Schräge Musik

[S'land]

I have recently been re-reading a couple of books about Bomber Command’s operations in the Second World War. One thing that puzzles me (and has done for a few years) is the fact that the authorities did not know about Schräge Musik.


The idea of a fighter with guns that fired upwards at a 45° angle were not really new. The Air Ministry had issued specification F.29/27 calling for an aircraft design that incorporated an upward firing Coventry Ordinance Works 37 mm automatic gun. Three designs were submitted: Vickers (Type 161), Westland (C.O.W. Gun Fighter) and Bristol (Type 112). The Vickers and Westland designs were actually built and trials were made in 1931.


I seem to recall that a similar concept was at least muted in the First World War to counter Zeppelins.


I know that nothing came of either specification, but surely the powers that be must have known about them and made a connection when crews reported back that they had not seen the aircraft that attacked them. Or was it a case of not letting the people at the sharp end know?

[BEagle]

...surely the powers that be must have known about them and made a connection when crews reported back that they had not seen the aircraft that attacked them. Or was it a case of not letting the people at the sharp end know?

Probably the latter. Along with the psychological myth of the 'scarecrow flare shell'. Which were in fact other bombers either being shot down or blown up by a faulty bomb fuze.

[Innominate]

Although similar tactics had been developed some 20 years earlier there's no guarantee that those in authority remembered it and made the connection!

Bomber Command's Operational Research Section did conduct some analysis of damage to returning aircraft. The AHB monograph on OR in the RAF states that research was carried out into damage caused by AA fire; "the great majority of aircraft damaged by heavy flak received only two or three strikes [but] strikes from below were twice as numerous as those from above." That in itself is hardly surprising, given that AA fire usually has an upward trajectory...

However, Schraege Musik may have been so effective that very few crews returned to report attacks. It's unlikely that intelligence on its use would have come from POWs or SIGINT, but it's hard to believe that we had no hint of it.

[longer ron]

The Canadians were certainly concerned about being vulnerable to attacks from below and quite a few of their heavy bombers were fitted with a 'scare gun' in the belly.
Unfortunately most of our heavy bombers simply did not have room for a proper lower turret,especially those a/c fitted with H2S.If the Canadians were aware of the risk I find it difficult to believe that our 'Airships' were not aware of the possibility of attack from below - as already posted - attacking from below was quite normal during WW1 and most RAF senior officers were WW1 veterans.

[longer ron]

The idea of a fighter with guns that fired upwards at a 45° angle were not really new. The Air Ministry had issued specification F.29/27 calling for an aircraft design that incorporated an upward firing Coventry Ordinance Works 37 mm automatic gun. Three designs were submitted: Vickers (Type 161), Westland (C.O.W. Gun Fighter) and Bristol (Type 112). The Vickers and Westland designs were actually built and trials were made in 1931.


It did not even need to be as technical as that - on a/c fitted with the 'Foster' type mounting for a Lewis gun on the top wing - these guns could be fired whilst angled upwards - this allowed attacks to be made from underneath EA blind spots.

[Innominate]

"most of our heavy bombers simply did not have room for a proper lower turret,especially those a/c fitted with H2S."

ISTR that early Lancasters (and possibly the other types) had a ventral turret, and the H2S scanner was mounted in the hole provided for the turret.

[clunckdriver]

Google Halifax LK 710 shoot down, the Bomb Aimer was my late brother in law John Grimer {F/LT RAF} he wrote a very lucid account of the effect of the inclined cannon fire on the aircraft and crew.

[longer ron]

Innominate;9862898]

ISTR that early Lancasters (and possibly the other types) had a ventral turret, and the H2S scanner was mounted in the hole provided for the turret.

Yes the FN64 was the original ventral turret ,but was deemed unsuitable for night use.
The Preston-Green design was later deemed more suitable for series production but as more H2S units became available - the space for fitment disappeared.
As I posted earlier though - the canadians had already fitted 'scare guns' under many of their heavies.



