UPS contract plane off runway - KCRW

[barit1]

Now reporting two killed. This is a hilltop runway at a joint civil-military field.

Cargo plane goes off runway at West Virginia airport - Cincinnati News, FOX19-WXIX TV (http://www.fox19.com/story/35351599/cargo-plane-goes-off-runway-at-west-virginia-airport)

[barit1]

Eight years ago - remember the depressurized 733?

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/381184-southwest-737-lands-yeager-airport-after-hole-fuselage.html?highlight=Yeager+charleston

[gearlever]

Air Cargo Carriers Short SD-330

[Airbubba]

From LiveATC.net, SNC 1260 was cleared for the VOR-A runway 5 at CRW. Wind check 200/5.

Metar from the AvHerald article:

KCRW 051054Z 23003KT 10SM FEW001 OVC005 14/13 A2941 RMK AO2 SLP952 VLY FG T01440133=

VOR-A chart here:

http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1705/00852VA.PDF

From news photos of the recovery activity it appears that the plane departed the runway to the left near the touchdown zone for runway 5 and the fuselage went down the side of the hill.

[peekay4]

From local news report:

The National Weather Service said winds were calm and there was valley fog, no fog was reported at the airport at the time of the crash.

“I viewed two videos,” Kanawha County Commissioner Ben Salango said. “It came in at a very strange angle. It hit on its left wing first and the landing gear detached and it careened over the hillside.”

The left wing was in the grass just off the runway.

Salango said a woman who lives in the Lincoln County community of Yawkey called the airport and reported hearing an aircraft making a strange noise and going very fast. Sayre said that would have been the flight path for a plane approaching Yeager from Louisville.

There was no communication to the tower that the airplane was having problems, officials said.

More: WV MetroNews | Plane Crash at Yaeger Airport; Yeager Airport closed (http://wvmetronews.com/2017/05/05/plane-crash-at-yeager-airport/)

[neilki]

First time i went in there was at 2am with an engine fire in a twin cessna. (Red sky at night engine's alight..)
Seeing the approach the following morning i'd have just let out burn...
The FAA installed EMAS there a while back; it caught a CRJ 2 aborting due to a takeoff config warning Accident: PSA Airlines CRJ2 at Charleston on Jan 19th 2010, overran runway on takeoff (http://avherald.com/h?article=42607d9d)
I believe there was a landslide more recently and the overrun slipped into coal country.
Given the state of the job market here i'm surprised the operators could staff a service like this...

[Carbon Bootprint]

Given the state of the job market here i'm surprised the operators could staff a service like this...
There was a recent thread in Freight Dogs about this carrier, which is basically a feeder from smaller cities to the larger freight hubs. I suppose the predictability of the operation might appeal to some. RIP to the crew.

http://www.pprune.org/freight-dogs/593619-air-cargo-carriers.html#post9743582

Press release on company website (http://www3.aircar.com/News.aspx)

[dontdoit]

N334AC/SH3029 which started its life with Loganair in Glasgow as G-BGNA in 1979.

[HEMS driver]

Also known as "Charlie West."

[Airbubba]

Here is Bill English's NTSB briefing from Friday evening. He says that two AAIB investigators will come from the UK as parties to the investigation.

NpE28JSA-l8

It looks like the minimum descent height on the VOR-A is 619 feet above the field with DME to identify FOGAG. The reported 500 foot ceiling would make this approach challenging, to say the least, in my experience.

[Airbubba]

Bill English gives his second and final onsite briefing about the accident investigation. I am surprised that a large (over 12,500 lbs.) turbine powered aircraft in a scheduled operation is not required to have a CVR or FDR. Is this one of those cargo cutouts in the FAA regs?

BxJ22jTY6-I

Here's the customary NTSB b-roll video that the media splice into their news reports about the crash:

XKfF_CLANNU

Some pictures of the runway damage and drone mapping of the accident site:

https://www.flickr.com/photos/ntsb/sets/72157680389042423/

The crew names have been released:

CHARLESTON, WV (WCHS/WVAH) — Yeager Airport has released the names of the two victims in Friday’s deadly plane crash.

Johnathan [sic - it may actually be Jonathan - Airbubba] Pablo Alvarado, 47, of Stamford, Texas and Anh K. Ho, 31, of Cross Lanes were killed Friday morning after their Short 330 twin-engine turbo plane crashed during landing at Yeager Airport, according to a news release from the airport.

Alvarado and Ho were the only people on board.


Names of pilot, co-pilot killed in Yeager Airport plane crash released | WVAH (http://wvah.com/news/local/names-of-pilot-co-pilot-killed-in-yeager-airport-plane-crash-released)

[Council Van]

Probably totally fatigued, awful time of morning and a difficult approach in a far from sophisticated aircraft.

