EC 225 Return to REAL Service

[gnow]

It has been almost two months that EASA lifted the ban to ground the Ec225. Initially it was a joy...in my company we activated the recurrency program to get all the pilots ready. We were expected to be operational within a week. Somehow the customers did not see it that way...still waiting for the AIBN report and most important the ROOT cause of the accident. As a result of this we are still not operational and I believe no major oil companies had started to operate the 225 again even though they could legally fly the machine.
Anyone out there heard anything on when most oil companies will accept the machine again?

[Aesir]

This article says that Statoil will never use it again.

Statoil vil ikke bruke Super Puma-helikopteret igjen - Petro.no (http://petro.no/statoil-vil-ikke-bruke-super-puma-helikopteret-igjen/44311)

[bladegrabber]

At the risk of sounding daft. Might one enquire what exactly the 225 operators have done to make them safe to fly ? Did they change the dodgy overstressed gearbox which has a habit of departing from the airframe ?
Or is it really a case of let's all stick our heads in the sand and wait for the next tragedy to happen ?
knowing all of the above would you put your children or grandchildren in one and take them for a trip over some really inhospitable cold water for a few hours ?

Too many questions perhaps but having read most of the very interesting and educated guesswork regarding the 225 and it's safety record on this esteemed forum I don't have a clue as to why the north sea moggies ( all the tigers are either dead or retired now) would want to suit up and get in the back of another 225 .

Anyone who has the answers please let us know and expect someone to ask the "show me " question !!!

Cheers
B.G

[HeliHenri]

knowing all of the above would you put your children or grandchildren in one and take them for a trip over some really inhospitable cold water for a few hours ?



Well, life is not always black or white.

For example, the 225M fly every day over inhospitable area without any problems.

And people don't react all the same about safety feeling's, I've even heard that there are some who pay to fly R22 !
.

[Tango123]

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-statoil-helicopter-airbus-idUSKBN13V0QB

[FC80]

As far as I can see BG they've ruled that one type of bearing must be used in the epicyclic module (as out of the two types available the other one had been involved in the two catastrophic failures) in addition to more stringent in-service inspections.

[Mustapha Cuppa]

So no EC175 then?

[Ex Machina]

The 175 is already operating in the UK North Sea with NHV and I wouldn't be surprised to see 189s arriving soon.

[HeliComparator]

IMO the 225 is a great helicopter apart from its single fatal accident. However I appreciate it was a nasty one with echoes of the past. I just wanted to mention that it's just as well this attitude isn't applied to the pilots. Look how many of them have crashed, killing plenty of folk and scaring many more. But for some reason we accept that, or at least we don't condemn the human race as the brains in the machine. So in answer to BG's question above about whether you would allow your nearest and dearest to fly in it, I think I would based on pure probabilities. The chances are fairly similar that they would die from the rotor head falling off, or die from an error made by a pilot or technician. In bother cases, the probability is pretty low.


But of course the industry isn't rational and so I accept that the 225 is unlikely to see a return to service in the near future if at all. Shame. At least one thing is certain, the next fatal crash will be a different type!

[jimf671]

Commons Select Committees - Transport - 2014

Offshore helicopter safety

"27. Super Puma variants make up some 60% of the offshore helicopter fleet, which means that it is unsurprising that they are involved in more accidents than other models."

That was still true when LN-OJF crashed.



Hands up who thinks the S-92 is so good that it will never crash no matter how much you sweat the asset?

Hands up who thinks a new type is always the answer?

[Concentric]

Jimf671,

From the same parliamentary report:

“21. Since 2002, the UK offshore oil and gas industry has suffered 38 fatalities. The five most recent accidents (since 2009) have all involved Super Puma variants and three of those accidents were caused by problems with the gearbox”.

Those figures are from 2014 and therefore exclude the 2016 LN-OJF fatal crash, bringing the total fatalities to 51. So we now have the six most recent accidents all involving Super Puma variants and four of those accidents were caused by problems with the gearbox, the other two being concluded as crew error.

