From World War to White Heat: the RAF in the Cold War

[topgas]

Came across this Massive Open Online Course (MOOC), described as:

"This free online course is a collaboration between the Royal Air Force (RAF) Museums and the Department of History at Royal Holloway, University of London. It will introduce you to some of the major turning points in the history of Britain in the post-1945 era."

Link is https://www.mooc-list.com/course/world-war-white-heat-raf-cold-war-futurelearn and it starts on 31st July

[Evalu8ter]

Completed it last time it was offered. Great fun, with emphasis on contributing to the debate via the message boards with each topic. Unsurprisingly very V-Force / FJ focussed, but some interesting comments upon the development of the UK INF and the Cold War role of RAFG.

[Wander00]

I did it last year - was quite impressed with all but the proof reading of course material, errors in which degraded the authority of the course for many participants

[Tankertrashnav]

I hope you dont mind me posting this as it seems to be in the same area as the MOOC as described above, and also comes under the auspices of King's College, London

I recently had a visit from Tony Redding, who took the opportunity during a holiday in Cornwall to interview me on life with the Victor tanker force. Tony is the author of two published books on RAF Bomber Command: “Flying for Freedom”, now re-published as “Life and Death in Bomber Command”, and “Bombing Germany – the Final Phase”.

He tells me he is making good progress (10 interviews of V-Force aircrew and ground crew completed and another 30 plus planned) on his planned V-Force book. This will concentrate on the human aspects of V-Force service.

Tony also starts his doctorate at King’s College, London, in October. His academic studies focus on the “capability and credibility of Britain’s airborne nuclear deterrent”. He will address three key questions (in contrast to the “human overview” in the book):

What degree of success would the V-Force have achieved, had a retaliatory attack been ordered?

To what extent did the Soviets regard the V-Force as a credible threat?

How much damage would have been inflicted by the V-Force?

The answers to these questions, of course, differ through the various stages of V-Force operational service – from the 1950s to the period after the Polaris handover.

I know of at least one PPRuNer who has taken part, but Tony tells me that he is still looking for volunteers (aircrew and ground crew) for interview, beyond those already helping him. If you would like to be part of this project, please PM me and I will pass on his contact details.

[etudiant]

Given the extreme overkill built into the US 'Massive retaliation' doctrine, I'd think a Soviet planner would have been most concerned about a rogue RAF operation.
In a real event, I don't think it would have been very important whether the first bombs on target came from the RAF, USAF TacAir or SAC.

[Pontius Navigator]

etudiant, you forget the timeline for the study.

At first there were a limited number of atomic bombs and the possibility of several attacks over several days. After the B36 came 1,600 B47. Many would have been deployed forward all around the world. I think some would have been in Spain, others in Turkey, but those is UK outnumbered by V-Force.

Then there were added IRBM and then thousands of tactical weapons in western Europe but these were not targeted against Russia.

Only in the 70s did the RAF strategic force run down.

Memories of the 6 sqn of Vulcans in the 70s swamp the memories of the 3 V-bomber types in the 50s and 60s.

[Pontius Navigator]

As for the "rogue" RAF operation, surely you mean the United Kingdom's Independent Nuclear Deterrent.

Speaking from experience, a single bomber could indeed have launched on a rogue attack. This would have needed the connivance of at least two crew members and their ability to neutralize any dissent.

There would have been a high probability of being shot down by a Lightning; recovery of the Lightning would have been ignored.

The Danes with Hunters and later F16 could have had a go and the Swedes too. Finally the IAVPOStrany would have been forewarned and against a single bomber would have been virtually certain of a kill.

OTOH, we did not have the personnel reliability program that you did, nor did we have PAL.

[etudiant]

Rogue operations can be launched by higher level authorities as well as by individual crews. So such an attack might well be by more than a single plane. From a Soviet perspective, I think that must have been a real worry.

[Pontius Navigator]

True. I know the authentication procedures were pretty rudimentary completed with SAC and PAL. But let us consider AOCinC Bomber Command orders a launch. The Bomber Controller would unhesitatingly scrambled all bombers.

The next stage required the cooperation of Fighter Command and the BBC accepting transition to the Wartime Broadcasting regime. Signals Command might have been easier so we might say the chances of a valid GO message was 50-50. Again the IAPVOStrany could have been given the penetration points and timings.

[etudiant]

Unless there was some reasonably well tested high level link to the other side, it is surprisingly difficult to transmit critical data, much less to act on it.
During, Fukushima, the Japanese Prime Minister ordered a Japanese ASDF aircraft to bring back the Chairman of TEPCO from his vacation so he could supervise the crisis response.
The command was overridden by the Japanese Defense Minister because it violated protocol. So the airplane, with the TEPCO chairman on board, returned to its departure point and the crisis management remained chaotic.
Another example, when Jimmy Carter first entered the oval office, he was briefed about the nuclear codes and the plans for emergency evacuation of the President in case of attack. The claim was that the President would be moved to safety within five minutes at any time.
Carter simply said: 'OK General, do it now.' A half hour later, Carter relieved the General from shouting into a phone by calling off the test.
While those examples are not directly comparable, they do illustrate how very difficult it is to get the expected result when a bureaucracy must deal with the unexpected.

[Tankertrashnav]

It may even depend on persuading a colonel to shoot open a Coke machine for you ;)

[etudiant]

It may even depend on persuading a colonel to shoot open a Coke machine for you ;)

Lol!!
Having to answer to The Coca Cola Company is even more threatening.