Nimrod MR4 vs P8

[stilton]

Currently reading Tony Blackman's 'Nimrod, the rise and fall'


Very interesting accounts of the MR2's gestation and its
distinguished service record.


The MR4 as it's planned successor seemed a very advanced
and capable platform.


I realize it's all academic now but i'm curious as to how it
would measure up technologically against the P8 ?

[Pontius Navigator]

A forties designed airframe, built in the 60s, nineties engines and wings or a a 60s airframe totally new build?

A re engined Austin of England or a new Mustang?

[MPN11]

PN ... that would be a "new Mustang" designed to operate at FL350 being hacked around at low level, surely?

A Mustang might be cool soon a Freeway or cruising a boulevard, but what are they like on Alpine roads? :)

[Kerosene Kraut]

Any new airframe that is in current military use in the US and some massively used airliner (that means parts available globally) is advantageous compared to some refurbished classic.

Nothing against it's new RR engines but the custom made adaptions needed for the wing/fuselage connection (because none was the same) made me wonder.

[Lima Juliet]

IIRC the Mission System for MRA4 and P-8 were very similar and essentially a BAESYSTEMS/Boeing collaborative project. The Indian P-8s have a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) boom whereas the rest do not. It is understood that due to its normal operating height the P-8 would find the MAD of limited value and is better off carrying 3,000lbs of extra fuel. Further, there are many new high-fidelity techniques - both acoustic, active and off-board that effectively renders a MAD not worth all of the effort.

As for MRA4's airframe: conceived in 1943, first flew 1949, maritime role conceived 1964, first flew 1967, then bastardised in the 90s with new engines and wings with a variety of build issues dating back from the time when the fuselages were built in wooden jigs. It is understood MRA4 had too small a tailplane/rudder to cope with the new engines and a workaround had to be found for loss of engine(s) at slow speed. There were build quality issues. Some of the control circuits were understood to be at the back of the bomb bay and so opening it at low level and taking a bird could have been catastrophic. It is understood that the RAF were asked to accept the aircraft with a speed limitation on the bomb bay and without a sonobuoy dropping clearance - not a lot of good for a maritime aircraft! Finally, it appeared that we had learned nothing from the sad loss of the MR2 in having fuel, heat and a source of ignition in enclosed zones without fire detection and extinguishing systems. We should have pulled the plug on the programme several times but the need outweighed common-sense judgement on many occasions; plus the good old 'Buy British' flag waivers had been allowed to get carried away without realising at that point that BAESYSTEMS is a global company.

Thankfully all will end up as it should have 10 years ago - a fleet of Boeing P-8 Poseidon with RAF roundels on them. It's just a shame we didn't do it earlier.

All in my humble opinion of course...:ok:

LJ

http://www.ukmil.org.uk/DLA2/thumbnail/rafp8thm.jpg

[camelspyyder]

Is the "technology" inside not related?

Did the MRA4 mission system not come from Boeing, get the bugs out, and then speed development of the P8?





Oops, Leon posted whilst I was typing.

[just another jocky]

IIRC the Mission System for MRA4 and P-8 were very similar and essentially a BAESYSTEMS/Boeing collaborative project. The Indian P-8s have a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) boom whereas the rest do not. It is understood that due to its normal operating height the P-8 would find the MAD of limited value and is better off carrying 3,000lbs of extra fuel. Further, there are many new high-fidelity techniques - both acoustic, active and off-board that effectively renders a MAD not worth all of the effort.

As for MRA4's airframe: conceived in 1943, first flew 1949, maritime role conceived 1964, first flew 1967, then bastardised in the 90s with new engines and wings with a variety of build issues dating back from the time when the fuselages were built in wooden jigs. It is understood MRA4 had too small a tailplane/rudder to cope with the new engines and a workaround had to be found for loss of engine(s) at slow speed. There were build quality issues. Some of the control circuits were understood to be at the back of the bomb bay and so opening it at low level and taking a bird could have been catastrophic. It is understood that the RAF were asked to accept the aircraft with a speed limitation on the bomb bay and without a sonobuoy dropping clearance - not a lot of good for a maritime aircraft! Finally, it appeared that we had learned nothing from the sad loss of the MR2 in having fuel, heat and a source of ignition in enclosed zones without fire detection and extinguishing systems. We should have pulled the plug on the programme several times but the need outweighed common-sense judgement on many occasions; plus the good old 'Buy British' flag waivers had been allowed to get carried away without realising at that point that BAESYSTEMS is a global company.

Thankfully all will end up as it should have 10 years ago - a fleet of Boeing P-8 Poseidon with RAF roundels on them. It's just a shame we didn't do it earlier.

All in my humble opinion of course...:ok:

LJ

http://www.ukmil.org.uk/DLA2/thumbnail/rafp8thm.jpg


Well said Sir. :D

[H Peacock]

Notwithstanding the decision to go with MRA4, how could it go so wrong? I heard various horror stories about the airframe being a complete handful, and build problems due to original MR2 wing/fuselage joints being bespoke, but was the project failure due to poor management or simply a lack of a well thought-through plan?

[Pontius Navigator]

HP, and chopping numbers as it went.

[reds & greens]

Whichever frame makes the best brew gets my vote...

[Pontius Navigator]

I wonder, did the MRA 4 need 4 engines? Well at 16k each - 64k compared with 27k each on the P8, you can see the advantage of pods over embedded installation.

[salad-dodger]

I wonder, did the MRA 4 need 4 engines? Well at 16k each - 48k compared with 27k each on the P8, you can see the advantage of pods over embedded installation.
Not sure about your maths PN.

S-D

[ACW418]

64K. He's a Nav so is good with numbers!!

ACW

According to Wiki it's 62K.

[sycamore]

He is a nav....

and you can shut down 2 ,less of an asymmetric problem..

[ACW418]

Sycamore,

I know. We were based at Coningsby and Cottesmore at the same time. I think it is called banter.

ACW

[sycamore]

Short arms and deep pockets....in the bar..

[Two's in]

Never mind the systems issues, having the engines buried in the wing root creates significant design, performance and maintenance challenges. Going from a turbojet to a turbofan and increasing the space required just exacerbated those issues. During the upgrade program it was discovered that no two airframes were alike, despite BAE's claim of Nimrod "being the best understood airframe in service". The design was flawed from the start, and the Ostrich mentality that ignored the obvious was responsible for the cost and delay still impacting the maritime capability today.

[Pontius Navigator]

Short arms and deep pockets....in the bar..

Nah, never carried money.

[Rhino power]

Going from a turbojet to a turbofan...

Minor point of order, the Nimrod never had turbojets, the Spey was/still is a turbofan...

-RP

[The Oberon]

Never mind the systems issues, having the engines buried in the wing root creates significant design, performance and maintenance challenges. Going from a turbojet to a turbofan and increasing the space required just exacerbated those issues. During the upgrade program it was discovered that no two airframes were alike, despite BAE's claim of Nimrod "being the best understood airframe in service". The design was flawed from the start, and the Ostrich mentality that ignored the obvious was responsible for the cost and delay still impacting the maritime capability today.

The bespoke nature of the airframe was a problem on the AEW3 when individual transition pieces had to be made to suite the standard radome. There were still a few of us boring old f****s around who mentioned this when a new wing was planned, completely ignored.

[RandomBlah]

I must admit that I don't understand the reasoning behind comparing something that doesn't exist, and will not be recreated against something that has been decided and is the future of UK LRMPA.

[Kerosene Kraut]

Forgive my ignorance but why is the to be P-8 operated by the RAF and not -say- the fleet air arm?

[thunderbird7]

Forgive my ignorance but why is the to be P-8 operated by the RAF and not -say- the fleet air arm?

