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AussieAviator
30th Jun 2017, 04:03
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2017/aair/ao-2017-057/

Preliminary report published: 30 June 2017

At about 1503 CST[1] on 30 May 2017, Cessna 441 Conquest aircraft, registered VH-XMJ (XMJ), and operated by Rossair Charter, departed Adelaide International Airport, for Renmark Airport, South Australia.

On-board were:

an inductee pilot undergoing a proficiency check, flying from the front left control seat
the chief pilot conducting the proficiency check, and under assessment for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft, seated in the front right control seat
a flying operations inspector from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, observing and assessing the flight from the first passenger seat directly behind the two control seats.
Each occupant was qualified to operate the Cessna 441.

On departure, XMJ climbed to about 17,000 ft above mean sea level, and was cleared by air traffic control (ATC) to a tracking waypoint RENWB, which was the commencement of the Renmark runway 07[2] RNAV-Z GNSS[3] approach. The pilot of XMJ was then cleared to descend, and notified ATC that they intended to carry out airwork in the Renmark area. The pilot further advised that they would call ATC again on the completion of the airwork, or at the latest by 1615. No further transmissions from XMJ were recorded on the area frequency and the aircraft left radar coverage as it descended towards waypoint RENWB.

The common traffic advisory frequency used for air to air communications in the vicinity of Renmark Airport recorded several further transmissions from XMJ as the crew conducted practice holding patterns, and a practice runway 07 RNAV GNSS approach. At the completion of the approach, the aircraft circled for the opposite runway and landed on runway 25, before backtracking the runway and lining up ready for departure. Although outside radar coverage, position and altitude information continued to be transmitted via OzRunways[4], operating on an iPad in the aircraft. The weather information recorded at Renmark around this time was clear skies, south-to-south westerly winds of about 9 kt, and a temperature of 13°C.

At 1614, the common traffic advisory frequency recorded a transmission from the pilot of XMJ stating that they would shortly depart Renmark using runway 25 to conduct further airwork in the circuit area of the runway. A witness at the airport reported that, prior to the take‑off roll, the aircraft was briefly held stationary in the lined‑up position with the engines operating at significant power. The take-off roll was described as normal however, the witness looked away before the aircraft became airborne.

Figure 1: Position information of VH-XMJ as the aircraft circled and landed on runway 25 (depicted in red), before backtracking and departing (depicted in green).
Figure 1: Position information of VH-XMJ as the aircraft circled and landed on runway 25 (depicted in red), before backtracking and departing (depicted in green).

Source: OzRunways

Position and altitude information obtained from OzRunways showed the aircraft maintained runway heading until reaching about 400 ft, before veering to the right of the extended runway centreline. The aircraft continued to climb to about 700 ft prior to levelling off for about 30 seconds, and then descending to about 600 ft. The information ceased 5 seconds later, about 60 seconds after take-off. The last recorded information had the aircraft at an altitude of 600 ft, and 22 degrees to the right of the runway extended centreline. The aircraft wreckage was located 228 m to the north-west of the last recorded position, about 3 km from the take-off point.

Figure 2: Altitude information of VH-XMJ – (each vertical line represents 5 seconds)
Figure 2: Altitude information of VH-XMJ – (each vertical line represents 5 seconds)

Source: OzRunways

On-site examination of the wreckage and surrounding ground markings indicated that the aircraft impacted terrain in a very steep (almost vertical) nose‑down attitude, and came to rest facing back towards the departure runway. The horizontal and vertical tail surfaces and empennage separated from the main cabin directly behind the rear pressure bulkhead, and the cockpit and instrument panel were extensively damaged. The remaining aircraft cabin had separated from the wing. The left hand propeller blades separated at the propeller hub. The right hand propeller blade tips separated, however the blades remained attached to the hub. A strong smell and presence of jet fuel was evident at the accident site, however there was no evidence of fire. The aircraft was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder, nor was it required to be.

