thoughtful way. Hopefully his time served will be weighed against his high standing and he will return to these boards in the near future.

Here here. Possibly a misunderstanding on his part

[OvertHawk]

His original post notifying us of his new book has been left up - it seems only to have been his link to Amaxxn that got him into trouble - Which in his defence he only posted as a response to a specific request from another poster.

As others have said - Let's hope it's a short lived ban and that he's back soon.

[chopper2004]

My dad's three cousins ( twins PO from FAA served on Invincible / Hemes and one CPO on Type 42) during the conflict. However I did read into what the Argentines fielded and it makes interesting reading from this book I have.


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Interesting enough they even considered their handful of legacy F-86 Sabres to defend Port Stanley but decided against.

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cheers

[PPRuNe Towers]

He got 5 days off - not for the Amazon ad itself- no action taken.

Got the boot when he replaced the ad in the OP and then repeated it to hammer it home.

Rob

[Navaleye]

I look forward to seeing him back.

[OvertHawk]

He got 5 days off - not for the Amazon ad itself- no action taken.

Got the boot when he replaced the ad in the OP and then repeated it to hammer it home.

Rob

Seems like a fair enough response then Rob!

[Duchess_Driver]

And if I may add nice to see Rob standing up and explaining - doesn’t happen often.

Added to my ‘stocking fillers please’ list.

F86’s against Sea Harriers would have been an interesting contest!

[MPN11]

Thank you, Rob :ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

F86’s against Sea Harriers would have been an interesting contest!
Not sure the context of that statement but F86 against Vulcan was no contest especially when the Vulcan went into the vertical.

[orca]

F-86F CAP - indeed any CAP - would have given the Vulcan crews something to think about - particularly if the fighters were getting Bogey Dope and the Vulcan wasn’t.
F-86F vs Sea Harrier would have been interesting - but at some point AIM-9L may have made it less so. My understanding is the F-86 was guns only...other than some rocket only derivatives.
I remember from 607 that a SHAR was airborne at the time of at least one B.B. raid but not sure this constituted a sweep as such.

[Flash2001]

Those F86s have only ranging radar, no positioning info.

[Wensleydale]

Not sure the context of that statement but F86 against Vulcan was no contest especially when the Vulcan went into the vertical.

...But would this have been a soft kill due to added fuel consumption?

[Davef68]

. My understanding is the F-86 was guns only...other than some rocket only derivatives.


Several countries had F86s that carried AIM-9 (e.g. Australia, Portugal), but not IIRC the Argentine ones. I think the deciding factor in not deploying them to the Falklands was the length of the Stanley runway.

[orca]

I don’t understand...F-86 intercepts Vulcan...Vulcan ‘uses vertical’...fight ruled ‘no contest’.

Is that really how things would have gone between a fighter with A-A weaponry against a bomber with none?

I can’t help but note that the Vulcan windows appear (never flown one so can’t state as definitive) - a slightly more restricted view than the wonderful transparency on a F-86. That may have been a factor.

I’ve been in the vertical plenty of times and always had to come back out...unless of course a lot of space debris is Vulcan aircraft that got stuck and kept going?

[Heathrow Harry]

A Sabre needed around 3600 ft of runway - a Mirage maybe 2800 ft - so if you weren't willing to risk the Mirages at Stanley you certainly wouldn't be any better off with the Sabres....................

[orca]

If your risk calculus was based on runway length alone.

[Heathrow Harry]

If your risk calculus was based on runway length alone.

That's was the reason given for the Argentinians not basing fast jets at Stanley - short runway with the chance that the RAF could shorten it (for a few days at a time) - but still not good.

https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/air-war-in-the-falklands-32214512/ for example..............

[Pontius Navigator]

The Vulcan climbed at as little as 170 kts, the F86 at 300. At 170 kts Vulcan could put climb the F86 which needed a much longer track distance to get the same height. At height a Vulcan could put run a Mig 21 - fuel was everything.

[orca]

The ability to climb at slow speed would appear to offer pros and cons if out running someone was your aim!

[Pontius Navigator]

Orca, got it in one. We used to run rings around Javelins. Out climb and out turn. A Lightning had enough energy to negate this advantage.

[Marcantilan]

Well, I am back. I was not aware I was breaking any rule here (but, I´ve learned the lesson)

Thanks for the kind words. It was very rewarding reading it from my jail time.

Regards to all,

[artee]

Well, I am back. I was not aware I was breaking any rule here (but, I´ve learned the lesson)

Thanks for the kind words. It was very rewarding reading it from my jail time.

Regards to all,

Welcome back. I've always enjoyed your knowledgeable, thoughtful posts.

It looks like your odometer has been reset - to 1 post!

Rick

[AndySmith]

The F86s were based in Mendoza and used to cover the Chilean border in that area, according to my source, There weren't that many operational anyway, and their secondary use was for freshly qualified pilot training, I guess a bit like an OCU or TWU. I don't believe they were missile capable - not even my source knows this off the top of his head.

I had the pleasure of translating Mariano's book, albeit over a very long time until he managed to get a publisher interested and things moved on quite quickly. I hope those of you who buy it enjoy it - and can add to the speculation about the unidentified submarine.....

There are some more translations in the pipeline with another Argentine author, with the first title to be a translation of a book about the first generation anglo-argentines participation in the RAF during WW2, of which there were many. More books on the Falklands will probably follow - some already written and some new. Watch this space.

Cheers

A

[Davef68]

- and can add to the speculation about the unidentified submarine.....


Intruiging - I wonder if it's the same mystery submarine Chris Parry mentions in his book (I think).....

[TEEEJ]

The F86s were based in Mendoza and used to cover the Chilean border in that area, according to my source, There weren't that many operational anyway, and their secondary use was for freshly qualified pilot training, I guess a bit like an OCU or TWU. I don't believe they were missile capable - not even my source knows this off the top of his head.



Image at following link showing a Fuerza Aerea Argentina F-86F fitted with an Israeli Rafael Shafrir.

The poster claims that only one F-86F was wired for the missile.

https://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?81971-Falklands-quot-What-if-quot&p=1305750#post1305750

[Marcantilan]

Intruiging - I wonder if it's the same mystery submarine Chris Parry mentions in his book (I think).....

We covered (briefly) the possibility in the book.

We have both Chris Parry´s excellent book and, also, the once top secret (now open to public) after action report of the event.

In my personal opinion, Adm Parry attacked a nuclear submarine...

[dragartist]

Good to see you back Mario, looking forward to reading your book.
interestingly I came across a link the other day to a photo album put together by a guy under the name “Think Defence” on Twitter. Hundreds of photos I had not seen before centred around Altlantic Conveyor and other stuff. You may be interested. I am not bright enough to post the links.
as you know my interest from the time was Chinook with the RWR installation I had been involved in the design when working at EWAU and the Nimrod R you were able to point me in the direction of material. We did not speak about what we did in those days.
best of luck with book and like others really pleased to see you back after a minor digression ;)
Drag,
of course back in those days I never dressed up in women’s clothes. Not till I became involved in airdropping in 1996 LOL!

[Marcantilan]

Image at following link showing a Fuerza Aerea Argentina F-86F fitted with an Israeli Rafael Shafrir.

The poster claims that only one F-86F was wired for the missile.


I have a "picture" of SS Canberra damaged by a F-86 Sabre (dated May 24,1982). Why on Earth they chose a Sabre (not even have the range to go there, drop a bomb and return) for the fake picture!

[Misformonkey]

Intruiging - I wonder if it's the same mystery submarine Chris Parry mentions in his book (I think).....
Do you have a link to the report?

[Pontius Navigator]

I have a "picture" of SS Canberra damaged by a F-86 Sabre (dated May 24,1982). Why on Earth they chose a Sabre (not even have the range to go there, drop a bomb and return) for the fake picture!
Either crap propagandists or deliberate disinformation or security stopping an operational aircraft photo?

We have any of that nonsense too. Used to be paranoid about publishing airframe numbers when it was publicly available and every airfield had its duty spotter. Nothing moves, at least in daylight, without being logged, privacy photographed and collated in some magazine etc.

[cokecan]

with regards to the mystery submarine - i've not read the book or know about the incident - but theres a bit in several of the diplomatic/political sources around the UN at the time in which the Russian Ambassador to the UN asks the UK ambassador to the UN 'i hope our submarines are being useful...'.

possible blue on grey, or is it blue on blue..?

