Military cargo aircraft crash - Savannah, Georgia

[GarageYears]

No details on aircraft type. Some distance from Hilton Head International Airport.
Live video of what appeared to be a warehouse on fire and emergency vehicles responding.

- GY

[GarageYears]

Savannah Professional Firefighters Association identified the plane as a c130

Twitter link

[RAFEngO74to09]

Officials confirm C-130 Hercules military plane crashes near Sav - WTOC-TV: Savannah, Beaufort, SC, News, Weather & Sports (http://www.wtoc.com/story/38094821/witnesses-report-seeing-plane-go-down-near-gulfstream-rd-hwy-21-in-port-wentworth)

Crashed on Route GA-21 - 5 POB - en route to Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ - all fatalties.

Eyewitness reports aircraft "rolling upside down" before crashing.

USAF states "shortly after take-off".

[PastTense]

A Puerto Rico Air National Guard plane with five people on board crashed Wednesday around 11:30 a.m. near the Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport, the Georgia Department of Defense told Channel 2 Action News.

The crash happened at the intersection of Highway 21 and Crossgate Road.

Channel 2 reported that the plane is a Lockheed C-130 Hercules. Officials are investigating.

The airport tweeted that “some flights are beginning to be impacted due to an aircraft incident off property. Customers should check with their airline prior to clearing security.”

https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/breaking-military-plane-crashes-near-savannah/7hZfZUOZPzp15ISzdyasPK/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Ij9Fb1wQP8

[gums]

Not good, RAFE.

Usual witnesses, but maybe they were trying to reach the airport with a real emergency.

Gums...

[RAFEngO74to09]

Eyewitness video just shown on Fox News does indeed show the aircraft fully inverted and then heading for the ground 90 degrees nose down up to the point of impact. I'll keep an eye out for a link.

[PastTense]

At least 5 dead:
UPDATE: 5 dead in National Guard aircraft crash near Savannah - WSAV (http://www.wsav.com/news/local-news/breaking-reports-of-military-aircraft-crash-closes-hwy-21-crossgate-road-near-savannah-airport/1155202433)

[Liffy 1M]

It was a former WC-130 weather recce aircraft, serial 65-0968. Some US media reports say it was on its way to Davis-Monthan AFB AZ.

[cappt]

R.I.P

Military cargo plane crash caught on camera outside Savannah GA Island Packet (http://www.islandpacket.com/news/local/article210307899.html)

[Onceapilot]

Sad video of event. RIP.

OAP

[Mil-26Man]

Footage - https://twitter.com/scottoftroy/status/991727656860299264?s=19

[Thaihawk]

Tail number 65-0965. A WC-130H.

RIP and Blue Skies to the five crew on board her.

[Thaihawk]

It was a former WC-130 weather recce aircraft, serial 65-0968. Some US media reports say it was on its way to Davis-Monthan AFB AZ.

As far as I'm aware, that is correct.

[RAFEngO74to09]

Maj Dahlen - spokesman for Puerto Rico ANG - has stated that the WC-130H was on its final flight after over 50 years service being flown to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance Regeneration Group at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ for long-term storage. There were 9 POB - 5 crew and 4 others including maintainers.

[NutLoose]

Tragic, utterly tragic, those poor folks :(

RIP and blue skies to all nine.

[PastTense]

Probably 9 dead: while they have only recovered 5 bodies the scene is still hot and there were 9 on board and no one has mentioned survivors.
As many as 9 feared dead as Puerto Rico Air National Guard plane crashes in Georgia (http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-military-plane-crash-georgia-20180502-story.html)

[Bobman84]

Eery that this is the second fatal 130 crash in only 3 days.

[JamaicaJoe]

Since this plane was being decommissioned, I would expect that all of the electronics bays would have been removed or stripped. Could this have affected the balance? Or perhaps the equipment was on pallets that were not secured?

[PastTense]

The 60-year-old plane, which was being repaired in Savannah before it took off Wednesday morning, had been used in relief efforts for several hurricanes in the Caribbean, including Hurricane Maria last fall.
Maj. Paul Dahlen of the Puerto Rican National Guard told CNN (https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/02/us/military-plane-crash-savannah-georgia/index.html) that the plane had been on its way to Arizona to be decommissioned.

https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/02/607769279/air-national-guard-c-130-crashes-in-georgia-killing-at-least-2

Defective repairs?

If it was on its way to be decommissioned why would it have 9 people on board?

[Mil-26Man]

Where are people getting 9 onboard from? The USAF is saying there were 5

C-130 crashes in Georgia > U.S. Air Force > Article Display (http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1510723/c-130-crashes-in-georgia/)

[Carbon Bootprint]

In a press briefing that just ended, a spokesman who I believe was identified as the Vice Commander of the 165th Airlift Wing confirmed nine airmen from the Puerto Rico Air National Guard died in the crash. He noted a number of state and federal agencies are on scene, with USAF leading the investigation. During the Q&A, he said the plane was actually built in the "late 1970s" and was not in fact 60 years old. He said the plane was in Savannah for routine maintenance enroute to Arizona, but did not elaborate. He didn't really have much else to say.

