EC 130 down at the Grand Canyon

[LRP]

Looks bad, RIP.

12news.com | 3 dead, 4 injured in Grand Canyon helicopter crash, police say (http://www.12news.com/article/news/local/arizona/3-dead-4-injured-in-grand-canyon-helicopter-crash-police-say/75-517184216)

A FAA employee said Eurocopter EC130 crashed under unknown circumstances in the Grand Canyon Saturday night.
Author: 12 News
Published: 10:07 PM MST February 10, 2018
GRAND CANYON, Ariz. - A helicopter carrying at least seven people crashed in the Grand Canyon Saturday evening.

Hualapai Police Department said three people have died and four more are injured.

Allen Kenitzer with the Federal Aviation Administration Officer of Communications said Eurocopter EC130 crashed under unknown circumstances in the Grand Canyon.

Hualapai Police Chief Francis Bradley said the helicopter, likely used for a tour, was from Las Vegas, Nevada.

The crash happened just before 5:30 p.m. Saturday, 60 miles northwest of Peach Springs.

A reporter from NBC affiliate KSNV

UPDATE#2: Another image from wreckage of tour helicopter crash in Grand Canyon. Pic courtesy Teddy Fujimoto. @News3LV pic.twitter.com/oyuxxq9HoO

— Gerard Ramalho (@GerardNews3LV) February 11, 2018

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DVugINtVAAA79FW.jpg

[rotorbug]

Wondering if anyone knows the reg of the EC-130 that crashed.

I flew in a EC-130 based at Grand Canyon in 2015, Reg was N831GC.

[ExGrunt]

Agreed,

Doesn’t look good - I just took my family on one of these trips earlier this year. I was surprised by how busy it was, with a dozen cabs in our group.

The arrangement was pilot+2 in front and 4 pax in the rear.
Just speculation, but looking at the numbers it may be the front end took the worst of the impact.

From the photo, it looks like it happened in the Canyon itself.

Condolences and prayers

EG

[gulliBell]

Incredible that anybody survived that one...

[Bell_ringer]

RIP.
Why do the American press first go and chat to lawyers that sue operators?
They quote history and immediately create a perception of safety issues.

[Mee3]

RIP.
Why do the American press first go and chat to lawyers that sue operators?
They quote history and immediately create a perception of safety issues.
that's how you spice up the reporting in a nation where news is a form of entertainment.

[mickjoebill]

Video and eyewitness report.

Three killed in Grand Canyon helicopter crash (http://www.wowt.com/content/news/Three-killed-in-Grand-Canyon-helicopter-crash-473724003.html)

I sincerely hope that a very negative report in Trip Advisor (now being tweeted) by passengers, who complained that a recent flight had a maintenance issue, is unrelated to this incident.

Mjb

[cncpc]

Incredible that anybody survived that one...

It looks like an auto that almost made it. Not freefall, not out of control, unless that flat open spot is just a coincidence.

[tigerfish]

Durban, I'm getting a bit rusty now on my Eurocopter's, but your picture looks more like the smaller EC120, than the EC130. Difficult because the image is a bit small.

TF

[nomorehelosforme]

RIP

Tigerfish, can you get 7 people in a 120?

[tigerfish]

No of course not. But at first glance on a small screen, the posted picture of the red helicopter at post 2, looked more like an EC120. Have since gone back and checked my own records, and I clearly mistook the lines. I used to work for the company and have flown in both types many times. However the inescapable facts are that this is clearly a real tragedy.
For me the EC130 was a great machine and the view from all seats, was superb. Unusual configuration as I recall, because it was flown from the LH front seat not the right. I was told that as the machine was intended for sight seeing work, the unusual configuration kept the collective away from passengers. As I said earlier its all a few years ago now!

TF

[Rigga]

I did that Papillon trip in September (Also all British pax) and the whole organisation was well rehearsed, practiced and run. They had 130s and 355s, I flew in a 130. I even had a chat with the pilot who, although not very long in the trade, seemed well practiced in his routine.
To be honest, they only followed a pre-set route and there was so much traffic there, only a mechanical failure would force one of them out of the route and that would be obvious to other flights.
I don't know if FDRs were installed but my flight was trialing a passenger/flight video system for sale to us punters - if that recording survived it may prove useful.
Last heard there was only one survivor
R.I.P.

[bvgs]

Flew up to the Grand Canyon when on holiday from Scotland many years ago. Hired an R44 and flew from Arizona. On landing at the airfield and booking our “ quick tour” seeing we had flown in, they upgraded us to a full tour, really nice people. All passengers were weighed and given their seat configuration. All in all lovely people and very professional. RIP.

[Heathrow Harry]

Britons killed in Grand Canyon helicopter crash named - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43025793)

Three British tourists killed in a helicopter crash in the Grand Canyon have been named by US police.

Becky Dobson, 27, Jason Hill, 32, and Stuart Hill, 30, died in Saturday's crash, the Hualapai Police said. Three other Britons and the pilot were injured when the helicopter, on a tour of the canyon, came down at about 17:20 local time (00:20 GMT) in Arizona.

It is not clear what caused the crash and eyewitnesses say rescue efforts have been hampered by high winds. Images have emerged showing flames and thick smoke rising from the boulder-strewn crash site.

Police said Britons Ellie Milward, 29, Jonathan Udall, 32, and Jennifer Barham, 39, were injured in the crash, along with pilot Scott Booth, 42.

They were rescued at 02:00 local time on Sunday and flown to University Medical Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, a statement said.
Gabby Hart, a local news reporter for the station KSNV, said it took nine hours for the survivors to be removed from the site because of the terrain and high winds.
She told BBC Radio 5 Live: "We are told by witnesses and also by rescuers that people trying to help once they saw this accident happen, they couldn't get down to the helicopter quick enough.

"They [the survivors] had to receive care there on site until emergency crews were able to remove them from the scene." The chief of the local Hualapai Police, Francis Bradley, called the incident "very tragic". He added: "Yesterday, we were hampered by severe weather conditions [and] we had gusts up to 50mph [80kmph]." He said the terrain around the crash site was also "extremely rugged".

Support and sympathy

In a statement, Brenda Halvorson, the chief executive of the helicopter company involved - Papillon Airways - said the company extended its heartfelt sympathy to the families of the dead and injured.

On its website, Papillon calls itself "the world's largest aerial sightseeing company" and says it flies more than 600,000 people a year.
The Grand Canyon, which is more than 1.6km (one mile) deep, is one of the most visited tourist attractions in the US.

A UK Foreign Office spokesperson said: "We are providing support to the families of six British visitors involved in a helicopter accident at the Grand Canyon on 10 February, and we are in close contact with the US emergency services."

[[email protected]]

Perhaps when a company flying so many tourists per year over such inhospitable terrain should have their own rescue capability to deal with the conditions.

The police chief said on TV that they (the authorities) didn't have the specialist crews available to do night SAR - perhaps that will be revisited at some point.

[Heathrow Harry]

Night SAR in the Grand Canyon........ another accident waiting to happen I'd have thought

Anyway it seems the pilot has survived so there will be an explanation sooner rather than later

[chopper2004]

that's how you spice up the reporting in a nation where news is a form of entertainment.

Hmmm well it’s heading this way over here with the likes of certain tabloids like the Fail. I do not want to read about this accident in that rag because it won’t exactly be gospel plus the readers comments can be atrocious (talk about banning flying as it’s dangerous let’s ban Helicopters etc etc blah blah ) apart from the usual sincere responses

RIP to victims and speedy recovery for the injured ....does not come at a good time as Heli Expo is in Vegas in a fortnight.

ATB

Cheers

[[email protected]]

Night SAR in the Grand Canyon........ another accident waiting to happen I'd have thoughtApart from the brown-out dust conditions for landing, nothing special - big terrain and low light levels but nothing to prevent SAR there - certainly better than having to wait for daylight to be extracted, they were there for 8 or 9 hours.

RIP for those that didn't make it and condolences to those who did and lost family or friends - very tragic.

[rotorspeed]

Very tragic indeed, RIP.

Bit surprising they operate as late, given this accident happened at sunset, so with no night SAR it doesn't leave much time for rescue if anything goes wrong.

And if the winds were so strong to hamper rescue, presumably they were pretty strong when the 130 crashed.

[Gordy]

Perhaps when a company flying so many tourists per year over such inhospitable terrain should have their own rescue capability to deal with the conditions.

The police chief said on TV that they (the authorities) didn't have the specialist crews available to do night SAR - perhaps that will be revisited at some point.

There is a rescue helicopter in the Grand Canyon, I believe staffed by Papillon. They do not however operate at night as per DOI rules.

[[email protected]]

So, as rotorspeed says - it is a surprise that they operate so late that any rescue can't be completed in daylight.

[chopper2004]

There is a rescue helicopter in the Grand Canyon, I believe staffed by Papillon. They do not however operate at night as per DOI rules.

Yep its a MD902 Explorer in black and yellow stripes though wonder if the 66th RQS out of Nellis may have provided assistance with a Pave Hawk?

cheers

[henra]

He added: "Yesterday, we were hampered by severe weather conditions [and] we had gusts up to 50mph [80kmph]." He said the terrain around the crash site was also "extremely rugged".


Hmmm, 50 mph winds in such a rugged Mountain terrain at that elevation with a heavily loaded helicopter? (assuming the winds didn't just start immediately after the crash).
Are there any restrictions for wind speeds for scenic flights over the canyon?

[Nubian]

So, as rotorspeed says - it is a surprise that they operate so late that any rescue can't be completed in daylight.

From the pictures in the article, it seems a company 130 landed with some sort of medical aid, and it did not look as it was dark......

[Rigga]

The police chief said the 1st responders took 20 mins to get there - so they didn't walk, and could not use wheels...

[[email protected]]

Henra has a good point - if the conditions were so poor that the rescue could not be made by the company helicopter, why were they flying? There is something not quite straight with everyone's story.