[Zaphod Beblebrox]

I will make this observation, at the risk of over generalizing.... This flight was operated under FAR part 135, (I think), and therefore not subject to the ATP requirement for passenger Part 121 operations in the US.

Here is a positing from Air Cargo Carriers on AirlinePilotCentral.com regarding pilot hiring.
Is Hiring?: Yes Next Estimated FO Hiring Event: July 2017

First Officer Requirements: Commercial MEL Rated/500 TT (preferred)

Starting May 1st, 2017-

If you take a low time pilot, minimal experience and add to that minimal training at the carrier, then we are likely to see more of these accidents. The available pilot pool is very dry now and if have a pulse and license you get hired somewhere. It's great experience, if you don't have an accident like this one. I think airfreight pilots make some of the best pilots out there. It is a very unforgiving type of operation and requires constant vigilance to stay safe. The learning curve is very steep, especially for the inexperienced.

I think we need to get used to seeing more of these, unfortunately.

[RAT 5]

Looking at the VOR A chart given in post #4 it is indeed a challenging approach. Was it daylight or just dawn, but the low cloud would have made it darker and there are no approach lights. It is 29 degrees off the centreline and a strange profile. There is no published DME/ALT table for the final descent, only MINS at 6nm and MPA at 8nm = threshold. Height loss is 1280' in 6nm. (Normally a 3degree slope would be 1920'.) This is very flat as a CDA, so suggests a dive & drive with a level segment. There you are, level, full landing flap, higher power, nose up, 800/700'AGL, searching for only threshold lights at 2nm (min vis required is also 1-2nm depending on category.) The ROD from 700' to 50' TCHT is about 3 degrees, but from 800' steeper. You see the runways lights late, off to the left; there is a slight delay in transiting to final descent from level flight and end up with high ROD and turning to gain the centre line, all with a tailwind. Someone was giving OVC 005. Good game. Sounds like an accident waiting to happen, to me.
And how can you have a min vis of 1nm with DH 700' if there are no approach lights? Am missing something?

[aterpster]

It looks like the minimum descent height on the VOR-A is 619 feet above the field with DME to identify FOGAG. The reported 500 foot ceiling would make this approach challenging, to say the least, in my experience.

Perhaps there was an issue with the airplane's DME. Otherwise the LOC Rwy 5 would have been a far better choice. Or, with that slight wind, the ILS 23 would have been an even better choice, no DME required.

[aterpster]

And how can you have a min vis of 1nm with DH 700' if there are no approach lights? Am missing something?

It's an MDA not a DA (or DH if you prefer). And, the 1 mile is for Approach Categories A and B only. The HAA of an MDA is geometrically permissive for A and B.

Also, these are circle-to-land-only minimums (that's why it's VOR-A, not VOR Rwy 05), which have their own set of traps for the unwary. And, the final approach course radial is 31 degrees different than the runway center-line.

All in all, quite the non-precision IAP.

[aterpster]

FWIW, attached are the TERPs CTL minima. These apply when either alignment or descent gradient don't permit straight-in minimums.

[A Squared]

Perhaps there was an issue with the airplane's DME. Otherwise the LOC Rwy 5 would have been a far better choice. Or, with that slight wind, the ILS 23 would have been an even better choice, no DME required.

The wind, light though it may be, was favoring the ILS 23. Would have been a slight tailwind for landing 05

[aterpster]

Correct. The other weather factors favored Runway 23 even more.

We don't know where the flight came on to the TRACON's radar. Perhaps the position favored least remaining track miles to Runway 5. Presumably, we will find that out, or perhaps someone already has.

EDIT: Note the ILS 23 and LOC 05 have a common frequency. Odds are ATC had the ILS 23 configured, which would have made the LOC 05 not readily available.

[peekay4]

A couple key questions at this point:

1. There's a report that the aircraft struck trees on final approach. Has this been substantiated?

2. There are witness statements and apparently more than one surveillance video showing the aircraft landing at a "very strange angle". What could be the cause? Sudden gust / windshear? Last minute side-slip? Mechanical trouble?

[Airbubba]

Perhaps there was an issue with the airplane's DME. Otherwise the LOC Rwy 5 would have been a far better choice. Or, with that slight wind, the ILS 23 would have been an even better choice, no DME required.

And, if they didn't have DME, mins for the VOR-A are 120 feet higher at 739 feet above airport elevation. With a reported 500 foot ceiling. :eek:

Visibility was 10 miles so the approach was legal for any category. Is the SD-330 category B (max speed 135 knots) for circling perhaps?

Also, these are circle-to-land-only minimums (that's why it's VOR-A, not VOR Rwy 05), which have their own set of traps for the unwary. And, the final approach course radial is 31 degrees different than the runway center-line.

