Eurocopter crash off Queensland north coast

[Foxxster]

Just reported. 5 aboard, no reports on condition. Seems to have crashed around Cairns. Noticed a rescue helicopter heading south east (out to sea) out of Townsville.

[1a sound asleep]

ABC says Hardy Reef which is off Airlie Beach

[Foxxster]

ABC says Hardy Reef which is off Airlie Beach

Yes. I was looking at a map on the tv which flashed up. Seems I was a little too far north.

[Dick Smith]

Very sad. Reporting fatalities.

[Heliringer]

Link to the news report

Category: | The Courier Mail (http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/police-rushing-to-scene-of-helicopter-crash-at-hardys-reef/news-story/853eda0ebad91ae36479dbe5453fb95d)

[DHC4]

Reporting 2 dead, H120.

[heli1980]

Very sad. Reporting fatalities.

I actually took you on that h120 from hayman island to hamo to your jet, sad news

[Nigel Osborn]

There seems to have been a few too many ditchings around OZ & the US this last fortnight. I believe all the helicopters had pop out floats, which usually work well, but in these last 3 cases none of the helicopters landed safely on the water which would have prevented the fatalities. Pilots can only practice water landings on fixed floats which are easy but obviously can't practice with pop outs. I wonder if this is causing these tragic ditchings?

[kaz3g]

Helicopter crash off Whitsundays leaves two dead, one seriously injured - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-21/helicopter-crashes-on-barrier-reef-pontoon-in-north-queensland/9573448)

RIP

[heliduck]

Pilots can only practice water landings on fixed floats which are easy but obviously can't practice with pop outs. I wonder if this is causing these tragic ditchings?

Good idea Nigel, I wonder how realistic the propeller heads could program a simulator for this?

[YPJT]

a sad week for RW

[gulliBell]

..Pilots can only practice water landings on fixed floats which are easy but obviously can't practice with pop outs. I wonder if this is causing these tragic ditchings?

Practice emergency landings on water in the simulator is quite realistic, you'll even get a dose of seasickness if you're susceptible to that.

[Vertical Freedom]

Rest in Peace

[spinex]

In the scramble to get the news out, media seem to have ruffled the ATSB's feathers, erroneously reporting that the ATSB had confirmed fatalities. Whatever the protocol, it seems that sadly the reports were accurate, with the Queensland Police now confirming that 2 passengers, believed to be overseas tourists had been recovered deceased. 2 more, along with the pilot are receiving treatment for injuries.

[gulliBell]

For those who have done helicopter underwater escape training would understand how unlikely it is that an untrained passenger would be able to self-extricate themselves from a submerged helicopter.

[cattletruck]

...unlikely it is that an untrained passenger...

I think the training deficiency could be bigger than that as most of our tourists simply cannot swim. Then there is basic physics knowledge that most of them aren't aware that a helicopter is often top heavy and the consequences thereof. They probably even harbour false assumptions with landing on water.

It's not their fault, they probably only wanted to take a convenient short trip over water without needing to have a masters degree in what can go wrong.

Now when I sit as pax on a Boeing or Airbus and look at the emergency card depicting a fully intact airliner floating on water with all life rafts deployed.... I know of only one incident where it actually happened, further perpetuating the belief that it does exactly what it says on the card.

[gulliBell]

It's being reported in the media now that it was "a botched landing attempt". There has to be more to it than that...

[Photonic]

For those who have done helicopter underwater escape training would understand how unlikely it is that an untrained passenger would be able to self-extricate themselves from a submerged helicopter.

Is there a common protocol for helicopter ditchings? What I mean is -- when there is enough time to know the ditching is inevitable during an auto, is it common practice to tell pax to unlatch seatbelts and brace? Maybe even open the doors (if possible)?

In my former life as a commercial photographer, I've only flown with doors off and either belted in the seat or (rarely) on a harness with quick release. And I know how to swim, which helped in one actual fixed-wing ditching many years ago. So I was always pretty sure I could escape even if the helo quickly inverted, as long as I wasn't injured otherwise. But tourists won't be thinking like that, and it might be a closed doors flight.

[[email protected]]

Is there a common protocol for helicopter ditchings? What I mean is -- when there is enough time to know the ditching is inevitable during an auto, is it common practice to tell pax to unlatch seatbelts and brace? Maybe even open the doors (if possible)? If the pax unlatch seatbelts then, unless the impact is anything but gossamer-light, they will be thrown around the cabin (or even out of it) injuring themselves and possibly you and then risk being swept away from an open door and trapped in the cabin as the aircraft rolls upside down and fills with water.

Stay strapped in and wait for the violent movement to cease before releasing your seatbelt and escaping (if you have kept a hand holding on to something that will help you find your exit).

[Ascend Charlie]

Australia's Greatest Aviation Expert, GT, was just on the TV. He was asked if the EC120 had two engines.

His reply was (and I may have missed a word) "No, not like the EC130..."

He should be our greatest EXPORT.

[gulliBell]

..Stay strapped in and wait for the violent movement to cease before releasing your seatbelt and escaping (if you have kept a hand holding on to something that will help you find your exit).

Close, but no cigar. You must remain strapped in and form your exit (jettison door or push out window) and be holding on to a known reference (eg, the opening) before releasing your seat belt. And then only after all the violence has stopped. If you are submerged and just release your seat belt you will become disorientated and have no way of knowing the way out. A passenger walking in off the street and taking a jolly has very little hope during a ditching, unless the floats inflated and the aircraft remained upright (eg the Hong Kong accident where all passengers survived). If they can't swim, even less hope (because they will panic when under water).

[Brother]

5 up in a 120 is quite heavy in the warm, could be a handful. i wonder how much wind there was.

[The Ozzie BOY]

There seems to have been a few too many ditchings around OZ & the US this last fortnight. I believe all the helicopters had pop out floats, which usually work well, but in these last 3 cases none of the helicopters landed safely on the water which would have prevented the fatalities. Pilots can only practice water landings on fixed floats which are easy but obviously can't practice with pop outs. I wonder if this is causing these tragic ditchings?

With your years of experience maybe people could learn from what you have achieved and done.
You always were a great pilot.

[[email protected]]

Gulli - that's what this sentence meant(if you have kept a hand holding on to something that will help you find your exit). you have to orientate yourself towards your exit before you release your seat belt.

I didn't go for the full nine yards of HUET drills as I was keeping my answer simple to match the question.

I've been doing HUET drills since 1983 and most recently in January so I'm quite aware of the procedures.

[Photonic]

Okay, thanks for the info (re seatbelt release).

As I said earlier, I survived one ditching in fixed wing, probably as well-handled as it could be with fixed gear that was going to flip the plane on contact with the water (Otter). I thought maybe with a reasonably controlled auto into the water with a helicopter it might not be that violent. But that's a best-case scenario. So, belts on until motion stops, got it.

[Dick Smith]

Let’s hope we can get information promptly re the cause so we can all work to reducing all accidents.

The ATSB have not yet released the report on the Richard Green EC135 fatal. It happened over two years ago!

What is going on?

[tartare]

Did HUET in Auckland in `94 as practice for getting out of the telly heli.
The most disconcerting bit was the roll when blindfolded.
Understandable that most pax would utterly freak out - and be unable to escape if turned upside down.