The 10 o'clock news showed another helicopter landing people to give assistance so where was the brownout dust conditions and the 50 mph wind?

[212man]

Henra has a good point - if the conditions were so poor that the rescue could not be made by the company helicopter, why were they flying? There is something not quite straight with everyone's story.

The 10 o'clock news showed another helicopter landing people to give assistance so where was the brownout dust conditions and the 50 mph wind?

Surely you don't get brown out with 50 mph winds?

[twinstar_ca]

Flew the canyon 2 years ago in may with a different operator... is very inhospitable when things go south... RIP to the deceased and speedy recovery to the survivors... :(:(

[TylerMonkey]

AvSafety network lists this call sign.
This pic is an old archive photo off google , pilot unknown.

https://i62.servimg.com/u/f62/11/94/64/62/45460b10.jpg

[Heliringer]

]Henra has a good point - if the conditions were so poor that the rescue could not be made by the company helicopter, why were they flying? [/COLOR] There is something not quite straight with everyone's story.

The 10 o'clock news showed another helicopter landing people to give assistance so where was the brownout dust conditions and the 50 mph wind?

They were flying because in Tourism flying they fly everyday unless it is unflyable. The visitors are only there once normally so you have to take their money while you can. That is the commercial reality. Sad but true.

[ChrisVJ]

We were in LV till that morning. We had five days of brilliant sunshine, light winds if any and temps from 21 to 25 deg C. Of course winds in desert 80 miles away might be very different.

We have done the "Night" tour of the strip by helicopter and it was very, very professional. Aircraft appeared to be in excellent condition.

Judging by the video just shown on TV here they were lucky anyone survived. Serious blaze from the machine.

[ExGrunt]

NTSB press conference announced:
Media Advisory: NTSB Briefing on Grand Canyon Helicopter Crash
2/12/2018
​WASHINGTON (Feb. 12, 2018) — The NTSB will today hold an on-camera briefing followed by a telephone conference call on the Feb. 10, 2018, crash of a tour helicopter at the Grand Canyon.

WHEN:
1 p.m. Pacific time (on-camera briefing)
1:30 p.m. Pacific time (telephone conference)

WHERE:
City Hall, Boulder City, Nevada
401 California Avenue
Boulder City, Nevada 89005

WHO:
Stephen Stein, Investigator-in-Charge

DETAILS:
Teleconference number:
Toll free, USA: 888-500-6975
International: 719-325-2330
Conference ID: 5950992

[jugofpropwash]

Apparently, different rules because the flight was on tribal lands:
Grand Canyon helicopter crashed on tribal land with fewer rules - Chicago Tribune (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-grand-canyon-helicopter-crash-20180212-story.html)

[[email protected]]

Aviation attorney Gary C. Robb said potential factors were winds of 10 mph with gusts of 20 mph, pilot error, mechanical failure or pressure within the company to meet the demand for tours.

Has someone wheeled out another 'aviation expert' to make incorrect statements or is he referring to weather conditions at Vegas rather than in the canyon?

Is this a form of positive discrimination where 'special rules' or alleviation from current regulations are allowed simply because you are dealing with a native Indian reservation? If there is a safety case for limiting flying (curfew) in the rest of the canyon then it should apply to the reservation area as well.

[Bell_ringer]

Aviation attorney Gary C. Robb...

Robb said the EC-130 helicopter flown Saturday generally lacks a system to keep it from exploding, denying passengers a few extra minutes to try to escape.

Why do they keep referring to this muppet in accidents?
Let's whip everyone up in a litigious frenzy shall we?

If the US is like other countries, national parks often have restrictions as they are protected areas so limitations for noise, for example, apply.
If it's private land and you're happy to swap some disturbance for money then why not?

[[email protected]]

If it's private land and you're happy to swap some disturbance for money then why not? That's fine, but there is the responsibility for the safety of the tourists who would, anywhere else in the Canyon, have regulated flights. Just because the reservation wants to make money, doesn't mean they can be exempt from sensible safety rules.

I suspect now that many tourists will stick to the more regulated areas for their tours.

[Bell_ringer]

That's fine, but there is the responsibility for the safety of the tourists who would, anywhere else in the Canyon, have regulated flights. Just because the reservation wants to make money, doesn't mean they can be exempt from sensible safety rules.

I suspect now that many tourists will stick to the more regulated areas for their tours.

Unless I am misunderstanding, in this instance, regulated means they restrict the number of flights and type of operations. It isn't necessarily an indication of more or less safe, just that the National park is more fussy to prevent the area being adversely affected by aircraft traffic.
I take it they probably license out the rights to fly in the area so this also has a bearing on cost to operators?

[[email protected]]

As i understand it - flights elsewhere in the Canyon are regulated with strict curfew which would ensure safe return or rescue before dark. From what the media are saying, that doesn't apply to the Reservation area along with limits on landing in the Canyon.

[Gordy]

I suspect now that many tourists will stick to the more regulated areas for their tours.

I suspect most will not know the difference or even care.

Many moons ago when I flew tours in Hawaii, I met tourists who just wanted the cheapest flight they could get, and did not care about safety.

[[email protected]]

I'm sure that is the case - right up to the point where they are involved in an accident:{Then the lawyers start circling.......

[LRP]

Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 50-2—Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of the Grand Canyon National Park, AZ

Section 1. Applicability. This rule prescribes special operating rules for all persons operating aircraft in the following airspace, designated as the Grand Canyon National Park Special Flight Rules Area:
That airspace extending upward from the surface up to but not including 14,500 feet MSL within an area bounded by a line beginning at lat. 36°09′30″ N., long. 114°03′00″ W.; northeast to lat. 36°14′00″ N., long. 113°09′50″ W.; thence northeast along the boundary of the Grand Canyon National Park to lat. 36°24′47″ N., long. 112°52′00″ W.; to lat. 36°30′30″ N., long. 112°36′15″ W. to lat. 36°21′30″ N., long. 112°00′00″ W. to lat. 36°35′30″ N., long. 111°53′10″ W., to lat. 36°53′00″ N., long. 111°36′45″ W. to lat. 36°53′00″ N., long. 111°33′00″ W.; to lat. 36°19′00″ N., long. 111°50′50″ W.; to lat. 36°17′00″ N., long. 111°42′00″ W.; to lat. 35°59′30″ N., long. 111°42′00″ W.; to lat. 35°57′30″ N., long. 112°03′55″ W.; thence counterclockwise via the 5 statute mile radius of the Grand Canyon Airport airport reference point (lat. 35°57′09″ N., long. 112°08′47″ W.) to lat. 35°57′30″ N., long. 112°14′00″ W.; to lat. 35°57′30″ N., long. 113°11′00″ W.; to lat. 35°42′30″ N., long. 113°11′00″ W.; to 35°38′30″ N.; long. 113°27′30″ W.; thence counterclockwise via the 5 statute mile radius of the Peach Springs VORTAC to lat. 35°41′20″ N., long. 113°36′00″ W.; to lat. 35°55′25″ N., long. 113°49′10″ W.; to lat. 35°57′45″ N., 113°45′20″ W.; thence northwest along the park boundary to lat. 36°02′20″ N., long. 113°50′15″ W.; to 36°00′10″ N., long. 113°53′45″ W.; thence to the point of beginning.
Section 3. Aircraft operations: general. Except in an emergency, no person may operate an aircraft in the Special Flight Rules, Area under VFR on or after September 22, 1988, or under IFR on or after April 6, 1989, unless the operation—(a) Is conducted in accordance with the following procedures:
Note: The following procedures do not relieve the pilot from see-and-avoid responsibility or compliance with FAR 91.119.
(1) Unless necessary to maintain a safe distance from other aircraft or terrain—
(i) Remain clear of the areas described in Section 4; and
(ii) Remain at or above the following altitudes in each sector of the canyon:
Eastern section from Lees Ferry to North Canyon and North Canyon to Boundary Ridge: as prescribed in Section 5.
Boundary Ridge to Supai Point (Yumtheska Point): 10,000 feet MSL.
Western section from Diamond Creek to the Grant Wash Cliffs: 8,000 feet MSL.
(2) Proceed through the four flight corridors describe in Section 4 at the following altitudes unless otherwise authorized in writing by the Flight Standards District Office:
Northbound