A quick search on this forum will reveal all the pros & cons debated ad nauseum....

[Kerosene Kraut]

But no answer.

[Pontius Navigator]

RB, it is a perfectly valid question. It is no less valid than many other questions on pprune and could be used to further support the decision to abandon the one and buy the other.

[reynoldsno1]

During the upgrade program it was discovered that no two airframes were alike
"Discovered" ? - I wuz on MR1s, and we knew all about this....

[Haraka]

Are there any parallels with the earlier RAF, Boeing AWACS , BAe AEW Nimrod saga still worth drawing I wonder?

[The Old Fat One]

Never mind the systems issues, having the engines buried in the wing root creates significant design, performance and maintenance challenges. Going from a turbojet to a turbofan and increasing the space required just exacerbated those issues. During the upgrade program it was discovered that no two airframes were alike, despite BAE's claim of Nimrod "being the best understood airframe in service". The design was flawed from the start, and the Ostrich mentality that ignored the obvious was responsible for the cost and delay still impacting the maritime capability today.

This is pretty much spot except as mentioned above this was completely common knowledge in the 70 late alone later. Many of the airframe issues came up during the ill rated AEW debacle (funny how often that fails to get a mention) and you can even roll back the lack of space issues to the 1960's comet v 707.

Military folk with decades of maritime experience, on the ground and in the air, were venting their frustrations about all of this in 1990's and as I've mentioned before, I, like many others, was ordered to "get with the programme" by the then staish.

I was at BAE on a course in May 1998 when a crew chief uncovered a previously unknown issue with the bomb doors. It was a headslap doh moment. Pretty funny really, except for the 3 billion plus tax payers money down the swanney and 10 years (maybe more?) with no kipper fleet.

Still well-played BAE Marketing Team...that was some stunt you pulled off there.

edit cross posting Haraka...answer yes, and they were all know and out in the open from the get-go.

[ShotOne]

There is a massive advantage in a design with thousands of airframes in daily use all over the world versus twenty or so last of the Mohicans. Not just spares , training facilities, maintenance...not to mention post-service jobs!!

[Haraka]

Still well-played BAE Marketing Team...that was some stunt you pulled off there.
Almost as good as Boeing apparently floating the AWACS concept primarily as a means of getting the last batch of 707 airframes coming down the line taken up........

[A4scooter]

Going slightly off topic but was Orion ever considered as a Shackleton replacement and if selected would we still a MPA force?
New Zealand, Spain, Brazil, Greece etc are still operating old updated P3s and will do so for a few more years.

[Pontius Navigator]

A4, and Atlantique

[tucumseh]

Military folk with decades of maritime experience, on the ground and in the air, were venting their frustrations about all of this in 1990's TOFO is correct, and MoD(PE) in London and then AbbeyWood (which dates it to pre-July 1995) were saying the same.

The reason for cancellation, eventually admitted on 3 February 2014 (that it could never be certified), was well known and regarded as a standing risk. BAeS's suggested mitigation was that they establish a new production line with modern tooling, etc. As soon as MoD rejected that strategy, the programme would have been a nightmare as its entire focus would have shifted. It is less well known that the parallel Sea King AEW programme went through exactly the same argument, at the same time. The solution to the endorsed requirement was Merlin AEW (what, 20+ years later, will be Crowsnest). There was a political overrule and PE was instructed to let the contract on another contractor, who hadn't bid (handy if your MP is a Defence Minister), and to modify existing AEW Mk2s. The essential difference between the aircraft was that Sea King was basically sound, with very little work needed to bring her up to scratch. But in addition to, for example, the above mainplane issues, Nimrod had suffered from serious neglect - exposed publicly post-XV230. No hope of a public inquiry, but I wonder if an insider might write a book?

[Shackman]

A4 - was Orion ever considered as a Shackleton replacement.

In a word - No.

As a JO I held prior to my Shackleton course at HQ Coastal Command, and one of my jobs was to look after the Archives. As such I also had the opportunity to file (and read) a lot of the documents that came in - including those regarding the Shackleton replacement(s). Right from the beginning there was one overriding Treasury edict - that whatever replaced it had to be British built and designed, to save spending any money outside of the UK. In addition when the replacement was first puit out to tender, it was the principle in MOD that UK forces only operated UK equipment (with a few very small exceptions). There was also the requirement for at least three engines (see HS 800 and Avro 776), as jets were still not considered reliable enough for twin engine ops a long way from land!

Of note, it seemed it was also the dead hand of the Treasury that led to the Mk 3 Shackleton as a Mk 2 replacement. The original plans were for a new airframe, but the Treasury would only accept an upgrade to the existing airframe - so although Avro did their best, that's what we got.

Unfortunately this wonderful treasure trove of documents and memorabilia going back to the formation of the Command and all the WW2 action reports and reviews was stored in the Headquarters building, which included the Officers' Mess. It was destroyed by fire early in 1969.

[Kerosene Kraut]

Was a Viscount based MPA ever considered?

[Chugalug2]

tuc:-
The reason for cancellation, eventually admitted on 3 February 2014 (that it could never be certified), was well known.... I wonder if an insider might write a book?
The words piss-ups and breweries come to mind. What insider is ever going to blow the whistle on such an expensive scandal (in treasure, lives, and capability)? Oh, wait....

[Haraka]

Was a Viscount based MPA ever considered?
I believe a Vanguard based MPA was - uncannily similar to a P3 Orion.

[Pontius Navigator]

The Viscount is actually tiny.

[Shackman]

I suppose the Viscount could have replaced the Anson!

[A4scooter]

Although I suspect totally impractical but a VC10 MPA would have looked the business.

[Shackman]

IIRC there was a re-engined VC10 derivative in the proposals, as well as other quite esoteric offerings.

One day the full story of how OR357 was developed (and the aircraft and engine R & D),and then over a weekend was suddenly changed to another OR thanks to extreme political machinations, will be written. Or not!

[Haraka]

Just as an aside.Some might recall Harald Penrose , ex CTP Westlands and a well respected Aviation historian and author. Hal wrote a series of books in the 60's and 70's on the evolution of the U.K Aircraft Industry ( "British Aviation" with which Haraka Snr. had considerable involvement) . Hal decided to stop at 1939.
His reason to call a halt : "If I continue to write honestly with what I know, I fear being sued"

[AQAfive]

I was told many years ago by a person involved with a Shackleton replacement trial, that several airframes were trialed. Among them was the Vanguard, two rigid in the wings, I think the Viscount was considered too old but cannot be sure, also the Brittania and the VC10. The VC10 came out the best but they could not get enough fuel on board to give the required endurance. (Pre 73 so lots of cheap petrol). Iv'e no idea whether the engine location was an issue. No decision was made. There is a book about maritime ac development, I must dig it out and read again.

Interestingly, the Comet did not feature in the trial. I was told that during a ministerial visit to de Havilland (that may of course be Hawker Siddeley) that some spare wings were spotted, (made for a cancelled order I believe), and the suggestion for a new MPA surfaced from that visit. How true that is I have no idea.

As for the MRA4; during my time on maritime I looked with envy at the P3. Not because of it's sensors or performance, for in those areas I considered it inferior. But the fact that the seats placed you in front of the kit. You had an APU that did more than start the engines, if you were quick. An air conditioner that kept the aircraft cool on the ground with only a GPU connected and of course air stairs, simple facilities that made life so much easier. Many times we would wait for a promised GPU to turn up, and then watch a P3 land, taxi in reverse into a parking space, shut down and unload the crew and put the aircraft to bed as we waited. Fitting an usable APU to the Nimrod was considered too expensive to consider, read that as no one wanted to do it.