[TWT]

The HUET courses I did 25 years ago were excellent when I had occasion to travel/work out of the company AS355 as 'SLF'

Blindfolded and one door randomly locked so you had to crawl over the seat to the other one if your door wouldn't open. But it is pretty easy in a warm water swimming pool compared to the ocean and a real helo ! After a few times, you can do it more calmly, but it is a stretch to expect untrained people to remain calm and egress successfully.

[Twist & Shout]

I’m a scuba diving, surfing, strong swimming, experienced pilot.

The panic was barely contained on my first HUET.
Despite being confident and prepared, ending up, strapped in a cage, upside down with water up the nose is very disconcerting.

A surprise ditching, ending up inverted, for a non HUET passenger - a fluke to survive.

[John Eacott]

Since there is a degree of discussion on underwater escape, some inaccuracies already corrected, it may be worth reinforcing essential actions taught during HUET.



Do not release safety harnesses until all motion has ceased.
Before releasing your harness, identify your location and firmly grasp a structural point which will lead you to your escape point.
When (2) is complied with and the harness released, follow your grip to the exit point.
Release (if necessary) the emergency exit and hold the frame securely.
Check with the free hand that the exit is clear and unobstructed.
Pull yourself through the exit and then inflate your lifejacket when clear of the airframe.

There is much, much more to HUET but these essentials have been refined over many years and will work. Like crab@ I've done this a few times, like every 2-3 years since 1969, am still current, and generally enjoy the course.


How an operator puts across these essentials to a paying passenger is the big question, along with having the right equipment in the first place. Even the choice of aircraft which can ensure better safety such as a twin with pop out floats or a single with fixed floats, rather than (in this case) a single with popouts.



Corporate knowledge can be lost and the lessons hard won in the past can be overlooked when experience is thrown out with ageing pilots and engineers.

[Nigel Osborn]

John, we are both too old to pass on advice that may save lives!

[heliduck]

What is going on?

Parylisis by analysis. I spend a large portion of my day determining the root cause of mechanical failures, there’s 2 stages - a tear down report which shows what the component looks like when it is disassembled followed by a detailed failure analysis a week or 2 later. Rarely does the failure analysis come up with any epiphanies that weren’t evident from the tear down report. We don’t often find new ways of breaking things, we just repeat the old methods over & over.

My point is the ATSB spend years developing a report which mostly mirrors what professional pilots/engineers suspected was the root cause all along. They have to get it right & people don’t always tell the truth so evidence & accuracy is more important than a timeline but the current timelines aren’t reasonable. I’ve been involved in 1 investigation through the ATSB which had all people on board including the pilot tell the same story, & yet it took 2 years for the Report to be released, & when it was released it summarised exactly what the pilot said on day 1. I’m sure that file spent most of its time sitting around on a desk somewhere.

Maybe we should set a 2 day timeline, whatever the consensus is on pprune after after 2 days is the root cause.:ok:

[tartare]

...other things that stick in the mind from HUET.
The warning not to hold onto the door handles as you hit the water - because lots of people break their thumbs or fingers by doing so.
How bloody freezing 10 degrees Celsius sea temperature is when tipped into a nice flat pool with no swell or wind - in your clothes.
How hard it is to climb into a life-raft in your sodden freezing clothes from the same freezing water.

[as350nut]

So it seems that experienced, pilots that have done either one or multiple HUET exercises state that it is difficult proposition to get out of a submersed helicopter, and that it might be very difficult to successfully extricate oneself in a real water emergency. Also that, they, with that experience believe it very unlikely that a paying passenger would, without that training be able to get themselves out. So what is a pilot in commands, duty of care to a passenger entail, in every over water flight.

Pre Flight Briefing should start

" Here is your life jacket I am now going to brief you on what happens if we ditch at sea; but may as well not listen because if it all goes bad I am really the only one that has a chance to get out because I have had all this HUET training that you haven't, and try as I may, even if I get out by the time I do that your toast anyway, if you don't work it out for yourself."

So can we as pilots in good conscious take passengers over water?
Do we care?
Is it unfair that with my training if it all goes bad I know I have a (good) chance to get out, but my passengers don't.
Why is it HUET for the pilot and not the passenger? ( I know the answer)

[John Eacott]

Why is it HUET for the pilot and not the passenger? ( I know the answer)

Why do the North Sea bears have to do HUET?
And the Australian offshore workforce?
Etc etc.....

[industry insider]

We now use the MK50 Jacket with Category A EBS so at least pax have approx 2 minutes of breathing air. The downside is that the MK50 jackets are heavy and not 100% comfortable. Fine for offshore in a 92 but probably not much good in a 120 without any training.

[Nescafe]

We now use the MK50 Jacket with Category A EBS so at least pax have approx 2 minutes of breathing air

These jackets are widely regarded amoungst the passengers as a joke. You’d need to be a proficient and well trained diver to have the presence of mind to operate them properly, not an offshore johnny doing HUET once every three years. Efforts are better spent getting out than fumbling around trying to get the EBS figured out.

[Ascend Charlie]

Why is it HUET for the pilot and not the passenger? ( I know the answer)

Do you want to have a 30-minute briefing before the flight, the result of which would be to scare the fork out of the customers and they will refuse to fly?

I made a 4-minute video of how the different seatbelts, door handles, sliding and hinged doors, intercoms and lifejackets wortked. All the customers were interested in was the well-constructed girl strapping into the full front-seat harness (Lift, and separate, like the old Berlei ad) and using the oral inflation tube. But I had done my bit, and if they didn't listen it was out of my hands.

[Self loading bear]

I do not consider HUET, EBS nor rebreather to be a joke. EBS has the longer duration but must not be deployed to early in order to exhaust the duration before splash.

Sorting it out when already upside down is theoretically possible but I think it is a remote possibility (also considering cold shock gasping in).

What worries me is that the EBS is still a dry training (in the Netherlands?) with indefinite duration. The HUET is still a rebreather course. (I would be extremely happy to be corrected, my knowledge dates back 2 years)

Self Loading Bear

[Stab Bar]

i wonder how much wind there was.

Fairly breezy looking at the radar picture from yesterday arvo for the area - a few showers moving through rapidly but it didn't look bad enough to cause problems visibility wise, and certainly enough wind so some translational lift would be there all the way onto the pad.

[heliduck]

...and certainly enough wind so some translational lift would be there all the way onto the pad.

...assuming of course that the aircraft was approaching the pad into wind.

[TWT]

According to this article, floats were activated after water contact but the helo eventually sank.

Whitsunday helicopter crash: Retrieving wreckage may take weeks, authorities say - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-23/fatal-helicopter-crash-retrieve-wreckage-may-take-weeks-qld/9578000)

I read elsewhere that after the ditching the pilot helped passengers to escape. An awful experience for all involved.

[RickNRoll]

He tried to land multiple times.

[red_dirt]

Same operator as the Port Hedland 135 ditching too

[KiwiNedNZ]

Red Dirt - Are you sure as thought the Aviator Group owned the 135 in WA and this 120 was owned by Des Davey/Brad Graves company ?

[heli1980]

Same operator as the Port Hedland 135 ditching too

Different operator and different AOC

[mickjoebill]

One lesson to be learned from the NYC ditching is that a pilot may survive and later be seen walking unaided, but yet be unable to save the lives of any of his passengers. We do not yet know if he released two of the passengers, we do know that despite his best efforts and those of the marine crews first on scene, three remained in the door-less cabin for one hour until released by divers.

