Indonesian Boeing 737 collides with ATR during take off run

[Centaurus]

Runway collision in Indonesia. The First Officer only had 153 flying hours total time before flying the 737. Frightening thought.
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/B738_/_AT46,_Jakarta_Halim_Indonesia,_2016?utm_source=SKYbrary&utm_campaign=8069adf88c-544_Inadequate_Comms_02_09_2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e405169b04-8069adf88c-276530305

Final Report:
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3901.pdf

[Progressive]

Poor ground control procedures, incorrect clearance to takeoff. Complete disaster averted by an alert, quick thinking FO with low hours. What was your point?

[flash8]

368TT, 215 on type.


The 153 one must assume can't be a CPL/IR, but one of those MPL's?

In the words immortalised by one SE Asian FO.... "Captain, if you go.. we all go!"

[pilotchute]

No MPL in Indonesia. BIFA (Bali International Flight Academy) pumps out students with a cpl/ir at 150 hours. IR is single engine only atm. Multi IR is done in type rating sim.

[First_Principal]

@Progressive has it IMO - it appears there's little, if anything the 73 drivers could have done. Whilst the thought of pilots flying the line with such low hours does disturb me I don't see that it could in any way have any bearing on this incident.

Moreover P2 alerted P1, P1 took fairly immediate action after P2's report. Suggests reasonable CRM with no obvious arrogance from 18k hour P1 to 300hr P2, nor was P2 too cowed to report the object. Way better than some other cockpit culture from what I've read in the past :D.

Horribly lax ground movement/control/communication procedure and culture though :mad:. This is an area of aviation that hasn't been particularly prominent in what I read on Pprune; perhaps because it just generally 'works' in our part of the world. Nevertheless it's a reminder to be aware of possible failures in the system outside the cockpit and while on the ground - something I have personal experience of...

FP.

[training wheels]

No MPL in Indonesia. BIFA (Bali International Flight Academy) pumps out students with a cpl/ir at 150 hours. IR is single engine only atm. Multi IR is done in type rating sim.

BIFA is one of the few flight schools which do actually have multi-engine aircraft. They have about 4 seminoles since 2014. But you're right, most CPL/IR grads in Indonesia before 2014 only had single engine IFR ratings.

As for this incident, the ATR was being towed to the remote south apron and was not powered up; no nav lights, no strobes were on. The tug driver was also not on tower frequency.

A sad end to what was a brand new ATR42-600, which was about 6 months old at the time of the incident.

[Judd]

P1 took fairly immediate action after P2's report.
Interesting discussion; especially after reading the full report by the investigation team It could be argued the PIC could have immediately rejected the takeoff run when the co-pilot warned of something on the runway and speed was 96 knots ground speed; even if the captain could not discern what was ahead. If he had done so, a collision may or may not, have been avoided. Even a low speed impact would have been safer than what happened next at high speed.

Instead the PIC elected to press on hoping to miss the other aircraft until a collision was unavoidable and only aborted when beyond V1. Certainly the decision to abort after impact was fortuitous since severe airframe damage made further flight highly dangerous. The report stated the collision was inevitable. But that was only when the captain made the decision to keep going and tried to steer off the centreline. All this discussion is being wise after the event but certainly food for thought in future

[training wheels]

The last two airlines I've been with has the Captain's hands on the thrust levers during the take-off roll, even if it is the FO as PF. I guess this is standard throughout the industry. My question is why? Shouldn't the PF have his/her hands on the thrust levers at all times?

[A37575]

Shouldn't the PF have his/her hands on the thrust levers at all times?

Not at all times. I don't know about overseas airlines, but I recall the catalyst for the Australian airlines change of policy where whoever was doing the take off handled everything, was an incident to a TAA DC9 at Townsville in the late 1950's or early 60's. During that take off the co-pilot was handling and retained the throttles as well. An event just before VR startled the co-pilot and he immediately abandoned the takeoff before the captain could stop him. I don't know the cause of the event. The DC9 over-ran into the stopway with red hot brakes. In other words the co-pilot made the decision to abort when investigation proved that an abort was unnecessary.
Historically the captain of an aircraft makes that decision as he wears the responsibility by law for the safe operation of the aircraft. As a high speed abort, especially on a limiting runway surface and length, is arguably the most critical decision a pilot will make in his career, that decision must be made by the captain.

Following the DC9 incident where the captain was helpless to stop the co-pilot from aborting the takeoff, the airline changed its policy of the co-pilot handling everything on his take off, to the captain retaining the power levers.

Whether or not the then Dept of Civil Aviation had a part in this I don't know but it became general policy that the pilot in command retain the throttles during the take off run up to V1. Most Australian operators accept this advice. With the advent of automatic braking (Rejected Takeoff or RTO) in modern types, the brakes would automatically be applied at full strength as soon as the thrust levers were closed beyond a certain speed in the take off roll. Nominally 90 knots in some jets. Hence the vital importance of the decision to be made by the captain and not abrogated to his co-pilot.

The major manufacturers followed suit leading to the statement in one manufacturers flight crew training manual that "the decision to reject the takeoff is the responsibility of the captain and must be made prior to V1 speed." In other words it is not the responsibility of the co-pilot; although under certain circumstances the captain may direct him to reject the take off. The Boeing 737 Flight Crew Operations Manual makes it crystal clear by saying: "the captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff. The decision must be made in time to start the rejected takeoff maneuver by V1. If the decision is to reject the take off , the captain must clearly announce "REJECT," immediately start the rejected takeoff maneuver and assume control of the airplane."

[atpcliff]

Some airlines have the Capt decide/perform the rejected takeoff, others have the flying pilot perform the reject.

I'm not sure why that is. It seems that one of the two is the "best" way, and every airline would do it that way...

Namaste...

[ACMS]

Only 1 Captain on the Jet. He gets paid the big bucks and he makes the decision.

[First_Principal]

Interesting discussion; especially after reading the full report by the investigation team It could be argued the PIC could have immediately rejected the takeoff run when the co-pilot warned of something on the runway and speed was 96 knots ground speed; even if the captain could not discern what was ahead. If he had done so, a collision may or may not, have been avoided. Even a low speed impact would have been safer than what happened next at high speed.

Not an unreasonable thought, but there are two things that come to mind:

(1) The need and time for processing by P1 [reaction time], which would probably include the need to confirm what was seen - after all it's not something 'likely', and P2 was comparatively inexperienced.

(2) IIRC (I'm not going to read it again right now!) a simulated run was done in which action was taken immediately upon report by P2. The conclusion from this was that not only would it not have avoided contact, but that it could have been a worse outcome. I think I'd treat that proposed outcome with some degree of latitude, without having considered it in detail, and it doesn't mean that P1 couldn't have done better - but on the face of it I don't think either did badly,

FP.

[A37575]

but on the face of it I don't think either did badly,

You may be right. But in some past accidents in that region there has been, for perhaps cultural or political reasons a tendency for the investigators to sometimes "protect" the captain. The 1997 Silk Air 737 crash comes to mind.