[Vzlet]

Joe Baugher's site indicates that 65-0965 crashed decades ago:
"(65-)0965 (MSN 382-4106) converted to WC-130H. Crashed while flying Typhoon Bess off Taiwan Oct 13, 1974. All 6 onboard killed. Some speculation that it was actually shot down."

[ShyTorque]

I was called out on a SAR mission some twenty years ago after a C-130 finished up in the sea, not long after takeoff. The cause of that one was loss of propellor pitch control (a propellor went into reverse pitch).

[sandiego89]

Since this plane was being decommissioned, I would expect that all of the electronics bays would have been removed or stripped.....

Joe, many aircraft arrive at the Davis Monthan with their standard equipment, and surely safety off flight essentials intact. Some equipment may be removed, but too early to expect it was "stripped", and definitely not "all".

[Airbubba]

Tail number 65-0965. A WC-130H.
Joe Baugher's site indicates that 65-0965 crashed decades ago:
"(65-)0965 (MSN 382-4106) converted to WC-130H. Crashed while flying Typhoon Bess off Taiwan Oct 13, 1974. All 6 onboard killed. Some speculation that it was actually shot down."

The PRANG plane that crashed in SAV was 65-0968.

https://www.onenewspage.com/video/20180502/10018360/Dead-After-130-Crash-Near-Savannah.htm

[Saintsman]

It's not unusual for an aircraft to be robbed before it goes into storage or maintenance, which may explain why there were 4 others on board. Take the bits they need and bring them back with them so that their remaining aircraft can carry on flying.

However no point in speculating at this stage.

[gums]

Salute!

Seems to me we should avoid naming the Guard outfit parent organization with an acronym, as the quote here is redundant:

The PRANG plane that crashed in SAV was 65-0968.

Gums sends...

[RAFEngO74to09]

Names released - RIP: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/05/03/guard-releases-names-9-killed-wc-130-crash.html

Maj. José R. Román Rosado - pilot
Maj. Carlos Pérez Serra - navigator
1st Lt. David Albandoz - co-pilot
Senior Master Sgt. Jan Paravisini - mechanic
Master Sgt. Mario Braña - flight engineer
Master Sgt. Eric Circuns - loadmaster
Master Sgt. Jean Audriffred - crew member
Master Sgt. Víctor Colón - crew member
Senior Airman Roberto Espada - crew member

[A Squared]

Names released - RIP: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/05/03/guard-releases-names-9-killed-wc-130-crash.html

Maj. José R. Román Rosado - pilot
Maj. Carlos Pérez Serra - navigator
1st Lt. David Albandoz - co-pilot
Senior Master Sgt. Jan Paravisini - mechanic
Master Sgt. Mario Braña - flight engineer
Master Sgt. Eric Circuns - loadmaster
Master Sgt. Jean Audriffred - crew member
Master Sgt. Víctor Colón - crew member
Senior Airman Roberto Espada - crew member



Last October I was flying Hurricane relief in the Caribbean. We were parked on the ramp in St Criox next to a Puerto Rico ANG herc, and the crew came over and up ont our flight deck to chat, and see what a civil herc looked like. Wondering if any of the guys I chatted with are on that list ...

[A Squared]

I was called out on a SAR mission some twenty years ago after a C-130 finished up in the sea, not long after takeoff. The cause of that one was loss of propellor pitch control (a propellor went into reverse pitch).


I don't have any information of the crash at hand, just what I've seen in the video. I have to say that a prop going into flat pitch or reverse is what immediately comes to mind as a possible cause of the loss of control shown.

[scifi]

I don't suppose they have FDR or CVRs..?
.

[ShyTorque]

I don't have any information of the crash at hand, just what I've seen in the video. I have to say that a prop going into flat pitch or reverse is what immediately comes to mind as a possible cause of the loss of control shown.

Agreed, which is why I mentioned that event.

[ExAscoteer]

I'm wondering just how you could get a C-130 Hamilton Standard prop into reverse in flight, given that the low pitch stop is at 23 degrees and reverse is -6 to -8 degrees.

Before you even got to the low pitch stop the negative torque (drag) build up would be such that the blades would be NTS-ing (-1260 +/- 600 inch.pounds) and by -6000 inch.pounds the prop would decouple.

[A Squared]

I'm wondering just how you could get a C-130 Hamilton Standard prop into reverse in flight, given that the low pitch stop is at 23 degrees and reverse is -6 to -8 degrees.

Before you even got to the low pitch stop the negative torque (drag) build up would be such that the blades would be NTS-ing (-1260 +/- 600 inch.poinds) and by -6000 inch.pounds the prop would decouple.