For anyone to extract themselves they must be concious.
In helicopters, unlike cars, there are no airbags and a crushing disrespect by the industry, for reducing head trauma, through the use of interior padding.

Yes, provision of helmets to charter passengers is problematic.

I propose that we can work towards the following common sense regime, for all pilots whom carry passengers over water:
1/ Pilots wear flight helmets
2/ In water below X degrees C, pilot to wear an immersion suit or similar to reduce effects of cold shock.
2/ be Huet practiced including the use of spare air.
3/ undergo training to rescue passengers from an inverted helicopter.

The ditching of the Bell, in Queensland a few years ago during aerial filming, resulted in incomplete inversion. We should not rely on floats to save the day.

In respect to the above helping affecting a successful extraction of passengers, it follows that the one size size fits all scenarios life raft may not be the best solution for a pilot to prevent incable passengers from drowning after egress.

Ditto the life vest in a pouch that requires the wearer to be conscious and have full use of both arms to be properly fitted.

Improvements would be:
1/ passenger life vests that require no additional donning in an emergency. So a survivor can assist the unconscious by inflating the vest of others.

2/ rethink use of life rafts that have primarily designed for survival from boating accidents where survivors are able bodied and uninjured. Also consider the use of life mats, similar to those towed behind the jet skis used by life guards. Such mats could be a missing link in the chain of survival.

3/ Create a lower level safety standard of head protection for charter passengers. What is the point of a safety standard if it is not practical or commercially viable to be adopted?
This would encourage design of a cheap helmet, for instance, a semi disposable polystyrene cap that can be worn with existing David Clarke headsets. (Helmets are turn off for some passengers but a turn on for the thrill seekers)

4/ In all large cities where a body of water is the likely emergency landing area (London and Sydney for instance) rescue services should train specifically for rescue of passengers in a floating inverted helicopter.

Despite training and assistance of others and albeit in very cold water and with a 5 knot current it (reportedly) took two divers 40-60 minutes to recover three of the victims in NYC.

This should be a reminder for both those whom legislate and those whom engage in flight over water of the difficulty in extracting the unconcious, even when all the doors are removed.


Are the commercial costs of engaging the above too onerous compared to the loss of business?

Surely charter work is being chipped away at the irretrievable loss of confidence some members of the public have when they read of passengers drowning?
Exacerbated in recent time by numerous events and their aftermaths being filmed on social media?

For example, how many more helicopters sold and joy rides taken if R44 fuel tanks had been more crashworthy a decade earlier?

Any studies on the public’s level of confidence in helicopters? Is it declining?

In the rotary world, safety agencies are at least adept at counting the dead.

As for pilots I have sympathy. For an aerial shoot, I once asked for an immersion suit for two, twenty minute duration transits across very cold water in a helicopter without floats.

On the day, pilot said that no immersion suit was forthcoming for either he or myself.

After the gig the pilot later told me he had an immersion suit in the boot of his car, but decided not to wear it when he realised I was a bit pissed off!

The reasons for his decision were a mix of commercial interest and a desire to maintain the crew bond.

In the event of a ditching, that decision to maintain the bond would have had the desired effect of equally reducing survivability for both of us!

Yes, I did not stick to my guns by refusing to fly, the show must go on, of course.


Mjb

[Frying Pan]

Coming back to the Whitsunday, Queensland coast crash. Regardless of all the training and safety procedures I notice that the 3 survivors were aged in their thirties and the 2 fatalities were age 79 and 65 respectively. Nothing more to add except that must have been a factor in their survivability?

[red_dirt]

Different operator and different AOC

The Aviator Group?
Incorporating Whitsunday Helicopters aswell?

Might be different AOC

[cattletruck]

Very good points mjb.

But I think the underlying issue is that the current helicopter floatation system is woefully inadequate.

In this instance the floats deployed but the ship sank. In NYC the floats deployed but the ship rolled over inverted.

I feel a completely new approach to developing emergency floatation devices for helicopters landing on water is needed, where the ship won't sink or roll over no matter how bad the last stages of autorotation onto the surface turns out.

[Kulwin Park]

The Aviator Group?
Incorporating Whitsunday Helicopters aswell?

Might be different AOC

It was Whitsunday Air Services that operated the EC120. Not part of Whitsunday Helicopters owned and operated by the Aviator Group. Different companies and not related apparantly.

[gulliBell]

But I think the underlying issue is that the current helicopter floatation system is woefully inadequate.

In this instance the floats deployed but the ship sank. In NYC the floats deployed but the ship rolled over inverted.


No surprise that NYC turned turtle given the forward speed and descent rate. I can't think of a helicopter type that consistently remains upright in ditchings...AW139, B214ST, S76 etc etc, they've all turned turtle in relatively calm seas for whatever reasons.

[chopjock]

they've all turned turtle in relatively calm seas for whatever reasons.

Reason being the location of the floats are low down on the airframe, presumably to try and keep the cabin above the water line. If we had some lateral thinking and prioritise keeping the airframe upright instead but allow it to sink a little, say put the floatation system on the roof and nose instead.

[cattletruck]

I guess in colder waters it makes sense to try make the ship stand on water, which is quite difficult particularly in either glassy or choppy seas, but otherwise the flotation device only needs to keep passengers heads above water, but that then that makes egress quite interesting if the rotors are still turning. Some major rethink is necessitated on these flotation devices because being inverted under water appears to be one of the worst outcomes for the untrained.

This incident also reminds me of an R44 incident in Docklands Melbourne where the pilot jumped out of the helicopter and survived before it splashed into the harbour killing the other occupant who was also a PPLH. If anyone has a link to the outcome of that investigation please supply it.

[[email protected]]

MJB - I agree with most of your suggestions but eactly what training would you give to the pilot in rescuing the pax?

If you have successfully extracted yourself from a submerged helicopter, the LAST thing you want to be doing is going back in. The AAC lost a pilot doing just that many years ago - he became snagged and when the aircraft sank, he went with it.

Looking after yourself is difficult enough with the restricted movement afforded by an immersion suit and life jacket (even if it isn't inflated) such that trying to assist anyone else is nigh on impossible, even if the pilot is young, fit and uninjured.

[red_dirt]

It was Whitsunday Air Services that operated the EC120. Not part of Whitsunday Helicopters owned and operated by the Aviator Group. Different companies and not related apparantly.

Ahh fair enough 👍🏽

[Stab Bar]

...assuming of course that the aircraft was approaching the pad into wind.

No reason not to, and pretty hard to not know which way it was coming from in that kind of SE stream weather.

[gulliBell]

I'm struggling to understand reports of multiple landing attempts. I mean, it's not all that difficult landing on a flat level helipad surrounded by miles of flatness.

[mickjoebill]

MJB - I agree with most of your suggestions but eactly what training would you give to the pilot in rescuing the pax?


Yes crab you are right to address these risks.

Smaller first step, call it “helicopter inversion rescue awareness”.

You are also correct, thstcsctivites su such as duck diving below a possibly compromised inflated bag supporting a helicopter has its risks.

However, training would include the number one rule of first response of not becoming a casualty yourself.

The training for volunteer emergency services around the world caters for people of varying fitness and capabilities. I reckon HUET itself is one of the most dynamic and challenging training environments in civilian world, yet folk with average ability pass the course.
A rescue module added to existing HUET programs seems sensible.