11,500 or
13,500 feet MSL
Southbound

>10,500 or
>12,500 feet MSL
(b) Is authorized in writing by the Flight Standards District Office and is conducted in compliance with the conditions contained in that authorization. Normally authorization will be granted for operation in the areas described in Section 4 or below the altitudes listed in Section 5 only for operations of aircraft necessary for law enforcement, firefighting, emergency medical treatment/evacuation of persons in the vicinity of the Park; for support of Park maintenance or activities; or for aerial access to and maintenance of other property located within the Special Flight Rules Area. Authorization may be issued on a continuing basis.
(c)(1) Prior to November 1, 1988, is conducted in accordance with a specific authorization to operate in that airspace incorporated in the operator's part 135 operations specifications in accordance with the provisions of SFAR 50-1, notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 4 and 5; and
(2) On or after November 1, 1988, is conducted in accordance with a specific authorization to operate in that airspace incorporated in the operated in the operator's operations specifications and approved by the Flight Standards District Office in accordance with the provisions of SFAR 50-2.
(d) Is a search and rescue mission directed by the U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center.
(e) Is conducted within 3 nautical miles of Whitmore Airstrip, Pearce Ferry Airstrip, North Rim Airstrip, Cliff Dwellers Airstrip, or Marble Canyon Airstrip at an altitudes less than 3,000 feet above airport elevation, for the purpose of landing at or taking off from that facility. Or
(f) Is conducted under an IFR clearance and the pilot is acting in accordance with ATC instructions. An IFR flight plan may not be filed on a route or at an altitude that would require operation in an area described in Section 4.
Section 4. Flight-free zones. Except in an emergency or if otherwise necessary for safety of flight, or unless otherwise authorized by the Flight Standards District Office for a purpose listed in Section 3(b), no person may operate an aircraft in the Special Flight Rules Area within the following areas:
(a) Desert View Flight-Free Zone. Within an area bounded by a line beginning at Lat. 35°59′30″ N., Long. 111°46′20″ W. to 35°59′30″ N., Long. 111°52′45″ W.; to Lat. 36°04′50″ N., Long. 111°52′00″ W.; to Lat. 36°06′00″ N., Long. 111°46′20″ W.; to the point of origin; but not including the airspace at and above 10,500 feet MSL within 1 mile of the western boundary of the zone. The area between the Desert View and Bright Angel Flight-Free Zones is designated the “Zuni Point Corridor.”
(b) Bright Angel Flight-Free Zone. Within an area bounded by a line beginning at Lat. 35°59′30″ N., Long. 111°55′30″ W.; to Lat. 35°59′30″ N., Long. 112°04′00″ W.; thence counterclockwise via the 5 statute mile radius of the Grand Canyon Airport point (Lat. 35°57′09″ N., Long. 112°08′47″ W.) to Lat. 36°01′30″ N., Long. 112°11′00″ W.; to Lat. 36°06′15″ N., Long. 112°12′50″ W.; to Lat. 36°14′40″ N., Long. 112°08′50″ W.; to Lat. 36°14′40″ N., Long. 111°57′30″ W.; to Lat. 36°12′30″ N., Long. 111°53′50″ W.; to the point of origin; but not including the airspace at and above 10,500 feet MSL within 1 mile of the eastern boundary between the southern boundary and Lat. 36°04′50″ N. or the airspace at and above 10,500 feet MSL within 2 miles of the northwest boundary. The area bounded by the Bright Angel and Shinumo Flight-Free Zones is designated the “Dragon Corridor.”
(c) Shinumo Flight-Free Zone. Within an area bounded by a line beginning at Lat. 36°04′00″ N., Long. 112°16′40″ W.; northwest along the park boundary to a point at Lat. 36°12′47″ N., Long. 112°30′53″ W.; to Lat. 36°21′15″ N., Long. 112°20′20″ W.; east along the park boundary to Lat. 36°21′15″ N., Long. 112°13′55″ W.; to Lat. 36°14′40″ N., Long. 112°11′25″ W.; to the point of origin. The area between the Thunder River/Toroweap and Shinumo Flight Free Zones is designated the “Fossil Canyon Corridor.”
(d) Toroweap/Thunder River Flight-Free Zone. Within an area bounded by a line beginning at Lat. 36°22′45″ N., Long. 112°20′35″ W.; thence northwest along the boundary of the Grand Canyon National Park to Lat. 36°17′48″ N., Long. 113°03′15″ W.; to Lat. 36°15′00″ N., Long. 113°07′10″ W.; to Lat. 36°10′30″ N., Long. 113°07′10″ W.; thence east along the Colorado River to the confluence of Havasu Canyon (Lat. 36°18′40″ N., Long. 112°45′45″ W.;) including that area within a 1.5 nautical mile radius of Toroweap Overlook (Lat. 36°12′45″ N., Long. 113°03′30″ W.); to the point of origin; but not including the following airspace designated as the “Tuckup Corridor”: at or above 10,500 feet MSL within 2 nautical miles either side of a line extending between Lat. 36°24′47″ N., Long. 112°48′50″ W. and Lat. 36°17′10″ N., Long. 112°48′50″ W.; to the point of origin.
Section 5. Minimum flight altitudes. Except in an emergency or if otherwise necessary for safety of flight, or unless otherwise authorized by the Flight Standards District Office for a purpose listed in Section 3(b), no person may operate an aircraft in the Special Flight Rules Area at an altitude lower than the following:
(a) Eastern section from Lees Ferry to North Canyon: 5,000 feet MSL.
(b) Eastern section from North Canyon to Boundary Ridge: 6,000 feet MSL.
(c) Boundary Ridge to Supai (Yumtheska) Point: 7,500 feet MSL.
(d) Supai Point to Diamond Creek: 6,500 feet MSL.
(e) Western section from Diamond Creek to the Grand Wash Cliffs: 5,000 feet MSL.
Section 9. Termination date. Section 1. Applicability, Section 4, Flight-free zones, and Section 5. Minimum flight altitudes, expire on April 19, 2001.
Note: [Removed]
[66 FR 1003, Jan. 4, 2001, as amended at 66 FR 16584, Mar. 26, 2001; 72 FR 9846, Mar. 6, 2007]




This all came about as a response to a mid-air in June 1986 between a tour B206 and a tour Twin Otter. I pulled some of the bodies out.



Prior to that it was the wild west for Canyon tours.


Don't know of any restrictions reference "rescue before dark".

[Helicodger Pilot]

FYI/ FWIW
According to the US Naval Observatory website, sunset in that area on Feb. 10 was at 1814. The crash reportedly happened at around 1720, so there was about an hour and a half of daylight/ twilight left for the rescue operations before things got really dark.

[OffshoreHeli-Mgr]

So, as rotorspeed says - it is a surprise that they operate so late that any rescue can't be completed in daylight.



I'm sure the FAA will have a new rule to cover that situation.

[rotorbug]

Durban, I'm getting a bit rusty now on my Eurocopter's, but your picture looks more like the smaller EC120, than the EC130. Difficult because the image is a bit small.

TF

No, EC130. I flew in it and I know the difference.

[ExGrunt]

NTSB Press conference video;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbzIt6i9LQs

[Thomas coupling]

It didnt crash because of a regulation.
So any guesses what happened?
This is Pprune after all.
My guess: Donk stopped inside the dead mans curve......

[gulliBell]

..My guess: Donk stopped inside the dead mans curve......

Pretty big dead mans curve over that terrain in a single engine helicopter.

[Thomas coupling]

What?
What's that got to do with dead mans curve?

[megan]

He means it's unforgiving terrain in which to pull off a successful auto, as in, the same as going into tall timber.

[gulliBell]

He means it's unforgiving terrain in which to pull off a successful auto, as in, the same as going into tall timber.

Correct (YODA KNOWS ALL).

[Hot and Hi]

He means it's unforgiving terrain in which to pull off a successful auto, as in, the same as going into tall timber.
At any normal tour altitude you would never be in the avoid side of the HV diagram. If it was just an engine out, there would have been plenty of time to autorotate to an acceptable spot for a zero speed landing.

Worst thing would be then rolling to its side. Which of course could theoretically start the fire we have seen.

I can’t see why it would be similar to autorotating into tall timber.

[Thomas coupling]

Exactly.
I'm curious, does the FAA clear tour operators to loiter inside the curve in a single?
If not, then a donk stop would indeed be more forgiving in that the availability to choose your LZ would increase.
The pictures suggest that once committed, the hostile terrain would exacerbate a roll over etc.
Interesting to hear from a tour pilot in this area and what their rules are regarding hostile terrain?

[gulliBell]

At any normal tour altitude you would never be in the avoid side of the HV diagram. If it was just an engine out, there would have been plenty of time to autorotate to an acceptable spot for a zero speed landing...


In the photos of the accident site vicinity I don't see any suitable ground for a zero speed landing...it all looks hostile to me...and would you really be intending to do a zero speed landing in (what I assume to be) a heavy aircraft with 6 POB?

[chopjock]

In the photos of the accident site vicinity I don't see any suitable ground for a zero speed landing...it all looks hostile to me..and would you really be intending to do a zero speed landing in (what I assume to be) a heavy aircraft with 6 POB?

What is suitable ground for a zero speed landing? Surely hostile ground is more likely to require a zero speed landing? If there is no chance for a run on then a hard flare and a vertical drop would be the lesser of the two evils No?

[gulliBell]

What is suitable ground for a zero speed landing?

Level. In to wind. Obstacle free.

[wrench1]

I'm curious, does the FAA clear tour operators to loiter inside the curve in a single?


136.13 Helicopter performance plan and operations.
(a) Each operator must complete a performance plan before each helicopter commercial air tour, or flight operated under 14 CFR 91.146 or 91.147. The pilot in command must review for accuracy and comply with the performance plan on the day the flight is flown. The performance plan must be based on the information in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for that helicopter, taking into consideration the maximum density altitude for which the operation is planned, in order to determine:

(1) Maximum gross weight and center of gravity (CG) limitations for hovering in ground effect;

(2) Maximum gross weight and CG limitations for hovering out of ground effect; and

(3) Maximum combination of weight, altitude, and temperature for which height/velocity information in the RFM is valid.

(b) Except for the approach to and transition from a hover for the purpose of takeoff and landing, or during takeoff and landing, the pilot in command must make a reasonable plan to operate the helicopter outside of the caution/warning/avoid area of the limiting height/velocity diagram.

(c) Except for the approach to and transition from a hover for the purpose of takeoff and landing, during takeoff and landing, or when necessary for safety of flight, the pilot in command must operate the helicopter in compliance with the plan described in paragraph (b) of this section.

[[email protected]]

So, since this operator has special dispensation to land in the Canyon, do we think this crash occurred on approach or departure from the LS.

[chopjock]

guille
Level. In to wind. Obstacle free.

More likely applies to a long run on...
If you have obstacles, a run on is to be avoided, surely? Therefore if obstacles are in the way of a run on, then a zero speed would be the preferred option?

[nigelh]

I think it’s pretty obvious that a zero speed ( or v slow speed) auto is the only one available over rocky ground like that . The important thing is to stay upright which would be almost impossible doing a run on over boulders ! Would be interested to learn if anyone thinks differently.

[Mast Bumper]

The terrain in the pictures dictates a zero airspeed touchdown. Not sure why some on here get that confused.

[Niner Lima Charlie]

Witness Lionel Douglass, who was attending a wedding on a bluff about 1,000 yards away from where the helicopter crashed and exploded. Douglass told ABC News that he saw the helicopter plummet from the sky after doing two complete circles as if the pilot was searching for a spot to set the aircraft down.