Well, the low pitch stop isn't immovable, it retracts so the the prop can go into the beta range. So if there's something that retracts the low pitch stops, that something could conceivably retract them in flight. And it's not just hypothetical, there have been instances of props reversing in flight, more than a few. One of my co-workers has had it happen to him. I don't know all of the ways it can happen, but a throttle cable failure is one way it happens. There are also failures of the prop control unit (Valve housing) whcih can command flat pitch in flight. Bottom line is that going onto flat pitch or reverse in flight is not some sort of a impossible, never happen, condition. It can and has happened. More than once. Regardless of what your googling about the prop specs told you.

[ExAscoteer]

Excuse me?

You might want to wind your kneck with the googling comments, I happen to be an ex Albert driver (the screen name rather gives it away).

I didn't say it couldn't occur, but for it to happen there would have to have been multiple failures:

a. Stop pins retract
b. NTS system fails to work
c. Prop fails to decouple.

[A Squared]

Excuse me?

You might want to wind your kneck with the googling comments, I happen to be an ex Albert driver (the screen name rather gives it away).

I didn't say it couldn't occur, but for it to happen there would have to have been multiple failures:

a. Stop pins retract
b. NTS system fails to work
c. Prop fails to decouple.

Well, I'm not sure what an "ex-albert driver" is, but if we assume that you at one time flew a c-130, we have to also assume that it was a while ago, because your systems knowledge is pretty lacking. Spouting the numerical specs for the prop is not the same as understanding how it works First the prop does not have "stop pins", I don't know where you got that but there's nothing in there that could be remotely described as a "pin". Regardless, the props go into reverse at high airspeeds on almost every flight. That's what you do on landing. It doesn't activate the NTS and it doesn't decouple the prop Besides, even if it *did* decouple, that doesn't prevent the prop from going into reverse. The safety coupling has nothing to do with prop function or control, All the safety coupling does is disconnect the reduction gearbox from the turbine, the prop is still out there in reverse. You may (or may not) recall that there is nothing to prevent you from moving the throttle into the beta range in flight. All you have to do is pick the throttle up over the flight idle gate and move it back into the ground range, and the prop will got to flat pitch, then reverse. It won't NTS because the NTS linkage is cammed out of engagement when you move the throttle into the ground range. Obviously that's a really bad thing to do in flight, so you don't do that. But, here's the thing; if you have a throttle cable break, the effect on the throttle coordinator out on the engine can be essentially the same, the throttle coordinator doesn't 'know" whether the cable broke or the throttle was moved into the ground range, all it knows is something just rotated it into the reverse range, and it does what it does in the reverse range ..whcih is this: it moves linkage to the valve housing whcih causes a prop pitch change into the reverse range and it cams the NTS linkage out of engagement. There you go: One single point of failure, and you have a prop reversing in flight. This isn't just speculation or theorizing this is the actual, real, cause of actual, real inflight prop reverse incidents. It seems odd that you claim to be a C-130 pilot and don't know about this. I thought that was one of those things that all Herc crews knew about. That's why you have a special Engine Shutdown Procedure which is different than a standard ESP when there's a known or suspected throttle or condition lever cable failure. You do remember that from your "albert" days, right? That a throttle cable failure had a special procedure? It's in all the Lockheed manuals, I don't know how you could have missed it. That's the reason, because it can cause the prop to reverse in flight.

[gums]

Salute!

Great explanation of the system, Squared. And I wonder if the plane had maintenance at SAV that may have involved the linkage or system sensors. My leading edge flap failure was a direct result of the mechs not installing a "keeper pin", so the doggone flap folded up about time gear fully retracted ( see my interview pic on the profile). If it would have vibrated loose just at liftoff I would crashed, as the configuration looses roll authority below about 160 knots.

Maybe "albert" refers to the Blue Angel Herc they call Fat Albert.

Gums sends...

[A Squared]

My leading edge flap failure was a direct result of the mechs not installing a "keeper pin", so the doggone flap folded up about time gear fully retracted ( see my interview pic on the profile).

That must have held your attention!

[Chris Kebab]

The C-130 is colloquially known as an Albert in the RAF....it's a Brit thing! And sometimes Fat Albert...

[bunta130]

Well, I'm not sure what an "ex-albert driver" is, but if we assume that you at one time flew a c-130, we have to also assume that it was a while ago, because your systems knowledge is pretty lacking. Spouting the numerical specs for the prop is not the same as understanding how it works First the prop does not have "stop pins", I don't know where you got that but there's nothing in there that could be remotely described as a "pin". Regardless, the props go into reverse at high airspeeds on almost every flight. That's what you do on landing. It doesn't activate the NTS and it doesn't decouple the prop Besides, even if it *did* decouple, that doesn't prevent the prop from going into reverse. The safety coupling has nothing to do with prop function or control, All the safety coupling does is disconnect the reduction gearbox from the turbine, the prop is still out there in reverse. You may (or may not) recall that there is nothing to prevent you from moving the throttle into the beta range in flight. All you have to do is pick the throttle up over the flight idle gate and move it back into the ground range, and the prop will got to flat pitch, then reverse. It won't NTS because the NTS linkage is cammed out of engagement when you move the throttle into the ground range. Obviously that's a really bad thing to do in flight, so you don't do that. But, here's the thing; if you have a throttle cable break, the effect on the throttle coordinator out on the engine can be essentially the same, the throttle coordinator doesn't 'know" whether the cable broke or the throttle was moved into the ground range, all it knows is something just rotated it into the reverse range, and it does what it does in the reverse range ..whcih is this: it moves linkage to the valve housing whcih causes a prop pitch change into the reverse range and it cams the NTS linkage out of engagement. There you go: One single point of failure, and you have a prop reversing in flight. This isn't just speculation or theorizing this is the actual, real, cause of actual, real inflight prop reverse incidents. It seems odd that you claim to be a C-130 pilot and don't know about this. I thought that was one of those things that all Herc crews knew about. That's why you have a special Engine Shutdown Procedure which is different than a standard ESP when there's a known or suspected throttle or condition lever cable failure. You do remember that from your "albert" days, right? That a throttle cable failure had a special procedure? It's in all the Lockheed manuals, I don't know how you could have missed it. That's the reason, because it can cause the prop to reverse in flight.