Preston Green under defence mounting Mk.II

On 29th February 1944, a Halifax III, (LW650), took off from Boscombe Down. It appeared to be just another Halifax, with the bulging blister of H2S radar beneath the fuselage, but close inspection would have revealed a 0.5in. Browning protruding through the rear of the blister. The aircraft was being used for trials of the Preston Green under-defence turret.
Preston Green began with an American mounting used by USAAF bombers. It gave free movement of the gun whilst providing a firm anchorage. Work had begun 18 months earlier, when it was suspected that enemy night fighters were attacking from below. At this time, the H2S sets were looked on as an essential aid, but production of bombers was outstripping the supply of radars, and it was decided to install Preston Green mountings in all Halifax IIIs.
The adapter was fixed across the base of a bowl-shaped enclosure immediately behind the bomb bay. The gunner had an aft-facing bucket seat within the blister, with a tilting back rest. The gun could be swung clear of its aperture when searching, but could rapidly locked in the firing position if needed.
Had more Bomber Command aircraft been fitted with the Preston Green turret, this previously non-existent protection from attack from below would have cut down the toll taken by Luftwaffe night fighters using upwards firing cannon.. Unfortunately, when H2S production increased, the turrets were taken out, much to the annoyance of bomber crews.

[Load Toad]

Oh, they knew about it alright. I've read quite a few books now about Bomber Command, unfortunately often it seems the priority was shipping maximum bomb loads rather than defence - though of course there was also the issue of how much defence is enough defence and when does it stop being beneficial.
You can debate also using .303 guns against fighters armed with at least 13mm & 20mm if not more.
Or the much maligned Defiant fighter that shot down most enemy aircraft during the Night Blitz....by attacking from below.

[Load Toad]

New 1/72nd Revell Halifax Mk.III- DONE,...FINISHED! - Page 3 - Work in Progress - Aircraft - Britmodeller.com (http://www.britmodeller.com/forums/index.php?/topic/234990192-new-172nd-revell-halifax-mkiii-donefinished/&page=3)

https://tailendcharlietedchurch.wordpress.com/tail-end-charlie-ted-church/rear-gunner-sentinel-of-the-skies/gunnery-training/

[Heathrow Harry]

lso you have to question the effctiveness of defensive weapons. When used in daylight they proved to be realtively useless TBH - for a start machine guns v cannons was no match

The main benifit of the air gunner was visual warning - which, at night, was highly variable - and the morale effect of firing back

Of course a downward and backward radar set or radar warning receiver was needed but the active sets were large & cumbersome and would have given the enemy somethnig to home on once they figured out they were fittted. There were warning receivers but they were always slightly behind enemy advances

[bobward]

Knowing about a problem is one thing. Being able to solve it is another. Maybe those in charge did know as we had some very clever people (Prof R V Jones for one) working in military intelligence.

How might aircrew have reacted if they were told that night fighters could shoot them from underneath and we had no counter at the time? Just a thought.

[Rory57]

A must-read, first hand, article on British Bomber losses and the official understanding of them here:

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/

by Freeman Dyson, eminent theoretician and member of the wartime operational research unit

[megan]

A devastating weapon. On the night of 22/23 March 1944 Helmut Lent shot down three Lancasters with just 22 rounds. He again shot down three Lancasters on the night of 15-16 June in seven minutes using 57 rounds of ammunition. 110 victories of which 59 were heavy bombers.

Aces of the Luftwaffe - Helmut Lent (http://www.luftwaffe.cz/lent.html)

[Mr Mac]

My late father was shot down by a Night Fighter which he beleived was equipped with the "Dancing Music" as he was a rear gunner and never saw the fighter until it opened fire below them, and he then could not depress the guns enough or bring to bear on target. His desciption of 20mm cannon shell fire at night in his words was " like playing tennis with flaming tennis balls" - he was a keen tennis player ! He also beleives only maybe 10 - 15 cannon shells hit the A/C but the damage they did was quickly fatal.


