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scr1
12th Mar 2018, 09:06
'Plane crash' at Nepal's Kathmandu airport - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43369179)

A plane has crashed at Kathmandu's international airport, local media report.

A plane from a Bangladeshi airline crashed on the east side of Tribhuvan International Airport's runway, the Kathmandu Post reported.

An airport spokesperson told the paper that casualties were feared.

Photos and video posted on social media showed smoke rising from an airport runway.

Cloudee
12th Mar 2018, 09:08
'Plane crash' at Nepal's Kathmandu airport - BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43369179)
Reports of Bangladeshi aircraft crash.

c_coder
12th Mar 2018, 09:22
This article has a picture of smoke in the distance:

US-Bangla airlines aircraft crashes at TIA - National - The Kathmandu Post (http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-03-12/us-bangla-airlines-aircraft-crashes-near-tia.html)

It gives the ACID as S2-AGU

It also says the aircraft crashed into a football ground near the airport.

andrasz
12th Mar 2018, 09:24
DH-8 Q400 S2-AGU

1a sound asleep
12th Mar 2018, 09:33
Terrible fire photos on here https://www.facebook.com/AIRLINESECRETS/

Heathrow Harry
12th Mar 2018, 09:34
A plane has crashed at Kathmandu's international airport, local media say.

The plane from US-Bangla, a Bangladeshi airline, went off the runway while landing and crashed on the east side of Tribhuvan International Airport's runway, the Kathmandu Post reported. An airport spokesperson told the paper that casualties were feared.

The plane can reportedly carry 78 passengers and firefighters were at the scene trying to extinguish a fire, local news site My Republica reported.
Photos and video posted on social media showed smoke rising from an airport runway.

The plane was identified in local media as S2-AGU, a Bombardier Dash 8 Q400, but this has not been officially confirmed.
The flight landed at TIA airport, also known as Kathmandu International Airport, at 14:20 local time (08:35 GMT), according to flight tracking website FlightRadar24 (https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/s2-agu).

Heathrow Harry
12th Mar 2018, 09:35
According to airport spokesperson Prem Nath Thakur, the aircraft careened off the runway during landing and crashed onto a football ground near TIA. The aircraft took off from Dhaka and landed at TIA at 2:20 pm.
US-Bangla Airlines commenced operations with domestic flights on 17 July 2014. It is a subsidiary of US-Bangla Group, a United States-Bangladesh joint venture company
Serial number 4041
Type DHC-8 402
Registration S2-AGU
Plane age 16.8 years

Heathrow Harry
12th Mar 2018, 09:49
67 pax on board

About 67 passengers were thought to be on board, officials told the BBC. The number of casualties is unconfirmed.
Seventeen people on board have been rescued so far, the authorities say.

Joe_K
12th Mar 2018, 11:31
67 pax on board

About 67 passengers were thought to be on board, officials told the BBC. The number of casualties is unconfirmed.
Seventeen people on board have been rescued so far, the authorities say.

The Grauniad have it as "Nepali police said at least 38 were killed and 23 injured, with another 10 people still unaccounted for."

With video of the aftermath. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/12/bangladeshi-plane-with-67-passengers-on-board-crashes-in-nepal

readywhenreaching
12th Mar 2018, 11:46
An unbelievable ATC transcript is just online at Jacdec
2018-03-18 US Bangla DHC-8-400 crashed on landing Kathmandu » JACDEC (http://www.jacdec.de/2018/03/12/2018-03-18-us-bangla-dhc-8-400-crashed-on-landing-kathmandu/)

Nemrytter
12th Mar 2018, 12:21
The transcript is based on LiveATC recordings, I just had a listen and the transcript appears correct. Astounding.

ironbutt57
12th Mar 2018, 12:46
easy enough to operate in and out of there as long as procedures are followed and ATC communications are made clearly and in standard phraseology, never had an issue

Mike Flynn
12th Mar 2018, 13:00
ATC Radio Transcript Kathmandu-Tower

(Note: this transcript is inofficial and can contain inadequate data)

BS211(female voice): „Good day, BanglaStar211 final runway 02.“
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, tower. Wind 220 degrees eight knots, tailwind component seven knots, continue approach.“
BS211(female voice): „Continue approach BanglaStar 211.“
..
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, wind 220 degrees seven knots, talwind component six knots, you’re cleared to land.“
BS211(female voice): „Cleared to land, BanglaStar 211.“
..
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, tower?“
BS211(female voice): „Go ahead, sir.“
BS211(male voice): „Go ahead, mam‘.“
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, you were given a landing clearance to runway 02.“
BS211(male voice): „Affirmative, mam.“
KTH-Tower: „You are going towards runway 20.“
BS211(male voice): „..(garbled transmission)..to runway 02.“
KTH-Tower (different voice): „…211, runway 20, cleared to land.“
BS211(male voice): „..cleared to land..(unintelligible).“
..
KTH-Tower (different voice): „BanglaStar211, Kathmandu Tower“
BS211(male voice): „Go ahead“
KTH-Tower (different voice): „BanglaStar211, request your intentions.“
BS211(male voice): „..(unintelligible)..“
KTH-Tower (different voice): “ BanglaStar211, that would be VFR.“
BS211(male voice): „Affirmative“
KTH-Tower (different voice): “ 211 join a ri…ehm..right downwind to runway 20.“
BS211(male voice): „Copied.“
KTH-Tower (different voice): “ …right downwind runway 02..“
..
Tower cleares another aircraft (Buddha282) to land on runway 02.
..
KTH-Tower: „And BanglaStar 211, traffic at final eh..runway 02 at two miles, report sighting.“
BS211(male voice): „Copied, Sir. We’ll be at (..) runway 02.“
KTH-Tower: „Confirm you’re tracking towards runway 20 ?“
BS211(male voice): „Affirmative.“
KTH-Tower: „Right..left, right downwind runway 02, I say again Bangla 212 traffic is on final runway 02 landing on runway 02.“
BS211(male voice): „Copied Sir“
..
Tower confirmed landing clearance for the other aircraft (Buddha282) to land on runway 02.
..
KTH-Tower: „211 I say it again, do not proceed towards runway 20. Cleared to hold at your current position.“
BS211(male voice): „Okay, we’re making an orbit to the right, copied ?“
BS211(male voice): „Tower, 211, making a right holding, right holding for runway 02.“
KTH-Tower: „Okay that’s good but do not land. Traffic is on short final runway 02.“
BS211(male voice): „We have that, Sir copied. (unintelligible) we’re cleared to land“
..
KTH-Tower: „..BanglaStar211, runway..eh..cleared to land. Runway is vacated, either runway 02 or 20 ?“
BS211(male voice): „Yes Siur, we like to land on 20.“
KTH-Tower: „Okay runway 20, cleared to land. Wind is 270 degrees, six knots.“
BS211(male voice): „260 copied, cleared to land.“
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, confirm you have the runway in sight?“
BS211(male voice): „Negative, Sir.“
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, turn right and ah..you have the runway, confirm you have the runway not in sight, yet ?“
BS211(male voice): „Affirmative, we have (..) runway in sight. Requesting clear to land, Sir.“
KTH-Tower: „And BanglaStar211, cleared to land.“
BS211(male voice): „Cleared to land runway 02, BanglaStar212.“
KTH-Tower: „Roger, ruway 02, cleared to land, BanglaStar211.“
..
BS211(male voice): „..sir, are we cleared to land ?“
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, I say again..turn… (yelling in background).“
..
(end of BS211 transmissions)


http://www.jacdec.de/WP/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2018-03-12_S2-AGU_DH84_US-Bangla@Kathmandu_MAP1.jpg

Heathrow Harry
12th Mar 2018, 13:23
I hope that isn't correct...............

ATC Watcher
12th Mar 2018, 13:38
I would like to hear the tape instead on relying on the transcript as there are a lot of (...) and (unintelligible) , anyone can post the link ?
From what I know of KTM ( been there quite a few times) , turboprop OPS are all VFR , not sure about international ones however. But a remark by the ATC supervisor ( or coach) seems to indicate they were VFR :
KTH-Tower (different voice): “ BanglaStar211, that would be VFR.“

The METAR indicate only CBs and few, but haze/mist is very common heavily reducing visibility , especially facing sun.

I cleaned up the last part which is important ; I doubt they were all the time VMC , and making a visual approach in partial IMC appears to be problem , as to to disorientation a to which runway they were going to use . or saw in the end.

KTH-Tower: Runway is vacated, either runway 02 or 20 ?“
BS211 : we like to land on 20.“
KTH-Tower: „Okay runway 20, cleared to land.
BS211: „260 copied, cleared to land.“
KTH-Tower: „BanglaStar211, confirm you have the runway in sight?“
BS211: „Negative, Sir.“
KTH-Tower: confirm you have the runway not in sight, yet ?“
BS211: „Affirmative, we have (..) runway in sight. Requesting clear to land, Sir.“
KTH-Tower: BanglaStar211, cleared to land.“
BS211 „Cleared to land runway 02, BanglaStar212.“
KTH-Tower: „Roger, ruway 02, cleared to land, BanglaStar211.“
..
BS211(male voice): „..sir, are we cleared to land ?“
For me , it looks like there might have been another technical or physical issue (Hypoxia?) , not reported to ATC, that could explain such erratic behavior, that you could see from a solo fight in a C152 that lost VMC than from an ATPL of an International airline.

jurassicjockey
12th Mar 2018, 13:40
That transcript is one of the most disturbing things that I've read in a long time. I would expect a higher level of performance from a student before going solo

ironbutt57
12th Mar 2018, 13:47
[QUOTE=Heathrow Harry;10081041]I hope that isn't correct...............[/QUOTE

If that is correct it would appear to be a stall then crash from right about the place they would have been maneuvering when told to enter right downwind for 02, then “hold” then deciding to go to 02, then back to 20

Nemrytter
12th Mar 2018, 13:50
I would like to hear the tape instead on relying on the transcript as there are a lot of (...) and (unintelligible) , anyone can post the link ? As I already mentioned, it's on LiveATC.
You can find it here: https://www.liveatc.net/archive.php
Kathmandu is VNKT and the relevant times are the 0800-0830 and 0830-0900 clips.

ironbutt57
12th Mar 2018, 13:54
[QUOTE=Heathrow Harry;10081041]I hope that isn't correct...............[/QUOTE

If that is correct it would appear to be a stall then crash from right about the place they would have been maneuvering when told to enter right downwind for 02, then “hold” then deciding to go to 02, then back to 20


and thats from the transcript AND live ATC...they seem to match

ATC Watcher
12th Mar 2018, 14:21
Thanks Nemrytter. I will check .
In the meantime the death toll is rising to 49 and the blame game has started .
Kathmandu airport crash: At least 40 dead as US-Bangla plane veers off runway - BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43369179)

Heathrow Harry
12th Mar 2018, 14:30
The plane was carrying 67 passengers and four crew.

It is now known that 33 of the passengers were Nepalis, 32 were Bangladeshi, one was Chinese and one was from the Maldives. Among the 22 people injured, some are in a critical condition.

One of the survivors, Nepalese travel agent Basanta Bohora, described from his hospital bed what he had experienced. After a normal take-off from Dhaka, the plane had begun to behave strangely as it approached Kathmandu, he said.
"All of a sudden the plane shook violently and there was a loud bang afterwards," (http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-03-12/i-am-fortunate-to-be-alive-us-bangla-flight-crash-survivors-account.html) he was quoted as saying by the Kathmandu Post.
"I was seated near the window and was able to break out of the window," he added.
"I have no recollection after I got out of the plane, someone took me to Sinamangal Hospital, and from there my friends brought me to Norvic [Hospital]. I have injuries to my head and legs, but I am fortunate that I survived."

The aircraft was permitted to land from the southern side of the runway flying over Koteshwor, but it landed from the northern side," Sanjiv Gautam, director general of the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal, was quoted as saying by the Kathmandu Post."We are yet to ascertain the reason behind the unusual landing."

However, US-Bangla Airlines chief executive Imran Asif has blamed Kathmandu air traffic control. "There were wrong directions from the tower. Our pilot was not at fault," he told reporters at his office in Dhaka.


Airport general manager Raj Kumar Chettri told Reuters news agency that the plane hit the airport fence before touching the ground. The pilot told flight controllers that everything was OK soon before landing, but did not reply when told his alignment was not correct, he said.

ironbutt57
12th Mar 2018, 14:46
However, US-Bangla Airlines chief executive Imran Asif has blamed Kathmandu air traffic control. "There were wrong directions from the tower. Our pilot was not at fault," he told reporters at his office in Dhaka.

ATC transcripts and recordings seem to contradict that

Ps7even
12th Mar 2018, 14:53
This is what the guys flying/on ground at KTM are saying. Ok so firstly, VNKT has VFR traffic holding inside the valley. They keep the approach and go around path for the cleared approach clear of all traffic. The A/C was cleared for a VOR DME 02, it decided to circle sometime on the approach. Obvious confusion when the crew said they want to circle. That would bring the head on to the traffic behind.

They circled to the right for RW20, there’s some high terrain on left base RW20 and apparently some Wx as well. From the picture posted above, the taxiways from North to South are A, B, C, D, E. When you land RW02 and exit on B, straight ahead is the domestic apron. To put things into perspective, the a/c was over the domestic apron very low and in a steep turn. It touched down near taxiway C almost taking out Malindo who had pushed back from the international apron and came to a stop at the point marked above. The trajectory reported makes sense if you look at the picture. That part about the ATC yelling is probably when they saw it turning over the domestic apron towards the apron/ terminal and tower. Terrible day for all. Speedy recovery to all those fighting for their lives.

Propellerhead
12th Mar 2018, 15:03
I have to say I’m having trouble understanding the transcript without a trace of their flightpath. Flightradar24 unfortunately stops after the hold which is to the South (extended centreline of 02). So why did ATC think they were approaching 20? Solely on the RT transmissions or from their radar (if they have it)? I wonder if they were intending to break off and fly a circle to land on 20 to avoid the tailwind but it’s a big runway and shouldn't be an issue for a turboprop. And the vis is reasonable at 7km. (Edited to say I crossed with the post above which seems to confirm they circled for 20). Why do a complicated circling approach with a 6-7kt tailwind on 02 which is 3000m? You could do that on a 747.

ATC Watcher
12th Mar 2018, 15:15
Listened to the 2 tapes on LiveATC. Slight differences with the transcript, e.g it is not " BanglaStar211, that would be VFR.“ but " BanglaStar211 confirm you are VFR".
and the (unintelligible) after the " request your intentions ": is "I would like to land on runway 02 "
But it does not change the overall picture. However the sound of the voice of the Captain , and the pace of delivery, would coincide with s being incapacitated , possibly Hypoxia as I indicated earlier, or another reason. But it would be easy for pilots of the airline that know him if this was his " normal" voice to clear this possibility.

Propellerhead
12th Mar 2018, 15:21
But a circling approach takes quite a lot of mental capacity to perform. If you were partially incapacitated wouldn’t you just land straight ahead on the runway which is simple (02)?

lomapaseo
12th Mar 2018, 15:23
Heathrow Harry

I hope that isn't correct...............

I'm with you

bcmpqn
12th Mar 2018, 15:52
Is the confusion over runway 02 and its heading of 20 degrees?

readywhenreaching
12th Mar 2018, 15:54
just for a sidenote: both flightcrew and ATC transmissions changed from female to male when things became abnormal.

Propellerhead
12th Mar 2018, 15:58
I think the confusion is initially that they are planning to approach 02 but land on 20. Later I think the pilot may just have mis-spoke under high workload as the brain easily confuses 02 with 20 (unlike 27 and 09 for instance). I think the crew were always planning to circle but didn’t communicate this well to ATC.

Tu.114
12th Mar 2018, 16:01
Seeing that hypoxia was discussed as a possible contributing cause, here´s a few words on the bleed air and pressurisation systems of the DH8D.