[AndySmith]

There is also the Invincible incident. One day in May, without going and looking in the log I can't be specific right now, there was a torpedo alert on board Invincible. The ship went to action stations and carried out some violent high speed turns that everyone on board at the time remember well, and say was the scariest moment of the whole conflict. It's mentioned in the commander's, JJ Black's, book. I am not sure if I can copy the text here or not without getting a ban - so I won't. I know two members of the Flight Deck crew that are sure that they saw torpedo tracks in the sea, and similarly the sonar team, I think on Brilliant, were convinced that they had heard a torpedo in the water. On the date in question, the only operational Argentine sub was nowhere near the area (as I have discussed with Mariano elsewhere). This is another yet to be solved incident. Did it happen? Was it a false contact?.....

[Marcantilan]

There is also the Invincible incident. One day in May, without going and looking in the log I can't be specific right now, there was a torpedo alert on board Invincible. The ship went to action stations and carried out some violent high speed turns that everyone on board at the time remember well, and say was the scariest moment of the whole conflict. It's mentioned in the commander's, JJ Black's, book. I am not sure if I can copy the text here or not without getting a ban - so I won't. I know two members of the Flight Deck crew that are sure that they saw torpedo tracks in the sea, and similarly the sonar team, I think on Brilliant, were convinced that they had heard a torpedo in the water. On the date in question, the only operational Argentine sub was nowhere near the area (as I have discussed with Mariano elsewhere). This is another yet to be solved incident. Did it happen? Was it a false contact?.....

May 5th, 1982

[Marcantilan]

Do you have a link to the report?

I could not upload pic or answer PMs right now. Remember me in a couple of days (or more?) and I will upload the report.

[Yellow Sun]

with regards to the mystery submarine - i've not read the book or know about the incident - but theres a bit in several of the diplomatic/political sources around the UN at the time in which the Russian Ambassador to the UN asks the UK ambassador to the UN 'i hope our submarines are being useful...'.

possible blue on grey, or is it blue on blue..?

It was in fact AVM Ron Dick, British Air Attaché to Washington and the source is the RAF Historical Society Journal No 30 2003, pp 25-35 (https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-30-Seminar-The-Falklands-Campaign.pdf)


YS

[Misformonkey]

I could not upload pic or answer PMs right now. Remember me in a couple of days (or more?) and I will upload the report.
will do, thanks. It does make you think what happened but wasn’t reported outside of MoD. I didn’t think Russian subs were that quiet in the 80’s.

[dragartist]

Having read the report that YS posted there are still lots of things that will probably never enter the public domain.
Most of the speakers at the RAF historical group are senior. I just wondered, whilst I have a little grey matter left if I should write down some of the things I was involved in as a very junior member of the team. I never had the complete picture, rightly so. As the years have progressed I try to put into context some of the stuff I did back then. I wish I had kept a diary. I know most of the design drawings and files from the time were destroyed.

[Marcantilan]

The Argentine Navy informed the US Naval attache, early on April 2nd, 1982, "one or more" Soviet submarine were near the islands. The US attache briefed BRITNAVAT Buenos Aires about the subs, and he sent the message to MODUK Navy via Flash Message.

So, from the very beginning, the Soviet subs were part of the equation.

In fact, the war was triggered by a Soviet boat. Mr Victor was detected and HMS Superb was deployed, from Gibraltar to chase the contact (I´ve the pic of the same Mr Victor, taken from a Nimrod). The press reported Superb was heading south, to the crisis in South Georgia and the Argentine government said now or never (a nuclear sub was a no go for the assault).

From there, many suspicious submarine contacts were reported. The book cover many of the mistery contacts and, specially, the May 5th, 1982 attack by a Tracker and Sea King of a submerged contact, far away from HMS Splendid, the closest UK boat. They dropped two Mk.44 SW torpedoes against a solid contact, detected by sonobuoys, MAD and Sea King passive sonar. Almost, almost the same story told by Adm Parry, which happened a couple of days later.

However, the mistery remains. I could say (quoting myself from Ewen Southby Tailyour´s "Exocet Falklands") a friend of mine was on ISA meeting Odessa 2004 and some Russians told him they were there (below water) waiting for "the order" from Moscow. And a Russian amateur historian informed me K-525 (an Oscar class boat) was down south in 1982. True or false, who knows. Some info I have support that claim, but the Soviet files of the time are still closed (and yes, I´ve asked via official channels).

Regards!

[Archimedes]

Having read the report that YS posted there are still lots of things that will probably never enter the public domain.
Most of the speakers at the RAF historical group are senior. I just wondered, whilst I have a little grey matter left if I should write down some of the things I was involved in as a very junior member of the team. I never had the complete picture, rightly so. As the years have progressed I try to put into context some of the stuff I did back then. I wish I had kept a diary. I know most of the design drawings and files from the time were destroyed.

Yes, you should write it down, please. Although it is generally the case that the more accounts there are the more confusion caused for historians when there are differences between the sources, the more sources the better.

I think that Marcantilan has corresponded with the PhD student writing his thesis on the air war, and it’s true that more books and articles will start appearing- if the stuff dealing with Chile is declassified after 40 years (rather than being closed for longer upon review), I imagine some more material will come out. I’m looking forward to reading Marcantilan’s book when it comes out.

[Marcantilan]

I think that Marcantilan has corresponded with the PhD student writing his thesis on the air war, and it’s true that more books and articles will start appearing- if the stuff dealing with Chile is declassified after 40 years (rather than being closed for longer upon review), I imagine some more material will come out. I’m looking forward to reading Marcantilan’s book when it comes out.


Yes, I am in contact with this fellow Ppruner and I am looking forward for his thesis becoming a book! That book will be THE BOOK about air warfare down south.

[orca]

Of course - one has to accept that a Russian might have had a good reason for wanting the UK or its allies to think that they were somewhere near the TEZ when in fact they weren’t...feigned global reach etc. Equally a remark made in a foreign language might have been meant in a different way to the one taken - for example a decrease in submarine op tempo in the North Atlantic might have freed up NATO (in this case UK) assets to go south.
In the Falklands Edition of Flight Deck the 820 NAS entry seems to suggest they attacked a whale ‘successfully’.
Sadly any events pieced together from memories will be inaccurate. Lord knows we’ve all spent enough time in peacetime de-briefs trying to make sense of what we thought we saw!

[Marcantilan]

In the Falklands Edition of Flight Deck the 820 NAS entry seems to suggest they attacked a whale ‘successfully’.

Hello orca, do you have any specific day about this attack. I could cross check with my files then. Best regards!

[orca]

No, the 820 NAS entry (unlike the others which are serious) is written very well in the style of a film review. The ‘critic’ noted that in amongst the main war storyline there is a love story with a tragic twist - involving a whale and a torpedo - and a case of mistaken identity leads to a ‘bloody climax’.

[Marcantilan]

No, the 820 NAS entry (unlike the others which are serious) is written very well in the style of a film review. The ‘critic’ noted that in amongst the main war storyline there is a love story with a tragic twist - involving a whale and a torpedo - and a case of mistaken identity leads to a ‘bloody climax’.

Thanks orca,

According to my records, 820 NAS launched 6 x Mk46 torpedoes and 18x Mk11 depth charges.

The main suspect for your whale kill is a torpedo released on April 24 (Observer Lt Smith), a GASS attack on Possub HI 3, identified later as a whale ("Cert whale"). Not sure if the torpedo hit the target, or the whale made evasive maneuvers.

Regards,

[Yellow Sun]

It is well worth reading Hennessy and Jinks’ “The Silent Deep” as it puts Corporate into context with Cold War operations. Whilst it is probably incomplete in some respects it does contain an unusually large amount of detail about post war RN submarine operations. Whilst I cannot claim to have extensive knowledge of the subject, I can say that there is information in the book that was TS when I last saw it.

No doubt there are gaps in their account, but I believe it is the best record so far of sub surface operations during Corporate,

YS

[Marcantilan]

It is well worth reading Hennessy and Jinks’ “The Silent Deep” as it puts Corporate into context with Cold War operations. Whilst it is probably incomplete in some respects it does contain an unusually large amount of detail about post war RN submarine operations. Whilst I cannot claim to have extensive knowledge of the subject, I can say that there is information in the book that was TS when I last saw it.

No doubt there are gaps in their account, but I believe it is the best record so far of sub surface operations during Corporate,

YS

Yes, a very good reading.

