Smartlynx A320 runway excursion EETN 28.2.2018

[jiggi]

Training flight MYX9001 reg ES-SAN, no casualties. Smartlynx has confirmed that flight had technical problems during flight before landing.

Video of the landing run:

https://youtu.be/YGAgmeQOSp8

[A0283]

just in front of the cameraman and in line with his car... there is a metallic sound and at that point the plane appears to leave the runway. Weird to see a tyre or wheel coming off, following the plane, and the doing a few circles below the wing behind it. ARFF pretty quick.

[andrasz]

The video was taken from here (note that Street View is very outdated):
https://www.google.ee/maps/@59.4157914,24.8562434,3a,75y,179.8h,91.42t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sNF5hrtG0kRcQUzkStp010Q!2e0!7i13312!8i665 6?hl=en

From FR24 it appears that after a number of left and right circuits and touch-and-go-s some problem developed, apparently they did a tower fly-by before data discontinues. From the video it can be seen that at least one nosewheel separates and briefly sparks from the nosegear appear before the aircraft comes to a full stop about 850m from RWY 26 threshold, well before taxiway F (fire trucks approach of F). Main gear doors are hanging indicating some hydraulic issue.

The position of the cameraman suggests he was aware of the issue and was waiting to film the landing. ARFF also appear to have been alerted and in waiting. Airport re-opened about four hours after the incident.


Edit: just released photos show the aircraft to be in the snow off the runway, with L1 slide deployed:


http://f8.pmo.ee/EZI4UvlSc0iZzTVvgi0zRZNu_Rs=/fit-in/1980x1980/filters:no_upscale()/nginx/o/2018/02/28/7648303t1h7cce.jpg

[J.O.]

Main gear doors open can also be an indication of a manual landing gear extension.

[jiggi]

Accident: Smartlynx A320 at Tallinn on Feb 28th 2018, runway excursion after bad touch and go (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b57c3dd&opt=0)

[Nightstop]

Severe hard landing due to Ground Spoiler extension after a bounce has been mitigated by a new SEC standard, it would be interesting to know if this new logic was fitted to this airframe. In any case, the new SEC logic won’t prevent a severe hard landing after a bounce caused by the Thrust Levers still being in the CLB detent on touchdown, in which case immediate application of TOGA and go around is required.

[Intrance]

Someone forgot to tell the new recruits that it’s the landing gear that needs to touch, not the fuselage.

But in all seriousness, this must have made for some interesting base training and a pretty awful landing to cause the damage seen in the pictures.

[andrasz]

My understanding is that the fuselage/engine damage was caused by hitting the approach lights while making an early touch-down before the threshold. It is not confirmd whether this happened duing the prior touch-and-go pr the final landing, but the cloud of snow on touchdown in the video suggests the latter. Not hard to envision with the adrenaline still running after the bounce, likely made worse by all the bells, whistles and xmas tree lights and not knowing the extent of structural damage.

[Kakaru]

Did they make 180 turn after their last touch and go and made an emergency landing in the opposite direction? If yes, then something quite serious must have happened. AFAIK, the runaway in use was 08 and they landed on 26.

[CargoOne]

Estonian CAA flight inspector was onboard - watch this space...

[DaveReidUK]

Did they make 180 turn after their last touch and go and made emergency landing in the opposite direction? If yes, then something quite serious must have happened. AFAIK, the runaway in use was 08 and they landed on 26.

From the link in post #5 (earlier today):

"Estonia's Ohutusjuurdluse Keskus (OJK, Estonia's accident investigation board) reported the aircraft had departed at 12:03L for a training flight to practise approaches and landings with 7 people on board, at 17:04L the aircraft approached runway 08 for another touch and go, the aircraft could not climb out and collided with the runway, subsequently managed to become airborne again, performed a left turn and landed on runway 26 veering off the runway."

[EDLB]

Strange. If nothing is on fire and the donkeys work, I would always fly a normal pattern and not do a 180 and return downwind on final.

[Prada]

It looks like RAM Air turbine is deployed for some reason.

https://tallinn.postimees.ee/4425029/blogi-hadamaandunud-smartlynxi-lennuk-eemaldati-rajalt-lennurada-avati-taies-ulatuses?gallery=120025&image=7648999

[gearlever]

Hard touch down...?

[andrasz]

Piecing together the puzzle from various (unconfirmed) reports and visual clues it appears the bounce was hard enough to dislodge the RAT and the main gear doors. The right main gear door later fell away during the go-around, while the left one probably fractured during the subsequent early touch-down.

[EDML]

Strange. If nothing is on fire and the donkeys work, I would always fly a normal pattern and not do a 180 and return downwind on final.



Looks like they really wanted to land ASAP - on 26 they had around 12kt tailwind ...

[EDLB]

That stuff get bent on pattern training is nothing new, not the first, in no way the last one. As long as everybody can walk away, it is a successful landing. You learn enormous by that.
The biggest hit takes the ego of the PF. Hope that he keeps flying. As usual the most is to learn for the decision making process. Much worse if your luck runs out before you have mastered that.

[tubby linton]

The gear doors are mechanically uplocked and I would be very surprised if a hard landing could defeat the locks. I wonder if two of hydraulic systems were damaged on a previous circuit. Gear doors open is normal with loss of Green and did they deploy the RAT to redover the Yellow and through the PTU the Green? Flight on Blue only is demanding and offers very limited flight controls. The Avherald also shows damage to an engine nacelle. The aircraft doesn’t appear to have landed with any flaps, pointing to a double hydraulic failure.
The report on this one is going to be very interesting.

[tubby linton]

The embedded light as seen in the Avherald appears to be pointing in the direction of flight so they hit it on climb out not approach.

[Sidestick_n_Rudder]

Looks like they really wanted to land ASAP - on 26 they had around 12kt tailwind ...

Several avherald comments claim loss of both engines, subsequent to short/hard landing. There are also pictures showing some damage to the engines.

That would explain the RAT extension and the quick 180 turn...

Edit, the fan on the photo looks intact, however there seems to be damage to the inlet and probably to the underside of the engine.

[andrasz]

The aircraft doesn’t appear to have landed with amy flaps

Looking at the photos boths slats and flaps are clearly out, appear to be 1+F (T/O setting).

[tubby linton]

You have now got me trying to remember the failure wherby the aircraft will give 1+F rather than just Flap 1,and I am guessing it will be some sort of ADR failure.The Avherald is reporting that there was no data from the transponder for the latter stages, which woud suggest a failure of date from ADR1

[andrasz]

Avherald is reporting that there was no data from the transponder for the latter stages


Simon is not correct in this case, there is ADR data for the last stage, but only speed and heading, no altitude. The final 180 loop is treated as a separate flight in the FR24 database, this seems to be the cause of the confusion:
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/es-san#1091b691


The same was commented on AVH but probably Simon did not yet see it.