Harsh (arguably unnecessarily so), but completely correct explanation. FYI RAF C-130s were and are referred to as Fat Albert...so ExAscoteer (Ascot was the RAF Air Transport callsign) has a good deal of experience no doubt. However, prop theory was always 'tricky', and time has undoubtedly not helped........

Yes, I just about remember the T-handle shutdown rather than condition lever in the event of suspect throttle cable failure (whilst leaving the power lever/throttle well alone), but it's been a few years for me since flying our 'Super Es' (C-130E plus Dash 15 motors).

'Gentlemanly' should be the way forward.........it's too easy to misconstrue/put others' backs up on forums....

Whatever happened overcame the pilots' capacity to recover at such low altitude....RIP chaps - a dreadful way to go.

[Tengah Type]

IIRC the fatal crash of XV180, shortly after takeoff at RAF Fairford, on 24 March 1969, was attributed to one the props going into Reverse. The aircraft then stalled.

[MightyGem]

IIRC the fatal crash of XV180, shortly after takeoff at RAF Fairford, on 24 March 1969, was attributed to one the props going into Reverse. The aircraft then stalled.

Yes, it was:
During climb out from Fairford, Gloucestershire the captain asked the co-pilot to feather No4 engine. However the engine went into full reverse thrust which rendered the aircraft uncontrollable. It entered a starboard wing over, crashed and caught fire. All six on board were killed
UK Military Aircraft Losses (http://www.ukserials.com/losses-1969.htm)

[ShyTorque]

Accident report here:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940923-0

[Airbubba]

The propeller stuff is way over my head. I remember something about pitchlock, NTS and helical splines but I forgot it after the oral. Was 'E-handle, HRD' the start of the Navy's version of the shutdown checklist?

Would there be a CVR or FDR on a Guard C-130 going to the boneyard? I was surprised to find both on the Navy T-45 that crashed in Tennessee last year.

[Tengah Type]

Mighty Gem

Thanks for the confirmation that the " Little Grey Cells " are still functioning to some extent.

85 Accidents in 1969 - so different to now - Thank God.

Shytorque

Different accident, but coincidently the No 4 in both cases. Is the Savannah accident the third, or have there been others?

[Chugalug2]

Shy Torque, thank you for the link to the L100-30 fatal accident at HKG 22.09.1994. It had eerie reminders of XV180 at RAF Fairford 24.03.1969 as posted by Tengah Type:-

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19690324-1

Your link to that of PK-PLV's accident summary leads in turn to the very detailed, thorough, and excellent report by the HKG CAA, with input by the UKAAIB, the RAF, and the aircraft, engine, and propeller manufacturers:-

http://ebook.lib.hku.hk/HKG/B35839806.pdf

For those interested I would point to the conclusion that the most probable cause was the failure of the #4 throttle cable system (pdf P80) , the cables as fitted (7x7 carbon steel, rather than the later 7x19 stainless steel ones - see pdf P89), and the sheer complexity of the engine control cable runs (pdf P's 157, 158, and 162).

Of course we must await an interim report at least of the OP tragedy before ascribing to it a similar cause, but the vulnerability of the Hercules to an engine control cable break at a pulley, fairlead, or due corrosion, etc, in these two accidents alone is indication of it being somewhat of an Achilles Heel to this very successful workhorse.

[A Squared]

Is the Savannah accident the third, or have there been others?

There have been others. Numerous sources say that a prop reversal is the cause of the loss of control in this one. (https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19691215-0)I don't know know the total number of accidents due to props entering beta range, but I suspect that it's more then the ones which have been mentioned here. I have a co-worker who was involved in one whcih didn't turn into an accident due to his quick thinking. He was engineer on an checkride, and just as the plane lifted off it started an un-commanded turn that the pilot was unable to control, heading for a hangar. He saw that one of the beta lights was illuminated, and reached up and shut down that engine using the T-handle.

