New ‘Security’ Measures

[PoppaJo]

Absolutely sensational effort from the Turnball Government here. I just feel so much safer now. It’s like Turnball is purposefully trying to get himself out of a job?

:ugh::ugh:


Nick Xenophon says Coalition's airport security crackdown 'a joke'

Baggage handlers, caterers, engineers and maintenance staff will undergo random testing for explosives in a new security crackdown, but Nick Xenophon says the changes are a “joke” that do not go far enough.

The federal government announced the new measures on Sunday, just months after an alleged plot to smuggle an explosive on to an international flight from Sydney Airport was foiled.

The transport minister, Darren Chester, said the new checks strengthen existing controls by ensuring airport staff are authorised and appropriately trained before entering secure areas. They may also be checked while working.

Privacy concerns voiced over photo database link to real-time surveillance

“Airport workers, together with their vehicles and belongings, will be randomly selected for explosive trace detection testing and other screening when entering or working in secure airside areas at major airports,” Chester said on Sunday. “Other measures being introduced include stronger access controls and additional security awareness training for aviation workers.”

Pilots, terrorism experts and the Transport Workers Union have lobbied for strengthened screening of workers including casual staff and sub-contractors.

The move to beef up security comes after authorities claimed to have foiled an alleged terrorist plot in which a military grade explosive was stashed inside luggage to be put on a 15 July flight from Sydney to Abu Dhabi.

Chester said the new rules would be implemented progressively to provide flexibility for airports.

But Xenophon said the changes were a “joke” that do not go far enough. The senator wants a US-style agency to be responsible for airport security and vowed to pursue the matter during Senate estimates this week

“Australian aircraft passengers deserve the world’s best practice when it comes to security but the government’s measures fall well short of it,” Xenophon said. “In countries like the US, all airport staff are required to be screened. Our government’s approach to random inspections is a joke.

“Systems of checking can be easily bypassed. People with evil intent can be tipped off by mates and avoid random screening.”

The prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, announced earlier in the month that facial-recognition technology would be enhanced up as a counter-terrorism measure.

State governments agreed with the changes, along with new commonwealth offences for terrorism hoaxes and the possession of the instructional terrorist material.

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/22/coalition-says-airport-workers-to-be-tested-for-explosives-under-security-crackdown

[Capt Fathom]

If someone wants to bring an aircraft down they can. There is nothing anyone can do to stop it.
Airport security is a farce. A very expensive one at that!

[YPJT]

A search back through the threads will reveal a not insignificant number of posters complaining about the lack of screening for airside workers.

Well you got what you wished for but now the other side is screaming blue murder. :ugh:

I wouldn't worry too much though. Apparently they still haven't figured out how the compulsory ID verification at boarding gates will be done.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

If an ASIC is ruled as unacceptable ID (and I don't know if it will be or not), I hope the crew all bring their Driver's Licenses or Passports with them.

Who really cares what Senator X thinks any more? Just more sound bites before disappearing into the oblivion of SA state politics.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

ensuring airport staff are authorised and appropriately trained before entering secure areas.
So there are to be competency tests at the airside gates? I assume showing your union card will permit access.

[Lead Balloon]

A search back through the threads will reveal a not insignificant number of posters complaining about the lack of screening for airside workers.

Well you got what you wished for but now the other side is screaming blue murder. :ugh:

I wouldn't worry too much though. Apparently they still haven't figured out how the compulsory ID verification at boarding gates will be done.Pointing out the gaping holes in the aviation security system is not so much complaining about the existence of the holes, but rather complaining about the patent illogicality of the system. It seems that the level of the stringency of security processes and procedures depends not so much on the objective risks and the ways in which practically to mitigate them, but rather how easy it is to stuff various classes of people around.

Individual pilots are easy to stuff around without political consequences, so it’s easy to make the ASIC system more and more difficult (sorry, I mean ‘security effective’) for pilots. But it’s ‘different’ when it comes to requiring photo ID of passengers or screening ground staff. The former could be politically problematic and the latter could put sand in the slave-labour 457 visa ground-support gearbox.

I’d like to point out the gaping holes in the security system so as to highlight the pointlessness of the nonsense through which I have to go. But if I do so, it’s interpreted as me ‘complaining’ about the holes and urging for them to be filled.

Imagine a hypothetical aerodrome. One boundary of the aerodrome has a huge wall, topped with razor wire, and a security gate that’s monitored for the purposes of ensuring that only security-cleared pilots or screened passengers go through the gate. It costs a lot of money to build and maintain the wall and gate and pay for the screening.