For a type that makes up 60% of the fleet it seems to be suffering a disproportionate 100% of the accidents, certainly the fatal ones. That is not irrational. It is a statement of fact.

The argument that the SP range is ‘tried and tested’, that we ‘know more about it’ than other makes/models falls flat because it has not translated into lower accident statistics. 60% presence is just 3 out of 5, not 5/5 (or 6/6).

[SASless]

Face it folks....the 225 is like that proverbial Parrot that Mr. Cleese and Company were on about. It is not napping, taking a Kip, ....it is as they said about the Parrot....it is DEAD!

Rather than admit they had a problem....the Maker refused to stare reality square in the Face on the problem and did themselves in by doing so.

Even if they do manage to cobble together a "perfect" Transmission....no one is going to ride in the thing.....as they have an Albatross around their neck and not a Parrot on a Perch.

One Man's Opinion here.

[Lonewolf_50]

Statoil made an announcement that the 225 is through with them, Reuters released it earlier today. Tango123's link (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-statoil-helicopter-airbus-idUSKBN13V0QB) makes it look to me like there is no going back on that particular relationship. Interesting quotes form that article: Airbus Group has expressed frustration at the local bans. Really? The ban is a reflection of the frustration with your support of the aircraft. In October Airbus Group's finance director Harald Wilhelm suggested Britain's decision to keep the aircraft grounded was related to the country's decision to leave the European Union. Yeah, blame it on Brexit. Clever gambit. Pawn to Queen 4. Britain's Civil Aviation Authority responded, saying that the decision was purely related to safety. Check and mate.

[Sky Sports]

Face it folks....the 225 is like that proverbial Parrot that Mr. Cleese and Company were on about. It is not napping, taking a Kip, ....it is as they said about the Parrot....it is DEAD!

Airbus Helicopters reputation is in tatters in my opinion. It's not just customers and passengers who have lost confidence.

Why are the military still placing orders?

[Lonewolf_50]

The military may have a different risk assessment matrix than the off shore oil business. From some of the PPRuNe 225 threads it seems that they have a shorter removal/overhaul cycle than the for profit personnel transport business.


That's a guess, though, not something written on a stone tablet.

[Bravo73]

IMO the 225 is a great helicopter apart from its single fatal accident.

You seem to be very quick to forget two other recent EC225 accidents where the MGB main shaft sheared in two. Thankfully they didn't end up with fatalities.

[Nigerian Expat Outlaw]

Sasless,

Make that two men's opinions.

NEO

[jimf671]

Jimf671,

From the same parliamentary report:

“21. Since 2002, the UK offshore oil and gas industry has suffered 38 fatalities. The five most recent accidents (since 2009) have all involved Super Puma variants and three of those accidents were caused by problems with the gearbox”. ... ...


Same principle for the MRGB. It is fundamental and critical to every helicopter so why would it not have a prime position in the accident record.

Most major medium/large types with substantial service have had a hundred or two accidents and several hundred fatalities. The S-92 and EC225 are well on the way to setting a completely new standard in safety. If we all ignore the numbers and go in a spin like an offended millennial at every significant event then the industry will be permanently in chaos

[bladegrabber]

Some good debate and clearly 2 sides of which i am with SASless and Neo so make that 3 mens opinion.

HeliC couldn't agree more all humans behave irrationally and the offshore bear is no different. The manf telling us that one type of bearing is safe after all their previous statements and misinformation doesn't cut it any longer and sadly they will not be trusted by the people who make the decisions as to which helicopters are used offshore.

Jimf671
The offshore logistics industry isn't in chaos and we seem to be coping quite well without the 225

GNOW to answer your question in simple terms ...wheel them out, polish the windshields and feel free to do your check rides etc but your going to be very lonely sitting up front perhaps doing the odd freight run when someone offers a cheap deal to get you airborne.

BG

[jimf671]

... ... ...
Jimf671
The offshore logistics industry isn't in chaos and we seem to be coping quite well without the 225.
... ... ...


Of course. But then, this is just the closing paragraph of Chapter One.