Experienced rescue divers and trainers please chip in...

Please do not extrapolate calls for better training as being critical of the pilots in recent ditchings.

Mjb

[[email protected]]

It's probably still better to train all the pax in HUET if you are going to fly them over the water - it works in O&G - just depends how much you value your pax vs what revenue they generate.

[gulliBell]

It's probably still better to train all the pax in HUET if you are going to fly them over the water - it works in O&G - just depends how much you value your pax vs what revenue they generate.

The fundamental difference is, the O&G SLF are going to work and have no choice over their mode of transport. So 3 over-water flights mandates they have a HUET tickets. Somebody like a tourist going on a jolly over-water one time only does have a choice, they can choose not to go, or perhaps choose which operator to go with. A pre-flight briefing and an on-board safety briefing card should be the limit of the requirement for them (in a language they understand).

[[email protected]]

But we've just seen how badly that can turn out in New York - if the tourists were shown a video of what a ditching can look like in a helicopter and THEN given a choice about what training and equipment they wanted, at least they go in with open eyes as opposed to assuming someone will be there to help them step out into the waiting dinghy without getting their feet wet.

[Fareastdriver]

if the tourists were shown a video of what a ditching can look like in a helicopter and THEN given a choice about what training and equipment they wanted,

What tourists?

[heliduck]

In the recent Grand Canyon incident the machine caught fire, so if flying over land should we wear fire suits like the F1 drivers & train the pax on SCBA use? Should we install automatic fire suppression system on the machine?

Of course we should but it’s not required by law so we don’t, if we did most tourist operators would probably be broke overnight. We need to lower the risk of each flight to “an acceptable level”, the moral dilemma is how acceptable can we be & still function?

[Stab Bar]

Not to be too silly about it, but these are tourist flights that are going to have people on board expecting to go on a nice fun flight. Mostly that happens, but sometimes not.
Pax brief, safety cards, that's about it, but perhaps to put it into perspective, it's no different to getting into a bus or taxi, or even on a theme park ride - things may happen. What are you going to do, mandate comprehensive HUET training in five languages for all pax on any scenic flight anywhere over water? Terribly sad for these individuals and their families, but you can't wrap the whole world up in cotton wool.

[[email protected]]

but you can't wrap the whole world up in cotton wool. no you can't but neither can you take risks with peoples lives using the justification of making money.

[601]

no you can't but neither can you take risks with peoples lives using the justification of making money.

People have choices. They either board the helicopter, as they do with a bus, train, drive under a bridge, ride their bike, watch burnouts and enjoy life or never get out of bed.

If the risk a ride in a helicopter was that great, you would not be able to get insurance.

[aa777888]

no you can't but neither can you take risks with peoples lives using the justification of making money.You must be joking. The list of for-profit activities that assist people in risking their lives is endless. Mountain climbing. Big game hunting. Bungie jumping. Skiing. SCUBA diving. Skydiving. Zip lines. Alpine slides. Water parks. Heck, we lose a few people a year on just plain old roller coasters.

The difference in this case is the expectation of risk is a bit different. To use an aviation analogy, going skydiving seems risky, but it's actual risk is not that great (to a certain extent--I say this as a USPA D-license holder). Flying in helicopter with the doors off and your feet hanging outside does not engender the same feelings of risk, but in fact may be far more risky than skydiving. Perception vs. reality.

And, sadly, because perception vs. reality is inverted here, the repercussions to the industry are also inverted. An activity that should only attract the most crazed thrill seeker instead becomes too accessible. People don't realize the riskiness of the activity. If someone augers in while skydiving you'll get not much more than a shoulder shrug from the FAA, a la they had to have known what they were potentially getting into, nothing to see here, move along... Instead in this case we get "Something Must Be Done".

Mind you I do think the lack of an appropriate quick release on the harnesses was dumb. And if they had lost someone out of the helicopter because they were too stupid not to mess with a quick release (training is not rocket science: "Touch this when you are not on the ground/in the water and you will die.") it might have been chalked up the same way as a skydiving fatality as opposed to the situation that now exists.

[megan]

To use an aviation analogy, going skydiving seems risky, but it's actual risk is not that greatAs an ex skydiver who reads the reports, I've come to the conclusion that the riskiest part of the sport is the aircraft ride, not crunched the numbers, but it's the general impression. Agree with the thrust of the argument that people accept a level of risk in whatever they do. How many don't wear seat belts when they drive? Plenty it seems from police reports. A local neurosurgeon years ago was campaigning for the wearing of helmets in cars, for that was the area he gained the vast majority of his business. Can you honestly see people wearing a helmet while travelling by car?

From the NY ditching thread.Regulation vs. Common Sense - Paul Bertorelli

Aviation regulation theory couldn’t be simpler. The freckle-necked masses aren’t expert enough to assess the relative risks in boarding a flying machine so we, as a society, allow the government to establish certain standards and rules designed to eliminate the most egregious practices that people trying to make money in the flying game will, quite naturally, engage in. Then, as predictably as the sun rising tomorrow, we bitch and moan about government interference.

Yet regulation is why, in part, modern aviation—even the relatively wild west of general aviation—is as safe as it is. The worst practices are kept at bay by the long arm of the FAA. Except, sometimes not. That’s why the NTSB issued an urgent safety recommendation Monday urging the FAA to prohibit commercial flights in aircraft where passengers aren’t equipped with quick-release restraints. This seems intuitively obvious, but it apparently wasn’t to FlyNYON, the operator of doors-off helicopter tours around New York city. Five people drowned last week when the helicopter they were riding autorotated into the East River after an engine failure and non-quick release harnesses kept them from egressing after the helo inverted.

The NTSB’s investigation soon revealed that the aircraft was equipped with harnesses of the tour operator’s own design that had not been inspected by the FAA. This raises some sticky regulatory issues. Did that constitute an unauthorized modification of the aircraft or will the attorney for the IA who signed off the annual argue that it was some kind of supplemental restraint not subject to FAR 27.785, which requires restraints with a single-point release? Technically, the harnesses had a single-point release, it just happened to be inoperable by the passenger without a knife. I won't wade into the swamp of TSOs.

How could this slip through the regulatory cracks? One reason is that tour companies operate under Part 91, in a netherworld somewhere south of Part 135. For-hire tour operators are required to have pilot drug testing programs, but they don’t need defined op specs like other for-hire businesses. They operate under specific Letters of Agreement, the FAA’s all-purpose catchall strategy when both the industry and agency agree that more forceful regulation isn’t needed.

So far, so good. But this means the tour operators are on their own to exercise good judgment and common sense in a relatively unfettered commercial air business. One unavoidable question is this: Would an FAA inspector examining that harness rig put the kibosh on it? I’m gonna go with yes.

And thus the regulatory gap and the basis of the NTSB’s urgent safety recommendation. Here we reach a philosophical divide. On Monday, we put up a Question of the Week asking if more regulation is needed, specifically banning doors-off flights. Neither the FAA nor the NTSB have gone quite that far. Yet. More than a third of readers said such flights shouldn’t be banned and that passengers are on their own to assess risk based on informed consent.