"It happened so fast. When I saw them turning, I wasn't sure what he was doing and by the time I yelled to everybody to turn around and look, it was all out of control," Douglass said. "It fell down between the mountains, the tail broke in half, it hit the bottom and it was the biggest explosion you ever heard and then flames like you never seen before."

He said the initial explosion was followed by five or six others.

[gulliBell]

The terrain in the pictures dictates a zero airspeed touchdown. Not sure why some on here get that confused.

...and who is confused?

[Thomas coupling]

Well the witness suggests it all got out of hand whilst circling so my dead mans curve theory just went south.

[gulliBell]

...so my dead mans curve theory just went south.

I'm curious what people's understanding of dead mans curve is, and how you might apply a HV chart in an operational context.

From the eye witness account the helicopter was out of control, and the tail boom was chopped off before it hit the ground. Engine failure is still a possibility...the eye witness description might fit a low RRPM situation during an auto-rotational descent.

[nigelh]

But surely low rpm would mean blades would bend up and away from the tail ? Either way it changes everything if the tail came off before impact .

[chopjock]

But surely low rpm would mean blades would bend up and away from the tail

Low rpm also brings less stability, so a little cyclic stick movement can lead to a lot of response...

[[email protected]]

Low rpm also brings less stability, so a little cyclic stick movement can lead to a lot of response... you will probably have slower response to cyclic input but the aerodynamic damping will also be less - the apparent lack of response can lead to larger control inputs and over-controlling.

As with TC - my theory about it happening on approach or departure also went South.

I'm not sure there is any confusion about dead-man's curve - inside it you are unlikely to be able to achieve a safe autorotative state that will allow you to carry out a normal EOL - it assumes a one second delay between engine failure and pilot action. It doesn't mean you will die but unless you are very skillful or very lucky, you are probably going to bend the machine and possibly yourself.

[HughMartin]

Having been persuaded by my wife, she and I took a tour flight some years ago. We were taken from the top and dropped off at the bottom of the canyon for a boat trip then flown back up. There was quite a bit of time during our particular flights that there was no safe landing point within autorotational distance. I was not comfortable at all having spent most of my career flying twins.

[chopjock]

I was not comfortable at all having spent most of my career flying twins.
Well perhaps take comfort from the fact that most accidents are due to pilot error and single engine helicopters are more reliable than twins. :}

[gulliBell]

..I'm not sure there is any confusion about dead-man's curve..

Maybe, but pilots need to be mindful that the HV diagram is predicated on <5kts of wind on the nose, operating at maximum allowable takeoff weight, and having a hard surface runway infront of you to safely land straight ahead should an engine suddenly become inoperative.

If you are lighter than max then obviously more fudge factor goes in your favour the lighter you are.

Without the hard surface runway you are outside the test parameters under which the HV chart was drawn. Obviously if the landing area is instead a boulder field full of big rocks you aren't likely to pull off a safe landing if the donk quits even if you've avoided flying within the shaded area of the chart. Which is why I was puzzled somewhat at the initial mention of dead-mans curve in the operational context of this accident.

[India Four Two]

I took a Papillon EC-130 tourist flight from the Grand Canyon Airport a couple of years ago. The whole flight was within the National Park, was above the canyon rim and followed a predefined GPS-waypoint flightpath.

I had no idea that there was another operation downstream of the National Park in the Hualapai reservation, which included flights and landings within the canyon. While looking for information on this, I stumbled on a very interesting National Geographic article about the impact of tourism on the canyon:

https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/09/grand-canyon-development-hiking-national-parks/

In the article is this amazing time-lapse photo of the helicopter and boat traffic in the Hualapai reservation:

http://i.imgur.com/hYPkmpY.png (https://imgur.com/hYPkmpY)

At the Grand Canyon, summer brings heavy traffic. This sequence of images—a time-lapse composite of 160 choppers on two different flight paths—covers an eight-hour period on July 9, 2016. Besides numerous boats, 363 helicopters were counted. On peak days, that number can exceed 450.

160 helicopters in eight hours - one every three minutes. It's a very busy place!

[Rigga]

IFT - I agree - last September I was a passenger on such a Papillon Ec-130 flight and I could clearly see five to eight helicopters in the 'Queue' of traffic making its way over the reservoirs and valley route from Boulder City - the higher route apparently. I did not see any helicopters lower than us but I was not looking for them. In my uneducated view, there was about a half-mile separation between us.

[HughMartin]

Well perhaps take comfort from the fact that most accidents are due to pilot error and single engine helicopters are more reliable than twins. :}

I am not making any implication as to the cause of this particular tragic accident. I was only making a point regarding the overall safety of flying singe engined helicopters over hostile terrain.

Show me the evidence that demonstrates that single engined helicopters have a lower engine failure rate PER INSTALLED ENGINE than multi engines helicopters, excluding intentional precautionary shut-downs

You also need to show me the evidence that singles have a lower forced landing rate than multis.

The logic of your statement above would indicate you are arguing for single engine helicopters to replace twin engine helicopters for all offshore operations over hostile seas.

[megan]

Hugh, his comment was a jocular reference to a certain poster here who continuously maintains that a single engine helo is safer than a twin. Note the emoticon he concludes with.

[HughMartin]

Thanks for that megan I learn something every day. I didn't recognise the connection of a face with bad teeth and humour. Too subtle for me :O

[Bravo73]

Hugh, his comment was a jocular reference to a certain poster here who continuously maintains that a single engine helo is safer than a twin. Note the emoticon he concludes with.

I don’t actually think his post was a reference to another poster. However, it was certainly intended to incit a reaction. Hugh bit.

[A681001]

I saw this on a site,

" on the trip immediately before the fatal flight the helicopter abruptly turned around on the eastern (outbound) leg of the trip and returned home without touring the canyon"
probably a pax was airsick , sounds like there where quite gusty conditions

the wedding witness as mentioned on a previous post flew out and back in a helicopter and reported a rough ride , media have dramatized it

https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2018/02/18/grand-canyon-helicopter-crash-we-should-not-have-been-up-there-las-vegas-pastor-says/348127002/

[megan]

Bravo, you're obviously not familiar with the thoughts and writings of AnFI.

[Bravo73]

I am. You are obviously not familiar with the 'thoughts' and writings of chopjock.

[AnFI]

is it thought that the engine failed?
seems more likely the tail failed?

[chopper2004]

I'm curious what people's understanding of dead mans curve is, and how you might apply a HV chart in an operational context.

From the eye witness account the helicopter was out of control, and the tail boom was chopped off before it hit the ground. Engine failure is still a possibility...the eye witness description might fit a low RRPM situation during an auto-rotational descent.

Interesting because what you said reminds me of the earliy Robinson R22 accidents which involved pulling back cyclic a tad too much (in Low G / Mast bumping). The H130 MRH is not a teetering head like any of the Robinson R22/44/66, Bell 206 or 204/205/212...etc

Hope the survivors are on way to recovery and managing to provide any cirtical information just before the accident.

Cheers

[Nubian]

Just a thought.
Lets say the pilot flies in gusty/turbulent conditions, orbits for a place to land?! for maybe a ''land as soon as possible'' scenario?!, bleeds off his airspeed inadvertently and ends up in a decent with zero indicated airspeed and tailwind at 7-8 thousand feet Density altitude with a full load of pax.....

[[email protected]]

That still shouldn't result in chopping the tail off - if that is what happened.

[Nubian]

Crab,

Indeed, IF that is the case.

[AnFI]

it's possible to chop your tail off in most types
some types you have to try harder
tech failures particularly to aero surfaces on the tail can help the pilot acheive tail chop
one example is the 365 of our passed friend CF where tail was chopped
EC130 has known tail cracking issues to boom and horiz stabilizer
very unlikely to be engine although all things are possible

[Bell_ringer]

Everyone is assuming, based on sketchy witness info (we all know how accurate that can be), that there was a tail strike.
Could that have been a secondary effect?
Driveshaft failures can also damage the tail can they not?

The prelim NTSB report will hopefully contain something more scientific, especially having interviewed the pilot and pax.

[gulliBell]

...Show me the evidence that demonstrates that single engined helicopters have a lower engine failure rate PER INSTALLED ENGINE than multi engines helicopters, excluding intentional precautionary shut-downs
..

Anecdotally, of the operators I have worked for with mixed single/twin fleets, over many years, the frequency of engine failures in singles is probably about 10 times more than engine failures in twins. I don't know how to explain that, whether hours flown by type might even out that number...what I do know is every engine failure in a single resulted in a forced landing, and most of those forced landings resulted in damage to the aircraft, and several resulted in multiple fatalities. The only instance I recall of an engine failure in a twin that resulted in damage to the helicopter happened after it was landed without a scratch but some bad guys put an RPG in it and turned it to ash.

[SASless]

I might win the Lotto and get lucky with the girlfriend and her twin sister too!

Can you add just one more “if” to your conjecture?

Just a thought.
Lets say the pilot flies in gusty/turbulent conditions, orbits for a place to land?! for maybe a ''land as soon as possible'' scenario?!, bleeds off his airspeed inadvertently and ends up in a decent with zero indicated airspeed and tailwind at 7-8 thousand feet Density altitude with a full load of pax.....

[Airbubba]

NTSB preliminary report out:

Location: Peach Springs, AZ
Accident Number: WPR18FA087
Date & Time: 02/10/2018, 1715 MST
Registration: N155GC
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER EC130
Injuries: 3 Fatal, 4 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter - Non-scheduled - Sightseeing

On February 10, 2018, about 1715 mountain standard time, an Airbus Helicopters EC130 B4 helicopter, N155GC, was destroyed when it impacted a canyon wash while on an approach to land at Quartermaster landing zone near Peach Springs, Arizona. The commercial pilot and three passengers sustained serious injuries and three passengers were fatally injured. The airtour flight was operated by Papillon Airways, Inc. under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The helicopter departed Boulder City Municipal Airport, Boulder City, Nevada at 1635 and had intended to land at Quartermaster landing zone, a group of landing pads within Quartermaster canyon. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed.