When the MRA4 was penned, all these facilities were included, we looked forward to a more usable ac until we lost the air stairs, too heavy. (in fact they were such a poor design they were less than useful). The APU was OK when it worked.

I still think the P8 is not the aircraft needed, there's a good reason the MAD was removed and I don't think it was because of the way the US intends to use the ac. And dropping sonobuoys from height can only be a choice made by boffins, no maritime wettie would ever consider it. Knowing where a sonobuoy is is one thing, but if its not where you intended it to be, it's just another lump of junk in the ocean.

Would the MRA4 have made the grade? I think so, although it still needed a lot of work in my opinion, but at around 15 hrs endurance it would have been quite useful. The question of build standards is way beyond my pay grade so I won't comment. Except to say I had a lot of time for the engineers, but none for the management

[howiehowie93]

The bespoke nature of the airframe was a problem on the AEW3 when individual transition pieces had to be made to suite the standard radome. There were still a few of us boring old f****s around who mentioned this when a new wing was planned, completely ignored.

I can vouch for that as I was a Liney on the AEW and none of the #4 Engine Doors would close without a load of "Wiggling & Percussion Adjustment"

The doors themselves were all mixed up on them when the 11 were taken out of service for modification..

[Shackman]

AQAfive - The Nimrod (HS801) came about purely thanks to the suddenly issued Operational Requirement (OR 381) which effectively negated all the previous work for OR 357 and was written almost completely around the Atlantique! Hawker Siddely took 7 days to come up with the 801 (Nimrod) using mainly existing Comet parts and won the contest. It was announced in 1965, first flew in 67 and front line deliveries started in 69. However, whilst it was an excellent aircraft for its time, as alluded to above it was still essentially a 1940-50 design. What might we have had had the original OR 357 winner been built. Not a P-8 certainly, but maybe we wouldn't have been in a position of needing it now either.

[Davef68]

I beleive an assessment of the Orion was made at the time of OR.381, but range/speed etc ruled it out. There was also a Trident variant (HS800) that reached the final candidates.

There were a host of proposals based on airliners that were considered as part of the overall process leading up to that point - a Comet version was first proposed for OR350/MR218, and over the 50/early 60s Brittania and VC10 variants proposed, as well as new build aricraft designs like the Acvro 745 (which looke dlike a cross bewteen a Shackleton fuselage and an Andover wing!)

[KonfusedofKinloss]

Quite a decent read on the whole process....
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nimrods-Genesis-Hikoki-Chris-Gibson/dp/1902109473/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1493731773&sr=8-1&keywords=NIMROD%27S+GENESIS

[Shackman]

At least we didn't get a variant of the HP 117 (it was offered!)

[Lima Juliet]

The Avro 776 was the Trident-based offering to rival the maritime VC-10:
http://i29.photobucket.com/albums/c275/hangar/Avro%20776.png~original
http://www.bisbos.com/images_aircraft/vc10/vc10_nimrod_600.jpg

[West Coast]

Those things look like the culmination of an incestuous relationship.

[msbbarratt]

My tuppence:

For the time and money actually spent on the MR4, it'd have been better spent on coming up with a whole new airframe. Or converting an A320, or A330. If it comes to that, how expensive are used A340s to buy, operate? Ok, so that's getting quite large, but surely that means a few additional tanks can be added for very long endurance?

I've nothing against the P8 as such, it's just that it'd be nice to think that it's not just the USA who can convert an airliner into an MPA. Still, I suppose that a kitted out P8 is a single line purchase order. It should be really difficult to screw that up!

Anyone know how good the Japanese one is? Perhaps we'll find out, with military relationships with Japan seemingly blossoming at the moment.

Whose fault was MR4? Who knows. I do know that it's the hardest thing in the world to get someone to foresake their "old dependable" and replace it with something completely new, even when the old thing is obviously a pile of junk... At some point it's just not worth saving, and recognising the point optimally takes real talent.

[Pontius Navigator]

That Trident should have won on looks alone.

[PDR1]

My tuppence:

For the time and money actually spent on the MR4, it'd have been better spent on coming up with a whole new airframe. Or converting an A320, or A330. If it comes to that, how expensive are used A340s to buy, operate?

I was peripherally involved in the RMPA option studies in the early 90s (before the ITT was compiled), and I remember BAe (as was) begging to be allowed to offer an all-new aeroplane, but the Treasury were adamant that they wouldn't even look it it because it was too technically risky (ironic, in hindsight). The A320/340 options were looked at, but they were deemed to be unsufficiently rugged and unlikley to stand up to the low-level rough-and-tumble that sub-hunting entails.

PDR

[EAP86]

PDR, my memories agree. The original proposal was for a missions​ system upgrade, new more fuel efficient engines (GE) and a glass cockpit. This fitted in with the target budget and maximised the existing investment in Service infrastructure. History records what came out of the subsequent negotiations with pretty much the same price to boot. At this point a new airframe would have reduced the risk substantially but that's hindsight.

EAP

[Shackman]

Unfortunately it always seems the Treasury puts the boot in and can only be persuaded to fund an 'upgrade' - ie Shackleton Mk 2 to Mk 3, Nimrod 2 to 4, Sea King (too various to mention)and the same with many other items across the military spectrum. So we end up with cost overruns, old equipment with (relatively) modern upgrades etc, instead of new build, more efficient and in the long run cheaper aircraft etc. And who gets the blame - MoD or the single service involved.

[MPN11]

OTOH, whilst agreeing with what you say, UK Mil procurement has also resulted in some very expensive and prolonged development of NEW items which, unsurprisingly, failed to generate much (if any) overseas sales to amortise the R&D and production costs.

So even if the money can be squeezed out of the Treasury, it doesn't always work out very well.

[tucumseh]

Unfortunately it always seems the Treasury puts the boot in and can only be persuaded to fund an 'upgrade' - ie Shackleton Mk 2 to Mk 3, Nimrod 2 to 4, Sea King (too various to mention)and the same with many other items across the military spectrum. So we end up with cost overruns, old equipment with (relatively) modern upgrades etc, instead of new build, more efficient and in the long run cheaper aircraft etc. And who gets the blame - MoD or the single service involved.

There is an old adage. Never modify a mod. Not set in stone, but there to warn of inherent risks that must be mitigated before being allowed to commence development. In the mid-90s, you had to disobey direct orders to let such a risk reduction contract. That is why SKAEW was such a relative success, as it faced the same risks as Nimrod yet delivered on time, under cost and to a better spec than the FAA asked for. (And was the lead programme on some new technologies common to both). What MoD will not tolerate is using such successes as a benchmark, as it raises the bar.

[Kengineer-130]

P8 will provide a superb platform, that will be "S" far more than a cobbled together 1950s relic. Look at the Voyager/MRTT, they are doing a fantastic job, day in day out. Common sense says use a modern, reliable commercially successful platform to start... can you imagine trying to get a wiggle valve widget for a MR4 in any location apart from the UK?

[PDR1]

Common sense says...

Sorry, but I'm a Professional Engineer and it is my experience that "Common Sense" is almost invariably neither.

Show me a modern airliner that routinely flies low with aggressive manoeuvering over the open ocean in all weathers and perhaps I might accept the point had some merit. But I can't think of one off hand - I'm sure the passengers would have noticed.

PDR

[Kengineer-130]

I would think that a brand new, modern, multi-billion dollar computer designed airliner that has been shaken down for the last 30 years would stand a better chance of surviving in that environment than a bodged up comet? Plus the maintenance is very well understood, spare parts available off the shelf, worldwide, huge manufacturer support etc... I don't believe the comet was ever designed to be operated low level across the ocean either?

