EC135 hard landing Chicago Area July 7 [Archive]

mnttech

14th Jul 2018, 20:33

5. Dual engine failure.... Or #4 continued.... From the NTSB

On July 7, 2018, about 2123 central daylight time, an Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135 P1 helicopter, impacted terrain during an autorotation following a dual engine failure while maneuvering near Chicago, Illinois. The pilot and paramedic sustained minor injuries, the flight nurse sustained serious injuries, and the patient was not injured during the accident. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, tailboom, and main rotor blades. The helicopter was owned by Bennett Aviation, LLC, Elmhurst, Illinois, and operated by Pentastar Aviation Charter under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an air ambulance flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and the flight was operated under a visual flight rules flight plan. The flight departed St. Mary Medical Center, Hobart, Indiana, at 2110, and was destined for Advocate Christ Medical Center, Oak Lawn, Illinois.

Preliminary satellite tracking and air traffic control information revealed the helicopter was traveling northwest from the St. Mary Medical Center on a direct route to Advocate Christ Medical Center about 1,000 ft above ground level. About 5 miles southeast of Advocate Christ Medical Center, the helicopter turned to the right after the pilot requested to return to the Gary, Indiana, airport. About 50 seconds later, the pilot declared a "mayday" and stated the helicopter was going down into a field. The helicopter came to rest upright in a grass area between the Interstate 94 and Interstate 57 interchange.

Surveillance video from a Chicago Transit Authority rail platform located adjacent to the accident site depicted the helicopter during the final phase of the autorotation and impact with terrain. The video showed a fire near the number 2 (right) engine during the autorotation. A explosion was observed after the impact with terrain.

Postaccident examination of the accident site revealed the initial impact was consistent with the fenestron skid cap contacting the terrain first, followed by the landing gear skids and fuselage. The left landing gear skid was separated and came to rest near the ground scar consistent with the fuselage. The fuselage was crushed upward, and the fenestron assembly was separated at the tailboom attachment location (see Figures 1 and 2). The pilot seat, paramedic seat, and flight nurse seat were found fully attenuated. Thermal damage was noted on the right engine and main transmission cowling. Both engines power turbine wheel blades were missing the outer halves of the blades. Multiple impact dents, consistent with the fractured turbine blades, were noted inside the exhaust stubs. The No. 1 engine had a 1/2" by 1/2" hole in the exhaust stub at the 2 o'clock position forward of the aft firewall, and the No. 2 engine had a 2" by 1" hole in the exhaust stub at the 11 o'clock position forward of the aft firewall.

The helicopter was equipped with an Outerlink IRIS video, voice, flight data, and satellite communications system. The IRIS equipment was removed and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder laboratory for video, voice, and data extraction.

Flying Bull

14th Jul 2018, 20:56

So thumbs up for the pilot carrying out a survivabel autorotation at night due, what seems one Engine failing and taking the redundancy with it....
Well done!
Sorry about my ppruning, didnˋt expected a major technical cause.

aa777888

14th Jul 2018, 22:10

So thumbs up for the pilot carrying out a survivabel autorotation at night due, what seems one Engine failing and taking the redundancy with it....
Well done!
Not to mention the in-flight fire. And put it down in a "field by a road at night" like it says to in "the book", in urban terrain, no less. Well done, indeed!

gulliBell

15th Jul 2018, 08:28

Flying Bull

15th Jul 2018, 09:02

So we're talking about, the pilot had about 1 minute warning that something was wrong with #2 engine, before that engine had an uncontained failure that took out the #1 engine. I wonder what indications were present on the problematic engine?

I donˋt think he had 1 Minute time to figure out what was going on.
Guess there were a few thuds when No2 startet do disintegrate, shortly after that followed by a Fire warning.
While shuting down No2 and transmitting a Mayday (with fire you should really start looking for a place to land, cause you donˋt know, wether you get it extinguished or not), No1 also failed on him.
Would be really interesting to have a look into the recorded data.

gulliBell

15th Jul 2018, 09:18

..with fire you should really start looking for a place to land, cause you donˋt know, wether you get it extinguished or not..

Isn't that what the fire warning light is for? The aircraft has an engine fire extinguishing system, right?
And even if the fire wasn't extinguished, the engine bays are typically rated to contain a fire for 15 minutes, right?
Once the spare engine went bang, then quiet, there weren't many options remaining.

Flying Bull

15th Jul 2018, 10:16

Isn't that what the fire warning light is for? The aircraft has an engine fire extinguishing system, right?
And even if the fire wasn't extinguished, the engine bays are typically rated to contain a fire for 15 minutes, right?
Once the spare engine went bang, then quiet, there weren't many options remaining.