A review of the recorded radar data showed that the helicopter departed Boulder City and continued on the Green 4 standard helicopter route prescribed in the Grand Canyon West Special Flight Rules Area 50-2. Witnesses reported that as the helicopter neared the vicinity of Quartermaster, they observed it on a flight path consistent with the pilot aligning to make a downriver-wind landing to a pad on the west. The helicopter began to slow after it passed over the river and maintained a southern course as it entered a canyon wash adjacent to the landing pads. While maintaining the same altitude, the helicopter entered a nose-high attitude and then began a left turn toward the Quartermaster landing zone. During the turn, the helicopter transitioned into a nose-low attitude and as it began to face the landing pads it began to slightly drift aft. The helicopter then maneuvered into a nose-level configuration and continued in the left turn. Subsequently, the helicopter made at least two 360° left turn revolutions as it descended into the wash below where it impacted terrain and a postcrash fire ensued.

[[email protected]]

WTF is a canyon wash?

[skadi]

WTF is a canyon wash?

a wash is the dry bed of a stream which flows only occasionally, usually in a ravine or canyon.

skadi

[India Four Two]

crab,

Often referred to as a "dry wash" for obvious reasons.

[Hot and Hi]

What is the report saying, if anything? Maybe the long winded explanations make sense to somebody who is familiar with the area?

The helicopter then maneuvered into a nose-level configuration
If accurate and succinct language is a sign of competence or intellectual rigor, then what does this report tell us about its author?

[Nubian]

I might win the Lotto and get lucky with the girlfriend and her twin sister too!

You wish!

Can you add just one more “if” to your conjecture?

No need to....

[[email protected]]

Couldn't they just call it a gully?

And what do they mean by a downriver-wind landing? Do they mean he is heading downriver or heading down wind or both?

The nose high attitude followed by the turn and then a nose low attitude whilst drifting aft has me imagining some disorientation and then recognition of aft drift which was corrected by shoving the nose forward.

Was he in fact affected by brown-out on approach as I had thought earlier?

That report hardly clears anything up and, as hot and hi says, isn't brilliantly worded.

[wrench1]

Couldn't they just call it a gully?

For what it is worth, a gully is a land feature like a ravine or canyon, whereas a wash, arroyo, or wadi like on your side of the pond is the bed of a dry water feature that intermittently flows water. Not all gullies have washes, and not all washes are found in gullies. A wash is mainly found in the SW US.

[SASless]

Having never seen a EC-130....can anyone enlighten me about possible Yaw Control issues at the loading and DA the aircraft was operating at when it crashed?

Does the 130 have similar limitations similar to the Bell 206 series at certain altitudes/wind directions?

Two 360 rotations as described does suggest a possible lack of sufficient yaw output or a loss of thrust due to a failure of some kind.

I too wonder what the “down river/wind” comment was actually saying.

Was the approach down wind?

[megan]

WTF is a canyon washA dry billabong? ;)

[herman the crab]

Having never seen a EC-130....can anyone enlighten me about possible Yaw Control issues at the loading and DA the aircraft was operating at when it crashed?

Does the 130 have similar limitations similar to the Bell 206 series at certain altitudes/wind directions?

Two 360 rotations as described does suggest a possible lack of sufficient yaw output or a loss of thrust due to a failure of some kind.

I too wonder what the “down river/wind” comment was actually saying.

Was the approach down wind?

I think they're saying the wind was blowing down river, as in direction. Using NSEW would have been clearer.

Suggesting that he turned to face up river and into wind.

Just my interpretation of it.

HTC

[peely]

Having never seen a EC-130....can anyone enlighten me about possible Yaw Control issues at the loading and DA the aircraft was operating at when it crashed?

Does the 130 have similar limitations similar to the Bell 206 series at certain altitudes/wind directions?

Two 360 rotations as described does suggest a possible lack of sufficient yaw output or a loss of thrust due to a failure of some kind.

I too wonder what the “down river/wind” comment was actually saying.

Was the approach down wind?

My experience of the 130 at high density (16,000 pa ISA +23) suggests not. Even when lifting at this height with loads at the max performance page figures plus, still never thought the tail would let go. Was on the stops on a few occasions but still it felt controlled. A very capable helicopter at altitude and in the wind provided you keep ahead of it.

[[email protected]]

Fenestrons are great but pilots have to understand that they behave slightly differently from a conventional tail rotor.

Some of the anti-torque thrust comes from what has been described as 'lip-lift' where the flow around the duct adds to what is being produced by the fenestron itself - a bit like a coanda effect.

When you get a situation where something affects that flow and disrupts the 'lip-lift', the demand for power pedal is suddenly increased to compensate and, if you are not on top of your game (or ahead of the aircraft) you can end up with a left yaw you weren't expecting.

There is still more than enough TR authority but it requires you to use a bit more pedal - this can sometimes be masked by the TR linear actuator if you have SAS or AP in yaw.

This is where the myth of Fenestron Stall was born - and subsequently disproved by Aerospatiale TPs. It hasn't stalled and you don't have a TR malfunction, you just need to apply more right pedal - perhaps all the way to the stop!

This isn't usually a problem but at high power, many pilots are reluctant to use that extra pedal due to the marked Tq spikes (also typical of fenestron equipped aircraft) experienced if you are less than gentle with the yaw input.

You can see this effect when you accelerate sideways (or hover crosswind with the wind from the right) - eventually you get to a point where the airflow through the fenestron needs to reverse as you apply lots of left pedal - there is a marked yaw disturbance but you still have full control and as you pass through this, normal feel is resumed. The same happens as you slow down again and that is where the Tq spike can occur, as you push right pedal to re-establish 'normal' flow again.

Airbus put out a safety notice a while back emphasising that the thrust from the fenestron vs pedal position wasn't as linear as from a conventional TR but slightly S shaped - for the reasons mentioned above.

If the pilot in this case, in gusty winds and manoeuvring to land, experienced what he thought was a TR problem, it might go some way to explaining the result.

[[email protected]]

BTW - a gully is defined as a 'water-worn channel' so it will have been created by water and may periodically contain water - how is that different to a wash:)

[RVDT]

Crab,

Your posit is possibly biased with Gaz experience which is only natural.

The fenestron on a 130 is near enough identical to that on the 135 albeit a mirror image wrt to direction of rotation.

The MGW of the 135 internal is about 450kg greater.

When was the last time you heard of issues on a 135 fenestron wrt to controllability?

I'm calling -

http://i0.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/newsfeed/001/057/323/c3b.png

[[email protected]]

RVDT - based on 341 AND 365, both of which exhibit exactly the handling qualities I detail.

Did you not see the Airbus SN then?

Edited to add it was Eurocopter Service Letter - 1673-67-04 so its a bit older than I had thought.

LMGTFY - http://airbushelicoptersinc.com/images/safety/Reminder-YAW-control-for-helicopters.pdf see particularly para 3

[Carbon Bootprint]

Another of the British tourists involved in the crash has died, after 10 days in hospital. RIP.

From the Beeb (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43159412)

[shimmersky]

Guys, just my 2 cents--I have flown this route hundreds of times for that company in the EC130
There is no issue with t/r authority in any conditions in the 130, you must mash the pedals harder than other boosted types but you can do most anything in any wind conditions.

The weather in the canyon can be very extreme IE: micro bursts, severe up and down drafts, T storms, turbulence etc..

The quartermaster site is a few hundred feet above the river and the pilots are usually very confident of the direction of wind based on a sock above the shade structure for Papillon and other landing traffic etc..

To be all out of sorts on short final to the LZ leads me to think its pilot error or some strange mechanical issue we dont know about yet...!!!

The NTSB gives no clues as to what happened

The pilot will be the only one who can shed light on what happen...!!

In my experience Papillon had excellent MX excellent TRNG during my time..

Only time will tell....

[[email protected]]

As I pointed out, there is no problem with TR authority - it is just the response in some wind conditions that can catch people out.

At High AUM and high power (ie full of pax and in the latter stages of an approach in gusty wind conditions) some pilots might be more reluctant to 'mash' the pedals than others.

It may not be a factor in this sad accident but we will have to wait for the full NTSB report to find out.

[Carbon Bootprint]

A fifth British tourist involved in the crash has now died, after losing her husband four days ago.

BBC article (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43206138)

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

https://www.verticalmag.com/press-releases/standardaero-papillon-airways-sign-mou-40-crash-resistant-fuel-tanks/

[Hot and Hi]

https://www.verticalmag.com/press-releases/standardaero-papillon-airways-sign-mou-40-crash-resistant-fuel-tanks/
And no mention of the background of this investment in safety. I bet somebody wishes they had done that a bit earlier.

[India Four Two]

I bet somebody wishes they had done that a bit earlier.

Hot and Hi,

I’m sure you are right, but they HAVE made what is no doubt a very expensive decision. They could have just ignored the problem.

Kudos to Papillon.

[SASless]

We had a discussion a year or so ago about the absence of crash worthy fuel cells on many helicopters.

If you climb into one without such a safety improvement....who is to blame?


Might you become an accident statistic tomorrow....and if you do...whose fault is it you went out in a blaze of glory?

[[email protected]]

Didn't Ford have to recall 1.1 million F150 pick ups 7 or 8 years ago because the fuel tanks were faulty and kept bursting into flames?

Manufacturers will produce what they think they can get away with.

[Carbon Bootprint]

Didn't Ford have to recall 1.1 million F150 pick ups 7 or 8 years ago because the fuel tanks were faulty and kept bursting into flames?

Manufacturers will produce what they think they can get away with.Not to mention the arguably worse Ford Pinto (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Pinto) debacle of the 70s, from which they apparently didn't learn a thing...

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

the recent lawsuit for one paramedic that was awarded 100 million, and the undisclosed award to the second paramedic for their injuries suffered in their crash and fire that killed the pilot, is a huge motivator to do something about the problem. With two survivors remaining and similar lawsuits likely on the horizon, you can bet the bank accounts of airbus and papillon are going to get appreciably smaller again.