[n6330v]

CCTV definitely looks like uncommanded Beta on the left wing. Check out this footage at 2:36 - aircraft will appear top right of the frame.

https://youtu.be/ldwWfQb4Odo?t=2m36s

[Bob Viking]

I’m glad I hadn’t seen that video before getting on a Herc two days ago.

It’s mind boggling how quickly it went from level flight to impact.

Poor buggers.

BV

[isaneng]

Many years since I operated Albert, but the Brit ones had the Beta light microswitch disconnected - we never had that warning system in my time. I forget now, did it light up the LSGI selector button? And yes, suspect throttle cable failure, T-handle shutdown, leave the throttle alone in case it fouled other systems.

RIP gents, got some old Albert friends up there waiting with a cold one for you.

[bunta130]

I’m glad I hadn’t seen that video before getting on a Herc two days ago.

It’s mind boggling how quickly it went from level flight to impact.

Poor buggers.

BV

Different engine and prop control on the J Bob.......FADEC rather than cables and pulleys....

[Bob Viking]

It wasn’t a J!

BV

[melmothtw]

Can't speak as to the veracity of this report, but it seems the pilot may have had some serious misgivings about this particular aircraft and flight WC130 Co-Pilot did NOT want to fly that plane ? PR informa (http://www.prinforma.com/archives/839)

[RAFEngO74to09]

According to the recently released 911 tapes, one eye witness reports one of the props wasn't turning after take-off.

http://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/05/07/it-just-fell-out-of-the-sky-frantic-calls-followed-crash/

911 audio here:
http://www.savannahnow.com/news/20180507/flames-and-smoke-everywhere-911-calls-recount-plane-crash

[ChicoG]

After a string of deadly aviation accidents, the Air Force has directed all of their wing units with flying and maintenance functions to ground aircraft for one day to conduct an "Operational Safety Review."

Active duty wings will have until May 21 while National Guard and Reserve units will have until June 25 to complete the review.

The order from Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David Goldfein comes after a WC-130 aircraft that belonged to the Puerto Rico National Guard crashed outside Georgia last week, killing all nine airmen on board. The 53-year old plane was heading to its retirement in Arizona when it spiraled out of the sky just outside the Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport.

“I am directing this operational safety review to allow our commanders to assess and discuss the safety of our operations and to gather feedback from our Airmen who are doing the mission every day,” Goldfein said in a press release on Tuesday.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/air-force-grounds-planes-day-safety-review-string/story?id=55017106

[sandiego89]

A very trivial question given the tragedy, but are these airframes still considered WC's? I note the airframe 65-0968 was likely delivered as a HC-130H and even retained the chisel nose but with the Fulton recovery arms long removed, and were later designated WC-130's. Some articles even still call this airframe a "Hurricane Hunter" (like here: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20590/puerto-rico-national-guard-wc-130h-hurricane-hunter-crashes-in-a-ball-of-fire-in-georgia but I presume it has not operated as a hurricane hunter for years. Is WC gear still retained or removed? So once a WC always a WC, or would reversion to C-130H be appropriate? I realize it does not matter, but just an interesting side note to the fascinating history of the C/MC/HH/HC/WC etc -130 line and to their crews over decades of service.

[Liffy 1M]

The USAF report into this crash has now been published. The summary conclusion is

"The board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was MP1’s improper application of left rudder, which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the MA’s departure from controlled flight. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately prepare for emergency actions, the MC’s failure to reject the takeoff, the MC’s failure to properly execute appropriate after takeoff and engine shutdown checklists and procedures, and the Mishap Maintainers’ failure to properly diagnose and repair engine number one substantially contributed to the mishap."

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Nov/09/2002061699/-1/-1/0/180502-/AMC-MU%C3%91IZ%20AIR%20NATIONAL%20GUARD%20BASE,%20PUERTO%20RICO-W/C-C130H-AIB-NARRATIVE%20REPORT.PDF

[MPN11]

What a very bad outcome that could so easily have been avoided. The Report makes sad reading.

[A Squared]

The USAF report into this crash has now been published. The summary conclusion is

"The board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was MP1’s improper application of left rudder, which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the MA’s departure from controlled flight. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately prepare for emergency actions, the MC’s failure to reject the takeoff, the MC’s failure to properly execute appropriate after takeoff and engine shutdown checklists and procedures, and the Mishap Maintainers’ failure to properly diagnose and repair engine number one substantially contributed to the mishap."

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Nov/09/2002061699/-1/-1/0/180502-/AMC-MU%C3%91IZ%20AIR%20NATIONAL%20GUARD%20BASE,%20PUERTO%20RICO-W/C-C130H-AIB-NARRATIVE%20REPORT.PDF

Thanks for posting the link. Without meaning to be disrespectful of the crew, it's hard to believe that the emergency was handled that badly. An engine flameout at a relatively light gross weight in good vfr conditions should have been something that ended in an air return, not the way it did. I'm surprised not to see a summary of the flight crew's experience and recent experience as would normally be included in a civilian accident report done by the NTSB.