All in all, quite the non-precision IAP.

These deadly circling approaches in less than VFR weather have been abandoned in the ops specs by most Part 121 air carriers for many years now. Recent type ratings given by those carriers have the limitation (sometimes called 'training wheels') 'CIRC APCH - VMC ONLY'. And yes, circling is supposed to be a visual maneuver so I'll let others hash out the VMC-VFR definitions.

We don't know where the flight came on to the TRACON's radar. Perhaps the position favored least remaining track miles to Runway 5. Presumably, we will find that out, or perhaps someone already has.

Piedmont 4825 was departing runway 5 just prior to SNC 1260's arrival. SNC 1260 was told to expect the localizer to runway 5 at 7:20 into this LiveAtc.net clip:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kcrw/KCRW-May-05-2017-1030Z.mp3

The audio is not great and it sounds like the VOR-A was requested by the SD-330 crew from the context. As aterpster observed, DME is required for the LOC Rwy 5 but not for the VOR-A.

I will make this observation, at the risk of over generalizing.... This flight was operated under FAR part 135, (I think), and therefore not subject to the ATP requirement for passenger Part 121 operations in the US.

There is indeed a pilot with a name similar to that of the first officer with a commercial license and a current Class I medical listed at a New Hampshire address in the FAA Airmen database.

[Airbubba]

1. There's a report that the aircraft struck trees on final approach. Has this been substantiated?

No mention of any impact prior to the runway in the NTSB videos posted above.

[aterpster]

A couple key questions at this point:

1. There's a report that the aircraft struck trees on final approach. Has this been substantiated?

It ended up hitting trees going down the embankment

2. There are witness statements and apparently more than one surveillance video showing the aircraft landing at a "very strange angle". What could be the cause? Sudden gust / windshear? Last minute side-slip? Mechanical trouble?

No gusts in those weather conditions. But, the final course radial is significantly offset from the runway. Lots of ugly possible scenarios there.

[peekay4]

Hmm. If there was no impact prior to the threshold, I guess the most "plain" possibility is that the aircraft broke out of clouds significantly high or offset from the runway centerline and impacted while attempting to maneuver back to the centerline? Or alternatively stalled while attempting to go-around, causing a wing drop and subsequent crash.

Those who've seen the videos probably have a good idea of what happened.

[aterpster]

The NTSB is limited by the lack of either a CVR or FDR.

[A Squared]

A couple key questions at this point:

1. There's a report that the aircraft struck trees on final approach. Has this been substantiated?

2. There are witness statements and apparently more than one surveillance video showing the aircraft landing at a "very strange angle". What could be the cause? Sudden gust / windshear? Last minute side-slip? Mechanical trouble?

No idea about #1, but if they were on the VOR A approach and acquired the runway visually right as they approached MACSA, an attempt to land from there would require a pretty abrupt last minute, low level turn to align with the runway. Pure speculation, but that would be my guess.

[pattern_is_full]

Only thought I can add to points already considered is that KCRW is a "tabletop" airport, with a steep upslope rising to meet rwy 5.

A south tailwind could result in an updraft under the approach, that may have interfered with the pilots' planned maneuvering.

Picture also shows the landslide that "ate" part of the EMAS.

http://www.wvgazettemail.com/apps/pbcsi.dll/storyimage/CH/20150312/DM05/150319672/EP/1/4/EP-150319672.jpg?s=1493510400069

[Airbubba]

Picture also shows the landslide that "ate" part of the EMAS.

Looks even worse on the Google Earth photo :eek::

https://goo.gl/maps/3YGuCXS3PjF2

[pattern_is_full]

Yep. Although some of that is the repair work - and raises the question of what effect the on-going repairs (lights? parked equipment?) may have had, sitting right at the runway end. I'm sure no one was probably on the job at 6:53 ayem - but was the site itself a distraction?

[Magplug]

Those gouge marks in the runway surface (video 3) look to be 1 or 2 inches deep which means the aircraft hit pretty damn hard. The marks also evidence a touchdown travelling at an angle of 30deg across the runway centreline so the approach was very far from being stable. The debris field appears to indicate airframe break-up started BEFORE the main body went down the ravine.

Considering that the cloud ceiling was 500' above the runway it is difficult to imagine how a stable approach (even one that busted minimums) could have been mishandled enough to result in crossing the runway at 30 degrees with such a rate of descent. It is quite possible this aircraft was stalled at impact.

[A Squared]

Also, the angle of the gouges is 'opposite" the misalignment angle of the final approach course of the VOR-A approach.


Possible scenario. They got the runway in sight late and by the time they had turned left to align with runway heading they had overshot the runway centerline considerably, which would necessitate continuing left turn back toward the runway, and then a right turn before touchdown to align with runway heading. Ran out of altitude to complete right turn to runway heading, so impacted in bank, while travelling at angle to runway.