[DaveReidUK]

Simon is not correct in this case, there is ADR data for the last stage, but only speed and heading, no altitude. The final 180 loop is treated as a separate flight in the FR24 database, this seems to be the cause of the confusion

The FR24 data (as usual) needs to be treated with caution.

The last three plot points are definitely incorrect, showing the aircraft's final position (after the teardrop turn) about a mile northwest of the 08 THR, heading west at 160 kts. That's probably FR24 doing a bit of dumb extrapolation based on the last reliable position plot (turning onto the 26 centreline at 15:10Z).

Incidentally, one thing that can be discerned from the FR24 data is that the training detail of 10 circuits appears to have included a couple of GAs and one full stop landing as well as touch-and-goes. The final circuit before the crash was, needless to say, a T&G.

[andrasz]

The FR24 data (as usual) needs to be treated with caution


Of course, I merely pointed out that there was some transmitted data, though quite clearly patchy and unreliable.


As I'm in Tallinn currently, I do check FR24 quite often for arriving flights, there is some signal disturbance for almost all rwy 26 approaches, flights usually end up North of the airport instead of shown as being on the runway.

[Kakaru]

As I'm in Tallinn currently, I do check FR24 quite often for arriving flights, there is some signal disturbance for almost all rwy 26 approaches, flights usually end up North of the airport instead of shown as being on the runway.

Very true, I was also watching Tallinn and Helsinki traffic recently and sometimes FR24 shows complete bull**** in terms of aircraft position close to the airport / runaway.

[Intrance]

Heard via via so take with a grain/bucket of salt... I don't know anything about Airbus systems so it can be complete bull as well but since it's the rumour forum...

Trainee being PF, could not get nose lifted after touch to proceed with the go, sidestick not responsive or something like that. Captain takes control, lifts off with trim input, due to slow change of pitch, aircraft nearly overspeeds, thrust is reduced, aircraft makes a hard touch down, lifts off again. Both engines fail for whatever reason (story said both caught fire), immediate turn around and landing supposedly in glide pretty much, touching around 50m before threshold.

Not sure about the speed at which they couldn't get the nose up by sidestick, supposedly around or between Vr/V1.

[DaveReidUK]

Captain takes control, lifts off with trim input, due to slow change of pitch, aircraft nearly overspeeds, thrust is reduced, aircraft makes a hard touch down, lifts off again. Both engines fail for whatever reason (story said both caught fire), immediate turn around and landing supposedly in glide pretty much, touching around 50m before threshold.

Distance flown between getting airborne after the final T&G and touching down again was around 11 nm.

It's unlikely that much of that was flown with zero thrust.

[girlpower]

It will be interesting to see if the remaining A320 ATO candidates will get to finish their base training. I'm sure all future Base training will be suspended for the time being.

[Intrance]

Distance flown between getting airborne after the final T&G and touching down again was around 11 nm.

It's unlikely that much of that was flown with zero thrust.No info about when exactly the engines failed, just that it apparently happened due to the second touchdown. As I said, take it with a load of skepticism.

[Callsign Kilo]

Is this a PTF outfit? If so, they seem to a paid a massive price after their aircraft was severely crippled. Wouldn’t want to see the bill for this one!

[Officer Kite]

Is this a PTF outfit? If so, they seem to a paid a massive price after their aircraft was severely crippled. Wouldn’t want to see the bill for this one!

They are not a PTF/P2F outfit no

[Intrance]

They are not a PTF/P2F outfit no
Depends how strict your definition is... This "cadet program" where you pay for your own A320 rating for a chance to join Smartlynx... I would consider that pay to fly.

[Officer Kite]

Depends how strict your definition is... This "cadet program" where you pay for your own A320 rating for a chance to join Smartlynx... I would consider that pay to fly.

OK, then Wizz, easyJet, Ryanair, CityJet, BMI Regional, FlyDubai and a countless list of others are also pay2fly


Smart Lynx and Small Planet ARE pay to fly outfits.

Small Planet ask you to pay for your TR and then you have to make a 40,000eu lump sum payment to them.

Smartlynx don't require this, it's the type rating and that's it (like almost 80% of the rest of europe).

You should do some research before seeking to make such firm statements that are incorrect.

[schweizer2]

OK, then Wizz, easyJet, Ryanair, CityJet, BMI Regional, FlyDubai and a countless list of others are also pay2fly




Small Planet ask you to pay for your TR and then you have to make a 40,000eu lump sum payment to them.

Smartlynx don't require this, it's the type rating and that's it (like almost 80% of the rest of europe).

You should do some research before seeking to make such firm statements that are incorrect.

You must be at Smartlynx if calling them P2F is pushing your buttons.

Of course they are a P2F outfit, you buy a type rating and hope to god they use you for some hours on type.

Don't try mix airlines where you are employed before being bonded.
Unfortunately, with the amount of pilots jumping around airlines, the companies now want the employee to bare the cost of a rating, sucks for everyone but it doesn't just happen at the low cost side of aviation!

[Intrance]

OK, then Wizz, easyJet, Ryanair, CityJet, BMI Regional, FlyDubai and a countless list of others are also pay2fly

You won’t hear me say otherwise :).

Out of interest... What kind of “conditional employment contract” does Smartlynx offer with the cadet program? Permanent? Six months?

Anyway, I suppose that is worth a whole other thread in discussion.

[BluSdUp]

Anyone paying for a typerating today must be desperate.And going to this lot and not Ezy, Ryr or major lowcost does tell me a bit about the basic skill of the candidate.

By the way something the trainers are moaning about on a regular basis.
The poor level of cadets today, that is.
Something I can confirm.I never fly with anyone anymore that has the big picture, ever. ( In the old days that was one of the ways of knowing " Is he ready for command?")
Slowly going down over the last 4 to 5 years.
And big pressure to upgrade to cpt as soon as they approach 3000hrs.
I am not surprised we see accidents like this, it being Cpt induced or Cadet induced.

Happy Landings Chaps.
Gone fishing

[Officer Kite]

And going to this lot and not Ezy, Ryr or major lowcost does tell me a bit about the basic skill of the candidate.

Great that you have £130,000 burning a whole in your pocket to pay to EZY/CTC/OAA, or are willing to take the plunge with no job offer on the off chance of getting something with RYR upon finishing.


Smart lynx put you in the line (eventually) after the type rating without any previous experience paying you the minimum possible.
No insurance, no medical, no pension, no taxes paid.
This is pay to fly to me.

You may have a different opinion but cannot change mine.

Best regards.

Pay2fly programmes are also knows as 'line training programmes', whereby you pay a large sum of cash to a company in return for flying 500 hours or so on a particular type. Some companies that do this are small planet and pegasus, just off the top of my head.