[Liffy 1M]

Thanks for posting the link. Without meaning to be disrespectful of the crew, it's hard to believe that the emergency was handled that badly. An engine flameout at a relatively light gross weight in good vfr conditions should have been something that ended in an air return, not the way it did. I'm surprised not to see a summary of the flight crew's experience and recent experience as would normally be included in a civilian accident report done by the NTSB.

That information is on pages 25-28 of the report.

[A Squared]

That information is on pages 25-28 of the report.

Thank you. I'd thought I'd read the entire document beginning to end but somehow I manged to skip right over that section.

[Chugalug2]

FE calls "power set" when it clearly wasn't before Vr. If he'd called "No 1 engine not responding" (or whatever) then they could have safely abandoned the take-off. Having got airborne the aircraft banks right to keep flying straight ahead, but left rudder is subsequently applied! This leads directly to the aircraft crashing (the left wing stalls in the sideslip). The very first thing you learn in asymmetric training is "Dead foot, dead engine". That simple slogan could have saved their lives. It had clearly been forgotten (for surely it was taught?). The after take off checks were not completed resulting in TO flaps remaining set.

As mentioned in the Accident Report, the first flight of the day was usually preceded by a standing start take off to ensure all engine parameters were normal. On RAF C-130Ks, this allowed setting the throttle lever gubbings to ensure max torque was not exceeded (though subsequent TOs from a different a/f would need it readjusting).

[A Squared]

FE calls "power set" when it clearly isn't. If he'd called "No 1 engine not responding" (or whatever) then they could have safely abandoned the take-off.

It's quite possible that the engineer was focusing on TIT to the exclusion of everything else. I've seen this same thing where the FE is so focused on the power setting parameter, that he fails to monitor the other parameters. FWIW, the FE was fairly inexperienced. A little over a year as an FE, and less than 200 hours flight experience.

[Chugalug2]

Indeed, A Squared. You have here the classic case of an experienced aircraft captain and a new/inexperienced co-pilot and FE. After the Staines Trident and the Kegworth 737, we still have crews not challenging the captain/flight deck when they clearly know that a situation is being mismanaged. Whatever happened to CRM?

[H Peacock]

The very first thing you learn in asymmetric training is "Dead foot, dead engine".

I'm not so sure that saying is used to help you decide which boot to move, rather than help you diagnose which engine has failed from the resultant rudder deflection! If an engine fails you move your feet to stop the yaw visually and put the ball in the middle all with the wings level. In this case that should have been right pedal. Once you've regained directional control you use the "dead leg" (in this case left) to confirm the loss of thrust is on the left!

That said, this accident was the result of some inept aircraft handling combined with equally poor CRM.

[Chugalug2]

HP:-
I'm not so sure that saying is used to help you decide which boot to move, rather than help you diagnose which engine has failed from the resultant rudder deflection!


Agreed, and they had already identified the failed engine (#1) but an incorrect left rudder input was subsequently applied. The Report considers that P1 was suffering a sensory overload. If he had simply remembered that simple mantra he would have realised that his left foot should have been the 'dead' one, ie applying no rudder, and fed in right rudder instead. The sideslip that killed them could then have been avoided. Given how much else was going wrong it is by no means certain it would have saved them but it would have been a start, at least...

[bunta130]

Qualified 2004......made a captain in 2016.....and an instructor later in the year; that's a bit odd. Very few hours in recent months too. With a very inexperienced group around him in the front 3 seats, the captain's mishandling was unlikely to be picked up. I wonder who authorised the flight........in my day, I would have thought very carefully before doing so.....

The supervisory chain needs to conduct a fair amount of corporate investigation in my opinion.

A very sad end.

[KenV]