Both engine, gearbox and propeller assemblies, along with several other components and documentation, were removed from the accident site for further examination by the ATSB.

The investigation is continuing and will include examination of:

recovered components and available electronic data
aircraft, operator, and maintenance documentation and procedures
flight crew information
flight manoeuvres being carried out during the check flight and flight characteristics of the aircraft
aircraft weight and balance
risk assessments carried out when planning the flight
previous research, and similar occurrences.
The information contained in this web update is released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and is derived from the initial investigation of the occurrence. Readers are cautioned that new evidence will become available as the investigation progresses that will enhance the ATSB's understanding of the accident as outlined in this web update. As such, no analysis or findings are included in this update.



__________

Central Standard Time (CST) was Universal Calibrated Time (UTC) +9.5 hours
Runway number: the number represents the magnetic heading of the runway.
An RNAV approach is a method of navigation utilising GPS that enables a pilot to guide his aircraft to a landing in low visibility situations. It is often practiced during check flights to ensure proficiency.
OzRunways is an electronic flight bag application that provides navigation, weather, area briefings, and other flight planning information.

General details

General details
Date: 30 May 2017 Investigation status: Active
Time: 16:17 CST Investigation type: Occurrence Investigation
Location (show map): near Renmark Airport Occurrence type: Collision with terrain
State: South Australia Occurrence class: Operational
Release date: 30 June 2017 Occurrence category: Accident
Report status: Preliminary Highest injury level: Fatal
Expected completion: May 2018

Aircraft details

Aircraft details
Aircraft manufacturer: Cessna Aircraft Company
Aircraft model: 441
Aircraft registration: VH-XMJ
Serial number: 4410113
Operator: Rossair Charter
Type of operation: Flying Training
Sector: Turboprop
Damage to aircraft: Substantial
Departure point: Adelaide International Airport, South Australia
Destination: Renmark Airport, South Australia

Desert Flower
30th Jun 2017, 07:31
That confirms what I was told by someone who'd flown over the crash site that it had turned right after takeoff.

DF.

Capt Fathom
30th Jun 2017, 07:33
Why does that matter??

Desert Flower
30th Jun 2017, 07:44
Why does that matter??

It doesn't. It just confirms that what he told me is correct.

DF.

spinex
1st Jul 2017, 23:48
Why does that matter??

It may not matter, but the fact, coupled with the minimal damage to the right hand prop in contrast to the left, do tell a story to those with an open mind. I'm not familiar with the field in question, but in most places it would be unusual to turn out right below circuit height as well. Occam's razor comes to mind once again.

Xeptu
2nd Jul 2017, 00:28
sorta suggests high power course blade angle on the left engine at impact, while the right propeller blade angle is closer to the beta range. There was a picture of the throttle quadrant, not suggesting that tells us anything really because they could be anywhere post impact, but everything was forward with the exception of the left condition lever, that appeared to be around the air-start range, almost certainly a post impact positioning.

Desert Flower
2nd Jul 2017, 03:13
It may not matter, but the fact, coupled with the minimal damage to the right hand prop in contrast to the left, do tell a story to those with an open mind. I'm not familiar with the field in question, but in most places it would be unusual to turn out right below circuit height as well. Occam's razor comes to mind once again.

Spinex, I think it's pretty clear which engine was the one that was operating at high power & which one wasn't.

DF.

Duck Pilot
2nd Jul 2017, 08:44
Interesting to note from the report that the FOI was qualified to operate the aircraft, why wasn't he in the left seat playing the roll of a new pilot under check?

Desert Flower
2nd Jul 2017, 11:40
Interesting to note from the report that the FOI was qualified to operate the aircraft, why wasn't he in the left seat playing the roll of a new pilot under check?

Why would he be? The pilot occupying the left seat was the inductee pilot, undergoing training on the Conquest after not flying one for some time. The CP was in the right seat, observing him, & the FOI was in a seat directly behind them (doesn't say which side) observing them both.