This is not what smartlynx do. You pay your type rating and then join permanently, not for 500hrs or 1000hrs or anything else - you do not pay for an amount of hours, so it's not pay2fly. This is exactly what most airlines in europe do too.

You may have grievances with other elements of the contract, but that doesn't make it pay2fly. Is it the best contract on earth? No. Is it it the worst? No. But that doesn't make it P2F just cos you don't like it. If you want to invent your own definition of P2F then go ahead, but it's rather disingenuous to try to fool those who may not know any better whilst concealing the real truth.

Anyway I think I saw you post about this on the Italian forum with a laughing face with a sarcastic 'hope no one was injured' ... says all we need to know about you.

Best Regards to you too

[Captain Kaboom]

C'mon, they offered me a NTR DEC position, I have to pay €29.900 after which I will receive a whooping €235 for every flying day, as captain!!!!

How is this not pay to fly.

I used to pay FA's much more on a daily basis.

Didn't do it

[Intrance]

Pay2fly programmes are also knows as 'line training programmes', whereby you pay a large sum of cash to a company in return for flying 500 hours or so on a particular type. Some companies that do this are small planet and pegasus, just off the top of my head.

This is not what smartlynx do. You pay your type rating and then join permanently, not for 500hrs or 1000hrs or anything else - you do not pay for an amount of hours, so it's not pay2fly. This is exactly what most airlines in europe do too.

You may have grievances with other elements of the contract, but that doesn't make it pay2fly. Is it the best contract on earth? No. Is it it the worst? No. But that doesn't make it P2F just cos you don't like it. If you want to invent your own definition of P2F then go ahead, but it's rather disingenuous to try to fool those who may not know any better whilst concealing the real truth.

I believe the only person making up definitions for pay to fly is you...

Are you money out of pocket before even flying a single minute for, or receiving a single minute of training from your new employer? You've just paid to fly.

Pay to fly started exactly like this, paying for your rating, and when people fell for that, people smarter than those paying for the ratings decided to make their business out of it and offered 'line training packages' and now 'self funded cadet programs' like the BAA Smartlynx program. If you need to consider it not pay2fly to justify your decision, that's fine. Just don't bring that bull to people who know better.

I'd still like to see what kind of 'conditional employment contract' they offer and if it is really permanent as you say. Even then, is it worth a €100 per day FO salary when you just plunked down €25k and are basically paying your own salary for the first year or so?

This should really go into a separate thread though...

Ontopic... Saw the plane on the apron today, could see the damage from quite some distance. Probably won't just buff out ;)

[A4]

In response to the above rumour.......How about CM1 takeover with sidestick button pushed during previous approach....FO sidestick locks out after 45 seconds......touch and go....rotate call....no response as stick locked out.......Capts stick should be fine though so trimming it airborne seems odd.

All speculation of course - going to be a really interesting report.

A4

[tubby linton]

How about deep landing, not enough room to stop and decision to go before they hit the lights?Looking at the photos they did hit the lights as one is embedded in the lower fuselage. There is very little coming out about this incident, so it may be a wait for the interim report before we know anything.

[High_Cloud]

Both engines shutdown during landing according to the Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau.

Both engines stalled during right turn after touch and go. According to Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau after touch and go airplane did not react to pitch control. Therefore airplane lost altitude during t/o roll and imapcted to the end of runway. Engines suffered heavy damage but pilots got airspeed and altitude back until right turn, when both engines shutdown inflight. Instructor and cadet injured during landing.

[172_driver]

I hope those are the words of a journalist and not what the Investigation Board actually said. Still, lots of questions.

Both engines stalled during right turn after touch and go. According to Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau after touch and go airplane did not react to pitch control. Therefore airplane lost altitude during t/o roll and imapcted to the end of runway. Engines suffered heavy damage but pilots got airspeed and altitude back until right turn, when both engines shutdown inflight. Instructor and cadet injured during landing

[andrasz]

I hope those are the words of a journalist and not what the Investigation Board actually said.

The exact CAA statement (using Google translete with edits):

On February 28, 2018, at 12.02, Smartlynx Airlines Airbus A-320-214 took off from Tallinn Airport to conduct training flights. On board, there was a master instructor, a pilot, four students, and an Aviation Administration inspector. The training consisted of repeated touch and goes as part of the type certification training.

At 17.04, after a successful approach and landing on the runway, the aircraft could not gain altitude on a new take off. The aircraft did not respond to any control inputs, lost altitude and contacted the runway with the engines and the main gear doors were sheared [suggesting gear was already up or in transition].

After ground contact the aircraft started to gain altitude, and the pilots managed to stabilize the aircraft and completed a 180 turn to land on runway 26. After completing the turn both engines stopped producing power.

The pilot declared emergency [not clear exaclty when, but this explains the rapid arrival of the fire trucks]. The aircraft landed at 17.11, touching down about 150 meters before the runway, and ultimately stopped 15 meters to the south of the runway edge.

During the landing, all the tires deflated. The instructor and one of the students received minor injuries in the accident.

[172_driver]

Thanks andrasz, that's a bit clearer.

Now over to the investigators to do theirs.

[CSCL]

As I heard that after a "successful approach and landing" they were trying to continue this flight with ELAC 1, 2 FAIL message on ECAM. During this training TRI were trying to reset this fault several times. As I heard...
Airbus pilots will understand what does it mean. No pitch control available.

[CargoOne]

I am finding it quite remarkable that dual engine failure involving the current generation aircraft in EASA environment, followed by somewhat successful landing, has managed to generate only 3 pages so far... Poor dog who died in overhead bin has generated 6 pages in a shorter time span.

[joe falchetto 64]

As I heard that after a "successful approach and landing" they were trying to continue this flight with ELAC 1, 2 FAIL message on ECAM. During this training TRI were trying to reset this fault several times. As I heard...
Airbus pilots will understand what does it mean. No pitch control available.

How come that Elac 1 and 2 fault leave you without pitch control? Are you sure?

[Intrance]

I am finding it quite remarkable that dual engine failure involving the current generation aircraft in EASA environment, followed by somewhat successful landing, has managed to generate only 3 pages so far... Poor dog who died in overhead bin has generated 6 pages in a shorter time span.

Well, no people or dogs died and it's only a silly Eastern European company and country :rolleyes::ugh:

(sarcasm, if not clear enough)

[EGPFlyer]

How come that Elac 1 and 2 fault leave you without pitch control? Are you sure?

It doesn’t.. reconfiguration logic is ELAC 2 then 1, followed by SEC 2 then 1. To lose elevator control you need to lose all 4 or else have a triple hydraulic failure

[Lascaille]

It doesn’t.. reconfiguration logic is ELAC 2 then 1, followed by SEC 2 then 1. To lose elevator control you need to lose all 4 or else have a triple hydraulic failure

Also, how likely is it that the commander would have chosen to take to the air with the only pitch control being through stab trim? Unless you suspected/confirmed you had no brakes wouldn't the possibility of having no roll control be at the forefront?