The other 3 sides of the aerodrome have a sheep fence that anyone can easily step over or cut with a $2 shop tool.

Anyone can fly into the aerodrome from other places that do not have any security screening processes.

There are patently obvious huge holes in the security system for this hypothetical aerodrome.

But why has this hypothetical aerodrome not been the subject of a terrorist attack? How is it that aircraft depart this place without bombs on board?

An objective analysis of these hypothetical circumstances would conclude that the threat is almost non-existent and the huge wall, the gate, the guards and the security clearance and screening system are a mere facade the cost of which is unjustified. Faced with the choice between a sheep fence and the huge wall, even the stupidest of terrorists or maniacs is going to choose the sheep fence. Those for whom the sheep fence is an insurmountable problem could just fly in from somewhere else or drive a truck full of superphosphate through the security gate.

But what actually happens in the Orwellian world of aviation ‘safety’ and ‘security’ is that more rules must be made, bureaucratic empires have to be built and empowered and procedures have to be implemented, to fill all the gaping holes. In that world, there will eventually be huge walls and gates and security screening for every place from which any aircraft could be flown, because aircraft can be flown from anywhere into e.g. Sydney or Melbourne or...

Given that in the real world there isn’t enough money in the entire GDP to build a hole-free aviation security system, we’ll just implement the easy bits that look and feel good.

Fortunately my ‘hypothetical’ aerodrome doesn’t exist.

[Defenestrator]

I watch countless numbers of unscreened vehicles and personnel enter airfields daily. I don’t have an issue with screening. It’s ineffective though if the intent is to prevent....anything.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

I’d like to point out the gaping holes in the security system so as to highlight the pointlessness of the nonsense through which I have to go. But if I do so, it’s interpreted as me ‘complaining’ about the holes and urging for them to be filled.
While that may have been your intent, the unfortunate fact is that the interpretation is exactly how yours and all the other complaints came across. Aw gee, I have to, why dont they? Well now they do.

[Lead Balloon]

That’s why I continue to say nothing to the ‘powers that be’ about the aviation security system. That, as well as the fact that the aerodrome I referred to is purely hypothetical. :ok:

[Bootstrap1]

Until such time that airport security is taken over by a government entity instead of the current rent-a-cop cheap as chips mob doing it now, security will be nothing more than a token effort to make the punters feels safe.

The lowly skilled lowly paid airport security workers are not going to put their lives in harms way for minimum wages.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

But don't forget that at your hypothetical aerodrome, there would be imaginary lines delineating a secure area that the huge wall etc is protecting, Anyone who flies in from unscreened ports, or who climbs over or cuts their way through the adjacent sheep fence is prevented from crossing these imaginary lines by a wizard with a staff and a lot of signs that say "You shall not pass!!, unless of course, that person wears a sacred ASIC. Even if in possession of a sacred ASIC, the person will still need to go and submit themelves to the scrutiny of the gatekeepers at the portals of your great wall. Only if judged pure will they be allowed access to the hallowed Secure Area.
So you see that Aviation Security in Australia, using rigorous, well thought out procedures, and magic, works even at your hypothetical aerodrome. There is nothing to worry about :ok:

[YPJT]

The lowly skilled lowly paid airport security workers are not going to put their lives in harms way for minimum wages.
And tell me Bootstrap, just where were FEDPOL when This (http://www.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/bikie-boss-convicted-of-airport-murder-20111102-1mv75.html) was going on?

It is neither a screeners or security officers role to "put their lives in harms way" that is for the police and military.

[AerialPerspective]

Absolutely sensational effort from the Turnball Government here. I just feel so much safer now. It’s like Turnball is purposefully trying to get himself out of a job?

:ugh::ugh:
Why do we need all these new laws... I'm pretty damn sure I saw a copy of the Crimes Act Aviation (1963) which back in the 80s was the current version - interestingly imposing the death penalty for 'placing a device on an aircraft' and I am pretty damn sure it included penalties for hoaxes.

Are these new laws necessary or are politicians just stroking... well, something... and using the scare tactic again???

Don't get me wrong, I think the laws should be water tight but I get the distinct impression in many of these cases current statutes cover the offenses but they insist on passing additional laws that feature the word 'terrorism' just to try and scare the populace into thinking we're under siege.

[AerialPerspective]

If someone wants to bring an aircraft down they can. There is nothing anyone can do to stop it.
Airport security is a farce. A very expensive one at that!
Wasn't it Senator Lyonhelm who said after the Bourke Street incident that it must have been committed by "... one of those semi-automatic cars..." and that perhaps they should be banned.