Hindsight, I'm personally glad they are taking the steps to modify their aircraft, but who else is? I hope many more follow suit. It really is costly for this kit, but again, look at the lawsuit cost, is it worth the risk? to some yes, to others no. Its tragic that it took another accident to get to this point though.
will the marketing brochures for the tour operators start listing the fuel tank status in an effort to gain passenger loads over the competitor?? Will customers start asking about the fuel tanks, shoulder harness', helmets and flame retardant clothing for their flights, or will they still be clueless and naive about the serious nature if something goes for a ****. Most believe they are paying for their safety up front and nobody is putting them at risk right???

I was perplexed the day after this accident though, with the smoke hardly cleared, I was seeing facebook posts from Maverick, claiming awards for their maintenance staff and the best maintenance in the industry. You tell me that wasn't ill timed and a low blow, when they should have been supporting their competitors under the tragic circumstances. It shows it's all about money and nothing else. Im actually surprised that Maverick didn't do an ad, with their maintenance staff sitting around a roaring campfire showing off their framed certificates of excellence.

[Helicodger Pilot]

I believe I've heard a saying attributed to the Japanese but applicable worldwide:
"Business is War"

[Helicodger Pilot]

BTW- I'm not endorsing that attitude, just mentioning that it's not unusual nor necessarily unethical, it's just how we are...

[nigelh]

Greyhorizon .... you’re not seriously suggesting pax should dress up in flame retardant gear and wear helmets for a joy ride are you ??!!
On that basis they may as well all pack up shop ..!!

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

Greyhorizon .... you’re not seriously suggesting pax should dress up in flame retardant gear and wear helmets for a joy ride are you ??!!
On that basis they may as well all pack up shop ..!!

i'm not suggesting it, but the lawyers might. the FAA might. The customers if they woke up might demand it. why would they simply stop at fuel tanks? I'm not sure the fuel tanks remove the risk of fire 100%, and I'm sure you will agree.

[SASless]

Flame Retardant clothing for tourist/corporate/air taxi flights might be a bit of a stretch....crash resistant fuel tanks is not.:ugh:

[nigelh]

That I do agree with ! In this day all tanks should be as crash proof as possible . Sadly as with most things helicopter related the price will be astronomical......

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

Flame Retardant clothing for tourist/corporate/air taxi flights might be a bit of a stretch....crash resistant fuel tanks is not.:ugh:

there's other industries and heli operations that make you don safety gear when using their services, so give a fair example at to why you think it's a bit of a stretch?
I can see a one size fits all overall emblazoned with the company logo as they waddle you out to the aircraft for your wedding photo shoot in the valley, because the FAA said so. Is it cool? no. Is it cumbersome and a PITA? yes.

[SASless]

Do you don Flame Retardant clothing to ride BA, Virgin, Air Canada, American, United?

As we say here....State rests its case yer Honor!

[[email protected]]

But how many have died on BA and Virgin recently?

[BigMike]

Crash worthy tanks are a no brainer.
The rest is ridiculous...

Have you ever been involved in tourist ops?
There has been some complete rubbish said on this thread, this taking the prize...

"They were flying because in Tourism flying they fly everyday unless it is unflyable. The visitors are only there once normally so you have to take their money while you can. That is the commercial reality. Sad but true."

Are you a commercial pilot? What company dosnt fly if its flyable?...
You will go out of business pretty quick if you only fly on nil wind, sunny days.

It might be worth looking at the numbers flown, vs accidents in tourist operations. It might surprise you.

[megan]

GrayHorizonsHeli, before donning the fireproofs you going to ask your guests to strip off their synthetic garments? Could be interesting with the ladies.

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

Don't assume I think its a great idea either. But I've seen how lawyers work. Lawyers make companies pay/lose money thru liability claims. We all know how liability works.

[John R81]

BBC announces one law suit (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-43269956)

Claims:

The pilot was at fault for crashing
The Directors were at fault for not fitting crash-resistant fuel cells
The manufacturers of the aircraft were at fault for not building the machine with crash resistant fuel cells
A mechanic was at fault for work on the tail
An Inspector was at fault for work on the tail

They missed the FAA for not mandating the retro-fitting of crash resistant fuel cells. After all, that's what they did to Robinson aircraft.

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

It might be worth looking at the numbers flown, vs accidents in tourist operations. It might surprise you.


probably shouldn't surprise you that even one unnecessary death is one too many regardless of statistics. Agreed?




On a side note: do any current tour operators require you to sign a waiver acknowledging and accepting the risks? If so, what specifically does it refer to?
I would assume if you don't have a waiver, offering some sort of legal protection or at least something to argue in court, the operator assumes any and all risk to passenger safety.

[SASless]

But how many have died on BA and Virgin recently?
have they made in the Grand Canyon....a couple of airliners have you know.....with no survivors.

[nomorehelosforme]

In its final report into the incident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the US concluded tailwinds, potential downdrafts and turbulence were the probable cause of the loss of control of the aircraft.The "most significant factor" affecting survival of those on board the helicopter was the post-crash fire, according to the findings.

The aircraft was "not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped, with a crash-resistant fuel system".

After the crash, the helicopter company announced that it would fit crash-resistant tanks to its fleet.


https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-sussex-55674015

[Hot and Hi]

Can’t find the actual NTSB report.

[Swiss Cheese]

Since 5 out of 6 pax died of burns injuries, rather than impact injuries, I am surprised the NTSB did not take the opportunity to explore the legislative history of CR Fuel tanks and review the benefits of mandating them.

I can see a Reg 28 Report (prevention of future deaths) being requested at the UK Coroners Inquest into the issue of CR fuel tanks in Helicopter Operations in the UK.

[212man]

Since 5 out of 6 pax died of burns injuries, rather than impact injuries, I am surprised the NTSB did not take the opportunity to explore the legislative history of CR Fuel tanks and review the benefits of mandating them.



Have you found/seen the report? How do you know that they didn’t?

[Watson1963]

I couldn't find the report either! It's not one of their big published reports, but is in their database:
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/basic-search
Select "Investigations"
Paste the accident number under "NTSB number": WPR18MA087 and then "Search"
Scroll down .. the PDF report and the docket will be listed

[212man]

I couldn't find the report either! It's not one of their big published reports, but is in their database:
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/basic-search
Select "Investigations"
Paste the accident number under "NTSB number": WPR18MA087 and then "Search"
Scroll down .. the PDF report and the docket will be listed

thanks - so, in fact, zero recommendations!

[Bell_ringer]

thanks - so, in fact, zero recommendations!

That’s the land of the free for you. Don’t encumber operators with responsibility and accountability, that would get in the way of making a buck.
A few people here and there is a small price to pay.
Keep calm and carry on.

[Watson1963]

NTSB published a safety recommendation report in 2016 .. requesting FAA & EASA to inform operators about CR tanks and urge them to fit, where available ...
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/ASR1602.aspx
2016 seems a long time ago :(

[212man]

NTSB published a safety recommendation report in 2016 .. requesting FAA & EASA to inform operators about CR tanks and urge them to fit, where available ...
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/ASR1602.aspx
2016 seems a long time ago :(Yes, that was the accident that popped up when I was searching.

I guess the concept of fires and aviation crashes is still in its infancy. Will take a while to address......

[Swiss Cheese]

I speak from personal knowledge since I represented 5 out of 6 of the families, and was privy to the Post Mortem Reports. The press reports and video show 3 pax survivors, two of whom later died of their injuries. Enough said.

[megan]

A few people here and there is a small price to pay.
Keep calm and carry on.Sorry to say it, but it's a bit like the safety of children at school in the same country, if you know what I mean.

[Bell_ringer]

I guess the concept of fires and aviation crashes is still in its infancy. Will take a while to address......

You say that, even Robbie have managed to make this mandatory and roll it out across the range.
I think we can all agree it has seriously reduced the number of deaths from survivable accidents.
In this day and age there is no excuse for putting something as simple as a bladder tank in an aircraft - apart from money, that is.

[aa777888]

You say that, even Robbie have managed to make this mandatory and roll it out across the range.That's actually not entirely accurate in the US. Because, you know, this is 'merica, baby. While Robinson did issue a factory service bulletin (SB) in Dec 2010, SB's are not mandatory for FAA Part 91 op's without an attendant AD, only Part 135 op's. And the FAA never issued an AD for this. Hell, technically you could even get away with it under Part 135 if you can get the FAA to sign off on your maintenance program, but I don't believe that anyone has tried that. So there are still a finite number of 44's and 22's flying around without bladders in Part 91 service.

[Bell_ringer]

That's actually not entirely accurate in the US. Because, you know, this is 'merica, baby. While Robinson did issue a factory service bulletin (SB) in Dec 2010, SB's are not mandatory for FAA Part 91 op's without an attendant AD, only Part 135 op's. And the FAA never issued an AD for this. Hell, technically you could even get away with it under Part 135 if you can get the FAA to sign off on your maintenance program, but I don't believe that anyone has tried that. So there are still a finite number of 44's and 22's flying around without bladders in Part 91 service.

Thats daft since part 91 is a big contributor to accidents in robboland.
It has been mandatory for some time in most civilised parts of the world :)
The FAA get a lot right but they seem determined to get a lot wrong.

[aa777888]

In this case it is easy to suspect that both Robinson and the FAA believed that between all the Astros having to get the hydraulic refit and the 12 year overhaul cycle, most owners would ultimately get the bladders by default. Since essentially all the Astros had to go to the Robinson factory for the refit Robinson would have forced that issue. But some number of Ravens built between when they were introduced in 2000 and the 2010 SB, even potentially having undergone more than one overhaul cycle, don't have them because the owners didn't/don't want to incur the cost. The sheet metal work, and the subsequent requirement for a paint job, drives the cost up quite a bit. Not saying it's right or wrong. It does make you wonder exactly how many are left like that.