What can be ruled out from the fact they made a controlled turn and got lined up again? Triple hydraulic failure must be ruled out, no?

The FR data for the last flight shows no altitude - can we make any assumptions from that? Speed is shown but FR will interpolate if no speed data is downlinked, do we know if the speed is reported speed or interpolated/GPS speed? Failure of ADS during takeoff would give reversion to...? Leading to 'we have no pitch' when actually control was in a reverted mode needing manual trim to t/o, especially if thrust was reduced by some other factor... Major object strike (multiple multiple birds) resulting in failure of air data system so takeoff in reverted mode and subsequent engine failure due to FOD? Does that make sense?

[joe falchetto 64]

It doesn’t.. reconfiguration logic is ELAC 2 then 1, followed by SEC 2 then 1. To lose elevator control you need to lose all 4 or else have a triple hydraulic failure
Yes, you are completely right: my post what somewhat ironic. As an airbi commander, i have experienced few sim scenario leading to the loss of both ELAC, in some cases also with 1 ENG shutdown; in the sim, given normal basic flying skills, the aircraft is controllable also in Direct Law, if the event happens with the gear down: it reverts to Alternate Law as soon as the gear is raised. That is, assuming no oher failures involved and normal reconfiguration logic is working.

[ShotOne]

Could we perhaps examine why training sectors with new-to-type pilots was being attempted in such poor weather conditions? It has become clear that the airline is very short of flight crew. Did commercial pressure to get crew on line override prudent decision-making?

[wiedehopf]

Could we perhaps examine why training sectors with new-to-type pilots was being attempted in such poor weather conditions? It has become clear that the airline is very short of flight crew. Did commercial pressure to get crew on line override prudent decision-making?

seeing the video i don't quite get the problem with the weather.

anyhow the pilots on line are being asked to fly in much worse weather i presume?

[ShotOne]

“I don’t get the problem with the weather..”. Really? Did you even read the METAR? Expecting a trainee pilot to cope with such conditions on what for some of them would have been their first touch of the controls of a large aircraft is quite likely to end in a serious accident. Which it did.

[andrasz]

“I don’t get the problem with the weather..”. Really? Did you even read the METAR? Expecting a trainee pilot to cope with such conditions on what for some of them would have been their first touch of the controls of a large aircraft is quite likely to end in a serious accident. Which it did.

EETN 281520Z 07012KT 9999 -SHSN DRSN FEW008 BKN013 FEW015CB M13/M15 Q1043 R08/490195 NOSIG=
EETN 281450Z 07013KT 9000 -SHSN DRSN FEW008 BKN013 FEW015CB M13/M15 Q1043 R08/810295 NOSIG=

What conditions ? Zero cross wind, good visibility, some light snow in patches, cleared runway (was in Tallinn that day, first hand info), absolutely nothing out of the ordinary. Whatever happened here, I'm sure wx had nothing to do with it.

[ShotOne]

BKN at 1300 in snow is challenging conditions to be attempting to train visual circuits (recommend height of 1500’)but for first time in the front of an airliner doubly so. Why would one elect to conduct an initial training flight in such conditions? However I’m sure the investigation team will be grateful for your comments ruling out weather as a factor in this crash. This will save valuable time. Thank you.

[Bowmore]

BKN at 1300 in snow for visual circuits is challenging training conditions but for first time in the front of an airliner doubly so. I’m sure the investigation team will be grateful for your comments ruling out weather as a factor in this crash. This will save valuable time. Thank you.


9 km visibility in feeble snowshowers and 1300 ft broken clouds should not be challenging to fly with an experienced TRE. Even for a first timer. I do not see what the extra challenge here might be.

[Intrance]

BKN at 1300 in snow is challenging conditions to be attempting to train visual circuits (recommend height of 1500’)but for first time in the front of an airliner doubly so. Why would one elect to conduct an initial training flight in such conditions? However I’m sure the investigation team will be grateful for your comments ruling out weather as a factor in this crash. This will save valuable time. Thank you.

I don't know if you've ever been in the Baltics or Tallinn specifically, but waiting for perfect weather in winter to do only visual circuits would be quite tricky and a giant waste of time :rolleyes:. As far as I am aware, there is also not a requirement for base training to be visual circuits and they are often not possible due traffic. Vectors and instrument approaches are fairly likely to be flown as well.

Besides that, the METAR is really not that terrible, even for training. Take a look at the video on the first page to check the actual weather. And that was similar to the weather it was most of the day. No huge shower storms or terrible visibility, just a flake here and there and the isolated shower at some point. So yeah, discounting the weather as factor might be over the top, but IMHO, so is your interpretation of the METAR and it's impact on the safety of the flight.

[ShotOne]

“Vectors and instrument approaches are fairly likely to be flown...” Except the report clearly specified they were flying visual circuits. If they’d been at the airbus recommended circuit altitude that would put them mostly in cloud. The bottom line is we don’t know how this aircraft ended up hitting the ground so hard. It wasn’t just the weather But very inexperienced pilots in marginal visual conditions is a good start point. Did commercial pressure influence the call to train in these conditions?

[Intrance]

Which report would that be? Not picking a fight or anything, but so far the only thing officially stated by the Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau (as far as I can see on their site) has been that is was a training flight performing touch and go practice related to the typerating training.

[EDML]

What is the Problem with the weather here?


Visibility was > 10km, few clouds at 800ft, broken 1300ft. That is more than enough for a pattern usually being flown at 1000ft.


Furthermore, on the video it was cleary visible that the conditions with regards to clouds and visibility where even better.


The accident happened on touch down - no problem with any cloud cover there at all.

[It's only Me]

However, should one want to remain VMC, an A320 whose circuit height is 1500' agl should remain 1000' clear of cloud.

[Lascaille]

The bottom line is we don’t know how this aircraft ended up hitting the ground so hard.

We kinda do, it seems established from multiple reports that it hit the ground hard due to dual engine failure following a touch-and-go that came close to lacking the the 'go' due to reported pitch control issues.

Are you suggesting that the touch-and-go was also a hard landing that caused whatever followed?

[ShotOne]

Really? So you’re telling us that in the course of a routine touch and go some gear doors just fell off and both engines suddenly failed??

[Lascaille]

Really? So you’re telling us that in the course of a routine touch and go some gear doors just fell off and both engines suddenly failed??

Well that's the question, isn't it?

We know the final landing was hard, but we're not sure yet about the touch-and-go. We know it happened due to FR24, and we know (assume) something was wrong after that point as no altitude data was recorded for that flight. We suspect therefore air data failure (do we?)