[AerialPerspective]

I watch countless numbers of unscreened vehicles and personnel enter airfields daily. I don’t have an issue with screening. It’s ineffective though if the intent is to prevent....anything.
Yes, like snot-nose duty free staff bringing boxes of alcohol in through the screening area - are they all screened??? Or are they 'randomly' checked so as not to upset 'business' ???

[Rated De]

The SIS Group is one of India’s largest security services companies and is the owner of its Australian operations, MSS Security. Prosegur is a multinational security company

Does MSS still screen passengers at Melbourne Airport?
All 'security theatre' if foreign owned companies control security screening at a major airport.

Do you seriously think Israel uses contractors at their airports to screen passengers?


Who really cares what Senator X thinks any more? Just more sound bites before disappearing into the oblivion of SA state politics.

Absolutely never met a camera he didn't like and usually a dollar short and a day late!

[Lead Balloon]

But don't forget that at your hypothetical aerodrome, there would be imaginary lines delineating a secure area that the huge wall etc is protecting, Anyone who flies in from unscreened ports, or who climbs over or cuts their way through the adjacent sheep fence is prevented from crossing these imaginary lines by a wizard with a staff and a lot of signs that say "You shall not pass!!, unless of course, that person wears a sacred ASIC. Even if in possession of a sacred ASIC, the person will still need to go and submit themelves to the scrutiny of the gatekeepers at the portals of your great wall. Only if judged pure will they be allowed access to the hallowed Secure Area.
So you see that Aviation Security in Australia, using rigorous, well thought out procedures, and magic, works even at your hypothetical aerodrome. There is nothing to worry about :ok:Good point, TIEW. :ok:

No terrorist is going to cross that line, because it would be against the law. :eek:

[IsDon]

I recently renewed my US crew visa.

One of the questions on the online application made me laugh.

The question was along the lines of; "whilst visiting the USA, are you planning on conducting terrorist activities?"

Of course that'll make those nasty terrorists give up their plans for world domination. Everyone knows a terrorist won't lie on their visa application, don't they?

[Lead Balloon]

Of course they wouldn’t lie on a visa application. It’s against the law!

[Pinky the pilot]

The question was along the lines of; "whilst visiting the USA, are you planning on conducting terrorist activities?"


IsDon; Quite a few years ago, apparently there was a question on the US Visa application which asked if it was your intention to attempt to overthrow the US Government.:rolleyes:

I'm not joking, as the following was in an article in the British Gliding Association magazine.

The writer of the Platypus column (Mike Bird) then featured in said magazine was visiting the US and found that question on his application card.

He stated that he wrote;'Sole purpose of visit.':rolleyes: in the reply section.
And still got his visa!:eek:

Which says something......I think.:confused:

[Snakecharma]

I find it somewhat amusing that getting through screening in the US as crew is significantly easier, quicker and much less hassle than it is going through screening in Australia.

They at least, it seems, acknowlege that having been put through the wringer to get crew visas and security clearances for ID’s that they would have identified any issues much earlier than when you turned up at the airport ready to “take over an aeroplane”

In the US we get treated much like the punters enrolled in the TSA’s trusted traveller programs. https://www.dhs.gov/trusted-traveler-programs

It would never happen in Australia because of our seemingly unendless desire to bow to the tall poppie syndrome - we could never be seen to get preferential treatment just because we are crew, so the great egalatarian ethos keeps us firmly in our place.

To me there needs to be a risk based approach to this, we get a rectal probe every time we renew out Asic, we get trusted with the lives of those we fly around and we get trusted with a multi million dollar machine, so perhaps there is some element of trustworthiness that can be extended to the other palava.

Engineers, cabin crew same same. The engineers particularly are the other major group who are “careerists” in so much as we tend to get into the flying/fixing game and whilst we might move airlines/businesses throughout the course of our respective careers, we stay pretty much in the same job. So we have an investment in our careers both in terms of money, effort and future employment, so perhaps we can be trusted just a little

[BossEyed]

Yes, it says Platypus was stealing a story from Peter Ustinov!

Or Oscar Wilde, Evelyn Waugh, Michael Foot or Gilbert Harding - to all of whom that quip has been attributed at one time or another.

[Tankengine]

Another old question : "have you been convicted of crimes against humanity?"

...convicted?...errr............ ;)

[peuce]

I think we've been over all these issues a million times before, and people still haven't come to grips with the big picture. Yes, there's a million little anomalies that, when viewed in isolation, make the big picture appear nutty.