However...for a reason I can not explain further...a book written by me was mentioned only in the second edition (the paperback one) of the FI chapter. Not a big deal, but I was upset for some time about it.

[Marcantilan]

will do, thanks. It does make you think what happened but wasn’t reported outside of MoD. I didn’t think Russian subs were that quiet in the 80’s.


https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmforum.com-vbulletin/602x846/red_c9e4e85ab51225d0e737442f8e1637a4b6e63db3.jpg

I can now! It was once UK Secret Eyes Bravo, now is in the NA. No Argentine submarine was even near this area at the time.

Again, on May 5th, 1982 a Tracker antisubmarine plane from the Argentine light carrier ARA 25 de Mayo was ordered to search an area near the mainland, looking for the patrol boat ARA Alferez Sobral, which was attacked earlier by British helicopters.

The Tracker (CO Lt. Carlos Cal) soon detected, by radar and latter visual, a small periscope or snorkel over the surface. Lt. Cal dropped then an Mk 44 and a sonobuoy. However, he could not track the torpedo run: the plane, because was configured for surface search, had not a sonobuoy receptor.

Alerted by the attack, another Tracker and two Sea Kings from the carrier were ordered to take off and rush to search and destroy the intruder. Arrived at the area, the new Tracker (CO Lt. Fortini) and one of the Sea King (the other had sonar problems) located and tracked (passively) a subsurface contact.

It is worth to mention the Tracker acustic operator had contact on three JEZEBEL (LOFAR) sonobuoys, and confirmed the source by nine MAD contacts. In addition, the Sea King helicopter heard the contact by its dipping sonar. After the helicopter confirmed the target, it guided the Tracker for a VECTAC, and then Lt. Fortini dropped a new Mk 44 over it. He saw the torpedo entering the water and he heard the torpedo duplicating its ping and it speeding (a sign of the torpedo acquiring a submerged target).

But none happened then. Contact was classified as a PROBSUB Confidence 1 in the scene and degraded to POSSUB Confidence 2/3 in the after action analysis, to the dismay of the Tracker / Sea King crewmembers.

Two actions. The same intruder?

Regards!

[Mogwi]

Shortly after this, our D came up with a song, to the tune of the Welsh National Anthem;


Whales, whales,
820 sinks effin whales!
When there's no submarine
To be seen at the scene,
820 sinks effin whales!

Much merriment!

mog

[MPN11]

From the RAF Historical Society ... https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-30-Seminar-The-Falklands-Campaign.pdf ... page 119 of an interesting read.

So from about 2006 the only fixed-wing aircraft which will be capable of embarking in the Invincible class carriers will be the GR7s and we will maintain that capability until the Joint Strike Fighter enters service with the two new big carriers in around 2012.


Or not, perhaps?

[Wensleydale]

In the Falklands Edition of Flight Deck the 820 NAS entry seems to suggest they attacked a whale ‘successfully’.

Was this classed as a possible Blue on Blue?

[ex-fast-jets]

I was one of the brave souls heading south from Ascension with Harriers, Chinooks, and other stuff that we had carefully placed on ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. Because of limited accommodation on ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, several (most) of us went South on NORLAND in convoy with a bunch of others. We did a classic "War At Sea" WWII convoy zig/zag at what seemed to me to be a fairly slow speed - about 15 KTS. It became clear why we were steaming at such a slow speed, when one of our few Grey Funnel escort ships - presumably using SONAR technology from WWII - declared a submarine threat. The convoy immediately turned to place the threat in its "six o'clock" and went "Full Steam Ahead" or whatever the terminology was in the early 80's. I then realised why the convoy speed was only 15 KTS - because at max welly, NORLAND could only make 15.5KTS. So we were at the back of the convoy as it bravely ran away from the "Submarine" threat.

Probably not the best place to be if there really was a submarine loaded with torpedos in the area!!

I think the threat was finally decided to be a Whale, which probably could not swim at 15.5 KTS, so it carried on with whatever Whales do once our unwelcome presence had gone!!

[Pontius Navigator]

Bomber H, Blue whales can go rather faster than that although Sperm Whales are slower. A convoy has a torpedo danger zone usually in the ahead sector where the threat is a conventional submarine. A turn as you describe will ensure the submarine is no longer in the TDZ.

[ex-fast-jets]

Thanks for that info PN.

I wish you had been on NORLAND in '82 with us - you would have made us feel a whole lot happier!

[Pontius Navigator]

Ah, but the wonderful thing about ASW is you can be wrong and a crafty enemy gets you to turn the wrong way :)

The best place to be is in the air.

[Yellow Sun]

BomberH,

I had a quick firkle around to try and find a clear and concise description of the construction of the “Limiting Lines of Submerged Approach”. I failed miserably, lots of descriptions but none clear and concise. This was the best I could find:

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/analysis-advantage-speed-changes-course-avoiding-attack-submarine.html

If you think of it as an exercise in geometry and relative motion, not dissimilar to air defence intercept geometry, but carried out in slow motion.

YS

[Pontius Navigator]

YS, para 2 is interesting as it shows ASW is as much art as science.

[AndySmith]

BomberH,

I had a quick firkle around to try and find a clear and concise description of the construction of the “Limiting Lines of Submerged Approach”. I failed miserably, lots of descriptions but none clear and concise. This was the best I could find:

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/analysis-advantage-speed-changes-course-avoiding-attack-submarine.html

If you think of it as an exercise in geometry and relative motion, not dissimilar to air defence intercept geometry, but carried out in slow motion.

YS


Of course, this theory is completely irrelevant if faced with a nuclear-powered boat - which was something the Argentine Navy was having to rapidly adapt its tactics to deal with.... as explained in Mariano's book.

[Yellow Sun]

Of course, this theory is completely irrelevant if faced with a nuclear-powered boat - which was something the Argentine Navy was having to rapidly adapt its tactics to deal with.... as explained in Mariano's book.

It’s not a “theory”, it is a mathematical technique used to produce a solution to a problem. It’s in exactly the same category as the procedures used to calculate a Critical Point or a Point of No Return or a Time Late at Datum calculation. You put the numbers in you get an answer, use different numbers you get a different answer. The information provided was in response to a post regarding a specific event. The threat was a conventional submarine not a nuclear powered boat.

You can still construct a Limiting Lines diagram for a submarine with performance characteristics of a SSN but quite clearly the Limiting Lines becomes threat lines outside of which the submarine would be unable to gain position to launch an attack. You may wish to consider the situation with a high speed surface unit; submarine has only a small or low speed advantage; and a weapon similar to the Mk8 torpedo. Manoeuvring after detection, based upon Limiting Lines could still negate the attacker’s firing solution.

The problem facing the Argentinians wasn’t just one of relative speed but an almost complete lack of acoustic information about potential attackers. No source level information, no signature information, not even any discrete lines. You get something print out on the AQA5 in a Tracker, how are they going to determine whether or not it might be a target related line?

ASW may be an “art” and does sometimes benefit from apparent luck. But it’s usually because one party knows the techniques and procedures very thoroughly and knows how to apply them and maybe the other party makes an error. RN warfare officers learnt the former on the Maritime Operations Course and later in their career would hone their decision making on the a Maritime Tactical Course. Maybe they still do.

YS

[AndySmith]

It’s not a “theory”, it is a mathematical technique used to produce a solution to a problem. It’s in exactly the same category as the procedures used to calculate a Critical Point or a Point of No Return or a Time Late at Datum calculation. You put the numbers in you get an answer, use different numbers you get a different answer. The information provided was in response to a post regarding a specific event. The threat was a conventional submarine not a nuclear powered boat.

You can still construct a Limiting Lines diagram for a submarine with performance characteristics of a SSN but quite clearly the Limiting Lines becomes threat lines outside of which the submarine would be unable to gain position to launch an attack. You may wish to consider the situation with a high speed surface unit; submarine has only a small or low speed advantage; and a weapon similar to the Mk8 torpedo. Manoeuvring after detection, based upon Limiting Lines could still negate the attacker’s firing solution.

The problem facing the Argentinians wasn’t just one of relative speed but an almost complete lack of acoustic information about potential attackers. No source level information, no signature information, not even any discrete lines. You get something print out on the AQA5 in a Tracker, how are they going to determine whether or not it might be a target related line?

ASW may be an “art” and does sometimes benefit from apparent luck. But it’s usually because one party knows the techniques and procedures very thoroughly and knows how to apply them and maybe the other party makes an error. RN warfare officers learnt the former on the Maritime Operations Course and later in their career would hone their decision making on the a Maritime Tactical Course. Maybe they still do.