The Fire extinguishing system is not automatic.
Activating it here, for No2 engine shuts down the fuel supply to the engine and the System discharges after pressing the extinguisherwhen N1 is somewhere below 45%.
you start the stopwatch and have another go after one minute.
If you donˋt extinguish the Fire it´s a „Land immediately“ - no 15 minutes time to play!
(Donˋt have the EC135 Manual at hand, but it sure is so, as it is with the BK117, the EC155 and also with the H145)

jimjim1

15th Jul 2018, 10:27

Sorry, this content is not available in your region.

Use Opera Browser and it's integrated VPN.

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jimjim1

15th Jul 2018, 10:39

you ˋre missing
4. lack of fuel - it was an EC135 with medical Equipment and four on board, so not so much gojuice available at MTOW...
5. Lack of fuel in the engines, plenty on board.[1]

[1]
Summary:
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aircraft-accident-report-aar-3-2015-g-spao-29-november-2013
Report:
https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5628ea4ded915d101e000008/3-2015_G-SPAO.pdf

FloaterNorthWest

15th Jul 2018, 10:45

Flying Bull,

You are correct but the second extinguisher is an option so may not be fitted.

With one extinguisher, landing priority is;

Caption clears after using extinguisher - Land as soon as possible

Caption remains after using extinguisher - Land immediately.

FNW

Flying Bull

15th Jul 2018, 10:49

Use Opera Browser and it's integrated VPN.

Two clicks, reload page, video.

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Or use TunnelBear with your favorite browser (https://www.tunnelbear.com/) with 500 MB free each month.

JimEli

15th Jul 2018, 16:22

1. Engine compartment fire extinguisher(s) are an option on the EC-135.

2. FAR 27.861 stipulates that, each part of the structure, controls, rotor mechanism, and other parts essential to a controlled landing that would be affected by powerplant fires must be fireproof or protected so they can perform their essential functions for at least 5 minutes under any foreseeable powerplant fire conditions.

An un-contained failure of an engine and the resulting damage to the firewall and other fire protection could easily nullify the above.

SASless

15th Jul 2018, 20:57

Is an Un-Contained Engine Failure, a "foreseeable power plant fire condition"?

gulliBell

15th Jul 2018, 21:38

When an engine starts flinging out high energy engine bits anything can happen. Fair chance this was a bearing failure in the engine, as there was some prior indications something was wrong before something went really wrong.

JimEli

16th Jul 2018, 00:10

Is an Un-Contained Engine Failure, a "foreseeable power plant fire condition"?

I believe no. By inference, FAA FAR Part 33 engine certification specifies that an engine must be capable of containing damage without catching fire for a specified period of time. Additional information can be found in AC 20-128.

SASless

16th Jul 2018, 02:10

But....if it cannot contain the departing bits and a fire occurs.....then it would seem there is a design/certification issue that needs to be considered.

JimEli

16th Jul 2018, 13:26

But....if it cannot contain the departing bits and a fire occurs.....then it would seem there is a design/certification issue that needs to be considered.

Not necessarily. The (certification) specified period of time may have been exceeded. Or, there could have been existing undiscovered damage, FOD ingestion, a maintenance error, or TBO exceedance, just to name a few. That’s why we wait for the NTSB report.

VERY IMPORTANT: I am not speculating here, just replying to your post.

Flying Bull

16th Jul 2018, 14:10

But....if it cannot contain the departing bits and a fire occurs.....then it would seem there is a design/certification issue that needs to be considered.

well SASless,
in every design consideration is incorporated the likelihood of a specific failure.
Thats why you can buy some things as an optional, I.e. a Second fire extinguishing bottle....
Failing power turbines are extremely rare by now, where computers do the startsequence, making hot starts nearly impossible and engine monitoring with power checks, every 25 hrs or so, give an insight in the health of an engine and it is changed/repaired, well before it normally starts to fail.
Adding Nomex, heatshielded, with extra weight and maintenance needed, for an event, which is very very rare - and even, when it happens, not always kills the other engine is like putting a rocket deployed parachute on an helicopter for the rare occurence of departing rotorheads.
And I have read about more accidents with departing rotors (old Bells, I might recall Robbie break ups and the one accident in Norway....)

RVDT

18th Jul 2018, 06:40

Un-contained exit of engine parts would/will go straight through most firewalls. On the PWC 200 it would possibly take most of the fuel manifold with it as well.

I have seen an RR250 eject #1 turbine wheel blades on a Bell 206. Through the engine pan - through the boot and onto the ground. Luckily it happened on the ground.

If the bits got to the remaining engine and caused a FIRE with that one you would have an interesting scenario. LAND IMMEDIATELY but do you press the FIRE button? Not if it is still running.

Had the same scenario recently in simulator - ENG FAIL just after TDP - remaining engine FIRE - LAND IMMEDIATELY - Do NOT press FIRE as it will shut down remaining engine.

If you do it is AUTOROTATION time DUAL ENG FAIL - night time it would help to restore the SHED BUS to get your RAD ALT back. You will be busy and it will certainly get your attention.