[Hot and Hi]

In its final report into the incident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the US concluded tailwinds, potential downdrafts and turbulence were the probable cause of the loss of control of the aircraft.The "most significant factor" affecting survival of those on board the helicopter was the post-crash fire, according to the findings.

The aircraft was "not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped, with a crash-resistant fuel system".

After the crash, the helicopter company announced that it would fit crash-resistant tanks to its fleet.


https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-sussex-55674015

I followed Watson's instructions. Here is the actual NTSB report (https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/96722/pdf). It is astonishing to hear that the same operator had done 180,000 landings between 1999 and 2017 at the same location without any accidents. The mishap pilot himself had done 581 landings at that spot, presumably in the same type and for the same mission (sightseeing with 6 or 7 pax). This was the second landing at the same location for the mishap pilot on the accident day. And it wasn't hot neither (actually 12 deg C, winter in Arizona). The a/c weight at the time of accident was declared as 5,022 lbs (300 lbs below MTOW). Compared to a hot summer day in the canyon, on that winter afternoon in February they must have had plenty of excess power to shove into this Fenestron.

The report basically accepts that a freak wind caused the accident.

Maybe doing the same thing again and again without a problem causes complacency to creep in? A priori, the approach to the west helipads would be flown with visual reference to the terrain. Add a strong tailwind or gust, and take your eyes a moment off the airspeed, and within a second he might have lost effective translational lift.

However freaky the gust, it wasn't entirely unexpected.

The seventh pilot to land entered the canyon at 1709. During his approach to the west pads, his intended destination, he recalled that the helicopter's tail swung rapidly due to strong winds and he applied significant right pedal and crabbed the helicopter to maintain the approach.

The last helicopter to land before the accident entered the canyon at 1710 and touched down about 2 minutes before the accident occurred. The pilot had experience flying in mountainous terrain, knew of the presence of 15-20 kt winds from the east, and thus anticipated windshear during the approach. While turning toward the west pads, he experienced a strong wind that swung the nose of the helicopter about 90° to the left.

90 deg swing (yaw) in a sightseeing flight while approaching to land with the gorge opening underneath? That certainly has the potential for the tourists to spill their champaign! Why didn't the pilots of the two prior flights radio a caution to the colleague coming right behind (5 minutes)? What culture is that that doesn't oblige you to report such, or at least encourages you to do so?

Maybe the mishap pilot did everything possible to avoid the crash, to no avail. There is something strange though:

A pilot on the ground at the landing site reported that the accident helicopter began to decelerate as it approached the landing pads and entered a nose-up attitude, then turned left toward the landing pads, transitioned through several pitch oscillations, and drifted aft.

I am not sure to understand what this "drifting aft" could mean.

Either way, the pilot coming in just 5 min before the mishap pilot, reported that he managed to handle the situation as per text book (increase airspeed, give the Fenestron the boot). Somewhere else we read that this pilot now has misgivings that he didn't alert is fellow pilot. I would feel the same. Here is what this pilot told the accident investigators:

The airspeed rapidly decayed and it required all of his effort to maintain control of the helicopter. As the helicopter began to descend, he increased collective to arrest the descent and was able to maintain control by pushing the cyclic forward and right to increase airspeed while applying full right pedal to keep the nose straight. He successfully landed the helicopter on one of the west pads.

(By the way, not sure whether maybe decreasing collective instead of increasing torque, and pushing cyclic to the left, that is into the torque-induced turn and in this case away from the terrain, would be a better approach? But hey, he survived, and I wasn't there...)

The mishap pilot had 2,400+ HRS TTRW, of which 1,000+ on type. The latter acquired over the past four years flying for this operator. However, he only flew 2 HRS in the past 30 days before the accident. The report doesn't dwell on this any further.

Another point that puzzles me is that 2,396 HRS of 2,423 HRS TTRW were PIC. That only leaves 27 HRS dual instruction over his entire flying career. These are also the numbers stated in the "Accident Report" (not the investigation report, but the initial report to the FAA). Don't they record recurrent training and line checks as "Dual"?

So what do we learn?

[Gordy]

Another point that puzzles me is that 2,396 HRS of 2,423 HRS TTRW were PIC. That only leaves 27 HRS dual instruction over his entire flying career. These are also the numbers stated in the "Accident Report" (not the investigation report, but the initial report to the FAA). Don't they record recurrent training and line checks as "Dual"?

They did not quote dual, they quoted TT and PIC.

In the US, once you have a certificate or rating for an aircraft type, then ALL time flown after that is logged as PIC. If there is an instructor on board and you are recieving instruction then it would be logged as PIC and Dual. Therefore those numbers are correct---he would have recieved 27 hours dual non-PIC only during his initiall PPL training.

[tdracer]

Thats daft since part 91 is a big contributor to accidents in robboland.
It has been mandatory for some time in most civilised parts of the world :)
The FAA get a lot right but they seem determined to get a lot wrong.
Actually, no service bulletin is "mandatory" unless there is an accompanying AD - that's not just for Part 91.
Problem is, before they can issue an AD, by law, the FAA needs a cost/benefit analysis to show that the benefit outweighs the cost. That's always tricky for crashworthiness changes since they only come into play after the aircraft has already crashed - makes it's hard to define lives saved. It's much easier for airworthiness changes since you can say it'll prevent a crash (note that this isn't the case for new regulations as they only apply to new certifications - not retrofit - no cost/benefit required).

[roscoe1]

You would be hard pressed to find a 135 set of ops spec that do not make so called mandatory service bulletins for engine, emergency equipment, and for airplanes their propellers a requirement under said Ops. Specs. Many also include ,mandatory airframe bulletins but it depends on who is doing the approving on the FAA side.

[Hot and Hi]

They did not quote dual, they quoted TT and PIC.

In the US, once you have a certificate or rating for an aircraft type, then ALL time flown after that is logged as PIC. If there is an instructor on board and you are recieving instruction then it would be logged as PIC and Dual. Therefore those numbers are correct---he would have recieved 27 hours dual non-PIC only during his initiall PPL training.

Thanks, Gordy for this clarification. So back to the accident. What then can we learn here?

Understandably, the emotional response here focusses mostly on crash-resistant fuel tanks, as in this case this is likely to have made a significant difference to an otherwise well-survivable accident. And because the idea of passengers burning to death is so horrendous.

On the other hand, the fuel tank issue is rather coincidental, as it has nothing to do with the cause of the accident. And amongst the bad luck of the post crash fire it was sheer luck that the mishap helicopter didn't roll down the ravine, killing all on board by blunt force trauma, even without a fire.

Do we accept that the accident itself was caused by an Act of God, as the report seems to suggest?

- Do we then accept that the airframe in question has a design fault that could even take out experienced pilots? This so far has been the exclusive domain of another, American OEM whose products are so often belittled here for exactly that reason.

- Or do we say that the wind situation the mishap pilot encountered was in all likelihood not significantly different from what the two pilots in the 10 min before him encountered? Challenging, but ultimately they was able to deal with that.

I don't see that we have another alternative: Either is was pilot error, or the anti-torque device of the EC130 doesn't have sufficient authority. (Or both of course.)

[FH1100 Pilot]

...Either is was pilot error, or the anti-torque device of the EC130 doesn't have sufficient authority. (Or both of course.)

Well. It was pilot-error, obviously. The impact was vertical and upright. This means he dropped it in with little or no forward speed, i.e. in a hover.

We are taught to land into the wind for a reason. And not just because birds do it instinctively. So we all must understand something: You can land a helicopter with a strong tailwind, but it take meticulous planning and skill...and even maybe a measure of luck. You have to be ready for anything...but you especially have to be ready for the thing to want to swap ends on you if you let the airspeed get low. You can get away with some crazy antics in a helicopter when you're into the wind. But downwind? All bets are off.

The Astar pilot had reportedly been into that particular LZ *581* times! So it's not like it was inexperienced and unfamiliar with operations down there. This time, he just made a poor choice of approach profile - for some reason. Hey, we're human; we screw up sometimes. With a windsock at the LZ, it would be pretty poor airmanship to not check it out before commencing the approach. And if you look at the pictures taken at the site at the time of the accident, you'll see the windsock sticking straight out. Me (and probably you too), I would want to land *INTO* the wind in such a case.

We've all heard of pilots using the infamous "rogue gust of wind!" excuse for why they crashed a perfectly good helicopter. In this case, the pilot upped the ante and reported a "violent" gust of wind! Well...if you knew the weather down in that canyon was strong and gusty, and you decide to land downwind, shouldn't you be prepared for that? I mean, what do they pay us for?

Let's call it what it was: Pilot error.

[Gordy]

Do we accept that the accident itself was caused by an Act of God, as the report seems to suggest?

I say yes---what is wrong with accepting that sometimes "**** just happens"....everything lined up....a series of unfortunate events?


- Do we then accept that the airframe in question has a design fault that could even take out experienced pilots?

Event 1

- Or do we say that the wind situation the mishap pilot encountered was in all likelihood not significantly different from what the two pilots in the 10 min before him encountered? Challenging, but ultimately they was able to deal with that.

Event 2

Either is was pilot error,
Ultimately Yep.....

[JimEli]

I don't classify it as pilot error (in addition to the accident of this topic, here are 3 similar accidents. There could be more, but currently the NTSB search function is limiting result to post 2010). Why, especially in today’s era, do we accept designs that are prone to LTE. I thought this deficiency was conquered in the 80s?

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20070501X00488&AKey=1&RType=Summary&IType=LA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20040504X00551&AKey=1&RType=Summary&IType=CA

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=CEN15FA164

[aa777888]

According to the paper I posted in this link:

https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10916510

LTE is a myth, and helicopters that meet certification requirements always have plenty of anti-torque authority.

A few posts down from that one there is also a link to a video of the author's presentation but the paper by itself is better.

[Agile]

Thanks to the link reminder, that was indeed a good paper.