[Triskelle]

Reminds me of an accident at Newtownards N.I. around 15 years ago where the pilot seeing the runway late (in that case due to limited visibility rather than breaking through low cloud) turned over-sharply towards the runway so that the wing on the inside of the turn stalled with insufficient height to recover.

[aterpster]

VOR-A final approach course with missed approach fix MACSA and FAA airport diagram.

If they didn't have an operating DME they would have been required to time the approach.

[A Squared]

As long as we're speculating about the operational status of their equipment; If they didn't have an operating localizer receiver, they would have had to take the VOR-A, with a tailwind, and an MDA above the ceiling.

[aterpster]

Doubt they would have had VOR but not LOC. They are usually the same receiver, more or less.

I am not speculating that they did not have an operational DME. I am stating what anyone would have to do to fly the VOR-A without DME whether inoperable or not installed.

[A Squared]

Doubt they would have had VOR but not LOC. They are usually the same receiver, more or less.

More "less" than "more". Yeah, they're typically housed in the same box with the same power supply, but the LOC portion is functionally separate, and they have separate antennae. Having VOR but no LOC is quite plausible.

[Magplug]

Speculation about which type of approach they were flying...... and how this precipitated the crash is pretty immaterial and will not lead to the 'why'.

Despite this aircraft being flown by two capable guys who were both visual with the field from 500' down to the runway they crashed hard at a steep crossing angle to the centreline. That strongly suggests that the aircraft was not under control when it hit the runway - This is where the focus of the investigation will lie.

[A Squared]

they crashed hard at a steep crossing angle to the centreline. That strongly suggests that the aircraft was not under control when it hit the runway -.

No! Ya think???? :}

Speculation about which type of approach they were flying...... and how this precipitated the crash is pretty immaterial

Au contraire. The fact that they were flying a non precision approach which was more than 30 degrees out of alignment from the runway, with an MDA above the reported ceiling may be *very* material to why they lost control.

As for why they chose that approach, no, that's not terribly relevant, but it's certainly something pilots would tend to wonder.

[gearlever]

Circling Approach MDA 800 AGL

KCRW 051054Z 23003KT 10SM FEW001 OVC005 14/13 A2941 RMK AO2 SLP952 VLY FG T01440133=

[Airbubba]

Speculation about which type of approach they were flying...... and how this precipitated the crash is pretty immaterial and will not lead to the 'why'.

The speculation is not about which approach they were flying, it was the VOR-A from the ATC tapes and the NTSB press conference cited previously on this thread.

The question is why would they fly that approach to circling mins if the LOC Rwy 5 with runway alignment and lower mins was available? They were told to expect the LOC Rwy 5 on initial contact with CRW approach control.

Circling Approach MDA 800 AGL

Nope, the VOR-A at CRW mins are 739 feet above field elevation without DME and 619 above with DME to identify FOGAG intersection. That stuff in parentheses is for military pilots like the C-130 drivers with the WV ANG.

Again, here is the VOR-A chart:

http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1705/00852VA.PDF

[gearlever]

Airbubba, my bad. Have to correct myself. 739 / 619 AGL, sorry.

[aterpster]

Nope, the VOR-A at CRW mins are 739 feet above field elevation without DME and 619 above with DME to identify FOGAG intersection. That stuff in parentheses is for military pilots like the C-130 drivers with the WV ANG.


I believe one, or more, military aviation branches are required to have the reported ceiling at, or above, those parenthetical values.

In my view, approaches like this VOR-A should be "ceiling required" for everyone. That used to be an option in TERPs (though never used). It was removed in the latest version of TERPs.

[galaxy flyer]

USAF requires ceiling for circling and, maybe for all non-precision approaches, but not for precision.

[aterpster]

I agree with that logic.

[West Coast]

With the proliferation of automated weather observing reports, I'd agree.

[Airbubba]

The flight inbound to SDF from CRW was SNC 1259, it sounded to me like the captain was operating the radio for a visual approach to 35R.

The FAA says he had a second class medical and no prior incidents or accidents:

CHARLESTON, W.Va. (WSAZ) - The pilot involved in the cargo plane crash Friday that killed both himself and the co-pilot had no prior incidents related to safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said.

Jonathan Pablo Alvarado, 47, of Stamford, Texas, never had a prior accident or incident, according to the FAA.

Alvarado, along with Anh K. Ho, 31, of Cross Lanes, West Virginia, died when the Short 330 aircraft crashed while attempting to land Friday morning at Yeager Airport. Both were pilots for Air Cargo Carriers, which is contracted by UPS.