Flying Bull

18th Jul 2018, 06:55

To know, where the shedbus is, especially in Eurocopter/Airbus helicopters is essential for night/IFR flying, if things start to go ugly.....
Thats why I ˋm really looking forward to this accident report with all the data collected from the bird

rotorspeed

18th Jul 2018, 13:05

SASless

18th Jul 2018, 13:22

Your have a valid point.

That being said....the answer might remain rather hard to pin down.

It is along the lines of "Did Grandma fall and break her Femur....or did she break her Femur and fall?".

Did that 50 Second period of time include realizing there there was a problem, analyzing the problem, arriving at a decision as to exactly what the problem was.....then deciding what course of action to take (remembering the Patient was onboard and thus affecting the decision on what to do) then considering the Options and deciding which one to choose.

Everyone survived what very well could have been a fatal crash.

I suggest the Pilot did an excellent job and deserves recognition for that.

No one is perfect....what matters is the end result where the Crew and Passengers stay with us.

The aircraft can be replaced.....unlike the people inside the thing.

Well Done! That Man!

Flying Bull

18th Jul 2018, 13:34

It will be interesting to see from the eventual report, assuming nothing comes out beforehand, whether the problem that caused the pilot to turn back 50 secs before total engine failure was one that should have prompted an immediate shutdown of the first malfunctioning engine, to avoid its ultimate failure shrapnel damaging the other engine. Not pointing the finger at the pilot at all, who clearly did a great job with a double engine failure, but just maybe we should be shutting down engines sooner sometimes to minimise this risk? Clearly the counter risk is the limitations of flying on one engine. And shutting down the wrong one!

well, fly the aircraft (that is establish OEI flight conditions) analyse, confirm right switch to prevent shutting down the good engine takes it time.
I guess the risks ******* up by fast reactions is much higher, than another failure like this one, where the first engine takes out the second...

SASless

18th Jul 2018, 14:28

My experience teaching in the 212/412f and 76 Sims is far fewer bad outcomes occur when no switches or levers are moved.

Far too many folks get carried away in the "need" to do something and as a result goof it up.

Thinking long and carefully trumps doing the finger dash over the switches and levers.

I always advocated two immediate first steps....Reset the Master Caution and punch the Clock.

Neither of which can hurt you....but satisfies that need to "Do Something!".

RVDT

18th Jul 2018, 14:58

Far too many folks get carried away in the "need" to do something

SAS - I think FIRE comes under "need" to do something. Just aft of those skinny firewalls it is all "plastic" i.e. composite.

So is the TRDS between the engines at that point.

Carbon fibre doesn't really burn but the glue holding it together does.

Know a guy last year who had the PT wheel exit from the #2 Arrius1 on an AS355N. The TRDS let go just after touchdown after LAND IMMEDIATELY and that was AI. I think they made a mistake putting out the fire after safe touchdown.

gulliBell

18th Jul 2018, 22:54

...whether the problem that caused the pilot to turn back 50 secs before total engine failure was one that should have prompted an immediate shutdown of the first malfunctioning engine...

Exactly. If he had a low/no engine oil pressure indication for 50+ seconds and did nothing about it, except divert, little surprise the engine blew up and took out the other one. I said, if. Just saying.

Generally I agree with SASless comments, there is no urgent need (even for an engine fire indication)...but if the engine has no oil pressure with secondary indications I'd be shutting it down pronto before punching the clock.

SASless

18th Jul 2018, 23:24

Gulli......if all you see is a low/zero oil pressure indication....even gauge and caution light.....how long do you spend scanning the gauges....caution panel....and other measures to determine if the indication is spurious or not?

Fifty seconds is not a very long time....depending upon what is going on....or not going on I guess.

Absent any other indications than a Gauge or Light....what does the Check List have to say?

By the time you fumble around and even find the EOP Section dealing with the problem....you will have eaten up a great deal of that fifty seconds.

Do you hurry and shutdown a good engine?

Now all this changes if there are secondary indications of a problem....like odd noises, odd vibrations, turbine wheel parts making like a buzz saw but until the Accident Report lays it all out for us....we are just having a generic discussion here.

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 00:15

Gulli......if all you see is a low/zero oil pressure indication....even gauge and caution light.....how long do you spend scanning the gauges

Gauge + caution light = immediate action. No need for any further navel or gauge gazing. 50 seconds is long enough for an engine without oil to blow up, hence why you need to immediately slow down and promptly get the problem engine back to idle as the first step of shutting it down.

My hunch that engine had no oil flowing through it, and it was still producing power at the moment it went bang. I'm guessing what caught fire was the oil that should have been flowing through the engine, but wasn't.

SASless

19th Jul 2018, 03:20

Gulli....you must be a Yankee.....as we Southerners tend to move a bit slower than them folks from up North.

There's a only a very few things in a Helicopter that must be done "Immediately" and "promptly".