YS

YS, sorry, I didn't mean to undermine your post, simply contrast the problems the Argentines were facing having not even trained or ever considered having to counter nuclear-powered subs prior to the conflict, let alone that their equipment was relatively antiquated for the time - the Trackers didn't even have AQA5, they were still on the previous version.

In the same way BomberH was bemoaning the fact that the Norland was chugging along at 15.5 knots, the ARA 25 de Mayo task group had a maximum speed of 20 knots, and some of their older escorts were thought to be incapable of maintaining high speeds for any long period of time. They had to adapt their ASW tactics to counter, as you quite rightly point out, an new and unknown threat.

Regards
A

[Pontius Navigator]

I guess the turn away tactic will be a best option against a nuclear threat too. You cut the nuclear speed advantage requiring an increase in speed, increased self-noise, and reduced sonar performance. Unless the target has the equipment to exploit this then it is just postponing the inevitable.
​​​​​​

[Marcantilan]

Either crap propagandists or deliberate disinformation or security stopping an operational aircraft photo?

We have any of that nonsense too. Used to be paranoid about publishing airframe numbers when it was publicly available and every airfield had its duty spotter. Nothing moves, at least in daylight, without being logged, privacy photographed and collated in some magazine etc.
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmforum.com-vbulletin/939x573/main_qimg_eb26b3be2961d6d62dda017d2130bfe6_7a36656ce1091df90 d6e1301db6e13da5385f11f.jpg

Here it is!

(I think the Sabre hit the SS Lady Elizabeth...)

[Marcantilan]

On May 23, 1982 a number of explosions were heard near HMS Valiant, getting progresively closer. The 5th (and last) one being loud enough to shake the submarine and its crew considerably. HMS Valiant suffered minor damage. The "attacker" were a flight of Skyhawk returning to San Julian air base, jettisoning its ordenance in the middle of nowhere. But HMS Valiant was in the middle of nowhere at the time. According to its CO, Tom Le Marchand: "We were lucky, but a few feet closer and it might have been something of a bad luck story."

The Argentine Air Force was very close to the first kill ever of an SSN...by pure chance.

Valiant was there at the time:

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmforum.com-vbulletin/1024x768/valiant_3e899bc8ebef93ce2b1329870a3a465a1585a9f8.jpg

Regards to all!

[Marcantilan]

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/472x669/52377246_2191232264254097_1446644130317860864_n_75b1a33ec142 f8ac08a894d0b65efcb6a3a00d4f.jpg

The final cover. The book will be in the streets (hopefully) late next week.

AndySmith worked hard as a translator and, also, he gave a huge help throughout this project. This book would not exist without him!

Regards!

[tartare]

Is your book likely to feature on Kindle soon Mariano?
The information now coming out after all these years is fascinating.
Remember the war well - as a 15 year old lad at the time.

[Marcantilan]

Hello tartare,

The contract I´ve signed mentions the book will be published electronically in the future. But I don´t know when.

But the book is in A4 format, with plenty of photos (more than 80), maps (seven) and profiles (12: nine aircraft and three submarines). I think paper suits best this type of book (and I am speaking as a big fan of Kindle...)

Best regards!
Mariano

[tartare]

Thank you - I'll order a copy.

[lmgaylard]

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/472x669/52377246_2191232264254097_1446644130317860864_n_75b1a33ec142 f8ac08a894d0b65efcb6a3a00d4f.jpg

The final cover. The book will be in the streets (hopefully) late next week.

AndySmith worked hard as a translator and, also, he gave a huge help throughout this project. This book would not exist without him!

Regards!
Looking forward to reading this book, it looks excellent.

Any chance I could get a signed copy for my Uncle, who was an aircraft inspector in Westland Helicopters?

Thank you.

[Surplus]

1982 Falklands.. All I remember was the Chef's Special Salad in the Volcano Club, Temazepam jellies and getting a free pair of desert wellies from Clarks. What did or didn't happen is still a mystery. Chilean burnt out Sea Kings anybody? I know a certain SSN made best speed after we pinged her with a Cambs buoy on the way home ;P

[Yellow Sun]

1982 Falklands.. All I remember was the Chef's Special Salad in the Volcano Club, Temazepam jellies and getting a free pair of desert wellies from Clarks. What did or didn't happen is still a mystery. Chilean burnt out Sea Kings anybody? I know a certain SSN made best speed after we pinged her with a Cambs buoy on the way home ;P

Sea Kings in Chile and more besides, read about it in Sid' Edwards book.

YS

[hoodie]

SK4 in Chile also discussed first hand in Richard Hutchings "Special Forces Pilot".

[Marcantilan]

Looking forward to reading this book, it looks excellent.

Any chance I could get a signed copy for my Uncle, who was an aircraft inspector in Westland Helicopters?

Thank you.

Yes, no problem! It will be a pleasure!

[Marcantilan]

I think it would be very interesting if someone could write about UK ASW in the Falklands war.

On one side, the Nimrod Squadrons based on ASI, the helicopters of the 820 and 826 NAS on the aircraft carriers and, finally, the surface ships (and the helicopters based there). On the other side, submarines ARA San Luis and ARA Santa Fe, the later disabled near South Georgia, and the former attacked on May 1, 1982 north of Macbride Head. Of course, some whales, soviet submarines, etc, could also enter the "red side".

There were 235 recorded incidents, and 314 contacts were made. 20 mk.46 torpedoes, 7 mk.44, 39 Depth Charges and 15 mortar salvoes were fired / launched at suspected contacts. I am writing here just about the Royal Navy. Maybe the Nimrod (which were cleared for the brand new Stingray torps) could also increase this numbers.

Gents, this is the story of so many people, doing a very proffesional job in very hard conditions. A lot of people (me first) need to read about it. I am willing to help if someone wants to write about it.

Best regards!
Marian

[Archimedes]

I think it would be very interesting if someone could write about UK ASW in the Falklands war.



It may be about to happen....

[NutLoose]

Marcantilan

I do not know if you are aware of them but I have been reading some of the articles here

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/shore-logistics-san-carlos-beyond/

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/raid-pebble-island/

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/ascension-island-1982-falklands-conflict/

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/san-carlos-fob/

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/the-atlantic-conveyor/

[dragartist]

TD recently republished his bit on Black Buck
a few interesting pictures I had not seen before.

[NutLoose]

Black Buck one is here and Ascension updated below

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2018/03/long-read-update-operation-black-buck/

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2018/03/content-update-ascension-island-and-the-1982-falklands-conflict/

[NutLoose]

Also this

https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-30-Seminar-The-Falklands-Campaign.pdf

[India Four Two]

Nutloose,

Thanks for posting that great link. Fascinating to hear from so many people who were involved in facilitating the RAF's air operations. It is quite clear that the whole affair would have been impossible without the active support of the US DoD. The paper is a must-read.

Three quotes that stood out for me:

Air Vice-Marshal John Price
You will, I am sure, note one significant absentee; there was no financier. Margaret Thatcher in her book, The Downing Street Years, recalls that she sought the advice of Harold Macmillan about the composition of the War Cabinet. He said, ‘Keep the Treasury out.’ She followed that advice. We followed that precedent. The Prime Minister was reported at the time as saying, ‘We will not count the cost, but will keep an account of the cost.’ We did – sort of.


Air Vice-Marshal Ron Dick
I asked if the US would help in providing whatever was necessary.

The admiral said that, of course they wanted to help, and asked how much fuel were we thinking of. I told him that we would like an eight- million gallon tanker full of jet fuel off the settlement of Georgetown within the next seven days. The UK could not provide one, but we hoped the US military could help us out. The admiral pulled the screens back on the big plotting chart on his wall showing the whereabouts of every tanker in which the military had an interest. After some discussion on the telephone, he fingered one of the plots and said they could divert it to do what we wanted. I seem to remember that it was a tanker on its way to Guantanamo. ‘How are you going to store and use the fuel?’, the admiral wanted to know. I told him that the ship would have to lie off Georgetown with lines ashore and be used as a floating fuel station until empty. ‘How long will that take and will you need any more?’, was his next question. I said that we would need a similar tanker seven days after the first, and then another in seven more days, and so on. ‘You can’t use that much fuel!’, he said. I assured him we were going to try, and he thereupon set about making long-term plans to meet the requirement.
...
There were, of course, many other instances of close Anglo-American co-operation besides the aviation fuel at Ascension. Among the more important were those in the fields of intelligence and communications, and there was an early request for AIM-9L Sidewinders. There was no fuss; our request for immediate delivery was quietly brought up to the top of the priority list as soon as I asked. We also bought navigation systems, like Omega, to cope with very long range over water missions, and other weaponry came in the form of Shrike and Harpoon missiles.