For most practical aspects, those systems work as on most other types. Bleed air is routed from the low or high pressure ports of the engines (automatically selected depending on power setting) via two air conditioning packs to the flight deck and cabin. Cabin pressure is then regulated via two outflow valves in the rear bulkhead; there is another outflow valve in the forward bulkhead in front of the flight deck that is only manually adjusted in case the automatic pressure regulator fails. So far, so normal.

Depending on the exact status of the DH8 and the supplements the airline bought from Bombardier, the exact use of the system may vary.

a. Takeoff with bleeds OFF. In this case, bleeds are selected ON at 400´AAL and then the pressurisation is scheduled as normal.

b. Takeoff with bleeds ON. This requires buying a supplement but restricts the performance a bit. The relevant supplement is not compatible with the one allowing reduced takeoff power, so a takeoff with bleeds on will be "Normal Takeoff Power" (NTOP, equals to TOGA on other types) at all times. Performance calculations require assuming an increment of 12°C on the actual OAT in this case.

Also, there is a switch on the pressurisation control panel that has been somewhat unimaginatively named the "AUTO-MAN-DUMP" switch. In Auto mode, pressure control is automatic; in MAN, it is as may be expected manual. Selecting DUMP will open the rear outflow valve and no differential pressure will show up. This switch is sometimes set to DUMP by maintenance; resetting it is part of a proper cockpit preparation. There is no indication showing the position of the switch apart from its position and the effects of the selection made. If during climb no pressurisation takes place, it will be felt in the ears (the DH8D reaches FL250 in ten minutes without any problems) and shown on the cabin pressurisation indications. Only when the cabin altitude reaches 13.500ft, there will be a triple chime, the master warning will flash and a red "CABIN PRESS" warning light will come on. This triggers memory items including donning the oxygen mask. With the switch on DUMP, the cabin will climb at the aircrafts rate; with the switch on MAN/AUTO and the bleeds forgotten in OFF, the climb rate will be substantially less.

Any DH8D pilot worth his salt knows this and has operated the switches many times. So in case the pressurisation looks and/or feels weird, a look at these 3 switches is completely logical for a not completely inexperienced crew and may even happen before any QRH is taken out.

So I dare say I´d be completely surprised if this suspicion was to hold any water.

Propellerhead
12th Mar 2018, 16:06
I don’t hear any sign of incapacitation on the transcript. And the confusion with ATC and which runway they’re landing on seems a bit of a side show. That doesn’t cause an aircraft to do what it did. Although there are signs of overload and probably loss of SA towards the end but suspect it may have been a fairly normal circling approach until the final turn.

wiedehopf
12th Mar 2018, 16:20
from a FR24 tweet "https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/973145006574854144"
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DYFNWU4W4AArpef.jpg:large
altitude profile

airport altitude 4400 ft

edit: remove obnoxious auto twitter insert
and because i can't post a simple link to twitter you will have to copy that link instead of clicking it :)

Daysleeper
12th Mar 2018, 16:32
I don’t hear any sign of incapacitation on the transcript. And the confusion with ATC and which runway they’re landing on seems a bit of a side show. That doesn’t cause an aircraft to do what it did. Although there are signs of overload and probably loss of SA towards the end but suspect it may have been a fairly normal circling approach until the final turn.


Listen to the recordings, it's confusion all the way and I don't think it's ATC that's caused it.

Propellerhead
12th Mar 2018, 16:33
Was the Captain Male or female? It would be unusual for the handling pilot to make RT calls on approach. If so perhaps indicates the co-pilot was out of the loop on what was going on?

India Four Two
12th Mar 2018, 16:49
Here are the two ATC files. Note there is some overlap between the two.

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/vnkt/VNKT-Mar-12-2018-0800Z.mp3

21:50 Communication with Approach

Handoff to Tower is missing

24:20 Contact with Tower

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/vnkt/VNKT-Mar-12-2018-0830Z.mp3

03:20 Last communication

The female pilot sounds very clear, but the male pilot’s voice sounds slurred to me.

Airbubba
12th Mar 2018, 17:03
An early media analysis of the cause of the mishap:

'Pilot error' blamed for deadly Kathmandu plane crash

At least 49 die after US-Bangla Airlines lands in "wrong direction" at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan International Airport.

Raj Kumar Chhetri, general manager at the Tirubhavan International Airport (TIA), told Al Jazeera that the aircraft skidded off the runaway after attempting to land in the "wrong direction against the order of the control room".

"The control room had given permission to land from the southern end. But it landed from the northern side after making few rounds in the sky," he said.

In a press briefing, Imran Asif, CEO of US-Bangla Airlines, said the pilot of the aircraft, Abid Sultan, was injured and was undergoing treatment.

Asif said the airline suspected that the crash was caused by "a miscommunication" between the pilot and the control tower at the airport.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/bangla-plane-crash-lands-kathmandu-airport-casualty-feared-180312090642034.html

As Strother Martin famously said in a movie "What we've got here is failure to communicate".

Flocks
12th Mar 2018, 17:30
Depending on the exact status of the DH8 and the supplements the airline bought from Bombardier, the exact use of the system may vary.

a. Takeoff with bleeds OFF. In this case, bleeds are selected ON at 400´AAL and then the pressurisation is scheduled as normal.

b. Takeoff with bleeds ON. This requires buying a supplement but restricts the performance a bit. The relevant supplement is not compatible with the one allowing reduced takeoff power, so a takeoff with bleeds on will be "Normal Takeoff Power" (NTOP, equals to TOGA on other types) at all times. Performance calculations require assuming an increment of 12°C on the actual OAT in this case

Hi all.

- In my airline, we do reduce power take off with the bleed on, no problems for that.

- And we have the cabin press warning at 9800ft.

Personally I don't believe in any hypoxia from the crew, they did more than 1hr cruise at 24000Ft, if took off with switch in the dump position, problems would have come sooner ... And I read airport is 4400ft ? So no really high ...

They just got confused with what to do, rwy 02, rwy 20, maybe did a circle to land not briefed so bringing more confusion in the cockpit
For example, FO think they will land 02, but captain start to break for the circling because of habit, or tired, ... ATC confused, crew confused, lost of visual conditions ... We know what it can lead to ...

Sadely for all those lives lost ...

ATC Watcher
12th Mar 2018, 17:31
It is a bit more than miscommunications I am afraid . . after all whatever the sense of the runway they was approaching it was free from obstacles and , seen the length of it, they should have made it whether it was 02 or 20. If as reported by witnesses they went over the terminal , then veered left over C in the other direction , and stalled in a steep turn , for me it is definitively more than miscommunications with ATC.

As to the Hypoxia theory, thanks for the technical explanation on the DH8. it is just that the voice and the speech delivery reminds me of this from my days in the military., where we practiced it in the decompression chamber. it could be intoxication due another source..or the guy could well speak "normally" like this .

readywhenreaching
12th Mar 2018, 17:40
Maybe the pilot felt uneasy with the tailwind component on 02. But hard to believe they would go to the opposite runway without giving any indication to ATC in particular after the exchange:
KTM-Tower: "BanglaStar211, wind 220 degrees seven knots, tailwind component six knots, runway 02 you're cleared to land."
BS211(female voice): "Cleared to land, BanglaStar 211.

Raffles S.A.
12th Mar 2018, 18:25
No mention of weather in the conversation, given that there were thunderstorms in the vicinity.

Smott999
12th Mar 2018, 18:48
Still uncertain the direction ultimately at the end?
Did they actually get all the way downwind and come back southward to Rway 20 ?

Or were they still maneuvering northward from the original 20degree track?

Escape Path
12th Mar 2018, 18:51
That's a whole mess right there. Quite the confusion about the runway to land. May I point out that it is the pilot who switches runways back and forth; ATC is trying to help by approving their requests, IMO. Pilot makes/requests at least two runway switches, which ATC approves.

The fact that the pilot voice changes from female to male (early on and it doesn't change back) may be that PF/PM duties were transferred as a means to cope with a high workload situation due to whatever reasons (weather, the ensuing confusion, circling to land, etc). As a mere speculation I think male voice is PIC and female voice is SIC. Could be that PIC was PF and as soon as things start to get murky, SIC is now PF to enable PIC to dedicate his mental capacity to making decisions instead of flying the airplane, which is now SIC's job, under PIC directions. As I said, take it with a grain of salt, it's mere speculation.

Nevertheless, quite astounding the runway switching (out of the blue, since transmissions from other aircraft were quite normal until 211 came along)

txl
12th Mar 2018, 19:11
Nepali Times quotes (https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/us-bangla-airline-crashes-at-tia/) an eyewitness saying aircraft came in from the south, making a steep turn to the left getting dangerously close to the tower:

According to a reliable eye-witness who was present at Sinamangal, just west of the Airport terminal, he saw the Bombardier aircraft coming in from the south, then rather than landing taking an unexpected steep turn to the left. According to the eye-witness, the aircraft came very close to the control tower while it did the turn, then flew over a Buddha Air ATR and a Yeti Airlines Jetstream and went out of sight. "In a couple of seconds I saw a pall of smoke rise from the other side of the runway."

If this is correct, how does the aircraft end up on the soccer field east of the runway? Must have made another 180 deg turn away from terminal/tower buildings.

Does anybody know the usual approach routes to respective runways? As I understand, standard approach is from the south.

wiedehopf
12th Mar 2018, 19:11
No mention of weather in the conversation, given that there were thunderstorms in the vicinity.

that's not quite correct.

the tower asks to confirm VFR

Ps7even
12th Mar 2018, 19:15
@Escape Path

Your speculations are correct. The female voice is the First Officer. Considering Kathmandu is a Cat C airfield and the nature of the situation (circle to land? Yes? No?), I doubt the First Officer was the PF. You would think so considering the fact that the Capt is doing all the radio.

The chatter in Nepalese you hear in the recordings is another pilot on ground letting the tower know his concerns about how the aircraft could possibly be disoriented and that he might need vectors. The tower agreed that he might have lost situational awareness. Quite possible that he lost sight of the a/c from the apron and that would likely mean the dash8 crew lost ground contact as well, not a good situation to be in considering he declared VFR.

Airbubba
12th Mar 2018, 19:37
Was there a go around attempt after a botched landing perhaps? Sounds like they buzzed the tower and nearly hit Thai and a couple of other planes before going over the side to the east. The runway 02, runway 20 confusion continues right up to the mishap in the liveatc.net recordings. :eek:

“The plane flew past just above the air-traffic control tower during its descent for landing. It touched down the ground just next to a parked plane and ploughed through a fence on the east side of the airport, and plunged into the lower ground,” said Chhetri. “Security personnel from Nepal Army and Nepal Police rushed for rescue operation due to timely fire control alert. Had the intensity of fire I saw continued for 10 more minutes, the situation would have been even more dreadful.”

Airport officials said the Bangla plane narrowly escaped from hitting the tail of Thai Airways plane parked at the airport.

Chhetri said when the aircraft approached ‘nine nautical miles’ the airport officials permitted it to land from south (02), but the pilot took the plane towards north (02) for landing [sounds like the writer is confused as well - Airbubba]. “When control tower asked the pilot if there was any problem, the pilot said everything is okay. However, instead of landing from the north side, the plane went towards north-east and made two rounds,” said Chhetri. “Again the tower asked the pilot why he didn’t land the plane and enquired if he was okay. In reply, the pilot said all is fine and he was preparing to land. The alignment of the plane was not properly adjusted for landing. When the air-traffic controller informed about the alignment, there was no response. And then the plane descended from close to airport tower towards the right side (near army hangar),” he added.

US-Bangla plane crashed due to missed approach: TIA - National - The Kathmandu Post (http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-03-12/us-bangala-plane-crashed-due-to-missed-approach-tia.html)

Paranoid
12th Mar 2018, 19:47
Whenever any confusions exist, and sometimes they do, the only course of action is to stop descending, and if necessary high rate climb to MSA.

fox niner
12th Mar 2018, 19:53
What a mess. If it narrowly missed the parked Thai, I would expect some security cam footage within a few days.

donotdespisethesnake
12th Mar 2018, 19:59
If this is correct, how does the aircraft end up on the soccer field east of the runway? Must have made another 180 deg turn away from terminal/tower buildings.


I think it is consistent if the "left" was to the left of the observer.

wiedehopf
12th Mar 2018, 20:28
Was there a go around attempt after a botched landing perhaps?

Probably there was.
Check the altitude record from the FR24 tweet

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DYFNWU4W4AArpef.jpg:large

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DYFNWU4W4AArpef.jpg:small

scifi
12th Mar 2018, 20:40
Looking at the ATC transcript, the phrase 'Cleared to Land' (CTL) was said 13 times, it should have only been said twice; Once by ATC, then one confirmation reply by the aircraft. Also after they had been cleared to land RW 20 a further airplane was cleared to land on RW 02. At no point was their Clearance Cancelled, so in effect they were cleared for both 02 and 20.


I hope they bring in an independent AAIB, as there are some fundamental faults blatantly obvious.
.

Smott999
12th Mar 2018, 21:18
The male pilot seemed most inconsistent, confirming both 02 and 20 in succession. Crazy.

Piltdown Man
12th Mar 2018, 21:21
Let’s remove the phrase “Pilot error” as a possible cause. I think we’ll find this a major cock-up where the fundamental problem is poor standards. Pilot error implies that they know the difference between right and wrong. The ATC transcript appears to show neither ATC nor the crew knew where they were. If I were looking to find fault I’d start looking at the money. If this was a joint US-Bangladesh operation I’d want assurances that the US side had ensured beyond all reasonable doubt that there would not be a smoking hole in the ground. How? The US had literally thousands of well qualified trainers who could advise the US side as to the competence of the pilot workforce of this operation and if not, bring them them up to standard. I do hope this worthwhile step was performed.

PM

jimtun
12th Mar 2018, 21:34
however the accident investigation proceeds , it maybe worthwhile for authorities to recommend that new runways are not aligned 02/20 or 13/31 , to eliminate one small opportunity for confusion in a stressful landing situation .

Doors to Automatic
12th Mar 2018, 21:38
however the accident investigation proceeds , it maybe worthwhile for authorities to recommend that new runways are not aligned 02/20 or 13/31 , to eliminate one small opportunity for confusion in a stressful landing situation .

For someone clever enough to operate and fly a modern commercial airliner it is not too much of an ask to expect them to know whether they are heading North or South, is it??

Airbubba
12th Mar 2018, 21:45
The male pilot seemed most inconsistent, confirming both 02 and 20 in succession. Crazy.

Yep, it sounded like Abbott and Costello doing their 'Baseball' routine (aka 'Who's on First?'). This skit was used as a familiar lesson in miscommunication in CRM courses years ago.

I am prepared to gamble that that is because you have no experience outside of 'First World' aviation.

The things that are said, and done, elsewhere astound everyone, except those who have experienced it.

I agree. Folks, you just can't make this stuff up. But you have to choose your words with care lest you be deemed culturally insensitive to non-Western levels of operational performance.

Smott999
12th Mar 2018, 21:46
Was there ever a radar track of the aircraft that was closer to the airport?
I wonder what Tower was seeing when they declared "you are going towards runway 20".

Herod
12th Mar 2018, 21:52
it maybe worthwhile for authorities to recommend that new runways are not aligned 02/20 or 13/31

Jimtun. You may not be aware, but with changes in variation, the runways would have to be rebuilt every few years.

jimtun
12th Mar 2018, 22:00
Easy guys , thankfully I'm familiar with variation changes over time , and the fact that qualified pilots should know north from south , but funny things can happen the best minds under stress, and anything to ease an approach is welcome Id say . nuff said

gcap
12th Mar 2018, 22:00
With respect, maybe continue lurking...
Your CRM seems to also have been born 50 years ago. WHY are they inept? IS IT physiological, OR incompetence? HOW did they get hired (IF they were inept)? WERE they let down by a training system? If so, WHY?
HOW CAN WE AVOID THE NEXT ONE?