It's time we learn from our mistakes, flogging the VC10 & Tristars on for as long as we did led to serious operational performance problems, not only from a (hideous) reliability point of view, but supporting the aircraft worldwide with no real back up from the manufacturers etc.. Operating a modified civil airliner has huge benefits that vastly outweigh any downsides. Funnily enough, all of the old sweats crowing about how the A330 was vastly inferior to the old Vickers funbus & deathstars have gone very quiet.

The Operators, Engineers, Passengers, Receivers all love the MRTT, because it turns up, does its job & goes home..... There is a lesson in there somewhere?

Besides, the venerable 73' has looked after numerous lo-co sausage factory first officers, including "that" Irish Airline, I'm sure the Raf couldn't be much heavier on it!

[PDR1]

I would think that a brand new, modern, multi-billion dollar computer designed airliner that has been shaken down for the last 30 years would stand a better chance of surviving in that environment than a bodged up comet?


Would you? I wouldn't!

One of the reasons why a modern airliner is so much more efficient in its intended role than the 1950s incarnations is simply what you say - computer-aided engineering. We can now do stressing down to the individual part with decidedly complex load-paths and so very little of the airframe is only along for the ride - it all contributes. So the airframe is optimised to a MUCH higher degree than those of yesteryear. Heck, you only have to watch one fly through a mild bit of wake turbulence and the wings are flapping around like the tacoma narrows bridge.

In the Comet era we lacked the ability to do the hundred billion calculations needed to fully understand the stresses reacted by many curved surfaces and components. So the aeroplane structure was comprised of a "primary structure" of largely straight and easily-calculated elements with simple load paths wrapped up in an aerodynamic fairing of "secondary structure". By the 1950s we had started including *some* of the structural properties of the secondary structure, but only through what were essentially rules of thumb and so the values were heavily "discounted" in the stressing cases.

As a result the Nimrod was (compared to a modern airliner) built like a brick outhouse. And that's the primary reason why it was easily adaptable to the low-level manoeuvering needed for the ASW role. Not that it's that relevant for the MRA4, because that had an entirely new wing which was designed explicitly for the stresses of that role - something which could not be said of any current airliner.

It's time we learn from our mistakes, flogging the VC10 & Tristars on for as long as we did led to serious operational performance problems, not only from a (hideous) reliability point of view, but supporting the aircraft worldwide with no real back up from the manufacturers etc.. Operating a modified civil airliner has huge benefits that vastly outweigh any downsides.

This is one of those assertions which sounds reasonable until you challenge the core premise. It assumes that civil and military operations are they same, but they aren't. I've been involved with initiatives which try to use commercial solutions to military availability issues, and they all stumble because in the commercial world any shortfall can be both defined and recitfied in purely financial terms. This was a peripheral area in my second Masters dissertation, and the following extract (in the next post) shows why the assumption is invalid.

PDR

[PDR1]

From my paper* (copyright PDR!):

There is a fundamental difference between equipment acquisition and availability/capability contracting. In an equipment acquisition programme the user is paying the contractor to deliver something that is fit for purpose, but it largely can be tested prior to using it on the Mission to confirm that the contractor delivered what was required. In an availability/capability programme the contractor is being paid to be an active part of the Mission, or at the very least the ability to sustain Mission Capability. One of the stated objectives of moving to Availability/Capability contracting is to transfer risk to the contractor, and with that risk goes responsibility.

But in the military scenario the full risk can never be transferred to a contractor. There is a traditional proverb, usually assumed to relate to the fate of King Richard III at the Battle of Bosworth[1]:

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of the horse, the rider was lost;
For want of the rider, the battle was lost;
For want of the battle, the Kingdom was lost;
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.


Although this proverb is usually cited to emphasise the need to attend to details, to the ILS community it illustrates the chain of causation between component failure and mission loss. If there had been an effective LSA programme the end effects of the nail failure mode would have been analysed in a FMECA, together with a probability of occurrence predicted in reliability analysis and verified through analogy or demonstration. The RCM analysis would have determined whether preventive inspections or lifing of the horse-shoe subsystem components were warranted and the maintainability analysis would have established the required inspection and rectification procedures together with the skills, equipment, spares, consumables and facilities required to achieve them. The level of repair analysis would then have ensured that the appropriate support policies were implemented to reflect the tolerable resource burden for the mission criticality of the horse. In short; King Richard’s horse would have been returned to serviceability (or replaced) within the time required to prevent a Mission failure. Rather than cry: “A horse, a horse; my Kingdom for a horse!”, supportability engineers would point out that he should have cried:

“A capable system, a capable system, my Kingdom for an increased investment in early-phase LSA during the procurement process to assure the most cost-effectively sustainable through-life Capability at Readiness!!”


But admittedly this does not have the same ring to it and would be difficult to render into iambic pentameter.

All of these analyses are based on probabilities and trade-offs between the cost and consequence of Mission Failure, and only the Mission Owner (the one who has the original political or economic need for the Mission) can own this risk. If King Richard’s personal transport had been provided by way of a “Horse Availability Service” it is doubtful that the commercial performance penalties resulting from the first-line mission availability failure would be regarded as an adequate compensation for the Plantagenet dynasty’s permanent loss of the English throne. This could be seen as a general characteristic of military missions that is rarely (if ever) present in non-military missions, and it is the reason why the Author would suggest the “blind” application of commercial models to military systems is probably naïve.

[1]Although this is unlikely since King Richard’s horse was actually stuck in deep mud rather than rendered unserviceable through the loss of a shoe, and some versions of the proverb are known to predate him


* Dissertation on the engineering implications of moves towards availability/capability contracting in the UK Defence sector. Unavailable from all good bookshops, its 226 pages and 54,000 randomly-selected words are currently believed to be mankind's most demonstrably effective treatment for insomnia.

PDR

[MPN11]

I am impressed ... not least by the fact that I understood some of it! Thanks, PDR1 ^

[Lima Juliet]

Airbus Military have the A319 MPA on the cards - hopeful of a sale to rplace Atlantiques and Canadian Orions I'm led to believe?

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/a319mpa/images/1-image-01.jpg

[stilton]

A couple of relevant points from Tony Blackman's book.


The Nimrod was no 'bodged up Comet' from all accounts the MR2 was a superb
aircraft in its role, from its high speed transit ability to the flexibility it offered
with the huge installed bomb bay and the variety of sensors on board, it seems
to have been a very effective platform.



The AEW version really was a disaster and the technical problems were never worked
out.



The MRA4 on the other hand was 'ready to go' all issues, such as bespoke fittings
had been worked out and the sensor suite was first rate, Tony claims it was a better
aircraft than the P8 and it's performance was outstanding, also it would have kept
that huge bomb bay, far bigger than the P8 along with wing hard points it could
carry an impressive amount of weapons and / or rescue gear.



This is all from his book, i'm no expert but it appears the real reason the MRA4 was cancelled was a temporary budget shortfall, nothing to do with technical shortcomings.


It also had a MAD boom as standard, unlike the P8 which will end up costing more anyway.

[tucumseh]

This is all from his book, i'm no expert but it appears the real reason the MRA4 was cancelled was a temporary budget shortfall, nothing to do with technical shortcomings.

That was the original Government claim. It later admitted it could never be certified safe.

[PDR1]

That was the original Government claim. It later admitted it could never be certified safe.

Do you have any evidence of that? I ask because at the time of the 2010 SDSR the first three aeroplanes were on the point of handover to the RAF (they would have entered servive within 90 days) and the RTS was ready for signing.

