JammedStab
24th Jan 2018, 23:56
Jens Flottau
Yes, technically Airbus’ latest long-haul model, the A350-1000, has not yet entered service, though it has completed development, flight testing and certification. The first customer aircraft is parked in Toulouse enduring the by-now customary delay in being accepted by Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker. His airline should have taken delivery of the aircraft before the end of 2017, but it came as no surprise that some last-minute issues arose. Airbus knows the drill by now: The same thing happened with the first A350-900.
Eventually, the aircraft will fly in the colors of Qatar Airways and many other airlines. Delayed delivery of the largest A350 version will likely be a footnote in future aviation history books. But the event is relevant in a very different way because it marks the end of a long development cycle.
Airbus has no more major civil aircraft development programs underway. One can ignore work on the Beluga XL, an in-house logistics tool, and the A319neo, which has not sold well and will be in an even worse position as Airbus takes control of the Bombardier C Series. More important, there also is no clarity about the manufacturer’s next moves, leading to the strong possibility of a material gap between the A350-1000 and the OEM’s next major program.
An extended gap between development programs is financially attractive because R&D spending declines rapidly and profit margins go up in consequence. But it is hugely problematic as far as engineering resources are concerned. For now, Airbus has too many engineers with little work to do. If it reduces capacity too much, it risks losing valuable know-how. Ideally, companies should aim at a more or less even flow of development work, with as few peaks and valleys as possible.
Airbus risks losing that balance—and it is clear why. There are two in-service aircraft families that cover most airline requirements: the A320neo and the A350. But Airbus is struggling with the decision about where to put its money next. There are several reasons for that indecision.
Following the acquisition of the C Series, there are two areas at which Airbus could potentially look: the midmarket segment that Boeing believes has huge potential, or the long-range widebody market. Starting with the midmarket segment, Airbus faces a timing issue. Management wants to wait for Boeing to move first and launch its New Midmarket Airplane. It wants to use the second-mover advantage—forcing its competitor to define its aircraft first—then be in the position to react. There is arguably no need to rush, because the A321neo and A321LR are proving popular. Airbus also wants to sell the A330neo, which would almost certainly be cannibalized by its own midmarket offering. This leaves Airbus with a tricky choice, and one that will require time to sort out. The most likely short-to-medium-term project is the launch of an A321plus—a larger version of the aircraft with more range, possibly a new composite wing and more powerful engines.
Then there is the true long-range market. It looks entirely possible that Airbus will soon be forced to end production of the A380. The only way around it would be a quick follow-on order by Emirates, and signs indicate the airline may ultimately decide against a commitment. In that scenario, the A350-1000 would be Airbus’ largest aircraft. It would be about 30 seats smaller than Boeing’s future largest aircraft, the 777-9 (leaving out the 747-8 passenger version, which lacks customer interest). For now, Airbus argues the sweet spot of the long-haul market is 300 seats, where the A350-1000 and the 777-300ER sit in typical airline configurations. But what about five or 10 years from now? If airlines are unwilling to buy a 550-seater—which Airbus clearly launched far too early—perhaps they would consider a much more modern aircraft with 350-400 seats that incorporates all the technology developments that have become available since 2000, the year the A380 was launched.
Yes, technically Airbus’ latest long-haul model, the A350-1000, has not yet entered service, though it has completed development, flight testing and certification. The first customer aircraft is parked in Toulouse enduring the by-now customary delay in being accepted by Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker. His airline should have taken delivery of the aircraft before the end of 2017, but it came as no surprise that some last-minute issues arose. Airbus knows the drill by now: The same thing happened with the first A350-900.
Eventually, the aircraft will fly in the colors of Qatar Airways and many other airlines. Delayed delivery of the largest A350 version will likely be a footnote in future aviation history books. But the event is relevant in a very different way because it marks the end of a long development cycle.
Airbus has no more major civil aircraft development programs underway. One can ignore work on the Beluga XL, an in-house logistics tool, and the A319neo, which has not sold well and will be in an even worse position as Airbus takes control of the Bombardier C Series. More important, there also is no clarity about the manufacturer’s next moves, leading to the strong possibility of a material gap between the A350-1000 and the OEM’s next major program.
An extended gap between development programs is financially attractive because R&D spending declines rapidly and profit margins go up in consequence. But it is hugely problematic as far as engineering resources are concerned. For now, Airbus has too many engineers with little work to do. If it reduces capacity too much, it risks losing valuable know-how. Ideally, companies should aim at a more or less even flow of development work, with as few peaks and valleys as possible.
Airbus risks losing that balance—and it is clear why. There are two in-service aircraft families that cover most airline requirements: the A320neo and the A350. But Airbus is struggling with the decision about where to put its money next. There are several reasons for that indecision.
Following the acquisition of the C Series, there are two areas at which Airbus could potentially look: the midmarket segment that Boeing believes has huge potential, or the long-range widebody market. Starting with the midmarket segment, Airbus faces a timing issue. Management wants to wait for Boeing to move first and launch its New Midmarket Airplane. It wants to use the second-mover advantage—forcing its competitor to define its aircraft first—then be in the position to react. There is arguably no need to rush, because the A321neo and A321LR are proving popular. Airbus also wants to sell the A330neo, which would almost certainly be cannibalized by its own midmarket offering. This leaves Airbus with a tricky choice, and one that will require time to sort out. The most likely short-to-medium-term project is the launch of an A321plus—a larger version of the aircraft with more range, possibly a new composite wing and more powerful engines.
Then there is the true long-range market. It looks entirely possible that Airbus will soon be forced to end production of the A380. The only way around it would be a quick follow-on order by Emirates, and signs indicate the airline may ultimately decide against a commitment. In that scenario, the A350-1000 would be Airbus’ largest aircraft. It would be about 30 seats smaller than Boeing’s future largest aircraft, the 777-9 (leaving out the 747-8 passenger version, which lacks customer interest). For now, Airbus argues the sweet spot of the long-haul market is 300 seats, where the A350-1000 and the 777-300ER sit in typical airline configurations. But what about five or 10 years from now? If airlines are unwilling to buy a 550-seater—which Airbus clearly launched far too early—perhaps they would consider a much more modern aircraft with 350-400 seats that incorporates all the technology developments that have become available since 2000, the year the A380 was launched.