Instead of writing them off, shall we try to understand first? (All of which ignores the fact that we have a considerable lack of facts at this point in time)
By all means speculate, this is a "rumour" forum after all, but at least feign some humility and respect for the unknown...

Well, they confirmed that they were VFR. Runway 02 or runway 20, it doesn't matter. CFIT. nothing more, nothing less.

Smott999
12th Mar 2018, 22:01
Anecdotal but wonder if it has import.... Was working with an Indian team, all w good English, but certain 'sounds' in English they always seemed to struggle with and often 'reverse'. Most common example (we were writing code for Geo-location stuff) was "Ohio" vs "Iowa" ....the 'Ai' vs 'oh' vs 'ah' sound gave several of them loads of difficulty.
One poor chap simply always reversed Iowa and Ohio....even worse when he was nervous or busy.
It just tweaked my memory and made me wonder about 'too-oh' vs 'oh-too' in a language not native to you...

Thanks for indulging a memory!

ATC Watcher
12th Mar 2018, 22:06
Was there ever a radar track of the aircraft
KTM APP has an old radar ( gift of the Japanese after a aerie of accidents some 20 years ago. However the controllers were/still are not trained to use it (due lack resources of the Nepalese CAA) so they use it only for information to locate position of aircraft.
This is one of the reasons all domestic traffic is VFR only , regardless of type used, and you will never receive a vector from them.
We tried to upgrade the situation a few years ago but failed. Nepal is still one of poorest countries on earth, hit by natural disasters and political struggles.
Bangladesh is not much better.
Welcome to the real world.

Gertrude the Wombat
12th Mar 2018, 22:16
however the accident investigation proceeds , it maybe worthwhile for authorities to recommend that new runways are not aligned 02/20 or 13/31
When I trained at Cambridge it had both 02/20 and 13/31, and we learned to avoid confusion.

birmingham
12th Mar 2018, 22:27
Sad event. Clearly "tower can we have vectors for a vfr to runway 20" was needed. Or an offer of same. Hindsight is a wonderful thing

A0283
12th Mar 2018, 22:36
Lots of factual information and data still missing of course - some examples:

A. At minimum sketches of the final flight paths from different witnesses.
B. Part of the communication between the older sounding male pilot exchange with ATC is garbled/missing. You would expect some motivation/explanation of some his actions. Could give some insight in the 02/20 mix up impression.
A x B synchronizing...
C. I wonder whether there were two or three people om the flightdeck. The young sounding female at the start of the tapes. The older sounding muffled sounding male - who in a later tape part sounds clearer by the way. And a clearer younger male voice appearing to make one remark.
D. The Nepalese chatter post... Would be interesting to get a transcript of that... @Ps7 could you provide that?

Pilots dont just fly into KTM. You expect that the airline requires the captain to fly the approach and landing. In that sense the PNF role with comms change appears to be the opposite of what you expect. Or, it could mean that the captain took over both the flying and the comms. Which might have increased confusion. Or, if there was a third person in the cockpit, that this person was monitoring the female pilot, who might or might not have been PF on finals.

ATC was not perfect in their comms (from the livenet tapes). Some minor slip ups and a double negative for example. The female pilot appeared clear and correct. The older male pilot comms are confusing.

Mixing up north and south is not as exceptional as some appear to suggest. It has happened to very professional and experienced people. First impression is that a discussion of cognitive dissonance will end up in the text of the final report.

More questions than answers as usual.

cooperplace
12th Mar 2018, 23:07
Jimtun. You may not be aware, but with changes in variation, the runways would have to be rebuilt every few years.
The GA field I operate from, in Australia, had a 02/20 designated runway and the owner decided there was too much confusion so he just changed its designation to 01/19. Still the same runway. And I have made the mistake, in a high workload situation, of saying 02 when I meant 20.

FIRESYSOK
12th Mar 2018, 23:11
CFIT is not this. ‘Controlled flight into terrain.’ Flying at night, into a mountain, on the wrong VOR radial, would be CFIT.

This is not that. And anyone who suggests this is, must be recognized as an armchair FS operator. Thanks.

Losing control of a plane is not CFIT.

NiclasB
12th Mar 2018, 23:20
The GA field I operate from, in Australia, had a 02/20 designated runway and the owner decided there was too much confusion so he just changed its designation to 01/19. Still the same runway. And I have made the mistake, in a high workload situation, of saying 02 when I meant 20.

I line with cooper's info: To my knowledge, some countries, e.g. Sweden, do not use 02/20 or 13/31 as RWY designators, no matter their magnetic orientation. So it seems to be a policy matter.

evansb
12th Mar 2018, 23:29
Perhaps the American phraseology of "runway two" instead of ICAO format "runway zero two" would have ameliorated this situation.

Mike Flynn
13th Mar 2018, 00:12
The Eva Air event at LAX some years ago springs to mind.

The communication between a busy controller and a confused pilot nearly led to a serious accident.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=tFdXax7Zh_g

portmanteau
13th Mar 2018, 00:20
Please people, the idea that any airline pilot can confuse 02 and 20 runways is just not credible. From that transcript it seems to me that the crew were clear they were headed for 02 but several untimely references to 20, 02 and finally "02 or 20" by ATC left the crew struggling to keep up with a constantly changing runway situation. I think this played a significant part in this accident.

wiedehopf
13th Mar 2018, 00:38
Please people, the idea that any airline pilot can confuse 02 and 20 runways is just not credible. From that transcript it seems to me that the crew were clear they were headed for 02 but several untimely references to 20, 02 and finally "02 or 20" by ATC left the crew struggling to keep up with a constantly changing runway situation. I think this played a significant part in this accident.

listen to the tape yourself and look at the altitude profile.

they made several approaches it seems without ever announcing a go-around to atc or it's not caught on the public recording (covering multiple frequencies)

so ATC was most likely confused by them flying strange patterns around the runway making it unclear where they will land.
maybe they were planning 20 all the time and just almost went into the ground somewhere else what do i know we will see i guess.

krismiler
13th Mar 2018, 00:42
Australia does not allow runway 02/20 due to possible confusion and this is something ICAO should adopt as well. Obviously this was a significant factor in the accident and may have been the primary cause.

A disaster shouldn't be the result of a simple mistake, had the runway been designated 01/19 this may not have happened. There is an obvious hole in the Swiss cheese which needs removing.

BTW I remember having to explain to a first officer one day how wind direction was given in a METAR so not much surprises me anymore.

aterpster
13th Mar 2018, 00:54
Sad event. Clearly "tower can we have vectors for a vfr to runway 20" was needed. Or an offer of same. Hindsight is a wonderful thing
No official radar at VNKT.

aterpster
13th Mar 2018, 00:57
Australia does not allow runway 02/20 due to possible confusion and this is something ICAO should adopt as well. Obviously this was a significant factor in the accident and may have been the primary cause.

A disaster shouldn't be the result of a simple mistake, had the runway been designated 01/19 this may not have happened. There is an obvious hole in the Swiss cheese which needs removing.

BTW I remember having to explain to a first officer one day how wind direction was given in a METAR so not much surprises me anymore.
VNKT works quite well with 20/02 as do many other airports.

Then again, it works best for pilots disciplined, qualified into a somewhat complex airport.

The Turks screwed it up with a new AB330 flying the RNP AR approach.

Toruk Macto
13th Mar 2018, 01:47
Tailwind on steep approach , maybe not being able to land on 02 cams as a bit of a shock to him ( too high ) and the circle to land not briefed ? When it goes wrong it goes wrong very quick ?

RIP and condolences to family and friends .

Sdewan
13th Mar 2018, 02:17
According to an article in the Indian newspaper The Hindu:

Even as the Bombardier is on its way in, Nepali pilots of other aircraft are heard warning the ATC that the Bombardier commander seems confused. Speaking in Nepali, the pilots warn: almaliyo jasto chha (he seems confused); disoriented bhae jasto chha (he seems disoriented); and yo kata jaala (he may end up anywhere).

This explains the Nepalese voices in the ATC recording.

Airbubba
13th Mar 2018, 03:13
I line with cooper's info: To my knowledge, some countries, e.g. Sweden, do not use 02/20 or 13/31 as RWY designators, no matter their magnetic orientation. So it seems to be a policy matter.

Australia does not allow runway 02/20 due to possible confusion and this is something ICAO should adopt as well. Obviously this was a significant factor in the accident and may have been the primary cause.

Wow, I've never heard of that one, I guess it's sorta like the missing thirteenth floor in some Asian hotels. Unless someone tells you about it, you might never notice it.

Anyway, after listening to the ATC tapes, I don't think renumbering the runways would have helped this ill-fated crew sort it out. :sad:

krismiler
13th Mar 2018, 05:58
Accidents can have the most trivial causes, an Eastern Airlines TriStar crashed into the Florida Everglades because of a burnt out light bulb which triggered a chain of events leading to the disaster.

Obviously the bulb blowing didn't cause the crash but what happened as a result of it did.

How many of us have heard a 02/20 clearance read back wrongly when operating into an airport with this runway orientation ? I have heard it regularly.

Mike Flynn
13th Mar 2018, 06:19
In the case of the Eva air incident (on the youtube I posted earlier) ATC continued to tell the pilot to turn on to a southerly heading instead of requesting 180 degrees.

At the same time there appeared to be no appreciation on the flight deck on where they were in relation to the high ground on their track.

The controller told the pilots to turn to a heading of 180, though it didn’t seem to transmit whether it was supposed to be a left or right turn
The pilots repeated that they should turn left heading 180, and they weren’t corrected (it appears they were supposed to turn right to that heading, so if ATC had been paying attention to their read back, this could have been avoided)
The air traffic controller uses a lot of non-standard phrases — rather than telling the plane to turn to a specific heading, the controller says “what are you doing? turn southbound,” so it’s possible there was something lost in translation

http://onemileatatime.img.boardingarea.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/EVA-777.png

This from the LA Times of December 2016.
An air traffic controller in San Diego who mistakenly routed a wide-body jet with 353 people aboard toward Mt. Wilson has been removed from her current assignment amid an investigation into the incident, The Times has learned.
The wrong turn, which has sparked concern in aviation circles, occurred in some of the busiest and most difficult to monitor airspace in the nation. On a typical day, more than 11,000 aircraft take to the skies in Southern California, most of them over the Los Angeles Basin. Los Angeles International alone handles 1,700 to 1,800 departures and arrivals daily.
In the past 30 years, the National Transportation Safety Board has blamed two major crashes in the region on air traffic control problems — the mid-air collision of a private plane and an Aeromexico jet over Cerritos in 1986 and another collision involving a SkyWest commuter plane and a USAir jetliner at LAX.
The controller has been given other duties and is no longer working air traffic after an EVA Air Boeing 777 that departed from Los Angeles International Airport last Friday morning was ordered to turn left to the north, sending the aircraft over the San Gabriel Mountains at low altitude.
The standard procedure for eastern departures from LAX is to make a right turn to the south shortly after takeoff and then head out over the ocean.
The EVA Air incident began about 1:30 a.m., when the controller ordered Flight 15 to turn left shortly after the pilot shifted air traffic control responsibilities from the LAX tower to approach control in San Diego, a common practice.
When the controller realized the EVA flight was turning in the wrong direction, Federal Aviation Administration officials said, she took immediate action to keep the aircraft safely separated from an Air Canada jet that had just departed LAX from the north runway complex.
Those planes remained the required distance from each another, which is 3 miles laterally and 1,000 feet vertically.
FAA officials said the controller then turned her attention to getting the EVA pilot to turn south and repeatedly ordered him to do so until he complied. At one point in the flight, the controller asked the pilot: “EVA 15 what are you doing? Turn southbound now,” according to a recording of radio transmissions.
The Taiwan-bound jetliner appeared to clear the 5,713-foot peak of Mt. Wilson by no more than 800 feet, according to website data cited by The Times. However, broadcast towers rise an additional 400 feet from the summit, potentially reducing the clearance.
FAA regulations require aircraft to be at least three miles away laterally or 2,000 feet vertically above obstacles such as mountains.
“No way they should have ended up where they were,” said Jon Russell, a commercial airline pilot and a regional safety coordinator for the Air Line Pilots Assn. “The pilots followed instructions from air traffic control and it led to other issues with traffic and terrain.”
Thomas Anthony, director of the Aviation Safety and Security Program at USC, said the incident raises several other important questions and issues, such as how close the Boeing 777 got to the mountains, the effort to separate the EVA and Air Canada flights and whether the air traffic controller might have been tired from working late-night shifts.
Ian Gregor, an FAA spokesman in Los Angeles, said the agency’s investigation will look into all aspects of the flight, including air traffic control, the actions of the pilots and the proximity of the EVA jet to Mt. Wilson before correcting its course.
Gregor described the incident as “highly unusual,” but declined to comment further, stating that a personnel matter was involved. A spokesperson for the National Air Traffic Controllers Assn. also declined to comment, citing the FAA investigation.
EVA officials have said the airline is cooperating with the FAA and that their plane was never too close to the mountains or other aircraft, such as the Air Canada flight.

parishiltons
13th Mar 2018, 07:00
Wow, I've never heard of that one, I guess it's sorta like the missing thirteenth floor in some Asian hotels. Unless someone tells you about it, you might never notice it.

Anyway, after listening to the ATC tapes, I don't think renumbering the runways would have helped this ill-fated crew sort it out. :sad:

They are correct. An example is YBBN where one runway has an orientation of 016/196. Logically it should be designated 02/20, but for the reason stated by krismiler it was designated 01/19

ATC Watcher
13th Mar 2018, 07:02
Once again, the 02/20 QFU confusion does not explain this accident. Contributing factor , yes, having caused it, no.
But I read in the Nepalese press that the captain survived, so we should know more pretty soon.

AAKEE
13th Mar 2018, 07:05
Wow, I've never heard of that one, I guess it's sorta like the missing thirteenth floor in some Asian hotels. Unless someone tells you about it, you might never notice it.


The 02/20 and 13/31 RWY ban is valid in Sweden also.
The risk of confusion isn’t in radio transmissions or superstition but 02 looks like 20 when you see it from the other side and vice versa. 13 seen from direction 31 or 31 seen from direction 13 is possible to mix up also. If they where doing some kind of holding over the field they maybe got confused when looking at the marks?

jack11111
13th Mar 2018, 07:29
It is all about manual, low level, low speed maneuvering proficiency. This only comes with practice. Otherwise, you are just afraid of the aircraft.

VH DSJ
13th Mar 2018, 07:30
The GA field I operate from, in Australia, had a 02/20 designated runway and the owner decided there was too much confusion so he just changed its designation to 01/19. Still the same runway. And I have made the mistake, in a high workload situation, of saying 02 when I meant 20.

Or make it simple by referring it to runway two, and runway twenty. That works in some countries!

Patanom
13th Mar 2018, 07:43
May be, there was runway 20 treshold input the database. But they tryed misused RW02. In 2015 A320 was crashed in this airport (landing on left from centerline) .

MD80767 Driver
13th Mar 2018, 07:51
I'm flying to KTM regularly, in a Heavy. In fact, I took off from there a few hours before this accident. I can not, for the life of me, understand why anyone would circle to Rwy 20 unless the tailwind component on 02 is absolutely prohibitive. 7 knots tailwind should never be, for a Q400. I'll prefer 10 knots tailwind for Rwy 02, even in a heavy, any day of the week.

philrami
13th Mar 2018, 08:02
I've been travelling to KTM for 40 years. Never landed on 20 with a heavy. 20 is circle to land and VFR only. On the LiveATC recording, all those cleared to land on 20 are domestic flights, operated by Twin otters or the like. In addition, this airline has been flying to KTM only for a few month, thus had a little experience of the environment.

MD80767 Driver
13th Mar 2018, 08:17
I've been travelling to KTM for 40 years. Never landed on 20 with a heavy. 20 is circle to land and VFR only. On the LiveATC recording, all those cleared to land on 20 are domestic flights, operated by Twin otters or the like. In addition, this airline has been flying to KTM only for a few month, thus had a little experience of the environment.