[Twist & Shout]

Apart from the tragic loss of life, the worst aspect of this whole saga is the manufacturers cynical and dishonest handling of the issue.

Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice shame on me.
I hope I'm never asked to fly an EC225 again. My preference would be never to fly a French helicopter again. I love flying them, but proven liars are just that. These lies can be fatal. :yuk:

[RVDT]

Read it for yourself - Statoil Report (http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2016/Downloads/investigation_helicopter_safety_statoil_english.pdf)

Interesting if you "read between the lines" of some of the inferences.

Particularly the sections on contracts and performance and why they have been brought to light.

Statoil must regularly conduct a holistic assessment in association with helicopter operators in order to improve understanding of the relationship between technical and commercial factors that, either individually or combined, can affect safety. Starting with the holistic assessment, a clearer flight safety strategy and accompanying action plan must be developed. Important factors that should be incorporated into the holistic assessment as a minimum include:
• The compensation format (penalty)
• Spare capacity
• The spare parts and parts cannibalisation situation (robbery)
• Turnaround time
• Several proactive risk indicators that can highlight undesirable developments
amongst helicopter operators in a timely manner
• Minimum requirements for competence and key positions in the contracts Statoil
has with helicopter operators

[HeliComparator]

You seem to be very quick to forget two other recent EC225 accidents where the MGB main shaft sheared in two. Thankfully they didn't end up with fatalities.
You want to dramatise it by saying "main shaft failure" but I would call it "oil pump drive failure" which is what it actually was. But I appreciate that sounds far less theatrical and thus doesn't suit your agenda. I seem to recall the precious S92 had its share of oil pump drive and design failures but you've conveniently forgotten to mention them.

And is a controlled landing on the water an "accident"? I guess it depends on your jurisdiction.

[terminus mos]

And is a controlled landing on the water an "accident"? I guess it depends on your jurisdiction.

Under ICAO they would both be classified as accidents as bot aircraft were damaged beyond economical repair, or written off in old language.

Twist and Shout emphasises my original point, the oil and gas industry no longer trusts AH. As has been said before, the market has re balanced. There is even a surplus of S-92s now.

[Concentric]

HC,

From an engineering perspective it ought to be appreciated that the main shaft in the 225 gearbox is multi-functional. It is supported in 3 bearings, 2 near the top very close together (possibly even contacting) and one near the bottom but above the oil pump drive. That bottom (radial) bearing appears much bigger than needed to react oil pump loads only. It locates the main shaft radially and reacts a moment due to the eccentric contact between the input drive and the axis of the main shaft. Indeed the proof of that lies in the cyclic bending stress that propagated the fatigue cracks, severing the shaft above the lower bearing. If the fatigue loading had come from the oil pump drives the shaft failure would be expected below the bearing.

With the shaft broken not only is drive lost to the oil pumps but the 2 upper bearings and their supports are subjected to loads which I very much doubt they would have been designed for. Evidently, and fortuitously, they survived long enough for the ‘precautionary’ landings on water but can anyone say how long they would have lasted without lubrication and cooled only with a 30 minute spray of glycol?

[Bravo73]

You want to dramatise it by saying "main shaft failure" but I would call it "oil pump drive failure" which is what it actually was. But I appreciate that sounds far less theatrical and thus doesn't suit your agenda. I seem to recall the precious S92 had its share of oil pump drive and design failures but you've conveniently forgotten to mention them.

And is a controlled landing on the water an "accident"? I guess it depends on your jurisdiction.

Wow. You really have been endoctrinated and blinded by the Eurocopter lies. The main shaft in the main gearbox sheared in two. How is this trying to dramatise things? Arguably (and highly fortuitously), the occupants were saved due to the erroneous indication that the EMLUB system had failed.

And I think you've got me pegged with the wrong 'agenda'. I know full well that the S92 has got it share of issues (and I'm personally very glad that I don't have to fly it). However, I was responding to your post that seemed to imply that the EC225 has only been involved in one serious accident.