I submit there was more to this Engine problem than a mere loss of oil pressure indication.

Engine Turbines usually fly apart from Turbine Wheels shattering while bearings heat up and cause a racket long before they seize from lack of lubrication and give off some aroma of very hot oil

My only engine failures were in a Chinook and a Hughes 500D and none involved a shattering of Turbine Wheels.

I did see evidence of some small pieces of Turbine Blade being spit out the front of a Lycoming T-55 after some FOD and the Hughes engine seized due to a Bearing Failure..

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 04:32

..There's a only a very few things in a Helicopter that must be done "Immediately" and "promptly".

And an engine with low/no oil pressure + caution light is one of those things. Unless one is comfortable explaining to the CP why more prompt action wasn't taken and an otherwise OK engine, apart from a dicky bearing or broken oil line etc, was needlessly turned into scrap metal. And a pilot doesn't need to refer to any checklist to carry out a common sense immediate action of reducing power and preparing for OEI when faced with such a situation. Just shooting the breeze here as an unqualified armchair investigator, obviously I have no idea of what really happened.

Flying Bull

19th Jul 2018, 06:21

@gullibell,
immediate action, except for an double engine failure, where the collective needs to be pushed down, is a good approach to desaster in a twin.
Any engine indication, establish OEI flight condition, continue FLYING the aircraft, which might include a turn away from hostile areas - and then deal with the problem.
F u c k binning an engine, that can be replaced.
But crashing the whole aircraft due to immediate actions without proper analysing costs a lot more, possible your life.
After a couple of hours with a good sim-instructor and a few avoidable crashes you might understand, why that is the way to go...

Flyting

19th Jul 2018, 08:32

From the Manual:
ENG OILP
Conditions/Indications
Affected engine oil pressure below minimum.
Procedure
1. Engine oil pressure indicator (VEMD) - If indication out of limit·
2. OEI flight condition
3. Affected engine
4. Single engine emergency shutdown
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 10:36

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 10:38

@gullibell,
immediate action, except for an double engine failure, where the collective needs to be pushed down, is a good approach to desaster in a twin..

Well, take that argument up with the RFM. Don't fancy your chances of winning that one.

RVDT

19th Jul 2018, 10:41

5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

The landing site and duration of flight are at the discretion of the pilot. Extended flight beyond the nearest approved landing area where appropriate assistance can be expected is not recommended.

Could be a long way in some cases.

Of note in the 135 RFM - Boldface letters on a grey background in the EP's shall be performed immediately without reference to the RFM or a checklist - memory items.

Flying Bull

19th Jul 2018, 10:51

Well, take that argument up with the RFM. Don't fancy your chances of winning that one.
its a question of defenition of immediate
immediate, when you have time, and that is after
flying the aircraft
correctly analysing the problem
checking double, you have your fingers on the right lever/swith
anything just done quickly, because you think you know whats going on, without confirming first, is another keychain to disaster....

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 10:57

If you're flying a twin helicopter - particularly single pilot - and at night - and you have a confirmed indication of low/no engine oil pressure, keep the ECL or RFM stowed where it is. You have important business to take care of. They are the immediate actions. Anticipate that engine without oil is going to kaboom itself within about 30 seconds if you don't take immediate corrective action. If it gets to kaboom state it might kaboom the other donk as well. Otherwise, no congratulations in order, you've turned a land as soon as practicable situation into a land immediately situation.

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 11:01

..its a question of defenition of immediate..

No it isn't. Immediate actions are those mandated by the RFM in response to an abnormal situation. Whether ECL memory items or not. There can be no doubt about that.

Flying Bull

19th Jul 2018, 11:52

No it isn't. Immediate actions are those mandated by the RFM in response to an abnormal situation. Whether ECL memory items or not. There can be no doubt about that.

you should read the first sentences of the RFM in section three:
„Basic rules These procedures deal with common emergencies. The pilot may deviate from these procedures if judged necessary under the given circumstances (specific failure condition, outside factors, and type of terrain overflown).
Although the procedures contained in this section are considered the best available, the pilot’s sound judgement is of paramount importance when confronted with an emergency.
To assist the pilot during an inflight emergency, three basic rules have been established:
1. Maintain aircraft control
2. Analyse the situation
3. Take proper action“
And that’s exactly what I wrote.
We train engine failure before and after TDP/LDP, and before Decison TDP or after Decison LDP, we just land the bird and deal with the emergency when on ground, no need to spoil a landing looking inside what is going on.
Same approach after Decision TDP/before Decison LDP, fly the aircraft, after reaching Vtoss, positive rate of climb, clear of obstacles, stable OEI flight and flying the way, you can autorotate, in case the second donk goes, you start analyzing- and that may take some time, before we start with 3, take proper action....