Air Vice-Marshal Tony Stables
The Conveyor part of this equation went ahead, largely without hitch, as did our flight to Ascension, although the transfer to the Norland was not without its moments, given that, individually, it was impossible to carry the amount of flying and survival clothing with which we had been issued. Additionally, no one had thought to inform 2PARA that we were joining – or so they claimed. This resulted in an undignified shouting match while we sought to find somewhere to sleep, compounded by our being asked to leave the Officers Mess after 1800 hrs because the colonel insisted on jacket and tie!

[NutLoose]

AVM Tony Stables. No, I haven’t, but, in the context of SNCOs, I would offer an observation on the quality of my airmen aircrew. They had originally enlisted as 18 or 19 year-old sergeants and I found that the quality of leadership was almost totally lacking. In fact, when we came back to the UK I made two specific recommendations. The first was that airmen aircrew should probably be employed as corporals to begin with and that they should be required to earn promotion to sergeant, and the second, that they should be subject to an annual assessment or appraisal,which they weren’t in those days. The assessment aspect was taken forward but the idea of starting out as corporals was not implemented, and I can, of course, appreciate the difficulties that the recruiters would have encountered in trying to sell the attractions of this option to the highly educated group of young people that we seek to attract to serve as aircrew. Nevertheless, the limitations of some of my airmen aircrew were very apparent. In fact, when we went ashore in the Falklands, the man I appointed to command the groundcrew element was the sergeant chef, because he had the most amazing qualities of leadership, far above those of my master aircrew, the warrant officers who worked for me. It was a very interesting lesson.

:eek: Interesting points about Ocean too

Mike Meech. We heard that one of the lessons taught by the Falklands


112 experience was that the Chinook demonstrated that it was the helicopter of choice, yet we seem to have overlooked this when it came to designing HMS Ocean. That ship was commissioned long after the Falklands but it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to get a Chinook into its hangar deck. Should we not have seen that one coming?

[Ivor_Bigunn]

Thanks very much to Nutloose for the fascinating linked document that he provided.

Another Quote that caught my eye in the linked doc was from Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire:


"So from about 2006 the only fixed-wing aircraft which will be capable of embarking in the Invincible
class carriers will be the GR7s and we will maintain that capability until
the Joint Strike Fighter enters service with the two new big carriers in
around 2012".

This is from 2002 !!

Obviously we did not keep Harrier Gr7's in service until the new aircraft carrier(s) were available, but the F35 (JSF) is only being worked-up now in 2019.

IB

[hunterboy]

Yet again, we have got away with it. Maybe we should scrap all of the armed forces and never go to war with anyone. We would save a fortune.

[West Coast]

Yet again, we have got away with it. Maybe we should scrap all of the armed forces and never go to war with anyone. We would save a fortune.

Go ahead and get rid of all your insurance as well, save a bundle.

[NutLoose]

more

Shrikes fitted to the Vulcan were used against the Argentine’s Westinghouse radars near Port Stanley. At about this time, I was drinking for Queen and country at a Washington reception when the local Westinghouse representative drew me aside. ‘How are you getting on against their radars?’ he wanted to know. ‘Do you need any specs or drawings?’ I was quite shocked. I asked him if he was not in danger of pushing the limits of ethical behaviour. ‘Hell no!’ he said. ‘You knock that one out and we get to sell them another one.’

:)

[Marcantilan]

‘You knock that one out and we get to sell them another one.’

In fact, Westinghouse charged the UK, for the refurbishment / service of the AN/TPS-43 / W430 Argentine Air Force radar captured at the end of the war.

Bussiness are bussiness:


https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/848x1046/w8273d_19822c692d0fb6d9e26d0dbb48f98aca3ae16741.jpg

[hunterboy]

I have probably misunderstood the previous post, but wouldn’t it have been better to accept the offer of the Westinghouse radar specs rather than query the reps ethical behaviour?

[orca]

Yes. I’m not sure who the quote is attributed to, but to have not taken up the offer immediately would seem extraordinary. I’m assuming it was taken up.
Then again - in what was an amazing feat of arms with great acts of ingenuity and heroism - there are a few other notable examples of ‘peacetime’ thinking and naivety.

[Pontius Navigator]

I have probably misunderstood the previous post, but wouldn’t it have been better to accept the offer of the Westinghouse radar specs rather than query the reps ethical behaviour?
If you read Ron Dick's original lecture you will appreciate that it is the sort of chit chat at a cocktail party and not an admonishment.

[k3k3]

I've just received an email from Amazon that my copy of the book will arrive on Friday. :-)

[Marcantilan]

I have started writing about UK ASW during the 1982 South Atlantic War. An honest question, would you like to read a book about that?

[rjtjrt]

I have started writing about UK ASW during the 1982 South Atlantic War. An honest question, would you like to read a book about that?
Yes, I would like to rad such a book.

[Flypro]

Marcantilan,

Yes please, though your chapter on RAF involvement will be VERY short !!!!!!!

[NutLoose]

I have probably misunderstood the previous post, but wouldn’t it have been better to accept the offer of the Westinghouse radar specs rather than query the reps ethical behaviour?

Yes. I’m not sure who the quote is attributed to, but to have not taken up the offer immediately would seem extraordinary. I’m assuming it was taken up.
Then again - in what was an amazing feat of arms with great acts of ingenuity and heroism - there are a few other notable examples of ‘peacetime’ thinking and naivety.

It always struck me as counter intuitive, how can you expect to make sales of your products to Countries that now know you will pass on details of the system to your potential agressors.

[cokecan]

I have started writing about UK ASW during the 1982 South Atlantic War. An honest question, would you like to read a book about that?

yes. i'd also be very interested to read about the MMR flights, the ELINT/SIGINT flights, and more on the logistics of the whole thing.

my copy is also ordered.

[orca]

Hi Nutloose,

You raise a good point. Forgive me for answering with a question.
How many weapons and systems are sold to a single customer? The point being that the U.K. could have bought a Westinghouse system if it wanted to.
Slightly more devious question. How many weapons and systems are sold where the customer has a 100% guarantee (and a way of assuring themselves that it’s true) that it’s not a watered down spec, or that the supplier (whether industry or state) may make details of the system available to others - either in a wartime assistance sense or as a precursor to further sales? Or that something critical wouldn’t be withheld (support, spares, crypto etc) in certain circumstances? Whether or not such dastardly practices are widespread it would be an optimistic customer who assumed that they weren’t.

[NutLoose]

True, the only way to prevent that is to be at the top of the pile and producing home products, you then control the game. Sadly we had sold ourselves out many moons ago to the Americans, and sadly now are prostituted to their whims to the detriment of our home grown industries..

[Pontius Navigator]

It always struck me as counter intuitive, how can you expect to make sales of your products to Countries that now know you will pass on details of the system to your potential agressors.
Nutty, the number of suppliers is limited and when you buy you assume your supplier is 'friendly ' but later they may become 'enemy'.

During Confrontation Indonesia had British search radars and Russian SAM. The search radar was supposedly effective to 35,000ft and their fighter control was limited to 30,000ft. How true this was I don't know but it was what Decca, I think, told us.

[Marcantilan]

Marcantilan,

Yes please, though your chapter on RAF involvement will be VERY short !!!!!!!

Well, the RAF deployed some Nimrod Squadrons to ASI (firstly, Nimrod MR1 from 42 Sqn and then MR2s from 120, 201 and 206). The submarine threat was considered (according to Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss) as "small but significant", so the Nimrod patrolled inside the 400 nm from ASI. Sometimes, they deployed down south, but mainly on ASuW duties.

From April 20, the planes departed with 3xMk46 torpedoes and 4x1000lb bombs. Three days later, ten brand new Stingray torpedoes arrived, and five Nimrod were wired to launch it.

Probably the more significant Nimrod ASW action was on April 18, helping to classify as NOSUB a contact first reported from RFA Olmeda and then investigated by HMS Alacrity, HMS Broadsword and three ASW helicopters.

And this is just the start: more on the way about April 1 chase on a Victor III, Stingray torpedoes being trialled and other things related to RAF ASW.