We have to remember a few things:


Aviation Security...like any Security, will NEVER be foolproof
Does it really matter who the share holders of a Security Company are? Who owns Qantas? Who owns Virgin? No, it's who is on the ground, or in the seat, that really matters
Aviation Security is a deterrent...nothing more
Everyone going through screening gets checked...otherwise the punters would be asking (valid) questions. Even Security Officers get screened before they can screen
Not every would be terrorist is an evil genius...good example, the latest Sydney attempt using an over weight meat mincer. Perhaps we might catch a few of these enthusiastic amateurs, but we would be pretty lucky to catch an evil genius. That's just a fact of life. At least have a go at catching or deterring those we have a chance of deterring...and let the Feds search out the others.
It's obvious from reading here that screening is a pain for most....sounds like its working to me
Don't under estimate the other objective of screening...intercepting nasty, pointed, sharp things...that people still attempt to conceal in their carry on luggage. Do your cabin crew really want to be confronted with one of these pointed at them during a flight, because they refused service of alcohol?
Yes, a pilot can easily bring down an aircraft without any outside assistance or tools...but it would be a big decision. Their employers are responsible for keeping an eye out for those sort of tendencies. Screening's part in the process is to make it harder to use other options.


Security is a huge big organism and the aviation security measures we see in daily life is just one little annoying part of the big machine. I'm convinced it continues to fill a purpose.

[Lead Balloon]

“[L]ittle anomalies”? That’s an interesting euphemism for gaping holes.

There were “little anomalies” in the defences of Singapore back in WWII, even though the British touted it as impregnable.

The system does continue to fill a purpose: To provide the facade of security, at the expense of the law-abiding.

Fortunately the real terrorists and maniacs have yet to resolve to exploit the “little anomalies” in the system. Let’s pray they never do.

[blow.n.gasket]

Some of those same anomalies were pointed out by Sir John Wheeler in the Wheeler report , Circa September 2005.
A number of those numberous security shortcomings highlighted by the report are still there and still ignored !
Obviously Airport security holds a high priority with Government !

http://www.allthings.com.au/Catalogue/cctv%20security%20surveillance%20ip%20network%20dome%20camer a%20articles/SecurityPolicingReview.pdf

[peuce]

Do you not think the Government is aware of every existing anomaly in the system? Do you not think that every Minister with any sort of responsibility to Aviation Security has not tin platted his or her arse with a water tight Risk Assessment review, prepared by his or her senior staff, showing that all the likelihoods and consequences line up appropriately...and that all the appropriate controls are in place? These people may be dumb, but they're not stupid !

My feeling is that the latest changes are purely to placate the squeaky wheels...not to address a particular need.

[blow.n.gasket]

Affordable security to go hand in hand with affordable safety perhaps? :E

[peuce]

Exactly !

Anything can be fully fixed....for a price !

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

Everyone going through screening gets checked.

Well, yes. (Unless 'screening' means something different to what I thought it did). I think the concern is with people who aren't screened and still have access to the aircraft.


It's obvious from reading here that screening is a pain for most....sounds like its working to me

Seriously? Being a pain means it's working? In that case, how about we make it a full cavity search with a tax audit thrown in for good measure? Then it'll be working really well.



Yes, a pilot can easily bring down an aircraft without any outside assistance or tools...but it would be a big decision. Their employers are responsible for keeping an eye out for those sort of tendencies. Screening's part in the process is to make it harder to use other options.

Of course it'd be a big decision - whether you just crash the thing, or employ the nail scissors and 150g tube of toothpaste that you somehow snuck past security. And let's not forget all the other stuff that's available on the flight deck, starting with a frickin' axe. With a spike on it. You really think screening would make it that much harder to use 'other options'?

Sorry if it seems like I'm having a go at you - I agree with your other points, and appreciate you coming on here and politely defending what to many of us seems like nonsense at times.

[Pinky the pilot]

Yes, it says Platypus was stealing a story from Peter Ustinov!


Ah so! Thanks BossEyed.:ok:

Reckon you could be quite correct!

[Lead Balloon]

It’s not the cost: It’s whether what is spent gets the best security for the buck, and the answer to that question is no.

Making the ASIC ID process more inconvenient and expensive for pilots will do nothing to increase security. Why is it happening? Simple: Because it can, without any political consequences.

Requiring photo ID for all commercial passengers could be done with the stroke of a pen. No ID? About turn out of the terminal and have a nice day. Why isn’t it happening? Simple: Because there would be political consequences.

British General, Singapore before the fall: Bolster the defences for an attack from the sea!

Hapless Minion: Sir, maybe the Japanese will invade on pushbike, down the peninsular. Maybe the seaward defences are adequate and we’d be better off bolstering the defences on the peninsular side.