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 12:25

And all that should take less than 30 seconds to accomplish once you're informed by the indicators the engine has no oil. Any deviation from that I hope you've had a bit of recent practice of engine off landings, and somewhere ample that is reasonably flat and obstacle free to aim for. There is virtually no room for pilot discretion or undue delay on this one. Some pilots might think about leaving an engine without oil at idle because they don't won't to lose the generator, particularly at night. Utter hogwash. An engine at idle without oil can kaboom itself and its off-sider just as readily as it can when at full noise. Just give it another 20 seconds or so and see. Now if it was an engine chip, pilot discretion might leave it running at idle and bring it up to full noise if you need it for landing. No problem. But an engine without oil you have no other choice, and time is absolutely of the essence.

Flying Bull

19th Jul 2018, 13:39

Sorry gullibell,

forget about 30 sec to get things sorted out single pilot at night to have a stable ship and a path, which won‘t kill you in case the second one fails on you.
I think SASless, with his sim experience, could confirm, that correctly identifying what is going on and handling an emergency will take its time and that hastly actions will more often bring extra trouble while an concentrated approach step by step, according to the first sentences in the emergency section will keep you alive most times!
There might be the god blessed pilot with all the knowledge and skills, but most pilots out there are just humans with a certain mental capability, from which flying alone takes a considerable amount...
It‘s an eye opener, to jumpseat sim missions and watching, what your fellow pilots are actually missing, when put under stress.
And a master caution generates stress...
You can even whiteness the degraded pilots capabilities just listining to ATC on a sunny weekend, when pilots, making propper calls earlier, start to sputter, when it gets busy in the pattern or they get orders from a controlled Airport, which they aren’t accustomed to....
Don‘t tell me, pilots should be able to handle OEI flight conditions and shut down in 30 sec.
Thats just asking for trouble!

SASless

19th Jul 2018, 16:14

Before you start reading this....start your Timer.....and at the end of it....check how long it takes you to read this post.

A couple of observations.

Gullibell is very secure in his opinions it appears.

He has arrived at some of those by means of a 30 Seconds of low or zero Oil Pressure and a Turbine Engine goes "Kaboom".

He appears to reckon that Peter Pilot must "Immediately" react to the first perceived indication there might be such a loss of Pressure or lack of pressure to avoid the "KaBoom".

Now....if he would be so kind to enlighten us on the factual basis for the 30 Second interval between first notice of the lack or or loss of Oil Pressure and the "KaBoom"....it would help us to understand his pedantic claim for the need for "Immediate" action.

Then....I would like to know what his definition of "Immediate Action" is.

Likewise....his explaining the definition of "Immediate" in the context of this discussion would be helpful to the rest of us.

Additionally, I would like to hear his Dissertation on the various outcomes of lubrication system failures in modern twin engine helicopters explaining the full range of causes and ramifications of actual loss or lack of adequate lubrication as compared to spurious indications.

So....please do hold forth Old Fellow and enlighten us please.

Fifty Seconds is a very long time according to Gullibell......how long did it take you to read this Post?

I wonder if I ever had him as a Student in one of my Sim's.....I am thinking not based upon his posts so far.

gulliBell

19th Jul 2018, 19:59

#36 and #41 about covers it, not much else to add.

SASless

19th Jul 2018, 21:07

Quote:
Originally Posted by Flyting images/buttons/viewpost.gif (showthread.php?p=10200304#post10200304)
From the Manual:
ENG OILP
Conditions/Indications
Affected engine oil pressure below minimum.
Procedure
1. Engine oil pressure indicator (VEMD) - If indication out of limit·
2. OEI flight condition
3. Affected engine
4. Single engine emergency shutdown
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE
EXACTLY...that is the list of immediate actions. There can be no arguing with that.

That is your post number 41.....Where is the word "Immediate" other than in your part of the post?

Care to explain what it means by "emergency engine shutdown" as compared to "normal engine shutdown"?

Where do you get any suggestion of an "urgent" requirement from that quote from the RFM you were provided?

AnFI

19th Jul 2018, 22:26

is this ANOTHER twin with a double engine failure?
get a grip

Flying Bull

20th Jul 2018, 06:08

Hmm,
I only had a go with the EC135 at the FNPT (Sim with vision but no movement) for my CRM - course, so I have to look to find a copy of the RFM EC135
but on the RFM, same manufacturer but different models, the bold face for ENG OIL pressure low is only
establish OEI flight conditions
everything after that ist just plain text....
And, depending on the flight conditions (I.e. HOGE - fly away), even after an engine failure, the manufacturer provides 2 ½ minutes power to establish OEI flight conditions.... and from the manufacturer approved flight instructors/examiner teach, to use the time (and power) available, to get to a save speed/height before further identifing and dealing with the emergency.

Also, you get an Oil pressure warning before all oil ist lost, so GulliBells Kaboom might take considerably longer.