Regards
Mr Mac

[longer ron]

The SM pilots targeted the wing fuel tanks - a few phosphorus type cannon shells in the Engines/Fuel Tanks would have been enough to bring the Bomber down.

The ammo used was a mixture done by the waffenmeister according to the wishes of the pilot.
normally 1 piece of explosive- Minengeschoss, then 1 phospor-fire - Phosphorbrand, and 1 tracer ammo-Glimmspur, the last not too bright.




Minengeschoss = HE

Phosphorbrand = Incendiary

Glimmspur = Dim Tracer

[682al]

It's a fascinating topic.

Despite what Mr Dyson says, his colleagues had detected the rise in night fighter attacks from below (and rear) as early as mid-1943.

Urgent action was taken to counter the threat. The solution decided upon was the 0.5" Browning "lash up" devised at the Bomber Development Unit (not by "the Canadians"), using the aperture originally intended for powered turrets in all the main bomber types still in service, i.e. Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster and Wellington.

Trials were conducted on the three heavies (I'm not sure the Wellington ever had the modification in view of its imminent departure from Bomber Command). The Lancaster's installation was judged to be slightly superior to that in the Stirling, while the Halifax was judged the least successful. The latter installation was modified, producing the "Preston Green turret" which was only a fairing in reality. I've searched high and low for background information as to who/what Preston Green was. The closest I've come so far is that the representative for Handley-Page in these trials was a Mr P. T. Green (co-incidence?).

There were inevitable delays in getting the aircraft equipped, but by early 1944, all the three types were being modified, either on the assembly lines or on the units.

The major problem, of course, was the parallel drive to get H2S into the same aperture in the airframe. Faith was to be pinned on H2S and Fishpond to detect the night fighter. That didn't work out too well either.

No. III Group continued to use the under gun lash up after the other Groups because their Lancasters had the 8,000 lb. bomb doors and no H2S fit.

Meanwhile: rejected by Fighter Command in 1942...

[longer ron]

Urgent action was taken to counter the threat. The solution decided upon was the 0.5" Browning "lash up" devised at the Bomber Development Unit (not by "the Canadians"),


What I meant was that 'The Canadians' seemed to be much more worried about it than the Brits.
The possibility of upward firing nightfighters very rarely gets a mention in any Brit Bomber crews autobios.
The Canadians at least acknowledged the problem could exist.And it is possible that some sqns had a local 'lash up' before the official 'lash up' - a couple of tracers fired at a night fighter would certainly cause the NF to break away.
All a bit strange really as an attack from below was the easiest and most obvious option for NF's and us brits had even designed a couple of upward firing fighters.

Wing Commander J. D. Pattinson of 429 Squadron, recognized an unseen danger but to him, it "was all presumption, not fact." He ordered that the mid-upper turrets be removed and the "displaced gunner would lie on a mattress on the floor as an observer, looking through a perspex blister for night fighters coming up from below.

[682al]

The first generation of new, monoplane bombers (i.e. Wellington and Whitley) had the "dustbin" type of turret which was lowered into the slipstream when required. A single .303"(*) and a loss in performance due to drag made them unpopular. I certainly wouldn't have wanted to go to war in one of them!

The second generation of Bombers, Manchester, Halifax, and Stirling had more advanced turrets where only a small proportion of the turret projected below the fuselage. This meant the gunner sat inside the fuselage and sighted through a periscopic sight. These turrets were considered useless at night due to the loss of vision through the sight and a tendency for the gunner to quickly become disorientated when traversing.

(*) I was thinking of the very early dustbin turret in the Heyford when I typed this. The later, retractable turrets in the Manchester, etc, all had two .303" Brownings.