As far as medical classification, the FAA reports that Alvarado was classified second class and Ho was first class. The FAA says second class still allows pilots to operate commercial planes.

Pilot in deadly plane crash had no prior safety issues (http://www.wymt.com/content/news/Pilot-in-deadly-plane-crash-had-no-prior-safety-issues-421665893.html)

[PPL Hobbyist]

At the risk of being shot down for speculating too soon, I am going to jump in and say what I think from footage of the accident aircraft. I am always open to criticism if I am wrong.

1. No post crash fire.
2. The aircraft was in a left hand bank when it crashed.
3. The right wing aileron is in the up position suggesting the that PF was trying to correct the left hand bank
4, The elevator is is an up position suggesting that PF was trying to pull up.
5. The rudder looks to be fairly center.
6. Unfortunately, we can't see the propellers, but I don't see any gouge marks anywhere on the runway or near it which might have been caused by a spinning propeller.

The evidence that I have cited above suggests to me that they ran out of fuel some time during the approach and they stalled.

Of course, I may be completely wrong.

Edit: Another thing I failed to mention: What looks like full flaps and gear down would have caused a stall very quickly.

[A Squared]

3. The right wing aileron is in the up position suggesting the that PF was trying to correct the left hand bank
4, The elevator is is an up position suggesting that PF was trying to pull up.
5. The rudder looks to be fairly center..

I think you're fooling yourself if you think that the position of the control surfaces after the plane broke apart and rolled down a hill has anything to do with he position of the control surfaces immediately prior to impact.

[pattern_is_full]

1. No post crash fire.

The Short(s) 330 (somewhat uniquely) carries all its fuel in the "hump" on top of the fuselage. Except, of course, the relatively small amount currently enroute to the engines through piping.

So unless the top of the fuselage was breached, there would not necessarily be much fuel released. Losing a wing might only release a relative dribble.

The only picture of the fuselage available so far is a tight crop that is a little difficult to interpret, but it appears the fuselage ended up on its left side, with the tail twisted the other way. The fuel tanks may well be intact.

Additionally, even if the tanks were breached in the tumble down the hillside, the ending position is down in a foggy, damp woods (from that same picture - drooping leaves heavy with moisture, plus NTSB mention that that site was "muddy" and "slippery"). There may have been no source of ignition remaining by the time any significant fuel spilled from the tanks.

[Airbubba]

The evidence that I have cited above suggests to me that they ran out of fuel some time during the approach and they stalled.

From a news report about the fuel status of the plane:

The plane took off from Louisville with 310 gallons of fuel, more than enough to reach Yeager. There was no explosion at impact. The fuel tanks for the Short 330 are on top of the fuselage. Some of the fuel did leak a the site. The state DEP and West Virginia American Water Company were contacted about the possibility of the spill reaching the Elk River. The spill was contained and didn’t reach the river, officials confirmed Friday afternoon.

WV MetroNews Bodies removed from crashed cargo plane; Yeager Airport closed (http://wvmetronews.com/2017/05/05/plane-crash-at-yeager-airport/)

From the LiveATC.net link I posted above the plane did not appear to do any holding on arrival at CRW prior to vectors for the VOR-A approach.

Edit: Another thing I failed to mention: What looks like full flaps and gear down would have caused a stall very quickly.

Gear down and at least partial flaps would be a normal configuration to cross the final approach fix for a circling approach in most planes, I would guess that is the case for the SD-330. It is indeed a high drag configuration with little altitude for recovery if you do stall. But, you are in that situation every time you land a plane, right?

[peekay4]

The evidence that I have cited above suggests to me that they ran out of fuel some time during the approach and they stalled.

Unlikely. Apparently there was a significant amount of fuel remaining that the WV Department of Environmental Protection had to deploy booms and absorbent materials to prevent the fuel spill from contaminating a nearby creek.

Yeager crash site monitored to check for possible fuel leakage in Elk tributary | WCHS (http://wchstv.com/news/local/yeager-crash-site-monitored-to-check-for-possible-fuel-leakage-in-elk-tributary)

[A Squared]

Given the position of the engines on the SHD3-30 I would be very surprised if the props had struck the ground.

Given the condition of the left engine nacelle, I'd be very surprised if that prop *didn't* strike the ground.



https://c1.staticflickr.com/5/4194/33653099054_f48c1bd1f3_z.jpg (https://flic.kr/p/TgNVTL)IMG_4597 (https://flic.kr/p/TgNVTL) by National Transportation Safety Board (https://www.flickr.com/photos/ntsb/), on Flickr

[Airbubba]

NTSB Docket opened here:

https://t.co/SgpKlf8rO4

A sign of the times, text messages, some sent while flying without an autopilot:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61194/615487.pdf

The FO was scared by the captain's IMC maneuvering down low near the airport hills in an earlier incident.