I was trained with the forces, with all the bold faces by heart and fast response to emergencies.
And it took time, to adopt to the new philosophy, to calm things down as long, as you ˋre not plummeting out of the sky, so you wonˋt miss nitty kritty important bits.
But out of experience I have to say, the later is the better approach to emergencies.

RVDT

20th Jul 2018, 07:24

Of interest on the PWC 200 B versions there is NO oil pressure until ~45% N1.

The "B" versions (AH) have "regulated" oil pressure that stays pretty constant and the "C" (Leonardo) versions effectively don't - oil pressure goes up and down with N1 and temperature and the instrumentation accounts for it.
The Leo "C" version works OK until you have a duff thermo-valve.

If there is no oil visible in the engine sight glass you start the engine and if you have no oil pressure you need to put some oil in it!! It is possible for the oil to drain into the RGB after a period of standing and overfilling it is just as bad.

There is also no oil change period or requirement.

There is an issue with the PW206 that the oil filler cap is checked regularly for tight fit and not able to unlatch itself. There is a mod to fix this issue with a large ball valve in the filler neck but it is optional. If you leave the filler off or loose the engine oil WILL escape!!

On the CAD there are a lot of captions - ENG OIL TEMP isn't one of them because it doesn't exist! The OIL TEMP gauge is normally behind your left knee if you are tall! In particular ENG 2.

SASless

20th Jul 2018, 11:53

RVDT,

Another interesting trait amongst those of us coming from very regimented environments is what I call “The Dipped Shoulder Syndrome”.

When the Master Caution illuminates....one of the four shoulders of the two Pilots “Dips” as he reaches for the Check List.

I prefer the Pilot(s) determine what Warning/Caution is being given....Reset the Master Caution....analyze the situation....rudely stated as THINK....then if necessary drag out the Checklist.....but do that while FLYING the machine.....and NAVIGATING.

A very few Emergencies require an immediate response while the vast majority do not.

The other sad thing I observed is far too many of us do not understand the effect of the controls on the control of the aircraft.....particularly during tail rotor problems.

One of the best best teaching Tools we had was the “Instant Reply” modes in the Sim and the Cockpit Video that recorded the pilot(s) conduct of the flight.

Done right the Sim is a very valuable learning device.

[email protected]

20th Jul 2018, 15:29

I'm with Gullibell here - an engine failure and the pilot's handling of it doesn't need to be rushed - the engine has already died.

BUT - a loss of oil pressure in a previously healthy engine does need prompt action before a simple loss of oil turns into something much worse.

If you didn't see oil pressure indications during engine and rotor start, what would you do? Let it keep going and consult the checklist? Or shut it down pronto?

I doubt anyone would have any problem in immediate shutdown, even though you are safely on the ground. Why? Because you don't want to make things worse.

I know of at least 2 accidents caused by engines losing oil pressure and not being shut down quick enough - in both cases the explosive failure that followed took out hydraulics and fuel but fortunately not the other engine.

At the very least achieve safe OEI flight and get it to idle, then confirm you have more than one indication and shut it down.

SASless

20th Jul 2018, 16:07

Define "Immediately" and "Prompt", please.

Folks keep using that word....Gulli said 30 seconds until an engine goes Kaboom but has not offered any basis for that.

No one is objecting to shutting an engine down if it is believed to be without adequate oil pressure or in fact has zero oil pressure.

The discussion is how does one determine if the indications are not spurious and how long do you allow to determine your plan of action prior to actually shutting down the ailing engine.

Explain your thinking about all that.

[email protected]

20th Jul 2018, 17:10

On a Lynx RR Gem engine, it was widely known that from the point the oil pressure went into the red (stepped gauge, red, amber green) the white metal bearings at the high speed input end would seize within 30 seconds followed by a loud bang as things went badly wrong.

Why anyone wants to keep an engine, that would be spinning at many thousands of rpm, going for any longer than it takes to confirm a double indication (gauge plus caption or noise) I really don't know - this has become a very semantic argument about definitions and exact timings. The quicker you act (once positively diagnosed and confirmed) the more likely you are to prevent further drama.

If you have a double indication, that should be enough to determine it isn't spurious and, even if it does somehow turn out to be, what is the drama with a precautionary shutdown of one engine in a twin?

If the oil light comes on in your car, how long do you keep driving it until you stop for a look? Do you assume it is spurious and then wonder why you end up with a garage bill for a new engine or rebuild?

SASless

20th Jul 2018, 17:42

Flying Bull

20th Jul 2018, 18:09

Lynx is an old bird, with air blown onto labyrinth type seals, that started leaking oil, when shutting down.
Happend to me, that the firetruck, on an Lynx unfamiliar airfield wanted to extinguish a smoking engine....
Could just stop them in time....

Back to the topic, which was a successful night autorotation after double engine failure, the first engine taking out the second.
Gullibel brought in the roumor, it could have been low oil pressure at the beginning, no prove so far.
The turn back, initiated by the pilot, was questioned without knowing, what actions he had done so far.