MRA4 was cancelled to fix a cash-flow problem. As has been shown many times, continuing with the MRA4 would (in overall cost terms) have been cheaper than the subsequent P8 procurement, and whilst I haven't seen the full P8 spec I am led to believe the overall mission capability of the MRA4 was significantly greater - especially when you consider that the MRA4 was equipped to take over the whole of the MR2 role (including all the non-sub-hunting and non-maritime roles) which I gather the P8 isn't.

PDR

[PDR1]

The AEW version really was a disaster and the technical problems were never worked out.


The issue with the AEW Nimrod was that the MoD tried to play the role of Prime Contractor and System Integrator, something that they had no relevant skills or experience in doing and so they made a right royal balls-up of it.

PDR

[Wensleydale]

The issue with the AEW Nimrod was that the MoD tried to play the role of Prime Contractor and System Integrator, something that they had no relevant skills or experience in doing and so they made a right royal balls-up of it.


As someone who was on the AEW trials team, I can state with some authority that you are so far off the mark with that comment.

[Dundiggin']

Hey Wensleydale.....please tell us more...

[Dundiggin']

As someone who was on the AEW trials team, I can state with some authority that you are so far off the mark with that comment.

Hey Wensleydale....please tell us more...

[Roland Pulfrew]

Airbus Military have the A319 MPA on the cards - hopeful of a sale to rplace Atlantiques and Canadian Orions I'm led to believe?




The problem with the A319 MPA is that it is a paper aeroplane - it doesn't exist in any form that potential customers can touch it, feel it and assess its actual performance. This is why it lost to the P-8 in the competition in India - I'm led to believe!

Any first customer is going to have to pay for all of the D&D and T&E costs for a potential sale of a handful of aircraft. Unless Airbus invest company money to build a demonstrator, then its unlikely to rack up any sales.

As for the Mighty Hunter Mks 1 & 2, that was a brilliant and very capable platform. MRA4 had lots of issues still to be resolved and was never going to sell anywhere other than the UK. Cancellation was probably inevitable despite its apparent potential; it did have better performance than the P-8 particularly weapons carried, range and endurance.

especially when you consider that the MRA4 was equipped to take over the whole of the MR2 role (including all the non-sub-hunting and non-maritime roles) which I gather the P8 isn't.

PDR Out of interest, what is your evidence for that?

[engineer(retard)]

Do you have any evidence of that? I ask because at the time of the 2010 SDSR the first three aeroplanes were on the point of handover to the RAF (they would have entered servive within 90 days) and the RTS was ready for signing.


And the airworthiness world was in a state of churn with the MAA standing up. The understanding from the projects that I worked on at this time was that the evidential bar was being lifted considerably higher.

[PDR1]

And the airworthiness world was in a state of churn with the MAA standing up. The understanding from the projects that I worked on at this time was that the evidential bar was being lifted considerably higher.

So you are saying that the aeroplane at the time it was about to tenter service didn't have the documentation to allow certification against a set of requirements which didn't exist at that time and only existed later. That's not really surprising. The real question is whether, after the introduction of the new standards, it would have been possible to generate the required documentation then. The advice I'm given by members of the project team who are still colleagues is "yes, there were no fundamental blockers, although it would have cost quite a lot".

But of course at that time (late 2010) the Harier, Tornado, Typhoon and various helicopters didn't meet sthe subsequent regulations either.

PDR

[PDR1]

Out of interest, what is your evidence for that?

Fair point - my basis is at best annecdotal because we're not involved in the P8 procurement. But it is my understanding that this is the case.

PDR

[engineer(retard)]

The real question is whether, after the introduction of the new standards, it would have been possible to generate the required documentation then.

The advice I'm given by members of the project team who are still colleagues is "yes, there were no fundamental blockers, although it would have cost quite a lot".

But of course at that time (late 2010) the Harier, Tornado, Typhoon and various helicopters didn't meet sthe subsequent regulations either.

PDR

The answer to your first question is that it is always possible to generate documentation, provided you have the underpinning evidence to document.

In 2010 there was no money in the MoD, we were deep in the Dwang. Projects were being asked to give up money, a request for more would have been unwelcome.

There was no immediate need for legacy programmes to meet the regulations but new projects had to meet it in full. I don't have first hand knowledge of the MRA4 either but Haddon Cave was likely casting a long shadow across the validity of any read across from earlier versions of the platform.

I also disagree with some elements of your civil/ military support concept. It is much easier and cheaper to run aircraft that have large fleets and a worldwide market to buy spares from. Although, I do accept the military usage spectrum does drive specific design requirements that preclude picking up an airframe in its entirety.

[PDR1]

As someone who was on the AEW trials team, I can state with some authority that you are so far off the mark with that comment.

With respect - would a member of the trial team have visibility of the ussues and events in the overall management and engineering integration, which would have occured some significant time befoire the trials team was stood up?

PDR

[The Oberon]

As someone who was on the AEW trials team, I can state with some authority that you are so far off the mark with that comment.

As someone who, on delivery, was the avionics trade manager at Waddington and who had spent the previous 2 years at Woodford, RSRE and OR60 in Main Building, I can fully agree with Wensleydale's comment.

[engineer(retard)]

With respect - would a member of the trial team have visibility of the ussues and events in the overall management and engineering integration, which would have occured some significant time befoire the trials team was stood up?

PDR

Based on personal experience, although not of the MRA4 project, I would agree with Wensleydale. Serving military on the trials teams were allowed a great deal of insight into the project and it was not unusual for project teams to ask for advice. On the large projects, the trials team often joined the project at the beginning.

[PDR1]

I also disagree with some elements of your civil/ military support concept. It is much easier and cheaper to run aircraft that have large fleets and a worldwide market to buy spares from.

Only for those aspects of the aeroplane which are identical in the military and civilan versions, which can be surprisingly few (see the discussions on the Air Force 1 programme). A classic example is the concepot of shared spares pools. If a civil and military operators share a pool of "safety/performance-significant" spares then at the moment* the CAA will not allow any RAF-used spares to be returned to the spares pool because the RAF's controls do not meet the CAA's requirements for a "controlled environment". So once a part has gone to the military it cannot be returned back through the repair/refurbishment route for use by the civilian partner in the spares pool. It must either be discarded or separately stored for military use only (negating the point of the shared pool).

Then there is the detail that often the military version of the aeroplane will have operating broader clearances than the civil version, so parts used in the military version have been exposed to environments and stresses which would cause them to be declared unservicable in the civilian environment. They are also maintained using different tools & procedures and to different schedules in the two environments, further adding to the difficulty in accepting they've been in a controlled environment.

Fundamentally the military version of a civil type is simply not just the same aeroplane in a combat jacket. It's a different aeroplane which is used and maintained differently, and that's where the comparison to "world fleets" just falls over.

But also civil and military support systems have fundamentally different objectives. A civil support system is focussed on minimising or eliminating the financial loss arising from a technical failure. It is predicated on the >99% true axiom that the consequences of any failure can be acceptably addressed by paying money to someone. The Military requirement is different - the loss of a mission can mean people die and wars are lost, so no amount of money will fix it.

PDR

* My last direct involvement with this was about four years ago, so it may now finally have changed

[tucumseh]

PDR1

Do you have any evidence of that? I ask because at the time of the 2010 SDSR the first three aeroplanes were on the point of handover to the RAF (they would have entered servive within 90 days) and the RTS was ready for signing.Hansard, 3 February 2014, during an exchange between Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour) and Mr Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence. The latter stated: “It is a bit rich for him to say that the gap in maritime patrol cover was created by this Government. What this Government did was to recognise the reality that his Government had been investing in aircraft that would never fly, would never be certified and would never be able to deliver a capability”.

Yet, two years before, Mr Hammond had repeated the MoD claim that the decision was purely a savings measure: “Scrapping the Nimrod MRA4 was one of many tough but necessary decisions we had to take to deal with an equipment programme that was out of control”.