Agree completely. KTM airport reg's should read like this : Rwy 02 for approved foreign pilots with Sim training. Rwy 20 for approved local pilots, no faster than Twin Otter only :O Slightly exaggerating maybe, but you get my point I hope. I would only accept circling to 20, in Severe Clear

Cloudee
13th Mar 2018, 08:20
Australia does not allow runway 02/20 due to possible confusion and this is something ICAO should adopt as well. Obviously this was a significant factor in the accident and may have been the primary cause.

A disaster shouldn't be the result of a simple mistake, had the runway been designated 01/19 this may not have happened. There is an obvious hole in the Swiss cheese which needs removing.

BTW I remember having to explain to a first officer one day how wind direction was given in a METAR so not much surprises me anymore.
Australia definitely has not totally banned runway 02/20. Can’t find a major airport with one but Waikerie YWKI and Naracoorte YNRC are both registered airports with 02/20 runways.

ironbutt57
13th Mar 2018, 08:40
I've been travelling to KTM for 40 years. Never landed on 20 with a heavy. 20 is circle to land and VFR only. On the LiveATC recording, all those cleared to land on 20 are domestic flights, operated by Twin otters or the like. In addition, this airline has been flying to KTM only for a few month, thus had a little experience of the environment.

we did circling approached to runway 20 in a 767, and Airbus 340 as well...at some point it was stopped, not sure if it was our airline, or the Civil aviation of Nepal...

ironbutt57
13th Mar 2018, 08:42
May be, there was runway 20 treshold input the database. But they tryed misused RW02. In 2015 A320 was crashed in this airport (landing on left from centerline) .

the flight path depicted is a but contrary to the tower saying they overflew the tower quite "close" crossed the airport and crashed on the east side...would seem to indicate they never aligned with 20 at all but somehow crossed overhead mid field

Livesinafield
13th Mar 2018, 08:46
That is the strangest ATC recording i have heard, so much confusion, never heard an aicraft ask so many times if they are cleared to land.

I can't even picture what was happening its so confusing

ZeroFuelMass
13th Mar 2018, 08:50
is it possible somewhere to visualize the path of the a/c ?

sarge75
13th Mar 2018, 10:49
the flight path depicted is a but contrary to the tower saying they overflew the tower quite "close" crossed the airport and crashed on the east side...would seem to indicate they never aligned with 20 at all but somehow crossed overhead mid field

Having dealt with them, don’t believe a word said by anyone who works for Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

ironbutt57
13th Mar 2018, 10:56
Having dealt with them, don’t believe a word said by anyone who works for Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

guess you're an expert then, operated in and out of there many years, never had an issue, ATC was better than some, worse than others...

rcsa
13th Mar 2018, 11:47
If this was a joint US-Bangladesh operation I’d want assurances that the US side had ensured beyond all reasonable doubt that there would not be a smoking hole in the ground. How? The US had literally thousands of well qualified trainers who could advise the US side as to the competence of the pilot workforce of this operation and if not, bring them them up to standard. I do hope this worthwhile step was performed.

PM

The US connection is tangential at best. The airline has no US routes, and although it is technically a US-Bangladesh joint venture, the US office is registered at 'Bangladesh Plaza, Jackson Heights, Queens'. Deduce from that what you will - what I deduce is that all the backers are Bangladeshi nationals - some of whom live in the US; and that the 'US' bit of 'US-Bangla' is to give the impression to gullible potential pax that the airline is a US entity.

In a bitter irony, the company's strap-line is 'Fly Fast, Fly Safe'....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US-Bangla_Airlines

Jetjock330
13th Mar 2018, 12:26
I flew A330 in there for a few years, VOR DME and minus 5,7 degree approach until 3-4 DME and then reduce to minus 3,5 degree and intercept PAPI. This is not the airport to be mucking around in or pulling a circling to land, without even informing the ATC or perhaps not briefing it. You take the tail wind or you go-around and start again from the top at 13500ft.

sarge75
13th Mar 2018, 13:21
guess you're an expert then, operated in and out of there many years, never had an issue, ATC was better than some, worse than others...

Have sat in a tower in Nepal and witnessed them give wind readings 7knots under what their screens told them so they could keep the airport open.

Nemrytter
13th Mar 2018, 13:33
Out of interest, which airport was that? Having spent considerable portions of the last 6 years working alongside CAAN to improve weather situational awareness amongst controllers and pilots this is not something I've ever encountered. Whilst not up to the standard of, say, UK or Australian controllers those working in Nepal are not nearly as bad as the (outdated) stereotypes would suggest.

aterpster
13th Mar 2018, 13:35
I flew A330 in there for a few years, VOR DME and minus 5,7 degree approach until 3-4 DME and then reduce to minus 3,5 degree and intercept PAPI. This is not the airport to be mucking around in or pulling a circling to land, without even informing the ATC or perhaps not briefing it. You take the tail wind or you go-around and start again from the top at 13500ft.

An A330 going into there these days is much better off if qualifications are met. The airplane is certainly capable:

ironbutt57
13th Mar 2018, 13:38
Have sat in a tower in Nepal and witnessed them give wind readings 7knots under what their screens told them so they could keep the airport open.

Amsterdam, Rome, how many airports to name that are guilty of that, keep the noise abatement runways open....so why when you were there didn’t you attempt to bring them up to your exacting Australian standards?

Jetjock330
13th Mar 2018, 13:46
An A330 going into there these days is much better off if qualifications are met. The airplane is certainly capable:

In my day, it was VOR DME and not the new RNAV-AR. No circling for us!

ATC Watcher
13th Mar 2018, 16:15
The RNAV-AR one is not for everybody , there are strict pre-conditions and it appears this Bengladesh DH8 ( or its crew) was not approved. It is still VOR-DME today for some.

aterpster
13th Mar 2018, 17:23
The RNAV-AR one is not for everybody , there are strict pre-conditions and it appears this Bengladesh DH8 ( or its crew) was not approved. It is still VOR-DME today for some.

Absolutely. The bar is set high. But, most modern large transports are equipped by the O.E.M for RNP AR. Then, it falls on the operator whether it wants to jump through all the hoops to gain RNP AR approval.

Ironically, later generation Q400s have an RNP AR option.

The Turkish A330 that went off the runway in fog was flying the RNP AR approach.

ironbutt57
13th Mar 2018, 17:31
seems I have seen DHC-8 aircraft at Dhaka airport with the name United something or other...a regional based there...many moons ago...wonder if it's the same outfit

Escape Path
13th Mar 2018, 18:23
As some have said, the whole 02/20 thing is contributory, at best. From the ATC recording, it's the aircraft who first deviates from what they were cleared (abnormal path, prompting ATC to ask if they are flying to RWY20). The altitude plot is quite surprising; climbing to over 6000ft, not too stable an altitude (apparently not maintaining traffic pattern altitude). Could there be a case of reporting VFR but not actually being that VMC? It's weird a tower ATCO asks if they are in VMC, particularly at a predominantly VFR airport, based on what some have said here. I recall the metar said VCTS, could it be that some clouds were interfering and they just reported VMC when asked so they could land?

Moreover, I'd like to know why the switch in pilot in comms. Did they switch roles? Had the Capt taken over both PF/comm duties? Who was flying the plane?

Cynical Sid
13th Mar 2018, 18:33
seems I have seen DHC-8 aircraft at Dhaka airport with the name United something or other...a regional based there...many moons ago...wonder if it's the same outfit
Not the same airline. United Airlines Bangladesh (no connection).

Tu.114
13th Mar 2018, 18:46
A map showing the flight track overlaid with a weather radar picture might be interesting. I doubt though that a ground-based WX radar is available at KTM, having read that not even an official ATC radar unit is in operation at the field...

arnicopanday
13th Mar 2018, 19:05
Long time lurker on this forum. Finally signed up.
I witnessed the final ~10 seconds of the flight before it crashed. Hope my description helps narrow down the scenarios of what may have happened.

Was driving northwards on Ring Road just west of the fuel depot at Sinamangal when I saw the plane fly very low across the airport buildings, turning from a northwesterly heading to a southwesterly heading. From my viewpoint It flew BEHIND the airport control tower, somewhere around the domestic terminal. (A taxi driver on the domestic parking lot reported that its wing almost touched the roof of the Nepal Airlines Hangar).
I lost sight of it briefly because of a tree, and then saw it flew towards me and across towards my right going very close to the southern corner of the international terminal, heading towards the runway near taxiway D, at a heading of perhaps 150 degrees. By that time the wings were level and the plane was slightly descending, but it appeared to be flying faster than a plane that was trying to land. Its sound was probably picked up on ATC audio while flying southwards on the west side of the tower (over the parking lot) I lost sight again as it disappeared behind higher terrain (The road I was on is lower than the runway), and seconds later saw a big plume of smoke from behind the runway.

Am trying to upload a sketch of what I saw but as a new poster here I don't seem to be able to post a link yet.

When the plane was doing the sharp turn left over the airport buildings my first thought was of the Transasia crash in Taipei.

Today I heard of witnesses talking about the plane buzzing Kapan hill (~4 km north of the runway 20 threshold) a few minutes before the crash, so it sounds like it may have flown north past the airport, did a turn towards 20 near Kapan hill, came back, missed 20, flew on towards the southern end of the airport or beyond, turned north again and appeared over the airport when I saw it (although I cannot tell whether it was aligned with the runway or not when it started its banked turn to the left over the airport buildings). Did it stall while doing the right turn over the airport buildings and was it too low to recover and then just aimed for an empty spot on the runway? At the time of the crash Jet Airways 266 had just pulled into position 1 (passengers disembarking), Thai was in position 2 (getting ready for take off), Malindo was backing out into the taxiway, while near taxiway E I saw one Buddha Air ATR and one smaller turboprop (most likely a Yeti J41) waiting to enter the runway.

Smott999
13th Mar 2018, 20:10
I wondered also about Cap assuming both comm and PF duties. The female FO seemed the only one clear, and presumably on Comm at the start , w him PF.

At one point she said "go ahead sir" and a second later he says "go ahead mam". Perhaps at this point he decides to Comm also?
Plus him confirming both 20 and 02 a couple of times in succession, he did NOT sound on the ball at all.

The CVR will be interesting.

Smott999
13th Mar 2018, 20:25
Did we ever get a diagram of the proper approach to land on 20, while first coming from the south?

Airbubba
13th Mar 2018, 21:26
Initial reports said that the captain survived, however it now appears that all four crewmembers are deceased:

The document confirmed the deaths of pilot Abid Sultan, co-pilot Prithula Rashid and crew members Khwaja Hussain Md Shafey and Sharmeen Akhter Nabila, clearing confusion over the fate of the airline officials.

https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2018/03/13/twenty-six-bangladeshis-including-crew-killed-in-kathmandu-crash-govt-doc-shows

Pictures of the pilots in this article:

US-Bangla plane crash: Pilot Abid, 3 other cabin crew confirmed dead (http://www.thedailystar.net/country/us-bangla-plane-crash-nepal-kathmandu-pilot-abid-sultan-cabin-crew-confirmed-dead-1547530)

clark y
14th Mar 2018, 04:03
Throwing Occam’s razor out there, I wonder if this will be a case of runway confusion followed by heads buried in the box? Does a DHC8-400 have a magenta line?

IF this is the case, it is once again a wake up call to all of us that no matter what happens, flying the aircraft is our ultimate responsibility.

Harry Wayfarers
14th Mar 2018, 04:53
Runways 02 and 20 but at least it seems they identify it as "zero two" rather than just an American "two"

ironbutt57
14th Mar 2018, 06:09
Runways 02 and 20 but at least it seems they identify it as "zero two" rather than just an American "two"

the "American 2" may and I emphasize MAY have caused less confusion, if indeed the crew had confused the runway directions

1at
14th Mar 2018, 06:23
I refer to the transcript and the tape.

BS211 reported to be " .. on final RWY 02 .."
TOWER consequently responded ".. continue approach ..".
TOWER: "BS211 ... RWY 02 cleared to land"
BS211 confirmed ".. cleared to land.." assuming RWY 02

If the crew intended to execute a circle to land procedure the phraseology should have been different for the initial call including "circle to land". The tower should responded consequently "BS211 continue VOR DME approach RWY 02 circle to land RWY 20" but not including a landing clearance.

Flocks
14th Mar 2018, 06:46
Throwing Occam’s razor out there, I wonder if this will be a case of runway confusion followed by heads buried in the box? Does a DHC8-400 have a magenta line?

IF this is the case, it is once again a wake up call to all of us that no matter what happens, flying the aircraft is our ultimate responsibility.

As dash 8 q400 driver, I think the same. On the paper the FMS of the dash is "quit" powerfull (Universal 1K). Nice colour, can do RNAV overlay vor or ndb approach with vertical profile, ... But the ergonomic of the system come from 40years ago (same page and logic as first universal 1 FMS).
Not always easy to set up, even more in a rush or if not really confident with how to do it, I won't be surprised if on the CVR, pilots tried to save all with the FMS ...

I don't know how was equipped with the plane, but I saw it was delivered to SAS in 2001, so probably the plane was equipped with only 1 FMS on cpt side, so if FO do set up, you need to go through the power levers and condition levers to the cpt side to do the FMS, really good to do "monitoring in the same time". If now the plane is equipped with 2 FMS ... Depending of the software version, the don t speak together (only last software allows them to share info), meaning does not change anything, the PM need to do the set up in the PF FMS then do what he did in his FMS ... And if now you think, the PM could do all in his FMS then the 2 pilot would have the source set to the PM FMS, so both pilots would see the same on their PFD and MFD ... Nop !!! You can only change the source of the PFD, on the MFD, cpt side will be always showing FMS1 and FO side FMS 2 ... I don't know how the engineers of bombardier managed to come with that but ...

Heathrow Harry
14th Mar 2018, 08:29
Long time lurker on this forum. Finally signed up.
I witnessed the final ~10 seconds of the flight before it crashed. Hope my description helps narrow down the scenarios of what may have happened.

Was driving northwards on Ring Road just west of the fuel depot at Sinamangal when I saw the plane fly very low across the airport buildings, turning from a northwesterly heading to a southwesterly heading. From my viewpoint It flew BEHIND the airport control tower, somewhere around the domestic terminal. (A taxi driver on the domestic parking lot reported that its wing almost touched the roof of the Nepal Airlines Hangar).
I lost sight of it briefly because of a tree, and then saw it flew towards me and across towards my right going very close to the southern corner of the international terminal, heading towards the runway near taxiway D, at a heading of perhaps 150 degrees. By that time the wings were level and the plane was slightly descending, but it appeared to be flying faster than a plane that was trying to land. Its sound was probably picked up on ATC audio while flying southwards on the west side of the tower (over the parking lot) I lost sight again as it disappeared behind higher terrain (The road I was on is lower than the runway), and seconds later saw a big plume of smoke from behind the runway.

Am trying to upload a sketch of what I saw but as a new poster here I don't seem to be able to post a link yet.

When the plane was doing the sharp turn left over the airport buildings my first thought was of the Transasia crash in Taipei.

Today I heard of witnesses talking about the plane buzzing Kapan hill (~4 km north of the runway 20 threshold) a few minutes before the crash, so it sounds like it may have flown north past the airport, did a turn towards 20 near Kapan hill, came back, missed 20, flew on towards the southern end of the airport or beyond, turned north again and appeared over the airport when I saw it (although I cannot tell whether it was aligned with the runway or not when it started its banked turn to the left over the airport buildings). Did it stall while doing the right turn over the airport buildings and was it too low to recover and then just aimed for an empty spot on the runway? At the time of the crash Jet Airways 266 had just pulled into position 1 (passengers disembarking), Thai was in position 2 (getting ready for take off), Malindo was backing out into the taxiway, while near taxiway E I saw one Buddha Air ATR and one smaller turboprop (most likely a Yeti J41) waiting to enter the runway.


well that certainly would account for the confusion........... all over the shop it seems

Heathrow Harry
14th Mar 2018, 08:31
Ladies & Gents just so you are aware this morning's "Times" report on the crash seems to be a complete cut 'n paste job off this forum

rcsa
14th Mar 2018, 08:42
Long time lurker on this forum. Finally signed up....
... Am trying to upload a sketch of what I saw but as a new poster here I don't seem to be able to post a link yet.