Some technical details of damage to and data recovery from the personal electronic devices:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61194/615510.pdf

Data was even harvested from the captain's CPAP machine:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61194/615506.pdf

[DingerX]

FO had something like 300 hours on her application, and had picked up another 330 hours on the job.
The key here is figure 5: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=463660&docketID=61194&mkey=95115
Combine that with the captain's alleged difficulties in IMC, particularly when banking, and it would look like he tracked 085 to 095 at MDA to half a mile from the threshhold, then chopped and dropped 600 feet, all the while trying to line up. Or that was his idea, and he just lost it.

[Daysleeper]

Is the F/O's training record really showing only 20 hours of type ground school during the rating? (plus a short 330/360 differences course) ?

[Iron Duck]

Gear down and at least partial flaps would be a normal configuration to cross the final approach fix for a circling approach in most planes, I would guess that is the case for the SD-330. It is indeed a high drag configuration with little altitude for recovery if you do stall. But, you are in that situation every time you land a plane, right?

FlightGlobal have published an article with a security video compilation (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/video-ntsb-gives-details-of-2017-shorts-crash-as-vi-449298/). If the playback speeds are correct, the aircraft appears to me to to be going like the clappers in a diving spiral. It looks similar to the FO's text descriptions of how the PI handled the aircraft when they had the undercarriage problem: steep bank and dive.

[Smott999]

....could he have actually been trying to slip it in?...

[Airbubba]

....could he have actually been trying to slip it in?...

Sounds like the cargo outfit was full of 'cowboys' including some who did slip the Shorts. From one of the interview summaries, page 14:

Mack had flown with a handful of pilots at ACC who flew “way” outside of the standard operating procedures (SOP). When he first started at ACC, his captain was hard on him and he came to appreciate that. He discovered that at ACC there was a compromise between flying to standards and managing the cockpit work environment. He described his choices; fly with good pilot who was hard on him, versus a poor pilot who was a nice guy. He would choose the good pilot as “the lesser of two evils.” He thought Anh would have made a good captain and would have been one that stayed within the SOPs.

When asked what kind of behavior he had seen outside of SOPs, he stated that some pilots wouldn’t be standardized and fly the set profile for the Shorts with airspeed, gear, and flap settings at specific locations on approach. He had flown with one guy who was always in a hurry and gave the example of another pilot flying inbound to the airport at 3000 feet and fast, then diving to the airport at the last minute. This other pilot would also be programming the GPS for the return leg even though they hadn’t landed on the outbound leg yet. He had also seen pilots pull the fuel levers to ground to get the aircraft to descend faster. He witnessed pilots side slip the aircraft, which he didn’t believe was safe to do in the Shorts. He said most of what he had seen from other pilots in terms of not following SOPs was related to poor planning. He clarified that these were specific individual pilots at the operator and not a reflection of the overall culture of the airline. He wasn’t sure how Jonathan had stayed that long at ACC has he had failed a few check rides. He had also seen certain pilots not use checklists. He felt that these problems typically came from pilots who had flown somewhere else and had brought bad habits to ACC. He believes that that is what happened with Jonathan during this accident.

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61194/615478.pdf

Of course, it can be argued that any crosswind landing involves a slip.

[Smott999]

I certainly think he was wise to prefer a good pilot who was tough on him and stuck to SOP.
Really feel for the FO who did seem reluctant to call out the risk-taking Cap. And from all accounts seemed eager to learn and perhaps had a future as a strong left seat.

What a shame all around.

[BluSdUp]

It is nice to see that phone SMS is now part of NTSBs tools, what is next, my old post cards and love letters.
I do appreciate that in this case without CVR and FDR and a crew that was a ultra incompetent in a company run like a 1970s bush operation , the NTSB would turn every stone.
But go into the WatsApp group for some bases and I suspect You find a few lies and subjective slander of other crew members.
I do feel sorry for the FO , very much so. But she was not 21 and blond, so she should have sorted out the Cpt at one point. I specifically remember two occasions were I told the Cpt to NEVER repeat the stunt he pulled. It is a FOs job.
Anyway , What shocks me is here use of the mobile phone in flight. That tells me one thing,Not fit for flight!
The Captain, 49 with less then 2 years as PIC multi and scared off IFR, at night!

Lastly I would like to mention that the focus on phones and iPad messages before flight , taxi out , just after touchdown and on turnarounds are going to end in tears.
As a matter of fact it already did for me, my nr4 cabin crew started crying and refused to tell us why on a turnaround , we had to dispatch with him "incapacitated" as we had less then 150 pax.
Never mind, back to thread.
Airing concerns on SMS to buddys , not constructive. Face the other part,Cpt in this case, then CP.
Reading this report was a bit back to old stomping grounds for me and not so relevant, UNTIL I saw the video of the approach, then two things occurred to me: Incompetent Cowboys are still out there AND they are trying to get into airplanes with hundreds of PAX.