Hammond has not yet apologised for misleading Parliament, nor the MoD for lying to him in a briefing.

There may have been a Release to Service document prepared, but no-one signed it. There have been many examples of an RTS being signed prematurely, and it is likely ACAS stopped short on MRA4 because his predecessors had been caught out during, for example, the Nimrod and Mull of Kintyre Reviews.

[engineer(retard)]

And in some some aircraft, the commonality is surprisingly large. You are focusing on R&O as opposed to brand new spares which is generally the larger parts count. For R&O, there is a standard T&C clause that does not allow the MoD to use secondhand parts without express permission. In EASA and European fleets the pool is often shared with lifing factors applied. Additionally, civil support tends towards power by the hour agreements which focuses on maximising availability not minimising financial loss.

[PDR1]

Hansard, 3 February 2014, during an exchange between Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour) and Mr Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence. The latter stated: .

“It is a bit rich for him to say that the gap in maritime patrol cover was created by this Government. What this Government did was to recognise the reality that his Government had been investing in aircraft that would never fly, would never be certified and would never be able to deliver a capability”.




I can't really accept that as an authoritative source when in the same breath he claims the aeroplanes never flew. I don't have the number to hand, but the fleet had accumulated flying hours that were certainly in the hundreds and I'm fairly sure were in the thousands. As I said - three were about to be delivered when the SDSR announcement waws made. I was in the building when the "Stop all work" order invoking the cancellation clause in the contract came in. That clause actually said something aloing the lines of:

"you will continue working to contract for up to 90 days while the cancellation terms are agreed".

This caused much ribald amusement as BAES responded with "OK, so we're delivering three aircraft in those 90 days - where do you want them?"...

PDR

[tucumseh]

PDR1

A more accurate phrase by Hammond would have been "...never fly in-service". One must allow him leeway. After all, what would he know about the rules pre-RTS aircraft fly under? He didn't make the statement up - it was briefed to him by MoD; at the time, probably the MAA. Are they an "authoritative source"?

[tucumseh]

Serving military on the trials teams were allowed a great deal of insight into the project and it was not unusual for project teams to ask for advice. On the large projects, the trials team often joined the project at the beginning.

I agree. On my last programme, the first thing I did was speak to the Service Appointer and arrange (at least) double tours. What was eventually the trials team, at least for the major mission systems, also sat in on original bid assessment and spec writing.

[PDR1]

I don't know. I do know that the first aeroplane was days away from delivery at the time of the announcement, and was to be followed by a further two over the next few weeks. There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of NOT flying them (quite the reverse).

I also remember a couple of weeks after that we had the Aldershot MP (defence specialist) visit the Harrier Team at Farnborough who explained that one of the reasons the Harrier had been dumped in the SDSR was that it couldn't carry <a particular weapon>. When challenged, he checked his notes and confirmed that he had been explicitly brief this fact by the MoD (I think he named the Perm Sec, but I'm not certain). One of the audience then went to his filing cabinet and produced his copy of the <weapon> 555 conference report and <EA signed> release documentation for that weapon integration on the GR9/9A showing that it not only *could* carry it, but had been formally cleared by the RAF EA to do so.

So I remain sceptical. I believe the reality is what Hammond originally said - it was a short-term cost savings measure. I believe he changed his subsequent position when it became clear that he would have to spend public money to fill the capability gap he had created by cancelling MRA4, and that he would have to spend substantially more filling the gap than he saved in the cancellation.

That he'd be spending money with a foreign contractor rather than a domestic one merely takes a gross abuse of public money and adds a charge of treason. I honestly believe it's time we returned to the proven, traditional people-performance measures in times like this. A few months being toirtured in the Tower followed by public (televised) hanging, drawing and quartering might have encouraged higher standards of decision making in his successors...

YMMV,

PDR

[Bing]

The Military requirement is different - the loss of a mission can mean people die and wars are lost, so no amount of money will fix it.

Must be why we have all those aircraft with 100% serviceability rates...

[downsizer]

PDR1,

What weapon?

[PDR1]

PDR1,

What weapon?

I'd love to say that was obfuscated for a reason and sound all sneaky-beaky & important, but the reality is that it's just my CRS kicking in again.

PDR

[5aday]

I was also on the AEW Trials Team from the start of the Tials Team Comet for about 2.5 years. The early Nimrod 3 airframes (DB1 , 2, AND 3?) were in New Assembly being chopped up to accommodate the scanners and we were in Flight Sheds on the other side of the field. (sometimes quite a hostile place if you were non union which by and large we were not.
As far as I was concerned my remit was A.E.W. Trials Planning involving RSRE Bedford, RAF Boulmer, Buchan, and the R.N. Fast Training Boats out of Hull.
When I arrived the system seemed to be set up for Co Prime Contractors between M.E.A.S.L. and BAe. At no stage in the time I was there was M.O.D. involved in anything and I don't even think we ever had any M.O.D. representatives flying on board the Comet. In fact I'm not even sure we would have had a spare seat on the trials that I was involved with.
Things may have changed when the DB1 e.t.c. were flying in terms of who was on board but I doubt Marconi or BAe would have accepted any M.O.D. interference into who was in charge. It was always a BAe flight deck and Nav, two radiation monitors (BAe again) and the Trials Team (at the time all recruited from G.E.C. and transferred to M.E.A.S.L)

ps M.E.A.S.L. =Marconi Elliot Avionic Systems Limited.

5aday

[Wander00]

I recall being on the Joint Services PR Course at Sunningdale when the cancellation of the AEW 3 was announced. Watching the TV with us was DPR(RAF), a well known senior officer and sheep farmer. Throughout the item (may have been a Panorama, cannot recall) the then Air Cdre was commenting such as "They followed that trail then", "Did not tell them that", etc, all highly illuminating

[tucumseh]

PDR1

There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of flying them (quite the reverse).This is the nub of the issue. While ACAS probably had every intention of signing the RTS, and the RAF of flying the aircraft, the Mull of Kintyre Review forcefully reminded both that they were not permitted to if the Aircraft Project Director said they couldn't. In old speak, the CA/MA Release was mandated upon them. This is what went wrong on Chinook - CA said "no fly", ACAS ignored him and signed an illegal RTS; and the rest is history.

(Edited to clarify that the evidence accepted by the MoK Review had been submitted and accepted some time beforehand. The actual report just confirmed this).

As for which Hammond version is true, I think it unlikely he would admit another airworthiness fiasco if untrue. Lack of approval to spend money is always the final reason (which is not the same as lack of money), but it is not the cause.

[PDR1]

Typing in a hurry and not checking meant that I didn't quite say what I meant. When I typed:

There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of flying them (quite the reverse).

What I actually meant to say was:

There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of NOT flying them (quite the reverse).

A small change that only changes the meaning slightly, but I felt it important to set the record straight.

Apols,

PDR

[EAP86]

Tuc,

I can honestly say that the reason for the inability to certificate the MR4 was not made clear to many of those in industry close to the process. I suspect that the fledgling MAA may have been involved in part.

A letter detailing around 10 failures​ to comply with DS 00-970 came from the PTL. The response to all of them was pretty much "true, and the PT was told at the time and given the reason why they were thought to be acceptable." While the letter came from the PTL, it seems likely that the MAA was the real source. Remember the MAA was relatively new to the certification process.

FWIW Leon J has already mentioned the only two real issues I recall.