And, yes, regardless of a particular jurisdiction's definition, when an aircraft has to ditch in the sea due to a broken gearbox, it is definitely an accident.

[HeliComparator]

HC,

From an engineering perspective it ought to be appreciated that the main shaft in the 225 gearbox is multi-functional. It is supported in 3 bearings, 2 near the top very close together (possibly even contacting) and one near the bottom but above the oil pump drive. That bottom (radial) bearing appears much bigger than needed to react oil pump loads only. It locates the main shaft radially and reacts a moment due to the eccentric contact between the input drive and the axis of the main shaft. Indeed the proof of that lies in the cyclic bending stress that propagated the fatigue cracks, severing the shaft above the lower bearing. If the fatigue loading had come from the oil pump drives the shaft failure would be expected below the bearing.

With the shaft broken not only is drive lost to the oil pumps but the 2 upper bearings and their supports are subjected to loads which I very much doubt they would have been designed for. Evidently, and fortuitously, they survived long enough for the ‘precautionary’ landings on water but can anyone say how long they would have lasted without lubrication and cooled only with a 30 minute spray of glycol?
Yes I know all that, but the fact remains that the sheared shaft only caused loss of oil pump drive and the remaining bearing showed no signs of distress. My point is that you could present this in one of two ways, either as a loss of oil pump drive which, with functioning emlube, allows 30 mins at Vy (which of course probably doesn't get you very far, 40nm still air minus the time taken to land). Or you could present it as "main shaft sheared, rotors nearly fell off shock horror" except of course that the rotors didn't nearly fall off.

It's all down to how emotive you want to be.

[soggyboxers]

2 of my 3 all-time favourite helicopters are French, but no matter how many times they change the name, Sud Aviation/Aérospatiale/Eurocopter/AH have always had an arrogant 'we know better than you' attitude and the most appalling so-called customer service and dreadful spares support.
As far as the 225 goes, I'm with SAS, NEO et al

[Heathrow Harry]

Statoil will not use type of helicopter involved in crash again - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-38221509)

Statoil will not use type of helicopter involved in crash again

An oil firm has said it has no plans to ever again use the make of helicopter involved in a crash which left 13 people - including an Aberdeenshire man - dead.
Iain Stuart, 41, from Laurencekirk, was among those killed in the crash off Norway in April (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36169929).

The Airbus Super Puma H225 was flying to Bergen from the Statoil-operated Gullfaks field.

Statoil said it would not use the helicopter again.

The model in question has been grounded in the UK and Norway, but Statoil said it would not change its position when the suspension was lifted.
Air accident investigators found a fatigue crack was the "most likely" cause of gearbox failure.

[212man]

Statoil will not use type of helicopter involved in crash again - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-38221509)

Statoil will not use type of helicopter involved in crash again

An oil firm has said it has no plans to ever again use the make of helicopter involved in a crash which left 13 people - including an Aberdeenshire man - dead.
Iain Stuart, 41, from Laurencekirk, was among those killed in the crash off Norway in April (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36169929).

The Airbus Super Puma H225 was flying to Bergen from the Statoil-operated Gullfaks field.

Statoil said it would not use the helicopter again.

The model in question has been grounded in the UK and Norway, but Statoil said it would not change its position when the suspension was lifted.
Air accident investigators found a fatigue crack was the "most likely" cause of gearbox failure.
I think that was covered in Posts 2 and 6....

[diginagain]

I guess we won't be hearing offshore workers being told to pull on their big boy pants any time soon?

[jimf671]

Never took mine off.

[SASless]

Correct me if I am wrong.....the Main MGB Shaft failed......right?

What was designed to be a single item became "two"....where I come from that is called a MGB Shaft failure!

No matter who designed it or what part number is on it.



You want to dramatise it by saying "main shaft failure" but I would call it "oil pump drive failure" which is what it actually was. But I appreciate that sounds far less theatrical and thus doesn't suit your agenda. I seem to recall the precious S92 had its share of oil pump drive and design failures but you've conveniently forgotten to mention them.

And is a controlled landing on the water an "accident"? I guess it depends on your jurisdiction.