Well, I'm not sure what an "ex-albert driver" is, but if we assume that you at one time flew a c-130, we have to also assume that it was a while ago, because your systems knowledge is pretty lacking. Spouting the numerical specs for the prop is not the same as understanding how it works First the prop does not have "stop pins", I don't know where you got that but there's nothing in there that could be remotely described as a "pin". Regardless, the props go into reverse at high airspeeds on almost every flight. That's what you do on landing. It doesn't activate the NTS and it doesn't decouple the prop Besides, even if it *did* decouple, that doesn't prevent the prop from going into reverse. The safety coupling has nothing to do with prop function or control, All the safety coupling does is disconnect the reduction gearbox from the turbine, the prop is still out there in reverse. You may (or may not) recall that there is nothing to prevent you from moving the throttle into the beta range in flight. All you have to do is pick the throttle up over the flight idle gate and move it back into the ground range, and the prop will got to flat pitch, then reverse. It won't NTS because the NTS linkage is cammed out of engagement when you move the throttle into the ground range. Obviously that's a really bad thing to do in flight, so you don't do that. But, here's the thing; if you have a throttle cable break, the effect on the throttle coordinator out on the engine can be essentially the same, the throttle coordinator doesn't 'know" whether the cable broke or the throttle was moved into the ground range, all it knows is something just rotated it into the reverse range, and it does what it does in the reverse range ..whcih is this: it moves linkage to the valve housing whcih causes a prop pitch change into the reverse range and it cams the NTS linkage out of engagement. There you go: One single point of failure, and you have a prop reversing in flight. This isn't just speculation or theorizing this is the actual, real, cause of actual, real inflight prop reverse incidents. It seems odd that you claim to be a C-130 pilot and don't know about this. I thought that was one of those things that all Herc crews knew about. That's why you have a special Engine Shutdown Procedure which is different than a standard ESP when there's a known or suspected throttle or condition lever cable failure. You do remember that from your "albert" days, right? That a throttle cable failure had a special procedure? It's in all the Lockheed manuals, I don't know how you could have missed it. That's the reason, because it can cause the prop to reverse in flight.A quick note about NTS. I'm not a C-130 driver, but was a P-3 driver which shares a lot of the propulsion systems with the C-130. NTS will NOT be engaged due to the props going into reverse whether in flight or on the ground. NTS is designed to decouple the prop from the engine when the prop drives the engine. In other words, it's not so much a negative thrust system as a negative torque system. When the prop blades go into beta range (i.e. negative pitch angle) the engine is still producing positive torque, but the prop is producing negative thrust. That will not trigger NTS. NTS is a fail safe in the event the prop goes into pitch lock and then the engine flames out (or the pilot is negligent and allows the RPM to droop). This condition can result in the prop system driving the engine, a potentially very dangerous situation. A small amount of negative torque is permitted to enable a windmill start, but a prop driving the engine can result in drag (negative thrust) well in excess of the equivalent of 6000 lbs negative thrust, much higher negative thrust than the prop can generate in beta range.

Hope this clarified.

[A Squared]

A quick note about NTS. I'm not a C-130 driver, but was a P-3 driver which shares a lot of the propulsion systems with the C-130. NTS will NOT be engaged due to the props going into reverse whether in flight or on the ground. NTS is designed to decouple the prop from the engine when the prop drives the engine.

No, NTS does not de-couple the prop from the engine. You are confusing the Safety Coupling with the NTS system. The safety coupling will de-couple the prop from the engine at a negative torque of 6000 inch-lb. The NTS system, senses negative torque being applied to the reduction gearbox, and through a mechanical linkage commands an increase in prop pitch to relive the negative torque. NTS is sort of "autofeather lite" it doesn't actually feather the prop fully, but it drives the pitch toward feather, whcih in a loss of engine power results in a lot less drag, and a lot less negative torque, than if the prop pitch had just gone to the low pitch stop ... whcih is what it would otherwise do in a loss of engine power. The NTS system activates at approximately 1200 inch-lb of negative torque. NTS is not a "failsafe", in fact, it is not uncommon to activate NTS on a descent if the throttles are brought all the way back to the flight idle gate. You'll see the torque-meters fluctuating as the prop pitch is cycled by the NTS.

Anyway, all this is beside the point. It is pretty clear from the AIB report that this was not a case of in-flight prop reversal as we earlier speculated. It was simply a mishandling of an engine failure.

[KenV]

No, NTS does not de-couple the prop from the engine.Apparently the P-3 uses the same term with a different meaning. Perhaps because P-3s routinely loitered engines (in flight shut down with the intent to restart inflight later) to increase on-station loiter time.

Anyway, all this is beside the point. It is pretty clear from the AIB report that this was not a case of in-flight prop reversal as we earlier speculated. It was simply a mishandling of an engine failure.Agreed. So sad that a crew was lost for what should have been a relatively simple and usually benign emergency.

[DCThumb]

One minor point that has been overlooked is the aircraft behaviour at rotate as it almost departed the runway. Normally the pilot will remove his hand from the nosewheel steering at around 60 kits. In this instance it was immediately before rotate at around 95kts, whereupon the aircraft began to veer to the left.

This sounds similar to the RAF incident during a practise windmill start where the pilot subconsciously/inadvertently was using nosewheel steering against the swing of the inoperative engine. At 60kts when he removed his hand to take the control column, the aircraft veered off the runway.

Incidentally, as I recall, normal practise was not to do a standing start to adjust ‘throttle gubbins’ as stated earlier - there was nothing to adjust. Not was it routine on the first flight of the day in the RAF. The only time I recall it being mandated other than for performance was when we had bleed air issues. However, I think most people would have carried out a standing start on an aircraft that had RPM problems on its last flight and had had work carried out to rectify the issue.

Inevitably a ‘chain’ of errors leading to a tragic loss of life. Very sad.

[Chugalug2]

DCT:-
Incidentally, as I recall, normal practise was not to do a standing start to adjust ‘throttle gubbins’ as stated earlier - there was nothing to adjust.

I think we might be both right (It was I that mentioned the 'gubbings'). My recollection is that the device was set for local flying prior to the first flight of that day. Obviously with different altitudes and OAT at other destinations a different torque output would result when the throttles were advanced to its stops, rendering it useless. Whether we then did a standing start first flight anyway to ensure all parameters normal I do not remember from that long ago (it was the early 70's for me). Perhaps others do? Was the gubbings dispensed with anyway?