I suggested upthread it could have been due to a bird (flock) strike leading to air data failure leading to takeoff in alternate law (with slow pitch-up due to as yet un-indicated reduced engine thrust) followed by dual flameout.

If you're suggesting the touch-and-go was hard enough to cause the damage then that definitely makes sense (something had to cause it) but then I'd ask why the commander didn't abort the 'go'? And what's the suggested failure path from 'hard landing' to 'pitch control failure' through to 'dual engine failure'?

[ShotOne]

I didn’t suggest anything but a main landing gear door was recovered from a village 3 miles away which points to a hard impact prior to the final landing

Multiple bird strike would leave plenty of physical evidence. There has been no mention of this theory other than by yourself

[andrasz]

Really? So you’re telling us that in the course of a routine touch and go some gear doors just fell off and both engines suddenly failed??
Please take the effort to read some of the past posts. In the initial statement of the Estonian AIB it is clearly stated that after a normal approach, touch down and go-around the aircraft "failed to gain height and did not respond to control inputs" and subsequently touched the runway with both engines and the open gear doors (not mentioned but by inference the gears were already in transit) before being able to gain height. The pilots immediately did a 180 to return to land from the oposite direction, the engines failed after completing the turn but before touchdown.

[Lascaille]

There has been no mention of this theory other than by yourself

Yes, it's my theory alone, and I don't even say it's particularly likely.

I was just really trying to get some ideas flowing... a bit of healthy speculation and debate. There's no bodycount and therefore no headline news but the hardware failures do seem intriguing, don't you think?

[CargoOne]

ShotOne have some problem with Smartlynx, it is quite clear from his other posts on this forum.

[ShotOne]

I don’t have a problem with Smartlynx but with account which just doesn’t add up. (Yes I did read it andrasz). We’re being asked to believe that in the course of a routine flight the aircraft suddenly failed to respond to any inputs and shortly afterwards both engines lost power. Just let’s think through how many separate but simultaneous systems failures it takes to achieve that.

[Lascaille]

Just let’s think through how many separate but simultaneous systems failures it takes to achieve that.

I've had a thought which for some reason didn't occur to me before - during the touch and go there's the first touchdown (not reported as hard) then the 'pitch issues'.

Subsequent to that the aircraft becomes airborne then descends to strike the ground with the gear in transit, so the engine nacelles strike the ground.

With that in mind it is quite likely that the subsequent problems (dual engine failure) are caused by that engine ground strike, and that the primary problems (pitch authority) aren't associated with those later issues, by that I mean, not linked by any system relationship.

For some reason this escaped me on first reading.

[CargoOne]

I don’t have a problem with Smartlynx but with account which just doesn’t add up. (Yes I did read it andrasz). We’re being asked to believe that in the course of a routine flight the aircraft suddenly failed to respond to any inputs and shortly afterwards both engines lost power. Just let’s think through how many separate but simultaneous systems failures it takes to achieve that.

This is what you wrote in T&E section - "Would they have chosen to fly with a small airline in a former-Soviet republic operating far from its regulator with a business model which hinges on high turnover of very low-paid pilots?". You have an agenda and trying to attach some silly arguments regarding the weather to it.

[andrasz]

let’s think through how many separate but simultaneous systems failures it takes to achieve that.



How about one: incorrect power setting on g/a... ?
An airline that must not be named managed to bend and soot a rather big lump of aluminium alloy not so long ago doing exactly that...

[Intrance]

I’m still wondering where this statement about “the report clearly stating visual circuits” came from :P .

That’s where the whole weather story hinged on but is now quiet about it...

Besides that, yes... read the initial statement by the Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau. The info has been there for some time. I will speculate a bit and say that the main issue is to figure out what caused the pitch issue on the Go part of the touch and go.

Sequence:

- Successful landing
- Pitch/control issue and unable to gain altitude but did liftoff
- Impacted runway with engines and gear doors, so likely gear was already in transit up
- Managed liftoff again, climbout and turn initiated to land on 26
- After turn, double engine failure, quite probably due damage sustained from initial impact after the pitch issue

No birds or hard touch and go mentioned anywhere (yet). Weather, don’t rule it out as factor but also don’t be dramatic about what is essentially a pretty decent winter flying day. It’s not like they were out doing base training with RVR 550m and VV 200ft or something.

[Enos]

A cloud base of 1300ft on visual circuits, few at 800ft, light snow, low sun, take away the matcho pilot attitude of i can cope with anything, so they should have been able to as well, these are marginal conditions for brand new guys to type, granted I know at this time of year it's good weather up north.

Having watched AF447 loads in CRM classes and not being an Airbus pilot is there any chance the trainee could have pushed forward on the side stick this cancelling out the training Captains inputs (what the inexperienced trainee saw didn't match his mental model while overloaded)

It seems very strange after all these years of this never happening on an Airbus it happens on a training flight.

The trainer mentally wouldn't want to pull the side stick so far back close to the ground, (to cancel out the trainees input) the trainee wouldn't have the same feel for the control input ??

[Lascaille]

is there any chance the trainee could have pushed forward on the side stick this cancelling out the training Captains inputs


You are correct on how the inputs would combine, but the 'dual input' verbal alert would be sounding, and the priority indicator on the glareshield would be lit.

[compressor stall]

...and that should cause the TRE to push the red button and lock out the other stick.

[joe falchetto 64]

...and that should cause the TRE to push the red button and lock out the other stick.

The TRI (or TRE) would have pushed the "take over push button" at the same time he was saying "I have control" as per Airbus Standard Procedure...

[Lascaille]

And if we continue the train of thought and suppose that the trainee for some reason (seizure!) accidentally pushed and held the takeover button on their stick - or that their sidestick suffered a malfunction such that their takeover button became permanently pressed - then even in such a case the TRE's sidestick would regain priority once the TRE pushed their 'takeover' button, as the last discrete button press (by which specifically we mean a transition from unpressed to pressed, not a continuation of the pressed state) assigns priority.

Thusly a wedged/locked sidestick with a wedged/locked priority button is still overridden with any single press of the priority button on the other stick at any later point in time.

What could not be overridden, I believe, would be 'rapidfire' of the priority button on the trainee's side.

I could only see that type of input happening - in the remotest of chances - if the relevant wires to the button had become loose or fractured and were intermittently making and breaking contact as the wire moved.

I suspect also this can be ruled out as I would imagine that the sidestick buttons are double-pole-changeover type, with a button press simultaneously closing one circuit and opening another? I imagine this knowing that even the brake pedal interlock switches on economy cars work this way. But I do not know for sure!