[Concentric]

Yes I know all that...

Yes, I expected you would...But what shocked me was the AAIB report into REDW and CHCN revealing that the manufacturer’s designers apparently did not seem to know it at the time of certification (Ref. AAIB 2/2014, 2.6.4).

Between main shaft design and planet gear/bearing design, the manufacturer does not seem to have had a very good grasp of FEM.

[Mee3]

Yes I know all that, but the fact remains that the sheared shaft only caused loss of oil pump drive and the remaining bearing showed no signs of distress. My point is that you could present this in one of two ways, either as a loss of oil pump drive which, with functioning emlube, allows 30 mins at Vy (which of course probably doesn't get you very far, 40nm still air minus the time taken to land). Or you could present it as "main shaft sheared, rotors nearly fell off shock horror" except of course that the rotors didn't nearly fall off.

It's all down to how emotive you want to be.
Sasless being sasless. You are taking it too serious.

[Fareastdriver]

The old AS 330 had the transmission oil pump on the LH accessory drive on the rear of the gearbox although the pickup was still at the bottom. Civilian use required a back up system on the 332 so they designed this Heath Robinson system placing both oil pumps dependent on one drive at the bottom of the gearbox.

In retrospect it would have been far better to have put the secondary oil pump on the RH accessory drive together with No 2 Alternator and No2 Hydraulic pump.

Doesn't help when you reduce the planet gears from five to four.

[SASless]

Mee3......putting Lipstick on a Pig doesn't change anything as it is still a Pig.

There are certain mechanical failures that must be seen exactly for what they are.

There have been plenty of explanations why a failed Main Shaft in the Main Gear Box is a far more complex and dangerous issue than merely losing drive to the Oil Pumps.

As we have learned from the loss of Rotor Systems because of such failures should make that abundantly clear even to the most obtuse amongst us.

This is not another argument about the various merits of the 92 compared to the 225 as a few wish to make it.....this is all about a failed design of exactly one kind of MGB that kills people.

I suppose there are some that attend here that think by clicking some Slipper Heels together and making a wish that all will be well.....but that is not reality.

The reality is the 225 is DOA....dead on arrival in the Oil and Gas Industry.

You can make like a River Dance on Steroids but all the Heel Clicking in the World is not going to change that.

[jimf671]

I do not think that "a failed design of exactly one kind of MGB that kills people" is supported by the numbers.

It would be lovely to live in an alternative universe where the perfect safe helicopter was possible but we don't. We edge safety to ever-greater levels as the technology allows. The current generation of rotorcraft in this weight class have done this quite successfully. That success continues.

Damning the 225 in the current circumstances creates a very real risk of replacing it with something worse.

[gasax]

The discussion starts t head in the inevitable Pprune direction...

I am self loading freight in these machines and so have some interest in them holding together.

Normally it would be considered very surprising for a manufacturer to state that their product was perfectly safe to fly - before the latest investigation report is delivered.
For a certification agency to support those statements and strongly suggest the aircraft is safe without modification or the report published is again very unusual - until you realise the national and commercial aspects of this case.

The vulnerability of the main shaft to failure started the concerns. Whilst virtually all the attention was there, the planet gears were apparently spalling and AH's understanding of the gearbox behaviour considerably lagged operational experience.

As to the comment that the replacement could or would be worst? Pretty unlikely you would have to step back to 1960s designs to see this level of componentry failure - which is not impossible but would mean any manufacturer would be toast - which may be where AH ends up.

The real disappointment is the certification system. Both the 225 and 92 have a significant level of 'grandfathering' in their approvals - with more of that happening in the 225's case. It has significantly undermined confidence in the certification process - the first 92 failures occurred at shockingly low fleet hours. Whilst the filter issues are now supposedly sorted I've not heard a fix to the gearbox foot cracking - is it all resolved now?

Pushing up power and weight and making incremental changes to compensate is the classic method to create engineering failures. The best example probably being bridges - where every concept has be enlarged and enlarged until the point at which it failed.