EAP

[tucumseh]

The benefit of one’s local MP being a Minister, is that the MoD Minister must reply to his questions, not some lowly pleb. I was given this by my MP, a statement by Minister for the Armed Forces:

"The design and manufacturing flaws in the Nimrod MRA4 were, in the main, discovered shortly before and immediately after the first aircraft had been delivered and while work was under way to prepare for eventual release to service. The issue with the design of the fuel system, which resulted in the immediate grounding of both complete Nimrod MRA4 aircraft, was discovered during the course of work to verify the BAE Systems aircraft safety case."

One might argue about the timing – MoD was very concerned to assure Minister it didn’t have prior knowledge of these defects, which merely revealed poor implementation of its safety management system. The reply implies that the MRA4 had a completely new fuel system design (which I can’t comment on) and that MoD played no part in mandated design reviews of the previous decade or so (which I can comment on, as staff are permitted to make a false declaration that they have been held successfully, when they have actually been waived). This last has been upheld so many times by Ministers, I’ve lost count!


On 13 October 2010, close to cancellation, an internal MoD report listed examples of the “design quality concerns”. I only have the unclassified part, so presumably there are worse examples than: Bomb Bay doors, Aileron Feel and Trim Unit, Ram Air Turbine, Icing Clearance, Inability to correlate finite element modelling and wing fatigue tests, Hot air pipe in forward intake zone, Inadequate drainage in forward intake zone, HP8 hot air pipe clamp, Nose landing gear, Engine bay firewall, “several hundred” Defence Standard non-compliances. This extract lists only two issues that have been resolved – aerodynamic design and flap hinge failure. Whoever in MOD was faced with the decision would not have got a warm feeling, and it is fairly easy to see why he cancelled. I of course appreciate that this is a one-sided document, but I’m sure MoD would have discussed the content with BAE during the 90 day notice period mentioned earlier.

[tucumseh]

EAP86

Thanks, I'm afraid I posted the last before seeing your post. I wouldn't change what I said, but you highlight an important point; that of agreeing deviations from mandated Standards, and recording that decision. My obvious question, which MoD has been reluctant to answer in other cases, is: What Production Permits and/or Concessions were signed to support these deviations? The company may offer a reason, but if not supported by a Permit or Concession, their opinion or claim is meaningless (regardless of how valid it is).

[Davef68]

The Avro 776 was the Trident-based offering to rival the maritime VC-10:
http://i29.photobucket.com/albums/c275/hangar/Avro%20776.png~original


HS800 was the designation given to the 1964 studies, Avro 776 was the AST 357 designation in 1963

[Davef68]

Re MRA4, I beleive the question asked was, in essence, 'How much will it cost to certify as safe, and how long will it take?' to which the answer was essentially 'We don't know' at which point the pen, red was deployed.

The P8 is not designed to do hard manouvering at low level, the USN envisages letting drones and weapons take that strain .

[tucumseh]

'How much will it cost to certify as safe, and how long will it take?'

Was that MoD asking BAe, BAe asking MoD, or Ministers asking MoD? Could be any or all!

[EAP86]

Tuc,
a very interesting list indeed. I recognise some of these but many not as particularly severe issues. It looks a bit like post decision justification if you see what I mean. In general I believe DS non-compliances would have been dealt with as contractual or project management issues with appropriate documentation. Production Permits or Concessions ​are used to document build deviations not design issues so wouldn't be used.

In its early days the MAA tended to regard the Def Stan as equivalent to a civil Certification Specification but anyone familiar with it knows that it didn't develop in that way and trying to use it as an absolute requirement would lead to madness. As it happens, the baseline standard for the Nimrod design was civil BCARs so deviations are almost guaranteed. Interestingly the MAA wanted the Typhoon design to be validated against the Def Stan despite the fact that it wasn't designed to its requirements. I'm sure it was worth the cost.

EAP

[tucumseh]

EAP86

Fully agree. The extract available is by no means complete and it isn't clear if all the issues apply to all aircraft; but it does say they were only identified after production commenced which is why I mentioned concessions and permits. My main concern is why so late in the day?

The dilemma faced by MoD procurers is that Controller Aircraft mandated 00-970 and the 05-series in all aircraft related contracts, but the Aircraft Project Director has the authority to deviate. He may apply engineering judgement. I can't recall those who held that position on Nimrod, but in the 90s MoD (a) appointed APDs who were not engineers, and (b) allowed non-technical staff below them to self-delegate, which led to a lot of conflict. We shared our 2 Star, the man with management oversight, whose job it was to assess the top 10 risks every month. This is why the Public Accounts Committee demanded his name at a hearing in about 2000. MoD denied knowledge of who he was; presumably both were unable to read the MoD telephone directory. Everyone in AbbeyWood knew, because he had just issued an edict that basic safety could be traded out in favour of time and cost, while making a declaration in the Release papers that the safety criteria had been met. Many jumped on that bandwagon.

[Chugalug2]

I hesitate to enter an arena filled with those who have personal knowledge of the MOD system and how it works (or perhaps more importantly, how it is supposed to work), but fools rush in...

It has been postulated here that had MRA4 release been carried out under the "laissez faire" pre MAA system it would have gone ahead and the aircraft entered into RAF service, with tuc's list+ to be worked through thereafter no doubt. The UK would have retained a Maritime Air Capability instead of losing it, with an aircraft of great potential enhancing a retained and famed capability.

Far more likely an outcome though would be yet another tragic airworthiness related fatal accident thread posted on this forum. A random shuffle of the Swiss cheese slices would align the pathway of predicted and predictable consequences and yet another disaster would be traced back (though not by existing official means) to the reckless actions of certain RAF VSOs 30 years ago and of the cover up ever since.

To be fair to the MAA, though they will not/cannot admit to that systemic damage to UK Military Air Safety, they do have a weapon of last resort, which is to ground fleets that the RAF feel able to do without. Hence the Air Cadet gliders extended "pause", and that of MRA capability. What of other fleets? What of the replacement fleets to those grounded? Grounding is not a viable policy, only a completely independent Regulator is. Unless and until the UK has an independent Air Regulator and Air Accident Investigator, both of the MOD and of each other, a cloud will hang over every UK fleet. The airworthiness related fatal air accident threads will continue to be posted here and UK Military Air Capability compromised.

The cover up must end!

Self Regulation Does Not Work and in Aviation It Kills!

[EAP86]

Chug, re your 2nd para.

If I came across that way it wasn't intentional. The pre-MAA approach didn't involve a MAA, the contractor was expected to certificate the platform to the satisfaction of the project office and sensible discussions​ about Def Stan compliance could be undertaken. It's probably worth saying that the Def Stan is an imperfect beast. Some parts are first class (eg escape systems), some parts are a bit behind the state of the art (inevitable with newer technologies) and other important aspects of design aren't covered at all. Into this scenario steps the MAA, it is sensitive to the circumstances which caused it to come into existence and some members of its leadership were away from their comfort zone. What could possibly go wrong?

As it happens, I believe that the contentious issues could have been discussed in an adult way if the will existed but the imposition of punitive cost savings on MOD by the new government meant that the technical aspects could be used to mask the Cameron\Osborne involvement.

EAP

[Chugalug2]

The MAA came into existence as a result of lessons learned thanks to Haddon Cave. Any lessons learned would have been of very dubious value as his report falsely described the period in which the Air Safety system was subverted by RAF VSOs as a "Golden Period" and instead named SOs (ie 1* and below) as responsible at a later date for Nimrod airworthiness shortcomings.

As for Safety Systems, Sean Cunningham's had no published Safety Case and it killed him. It had no Safety Case because those engineers within the MOD whose job it was to ensure that it had one were got rid of, and their knowledge went with them. To admit that would reveal the subversion that led up to it and the illegal actions of those VSOs. That is presumably unacceptable, so the cover up continues and the MAA remains compromised together with RAF airworthiness.