There is a lot of RAF ASW activity to be told!

[Marcantilan]

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/960x960/55600791_1193434177485923_8250884169937190912_n_bacd4d1f733b 78ffe807208eaa84616d17a6cf56.jpg
From illustrator´s FB page.

[RAFEngO74to09]

Nimrod MR2 was also equipped to carry Sidewinder for Op CORPORATE. I was OC Armament at the base that did the necessary mods on Phantom LAU-7A launchers in double quick time over the Easter Bank Holiday long weekend 8-11 April 1982.

A Nimrod was flown in to enable a trial fit on underwing pylons.

I seem to remember carriage of BL755 and Harpoon being considered as well but that was outside my bailiwick at the time.

[tucumseh]

Slightly more devious question. How many weapons and systems are sold where the customer has a 100% guarantee (and a way of assuring themselves that it’s true) that it’s not a watered down spec, or that the supplier (whether industry or state) may make details of the system available to others - either in a wartime assistance sense or as a precursor to further sales? Or that something critical wouldn’t be withheld (support, spares, crypto etc) in certain circumstances? Whether or not such dastardly practices are widespread it would be an optimistic customer who assumed that they weren’t.

Prime example - Blue Fox radar (Sea Harrier FRS1), as sold to India. We didn't allow them the mid-life upgrade, which was essentially a technology demonstrator for Blue Vixen (FRS2/FA2) and EFA ECR90. The fact that some kit was handed over to India accidentally by the sailing Navy is a different matter. They didn't know what it was and returned it.

Westinghouse - RN and RAF were within days of having to ground the SAR fleets in 1989, as Westinghouse pulled the plug on support at the last minute, having accepted a contract 18 months before. Luckily, the Design Authority (MEL) sales manager found supplies in a back street shop in Lagos. Inserted in little black book, and never engaged again while I managed fire control and surveillance radars. A very rare occurrence I might add.

[1771 DELETE]

Nimrod MR1 was also equipped to carry Sidewinder for Op CORPORATE. I was OC Armament at the base that did the necessary mods on Phantom LAU-7A launchers in double quick time over the Easter Bank Holiday long weekend 8-11 April 1982.

A Nimrod was flown in to enable a trial fit on underwing pylons.

I seem to remember carriage of BL755 and Harpoon being considered as well but that was outside my bailiwick at the time.
Only the MK2 had sidewinder. The Mk1 departed ASI before the long flights took place. The bomb / torp mixture was to counter the low possibility of a sub but the higher possibility of a clandestine assault on ASI.
Sidewinder was both defensive and offensive if we came upon the 707 reece aircraft.

[sandiego89]

From illustrator´s FB page.

ohh, excited about the artwork. Especially like to see coverage of the less talked about types, like the Neptune, 707- and even the Bear!

[RAFEngO74to09]

Corrected my post to Nimrod MR2 - it was a long time ago !

[RAFEngO74to09]

Article about the Argentinian B707 ELINT aircraft here:
https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-unknown-story-of-the-raf-phantom-pilot-who-intercepted-an-argentine-boeing-707-spy-plane-over-the-falklands/
Can you imagine the headlines that would have been in "The Sun" if the Nimrod had got an air-to-air kill on the B707 ? Another distasteful "GOTCHYA !" no doubt.

[orca]

Which no doubt resonated with anyone in the TEZ. In Woodward’s book doesn’t he say something like ‘Gotcha’ reflected his feelings but he would have suffixed it with ‘You Bleeder’?!

[Marcantilan]

Well, future project about UK ASW during Op Corporate is progressing very well.

The RAF chapter is not so small after all. For example, I do not know Nimrod long range sorties included sonobuoy fields on areas of suspected Argentine submarines snorting (thanks Nimrod Boys for that info!). The submarine vs submarine chapter is also there, and so on.

If someone have pictures of the time down south and willing to share (ships, planes, helos or other ASW related themes), please let me know. Full credits will be given, of course.

Best regards!
Mariano

[Davef68]

Article about the Argentinian B707 ELINT aircraft here:
https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-unknown-story-of-the-raf-phantom-pilot-who-intercepted-an-argentine-boeing-707-spy-plane-over-the-falklands/
Can you imagine the headlines that would have been in "The Sun" if the Nimrod had got an air-to-air kill on the B707 ? Another distasteful "GOTCHYA !" no doubt.

Imagine the smugness in the Kipper fleet if the RAF's first jet-on- jet kill had gone to a NImrod......

[Roadster280]

Imagine the smugness in the Kipper fleet if the RAF's first jet-on- jet kill had gone to a NImrod......

Smug or not, it would have been preferable to the actuality.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/55364

[Rheinstorff]

Smug or not, it would have been preferable to the actuality.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/55364

At the (very considerable) risk of thread drift, I think the RAF’s first jet kill, a Me-262 was on 28 November 1944 at Helmond in the Netherlands, with a Bofors gun. One of many shot down by the RAF Regiment. I think the Hawker Tempest was quite successful too.

[Haraka]

,,and of course the first British built jet on jet kill was by Syrian Meteors on a P.R. Canberra during the 1956 Suez conflict.

[West Coast]

Are we looking for participation trophies? Who's the first kill by a left handed pilot with red hair?

[charliegolf]

Are we looking for participation trophies? Who's the first kill by a left handed pilot with red hair?

Ginger Lacey?:E

[Marcantilan]

Imagine the smugness in the Kipper fleet if the RAF's first jet-on- jet kill had gone to a NImrod......

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/270x178/jag_7f4f7ca0d1e09644e06eaeda86eeb2122bceb6ce.jpg
It already happened...

[57mm]

Ah, that'll be XV422, which also sported a Jindivik kill mark....

[dragartist]

Marcantilan,
Henry Jones, (H Jones grandson) is running a “On this day” commentary on his Twitter page. Some interesting documents and pictures coming to light.
Thought others may be interested otherwise I would have sent pm.

[Marcantilan]

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/falklands-war-time-british-and-argentine-aircraft-carriers-nearly-fought-death-65731

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-aircraft-carrier-and-submarine-hunted-each-other-during-falklands-war-63657

It looks like the journalist enjoyed "A Carrier at Risk"!

[Marcantilan]

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/697x864/67453452_349221945999170_673560861830283264_n_2d5900f5e2f56f d9e5d5c1107b15fcc6c56e6390.png

Really?

[dragartist]

Those of you who subscribe to the book of faces may be interested in the EE Canberra Appreciation Group. A chap called Eduardo Luis Angelelli is posting a few pictures of the Canberra being bombed up for ops in 82. I guess photos from his own private collection that have not previously been published.

[Marcantilan]

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/591x835/90890296_2548790105391553_5902201679444443136_n_1ff918d3443a cccb4f360e083ebd9874b0a40b56.jpg

Happy to post it here!

[typerated]

I remember as a boy seeing lots of Canberra's parked up outside Salmesbury during the war.
I was told these were embargoed Argentine ones but suspect not not I am older.
Can anyone shed any light.

Thanks

[TEEEJ]

I remember as a boy seeing lots of Canberra's parked up outside Salmesbury during the war.
I was told these were embargoed Argentine ones but suspect not not I am older.
Can anyone shed any light.

Thanks

A second contract was placed in 1981 for a further two aircraft - WH914 (a B.92) and XH583 (a T.94). These were prepared for delivery but were embargoed because of the Falklands Conflict. Both aircraft were later dismantled and scrapped.


ARGENTINA CANBERRAS (http://www.bywat.co.uk/argent.html)

I had a search around the enthusiast forums and an enthusiast noted the following at Samlesbury during May 1982.

WT483, WT488, WH846, WH850, WE192, WJ639, WJ721 and WK122. Plus rear fuselages of Canberra WH777, WH796 and WH798.
There was possibly more Canberras but not visible to the enthusiast? Possibly the two Argentine Canberras were still at Warton having recently been refurbished?

By 1986 one of the Argentine ones XH583 was noted and photographed by an enthusiast at Samlesbury. Both XH583 and WH914 were reported as being scrapped at Samlesbury between 1988 and 1991.

[pr00ne]

typerated,

Not sure what period you are referring to but certainly in the mid early to mid 70's there was a large gaggle of ex 213 Sqn B(I)6 aircraft very visible at Samlesbury. They were there for potential refurbishment and sale overseas but I think were all eventually scrapped. Don't think a single Argentinian Canberra was embargoed as they were delivered in early 70's.