But back to the plot, I wish the best of luck to any management team trying to persuade their offshore teams that rotors flying off the machine is sorted - without a shiny new and much better gearbox.

[Variable Load]

and 92 have a significant level of 'grandfathering' in their approvals

gasax - Suggest you have a close look at the TCDS for the S92. Not sure I can agree with "significant level", not even close!

[FC80]

Gasax - the gearbox foot cracking was fixed years ago, the new feet are about three times the size of the old ones.

[lowfat]

Bergensavisen - Dette fikk bilistene til å sperre opp øynene (http://www.ba.no/nyheter/transportnaringen/flytrafikk/dette-fikk-bilistene-til-a-sperre-opp-oynene/s/5-8-478133?ns_campaign=editorial.article&amp%3Bns_mchannel=editorial.facebook&amp%3Bns_source=editorial.facebook&amp%3Bns_linkname=editorial.share.article&amp%3Bns_fee=0)

Nice pic of a 225 on lorry out of norway

[nowherespecial]

Gasax are you referring to the grandfathering of the Black Hawk family technology into the S92?

[jimf671]

This 'grandfathering' is how everything works these days. Literally.

Thirty or forty years ago when the Japanese were making reliable cars that were putting European and American stuff in the shade, people wanted to know how. The fact that it was copied from something was perceived as a negative but that was the secret. 80% proven technology and 20% new. :ooh:

It doesn't matter whether it's aircraft, cars or mobile phones, the facelift model is actually half of the new model under market test without the new fancy bodywork and the new model is the facelift model with the barely consequential glitz added. :cool:

This is so ingrained in the engineering profession now that those of us who have real ideas and want to do something new are seen as weirdos. :(

[muermel]

Three owners/ operators are now suing Airbus Helicopters over the current situation of the EC 225.

https://www.verticalmag.com/news/airbus-helicopters-sued-three-companies-h225-situation/


Was actually wondering why it took so long and why it's only those three so far.... :confused:

[henra]

The manf telling us that one type of bearing is safe after all their previous statements and misinformation doesn't cut it any longer and sadly they will not be trusted by the people who make the decisions as to which helicopters are used offshore



Fully agree!
Worse than the pretty unconvincing concept of why this now should not occur again is the handling of previous significant issues.
So you have a manufacturer that delivers a very slim explanation that a different Part# of a bearing of rather similar design will prevent this from re- occurring and this from a manufacturer who has prematurely and pretty aggressively denied the cause that later came out a s the real one and all this after similar behaviour in the past.
It is about time for massive and rigorous cleansing in the two upper management levels of AH (France). Starting at the Top.
This will not help the 225. That one is Dead. But unless they throw out all current top managers the successor Modell to the 225 will face the same fate.

[TylerMonkey]

Three owners/ operators are now suing Airbus Helicopters over the current situation of the EC 225.

https://www.verticalmag.com/news/airbus-helicopters-sued-three-companies-h225-situation/


Was actually wondering why it took so long and why it's only those three so far.... :confused:
From the Vertical mag link above , I find this quote troubling :

" Further, Era claims that, following the AIBN’s last report, it undertook its own investigation to explore the condition of the second stage planet gears inside its EC225s.

“Multiple second stage planet gears in at least one of Era’s 225s exhibit characteristics of degradation and spalling associated with the design defect that has been identified as a causal factor in the catastrophic failures involving Super Puma helicopters,” the company claims in its petition.

“While there are indeed fundamental differences between the two planet gear configurations, the characteristics of degradation are evident on both the parts identified for replacement (i.e., the ‘bad’ parts) and the parts identified for retention (i.e., the ‘serviceable’ parts). Era has determined that even those parts identified by Airbus Helicopters as ‘serviceable’ exhibit the same symptoms of failure that have necessitated the immediate removal and disposal of the parts that Airbus Helicopters has now admitted are defective and unsafe.”

- See more at: https://www.verticalmag.com/news/airbus-helicopters-sued-three-companies-h225-situation/#sthash.esg0Blh2.dpuf

[SASless]

We have to assume the ERA findings are correct (until proven not to be...) as they challenge the assertion that a simple change of similar parts cures the problem.