I personally think, that flying the aircraft, that is establishing OEI flight conditions, while turning to a direktion, where an autorotation is possible, is more important than diving down into the cockpit, to start to analyse, what’s going on.
At the end this saved lives, even if the bird is broken by know.
The other option would not have guaranteed, that the pilot would have been fast enough to prevent the engine going kaboom anyway - only, that he wouldn’t have had an area for the autorotation......

Thomas coupling

20th Jul 2018, 18:56

Jesus - we are digging into the weeds here aren't we.

May I remind all of you about:

https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/602332-clutha-accident-2013-a.html

and how a pilot may meet his/her ultimate challenge.

Having flown the EC135 for 2000hrs, mostly at night - it is very forgiving but when one is visited by the "silence" (where both donks stop), it is down to luck AND judgement.

The fella survived - bollox the size of pumpkins.

BZ.
Can we move on perhaps?

[email protected]

21st Jul 2018, 07:16

So....if you were at a hover, two guys on the winch line, Pressure drops to zero and caution light illuminates....you hit the Red Button and cut the hoist wire, and immediately pull the Engine Lever to Stop....and shut the fuel cock to the affected engine? No, you would initiate a transition to safe OEI flight, winching in as you do so and then shutdown the engine - you can't have a 'one-size fits all' approach to emergency handling - there has to be some airmanship and discretion applied to suit the scenario you find yourself in. If you were safe OEI in the hover then shutting down the bad engine, once confirmed would also be acceptable - it is still better than an explosive failure taking out the other engine.

Flying Bull - the white metal bearings are at the input to the MRGB stage not the back end of the engine where the No5 bearing seal used to leak.

Thomas coupling

21st Jul 2018, 20:00

hear hear........

Vertical Freedom

22nd Jul 2018, 04:05

megan

22nd Jul 2018, 05:07

there has to be some airmanship and discretion applied to suit the scenario you find yourself in As with TC, hear, hear. Once took off in a single engine helo with zero engine oil pressure, confirmed by master caution & CWS & gauge, ran for long enough to do what we wanted to do.

Flyting

22nd Jul 2018, 07:17

Once took off in a single engine helo with zero engine oil pressure, confirmed by master caution & CWS & gauge, ran for long enough to do what we wanted to do.
that's not airmanship - that's just plain stupid!

Vertical Freedom

22nd Jul 2018, 07:34

Once took off in a single engine helo with zero engine oil pressure, confirmed by master caution & CWS & gauge, ran for long enough to do what we wanted to do.

that is way beyond stupid, that is a criminal bloody act :mad:

SASless

22nd Jul 2018, 10:48

So......it would appear there is a legitimate concern about serious engine issues upon detection of below minimum or loss of engine oil pressure that in some cases require an "emergency shutdown" of the ailing engine.

The procedure is different between Aircraft.....single versus twin engine owing to the idea of shutting down the only engine running creates its own dire emergency if done in flight.

Also, it is appears other considersations come into play in the decision to shut down an ailing engine.

This thought of "immediately" shutting down an engine bears some review to determine exactly what "immediately" should mean.

Rushing into carrying out an Emergency Procedure requires careful consideration as well because doing so might make a bad situation much worse.

We have to get back to the reality of Aviate, Navigate, Communicate to guide our actions......but most importantly we must (imperative tense) "THINK" about what we are doing to ensure we consider all of the factors before taking action when things start going wrong.

megan

23rd Jul 2018, 00:33

that is way beyond stupid, that is a criminal bloody act To allay your fears, it was a choice of staying where we were and more than likely dying in the gun battle that was extant, or getting our still warm pinks to a better (safer) place.

As crab said, you can't have a 'one-size fits all' approach to emergency handling...... there has to be some airmanship and discretion applied to suit the scenario you find yourself in .

Only took one hit, in the engine oil cooler.

Vertical Freedom

23rd Jul 2018, 02:24

To allay your fears, it was a choice of staying where we were and more than likely dying in the gun battle that was extant, or getting our still warm pinks to a better (safer) place.

Hey there Megan....that snippet of info would have been vital on the onset on your first statement...blasting off without oil pressure, everyone would have seen it in a different light (then) :E I'd have done the same, saving self & fellow crew as opposed to poor airmanship :rolleyes:

SASless

23rd Jul 2018, 05:33

Vertical Freedom

23rd Jul 2018, 05:46

I think the point is just as you judged Megan....without knowing the full details....that happened earlier on when someone took exception to a 50 Second Delay without giving due consideration to the circumstances the Pilot in Chicago had to contend with.

Yep You're righ SASlesst; a judgement was made based on information provided, which certainly appeared devoid of good airmanship. Which later turns out to be seriously lacking in the full (critical) story, most likely to get a negative reaction? Had the information been a little more complete, opinions would have been greatly differing; rather praising & nothing less!