[Volume]

For me this looks like a much, much simpler scenario. And it did happen before.
If you do not apply full thrust for the go-around (and you do not need this for an empty aircraft on training flights) you do not trigger the TOGA logic, your autopilot still tries to land the aircraft.
"the aircraft suddenly failed to respond to any inputs and shortly afterwards both engines lost power" This is what you expect from an active autopilot which you ask to land the aircraft...
Computers do not do what you want them to do, but what you ask them to do... Learn the language of the computer if you want to use it. To initiate a go-around you have to advance the throttles all the way to the TOGA detent. If you don´t, your aircraft behaves strangely and won´t go around the way you want it to.
This accident is probably the same issue as the 777 in Dubai, just on a different type of aircraft and hence a different type of fingertrouble initiating a go-around (or not initiating it...).

[FlightDetent]

^^^ rubbish

[Volume]

https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Safety-First-23.pdf
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/793232/ao2007044.pdf

[Intrance]

https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Safety-First-23.pdf
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/793232/ao2007044.pdf

Not sure about the logic of that 'simpler' scenario... autopilot trying to fly the plane on a takeoff roll? That would mean autopilot engaged on the ground before takeoff? I'm pretty sure they don't do autolands during the basetraining so I see no logical reason why the autopilot would have any kind of control during a touch & go...

And the first part of the thrust lever movement is still direct control in the Airbus, correct? So even if you don't move them all the way to the TOGA detent, you should still get a bunch of thrust. Perhaps the logic doesn't change but there shouldn't be any autopilot engaged sooo....

But I don't fly the Airbus so maybe I lack some knowledge there. Your simpler scenario just doesn't make any sense to me, perhaps my type is too simple :rolleyes:. The two PDFs you linked also don't really seem relevant as they treat go-arounds performed during the approach and from autopilot engaged situations.

[wiedehopf]

@intrance

could still influence the FD bars right?

so yes they would gain speed in the MCT setting as ATHR becomes inactive but if they go back to the CLB detent the ATHR kicks back in (see the second pdf and scroll to the nice diagram).

a trainee flying the FD bars could then produce the strange behaviour of the plane not wanting to climb. dual input would sound as described but maybe it wasn't recognized properly as described in other posts.

and as for the second pdf:
the PIC had more than enough thrust and speed to climb but he didn't. (in the diagram you can see the airspeed being quite high and they are still descending)
so even as he was controlling the aircraft he was probably following the FD.

even the training captain taking control might have fallen for this stuff even if he shouldn't have.

too bad FDR data is not just made public at the start of the investigation now that would reduce the speculation on defects and human factor not what actually happened :)

[Lascaille]

too bad FDR data is not just made public at the start of the investigation now that would reduce the speculation on defects and human factor not what actually happened :)

It always seems ghoulish and disrespectful to the dead to speculate too wildly about human failures, mistakes and suchlike in an incident which claims lives, especially the lives of the flight deck crew.

In a bloodless incident like this I quite enjoy the chance to harmlessly speculate, bounce scenarios off people and learn some systems knowledge.

[Intrance]

If you have just made a successful landing in the A320, and you don't set proper TOGA power, what mode does the automation revert to? What will the FD show? Will it be approach mode and basically only show a localizer perhaps? I'd doubt anyone will try to fly a FD with the vertical guidance showing level or just completely missing for a takeoff roll...

The scenario just sounds like a bit of a reach honestly. But who knows. I'd still put my money on some sort of technical issue or perhaps the dual input issue.

[FlightDetent]

Volume, thank you for the links, my favourite would be this one: https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2012/f-zu120313/pdf/f-zu120313.pdf.

Neither of the three has any relevance to the situation in Tallin, I believe. Sorry for my brevity in the morning. The bolded text below is yours.

If you do not apply full thrust for the go-around It is was not a go-around, but a touch-and-go. In the context a seriously different thing.

an empty aircraft on training flights standard base-training load as per Airbus training manual is +10t ballast, not empty

full thrust for the go-around (and you do not need this You're starting the "-and-go" part of the show after some essential re-configuration from around 90 kts. with maybe no more than 900 mtrs left. The only way to reasonably assure T/O perf is to go full TOGA, no middle ground.

not trigger the TOGA logic, your autopilot still tries to land the aircraft no, it was not engaged for the preceding landing.

"the aircraft suddenly failed to respond to any inputs and shortly afterwards both engines lost power" This is what you expect from an active autopilot which you ask to land the aircraft... Without attacking the quote's accuracy - which may be prudent later: not on Airbus. To make an input is to pull, and pull on the stick disengages the A/P. I am not saying the aircraft remained responsive, but if tragically so then it was not a result of A/P engaged.

Also there would be no leftover flight directors.

[FlightDetent]

successful landing in the A320, and you don't set proper TOGA power, what mode does the automation revert to? What will the FD show? Nothing engaged, nothing armed. Empty.

[Elephant and Castle]

If the AC had remained in Flare mode a pitch down order would be introduced and the behaviour and feel of the flight controls would be very different to what a trainee would be used to. Any release of the side stick, before flight mode has resumed, would mean an immediate pitch down. This would be compounded if the attitude at 50`on the approach was very nose down, as that is the reference point the system uses for the flare manoeuvre.

An unstable approach path with a steep nose down attitude crossing 50´followed by a hard landing with a failure of the air ground sensing logic would have prevent the aircraft flight control laws transitioning to ground mode. At "rotate" the trainee would have pulled the side stick to start the rotation, if he then released the pitch input on the side stick (as in a normal T/O) the aircraft would have pitched down and maybe made contact with the runway. If we combine this with an over-keen "positive climb - gear up" call the aircraft might have contacted the runway with the gear in transit. Leading to damage of the gear doors and engine contact with the ground.

[tubby linton]

If there had been a technical problem Airbus would have issued a notice to operators by now.Has anybody heard of one being issued?
The last time I did base training in the aircraft the brief was after touchdown the trainer would reconfigure the aircraft, whilst the trainee kept it straight. Once this had occurred the call was to stand the thrust up , and when stable apply TOGA thrust. Did the trainee not apply Toga before the end of the runway?

[Volume]

Did the trainee not apply Toga before the end of the runway? That´s what I suspect.
And this would not be a "technical problem", but mishandling of the aircraft. Airbus did issue several publications to clarify the use of the throttles and the TOGA logic if no full power is required.

It is was not a go-around, but a touch-and-go. Is it yet clear, how much it really touched? It may have kissed the ground, but not enough to trigger the ground logic. Excessive speed was mentioned in the reports.
The FDR will tell.

[macdo]

If there had been a technical problem Airbus would have issued a notice to operators by now.Has anybody heard of one being issued?
The last time I did base training in the aircraft the brief was after touchdown the trainer would reconfigure the aircraft, whilst the trainee kept it straight. Once this had occurred the call was to stand the thrust up , and when stable apply TOGA thrust. Did the trainee not apply Toga before the end of the runway?