[Warmtoast]

Rory57 your post #13

first hand, article on British Bomber lossesThe German night fighter force was tiny compared with Bomber Command. But the German pilots were highly skilled, and they hardly ever got shot down. They carried a firing system called Schräge Musik, or “crooked music,” which allowed them to fly underneath a bomber and fire guns upward at a 60-degree angle. The fighter could see the bomber clearly silhouetted against the night sky, while the bomber could not see the fighter. This system efficiently destroyed thousands of bombers, and we did not even know that it existed. This was the greatest failure of the ORS. We learned about Schräge Musik too late to do anything to counter it.Schräge Musik "efficiently destroyed thousands of bombers"
Really that many?

[Icare9]

Coming late to the party and discussion, but I have always wondered why the H2S was in a ventral dome when there could have been space for either H2S or a turret under the nose, slightly aft of the bomb aimer.
I can't understand the provision of a nose turret - to my mind anyone sitting there is in the face of a 200 knot wind, plus rain, sleet, snow and in the dark, even if you saw a fighter from head on, at a closing combined speed of 500 mph, how much time would that give?
Up gunning from .303 to 0.5 calibre should have been a priority plus why would H2S have needed a ventral dome? It could have replaced the nose or mid upper turret, freeing the ventral position for a turret.

The main aspect was that the enemy would soon have worked out another weak spot and developed a form of attack at that place.

I still remain in awe of those Bomber Command crews who still went out night after night, knowing pals and other Squadrons had lost many aircraft, yet still went out again and again. They knew it was roulette, their number might not come up, if they had the right mascots and rituals, it would always be someone else.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight so much that was done in WW2 could have been done differently. But it wasn't.
Fortunately there were enough foolhardy souls to fill the gaps in the ranks and ensure final Victory.
I wasn't born then, but I know the debt I owe to them and every poor sod who put on the uniform and did their bit.

With an aircraft mounting 2 20mm or 30mm cannon, once you were the target, not much would save you.

[S'land]

Some very interesting comments. I think that that of BEagle sums up my thoughts on the subject, that the powers that be knew, but did not do anything about it. I cannot believe the comment by Freeman Dyson that ORS knew nothing of Schräge Musik. to me it just sounds as if he is trying to justify his own role in the bombing war.


I still remain in awe of those Bomber Command crews who still went out night after night, knowing pals and other Squadrons had lost many aircraft, yet still went out again and again. They knew it was roulette, their number might not come up, if they had the right mascots and rituals, it would always be someone else.I quite agree with Icare9. Over the years I worked with some of the members of Bomber Command. Most of them did not talk about their experiences. Only one, a tail gunner, who was being shown around the Lancaster in the RAF Museum spoke briefly about what it was like on operations.

i would be interested to know more about the rejected Fighter Command "Havoc" idea mentioned by 682al

[682al]

I think that BEagle sums up my thoughts on the subject, that the powers that be knew, but did not do anything about it. I cannot believe the comment by Freeman Dyson that ORS knew nothing of Schräge Musik. to me it just sounds as if he is trying to justify his own role in the bombing war.

Well it would appear that at least one bloke at B.C. thought he knew what was going on, and his frustration at not being able to persuade others and thus influence the evolution of bomber defence is pretty clear in this memo, don't you think?

Consider that the downward firing "scare gun", downward vision blisters (referenced by longer ron above) and the Rose rear turret combining heavier armament and - importantly - a much improved downward vision for the gunner, were all Bomber Command initiatives aimed at thwarting attacks from below. I think history has got this subject wrong.

p.s. The Havoc system was devised by Nash and Thompson (the turret people) and was rather more complicated than a S-M installation in that control of the guns was in the hands of an observer in the nose compartment. By the time it had been trialed, Fighter Command opinion was that the Beaufighter (soon to be followed by the Mosquito) had more than ample forward firing armament to tackle German bombers.

It didn't stop further trials with Beaufighter and Mosquito having four gun turrets installed along the lines of the Defiant, which would have allowed attacks from the beam - or from beneath...