DF.

Duck Pilot
2nd Jul 2017, 12:20
From a risk assessment and inductee pilot standpoint, wouldn't it have been better to have a pilot not under check who was quailed on the aircraft be acting as a trainee? I know the FOI was very experienced on type. At least there would have only been two pilots in the aircraft opposed to three if something went really bad.

Desert Flower
2nd Jul 2017, 12:53
From a risk assessment and inductee pilot standpoint, wouldn't it have been better to have a pilot not under check who was quailed on the aircraft be acting as a trainee? I know the FOI was very experienced on type. At least there would have only been two pilots in the aircraft opposed to three if something went really bad.

Duck Pilot, I don't get your drift. The pilot occupying the RHS was the CP of the company (Rossair), & as such had every reason to be there. The FOI (who was a former Rossair pilot) was observing them both. In other words he was checking the CP who was checking the inductee pilot.

DF.

Duck Pilot
2nd Jul 2017, 13:28
Wouldn't it have been potentially more safer to remove the pilot under training completely out of the excercise to achieve the same outcome? This type of practice was once the norm years ago where the FOI would actually operate as a trainee or examiner in the right seat.

Having operated as a trainee with an FOI and a flight examiner under check as well is a very stressful experience, having been in this situation myself.

Desert Flower
2nd Jul 2017, 13:37
Wouldn't it have been potentially more safer to remove the pilot under training completely out of the excercise to achieve the same outcome? This type of practice was once the norm years ago where the FOI would actually operate as a trainee or examiner in the right seat.

Having operated as a trainee with an FOI and a flight examiner under check as well is a very stressful experience, having been in this situation myself.

If you removed the pilot under training or in this case undergoing retraining (the inductee pilot) the whole exercise wouldn't have been necessary to start with!

DF.

KRUSTY 34
3rd Jul 2017, 00:54
So, does it appear we are looking at a "practice" EFATO at night?

Jesus wept!

Xeptu
3rd Jul 2017, 01:00
Not at all, the event occurred around 1615 local time, still daylight, in fact almost directly into the sun which wouldn't have helped.


Edit: I don't know if there's been much discussion on polarising sunglasses, when facing directly into the sun and their effect on vision at critical angles, but I had to get rid of mine and it wasn't easy finding a non polarised lens these days.

Duck Pilot
3rd Jul 2017, 01:13
My interpretation from the report was that the pilot in the right seat was being checked by CASA for the issue of a check approval.

Let's wait and see what comes out in the final report. ATSB have done a good job in getting the preliminary report out reasonably quickly.

Ethel the Aardvark
3rd Jul 2017, 07:19
Does anyone have info regarding the accuracy of the oz runways positioning.
what are its limitations with regard to terrain and distance to receivers etc.
just curious if we are talking plus or minus mm, meter or larger distances

Xeptu
5th Jul 2017, 01:47
I’m not sure how accurate that plot is and not sure that it needs to be. I do however find the 30 second level segment troubling, it’s a long time to wait for a stall. On the other hand the exercise may have been complete or discontinued. If power was restored like the throttle quadrant suggests (I know that does’nt mean much post impact) and the blades failed to coarsen (produce thrust) then there’s our Vmca event right there. There just might be an issue with the prop governor and its associated components.

Ethel the Aardvark
9th Jul 2017, 03:01
I beg to differ xeptu,
If the plots are destined for a coroners enquiry then its accuracy should be known by all. Maybe it was exactly where the plot indicated or maybe it was not, do geographical obstructions cause accuracy issues?
All will be revealed I guess.

gassed budgie
9th Jul 2017, 05:09
Does anyone have info regarding the accuracy of the oz runways positioning

I've had reason to visit the crash sight and the track as depicted by ozrunways is accurate. The end of the green line denotes the impact sight to within a few feet.