I agree though that with previous engine performance issues a standing start was called for in this case.

[Onceapilot]

Very sad state of affairs all round, if the report is as accurate as it appears to be. The report makes some observations that I presume are more formally addressed in a classified version, can anyone say? I note that the documentation of aircrew records is incomplete. Also, the pathology reports are not supported by statistics and the alcohol measurement is not given. The actions of the maintenance crew appear to have been inept. The flightdeck crew seem to have been incapable of operating the aircraft. I would suggest that the report describes the performance you might expect of an untrained and unqualified crew. Bad

OAP

[A Squared]

The report makes some observations that I presume are more formally addressed in a classified version, can anyone say? I note that the documentation of aircrew records is incomplete. Also, the pathology reports are not supported by statistics and the alcohol measurement is not given.

I expect that you would find all that information in the Tabs, which are not included in the document released to the public. There is an index to the investigation tabs on page 46-47.

[Onceapilot]

I expect that you would find all that information in the Tabs, which are not included in the document released to the public. There is an index to the investigation tabs on page 46-47.

Yes, thanks ASquared, I saw the references. Apart from the nitty gritty, I guess we must presume that some formal actions are being taken? The deplorable lack of ability and competence described in the report would indicate that despite qualifications, all involved failed to perform to the required standard.

OAP

[ancientaviator62]

Not being a pilot nor a Hercules engineer, air or ground, I have hesitated before raising my head above the parapet. However I did have a foot in two camps. I worked on the Javelin, Hunter and Lightning and flew for almost 30 years on the RAF C130K as a loadmaster . With my tech background I took an interest in the workings of the aeroplane. so I can follow well enough the technical discussion in the report.
That the maintenance team did not carry out the task in the prescribed manner is beyond doubt. But there is probably not a tradesman in any force in the world who has not had to 'work around' due to pressure to get the a/c back on line. The report highlighted the usual culprits of lack of tradesmen, spares (robbing is a wasteful and morale sapping necessity in most forces) and confusion about the paperwork qualifications. Often also the manuals do not reflect the actuality on the a/c. It also flagged up the disassociation some feel when the a/c do not 'belong' to them.
To my mind it was an implied criticism of the 'system' something I have never encountered in my experience of inquiries in the RAF. This of course in no way exonerates the tradesmen, it is just an attempt to understand from one who has been in analogous situations. Can we say that this situation is absent from the RAF today ? Are there any lessons to be learnt ?
As for the pilots and air engineer, I have struggled to understand the mindset. An Hercules crew knows that the propeller is a fickle friend who needs constant attention. They knew it had a valve housing change and the minimum of common sense would have required a very attentive run up as described by 'chugalug' and others. Then to get airborne with the a/c in the state it was in beggars belief. What was the engineer looking at ?
I have been in the a/c when we have taken it over after prop work. A fuselage rattling, tailplane shuddering run up was always the outcome to ensure that all was well..And a very careful monitor by the engineer as we rolled for T/O.
Time to duck before the sniping starts.

[A Squared]

It also flagged up the disassociation some feel when the a/c do not 'belong' to them.

I don't think that applies in this case. The Aircraft was in Savannah for some fuel cell repair at that facility, but unless I badly misunderstand the the report, the maintainers who did the engine maintenance were from the Air National Guard Wing in Puerto Rico, so it would have been "their" aircraft.

[Chugalug2]

AA62:-
Can we say that this situation is absent from the RAF today ? Are there any lessons to be learnt ?

Given that Sean Cunningham was killed by an inadvertent ejection from an unairworthy aircraft in a seat that had no Safety Case, the only lesson that comes to mind concerns Glasshouses and Stones. That MB should be fined for a death caused by a dysfunctional UK Military Air Safety System is a measure of how low we have sunk. As Aviation Professionals we should all feel shamed and dishonoured.

[ancientaviator62]

One thing that the investigators of this unfortunate accident had was recorders ! Those investigating the RAF C130K crashes were severely hampered by this vital lack of evidence as our a/c were never fitted with them.

[RAFEngO74to09]

Video explaining sequence of events of this Aircrew Error mishap:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=197IxHaH34s

[sandiego89]

Video explaining sequence of events of this Aircrew Error mishap:



Thanks for linking. Those video re-creations are tough to watch, but are excellent and helpful learning tools.

Looks like the Puerto Rico ANG transitioned into contingency/disaster response and communications support after the mishap, with this 2019 article citing "....systemic issues plaguing the unit. The Accident Investigation Board report highlighted a disregard of maintenance practices, a “good enough” mentality on maintenance, and an overall view that the PR ANG was disconnected from the rest of the Air Force because their aircraft were not combat-coded and were outdated, meaning there was no feeling that they were directly connected to a mission (https://www.airforcemag.com/investigation-pilot-errors-caused-deadly-wc-130-crash-though-systemic-maintenance-and-morale-issues-contributed/)"

https://www.airforcemag.com/puerto-rico-guard-gets-new-mission/