What a terrible, unnecessary way to go. But it is Darwin , Newton and Bernoulli that rules in here. One must at all time try to respect them!

[Timmy Tomkins]

The weird thing is that the viz and cloud base look well good enough to see perfectly clearly that it was all wrong; so why press on with what is clearly a disastrous approach? A death wish?

[Carbon Bootprint]

It is nice to see that phone SMS is now part of NTSBs tools, what is next, my old post cards and love letters.
I do appreciate that in this case without CVR and FDR and a crew that was a ultra incompetent in a company run like a 1970s bush operation , the NTSB would turn every stone.Welcome to the not-so-new Millennium. FWIW, it appears NTSB limited its purview of the FO's text messages to items that were relevant to her flight experiences with this Captain. I would surmise old post cards and love letters would be safe, unless they somehow involved another member of the crew or the flight in question.

Back to the point, cowboys do still seem to be out there. The part from the NTSB docket cited by Airbubba may indicate some issues within the carrier. They may not have been system-wide but it would appear some individuals probably deserved some special attention. If the Captain had indeed failed some check rides, that raises some questions which will hopefully be answered when the final report is issued.

[Two's in]

If you don't want the NTSB to look at your social media postings (post mortem), you might want to reconsider your choice of employment.

[DingerX]

The messages did show that the captain had issues getting enough sleep in the recent past, that he improvised poorly, that he "does not like to be in IMC", and tended to bank hard and lose a lot of altitude. From the investigation, I think we can safely conclude that he had sufficient rest at the time of the accident.

The FO did stand up to the him on one occasion, after one week he had her fly every leg so that he could get some sleep. On Thursday, she told him off, and on Friday, he gave her a "good job" plaque.

So, here's the problem. You've got an outfit with about 20 aircraft, 20 captains and 20 FOs stationed at 20 airfields. This is the FO's first job, and it's also clear from her texts that any action she took would likely result in her moving. Both she and the Captain seemed to have SOs in the area.
In late February, she texted this about talking to the chief pilot: "He asked me if [the captain’s] gotten any better and I'm like ummm..he can fly in VFR..lol"

So, like it or not, her SMS history paints a picture of her job and of the captain, that frankly explains how someone would not want to go around (and back to IMC), misjudge the approach on a downsloping tabletop runway early in the morning, bank for the final, and drop it hard.

If you expect a low-hours FO to stand up to a bush league captain, who is sixteen years her senior and two-and-a-half times her weight, well she did, just probably not in time in that dive for the field. Did she say something to the CP? Yes, just not necessarily clear enough that this guy was a danger to himself and others? Well, how much experience did she have? Normalization of deviance, etc. How much are you willing to say, "It's not so bad. He made it to age 47. Just another year of this and I'll have 1500 hours."?

[Uplinker]

What an horrendous accident. What the hell was the Captain thinking and doing????????? The visibility and conditions seem perfectly OK for a normal approach and landing, how on earth did he manage to get so far out of shape? Incapacitation, unrecognised ADI failure?

What about company SOPs for stable approaches? Where there any??

Secondly, I’m sorry, I am going to sound very old fashioned here but I cannot believe that anyone - even a 600 hour rookie - thinks it is acceptable and prudent to send text messages while airborne as a pilot of an aircraft, especially when flying a non-autopilot aircraft as PF, and while the other crew member is taking ‘controlled rest’* !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Why was her phone even switched on during flight?

To those who say this F/O should have said something and taken control; yes, of course she should, but I ask this: F/Os are told they must step in and take control, but what training is given to F/O’s about how to actually do this? Conflict management needs to be actually taught, it is no good just putting everyone through CRM training** and ticking their attendance record. Not every one is comfortable or even able to stand up to an aggressive person - especially if the Captain is a gruff, uncommunicative “gear up shut up” type and/or the F/O is perhaps towards the meeker end of the spectrum. Not everyone has had the life experience of facing down bullies in bars etc.


*Yes, I know it wasn’t really ‘controlled rest’, I am being charitable here.

**CRM training usually consists of a morning in a classroom watching some powerpoint presentations and answering questions such as “What is CRM?”, while most in the room are trying to get finished and go home as soon as possible. On more than one occasion I have heard attendees say ‘don’t ask any questions, we want to get this finished ASAP and beat the traffic to get home’. And those difficult Captains who most need to learn about CRM mysteriously never seem to be on these courses. I have never seen any practical training given in conflict management or how to deal with a difficult Captain.