[typerated]

Thanks Gents,

It would have been during or just after the war I saw them,
I assumed they had returned for refurbishment.
So maybe a element of truth to the story.

[Marcantilan]

A short fan-made video about the book. The audio is a tribute to the classic "Dangerous Waters" sim.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d68cJXgVbOQ

[Marcantilan]

Well, it his here!

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/350x495/helion1001052_961cd695f569d05d6eb88929b871fa20f0911de7.jpg

[Not Long Here]

I was on the GD Aerosystems Course in 82 and, as part of Industry Engagement, we visited the Dassault facility in Bordeaux. Wandering into a hangar we discovered a row of brand new Super Etendards with Argentinian markings.

The French Government rep was a bit disconcerted when we all started posing by them for photos which conveniently captured all the tail numbers. Much Non, Non which got ignored. Never did find out if they were actually delivered. :)

[TEEEJ]

I was on the GD Aerosystems Course in 82 and, as part of Industry Engagement, we visited the Dassault facility in Bordeaux. Wandering into a hangar we discovered a row of brand new Super Etendards with Argentinian markings.

The French Government rep was a bit disconcerted when we all started posing by them for photos which conveniently captured all the tail numbers. Much Non, Non which got ignored. Never did find out if they were actually delivered. :)

Five Super Etendards were delivered to Argentina during late 1981. After the conflict the remaining nine Super Etendards were delivered. Argentina also received five refurbished Super Etendards during 2019 after the French Navy retired them.

[West Coast]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Algeciras

Had not heard of this operation before today.

[Asturias56]

"They paid their bills weekly in cash, which after a while raised suspicions, and led to their arrests"

Should have worn appalling bright clothes, gone out every night on the lash and slept in until 1midday - and better still speak English and talk loudly about what a bunch the Spanish were....... they'd never have been noticed.......

[NutLoose]

A fascinating read and it looks like we were lucky not to lose more.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/october/enemy-below-ara-san-luis-war-patrol-during-1982

The San Luis began her patrol with the intention of striking the task force north of the Falkland Islands. During her one continuous patrol she claimed three torpedo attacks against British shipping. She claimed to have fired two German-manufactured SST-4 antisurface ship torpedoes and one American Mark 37 antisubmarine torpedo. Her first engagement was against HMS Yarmouth (Type 12 frigate) and HMS Brilliant (Type 22 frigate).

The San Luis’ attack did not result in any hits and she sustained a determined ASW battle for 20 hours, surviving depth charges and one torpedo. The San Luis broke contact and began her second run on 8 May against a British submarine. Twelve minutes after firing her torpedo, the San Luis heard an explosion from her target’s same bearing; however, the Royal Navy claimed no losses of any submarines during the conflict, and it is speculated that the San Luis’ torpedo may have struck the bottom.

Her final run was conducted on 10 May against two more warships, firing one torpedo against HMS Arrow (Type 21 frigate) and HMS Alacrity (Type 21 frigate). After six minutes, a small explosion was heard on the frigate’s bearing, and when HMS Arrow retrieved her towed countermeasure, it was evident that she had been hit.

The main British Task Force was located and attacked without success by the Type 209, San Luis. That submarine was at sea, and at times in the area of the British force, for an estimated 36 days. The threat from Argentine submarines was a continuous concern for the British Task Force commander, and numerous attacks were made against suspected submarine contacts, with a large number of ASW weapons being expended. In any event, San Luis survived all British ASW efforts, but at the same time was unable to inflict damage on the British force because of materiel problems.”

The submarine has been identified as firing its munitions too deep, having an outdated fire-control system that required the crew to calculate their solutions manually; broken wires after the torpedoes were fired, which denied the ability to steer the fish to their targets; lack of preparation of the SST-4s in the torpedo room’s tubes; which did not allow the torpedoes to arm themselves after firing, and an inexperienced crew.5 All these factors combined to allow the targeted ships to escape the San Luis’ attacks.

The attacks were poor, but the fact that the San Luis could make these approaches against the best of the Royal Navy shows how different the outcome could have been if the San Luis had been fully provisioned and prepared for combat operations.

It is significant, however, that these attacks and ASW battles took place. A German designed and manufactured U-boat had fired live torpedoes in anger against warships of her majesty’s Royal Navy for the third time in the Atlantic during the 20th century. This time, the submariners in this Latin American version of Das Boot had encountered a stroke of luck as they managed to slip past the Royal Navy’s determined depth charge and torpedo attacks and returned home without a scratch.


More though we maybe cannot access them.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/december/fighting-along-knife-edge-falklands

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1983/april/unobvious-lessons-falklands-war

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2019/august/very-moment-they-were-landing-falklands

[WE Branch Fanatic]

There is a paper on the net, written in the early nineties, in which a US Navy Officer offers an analysis of the submarine and ASW operations in 1982. It is a bit flawed. I think that the author was called Harper.

1. He describes the British ASW effort as unsuccessful - yet neglects the point that sinking enemy submarines is secondary to stopping submarine attacks against your own forces. In that sense the British effort was 100% successful.

2. He lists the SSNs sent South as participants in ASW operations, but they were not due to worries about blue on blue situations, as noted in One Hundred Days by Woodward.

3. ASW was the Royal Navy's main role as part of NATO, which why we had the Invincible class to carry Sea Kings for constant ASW operations, and Sea Harriers to deal with the aircraft that provided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and over the horizon targettinkg for their missiles.

4. The Argentines planned to attack the supply lines down from Ascension with the ARA Santa Fe. The requisitioned vessels full of troops would have been particularly vulnerable, so any sighting of an Argentine submarine would result in attack,

[Marcantilan]

There is a paper on the net, written in the early nineties, in which a US Navy Officer offers an analysis of the submarine and ASW operations in 1982. It is a bit flawed. I think that the author was called Harper.

1. He describes the British ASW effort as unsuccessful - yet neglects the point that sinking enemy submarines is secondary to stopping submarine attacks against your own forces. In that sense the British effort was 100% successful.

2. He lists the SSNs sent South as participants in ASW operations, but they were not due to worries about blue on blue situations, as noted in One Hundred Days by Woodward.

3. ASW was the Royal Navy's main role as part of NATO, which why we had the Invincible class to carry Sea Kings for constant ASW operations, and Sea Harriers to deal with the aircraft that provided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and over the horizon targettinkg for their missiles.

4. The Argentines planned to attack the supply lines down from Ascension with the ARA Santa Fe. The requisitioned vessels full of troops would have been particularly vulnerable, so any sighting of an Argentine submarine would result in attack,

The British ASW effort was 100 % effective (no ships sunk by torpedo). The Argentine Navy order to COFUERSUB (Comando Fuerza Submarinos or Submarine Forces Command) was to "disrupt the enemy Expeditionary Force in the Malvinas and South Georgia area, with the aim of maintaining and consolidating the retaking of the “ISLAS MALVINAS”. So, at the end, their mission was also partially successful.

SSNs were tasked a few times against Argentine SSKs. Conqueror vs Santa Fe near South Georgia, Spartan vs San Luis in late April 82 (north of the islands) and Valiant vs San Luis, near Mar del Plata, mid May. No contacts were made by either side. San Luis had a noise advantage (-8db) over a British SSN of the period.

This is Spartan vs San Luis:
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1579x944/image_9ed8b8501ef40fd44f23b34be34c4351d810d354.png

[WE Branch Fanatic]

I really must order your book!

[Xmit]

Perhaps the real success of the Argentine submarine campaign was that it forced us to counter it. Numerous Sea Kings, and the odd Wessex, were required to maintain a constant screen around the carrier task force, while others had to be detached from the main force to escort ships in and out of Falkland Sound. The logistic tail required for this was huge, and the Sea Kings took up valuable capacity on the carriers.

The Argentine submarines' mere existence was enough to cause us problems. In terms of Naval warfare, a small conventional submarine must be one of the most cost-effective weapons available.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Likewise the carrier with multiple ASW helicopters is an effective counter, as they can put their dipping sonar below the thermal layer, and support operations around the clock. The Sea Kings also did surface search (both visually, and with radar) and SAR as well, As for the capacity aboard the carriers - we deployed pretty much evert single Sea Harrier in existence. ASW was their day to day NATO role.

Submarines on both sides also collected intelligence and landed special forces.