Thanks for this Arnicopanday. That's a very comprehensive account of what looks like a totally shambolic situation. I hope you can find a way of uploading the sketch you made.

Airbubba
14th Mar 2018, 15:26
Ladies & Gents just so you are aware this morning's "Times" report on the crash seems to be a complete cut 'n paste job off this forum

Any chance you could post a link or quote a section of the article?

Smott999
14th Mar 2018, 15:32
Thanks for the terrific account Arnicopanday.
I now wonder if what seemed like confusion on part of the Cap between 02 and 20, was in fact him flying from one end of the lot to the other, picking runways as he went. Incredible if so.

cbradio
14th Mar 2018, 15:48
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBgcC3OlqfQ

some video has turned up.
from Aviation Safety Net -
"Video shows US-Bangla Airlines flight #BS211 during go around after attempting to land on runway 02 at Kathmandu Airport. The accident happened a few minutes later: "

RAT 5
14th Mar 2018, 16:16
From 1at:

BS211 reported to be " .. on final RWY 02 .."
TOWER consequently responded ".. continue approach ..".
TOWER: "BS211 ... RWY 02 cleared to land"
BS211 confirmed ".. cleared to land.." assuming RWY 02


Lots of speculation, but this seems very clear and simple. The runway is long enough for a -8 to land, takeoff and land again. We hear the captain has survived so we wait to hear why they didn't KISS.

gearlever
14th Mar 2018, 16:20
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBgcC3OlqfQ

some video has turned up.
from Aviation Safety Net -
"Video shows US-Bangla Airlines flight #BS211 during go around after attempting to land on runway 02 at Kathmandu Airport. The accident happened a few minutes later: "

Is it 02 or 20?

Sorry, more than 20 years I've been there:bored:

Doors to Automatic
14th Mar 2018, 16:28
Arnicopanday - welcome to the forum and thank you for your (dramatic) first post. If you find a way to post the sketch that would be brilliant.

arnicopanday
14th Mar 2018, 16:46
The caption in the video above says it was taken in Gagalphedi, approx 7 km NE of the Runway 20 threshold at the base of high mountains. Amazing that they got that low so far from the runway.

It looks like they flew north past the airport, right up to the northern end of the Kathmandu Valley and turned around at the last moment before impacting with terrain there, then missed 20 while heading back south (shortly after this video clip).

Airbubba
14th Mar 2018, 17:02
We hear the captain has survived so we wait to hear why they didn't KISS.

Apparently the captain is now deceased:

US-Bangla plane crash: Pilot Abid, 3 other cabin crew confirmed dead (http://www.thedailystar.net/country/us-bangla-plane-crash-nepal-kathmandu-pilot-abid-sultan-cabin-crew-confirmed-dead-1547530)

Yo_You_Not_You_you
14th Mar 2018, 17:24
That account from arnicopanday plus the new video puts the plane's path quiet clear now . The place of video is Gagalphedi , it is due N-NE of the airport and 7-8 kms far. search it on google or bing , my new account ! no link

It went north , almost touching the hills : "Yeti airlines panicking on the recordings in Nepali about the hills visibility, providing radar vector to correct its path" was about this ..
Turned back as in the video
Overshoot runway 20's approach , flew South,circling , why ?
My guess :since they didn't take 20 or delayed it because Buddha air253 (was it?) landed on 02, then clear it afterwards.
ATC open both 20 and 02 . as by this time they were in middle , somewhere in the west, capable of approaching both.
From arnico's account it came in hot trying to land on 20 , like someone new on a plane simulator would do! Turning!

when I saw the plane fly very low across the airport buildings, turning from a northwesterly heading to a southwesterly heading. From my viewpoint It flew BEHIND the airport control tower, somewhere around the domestic terminal. (A taxi driver on the domestic parking lot reported that its wing almost touched the roof of the Nepal Airlines Hangar).
I drew a sketch here based on the points from arnico : sitename: imgur address : /8WzvUeI I might be wrong.
I request him do this on maps , post it here

Another wild guess, The domesticTerminal parking bay ? , up North angled to 20, looks alot like a Runway . something like Runway 15(!), if it were to exist? \\ . Look at the maps , It is Narrow , elongated , a path extends straight to a hangar across the main runway . Did they made an approach towards this ? unknowingly?

donotdespisethesnake
14th Mar 2018, 17:36
One item that I haven't seen mentioned here

https://scroll.in/latest/871866/nepal-plane-crash-airport-and-airline-authorities-blame-each-other-investigation-underway
Defending the pilots, the airlines [US-Bangla Airlines chief executive Imran Asif] said Captain Abid Sultan, who survived the crash, had more than 5,000 hours of flying experience and was specially trained to land at the airport. Sultan is a former Bangladesh Air Force pilot and was also a flying instructor with the airline, AP reported.

If I was to speculate, I might suspect CRM/gradient issues.

captain1013
14th Mar 2018, 17:47
"Video shows US-Bangla Airlines flight #BS211 during go around after attempting to land on runway 02 at Kathmandu Airport. The accident happened a few minutes later: "
They tried to switch from a initial go around runway 02 into a circling approch runway 20?

Heathrow Harry
14th Mar 2018, 18:18
Any chance you could post a link or quote a section of the article?

Paywalled.. and I'm on the road but they regularly pick up stories from this site...

Heathrow Harry
14th Mar 2018, 18:23
From 1at:

BS211 reported to be " .. on final RWY 02 .."
TOWER consequently responded ".. continue approach ..".
TOWER: "BS211 ... RWY 02 cleared to land"
BS211 confirmed ".. cleared to land.." assuming RWY 02


Lots of speculation, but this seems very clear and simple. The runway is long enough for a -8 to land, takeoff and land again. We hear the captain has survived so we wait to hear why they didn't KISS.

Order, counter order, disorder

I suspect this one will go into the text books. After a few minutes not only were they lost spatially but it sounds as if they'd lost touch with what they wanted to do.... horrible

Smott999
14th Mar 2018, 18:44
Re CRM gradient is there cultural component as well, I.e. Go Around w female FO may cause losing face?
I still wonder if Cap attempted to take over both Comms and PF duty.

evansb
14th Mar 2018, 18:48
At this point, does anyone other than the bereft, insurers and lawyers sincerely care about this crash? Abbott and Costello crash a transport category aircraft in VMC with Curly and Moe in the tower. (Curly and Moe were two members of the comedy trio known as the "Three Stooges". Abbott & Costello were a comedy duo).

arnicopanday
14th Mar 2018, 23:35
There's the sketch of what I think I saw (~last 10 minutes of flight)

It is on imgur: /a/Parhr

India Four Two
15th Mar 2018, 04:40
https://www.imgur.com/a/Parhr

iflytb20
15th Mar 2018, 05:07
I flew there yesterday. Spoke to our AME who witnessed the final moments of the flight. The flight path he described is slightly to the north of the one sketched by arnicopanday. He was at stand 1 looking towards the tower when the aircraft appeared in a left bank. It narrowly avoided the control tower and a lamp post at the edge of the apron. He claims he saw the aircraft pitch up to avoid the tail of the Thai 777 before hitting the ground in a left bank just beyond taxiway C. He was not sure if it touched down on the runway or the ground just after the runway. As per him it was the lady FO’s first flight to KTM.

^^
The above is a second hand information so I can’t vouch for the accuracy but it seems to correlate with what the other eyewitnesses saw.

ironbutt57
15th Mar 2018, 06:29
read the updated at The Aviation Herald, the last paragraph above the comments sheds some light..

DaveReidUK
15th Mar 2018, 07:44
Paywalled.. and I'm on the road but they regularly pick up stories from this site...

Could well be the case here:

Kathmandu crash pilots confused runway codes

Charles Bremner

March 14 2018, 12:01am
The Times

There was confusion among disoriented pilots and stressed air traffic controllers in the moments before the crash of a Bangladeshi aircraft in Nepal on Monday with the loss of 49 lives.

Kathmandu airport and US-Bangla Airways blamed each other for the events that caused the Bombardier Dash 8 turboprop aircraft to plunge into a field just off the mountain-ringed single runway on the edge of the Nepalese capital. The four crew died but 22 passengers survived by escaping the burning wreckage.

Recordings of six minutes of radio conversations between the pilots and the control tower showed deep confusion over which direction the airliner was to land in as it approached and began circling on a flight from Dhaka. Captain Abid Sultan and Prithula Rashid, the first officer, were cleared to land from the south on runway 02 but controllers told them “you are going towards runway 20”, approaching the strip from the opposite end.

“Do not turn towards runway 20, turn right,” the controller said. The pilots were nevertheless cleared to land on 20, then seemed to be heading back for 02. The controllers, who were dealing with several other aircraft, displayed confusion over the instructions they were giving. When the airliner appeared low over the airport unaligned with any runway, a controller barked: “I say again, turn!”

On the same frequency a voice in Nepali said: “They appear to be extremely disoriented. Looks like they are really confused.” It was not clear whether the speaker was a pilot or a controller.

The Canadian-made jet came down just after flying over the control tower in a turn as the pilots apparently manoeuvred to start a new approach. Passengers reported a sharp turn just before the crash.

“I had asked the air hostess, what is happening, is everything fine?’ She gave a thumbs up, but I could see she was panicking,” said Ashish Ranjit, 35, who escaped through a window on the aircraft’s right. “It was so low and it took such sharp turns.”

Imran Asif, chief executive of the airline, said: “We suspect wrong signals from Kathmandu air traffic control room might have led to the crash.”

Captain Sultan was a highly experienced pilot who had landed more than 100 times at Kathmandu, it said.

Raj Kumar Chetri, general manager of the airport, said: “The tower repeatedly asked if the pilot was OK and the reply was ‘Yes’.”

777fly
15th Mar 2018, 08:29
This accident simply confirms that the most dangerous manoeuvre in civil aviation these days is a circling approach. It has to be planned and carefully pre briefed, with a clear understanding of what the escape plan is when it all goes wrong.

Livesinafield
15th Mar 2018, 08:59
Maybe someone can shed some light for me, i am still confused as to what runway they where supposed to be landing on, seems they flew the approach on 02, and appears to be to a circle to land on 20? but ATC transcript stresses they are not to land on 20 because of a conflict?

Looking at the sketch there appears to be an older disused runway and from the sketched drawing appears they maybe mistook that?

Landflap
15th Mar 2018, 11:02
777fly- circling approaches were banned from most major's SOPs donkeys years ago. Very dangerous. Big difference to letting down with an aid to visual minima. The intention then to break out for a left or right downwind to the runway in use. Good fun in the little stuff but care needed in the big stuff. Wouldn't do it in anything at KTM.

piratepete
15th Mar 2018, 11:10
I dont agree with the last post entirely.Some time ago when my job was to route and airport check Captains into VNKT, one of the required checks was a VOR approach to 02 but followed with a circling approach to 20.This was practiced first in the SIM.The actual circle, WX permitting followed.No one failed to my knowledge, but I would not call it an easy exercise.Very good planning and handling was required.This was in a very large jet.

KAPAC
15th Mar 2018, 13:26
It was F/O’s first flight into KTM ? Was this a training flight ?

portmanteau
15th Mar 2018, 13:33
ATC says " you are going to 20" probably because they saw aircraft visually going right downwind for 20 having been too high for landing on 02. Now there's a potential problem because the next aircraft is already on finals for 02. For the uninitiated it is not normal to have aircraft landing from opposite directions at the same time on the same strip of concrete, so 211 has to keep out of the way until the runway is clear again.

One clue to this accident is likely to be that 211 had cancelled IFR and therefore the responsibility for avoiding other aircraft was his and not ATC.

ironbutt57
15th Mar 2018, 14:18
777fly- circling approaches were banned from most major's SOPs donkeys years ago. Very dangerous. Big difference to letting down with an aid to visual minima. The intention then to break out for a left or right downwind to the runway in use. Good fun in the little stuff but care needed in the big stuff. Wouldn't do it in anything at KTM.

normal practice was to descend to a visual traffic pattern altitude then fly a proper downwind, base and final...it was done in both the 767, and the A-340..circling right down at circling minimums is another matter entirely

aterpster
15th Mar 2018, 14:22
I dont agree with the last post entirely.Some time ago when my job was to route and airport check Captains into VNKT, one of the required checks was a VOR approach to 02 but followed with a circling approach to 20.This was practiced first in the SIM.The actual circle, WX permitting followed.No one failed to my knowledge, but I would not call it an easy exercise.Very good planning and handling was required.This was in a very large jet.

The plane, which was flying from the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, was a Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 turboprop and was 17 years old.

Not exactly a very large jet.

RAT 5
15th Mar 2018, 14:54
ATC says " you are going to 20" probably because they saw aircraft visually going right downwind for 20 having been too high for landing on 02

And then the question arises is how they came to be too high to land a turbo prop on a mega long runway. I'm not familiar with the approach flown: I heard it was a VOR/DME. Why would that be so difficult to be Soooo high at visual time?

Gauges and Dials
15th Mar 2018, 14:58
. As per him it was the lady FO’s first flight to KTM.

^^
The above is a second hand information so I can’t vouch for the accuracy but it seems to correlate with what the other eyewitnesses saw.

Certain parts of the world, they seem to make a point of always stressing the pilot's gender after an incident if a woman was in the cockpit. Times of India seems particularly consistent on this point.

ATC Watcher
15th Mar 2018, 16:01
I'm not familiar with the approach flown: I heard it was a VOR/DME.
Just a reminder ; there is no published VOR-DME approach for runway 20 , only for 02 .
20 is only VFR/Visual APP .
The Nepalese AIP is online if you want to check the various published approaches : Civil Aviation Authority Of Nepal (http://e-aip.caanepal.org.np/welcome/listall/1)

ironbutt57
15th Mar 2018, 16:12
watching the very tiny video of him climbing suddenly while turning toward the south east makes me wonder if he may have fallen to somotographic illusion to some degree, hence the descent as he crossed the runway and subsequent crash

aterpster
15th Mar 2018, 16:14
Just a reminder ; there is no published VOR-DME approach for runway 20 , only for 02 .
20 is only VFR/Visual APP .
Runway 20 is authorized for daytime circle to land:

ATC Watcher
15th Mar 2018, 16:29
Runway 20 is authorized for daytime circle to land:
Yes, of course and all local domestic carriers are using 20 but but my point was that there is no published VOR-DME Approach for runway 20.

aterpster
15th Mar 2018, 16:32
Yes, of course and all local domestic carriers are using 20 but but my point was that there is no published VOR-DME Approach for runway 20.

Indeed you did. But, you also stated, "20 is only VFR/Visual APP." That implied to me there were no IAP CTL minima for Runway 20.

Daysleeper
15th Mar 2018, 17:03
One clue to this accident is likely to be that 211 had cancelled IFR and therefore the responsibility for avoiding other aircraft was his and not ATC.

Despite being asked towards the end confirm you're VFR, I doubt you can take the utterly confused exchanges on the radio to be a genuine considered cancelling of IFR.

ATC Watcher
15th Mar 2018, 17:06
aterpsterThat implied to me there were no IAP CTL minima for Runway 20
You are right, there is in daytime. A 777 did one landing in 20 last year, caused a lot of rumbles and even made news headlines as locals were not used to see such a big one a few feet above their houses :)

Smott999
15th Mar 2018, 20:15
Have they found FDR/CVR?

gearlever
16th Mar 2018, 00:29
Have they found FDR/CVR?