[Herod]

Things change. When I was flying I always made a point to the FO that he/she was the check against me getting it wrong. "If you don't like what I'm doing, say so. I'll either explain to you why, to your satisfaction, or we stay on the ground/ abandon the approach until we are both happy".

[svhar]

That is how it should be, of course. CRM and MCC. But after decades of including this in initial training, simulators and ground courses, things have not become much better. And they may get worse. An FO with 2000 hours may have the confidence to doubt the captain but hardly an FO with 200 hours.

[Herod]

svhar. Exactly why I made my point. We were both learning. the F.O. because they had an awful lot to learn, me because "the more you know, the more you know you don't know". Not quite Rumsfeld, but you get what I mean.

[Uplinker]

@Herod, you were obviously one of the good guys: the sort that when you see their name as you check in you smile and think, fantastic! he is a nice guy and it will be a good day. The majority of pilots I fly with are good guys/gals, (and one trainer who taught me really was an actual sky god - a terrific bloke), but there are the occasional idiots with an inflated ego and sense of self importance.

They are reducing in numbers now, but there were too many Captains who thought they were a sky god. Not realising that the only reason the entire crew, the ground staff, the fueller, the dispatcher, Operations, passengers etc, etc, appeared to respect them and look up to them was not because they were actually a sky god*, (or even good pilots), but that legally they are responsible for the flight, so their decision is final.



*(they were/are in fact annoying little twats, who if they were not my boss and they behaved liked that in a bar, would get punched).

[aterpster]

It is nice to see that phone SMS is now part of NTSBs tools, what is next, my old post cards and love letters.

When a smart phone is found in the proximity of a car, truck, or bus driver (or railroad engineer) the authorities check for both voice and SMS. Do you believe that to be inappropriate?

I recall the NTSB was able to determine probable cause in a California train crash several years ago based on the engineer's use of his smart phone.

[BluSdUp]

Yes , lets use the word inappropriate and not immoral or illegal, just for arguments sake.
As I wrote, in this case , without CVR or FDR or personal OFDM as we have, I can see the exception.

But I am strongly against flightdeck Video, more then 2 hrs CVR and personalized OFDM.
It is abused by some company's.

I do not like CCTVs and NSA et Al being able to suck out any info from anyone. The world does not become any safer by these devices on a general basis, what we need is less nutters and more people in government. Clearly demonstrated in Canada yesterday and in Singapore on Tuesday.

And on a specific case like this, it is clear that FAA did not have proper control over this Company and its somewhat strange structure and minimalist approach to Ops Training and Safety. The SMS messages did confirm that both were not up to standard, that I have to admit. It is clear to me that it is the Company and FAA that failed here, no need for reading SMS, big need for Auditing and a better model for this kind of Ops.

But , looking at the postings her , Post Mortem, I suppose more the one of us would loose our medical and command, retroactively , if taken seriously at all postings.
No one will ever get my phone , as there will never be any need.
Happy Flying

[aterpster]

No one will ever get my phone , as there will never be any need.
Happy Flying
They don't need the actual phone.

[Herod]

Uplinker. The sky-god who trained you didn't have the initials JB did he?

[Airbubba]

It is nice to see that phone SMS is now part of NTSBs tools, what is next, my old post cards and love letters.

Data was harvested from the captain's CPAP machine as well as the pilot's phone records:

From the NTSB Aviation Accident Final Report:

According to data from the captain's CPAP machine, he used the machine between about 0659 and 1630. Data from the first officer's personal electronic devices (PED) indicated activity about 1755. The flight crew departed CRW for SDF about 2302.

The flight crew arrived at SDF about 0025 on May 3. They departed SDF about 0450 and arrived at CRW about 0549. The captain's CPAP machine showed use from 0654 until 1242 and his PED records showed an outgoing text message about 0715. PED records for the first officer indicated activity from 1711 to about 1800. The flight crew departed CRW for SDF about 2302.

The flight crew arrived at SDF about 1206 on May 4. They departed SDF about 0528 on a return flight to CRW, arriving about 0637. The captain's CPAP showed use from 0712 to 1511. He cooked dinner for his girlfriend that night and met her around 1900. He got ready for work around 2100. The first officer's PED records showed an outgoing text message about 1330. She talked to her brother from 1658 to 1838, cooked dinner, then talked to her brother again.

No surprise on the Probable Cause:

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

the flight crew's improper decision to conduct a circling approach contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP) and the captain's excessive descent rate and maneuvering during the approach, which led to inadvertent, uncontrolled contact with the ground. Contributing to the accident was the operator's lack of a formal safety and oversight program to assess hazards and compliance with SOPs and to monitor pilots with previous performance issues.


The Final Report is posted here:

https://t.co/t7ImyP4PFT