I agree they shouldn’t be banned, but given what I view as a serious safety breach, either the LOAs should be hardened to require inspections or tour operators need to be held to a higher basic regulatory standard. There’s always a danger in knee-jerking toward new regulation on the basis of a single occurrence and regulation has to balance the public interest against chilling commercial vitality. But as I mentioned in last week’s blog, it’s unrealistic to think those passengers could have reasonably assessed the risk they were about to take. So how Darwinian do you want to be?

Every Saturday morning in the U.S., thousands of unsuspecting passengers sign up for tandem skydives. The perceived risk is so high that they sign multi-page waivers and the FAA allows the industry to exist in its own laissez-faire bubble. The demonstrated risk is rather lower. Still, inspectors do show up to have a look at these operations, examine the airplanes and look over the maintenance logs. Even though minimal, these inspections are sometimes capricious and intrusive because FAA inspectors can do that if they want. It appears to me that air tour operators don’t even get that much attention. If they did, maybe someone would have squawked those harnesses.


https://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/101/3971-full.html?ET=avweb:e3971:244160a:&st=email#230469

[Stab Bar]

no you can't but neither can you take risks with peoples lives using the justification of making money.

You certainly can, and every commercial organisation does it every day. It's just the level of risk and the mitigators that vary.
As I said, buses, taxis, theme park rides, just getting in the car to drive to work can all be fraught with danger - why should aviation be a special case?
You can't be cavalier about it, of course, so you need to take sensible precautions and give people fair preparation and warning for what they're about to do, but you can't expect pax for a 10 minute reef scenic to be put through anything more than a safety brief and demonstration not unlike the one the cabin crew give you in an airliner in terms of complexity, really.

[[email protected]]

I should have put the word unacceptable or unmitigated in this sentence
no you can't but neither can you take risks with peoples lives using the justification of making money.

What the author of Megan's post calls the 'wild west' of aviation that pushes the boundaries of 'common-sense' safety in order to cram more people in more frequently is where I have an issue -
It appears to me that air tour operators don’t even get that much attention. If they did, maybe someone would have squawked those harnesses. - you can't remove all risk from aviation (or most of life for that matter) but you must allow people to understand the risk - the phrase 'Informed consent' best sums up your responsibility when you are taking money off people and expecting them to take those risks.

[Stab Bar]

harnesses of the tour operator’s own design

Fair enough, this is just stupidity.

[megan]

but you must allow people to understand the risk - the phrase 'Informed consent' best sums up your responsibilityTrouble is, what constitutes "informed consent", beyond these things can crash for a whole heap of different reasons. What constitutes informed consent when you hop on a train, bus, or an airliner. You buy your ticket and trust in God.

[KiwiNedNZ]

"harnesses of the tour operator’s own design" - that comment is just stupid. NYON didnt just design their own harness they bought a commercially available one. Should it have been a quick release one - absolutely - but no way in heck was it just something they designed up themselves - is someone really that stupid that they would believe that comment or better yet stupid enough to post that.

[RickNRoll]

Preliminary report out.

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/aair/ao-2018-026/


While approaching the pontoon, at about 1535, the pilot reported noticing a warning message illuminate in the upper vehicle and engine multifunction display (refer to section titled Helicopter information). As this was a high workload phase of flight, the pilot was unable to verify the nature of the warning. However, in response, the pilot elected to conduct a go-around. When the helicopter was at an altitude of about 40 ft (12 m) above the pontoon, the pilot recalled feeling a ‘thud’ and the nose of the helicopter yawed sharply left (anticlockwise from above). In an attempt to arrest the yaw, the pilot reported that he made a number of control inputs, which included lowering the collective[2 (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/aair/ao-2018-026/#footnote2)] and pushing the cyclic[3 (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/aair/ao-2018-026/#footnote3)] forward and to the left. The pilot was unable to regain control of the helicopter and it collided with the water. A passenger reported that soon after impact with the water, the helicopter rolled onto its right side in a mostly inverted orientation.

[Cloudee]

After three years, final report out. https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5779875/ao-2018-026-final.pdf


What the ATSB found
Although none of the possible VEMD messages required immediate action by the pilot, the pilot considered a go-around to be the best option given the circumstances at the time.
During the go-around, the helicopter continued yawing slowly to the left, and the pilot very likely did not apply sufficient right pedal input to correct the developing yaw and conduct the go-around into wind. The helicopter then continued yawing left, towards a downwind position, until the sudden and rapid yaw to the left occurred. In response to the rapid yaw, it is very likely that the pilot did not immediately apply full and sustained right pedal input.

The operator complied with the regulatory requirements for training and experience of pilots on new helicopter types. However, the ATSB found the operator had limited processes in place to ensure that pilots with minimal time and experience on a new and technically different helicopter type had the opportunity to effectively consolidate their skills on the type required for conducting the operator's normal operations to pontoons. In this case, the pilot of the accident flight had 11.0 hours experience in command on the EC120B helicopter type, and had conducted
16.1 hours in another and technically different helicopter type during the period of acquiring their EC120B experience. Associated with this limited consolidation on the EC120B, it is likely that the pilot was experiencing a high workload during the final approach and a very high workload during the subsequent go-around.
In addition to limited consolidation of skills on type, the ATSB found that the safety margin associated with landing the helicopter on the pontoon at Hardy Reef was reduced due to a combination of factors, each of which individually was within relevant requirements or limits. These factors included the helicopter being close to the maximum all-up weight, the helicopter’s engine power output being close to the lowest allowable limit, the need to use high power to make a slow approach in order to disperse birds from the pontoon, and the routine approach and landing position on the pontoon requiring the pilot to turn left into a right crosswind (in a helicopter with a clockwise-rotating main rotor system).

The ATSB also identified that the passengers were not provided with sufficient instructions on how to operate the emergency exits and the passenger seated next to the rear left sliding door (emergency exit) was unable to locate the exit operating handle during the emergency, and as a result the evacuation of passengers was delayed until another passenger was able to open the exit. The nature of the handle’s design was such that its purpose was not readily apparent, and the placard providing instructions for opening the sliding door did not specify all the actions required to successfully open the door.

[gulliBell]

OK, so to summarize (from what I understand). There was nothing technically wrong with the aircraft for it to end up in the water, the pilot only had 11 hours experience on type, it ended up in the water without the floats deployed and two passengers drowned.

[[email protected]]

Pretty accurate summary Gulli and he had only the hours on the 120 as experience of Fenstron handling - how many pilots don't understand the difference in handling characteristics and the need for full right pedal in the event of unexpected left yaw?

[SASless]

I struggle with the announced inability of a Pilot to apply pedal to the stop if the helicopter is yawing.

That should be a natural response....apply that pedal which is required to stop the yaw.....and if you hit the physical stop and the yaw is continuing.....then you have a bonafide emergency to deal with.

Upon hitting the physical limit of the pedal movement....you would have to assess the situation to determine the factors causing that.....and determine what actions are needed and are possible.

[aa777888]

Also interesting is how all of the incidents cited in the appendix involved fenestrons.

[212man]

Also interesting is how all of the incidents cited in the appendix involved fenestrons.. I wonder why that is?

[Flying Bull]

I struggle with the announced inability of a Pilot to apply pedal to the stop if the helicopter is yawing.

That should be a natural response....apply that pedal which is required to stop the yaw.....and if you hit the physical stop and the yaw is continuing.....then you have a bonafide emergency to deal with.

