B707 over-ran Runway 34 Sydney after rejected take off due bird strike, 1969 Report

[Centaurus]

While taking off from Runway34 at Sydney Airport for a flight to Honolulu U.S.A, a Pan American Airways Boeing 707 struck a flock of seagulls, the No.2 engine lost power and the captain abandoned the take-off. Before the aircraft could be brought to a stop, it over-ran the end of the runway, struck a section of approach lighting installation and came to rest nearly 600 feet beyond the runway end. None of the 136 persons on board was injured and they quickly evacuated the damaged aircraft.

The take-off was carried out by the first officer from the right hand seat. As the aircraft accelerated, the captain called airspeed indication of 80 knots and 100 knots, and then"V1", but just after the V1 call the aircraft struck a flock of seagulls and there were two sharp reports from outside the aircraft.
The captain, who was scanning the engine instruments, saw the No.2 engine pressure ratio (EPR) indication drop from 1.85 to about 1.55 and at about the same time, the flight engineer called that there was a power loss. The captain immediately took control and abandoned the take-off.

The captain's recollection of the sequence of events was that the power loss occurred shortly after the aircraft attained 100 knots and before V1 speed and this recollection was shared by other crew members. The captain said that when he abandoned the take-off he had applied considerable braking simultaneously with the selection of speed brake and reverse thrust and full wheel braking immediately afterward.

The decision to abandon the take-off after passing V1, remain as the primary factor in the circumstances leading to the aircraft.

As a matter of personal interest it is understood the senior DCA Accident Investigator of this event was Mr Paul Choquenot, a former pilot in the RAAF on the same Post War Pilots Course (No. 8 ) as Centaurus

See link to report:
http://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/552.pdf

[bluedevil]

That was the marketing phrase used by PanAm over some years. When the wreckage was moved to a Qantas hanger shortly after the accident, I went in to have a look. A detached engine was sitting on the hangar floor, with these words written in black marker ink on the nacelle " PanAm makes the going grate"

[Dark Knight]

This accident report plus the excellent paper produced and published by airline Captains in the USA by ALPA (unfortunately the names I no longer recall) are primers for the importance of fully understanding the Accelerate/Stop Manoeuvre.

Accelerate/Stop is the most critical manoeuvre an airline pilot will ever be required to undertake particularity at maximum T/O weight on a balanced field length; should it not be done correctly, all conditions not be correct then an incident/accident is highly likely.

This report is a prime example of an accident where all was not correct or done properly.

All will do well to study, read and digest this report learning from past errors.


`Another look at accelerate-stop criteria'
T. FOXWORTH, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSN., WASHINGTON, D.C.; H. MARTHINSEN, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSN., WASHINGTON, D.C. 1969

[Centaurus]

Accelerate/Stop is the most critical manoeuvre an airline pilot will ever be required to undertake particularity at maximum T/O weight on a balanced field length

Introduction of the RTO (Rejected Take-off) function in most modern jet transports remains a great addition to flight safety. Previously, pilot technique in the application of full braking varied considerably; especially in a strong crosswind or asymmetric reverse thrust was used. It is difficult to apply full symmetrical braking while using rudder to counteract effect of crosswind. Invariably brake application can be uneven,resulting in extra runway used during the aborted take-off run.

RTO automatically applies maximum available symmetrical brake pressure when thrust levers are retarded to idle at or above 90 knots (Boeing 737 Classics and above). The over-run to the PANAM 707 would probably not have happened if RTO was available in those days.

[Dark Knight]

Undoubtedly correct; any advance and addition of technology can assist in enhancing safety however; my experience indicates how little emphasis, teaching or understanding of the principles involved is understood by today's pilots.

I stand by my statement `Accelerate/Stop is the most critical manoeuvre an airline pilot will ever be required to undertake'.

A B747, B777 or any heavy jet at maximum T/O weight on a hot day/evening on any but an extremely long runway will be a handful in the event of a rejected T/O at or just below V1 - many a night I know the main wheels lifted off the runway at the `piano keys' (even in the beloved B727)

[mustafagander]

The decision to reject T/O after V1 was a very sound one. As stated, #2 engine had failed due bird ingestion but #1 also had significant damage and was very unlikely to have been able to produce rated thrust. A good application of "gut feeling" that she wouldn't fly. I'm sure of that, I was part of the effort to list the damage to each engine and this one, #1, had feathers too, lots of them.
It was definitely past V1, my crew and I were having our meal break outside H131 watching the aircraft, as you do if your a bit crazy about aircraft, and I can swear to the fact that the nose wheel was actually off the ground when the RTO started. We watched in horror as she slid into the swamp with all the surging of reversers and such.
My crew was part of the retrieval effort so we got to see it all. There was a big bonus, I am reliably informed that the first thing out the front left door was a full bar cart which we engineers immediately secured to avoid further damage. By the time the aircraft had been secured it was close to dawn so a drink sponsored by Pan Am in our crew meal room was very welcome.
The repair was fascinating in the way that Boeing organised all the bits and pieces in a very orderly fashion, right down to the last rivet in each kit for each part of the ship.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
One of the "comments" I recall at the time regarded the standard of the "frangible" approach light poles, and the unfortunate fact that the large concrete block that were their base did not "frange" quite so easily.
A summary of the major structural damage was an impressively long list, it was a most remarkable rebuild, first time I saw a Boeing AOG team at work. Quite something.
Tootle pip!!
PS: Current accelerate/stop certification criteria current are far more realistic than then SFAR422b.

[blueys]

I remember the pan am flamer that was also repaired at QF hanger? mascot

[B772]

If my memory serves me correctly the a/c was overweight due to a faulty hydrometer and the brakes were not up to scratch either.

[LeadSled]

B772,
Re. weight, true.
Re. brakes, on that model of B707-321, even in top condition the brakes were a bit ordinary, compared to what we have become used to.
Tootle pip!!