[email protected]

23rd Jul 2018, 08:28

Or you could have credited Megan - who has been on this forum for a good while and always has good points to make - with the skills and knowledge to have made a decision based on whatever scenario he was dealt, rather than firing from the hip and assuming he was an idiot.

Vertical Freedom

23rd Jul 2018, 08:47

Incomplete information is bound to come from wrong opinions being formed....any lower-time Pilot reading that statement of blasting off with no engine oil pressure would certainly be assuming; hey so it's OK to do that. When if You do that due to gun-fire certainly puts a totally different spin on the info :ouch:

SASless

23rd Jul 2018, 11:46

Asking for an explanation before offering that evaluation of a comment never hurts much as being in a difficult situation and taking that extra few seconds to fully consider all of the options can lead to a better outcome.

Along the lines of Megan's experience.....I can recall a situation that involved multiple emergency procedures compounded by an honest to goodness Cockpit fire.....where we coped with the situation as a Crew and never once referred to a Check List.

Sometimes One puts down the Etched Stone Tablet and simply does what is required.

[email protected]

23rd Jul 2018, 11:53

that's not airmanship - that's just plain stupid!

that is way beyond stupid, that is a criminal bloody act https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/censored.gif

Megan's post didn't warrant those comments

Bell_ringer

23rd Jul 2018, 11:59

Megan's post didn't warrant those comments

With respect, the post was designed to provoke a reaction and that is what it got.
Intentionally leaving out detail that significantly altered the context was always going to get a response, especially one that appeared to condone dangerous behaviour.
While you and others may know everyone around here and surmised there may be more to it, many others that do not have this context would have read it very differently and, as VF indicated, could have taken the wrong message away with them.

[email protected]

23rd Jul 2018, 14:09

Bell_ringer

23rd Jul 2018, 15:39

No, I think it is a symptom of modern social media where people feel they are entitled to launch into insults rather than ask a polite question.

It happens and I have done it myself - usually looking foolish afterwards when the detail comes out.

That is part of the problem. Won't disagree, though equally you know VF and given that context surely some benefit of the doubt also applies?

jayteeto

23rd Jul 2018, 20:07

Pumpkin Balls
I can’t get the picture out of my mind

ChopperFAN

23rd Jul 2018, 21:41

Incredible job by the Pilot, hats off....having also walked away from a successful landing after engine failure (350B2) myself at low level, crap weather, in a narrow valley with very few options for a safe landing plus with an added bonus of a cockpit totally filled with smoke IMC inside; I feel for this guy. at night.............YIKES :D

Seen your pics mate, you did mighty fine under circumstances. That valley and raging river, only just made the the tiny patch of green for touchdown :ok:

megan

24th Jul 2018, 00:37

that snippet of info would have been vital on the onset on your first statement VF, I did say in the post, "ran for long enough to do what we wanted to do". I thought at the time of writing giving the circumstances would be too much of there I was at 40,000 feet etc bragado. Nevertheless, it's commentary on how we so often make judgement on these pages of incidents and accidents that befall others without having knowledge of the background and circumstances. A salutary lesson to be had I feel.

My intent was to reinforce Crab's, you can't have a 'one-size fits all' approach to emergency handling...... there has to be some airmanship and discretion applied to suit the scenario you find yourself in

AnFI

28th Jul 2018, 16:09

recap please
please just remind me what the logic was behind the idea to carry two engines and how does this incident fit with that logic?

Bomber ARIS

12th Jan 2022, 00:22

It turns out that events were very much not as they first appeared.

The whole thing appears to have been self induced...

US HEMS EC135P1 Dual Engine Failure: 7 July 2018 - Aerossurance (http://aerossurance.com/helicopters/hems-ec135-dual-engine-failure/)

Non-PC Plod

12th Jan 2022, 17:46

Goes to show - the strategy to save money by skimping on pilot training doesnt always work the way you intend...

Flying Bull

12th Jan 2022, 17:48

Goes to show - the strategy to save money by skimping on pilot training doesnt always work the way you intend...

If you want to save money by cutting on safety - calculate the costs of an accident.....

gipsymagpie

14th Jan 2022, 18:51

Yes the guy did it to himself, mostly due to poorly executed differences training (incidentally the same issue occurred on N601FH 12 years earlier). But why would you design a unguarded control in a cockpit which if inadvertently operated can destroy your engine AND which requires a sequence of control inputs to correct?

The emergency sequence just couldn't happen on a T variant. But later (505 onwards) T variants ended up with the pointless throttle guard that was the "fix" for the 2006 incident. Which of course wasnt fitted to N312SA and would have prevented the second event - go figure.

It turns out that events were very much not as they first appeared.

The whole thing appears to have been self induced...

US HEMS EC135P1 Dual Engine Failure: 7 July 2018 - Aerossurance (http://aerossurance.com/helicopters/hems-ec135-dual-engine-failure/)