On Mar 14th 2018 Nepal's CAA reported that the black boxes have been recovered, an accident investigation commission consisting of six people has been formed. Bangladesh as well as the aircraft manufacturer are participating in the investigation led by Nepal's CAAAccident: US-Bangla DH8D at Kathmandu on Mar 12th 2018, landed across the runway and fell down slope (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b5fa1cb&opt=0)

Escape Path
16th Mar 2018, 03:42
"Confirm you are VFR" may mean VMC. Not cancelling IFR as such. By the way, from the video it seems it's a bit hazy which could add to the confusion/stress situation. I think someone forgot to fly the plane... And I still would like to know who was flying and why the apparent switch in duties at that time in the approach.

I used to fly the DH8B (the -8-200) and it does have "a magenta line". However it's interface would make it incredibly complex (and quite a stupid decision I think) to try and do something with it at this stage of flight. Plus there wouldn't be too many benefits from doing something as the other side it's only a circle to land.

I'm very curious to the CRM factor on this one

KAPAC
16th Mar 2018, 05:17
Allegedly it was F/O’s first flight into KTM , was it a training flight . Young ( female , relevant in some cultures ) F/O and ex military captain . She may have have not been doing a lot in those last few minutes ?

Sqwak7700
16th Mar 2018, 06:28
I would like to see a toxicology report on the Captain. Such erratic flying and radio phraseology is pretty suspicious.

Toruk Macto
16th Mar 2018, 06:33
Senior ex military captain , junior F/O ( female , culturally relevant ) first flight , allegedly, into KTM ( was it a training flight ) ? CRM ? She may have just been a passenger in the end ? Wait and see ?

Smott999
16th Mar 2018, 10:14
Yes CVR will be interesting. It does seem he took over comms. Does this mean he relegated FO to neither flying nor comms and tried to do both himself?

Also what would seemingly put him to the right of the approach path? Seeing that old runway and mistaking it for the main?

ZFT
16th Mar 2018, 10:19
Yes CVR will be interesting. It does seem he took over comms. Does this mean he relegated FO to neither flying nor comms and tried to do both himself?

Also what would seemingly put him to the right of the approach path? Seeing that old runway and mistaking it for the main?

It's a Cat C airport so why would she be PF?

portmanteau
16th Mar 2018, 11:09
Using the correct phrases is paramount in ATC and dare I say it on the flight deck as well.
VFR refers to the rules of flight and VMC refers to the the weather conditions. There is no chance that one "may mean" the other. That's a red herring you are introducing.

10 DME ARC
16th Mar 2018, 11:55
How often have you seen a older senior male 'showing' off to a young pretty junior....look how good I am..... and then ending in a nightmare!! Seen it in the cockpit and in ATC!!

jackcarls0n
16th Mar 2018, 14:36
Allegedly it was F/O’s first flight into KTM , was it a training flight . Young ( female , relevant in some cultures ) F/O and ex military captain . She may have have not been doing a lot in those last few minutes ?

Pilots- male or female at one point or other have to fly to a new airport. Training flights have additional risk, that is why there is an IP in the cockpit.

Things turned bad pretty fast. One single thing cannot be blamed and is never a root cause of a crash. Loss of situational awareness, communication breakdown, engine failure, MELs& MX, weather, traffic, psychological and physical state of pilots can all play a role. Everything needs to be scrtunized.
I have flown in and out of VNKT as a local pilot many times and now fly all over the world. The controllers are not any different than in other Asian countries. Lack of resources and information inhibits their abilities.
Pilots don't have the luxury of ILS or precise radar vectors. It is a VOR DME approach with lot of pressure. The terrain can be intimidating if you see it visually from a cockpit.
Various questions needs to be answered- automation, what was being used and what was MEL? Was it hand flown all the way? Was the traffic a problem? Hearing the ATC recording the pilot seems quite calm but the ATC is being frantic about the Dash8 flying towards wrong runway.
02 and 20 is easy to confuse but you have an (MFD) ND that clearly shows the runway that is active for the approach.
ATC and pilots are both responsible for a safe landing.

I hope they find a root cause and can improve things and avoid similar accidents. Bangladesh and Nepal are two very corrupt countries and the report can change and have a common conclusion. Has happened before!

Smott999
16th Mar 2018, 16:30
I guess I wasn't sure the Cap sounded calm, vs more groggy/unclear IMO.
It seemed as if he took over Comms so one wonders if he was still PF also.

Perhaps he just drifted offline w the westerly wind, wound up right of the centerline and figured he could save it by going downwind and coming back on 20.

CVR will hold a lot of details.

Smott999
16th Mar 2018, 16:39
Possible flight path
https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/20-by-02/

ATC Watcher
16th Mar 2018, 17:10
if the drawing is correct it turned downwind for 20 , not overflying 02 , so the TWR question if he was VFR (as opposed to VMC) appears to be correct.

Airbubba
16th Mar 2018, 17:30
Possible flight path
https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/20-by-02/

Wow, they weren't kidding when they called it a circle to land. :eek:

An interesting detail from the story linked above:

Apparently, this was Capt Sultan’s fifth flight of the day, and he had just sent in his resignation to the US-Bangla management in order to join a Gulf airline.

VFR refers to the rules of flight and VMC refers to the the weather conditions. There is no chance that one "may mean" the other. That's a red herring you are introducing.

I disagree. I've certainly heard VFR used to mean in visual conditions on more than one occasion. From context I think VFR was probably used by the tower controller to mean visual conditions in this case.

Smott999
16th Mar 2018, 17:51
The article makes it sound like that airport is known for stacking the arriving aircraft.

Perhaps another reason Cap did not want to GA and get back in line?...

Heathrow Harry
16th Mar 2018, 17:59
That link said it was his 5th flight of the day and he was working his notice as he'd quit......

Airbubba
16th Mar 2018, 19:16
That link said it was his 5th flight of the day and he was working his notice as he'd quit......

Probably coincidental but the captain on the Flydubai 981 crash two years ago was in a similar status.

jackcarls0n
17th Mar 2018, 01:37
Wow, they weren't kidding when they called it a circle to land. :eek:

An interesting detail from the story linked above:





I disagree. I've certainly heard VFR used to mean in visual conditions on more than one occasion. From context I think VFR was probably used by the tower controller to mean visual conditions in this case.

The path looks quite different than it should be if you are cleared from Guras to continue the approach. In this case the approach would be VOR DME 02! But the flight path might be exaggerated. Most probably trying to do a 360 at low altitude combined with fatigue due to 5th flight(that is some long hours for the day resulting in fatigue); this might have resulted in loss of SA, confusion and a stall! Combined effect!

VFR in this context certainly means VMC conditions in this case.

ironbutt57
17th Mar 2018, 05:46
The article makes it sound like that airport is known for stacking the arriving aircraft.

Perhaps another reason Cap did not want to GA and get back in line?...


it's a long way around to GURAS to start the VOR 02 approach, fuel perhaps?

I've seen "stacking" over GURAS prior to commencing the approach, but never in the immediate vicinity of the airport on a regular basis for IFR arrivals,

16024
17th Mar 2018, 12:32
ZFT wrote:

It's a Cat C airport so why would she be PF?

It's a company SOP thing. There's no blanket prohibition on this.

Smott999
17th Mar 2018, 13:26
I understand the first orbit, then as he comes out of it moving west, he is perhaps high and overshoots 20. But after that it is all descending left turn - seemingly over airport structures....Left seat should be well aware where he's ending up. Very strange.

aterpster
17th Mar 2018, 13:42
The article makes it sound like that airport is known for stacking the arriving aircraft.



Non-radar and terrain. Lots of arrival holding patterns.

RAT 5
17th Mar 2018, 15:27
I'm waiting for the FDR to discover why the straight in approach went wrong. One has to assume that they briefed the NPA thoroughly and put themselves in a position to commence it without confusion or rushing. Surely?

Livesinafield
17th Mar 2018, 16:47
I wouldn't really look too much into the positions as recorded on that sketch from witnesses and other accounts, these can be wildly inaccurate, although they give a good idea to what was happening and a rough idea of their positions they cannot be relied on for asking "why was the approach offset and right of track" etc

The Q4 flies very good FMS Overlays and would have some serious errors for it to be that far right of track

Agree with some other posters... i cannot comprehend how a Pilot who is a trainer with 5000, odd hours gets themselves into that mess and piles it in... not even into a mountain but into flat terrain... something very odd has happened here, terrible tragedy but could be a fascinating investigation

I'm waiting for the FDR to discover why the straight in approach went wrong. One has to assume that they briefed the NPA thoroughly and put themselves in a position to commence it without confusion or rushing. Surely?

Wouldn't be the first time a crew has rushed a NPA and made a dogs dinner of it...admittedly its usually to do with the vertical profile but still anything is possible

VGCM66
17th Mar 2018, 17:58
https://www.thinglink.com/scene/1031074446930083843?buttonSource=viewLimits

If that is not a tired brain trying to pilot an airplane I do not what sleep is. :ugh:

RIP.

Cheers,

Smott999
17th Mar 2018, 19:42
Livesinafield :"The Q4 flies very good FMS Overlays and would have some serious errors for it to be that far right of track "

Up thread was a good description of the varying FMS configs in Q4....possible the Captain's side had inadvertently input 20 and missed in the brief?

camel
18th Mar 2018, 06:03
Listening to the radio recordings ...in the first one the female controller says' confirm you are holding' this is a long way out ...the female co pilot replies no..

Wondering if they originally miscalculated the decent and were doing a quick orbit or two to loose height without informing ATC first? Then continuing on trying to get down on the correct profile.

Yo_You_Not_You_you
18th Mar 2018, 13:15
dhakatribune /bangladesh/2018/03/16/us-bangla-crash-inevitable/

The US-Bangla Airlines plane crash at Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu, Nepal, which claimed at least 50 lives, was inevitable, according to a professional pilot. The claim may sound outrageous, but the pilot, whose identity will not be revealed considering his job safety, told his colleague, another professional pilot, that this tragic accident was “just waiting to happen.”

Both the pilots work in the private sector.

The letter, a copy of which was obtained by the Dhaka Tribune, is printed verbatim below:

I’m so depressed and disturbed. This accident was just waiting to happen.

The safety culture or, truly speaking, the lack of it in private sector is simply outrageous!I know the pilots are forced to operate by their management in situations where it’s prudent not to fly. Routinely, schedule regularity and commercial considerations take precedence over flight safety.I’ve heard many harrowing stories from our First Officers who were in private sector before. Even if there are some exaggerations, if I consider only 25% of what they say is true, it is alarming!You are one of the senior most pilots and a pioneer. Please stand up. Once you told me that you haven’t learnt to say no. Please remember, brother, a Captain must know when to put his foot down and say “no” to the face of the management. We routinely observe private carriers shooting approaches well below minimum visibility, departing for a destination with very marginal weather or visibility, compromising on technical issues, flying without weather radar, forbidding pilots to give entry in the engineering log, especially at outstations as grounding would cost money! Money is more important than safety!!! OMG!It’s human lives that are at stake! This is what we pilots deal with every single day. It’s a sacred duty, not the glamorous job that the media portrays!I’ve often seen Biman or other foreign carriers holding for visibility to improve in winter, when US-Bangla or Regent not only commence approach, but landing!! I’ve heard private airlines pilots asking for “pilot’s discretion” start up when visibility in Saidpur or Jessore or Cox’s Bazar is 1,000 or 1,200 metres without improving trend!!! Non-precision approach airports!!!Brother, please, all pilots should realize the implications of our actions. If all are together, the management will not be able to exert pressure to depart with a bad weather approaching or with a technical issue or with less than minimum rest between flight duty periods. True, even with all precautions and safety, accidents can happen anytime, to anyone – even the most experienced crew – but that shouldn’t stop us from being conservative when it comes to safety.I heard Captain Abid Sultan had flown four sectors before going to an airport to Kathmandu. How outrageous! That, too, with a First Officer with barely two months’ experience! Biman doesn’t allow such inexperienced FO to fly to Cox’s Bazar, even!At the end of it all, the children of Captain Abid will never see their father again! Breaks my heart. It could be me, it could be you. Oh my! Sorry for the long message. Feeling extremely sad. Had to share.

Take care, brother. Fly safe. May Allah be with you and us all. All the crew of all airlines.”

aterpster
18th Mar 2018, 13:24
Listening to the radio recordings ...in the first one the female controller says' confirm you are holding' this is a long way out ...the female co pilot replies no..

Wondering if they originally miscalculated the decent and were doing a quick orbit or two to loose height without informing ATC first? Then continuing on trying to get down on the correct profile.

VNKT is not the place to be doing that.

Livesinafield
18th Mar 2018, 19:15
Livesinafield :"The Q4 flies very good FMS Overlays and would have some serious errors for it to be that far right of track "

Up thread was a good description of the varying FMS configs in Q4....possible the Captain's side had inadvertently input 20 and missed in the brief?

Possible, thing is even if it was coded wrong in one fms it only follows the active side fms, each MFD has a selectable nav source so both pilots can be on FMS1 or both on FMS2 or respective sides each, they do not talk to each other.

Its possible to fly the approach with one FMS set for the approach in Miami and the other for the VOR DME in Katmandu, and as long as PF has his/her FMS set to the KTM approach all will be fine.

as mentioned earlier the FMS is very capable in the Q400 and it does a pretty good job, its a bit tricky navigating your way through the options and menus and all a bit out of place, but for anyone with some time on the dash it should be easy.

To be honest i don't see the issue here is with the initial approach, it appears approach was flown ok otherwise they would have probably hit a mountain, looks like it went pete tong after MDA and possibly misshandling of an "orbit" the Q400 is not really the kinda machine you want to be trying to fly low level orbits in, its a bit of a handful and cockpit visibility not the best.

Its a sad state of affairs, no pilot goes out to work intending to screw up but i guess sometimes mistakes happen and it all lines up and thats that. :(

aterpster
19th Mar 2018, 00:32
Its possible to fly the approach with one FMS set for the approach in Miami and the other for the VOR DME in Katmandu, and as long as PF has his/her FMS set to the KTM approach all will be fine.
(

Some modern FMSes require the approach to be in sync.

Airbubba
19th Mar 2018, 00:40
Some modern FMSes require the approach to be in sync.

Modern as in three decades ago right? E.g. the 757/767 and the A310/A306.

aterpster
19th Mar 2018, 13:07
Modern as in three decades ago right? E.g. the 757/767 and the A310/A306.

I flew the pre-Pegagus 767. I don't remember whether the FMSes sync on approach because we didn't do RNAV approaches in those days. I flew the L1011 for three years after that, which tended to "bulk erase" the 767. :)

Livesinafield
19th Mar 2018, 17:31
FWIW i saw a video of S2-AGU and it has 2 FMS... as it happens i seriously doubt this had anything to do with the accident

Smott999
19th Mar 2018, 20:06
It does seem they came in far enough off line to the east that ATC assumed they were on track for circle/land 20...
Wind from the west?

Escape Path
19th Mar 2018, 22:50
Using the correct phrases is paramount in ATC and dare I say it on the flight deck as well.
VFR refers to the rules of flight and VMC refers to the the weather conditions. There is no chance that one "may mean" the other. That's a red herring you are introducing.

It's not far off the question to propose such an error. ATC is in a non native language, stressful moment... Besides I've seen it being used that way in the aforementioned conditions. Plus I don't see any reason why to ask such a thing at that time.

As someone mentioned earlier, it would be interesting to see what happened with the first approach and why they seem to take a circle to land/visual traffic without telling anyone, as that would seem to be a key moment, everything else after that is just a cascading mess

aterpster
20th Mar 2018, 00:44
It's not far off the question to propose such an error. ATC is in a non native language, stressful moment... Besides I've seen it being used that way in the aforementioned conditions. Plus I don't see any reason why to ask such a thing at that time.

As someone mentioned earlier, it would be interesting to see what happened with the first approach and why they seem to take a circle to land/visual traffic without telling anyone, as that would seem to be a key moment, everything else after that is just a cascading mess

It really boils down to "aviagate" "navigate" then "communicate."