Upon hitting the physical limit of the pedal movement....you would have to assess the situation to determine the factors causing that.....and determine what actions are needed and are possible.
Hi,
do you have fenestron experience?
You would be surprised, how many pilots just don't push the pedal to the stop...
Especially, if they come from a normal tail rotor background

[212man]

Hi,
do you have fenestron experience?
You would be surprised, how many pilots just don't push the pedal to the stop...
Especially, if they come from a normal tail rotor background
I don’t understand that. If the aircraft starts rolling left to the inverted, I’m pretty sure every pilot would have full opposite right stick, or if it pitched vertically down they’d have full aft stick. Why is yaw different?

[Flying Bull]

I don’t understand that. If the aircraft starts rolling left to the inverted, I’m pretty sure every pilot would have full opposite right stick, or if it pitched vertically down they’d have full aft stick. Why is yaw different?
Well 212man,
Why, because with a normal tail rotor you have more or less a straight line between pedal travel and force generated at the tail, while with a fenestron its not only further travel necessary - its also dependent on the speed, cause the aerodynamical fin will take most of the force of the fenestron at speeds above 60 to 70 knots.
That means, that when you slow down, especially under 40 knots, you need to counteract yaw which isn't compensated by the fin anymore with the fenestron.
Ad to that a crosswind component means you need to give a boot full of pedal to stay straight.
It's no witchwork, but you have to know, what you are doing.
If you come from normal tail rotors you need to adopt.

[casper64]

Has not much to do with fenestron vs tail rotor but simply with a relatively low power tail rotor/fenestron… (like an ec120’has…) with both you run out of them at some point. With aircraft with larger fenestrons you hardly notice any difference if any at all between them and a normal tail rotor. Fenestron of an H145 is for example much more powerfull than the tail rotor of its predecessor (BK117 up and including C-2) Even Bell and Leonardo who always argumenten agents “enclosed tail rotors” now introduce them on their Invictus and AW009… Comanche also had one and flew 70kts sideways easily.

[212man]

Well 212man,
Why, because with a normal tail rotor you have more or less a straight line between pedal travel and force generated at the tail, while with a fenestron its not only further travel necessary - its also dependent on the speed, cause the aerodynamical fin will take most of the force of the fenestron at speeds above 60 to 70 knots.
That means, that when you slow down, especially under 40 knots, you need to counteract yaw which isn't compensated by the fin anymore with the fenestron.
Ad to that a crosswind component means you need to give a boot full of pedal to stay straight.
It's no witchwork, but you have to know, what you are doing.
If you come from normal tail rotors you need to adopt.

I wasn’t questioning pedal travel difference vs normal TR. I was questioning why you wouldn’t use full control inputs to stop an excess deviation. I have 2,000+ hours on EC155, so have some fenestron experience.

[aa777888]

One wonders how many hours is appropriate to achieve reliably adequate skill levels under all conditions when making a "fenestron transition".

With all my time in the R22 and R44, when I jumped into the G2 for the first (and so far only) time, the instructor warned me some profanity was likely to be spewing from my mouth. Flying the pattern and autos were fine, but hover patterns in 10 gust 20 did have me cursing some! After two hours I'd say I only had the most rudimentary mastery of the system. Not sure 10 hours would have seen me supremely confident in all conditions.

[SASless]

I don’t understand that. If the aircraft starts rolling left to the inverted, I’m pretty sure every pilot would have full opposite right stick, or if it pitched vertically down they’d have full aft stick. Why is yaw different?

Thank You!

Why should you have had to state the bleeding obvious.


For our Fenstrom Expert....would it surprise him to think that even the venerable old Huey had a Tail Fin and Synch Elevators for a reasons besides being a. neat place to hang a Non-Fenstron Tail Rotor?

Yes...Fenstrons are different than legacy tail rotors but then so are NOTAR's and oddly enough the Kaman Husky really is different as well....yet it has tail fins.

But in everyone of them....if the nose is going in a direction you do not wish it to go....you push the opposite Pedal until the yaw stops....or you run out of pedal travel which ever happens first.

[Hot and Hi]

I struggle with the announced inability of a Pilot to apply pedal to the stop if the helicopter is yawing.

That should be a natural response....apply that pedal which is required to stop the yaw.....and if you hit the physical stop and the yaw is continuing.....then you have a bonafide emergency to deal with.

Upon hitting the physical limit of the pedal movement....you would have to assess the situation to determine the factors causing that.....and determine what actions are needed and are possible.

Actually, it doesn’t work like this. Hitting pedal stop is indeed common and not a bonafide emergency. It needs to be accepted and sustained to - eventually - bring this yaw to a stop.

Thinking it *was* an emergency (eg loss of TR control) those mishap pilots then “trying to determine the factors causing that” (as you wrote) then get off that presumed ‘ineffective’ pedal, maybe roll of the throttle or try other crazy things that then cause the crash.

[Hot and Hi]

I don’t understand that. If the aircraft starts rolling left to the inverted, I’m pretty sure every pilot would have full opposite right stick, or if it pitched vertically down they’d have full aft stick. Why is yaw different?
That doesn’t work like this neither. To the opposite, new civilian pilots are first and foremost taught to not over control and to avoid harsh, rapid or abrupt control inputs. We are taught to “ride it out”, in particular to be aware of mast bumping in turbulence (which requires the opposite of what you say, you must lean into the bank, not fight it with opposing cyclic) etc pp.

When this yaw problem develops (ie in the hover, or when transitioning from slow forward flight to hover) we are (in a H120, Gazelle or Guimbal anyway) already close to max power. Again, pilots primary fear is to avoid over torquing that engine by commanding much of that power sapping Fenestron in the back.

What is required here, namely to give full right boot, immediately and without delay, and to stand on that pedal stop until the rotation stops, comes as extremely counter-intuitive to most pilots, for the above mentioned reason.

This is the reason for many entirely avoidable accidents that are wrongly blamed on the lack of tail rotor effectiveness of the Fenestron.

[Twist & Shout]

I have found the Fenestron on the EC120 to be very effective, but obviously it uses a lot of power. A trait of Fenestrons in the hover/low speed regimes.
In one flying roll, I would swap during the day between an AS350 and the EC120. The difference in required peddle movement was extreme.
Many people falsely confuse the required peddle travel with ineffectiveness. And some don’t use the unfamiliarly large full travel when required.

As an aside: I have witnessed poor piloting technique result in over torque events. (Basically allowing a yaw to develop, often associated with sudden increase in power, then finally correcting with sufficient peddle and the associated increase in power demand.)

[gulliBell]

Can somebody tell me if I'm missing something here. We have a pilot new to type with a design feature he has limited experience with, flying a heavy aircraft with an engine that is running out of puff, landing in a tight spot and out of the wind, surrounded by water with nowhere else to go, carrying tourists who don't understand English. And then, when things turned to worms, he didn't put in full right pedal to arrest an un-commanded yaw. And then, in all that excitement failed to pop the emergency floats when splashdown was imminent. I mean, did he give himself any chance of ever pulling this off safely? We as a pilot community seem to be doing inexplicable stuff that wrecks otherwise perfectly serviceable helicopters time and time again.

[Hot and Hi]

I fully agree with your sentiment, gulli.