[Heathrow Harry]

Free 10 page downlaod on the p-8 here

http://www.janes.com/images/assets/471/70471/Global_coverage_P-8A_provides_patrol_capacity_around_the_world.pdf?utm_campaig n=CL_Jane%27s%20360-26-May-2017_PC5308_e-production_E-1063_KP_0526_0800&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua

[msbbarratt]

The A320/340 options were looked at, but they were deemed to be unsufficiently rugged and unlikley to stand up to the low-level rough-and-tumble that sub-hunting entails.

PDR

I know that, but the price of second hand A320s / A340s nowadays probably means that they can be bought, have all the kit wheeled on board, holes drilled where required, painted grey, flown until they fall to bits and thrown away, and replaced with another. I'd guess that'd still be a cheaper way to get a capability than what MR4a cost, even if it is 'wasteful'... An old airliner is probably, what, a couple of £mill at most?

[PDR1]

I know that, but the price of second hand A320s / A340s nowadays probably means that they can be bought, have all the kit wheeled on board, holes drilled where required, painted grey, flown until they fall to bits and thrown away, and replaced with another.

Bit of a shame for the boys and girls on the aeroplane when it falls apart and drowns them in the deep ocean, but then what's a few dead aircrew against a good piece of armchair engineering...

PDR

[ShotOne]

But a number of comets and electras DID suffer in-flight structural failures in airline service depositing their occupants in the ocean/prairie,PDR. The same can't be said of 737 or 320 with the exception of one very high-cycle 737 (Aloha). On what basis was the 320 judged less robust than 737? I'd have thought there wasn't much to choose

[PDR1]

Early Comets suffered structural failures at cruise altitude due to the (then) poorly understood behaviour of metals under cyclic loadings. The 737 and the Comet 4 (on which the Nimrod structure was based) were designed later when there was a better understanding.

But all of that is irrelevant, because the fatigue failures were associated with the pressurisation stresses of high-altitude cruise. The ruggedness assessment you refer to concerned manoeuvring stresses at a few hundred feet over a storm ocean. IIRC no Nimrod ever suffered a structural failure during these manoeuvres. This was (at the time of the RMPA ITT) cited as a cardinal mission requirement, and none of the modern airliners were deemed rugged enough to meet this requirement.

In the subsequent P8 procurement the RAF were simply told that there was no available aeroplane that could do this role, so they would need to accept that this mission was no longer possible; they would have to use the sensors from medium altitudes instead. That's why the P8 is now an acceptable platform where it wouldn't have been before. AIUI there is still a "spirited debate" over whether two engines are sufficiently safe even without the low-level mission. No doubt that will be addressed in its MAR recommendations.

PDR

[Pontius Navigator]

msbbarrat, I attended a wedding back in 1974 and was at a table with a wg cdr who was cock-a-hoop having just bought East African's VC10s for peanuts. I think it was 6 figures. I think it cost many millions to actually certify them as safe to fly.

[ShotOne]

ALL the contenders, PDR are modified civil airliners, and none of the original designers would have been principally concerned with low level performance. While it's true no nimrod suffered structural failure (other than resulting from a catastrophic fire!) given the tiny number in service versus the thousands of 737's and 320's that's not a big claim statistically and hardly justifies your emotive point about dead aircrew

[PDR1]

Somewhere way upthread it was explained why a civil airliner designed in the 40s/50s had much greater structural margins than one from more modern eras. And of course the Nimrod wasn't just a comet with a bomb bay - there were significant structural differences - especially in the wing root and C/S area (aside from anything else it needed to be different to fit the Nimrod's Speys rather than the Comet's Avons (the spey having 25% greater diameter and 35% more length).

PDR

[flighthappens]

Somewhere way upthread it was explained why a civil airliner designed in the 40s/50s had much greater structural margins than one from more modern eras. And of course the Nimrod wasn't just a comet with a bomb bay - there were significant structural differences - especially in the wing root and C/S area (aside from anything else it needed to be different to fit the Nimrod's Speys rather than the Comet's Avons (the spey having 25% greater diameter and 35% more length).

PDR

Just as a P8 isn't just a 737 with a bomb bay. Besides - with modern fatigue monitoring and prediction the ability for airworthiness regulators / Air Force to measure the fatigue cycles is far in advance of the 1950's "over engineering"

[camelspyyder]

Shot One

do you work for Boeing?

Only one structural failure in a B737?

What about the rudder defect that took down at least 2 and probably 4 aircraft, along with others that survived the same issue?

[Davef68]

ALL the contenders, PDR are modified civil airliners, and none of the original designers would have been principally concerned with low level performance.

Japanese P1 isn't

[ShotOne]

If we'd been discussing all causes rather than structural failures, yes I'd have mentioned those two (out of @9,500 737's flying!) But then in fairness we'd also have had to mention that two out of 49 Nimrods were destroyed by inflight fires plus a third very near miss (XV235, 2007)

No, I don't work for Boeing, indeed I posed the question of why the process that selected P8 dismissed the 320 as insufficiently rugged

[The Old Fat One]

three out of 49 Nimrods were destroyed by inflight fires

Fixed your post.

note Bomb Bay fire St Mawgan, hull loss, but crew safe...

...and there were also several more near misses the don't generally get a mention. Like the MR1 in the US that had a sustaining fire in the radio crates, but was in the circuit, so it got put out on the ground.

[DaveyBoy]

TOFO: Not sure XV257 really counts as a hull loss due to fire... she flew after her St Mawgan escapade! At least not without a bit of a stretch, reasoning that if the fire hadn't happened, she wouldn't have been selected for conversion to AEW3 (conveniently being fully repaired in the process) and hence wouldn't have been in the hangar at Woodford when the roof collapsed on her... which did finally cause hull loss!

[camelspyyder]

257 was Cat4 at St Mawgan. Once repaired on site, it was ferried to Woodford, subsequently declared Cat5 and sat outside for years until scrapped in the 90's AFAIK. It was not one of the 11 Aew3's - that project ended in 86 round about the time257 would have made its one and only flight post-fire.

249 was another that apparently had underfloor burning (without being destroyed) after being back converted to R1 (to replace 666).

[betty swallox]

Hey Davef68.

Just wondering why you think the P-8A isn't designed to do "hard manoeuvring at low level"?

[glad rag]

This is pretty much spot except as mentioned above this was completely common knowledge in the 70 late alone later. Many of the airframe issues came up during the ill rated AEW debacle (funny how often that fails to get a mention) and you can even roll back the lack of space issues to the 1960's comet v 707.

Military folk with decades of maritime experience, on the ground and in the air, were venting their frustrations about all of this in 1990's and as I've mentioned before, I, like many others, was ordered to "get with the programme" by the then staish.

I was at BAE on a course in May 1998 when a crew chief uncovered a previously unknown issue with the bomb doors. It was a headslap doh moment. Pretty funny really, except for the 3 billion plus tax payers money down the swanney and 10 years (maybe more?) with no kipper fleet.

Still well-played BAE Marketing Team...that was some stunt you pulled off there.

edit cross posting Haraka...answer yes, and they were all know and out in the open from the get-go.

Indeed, replace MR4A with F35b and we are where we are..

[Davef68]

Hey Davef68.

Just wondering why you think the P-8A isn't designed to do "hard manoeuvring at low level"?

bad syntax, I said designed when I meant 'intended'

[Kerosene Kraut]

It is both designed and intended to do so.
It has a new wing and can drop stuff from below the wings and it's bomb bay. It has a thicker skin to do more higher g maneuvering at lower altitudes. Like when hunting submarines.

737-MMA / P8A Poseidon (http://www.b737.org.uk/mma.htm)