The crew saw the airport from their perch, not anyone else. You simply do not circle to land unless the view of the airport and your position are within the parameters.

Lascaille
20th Mar 2018, 04:08
It really boils down to "aviagate" "navigate" then "communicate."

The crew saw the airport from their perch, not anyone else. You simply do not circle to land unless the view of the airport and your position are within the parameters.

You also do not 'circle to land' for one runway while cleared for another, then perform two 'orbits' (one on the short final path of the runway they weren't meant to be landing on, the other over the field and on the deck), do you?

Taking into consideration what actually happened, are you really confident in your pronouncement that the crew had all the boxes ticked prior to commencing their 'circle to land' maneuver?

piratepete
20th Mar 2018, 06:14
I have operated in a heavy around 60 times to VNKT.I have observed many highly experienced and quite well trained pilots make just about every type of error possible during these flights.My take on this accident, sadly is INEXPERIENCE plus CONFUSION equals DISASTER.The effect of language problems (english as a second language) most likely played a big part in this crash too.

RAT 5
20th Mar 2018, 08:23
Taking into consideration what actually happened, are you really confident in your pronouncement that the crew had all the boxes ticked prior to commencing their 'circle to land' maneuver?

IMHO the question still remains why the screwed up the straight in approach. From various posts it is suggested that the 'circle' was commenced because they were too high for a straight in. If true, that is a huge error on vertical profile. How? If they were so far offset laterally after an autopilot flown approach, that is also a huge error. How? If both were true then one can only wonder WTF was going on. Personally I can't believe the latter where there was huge vertical & lateral error. The FDR + CVR will tell us.
Given the wind conditions I also can't believe that a turbo-prop crew would not plan for a straight in. The talk about FMS approaches: if the autopilot was following an FMC profile it should have been backed up with raw data monitoring; basic radial + DMA + altimeter. How they got themselves in such a pickle is the mystery.
I can't remember seeing the metar for their arrival. Usually someone posts it. I don't know how to do that from archives. Any chance, someone, please.
The facts should come to light quite quickly and all else is pure speculation.

Lascaille
20th Mar 2018, 08:53
My take on this accident, sadly is INEXPERIENCE plus CONFUSION equals DISASTER.

Not rushing to judgement is quite commendable but do you not feel there is a level of confusion which should simply never occur when flying a fully functional and instrumented aircraft during daylight hours with relatively clear sight of the ground and moderate haze?

Adopting a track to enter a traffic pattern for runway 20 when cleared to land 02 may be accepted as confusion.

Entering the left downwind when ATC clears you for the right (then right, then right, then left, then right) downwind is easily accepted as confusion, especially when ATC seem to be clearing you for whatever they guess you're planning to do next anyway.

Then they receive and understand 'cleared to hold?' They readback 'right orbit' then proceed to steadily lose height in the orbit until - I'd guess - an EGPWS warning shakes them out of their fugue state. They abort the orbit into an approximate (climbing, of course!) left base leg, overshoot the runway they apparently can't see (probably due to being too high), 180 left turn into... well, it's high key, isn't it? Followed by the usual which turns out not to work so well in an ATR.

I see a lot of confusion in the initial stages, but in the later stages I see a certain 'I know exactly what to do, now I just have to get the airplane to do it' certainty of purpose that's something quite different entirely and much more dangerous. Confused people aren't dangerous if they know they're confused. They hold, they put the autopilot on, they pause. The danger starts when people suddenly snap out of their confusion, believe they're in a familiar and tolerable situation and begin a tactical approach from high key. In an ATR. Wouldn't you say?

Livesinafield
20th Mar 2018, 09:00
Except it was in a Dash not an ATR

As requested METAR

VNKT 120850Z 26007KT 140V300 7000 FEW015 FEW025CB SCT030 BKN100 21/10 Q1015 NOSIG CB TO SE AND S=
VNKT 120820Z 28008KT 240V320 6000 TS FEW015 FEW025CB SCT030 22/11 Q1015 NOSIG CB TO SE S AND SW=

wiedehopf
20th Mar 2018, 10:40
in hindsight a go-around instruction from the tower would not have been a bad thing.

but they probably assumed the plane had some kind of problem and didn't want to add to it.

RAT 5
20th Mar 2018, 10:43
Thank you. So there would appear to be no weather problems over the airfield. Reasonable visibility with circuit level dotted cloud and light winds. So why did the straight in not work? The root cause lies well before the chaos of 'buzzing the tower & apron' in a seemingly 'where am I and what am I supposed to do' quandary.

troppo
20th Mar 2018, 12:05
Apart from the specifics of this particular accident, how many countries are there in the world that allow scheduled VFR flights in transport category/heavy turboprops?

Smott999
20th Mar 2018, 13:35
Captain had landed 100+ times at this airport.
All very strange.
Seeing the final track and the tightening left turn I actually wondered if something was amiss w the left engine right at the end.

EternalNY1
20th Mar 2018, 13:52
I still lean towards some sort of hypoxia incident here, and I wouldn't normally jump straight to that conclusion as there should have been plenty of warning signs.

However if you are hypoxic, might not recognize them. Although the masks would have dropped based on cabin altitude if that was the case.

Even though I just speculated I'm not a big fan of speculation in aviation so FDR/CVR should help here.

Hotel Tango
20th Mar 2018, 16:03
We can all speculate until the cows come home. There comes a time when speculation needs to give way to some patience for the facts to emerge.

Livesinafield
20th Mar 2018, 20:46
FYI most Q4s don’t have drop down masks in the cabin it’s an optional extra for max ceiling of FL270

Also we cannot talk about track that drawing/sketch is purely made from eye witness accounts would say it has very very little accuracy.

Does KTM have radar? If not any military stations? be nice to see a radar track

krohmie
20th Mar 2018, 20:57
I still lean towards some sort of hypoxia incident here, and I wouldn't normally jump straight to that conclusion as there should have been plenty of warning signs.

However if you are hypoxic, might not recognize them.

Possible "fuming incident"? Loss of situational awareness....

Just my two cents

MD80767 Driver
20th Mar 2018, 21:33
ZFT wrote:



It's a company SOP thing. There's no blanket prohibition on this.

You know, I've started flying to VNKT in a heavy pretty recently. I do it regularly now. It's a Capt's landing and take off as per my company SOP's. After my first two approaches there, where I found myself 'busy' mentally, with FO's from a culture that have a hard time speaking up to and correcting the Capt. (no- I'm not an a....in the cockpit) I decided to let the FO fly the approach the last few times. My reasoning; I want to be 100% concentrated on exactly where we are and what comes next. And not be busy pushing buttons. I've found myself much more at peace and ahead of the game, going into VNKT, monitoring and guiding the approach, in min. weather at Kathmandu. Breaking the SOP's? Yes I am.:ouch:

Heathrow Harry
20th Mar 2018, 21:50
Looking at the path it seems to me a reasonable explanation is a series of attempts to circle to land on 20... none of them are good and seem to have been affected by too tight/maybe fear of terrain,

As it goes on the excursions get bigger and the turns tighter

probably finally total loss of awareness (but still fear of nearby terrain) and overcooks the turn and stalls in

Escape Path
21st Mar 2018, 02:07
It really boils down to "aviagate" "navigate" then "communicate."

I agree with that. But it doesn't seem that there's an obvious problem (i.e. declaration of emergency) that warrants flying something without requesting it first, or at least a short while after starting to doing it (that last bit as a sort of a benefit of doubt in case of a hectic cockpit for whatever reason). ATC is the first to notice they're deviating from their clearance. IMO they failed to do any of those three "golden rules" in a proper manner. They shouldn't crash if they've done them properly, but FWIW, initially at least, I think they attempted to aviate but failed to navigate and communicate (efficiently anyway).

@eternal: I don't get it mate. Why would they suffer from hypoxia (at 5-6k ft anyway!) and, based on what has been said here, after a considerable amount of flight time (around 1hr). Plenty of things should have happened before if that was the case.

My first questions would be:
- What happened with the first approach? Everyone else seems to have managed it. There isn't an obvious sign of why they botched/missed it
- What happened in the cockpit after missing that first approach, regarding decision-making, PF/PM duties?

Everything else after that I think is just the consequence/poor execution of these decisions/actions

PeterTG
21st Mar 2018, 06:04
Having read the transcripts and also the comments relating to slurred speech, confusion, and erratic communication combined with the miss handling of the aircraft it struck me the pilot flying may well have suffered a medical problem, specifically the possibility of a TIA (transient ischemic attack) prior to and during the approach.

Sometimes Occam's razor can cut.

donotdespisethesnake
21st Mar 2018, 08:12
In all the cases where people have suggested incapacitation, fumes, hypoxia etc in order to explain otherwise inexplicable flying, I don't think a single one has been found to involve such an event after the formal investigation.

The simpler explanation is that the human brain is fallible, gets overloaded, loses SA and never regains it. Remember that these are rare 1 in 10 million events, most pilots will never experience such a degree of mental "lockup" through their whole career.

Livesinafield
21st Mar 2018, 08:42
In all the cases where people have suggested incapacitation, fumes, hypoxia etc in order to explain otherwise inexplicable flying, I don't think a single one has been found to involve such an event after the formal investigation.

The simpler explanation is that the human brain is fallible, gets overloaded, loses SA and never regains it. Remember that these are rare 1 in 10 million events, most pilots will never experience such a degree of mental "lockup" through their whole career.

Really good post and points

Heathrow Harry
21st Mar 2018, 08:54
In all the cases where people have suggested incapacitation, fumes, hypoxia etc in order to explain otherwise inexplicable flying, I don't think a single one has been found to involve such an event after the formal investigation.

The simpler explanation is that the human brain is fallible, gets overloaded, loses SA and never regains it. Remember that these are rare 1 in 10 million events, most pilots will never experience such a degree of mental "lockup" through their whole career.

I think you are right - I've "locked up" once and seen it happen to others (all in non-flying/driving situations thank God)

Its very weird and normally caused by the brain just getting so much conflicting information WHEN KNOW YOU NEED TO REACT FAST -you just shut down,... might be 10 seconds, might be 15 minutes........... You remeber what was happening - you just can't make any decisions

GlenQuagmire
21st Mar 2018, 10:58
You know, I've started flying to VNKT in a heavy pretty recently. I do it regularly now. It's a Capt's landing and take off as per my company SOP's. After my first two approaches there, where I found myself 'busy' mentally, with FO's from a culture that have a hard time speaking up to and correcting the Capt. (no- I'm not an a....in the cockpit) I decided to let the FO fly the approach the last few times. My reasoning; I want to be 100% concentrated on exactly where we are and what comes next. And not be busy pushing buttons. I've found myself much more at peace and ahead of the game, going into VNKT, monitoring and guiding the approach, in min. weather at Kathmandu. Breaking the SOP's? Yes I am.:ouch:

Kindred spirit - good decision.. Never understood the bull**** of Captains Only airfields. Captain can make the decision about who is flying but if they can't make that decision in the best interests of the flight they shouldnt be captain!

ironbutt57
21st Mar 2018, 11:01
Kindred spirit - good decision.. Never understood the bull**** of Captains Only airfields. Captain can make the decision about who is flying but if they can't make that decision in the best interests of the flight they shouldnt be captain!


"bull****" well the regulatory body of the airline most certainly won't see it that way....

Herod
21st Mar 2018, 11:49
Nor will the insurance company.

GlenQuagmire
22nd Mar 2018, 05:43
Nor will the insurance company.

If a company mandates that one or other pilot needs to handle on the basis that somehow that improves the liklihood of a successful landing then they are completely negligent in allowing a multi crew aircraft to operate there. It should be absolutely clear that either pilot should be capable of making an approach and landing the aircraft at any airfield that the company operate into. If it is the case that one or other pilot is not capable of handling an approach and landing into an airfield, what are they doing sitting in the pilots seat! If you can't make the approach and landing yourself, how can you competently be pilot monitoring?

The choice of who handles and who monitors is a crew and ultimately captains decision. If the best crew member to handle is the FO because it gives the best SA to the Captain then the company are deliberately reducing safety margins by taking away that option.

piratepete
22nd Mar 2018, 09:29
Glen, im sorry but you are talking complete rubbish.First of all it is the operators right to decide this issue in the interests of safety.Quite often the demanding nature of any particular operation (take off or landing) requires a high level of experience to ensure a safe level of handling.This is not the Captains choice but the operators im afraid.In general it is the PIC who has this required level of expertise, not the effoh.

What is very often overlooked is that the pilot monitoring (copilot when the PIC MUST be the PF) has a very very important and demanding role.....of monitoring what the PF is doing.Many Captains are good handling pilots but, poor at PM.Leave this function to the F/O.Often they are much better at this role.

excrab
22nd Mar 2018, 09:30
This is possibly getting off the original subject, but in my maybe limited experience of Cat C airports it isn't about one pilot being better than the other, it is often down to training costs.

To take the example of VNKT which is what the thread is about, the simulator training takes about 5 hours, most of which is devoted to the circling approach and the single engine go around from various points in the valley.

The captain is designated as PF and does the flying, most of which is hand flown.
Halfway through the detail it is normal to switch F/Os, as they are not PF, so they spend half the detail as PM and half observing in the back of the sim.

If F/O s were also checked out as PF it would double the cost of training in the sim, and also need more line trainer's time for the initial airfield visits.

Strangely enough, in all of the times I have flown into VNKT none of the F/Os, ranging from 300 hour cadets to 10000 hr ex turboprop captains, have expressed any regret at not being allowed to fly a steep NPA, with a tailwind, at night, to an upsloping runway in a black hole surrounded by 15000 ft mountains. There are plenty of other difficult places on the network that they can fly to if they feel a need to prove themselves.

aterpster
22nd Mar 2018, 13:29
Strangely enough, in all of the times I have flown into VNKT none of the F/Os, ranging from 300 hour cadets to 10000 hr ex turboprop captains, have expressed any regret at not being allowed to fly a steep NPA, with a tailwind, at night, to an upsloping runway in a black hole surrounded by 15000 ft mountains. There are plenty of other difficult places on the network that they can fly to if they feel a need to prove themselves.

The RNP AR Rwy 02 tames the approach substantially.

Chu Chu
22nd Mar 2018, 23:38
As SLF, I think I'd be happier if the flight diverted from a captains only airport if either pilot was incapacitated.

hans brinker
23rd Mar 2018, 05:57
Glen, im sorry but you are talking complete rubbish.First of all it is the operators right to decide this issue in the interests of safety.Quite often the demanding nature of any particular operation (take off or landing) requires a high level of experience to ensure a safe level of handling.This is not the Captains choice but the operators im afraid.In general it is the PIC who has this required level of expertise, not the effoh.

What is very often overlooked is that the pilot monitoring (copilot when the PIC MUST be the PF) has a very very important and demanding role.....of monitoring what the PF is doing.Many Captains are good handling pilots but, poor at PM.Leave this function to the F/O.Often they are much better at this role.

Totally agree with the first part, however I disagree with the second part:
I remember transitioning as PIC to a different type and on my first trip after OE/linetraining, had a late evening arrival with gusty winds into San Sebastian (LESO), special training required but both PIC and FO can land. The FO was new (less than a year). I decided to be PM, because I knew I would definitely call the GA if I wasn't comfortable with the approach, but I was not sure if a inexperienced FO would call the GA on an "experienced" PIC (I was experienced, just not on type/destination). My brother is merchant marine, the captain never holds the control but always monitors.

ps: Also have to take big issue with "Many Captains are good handling pilots but, poor at PM. Leave this function to the F/O.Often they are much better at this role". After 20 years I have much more experience than most of the FOs I fly with. I can let them fly the plane, and know that if needed I can suggest/direct/take over if needed. I fly with a lot of new FOs, so I am definitely better at handling, but that does not make them better at monitoring. If you want to be a good captain you let your FO be the PF as much as possible, he will learn much more from doing than watching, if you can't be a good PM as PIC you are doing something wrong.

tommoutrie
23rd Mar 2018, 06:15
Totally agree with the first part, however I disagree with the second part:
I remember transitioning as PIC to a different type and on my first trip after OE/linetraining, had a late evening arrival with gusty winds into San Sebastian (LESO), special training required but both PIC and FO can land. The FO was new (less than a year). I decided to be PM, because I knew I would definitely call the GA if I wasn't comfortable with the approach, but I was not sure if a inexperienced FO would call the GA on an "experienced" PIC (I was experienced, just not on type/destination). My brother is merchant marine, the captain never holds the control but always monitors.