I think the essence of a good pilot, is to already predict the chain of event, and be ready to push that pedal (or decrease that collectives) because you saw it coming

I remember very early in my training:
was flying downwind on the upwind side of a hill, the aircraft was so gentle it was beautiful,
went around the hill, on the downwind side, the aircraft started sinking toward the ground
added a bunch of collective and the tail started to spin around, almost did a full turn (we were still downwind)

I didn't see it anything coming, missed all the signs passing by me, yet the fix was soo simple, Instructor just push the collectives slightly down and gently steer us toward the valley

Since then I have never tried to fight nature with collective, its a losing battle.

[Hot and Hi]

According to the paper I posted in this link:

https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10916510

LTE is a myth, and helicopters that meet certification requirements always have plenty of anti-torque authority.

A few posts down from that one there is also a link to a video of the author's presentation but the paper by itself is better.

Granted. But let’s then just call it “lack of tail rotor authority”. The replacing of ‘positive bite’ with ‘it will eventually stop spinning provided you give full right rudder and wait it out’.

[aa777888]

Granted. But let’s then just call it “lack of tail rotor authority”. The replacing of ‘positive bite’ with ‘it will eventually stop spinning provided you give full right rudder and wait it out’.Or maybe "anti-torque ergonomics"? Because the paper provides compelling data that the authority is there. But it also seems to point out, indirectly, that that authority may be easier to access and manage on some designs compared to others. I have all of three hours using a fenestron, so I'm certainly the wrong person to give an opinion, but I found it much more difficult to manage. On the other hand, would I say the same thing after 300 fenestron hours? I suspect not. Perhaps others will chime in on this.

[FH1100 Pilot]

In the discussion of this accident in one of the Facebook rotorcraft groups, a guy - presumably a pilot but you never know - said, "I believe the primary cause of this accident was LTE."

It seems that there is a whole generation of pilots who've come to accept the myth of "Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness." They believe that the tail rotor can somehow get into a condition ("cavitation?") where it stops producing thrust and the helicopter will spin around like a top even with full power-pedal applied. This of course is nonsense. But pilots are loathe to apply and hold *full* pedal, even if it's called for. Because...I guess...if you do that in a hover when you're near a power limit, you could easily have an engine temperature or torque exceedance. And nobody wants that! But it's hard to understand why pilots would accept a crash as opposed to saving their skin.

The thing to remember...well, *two* things to remember are that: 1) The helicopter is a big weathervane and wants to point itself into the wind; and 2) As long as it's spinning, the tail rotor *never* stops working. If more pilots would just understand these two basic things, I'd bet there'd be fewer crashes where the pilot gets out and says, "It was LTE! The aircraft failed me!"

[John R81]

I fly almost exclusively a 120 - fenestron - though learned in a 44.

It has more than adequate thrust from the tail rotor.
However it is a fenestron, not a simple blade, and so the pilot has to understand how it works and what it will do when you disrespect it. compared to a simple blade design

1. Just as much "push" available
2. To access it will likely require significantly more pedel than a non-fenestron pilot will expect
3. There is also a "Big Wing" in the design. That introduces benefits (unloading the fan in forward flight, increased stability into wind) and issues (air flow angle of attack exceeds 20 degrees and suddenly you lose all assistance from the "wing" (it stalls), and it is a bigger "rudder" to drive you around if you get the wind wrong on the tail).

Suffers from LTE - no
Harder to fly - no, just different. If you trained G2 and moved on to 120 /130 I doubt you would even understand what the fuss is about
More dangerous - certainly not. I happily put the world's most precious cargo (to me) in one

In this case, landing down wind in gusty conditions without adequate planning was asking for it (in any helicopter, I think)

[henra]

In this case, landing down wind in gusty conditions without adequate planning was asking for it (in any helicopter, I think)
Possibly compounded by the terrain. These ravines can act as funnels if the wind is pointing straight onto them and create much stronger local winds. If I interpret the situation correctly it went out of control pretty much in the middle of that funnel/ravine.

[Robbiee]

In the discussion of this accident in one of the Facebook rotorcraft groups, a guy - presumably a pilot but you never know - said, "I believe the primary cause of this accident was LTE."

It seems that there is a whole generation of pilots who've come to accept the myth of "Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness." They believe that the tail rotor can somehow get into a condition ("cavitation?") where it stops producing thrust and the helicopter will spin around like a top even with full power-pedal applied. This of course is nonsense. But pilots are loathe to apply and hold *full* pedal, even if it's called for. Because...I guess...if you do that in a hover when you're near a power limit, you could easily have an engine temperature or torque exceedance. And nobody wants that! But it's hard to understand why pilots would accept a crash as opposed to saving their skin.

The thing to remember...well, *two* things to remember are that: 1) The helicopter is a big weathervane and wants to point itself into the wind; and 2) As long as it's spinning, the tail rotor *never* stops working. If more pilots would just understand these two basic things, I'd bet there'd be fewer crashes where the pilot gets out and says, "It was LTE! The aircraft failed me!"

As a pilot who believes in LTE I can say that, the tail rotor does not stop producing thrust (the idea that we think that, is the myth). I am not "loathe to apply and hold full pedal" ,..that is completely ridiculous! The corrective action for LTE is full left pedal/forward cyclic. Why would someone who believes in LTE, not believe in its text book correction?

With LTE the airflow over the tail rotor simply becomes disrupted (and if not readily attended to by the pilot) can cause the nose to spin about. The tail rotor is still working just fine, but the pilot needs to be awake on the pedals, to prevent a loss of control.

LTE is not a "get out of jail free" excuse. The accident is still "pilot error", LTE just explains what he let happen.

,...but I'm just a poor 22 guy. :(

[Wide Mouth Frog]

I think it's missing quite a lot to call this pilot error.

If you look in the docket at the Operations Factual Report you'll see this There are two main approaches that the pilots make to the pads at Quartermaster. The decision of which approach to make is determined by the location of the pad the pilot decides to land. When landing on the east pads, the pilots maneuver the helicopter south over the river and continue over a saddle-shape in the terrain, referred to as “the notch.” After passing over the notch, the pilot makes a descending left turn and touches down facing to the west-northwest. The alternate approach, commonly used when landing on the west pads, entails the helicopter crossing over the river and entering into a 3,800-foot long box canyon; the distance back the pilot maneuvers into the canyon is determined by their assessment of the wind. Now it's a little surprising that there's no mention of wind direction, but the inspectors won't have licked that up off the floor. Somebody gave them the idea that the approach was dictated by the pad to be used, and that is actually completely consistent with the observed arrival pattern of the helicopters. Now listen to the Chief PilotWhen the Chief Pilot was queried as to why the pilots are not provided any guidance on which approach to make and pad to land on, he responded that because the wind conditions are unknown, he would not be able to predict which pad/approach would be favorable. He stated that “as a commercially-rated, instrument-rated professional pilot, they've got to have some latitude to make” a decision as pilot-in-command and “have a degree of operational control… they have the final authority… and I expect them to exercise that from time to time.” Instead he ensures that the pilots are trained to always make an approach into the wind. Sounds like common sense until you remember that three 'commercially-rated, instrument-rated professional pilots' late that day did exactly the same as the accident pilot, and the last one very nearly came to grief also. And then from the final report Multiple Papillon pilots stated that the winds at Quartermaster were unpredictable and that the wind direction could drastically change during an approach into the landing siteAm I the only one sensing a disconnect between the chief pilot and those regularly flying the line ? As the final report says, Papillon has automated weather reporting systems at other nearby landing sites so why not this one ? And why not some landing limits that reflect the actual wind conditions at the site.

And what about that 'Letter of Agreement' between the operators to cut out 'unnecessary chatter' on the special frequency ? That doesn't seem to encourage pilot reporting of unusual conditions.

All these subtleties present in the operations report were airbrushed out in the final, in favor of freak wind and LTE. I don't think this was pilot error, I think it was an accident waiting to happen. And unless the operation has been altered as a result of this report, then it's waiting to happen again.

[fdr]

Fire Safety

RHC's improvement in the tank design was commendable. Being Avgas, its a critical factor for survival post-impact where g and survival space have not compromised the outcome. Having a circular saw beside the inside of the tank would concentrate the corporate mind. The addition of foam inserts to remove explosive potential, and to further assist in fluid escape would add minimal weight, and reduce the fuel volume minimally. As an STC, it sucks to develop, but as the OEM, it is a straightforward enhancement.

I went through that issue with the B737 center wing tank and the aux tank fun and games. Compared to the OEMs inerting generator system, foam inserts made mode sense and saved more than cents. Foam seems to be desirable on any tank if you happen to ahve a chance of having bad days and being near by.

Fenestrons are neat.

There is a natural fractional delay in thrust response as the circulation effects are over a larger area than just around a TR blade. The surround helps in increasing directional stability in forward flight with the downside that quartering tailwind conditions will reduce stability more than having a smaller keel area at the tail rotor. That means the stability is slightly more dependent on wind vector than a common or garden TR. And they are still cool. The delay in developing thrust adds to a greater excursion if perturbed.

[[email protected]]

As John R81 says and fdr states - a problem with Fenestron equipped aircraft is the size of the tail fin, designed to offload the fan in the cruise, which can aggravate the weathercock tendency when operating out of wind - this was true on the Gazelle and the 365.

To pick up on Robbie's point, yes you know that full pedal is required to stop that unexpected yaw but do you actually put in that full pedal - because it feels so wrong - when you need it?. Reports from other 'LTE' incidents indicate that pilots who were sure they applied full pedal actually didn't.

Another issue is that with experience of Fenestrons you learn to anticipate the different handling characteristics, just as you adapt to the steering or brakes on a new car.

I currently fly B412EP - standard TR but only 2 blades which is very hard work even in a moderate crosswind, compared to my previous ride, the AS365, which used to sit with a 40 Kts crosswind with no problems.

With the Grand Canyon crash it seems, as ever, to be a number of factors contributing to the accident - the unpredictable wind and poor wind awareness by the pilot plus comms and training perhaps - but I don't think the Fenestron is to blame.