[megan]

I mean, did he give himself any chance of ever pulling this off safely? We as a pilot community seem to be doing inexplicable stuff that wrecks otherwise perfectly serviceable helicopters time and time againDid the "system" give him the chance of pulling it off safely? Inexperienced on type, flying a 206 as well while gaining his 11 hours on type, maxed out weight wise, min spec engine. I was always of the opinion it took about 100 hours to gain confidence in a new type, but then I may be a slow learner, it takes a while for everything to fall to hand - muscle memory, where is that float switch? Mostly flew a 76 with 412 occasionally added, getting into the Bell always took adjustment - reaching for the heading knob was always a gotcha.

Pertinent quotes from the report.the helicopter manufacturer advised against conducting left turns at low airspeed, especially in performance limited conditions (and what was this lad doing? Complying with company SOP)

although legally qualified to conduct the flight, the pilot was inexperienced on the helicopter type, and the opportunity provided for consolidating their skills on the helicopter type was limited (do we say its his fault for the limited type experience?)We could always use the excuse the RAAF applied to a fatal F-111 crash, "If Bloggs didn't think he could handled the mission he could have refused to fly". ex Sale school boy Gulli. How does one gain experience? By doing with adequate supervision and training, both missing in the F-111 case, one could say both were missing in this helo accident also..

[[email protected]]

Not the 'system' per se, just piss poor oversight by his employer.

The legal minimums are too low and it is his employer's responsibility to make sure he is competent and proficient enough to fly pax in that aircraft.

Perhaps they didn't understand the differences between TR and Fenestron either.

[212man]

That doesn’t work like this neither. To the opposite, new civilian pilots are first and foremost taught to not over control and to avoid harsh, rapid or abrupt control inputs. We are taught to “ride it out”, in particular to be aware of mast bumping in turbulence (which requires the opposite of what you say, you must lean into the bank, not fight it with opposing cyclic) etc pp.

When this yaw problem develops (ie in the hover, or when transitioning from slow forward flight to hover) we are (in a H120, Gazelle or Guimbal anyway) already close to max power. Again, pilots primary fear is to avoid over torquing that engine by commanding much of that power sapping Fenestron in the back.

What is required here, namely to give full right boot, immediately and without delay, and to stand on that pedal stop until the rotation stops, comes as extremely counter-intuitive to most pilots, for the above mentioned reason.

This is the reason for many entirely avoidable accidents that are wrongly blamed on the lack of tail rotor effectiveness of the Fenestron.
Sometimes I feel like I live in a parallel universe!

[gulliBell]

Did the "system" give him the chance of pulling it off safely?..

Sure, send him off as a Cat D for the first 25 hours at significantly reduced weights with cross-wind limitations, then if he hasn't bent anything after that time bump him up to a Cat C. etc etc. But I bet the boss would not be happy going out with less than a full load of passengers. I've got a hunch I know what was going through the pilot's mind when he noticed that caution light on just before landing. I 'aint gonna land with a caution light on and not being allowed to take-off again, causing the boss a headache to get a defect fixed on a helicopter parked out on a pontoon. Boss 'aint gonna be happy with me if I do that. Well, the boss gonna be more unhappy dropping it in the tide, failing to pop the floats and drowns two passengers. All because of second guessing what the boss might think about stranding his helicopter out on a pontoon.

[SASless]

Do. not feel like you are the only occupant of that parallel universe 212man.

In the past couple of days I have been fortunate to learn a lot here in this forum than during my career spent flying helicopters in just about every part of the industry there is....and in more than a few kinds, types, and. models of helicopter.

That is the benefit of this forum....especially when that which is being learned is valid, useful, and accurate.

That is the shortcoming of that parallel universe we slip into at times....where it's conventional wisdom is contrary to the Real World we actually live in.

The danger is there are some through their newness cannot discern the difference and might fall pray to the teachings of that parallel universe.

[Twist & Shout]

I’m not sure how much “Time on Type” is required before applying right peddle* is the response to left yaw/applying power in a “French” machine.
*(in sufficient amount, ASAP, up to the stop if required)

[megan]

I’m not sure how much “Time on Type” is required before applying right peddle* is the response to left yawThings are not quite so simple. When you understand the issues facing the pilot you perhaps can understand. His departure from home base required maximum take off power, being so heavy, actually over permissible take off weight, the engine was min spec performance wise, the wind was from the right side, pushing in more right pedal requires more power for the tail rotor/fenestron, power being sent to the tail rotor/fenestron is power that's not available to the main rotor. Forgetting about any performance benefit from the wind he, more than likely, would have had his hands full trying to keep the engine within limits. Just my guess. The pilot commented that he was "busy", a sign that he was anxious/concerned/up tight/in full knowledge he was facing a difficult approach perhaps.

[gulliBell]

It had potential disaster written all over it, right from the beginning.

[Twist & Shout]

Things are not quite so simple. When you understand the issues facing the pilot you perhaps can understand. His departure from home base required maximum take off power, being so heavy, actually over permissible take off weight, the engine was min spec performance wise, the wind was from the right side, pushing in more right pedal requires more power for the tail rotor/fenestron, power being sent to the tail rotor/fenestron is power that's not available to the main rotor. Forgetting about any performance benefit from the wind he, more than likely, would have had his hands full trying to keep the engine within limits. Just my guess. The pilot commented that he was "busy", a sign that he was anxious/concerned/up tight/in full knowledge he was facing a difficult approach perhaps.

Good points.
Accepted.

[[email protected]]

He had a wind from the right which helps in a right power pedal aircraft. = stable so far

He planned to yaw left to align with the pontoon putting the wind further round. = reduction in right pedal to yaw left

When he attempted the go around, his yaw pedal position was very far behind where it needed to be and then he got weather-cocked to downwind and panicked. = needed enough right pedal to stop the original yaw and more to compensate for the handful of power pulled.

I don't know what Tq warning indications there are on the 120 but the Gazelle had a red flashing light that then went on steady.

In this respect I agree with Megan than concern about overTqing might have prevented him using full right pedal.

So instead of a mild overTq taking a couple of hours off the transmission - he crashed the aircraft instead!!!!!

[gulliBell]

I'm not familiar with this aircraft type. I just assumed it would have a digital engine control that wouldn't let you do anything too nasty to the engine and it would restrict power to a limit and then bleed off RRPM if you applied more collective.

[ApolloHeli]

I'm not familiar with this aircraft type. I just assumed it would have a digital engine control that wouldn't let you do anything too nasty to the engine and it would restrict power to a limit and then bleed off RRPM if you applied more collective.

No protections, it's got a nice big FLI display (Zero-Ten scale, 10 is T/O power limit, and a red triangle above for the transient limit).

The Tq limit below Vy (65kts) is 103%, but you are able to pull through that up to 110% for a transient of 5 seconds without penalty. A horn comes on after 1.5s in the transient range to let you know you are there, and nothing on the aircraft would stop you from pulling beyond in order to avoid an accident.

[Hot and Hi]

[...] He planned to yaw left to align with the pontoon putting the wind further round. = reduction in right pedal to yaw left

When he attempted the go around, his yaw pedal position was very far behind where it needed to be and then he got weather-cocked to downwind and panicked. = needed enough right pedal to stop the original yaw and more to compensate for the handful of power pulled.

I don't know what Tq warning indications there are on the 120 but the Gazelle had a red flashing light that then went on steady.

In this respect I agree with Megan than concern about overTqing might have prevented him using full right pedal.