Hello Hans

I am confused. Are you arguing for or against the company deciding who handles into an airport? Your decision is exactly the right one in my opinion and the same as the decision I made operating into LESO. Lovely place, got filmed departing (youtube 9H-COL). I think you have identified one reason why it is important that the crew decide who is PF and who is PM... Your ability to assess the approach and decide if it should be discontinued is based on your ability to fly it. Your cockpit and aeroplane is safer as a result
https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

ironbutt57
23rd Mar 2018, 09:55
the point is folks, if your company has nominated an airport as "Captains only", then the legal ability of the Captain to make the decision has been removed, conducting the operation in any fashion contrary to the operational policy, except in an emergency, would fall into the "wilful violation" category, and is technically against the law laid down by the operator's regulatory authority...simple really

MD80767 Driver
23rd Mar 2018, 10:04
I agree completely with hans brinker and tommoutrie. Also with Ironbutt57 though. Ironbutt; actually my Policy manual says "Capt's landing'...so in order to satisfy the legal heads, I might just to the Big Airways thing next time, and take over when runway is in sight :-) I still find it much better for MY decision making and SA, to let the FO fly the APPROACH into VNKT though...

excrab
23rd Mar 2018, 10:16
I think to some extent people are comparing oranges to clementines here, Hans Brinker and Tommoutrie are talking about a Category B airfield on the coast of Spain. We also fly into plenty of Cat B airfields, and for them either pilot can land there, the decision about who does so being made by the crew (ultimately the PIC) on the day after reviewing the weather conditions.

Cat C is a bit more involved, and the rules are generally not even a decision by the operator alone, but involve the company's flight ops inspector as the representative of whichever national regulatory body grants the company AOC.

For Sptraveller, if you are referring to my post, then no, that isn't what was said. What was said was that the F/O was given five hours of training at VNKT (split equally into observer and PM), so they know exactly what the PF is doing. They also have an airfield visit with a line training captain flying the
aircraft, and before they do any of that they need to have 500 hours on type.
So there is no reason to think that they can't effectively monitor what the PF is doing. I would never have any worries about whether any of our F/O's would tell me to go around if I was making a dog's breakfast of it, I know that they are all perfectly capable and prepared to do that for any approach, anywhere.

Also, looking at it from the passenger's perspective, if you were going into VNKT at night, in turbulence, with visibility and cloud base at minimas, in the pouring rain, with your family sitting next to you, who would you rather have flying the aircraft, the five, six, seven (or seventeen) thousand hour captain, or the seven hundred hour F/O because the Captain wanted to be pilot monitoring.

Finally, just saw MD drivers post. Our ops manual is quite specific, "Captain's only approach, landing and take-off". So no monitored approaches and taking over at MDA in VNKT for us.

I should also point out that this is an enormous amount of thread drift...the training the airline I fly for gives is not necessarily the same as that given by
the airline involved in this crash, as we do not know what is in their ops manual and agreed with their regulator.

Smott999
23rd Mar 2018, 11:31
As a SLF but with ex RAF Dad, I always thought that PF v PM effectiveness had much to do w the relationship between left and right, which can have all kinds of angles including seniority, culture, gender. We may have all three happening here, contributing to a Jr FO maybe being less willing to correct a senior Captain or call for a GA.

Landflap
23rd Mar 2018, 11:46
Bit of a thread creep but still interesting. All those who determine "Captains only" means exactly that are correct. Develop the thread and suggest that FO could/should fly the approach but still let Capt land are technically correct but not in the spirit of the ruling.


Long time ago, Funchal in Madeira was Capt Only and Cat C. The visual, curved approach was such that on finally levelling wings on completion of the "approach" there was very little time to decide whether a landing could be met, let alone a last minute switch of handling. Better let Capt do the whole thing. That is, actually, the spirit of the regulation.


Now, we don't want to go to far into the old BEA monitored app. For Cat 3, "blind in the fog" landings, RHS did the approach but with typical DH of 50ft, Capt response to "Decide" was "Land" but with the latter calling the shots and George now continuing to land. Oh yeah, confused ? Watch those guys in cavok at LHR and it was a larf a minute. RHS always did the app. Capt Always did the landing. DH call would be around 200ft but success was pretty well anticipated many miles out. Yet, we still did the "soft shoe shuffle" at 200ft with some interesting minor divergences leading to a thump in the guts as we "arrived".


Creeping back to thread ; I too been into & out of Kat many times. Wouldn't dream of a monitored approach. I too hated dipping my nose into the valley, higher rate of Descent, often tail wind, upsloping runway, on limits and getting it all right for the touch was better handled by someone handling all the way. GA needed to be well rehearsed and briefed as, I recall, it was a turn in one direction if all donks were running and, in a twin, a opposite direction turn if you happen to be on one. I got a very funny look from my initial Trainer when I asked what do we do if a donk fails during a two-engine GA.


Capt Only airfiields are just that & as Ironbutts correctly exhorts, It is a Regulatory requirement, adopted in the SOPs. Stick your head above ground, like one Poster, who claims he regularly breaks the Company SOPs and you are headed towards a Court appearance.

aterpster
23rd Mar 2018, 13:39
Also, looking at it from the passenger's perspective, if you were going into VNKT at night, in turbulence, with visibility and cloud base at minimas, in the pouring rain, with your family sitting next to you, who would you rather have flying the aircraft, the five, six, seven (or seventeen) thousand hour captain, or the seven hundred hour F/O because the Captain wanted to be pilot monitoring.


That scenario alone would make me question why any airline would want to risk VNKT unless they can fly the RNP AR RWY 02 approach. Nepal understands this issue; that’s why they spent the resources to get RNP AR capability for the airport early on.

RNP AR 3-D 2.80 degree path to a DA of 4,621’ (300’ Height Above Touchtown).

VOR Rwy 02 5.31 degree path to an MDA of 4,950’ (629’ Height Above Touchdown) with a demanding 6 DME stepdown fixes from the FAF to the VOR, and with the following cautionary note:

VOR course scalloping between D10.0 and D7.0 on R-202. Cross-check position with other available navigation means.

ironbutt57
23rd Mar 2018, 14:02
That scenario alone would make me question why any airline would want to risk VNKT unless they can fly the RNP AR RWY 02 approach. Nepal understands this issue; that’s why they spent the resources to get RNP AR capability for the airport early on.

RNP AR 3-D 2.80 degree path to a DA of 4,621’ (300’ Height Above Touchtown).

VOR Rwy 02 5.31 degree path to an MDA of 4,950’ (629’ Height Above Touchdown) with a demanding 6 DME stepdown fixes from the FAF to the VOR, and with the following cautionary note:

the RNP AR has been fairly recent, and it takes you a bit west of the VOR final approach course through a valley where quite often a thunderstorm is happily doing it's thing, our airline had a CDA style procedure for the VOR flown in either FPA on the Airbus, or VS on the Boeing, scalloping was experienced but very slight, the visual sector of the approach was on a standard PAPI, never felt it was particularly demanding or otherwise...

aterpster
23rd Mar 2018, 15:33
the RNP AR has been fairly recent, and it takes you a bit west of the VOR final approach course through a valley where quite often a thunderstorm is happily doing it's thing, our airline had a CDA style procedure for the VOR flown in either FPA on the Airbus, or VS on the Boeing, scalloping was experienced but very slight, the visual sector of the approach was on a standard PAPI, never felt it was particularly demanding or otherwise...
The VOR radial goes directly over a 7,680' terrain point. The RNP AR track is 2.5 miles west of that point. Not much of a difference when TRWs are popping.

I have no doubt experienced pilots that are very familiar with the airport handle the VOR approach quite well. Nonetheless, it is archaic compared to the RNP AR approach. And, 1,100 meters vs. 2,800 meters visibility for CAT C is also significant, especially when the rain is coming down in a habitually polluted valley.

hans brinker
23rd Mar 2018, 23:19
Hello Hans

I am confused. Are you arguing for or against the company deciding who handles into an airport? Your decision is exactly the right one in my opinion and the same as the decision I made operating into LESO. Lovely place, got filmed departing (youtube 9H-COL). I think you have identified one reason why it is important that the crew decide who is PF and who is PM... Your ability to assess the approach and decide if it should be discontinued is based on your ability to fly it. Your cockpit and aeroplane is safer as a result
https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

If the company makes it a captain only airport, only the captain can be PF, no discussion. However the company I flew for believed in equal qualifications for FO and PIC, so both would be able to be PF. This applied to all category C airports we flew into (and we flew into a lot of dodgy places including unpaved strips in central Africa for UN evacuation flights, and Afghanistan/Kazachstan aso).

piratepete
24th Mar 2018, 01:23
At one time I worked for a carrier whose base was 8000 feet amsl.After quite a few take off and landing tailstrikes on the big jets, only Captains were allowed to conduct landings.There were still landing tailstrikes going on however the frequency reduced by 75%.As I was/am a quite experienced instructor, I let some copilots do the landing, once I had observed them and determined that they were competent.I immediately understood why the Managers put this policy in place.Several times, I had to take control during the flare or earlier as the required touchdown accuracy was not going to be met plus the pitch atttitude was creeping up too close to the tailstrike range.I stopped this "act of kindness" and just did all the landings myself.These types of operations are best conducted not only by the most experienced pilot (usually the PIC), but also by the pilot with the most exposure to doing it.

GlenQuagmire
24th Mar 2018, 03:20
At one time I worked for a carrier whose base was 8000 feet amsl.After quite a few take off and landing tailstrikes on the big jets, only Captains were allowed to conduct landings.There were still landing tailstrikes going on however the frequency reduced by 75%.As I was/am a quite experienced instructor, I let some copilots do the landing, once I had observed them and determined that they were competent.I immediately understood why the Managers put this policy in place.Several times, I had to take control during the flare or earlier as the required touchdown accuracy was not going to be met plus the pitch atttitude was creeping up too close to the tailstrike range.I stopped this "act of kindness" and just did all the landings myself.These types of operations are best conducted not only by the most experienced pilot (usually the PIC), but also by the pilot with the most exposure to doing it.

Totally in agreement. But it should not be mandated by the company as it is not always the case. It should be decided by the crew. You, as captain, are not necessarily a better handling pilot. You are a more experienced pilot and you make the decision about who flies the leg. If your decision is that its best if you handle, handle. We are all different - some captains will be very happy to monitor an FO landing at a more challenging airport, some won't. That ability to assess our own attributes and those of our crew is part of what makes us good commanders.
Consider this. How many of the FOs you flew with actually had a tailstrike while you were flying? How much did they benefit from flying with you and understanding how it had got out of shape when you took over and explained it to them afterwards. Talk to them now - some of what you let them "discover learn" will have prevented them making the same mistake now they are in the left seat. That learning goes away when companies dictate that you only become a competent handling pilot when you are also capable of command.

excrab
24th Mar 2018, 11:56
GlenQuagmire,

With all due respect there is a huge difference in what can be done in a corporate operation with a small pilot force who all know each other (been there and done that), and an airline. Even if an airline Captain wants to break the rules and ignore company SOPs, how is she or he supposed to decide if the first officer they are flying with, one of several hundred in the same base, who the captain has never flown with before, is the better or worse handling pilot in order to decide who should do the landing at the Cat C airport they are inbound to?

The only sensible answer to that question is that they can't, so therefore SOPs
are put in place based on the fact that Captain is capable of landing there, and it doesn't matter if the F/O is or not.

In the airlines I've worked for I have never considered being qualified for Cat C airfields to be an indicator of my skills, instead it is a pain in the a*rse as you end up (in Europe) working every weekend doing ski charters to horrible places or being a target for crewing for more standby call outs because you are the only one available who can go there.

Getting a bit closer to the original topic, the VOR approach to VNKT if flown in LNAV / VNAV really isn't that difficult, and weather wise one day the CBs might be in the way of that approach and the next day where the RNP approach takes you....however flying the VOR approach in VORLOC and VS with a tailwind might be a bit harder....my guess is they got high on the approach and tried to cobble together some sort of visual approach without briefing it or planning it, rather than fly the missed approach, divert and end up at the alternate, possibly out of duty hours to get home. Just a guess , as is most of what has been posted on this thread about the original topic.

ATC Watcher
26th Mar 2018, 19:42
Back to the original discussion and reference the earlier speculation that the controller who said " confirm you are VFR" could have meant VMC.
I got confirmation that the tower controller did meant VFR and not VMC . When spotted the position of the aircraft was roughly 1000ft AGL East of the runway which corresponded roughly of the downwind position for the VFR East pattern for 20. Hence the question. The controllers had visual with the aircraft.

portmanteau
27th Mar 2018, 23:06
ATC Watcher; thats lefthand downwind position for 20. Later on ATC tells crew to "join right downwind to runway 20" followed almost immediately by " right downwind runway 02". Confusing or what? Lets hope we find out in the Preliminary report due within 30 days of event.









I

ATC Watcher
28th Mar 2018, 09:29
Portmanteau : "join right downwind to runway 20" followed almost immediately by " right downwind runway 02". Confusing or what?
Not if you put the things back in their context . The second instruction is a correction to the first, and it is that one which is acknowledged back by the Capt later. The Capt requested and confirmed 02 until that point remember , and the controller aim at that point was to try to bring it back in the (VFR) pattern for 02 behind the others.
You have to link the R/T exchange with the behavior and position of the aircraft as seen by the Tower controller at the time of the transmissions to understand the situation.
Things will become much clearer hopefully once we see the preliminary report .

portmanteau
28th Mar 2018, 22:38
ATC Watcher, for what it is worth, 211 was on frequency for 12 minutes from 08hrs:21 mins:45secs to 08:33:34 of which 06 mins was on approach up to first attempt to land and 06 mins thereafter up to 211's last transmission. At approx 08:27:20 Tower says you are going to runway 20 which would fit in with your information that ATC had visual with the aircraft. Around 06 mins later the aircraft crashed.

fox niner
10th Apr 2018, 20:09
And here it is: the preliminary report.


http://www.tourism.gov.np/downloadfile/DRAFT%20PRELIMINARY%20REPORT%20FOR%20COMMISSION_1523376481.p df

Livesinafield
11th Apr 2018, 14:44
Not giving a lot aware there!

ATC Watcher
12th Apr 2018, 17:24
No, the strict legal minimum, It would have helped to give the path the aircraft actually flew ( known by now ) to eliminate the wild media speculations we saw at the beginning, but they choose not to . Pity .

aterpster
13th Apr 2018, 00:51
No, the strict legal minimum, It would have helped to give the path the aircraft actually flew ( known by now ) to eliminate the wild media speculations we saw at the beginning, but they choose not to . Pity .

Nonetheless, Nepal will eventually provide a good report. Can't say that about all ICAO nations.

ATC Watcher
13th Apr 2018, 05:06
Nonetheless, Nepal will eventually provide a good report. Can't say that about all ICAO nations.
Absolutely agree with you .

portmanteau
13th Apr 2018, 13:23
well we can try to piece a few things together. 211 is seen in the lefthand downwind position for runway 20 at approx circuit height , at approx 6 minutes before the crash. How far could he go in 6 minutes? 9 miles say? Touches down halfway along runway 20. A Q400 pilot could tell us what the aircraft was capable of doing in that time /speed /distance scenario.

portmanteau
15th Apr 2018, 19:02
At least the Preliminary Report referred to the communications between ATC and 211. It says that they were normal until 0832:52. (Crash occurred at 0834:10). I think the consensus on here was that they were anything but normal.