British General: Nonsense, Hapless Minion! An invasion on pushbike? The attack will be against our strongest defences! Bolster the sea defences!

If there is a terrorist or maniac attack on an aircraft in Australia (and touch wood there isn’t) I reckon it will be by the equivalent of a Japanese soldier on a pushbike. Straight through the back door.

[peuce]

No need to apologise. I'm a big boy.... I can take it. And, I don't have all the answers...only an opinion.
Unfortunately, I haven't seen the answers from anyone else here...only gripes... Interspersed with a smattering of ill informed generalisations.

The bottom line is.....it is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside.

So, do you give up and throw your hands in the air....or do you do what is achievable and economical?
That, together with other, not always visible, controls....should provide an acceptable residue risk.
If it doesn't , then additional measures need to be put in place, but....who is it that knows if we have an acceptable residue risk? The pollies, I guess.

So, we either accept that, or we promote the notion that we know better than they...who have all the information.

I'm the last one to say trust a pollie, but I guess there comes a time that we have to trust them to do the job we pay them to. If we don't like how they're doing their job...get rid of them at the next election.

[YPJT]

Peuce,
Some very well thought out response and explanations in your posts. One of the few who clearly get it.

[Lead Balloon]

.....it is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside.A statement of the bleeding obvious.So, do you give up and throw your hands in the air....or do you do what is achievable and economical?A false dichotomy, but in any event I note that many things in the system of aviation security are “achievable” and “economical” (in the sense that it doesn’t cost the consolidated revenue fund anything) but do not contribute thing one to an increase in aviation security. The recent changes to ASIC ID requirements are a prime example. It’s doing something to be seen to be doing something.

Your sentence should be: You do what has the greatest causal effect on aviation security, for the cost. That, together with other, not always visible, controls....should provide an acceptable residue risk.”Should” it?

That’s merely an expression of earnest hope.

If it doesn't , then additional measures need to be put in place, but....who is it that knows if we have an acceptable residue risk? The pollies, I guess. More faith-based reasoning!

Whilst is it true that is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside, the ease with which the sterilisation measures can be circumvented suggests the assessment of acceptable residual risk is more about astrology than risk assessment.So, we either accept that, or we promote the notion that we know better than they...who have all the information.They don’t have all the information, because if they did they wouldn’t agree to requirements that produce no increase in security while leaving gaping holes to gape. I'm the last one to say trust a pollie, but I guess there comes a time that we have to trust them to do the job we pay them to. If we don't like how they're doing their job...get rid of them at the next election.Which is why the most important element of the aviation security system is the low probabilities of an attempt, not the expertise of pollies and their advisers. And thank what ever deities there may be for that!

The reason the people who know better don’t point out the patent inconsistencies in the system is the that almost inevitable outcome would be more inconvenience and costs to the law-abiding rather than a re-jigging of the system so as to deal with risks in a consistent way.

[peuce]

Lead Baloon, you've said it all in your second last paragraph....the probability is low.
So, why can't the Pollies also accept that probability and tailor their measures to it...like they have. That is how risk management works.
You appear to be supporting a case where there is an expectation that measures to counter a (non existing) higher probability are implemented.

[Lead Balloon]

[W]hy can't the Pollies also accept that probability and tailor their measures to it...like they have. My point is that they haven’t. It may be that they earnestly believe they have, but they haven’t. I take it that you earnestly believe they have.

The measures have not been tailored to get the best security outcome for the cost, but rather to get what’s easiest and looks good. That’s why the usual methods for access to many regional aerodromes by-pass the ‘security’ infrastructure. Lots of ‘criminal’ activity, but terrorists and maniacs don’t care about the law. That’s why the ASIC ID requirements are becoming more complex and incoherent when measured against the risks and whether the requirements actually mitigate those risks. Just keep piling it on to pilots. Curious that the same requirements aren’t imposed on pilots in the USA.

This is the kind of thing that produced the circumstances that triggered this thread. We have a security system in which the least-trusted class of persons as to background and identity is pilots, who sit in the cockpit and watch a bunch of people of unknown identity or security risk or even known-dubious backgrounds wandering happy as a cloud airside, unscreened.

I stress - because this is my key point - that I’m not advocating for filing the gaping holes at the same time as piling more and more requirement on pilots, but rather for mitigation measures that are appropriate to the risk. If having terrorists or maniacs airside is a risk worth mitigating, it’s incoherent to mitigate that risk by implementing hairy-chested security measures for the people who come in through one door while leaving other doors or windows open.