[trident3A]

A must-read, first hand, article on British Bomber losses and the official understanding of them here:

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/

by Freeman Dyson, eminent theoretician and member of the wartime operational research unit

Fascinating read, thanks :ok:

[S'land]

I have just got round to fully reading the Dyson Freeman article. I really got it wrong. he was not trying to pass the buck, but admitted that his department missed the signs. My apologies. I must say that I am rather pleased to have been wrong as I have a lot of respect for Dyson.

Thanks to 682al for the copy of the memo from Bomber Harris. It confirms that he and his team did know about Schräge Musik and wanted something done. As with only fitting .303 guns instead of .50 cannons, it was the penny-pinchers at the top who did nothing about it.

[bkm]

Slightly off topic. Reading this thread and the work of the ORS reminded me of something I'd read ages ago, so I yomped upstairs and dug out the book.

It contains a very short section on the work of Abraham Wald and the US Statistical Research Group during WW11. Wald, a mathematician, was asked the following question by the US military following bomber raids in the European theatre: 'Our planes are coming back covered in bullet holes, More in the fuselage, least in the engines. We need to concentrate armour in areas of the greatest need, where the planes are getting hit the most. So exactly, how much armour belonged on those parts of the plane?'

The Military's expected answer was fuselage and other high hit areas.

Wald and his team proved the opposite, you put the armour where there aren't any/least bullet holes. The explanation being, the reason that the engines on returning aircraft showed fewer hits was that planes that were heavily hit in the engines weren't coming back, whereas those returning with a fuselage like a swiss cheese is pretty strong evidence that hits to the fuselage can (and should) be tolerated. You can't count the bullet holes on aircraft that don't return.

Interestingly, Wald was classed as an enemy alien (Romanian Jew) and, in theory, not cleared to read the reports he was authoring.

If this is old news, I apologise.

[oxenos]

Similar story from WW1.
After the troops were given tin helmets the medics found they were treating more men with head injuries. Didn't seem to make sense until it was realised that the men with head injuries survived to be treated because the tin helmets reduced the severity of the head injuries. Without the helmets they would never have survived to be treated.
Could Wald have been aware of this, and applied the same logic to the damaged aircraft?

[rolling20]

Bomber Command may not have known about Schrage Musik, but in the summer of 43, 1 Group gunnery leaders were teaching their gunners to ask pilots to dip a wing to look for fighters below. This was possibly before the official advent of SM in August 43. In July 44 an intact Ju88 Night Fighter landed at Woodbridge. However the only thing that BC learned was that 'Monica' was being homed in on by the night fighters. It had no SM guns.It would be interesting to know if the captured pilot knew of, or made any references to SM. After D Day, the tide slowly turned in favour of the bombers.
Attacking a bomber from underneath with front firing guns or even a turret is in my opinion pure folly and virtual suicide for a night fighter pilot. To quote from an X user of SM with whom I corresponded: 'To shoot into the fuselage too near was dangerous because the aircraft could explode of bombs and oxygen-bottles.
We were aiming for between engines Nr 1 and 2 left side a short second and then moved away right away. In most cases the fuel tanks between the engines and wing were burning, so the boys had time to parachute from fuselage.'
There were a number of recorded cases, where bombers just caught fire in level flight and with no warning. One must wonder about debriefings and of attacks that failed, were they widely circulated? Don't forget SM did not use tracer, so no one was aware of the attack. It would seem odd though that no reports did get back to England from survivors. Freeman Dyson though mentioned before that the escape hatch on a Lanc was an inch or so too small for a fully clothed crew member to escape from with ease. However, nothing was done to remedy the situation and he calculated that 10,000 crew members died needlessly.
BC powers that be were as mentioned in Max Hastings book still telling crews to use IFF over enemy territory as crews believed it interfered with German radar, when the opposite was true. Also as mentioned here earlier, 'Scarecrow Flares' were not some pyrotechnic fired up by the Germans, but aircraft , usually fully ladened receiving a direct hit. BC seemed in both cases to have decided that moral would be affected if the truth was known. I often wonder if the same was true of SM?