That's how we do it. Is it possible that the trainer got distracted and they tried to get airborne with the TL's just stood up? Hard to believe as CM1 should have put their hands on the TL's for the remainder of the take off run and someone should have been reading the FMA. Even if the TL's were only pushed to CL detent I would have thought there would be enough power to get the thing airborne in an empty aeroplane, but I guess that if they were not and the thing was struggling to launch an early Gear Up could have squatted it back down on to the moving gear. Going to be a fascinating story when it all come out.

[andrasz]

Many moons ago I witnessed a 73' do a derated takeoff with a slight (1-2 kts) tailwind component. FO instinctively selected gear up as soon as mains left the ground, just as a slight increase in tailwind caused the aircaft to slowly sink. Full thrust was applied but with the time lag the plane settled back on the runway with gears retracted, sliding on the engine pods and the rear fuselage for a few seconds until it climbed away. Crew were unaware of the ground strike and continued takeoff, ony to return after the aircraft failed to pressurize. Interestingly the engine pods had minimal damage (with no damage to the engines themselves) but the fuselage needed extensive repairs.

[FlightDetent]

macdo / tubby: the airbus drill is bit different. Stand up first, then conf change followed by TOGA. (checked the book right now).

Volume: the problematics explained so well is PLENTY of power, but automatics / guidance still aimed to land. Does not apply here. Their automatics were off by the nature of the landing done, but not enough thrust... The "touch-and-go" is "land, then roll quite a bit, and takeoff": no way to fool WoW there. (red herring anyway)

[tubby linton]

Do you have a reference Flightdetent?
We always did it as I described , and recounted here.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5423027340f0b61342000a89/Airbus_A320-214_G-OZBY_07-14.pdf

[FlightDetent]

These are leaked into public domain (noted: yours is more recent - useful read BTW!)

http://elearning.onurair.com.tr/webcmi/data/Airbus/A320/UFI12381/BSTR_A320.pdf
http://cbt.brusselsairlines.com/webcmi/data/CourseContent/O5A11401/BASE-TRAINING.pdf
https://www.cockpitseeker.com/wp-content/uploads/goodies/ac/a380_fctp_package/fctp/fctp.pdf

[ShotOne]

If the thrust levers had been stood up but then not advanced to TOGA it would likely have produced the flight path that occurred. But can anyone suggest a technical failure or failures which would fit in with what the operator has said happened?

[FLEXJET]

What about the possibility of a double ELAC failure at the wrong time and side sticks U/S?

[A4]

.....the chances of which are infinitely small! What about aliens......:hmm:

[macdo]

While not supporting any particular failure in this incident,with Airbus you can never discount the impossible. Years ago, we were told that it was impossible to lose all 6 screens, but one of ours did over the Bay of Biscay. All ended happily, eventually Airbus came up with a 'why' this happened when it was thought impossible.

[andrasz]

Taxied past the aircraft yesterday, still sitting on the ramp where it was parked right after the accident, with engines covered and gear doors (at least what remains) hanging. Does not look like it is going anywhere anytime soon.. W/O?

[ShotOne]

Two months down the line after, allegedly, an exceptional combination of sudden technical failures caused a near-catastrophe in s widely used passenger jet. Anyone care to comment on this inexplicable deafening silence?

[tescoapp]

There is one bloke that does accident investigation in Estonia with I think another two helping neither of which have any high level engineering qualifications. There is no real skill set in country for the systems analysis. Normally there is not a lot of on going incidents to work on hence everything is probably getting farmed out. Its not like the UK where there are several investigators full time with multiple full time resources to call on.

The bloke is probably still getting his head round how an airbus works.

What's happened to the airframe?

[Intrance]

Taxied past the aircraft yesterday, still sitting on the ramp where it was parked right after the accident, with engines covered and gear doors (at least what remains) hanging. Does not look like it is going anywhere anytime soon.. W/O?

It has actually been towed between stands and there is activity around the plane fairly often with doors open, people moving in and around. It is still in poor state though, with the soot still on the engines from the apparent fire(s).

Wonder if the trainees have been cleared for duty again already, Smartlynx was doing a bunch of base training yesterday or the day before.

[andrasz]

Taxied past it again yesterday, same position, exactly the same state as five weeks ago.
Saw another white tail 320 reg XY-AGO at a gate, apparently leased in from Myanmar Airways to fill the capacity gap for the summer charters.

[andrasz]

The aircraft is still parked where it was four months ago with hanging gear doors, but now sans engines. Given the long inactvity it could be a w/o.

[ShotOne]

Well it’s 2019 now, no further official information about the cause of what now appears to be a hull-loss. Any news?

[Sidestick_n_Rudder]

FWIW, it took the Germans 7 years to investigate the SIA MUC incident, so don’t be too harsh on Estonian investigators...

[Intrance]

Definitely hull loss. Plane was purchased by Magnetic MRO I believe, and parted out with the main fuselage being transported away from the airport on the 14th last month. Otherwise no news on the report or investigation that I know of. I think the most recent English language report took them a little over a year to complete and was about a decompression of a small business jet. This crash landing of the Smartlynx could be considered a bit more complex and probably will take longer, but who knows, perhaps something will pop up next month.

Blurry pic of the fuselage being removed:

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1124/d9bd510f_e744_4826_abf3_ae5389b89943_6986250ec5954865474d0ac a415798daad7108e9.jpeg

[FlightDetent]

Latest FCTM revision comes with a new paragraph. In case of an in-flight failure during circuit training, the next take-off should be (after a full stop, presumably) considered a new dispatch with release as per MEL if required. Any leads this is connected?

[FreezingDrizzle]

As far as I understand, if there are failures during cirquit training, the MEL should now be applied also after each touch and go, not just full stop landing. The final report will most likely reveal that this is related.

[giggitygiggity]

As far as I understand, if there are failures during cirquit training, the MEL should now be applied also after each touch and go, not just full stop landing. The final report will most likely reveal that this is related.

Really? If I go around, must I apply the MEL before I land again? If I get a no-go item such as an aircraft that will no longer compress due to a tail strike, what am I supposed to do? The MEL can be used for information, but not procedures to be followed as they're designed for use on the ground. Some procedures might ask you to pop cbs, those procedures are not approved for use in flight.

[FlightDetent]

GG you are reading it all wrong. Me guilty as charged, things lost in translation of my post as well.

Your example is good, just do not put GA into the explanation. Should you have a tailstrike during circuit touch and go training, surely you just come back. And that is when the new wording from Airbus comes to rule. After that touchdown we are told to stop and apply new maintenance dispatch release, including MEL relief and restriction if possible or required. Kind of a no brainer huh, nobody would continue the circuits with a scratched tail.

Well, for some gremlins it might not be as clear cut and immediately obvious. BRK SYS 2 fault? Hot Air fault?