So instead of a mild overTq taking a couple of hours off the transmission - he crashed the aircraft instead!!!!! [emphasis by Hot and Hi]


The below has relevance:



[...] new civilian pilots are first and foremost taught to not over control and to avoid harsh, rapid or abrupt control inputs. [...]

When this yaw problem develops (ie in the hover, or when transitioning from slow forward flight to hover) we are (in a H120, Gazelle or Guimbal anyway) already close to max power. Again, pilots primary fear is to avoid over torquing that engine by commanding much of that power sapping Fenestron in the back.



From the actual ATSB Transport Safety Report (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5779875/ao-2018-026-final.pdf). Page 35:

Following the [mishap's] pilot’s check to line with the chief pilot on 13 March 2018, the chief pilot noted on the check form that the pilot needed to be gentle on the pedals [emphasis by Hot and Hi]. The chief pilot advised that all new EC120B pilots were coached the same way and the same comment could be found on many of the check ride records for those pilots.


Page 34:


(4) [...] If at this point [in OGE hover just before arriving overhead the pontoon - amended by Hot and Hi] the helicopter was at maximum take-off power, further application of right pedal would not be available (without exceeding engine limitations or ceasing the climb).

(5) The loss of airspeed experienced by a helicopter turning into a downwind position at low speed increases the power requirement[...]. If the use of right pedal was limited by the available power during the initial phase of the go-around, there would not be enough power for a recovery of the left yaw at this point without exceeding engine limitations.

Page 75

[...]there was a reduced power margin available to the pilot on the final approach to the pontoon. This was due to:

The aircraft was overweight [[b]actually, above MTOW - amended by Hot and Hi] on departure from Hamilton Island. Being overweight on departure meant that when the pilot reached the pontoon the helicopter was heavier than it should have been. Although it was below the maximum allowable weight when operating at the pontoon, it was close to this maximum allowable weight.
The helicopter’s engine power output was close to the lowest allowable limit for the helicopter type.

The pilot was required to use high power to make a slow final approach in order to disperse birds from the pontoon.





And finally Page 77, confirming what crab said:



The pilot reported keeping the power at or close to maximum take-off power during the go- around, and therefore they had limited power available to correct the yaw. As the helicopter kept yawing further left, it would have reached the point where applying sufficient right pedal to arrest the yaw and then yaw right would have meant exceeding engine limitations. Based on the available evidence, there were no indications an exceedance occurred after the go-around was initiated.

[Hot and Hi]

He had a wind from the right which helps in a right power pedal aircraft. = stable so far

It is correct that in a CW rotating helicopter, wind from the right 'unloads' the anti-torque device. In other words, the wind pushes in the same direction as the tail rotor thrust vector. Stable so far, OK, but for how long?

When I did my type conversion on one of those French Fenestron-equipped helicopters, I was taught the that there is a specific problem with wind from the right, related to the stalling of the vertical fin:



A large portion of the anti-torque thrust of a Fenestron comes from the airfoil profile of the vertical stabiliser = at forward speed the tail fin creates lift supporting the Fenestron.
That tail fin stalls at a given given speed and Angle of Attack, like any other wing.
While wind from the right initially supports the Fenestron (ie, requiring less right pedal), the same wind from the right increases the AoA of the relative wind. The increased AoA makes the tail fin stall earlier (at higher ground speed).
The change of right pedal required (from pre-stall pedal position, to the position required post stall) is more dramatic in this scenario, as due to the right wind initially the right pedal required was lower compared to pointing straight into wind.


It was said that many pilots got caught out this way. The convex training put specific emphasis on sensitising new pilots for this specific "gotcha" scenario.

[aa777888]

Probably most have seen this paper already, but for the few who may not have it has some relevance: ERF2019-0017 (https://www.pprune.org/attachments/rotorheads/6231d1604231684-r44-crashed-alps-erf2019-0017.pdf).

[Jelico]

We operate an EC120 amongst other types. When flying heavy you are in constant fear of an over torque. Takes you back to the robby days, of having to plan out every approach carefully beforehand to ensure you don't bump it over the red line. Everything (wind etc) needs to be stacked in your favour. In my experience it is a huge distraction. The problem is that the engine produces a lot more power than the transmission will handle, so there is always a hesitation to put in a boot load of right pedal as this is the quickest way to an over TQ. I reckon that was at least a consideration by the pilot here, if not a large part of the cause of the accident. This is NOT the case in the other fenestron equipped machine I fly regularly, the EC130 where you can happily use up all the pedal travel without pushing the FLI into the red.

[SASless]

Are we saying the EC-120 is poorly designed?

[Twist & Shout]

Are we saying the EC-120 is poorly designed?

I personally think the EC-120 is a delightful helicopter.
It does not have a large power margin like an AS350 B2/3 for example, or an easily ignored power limit like an R44 at sea level, for example.
Much like many helicopters (B47/B206/A109A/B222 for examples) it requires some thought, intelligent and appropriate techniques applied, especially when loaded near max gross weight.
I’d rate it’s performance as very similar to a B206III (But it won’t run out of TR authority, and it will record any exceedance’s)

Considering it is a much newer design, and the size of the boot - the performance is disappointing*, and leads to pilot induced problems. But you can’t depart vertically in B222B at max gross weight either, even on a cool night. Well, I can’t.

*Potentially designed this way, to prevent competition with other Airbus products.

[[email protected]]

Every helicopter with a vertical fin will experience changes in the lift it produces at various speeds and the Fenestron equipped aircraft just have bigger fins than most - as Hot and Hi says, to offload the Fenestron in forward flight.

I think it less likely to have been a factor in this accident since he was already in a low speed situation when the yaw started and the main effect of the vertical fin would have been felt as he yawed to give himself a downwind component - a tendency to weathercock towards complete downwind would have been the result, not a stall.

[gulliBell]

I think we are all in agreement that another pilot crashed another helicopter that had nothing wrong with it. The next example is just around the corner and will appear here soon enough for sure.

[Flying Bull]

I personally think the EC-120 is a delightful helicopter.
It does not have a large power margin like an AS350 B2/3 for example, or an easily ignored power limit like an R44 at sea level, for example.
Much like many helicopters (B47/B206/A109A/B222 for examples) it requires some thought, intelligent and appropriate techniques applied, especially when loaded near max gross weight.
I’d rate it’s performance as very similar to a B206III (But it won’t run out of TR authority, and it will record any exceedance’s)

Considering it is a much newer design, and the size of the boot - the performance is disappointing*, and leads to pilot induced problems. But you can’t depart vertically in B222B at max gross weight either, even on a cool night. Well, I can’t.

*Potentially designed this way, to prevent competition with other Airbus products.

Close to or at MTOW you have to plan your flightpath with most helicopters very carefully.
I recall pleasure flights with the Bell 206 where the ground crew brought the fat father with the fat mother and the fat kids just after refuelling - forcing the doors shut....
When I was young and not bold enough to say - NO
Creeped away in the ground cushion (but that's another thread here on PPRUNE)
Only, that the EC120 is recording over limits - while other conventional helicopters doesn't - shouldn't prevent a pilot to over torque - if it is required to survive.
Its shameful - and shouldn't be done on e regular basis - but better than crashing ...
If the other helicopters could tell, how often they have been mistreated - you would have to listen to long stories...