[Xmit]

Agree regarding the number of Sea Harriers but, if there were no submarine threat, more deck space would have been available and I'm pretty sure that we could have deployed more RAF GR3s. These would have significantly enhanced our ability to support the ground campaign.

The Sea Kings were indeed invaluable in numerous roles, but the overwhelming bulk of the SK Mk5's task was ASW....to counter a small, relatively inexpensive, relatively unsophisticated, but nonetheless lethal, threat.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Agree regarding the number of Sea Harriers but, if there were no submarine threat, more deck space would have been available and I'm pretty sure that we could have deployed more RAF GR3s. These would have significantly enhanced our ability to support the ground campaign.

The Sea Kings were indeed invaluable in numerous roles, but the overwhelming bulk of the SK Mk5's task was ASW....to counter a small, relatively inexpensive, relatively unsophisticated, but nonetheless lethal, threat.

Not disagreeing with you - but should we focus on the relative lack of sophistication of the Argentine submarines and their cheapness compared to SSNs, or the consequences of a couple of torpedoes going into something like Canberra or one of the LPDs - in terms of capability loss, loss of life, and public/political impact? It would have put paid to the operation.

You fight as you are.

The submarine was invented as an asymmetric weapon.

[Xmit]

Agreed; however, my intention wasn't to focus on the low cost and sophistication of the Argentine submarines compared with ours. Rather, it was to draw attention to their effectiveness in tying down our assets, forcing us to consume valuable resources and limiting our options. From that point of view, they were very successful indeed.

Of course our SSNs did the same, arguably to an even greater extent, to the Argentine Navy. After the sinking of Belgrano, the UK SSN threat was clear and they had no effective counter to it. Consequently, the Argentine carrier task group could no longer be risked at sea.

[Video Mixdown]

A fascinating read and it looks like we were lucky not to lose more.
Lots of 'what if's' in there. You can equally argue that the Argentine submarine was detected and attacked by assets specifically deployed for the purpose, and it was lucky to escape being destroyed.

[NutLoose]

Luck on both sides, if their weapons had worked as they should have we could have been looking at a loss of a lot of assets and people.

[Marcantilan]

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/407x314/nueva_imagen_de_mapa_de_bits_821ac3b9d6558d20b2593bc38822d8d c3f7e26a6.jpg

[Mr N Nimrod]

Luck on both sides, if their weapons had worked as they should have we could have been looking at a loss of a lot of assets and people.
insightful as always nutloose

[MAINJAFAD]

Agree regarding the number of Sea Harriers but, if there were no submarine threat, more deck space would have been available and I'm pretty sure that we could have deployed more RAF GR3s. These would have significantly enhanced our ability to support the ground campaign.

I think that Ex Fast Jets could explain that enhancing our ability to support the Ground campaign could have been done more easily by having a fit for purpose air tasking organisation on HMS Hermes. I don't think more GR Mk 3 would have had that much effect unless that issue had been sorted.

[AndySmith]

Lots of 'what if's' in there. You can equally argue that the Argentine submarine was detected and attacked by assets specifically deployed for the purpose, and it was lucky to escape being destroyed.

But, that's the million dollar question - was the San Luis actually detected? The RN had a good idea of what its orders were and where it was operating thanks to SIGINT - but I think there's some doubt as to whether or not it was actually detected as a CERTSUB by a UK asset.

[Navaleye]

Antrim's Wessex came very close to bagging a Soviet nuclear boat with a Mk46. That would have been interesting.

[tucumseh]

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/407x314/nueva_imagen_de_mapa_de_bits_821ac3b9d6558d20b2593bc38822d8d c3f7e26a6.jpg

Thanks for that Marcantilan. Those Mk5s had some baptism. This was during the Mk2-5 conversion prgramme, and equipment development had to be stopped and production ramped up. Makes those figures all the more impressive.

[Xmit]

Thanks for that Marcantilan. Those Mk5s had some baptism. This was during the Mk2-5 conversion prgramme, and equipment development had to be stopped and production ramped up. Makes those figures all the more impressive.

The Sea King M5's new passive ASW equipment had to be removed because it was next-to-useless against a conventional submarine threat. Although it had the Sea Searcher radome, it was still fitted with the old Mk2 radar system. It's fair to say that the Sea Kings were Mk5s in name only.

[West Coast]

Antrim's Wessex came very close to bagging a Soviet nuclear boat with a Mk46. That would have been interesting.

Do tell…….

[Yellow Sun]

Do tell…….

Read "Down South" by Chris Parry (https://www.abebooks.co.uk/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=22926054901&searchurl=an%3DParry%26sortby%3D17%26tn%3DDown%2BSouth&cm_sp=snippet-_-srp1-_-title1) and form your own conclusions. Nowhere near as cut and dried as suggested.

YS

[Marcantilan]

Do tell…….

There is a file, still classified, about that event. Conclusions: Soviet boat.

[tucumseh]

The Sea King M5's new passive ASW equipment had to be removed because it was next-to-useless against a conventional submarine threat. Although it had the Sea Searcher radome, it was still fitted with the old Mk2 radar system. It's fair to say that the Sea Kings were Mk5s in name only.

Agreed. There were some Mk5s with Sea Searcher fitted, but a few features were not yet finished, such as Track While Scan and radar/sonics integration. There was a TWS switch, but no wiring behind it. It took another 4 or 5 years to finish most of the development, as it was slowed down due to other priorities such as secure comms, EW and AEW. And almost immediately any sonics developments were effectively technology demonstrators for Merlin, the Mk5 sonics kit quietly forgotten. That LAPADS kit, hard copy unit and USH24s were beasts. Lynx and SHAR were the same. All the development/upgrade eggs were in one basket. This meant there were series of regular funding peaks and troughs, and in an effort to smooth them out many programmes were delayed to stagger them. Such as 360 scan for Lynx, which was ready to go in 90 but still wasn't in by 2003. And some of the features evident in the ASaC Mk7, delivered in 2002, were ready by 1988. To say there was a bit of a disconnect in the Naval Air Programme is an understatement, but I always felt it stemmed from the sudden financial windfall in the late 70s that dumped all those eggs on MoD(PE) at the same time, but no other resources. The above work was just a couple of junior engineers and one scientist on a secondment from Farnborough. I thought they did very well.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Surely the ASW Sea Kings had active dipping sonar?

[tucumseh]

WEBF

Both.

The Mk5 upgraded the SK Mk2/Wessex active system with a deep water mod, meaning extensive winch and pithead gear mods, in addition to the new Sea Searcher radar and TANS. But it wasn't all integrated, which was the main thrust of the Mk5-6 upgrade, along with secure comms.

The existence of the short-lived Mk5 is slightly misleading. The two conversions were actually pre-planned phases of the same programme, with Mk5 and Mk6 monies released for development at the same time (early 80s). The new AEW Mk2 for example was the first to get the Mk6's secure comms, albeit in a poor Service Mod. 'Mk5' was a configuration control nicety, as that build standard became the baseline for the Sea King drawing set, not the Mk1. (So, the AEW Mk7 was in that sense a mod to the Mk5).

Even Mk6 was meant to be short-lived, as Merlin ISD was meant to be 1989, and indeed most of the avionics were ready by then. With delays to the airframe, the Mk6 sonics Active Hardware and software was upgraded every 18 months or so - as I said, essentially to keep the Merlin kit up to date. Issue 5 was 1994, and the last was Issue 6, which was software only. But one thing Mk6 didn't get was its intended expanding array sonar. It was all trialled in about 1985, but it was decided to wait for Merlin. I lost track of it after that.

It was quite difficult keeping track of what was fitted to what, and as Xmit said a cab could externally look like a Mk5, but be a 2.5 inside. The ructions caused by having to shut down development and launch production up to a year early in 1982 was never really resolved in the life of the ASW SK. Much of the pre-requisite and risk reduction work for the AEW Mk7, in 94-98, was stablising this build standard, but only for AEW. (The equivalent work on Nimrod wasn't done, which is ultimately why it had to be scrapped. Another story).

[Xmit]

'.... in addition to the new Sea Searcher radar and TANS.'

You're right - I'd forgotten about the Mk5's new TANS (TANS G?) I recall that it was significantly better than the Mk2's - even without radar integration. However, there was one drawback. If I remember rightly, it incorporated a new doppler system (Doppler 91?). Unlike the Mk2's doppler, the Mk5's didn't provide a direct height read-out for the pilots. This facility was a useful backup to the Sea King’s (single) radar altimeter, and its loss was a distinct retrograde step.