Now, most likely as a result of a human factors cluster flop, a new sentence is introduced to clarify that a fault during circuits ends the exercise with the next touchdown, and once stopped the ground phase MEL restrictions would apply.

It seems related to this accident, hence I revivied the topic.

[FreezingDrizzle]

Really? If I go around, must I apply the MEL before I land again? If I get a no-go item such as an aircraft that will no longer compress due to a tail strike, what am I supposed to do? The MEL can be used for information, but not procedures to be followed as they're designed for use on the ground. Some procedures might ask you to pop cbs, those procedures are not approved for use in flight.

As already pointed out, this FCOM revision was related to cirquit training, not to normal revenue flights. In cirquit training this means that you cannot perform a touch and go (or a full stop and a new take off) IF you have new failures and IF you haven’t applied the MEL. If, say, an ELAC fails during cirquit, instead of a planned touch and go, you must now make a full stop landing, apply the MEL and then take off again if allowed by MEL. Obviously if you are airborne, you’ll handle your ECAM actions the same as always.

[compressor stall]

The FCTM revision came out from Airbus in Dec 18 (and obviously took time to filter down to line pilot level). I've been told there's a link.

[tubby linton]

Simon H has written up the accident report.What a horrible situation the crew found themselves in.
Accident: Smartlynx A320 at Tallinn on Feb 28th 2018, runway excursion after bad touch and go due to elevator control completely lost (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b57c3dd/0000&opt=0)

[macdo]

Jeez, that was a real Halloween read just before bed. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate saves the day.

[Capn Bloggs]

Crikey! My head really hurts after reading that...

SEC design flaw allowing for a single event, the left landing gear temporary decompression, to cause the loss of pitch control by both SECs.
Tut tut!

[DaveReidUK]

Investigation Report - Accident, Loss of Control with Airbus A320-214 near Tallinn Airport on 28.02.2018 (https://www.ojk.ee/en/system/files/fail/manus/ee0180_es_san_investigation_report_0.pdf)

[172_driver]

From a Boeing driver who hasn't got a clue about Airbus flight controls;

Is ELAC PITCH FAULT a dispatchable defect? To get a sense of the seriousness of such a message. To me it doesn't sound normal to keep resetting a computer that's not playing. Not only one, but two, computers erring quite early in on the training session. And they kept departing.

[tubby linton]

Elac 1 pitch fault is dispatchable, Elac 2 is not.

[CargoOne]

From a Boeing driver who hasn't got a clue about Airbus flight controls;

Is ELAC PITCH FAULT a dispatchable defect? To get a sense of the seriousness of such a message. To me it doesn't sound normal to keep resetting a computer that's not playing. Not only one, but two, computers erring quite early in on the training session. And they kept departing.


It is NO DISPATCH on ELAC2 and conditional on ELAC1 but here comes in play the ambiguity whether you apply MEL inside touch and goes, now it was clarified by Airbus because of this accident.

[172_driver]

Thanks, the result spoke for itself this time.

[dlcmdrx]

i´m sorry but paragraph 5 from page 15 of the report doesn´t make sense whatsoever.

And then much less what is done in paragraph 6.

5. Four seconds later, while the aircraft was approximately 950m from the end of the runway 08, flying with the airspeed of 190 kt, at 19 ft, pitch attitude maximum of 2.8° Nose Up was reached, thrust levers were moved to IDLE and the flap lever was moved from CONF2 to CONF1, moving the flaps from conf. 2 to 1+F.

6. At 15:05:21 the instructor commanded “gear up” and the gear lever was selected to GEAR UP position. Two seconds later the aircraft reached its maximum altitude over the runway – 48ft and started to descend. The pitch attitude was 0.3° Nose Up, THS remained in 1.5° Nose Up position, and thrust levers were set back to TOGA (Figure 6).

Are the investigators sure it wasn´t the plane itself and not the TRI who put the thrust to idle??

And before this, are they sure Lever position before this was fully clacked at TOGA and not sensed by the plane in MCT/CLIMB??

[Locked door]

Imagine you’re in what you think is a serviceable aircraft (or one where you haven’t yet realised the elevators have failed) with a wildly increasing airspeed approaching Vfe for the current configuration (200 knots flap 2), it might seem reasonable to reduce the thrust and retract a stage of flap (although idle thrust that close to the ground is a brave or unconsidered action). The auto thrust is disengaged with TOGA selected, there’s no way the aircraft would deliver anything other than TOGA thrust unless the thrust levers were moved back, MCT would be delivered at the next detent, the auto thrust only becomes active with a second click backwards reaching the climb detent.

I can’t imagine what it felt like when the results of those actions became apparent.

[IcePack]

I refused to take a 320 with an ELAC 1 pitch fault that had occurred on push back.
Next day got phone call to be b*****d for not following the Mel and departing. Luckily I had kept in touch with the engineer who had informed me that the cause was a rather unknown relay. He considered the relay a no go item & being at main base not worth the risk. The bloke on the phone apologised & I got a thank you letter. This was early days of the 320 early 90s. What this waffle is about is that after failure things do not always go as the manufacturer may lead you to believe. The crew imho taken more note of the intermittent ELAC failures but boy did they then do a good job.
To those who think I should have taken the aircraft as per the Mel. Well fine but I always use the proviso do I understand what is wrong with the aircraft. If I don’t I do not go. My Mel if you like.

[captplaystation]

Followed this story ( along with the gradual dismantling of the airframe as I taxied by it ) The initial rumors were quite perplexing, but nothing like as scary as the eventually revealed reality. They were lucky with a capital WTF that this didn't end with a smoking hole in the middle of the village/ houses just off the 26 threshold.

[Alexlehay]

I have just read the full report about this incident. How come both SECs got lost after receiving that one main landing gear was on the ground and the other not? I understand that they (the monitoring and control part of each SEC) received conflicting data (ground/flight mode) but it is a known scenario isn't it? In this specific case, with one MLG on the ground, you should get at least a partial deployment of the spoilers according to the FCOM but surely not the loss of those 2 computers! Anyone able to clarify this? Official report can be found on the
Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau (ESIB), sorry I'm not allowed to copy URLs.

[Alexlehay]

I am now :)

https://ojk.ee/en/content/animation-describing-accident-loss-control-arbus-a320-214-28082018-tallinn-airport

[Capn Bloggs]

That gave me the shivers.

[GUMPS_CHECK]

During my Upgrade to Captain the very same Instructor was doing my Sim and he presented me with this failure and its side-effects no one knows about . Even Airbus is not acting towards a solution for that . so basically you Sioux City but you need to fight the Airplane till the end to actually essential advance the trust seconds before touchdown to get the nose up moment to land.....

[Boeingdriver999]

There was a youtube video of the FDR trace floating around for a while but now I can’t find it. Does anyone have a link or have it saved?

Thaaanks,

BD999