I am waiting to hear AH's full detailed explanation on the exact cause for the problem....not the evidence of the problem....but the actual cause of the problem.

Perhaps I missed something over the past year or so but I am not sure they have done that in a degree or level...that would allow for a "Peer Review" process by a completely independent third party.

Then....I want them to fully explain why the current methodology for "catching" impending failures is sufficient to provide timely and completely unambiguous warning of an imminent failure. (Like....at the end of a flight and prevent future flights with the pending failure.)

Anyone disagree with that kind of "Soul Bearing" by AH?

[Twist & Shout]

SASless

Have they (AH) ever even admitted they were wrong about it being a maintenance issue?
Like an actual statement that apologizes for trying to throw the maintainers under the bus.

(I can't begin to understand how the maintenance personnel felt at the loss of their colleagues and passengers to begin with, then have AH put out the statements they did. It could have easily resulted in loss of life. Seriously.)

Or do AH just start a new line/lie as the last becomes untenable?
Want to bet the next one is: "we have a third, supplier/process for the part that is failing". "A new one that no one can prove isn't up to the task, yet."?

Then a new gearbox.

Then another name change.

(They may have issued retractions, and I just haven't seen them.)

[Pittsextra]

I am waiting to hear AH's full detailed explanation on the exact cause for the problem....not the evidence of the problem....but the actual cause of the problem.


One issue that will raise its head in any future explanation will be the how and why any conclusions or investigational pathways become different now to before. After all unless there is a specific thread of analysis that wasn't available to the investigators (including AH engineers) previously the logical extrapolation is for interested parties to ask - why wasn't this apparent before?

It also raises further questions at EASA..

[Pablo332]

It’s a shame that the original 225 accident thread has disappeared, it was a useful resource for who said what and when.

Can anyone remember how soon after AH wrongly pointed the finger at CHC on the 27/05/16 that CHC came out with the we are returning all our leased 225s and will not operate another one unless expressly specified by an oil company statement?

[Senior Pilot]

It’s a shame that the original 225 accident thread has disappeared, it was a useful resource for who said what and when.

Which thread? There have been three and they are all still open: indeed, you have posted in all of them, multiple times.

No 225 accident thread has been removed from Rotorheads.

[ukv1145]

They have certainly been beefed up but are still on a 50 hr inspection schedule and will continue to remain on that schedule until the cracking stops!!

Not aware of a single crack event on a phase III gearbox, has there been any that you are aware of? The 50hr check requirement is aligned with the standard check and seems sensible to continue indefinitely. The gearbox is inspected visually at every daily.

[Satcomm]

fc80/ukv1145 - Apologizes, have to retract that statement. Confirmed today from my original source that what they thought was a crack turned out to be NDT'd as superficial. So no, I am no longer aware of any phase III cracks.

[Twist & Shout]

This is the sort of announcement I'm wondering was ever officially retracted or explained:

SIN 3031-S-00

"Considering the additional information gathered during the last 48 hours, Airbus Helicopters’ decision, at this stage, is to not suspend flights of any nature for the EC225LP."

In two days, AH had decided there was nothing wrong with the machine, and the blame lay elsewhere.:=

[Satcomm]

I believe that statement was made because at that point they had confirmed that at bare min that it was not an issue with the bevel gear .... hence not a repeat of anything that had ever happened to the 225 before. Arguably a very bold move not to suspend flights at the time due to the fact that they did not know what happened but really, that's aviation. We do not ground every 206 in the world every time one goes missing in the mountains. Likewise, the fix wing world does not ground the type worldwide if an aircraft crashes ..... at least not until a definitive reason is determined or a pattern has established.


Obviously just my opinion and I have been back and forth with whether I believe airbus handled the situation suitably however, hine sight is 20 20.

[casper64]

I believe that statement was made because at that point they had confirmed that at bare min that it was not an issue with the bevel gear .... hence not a repeat of anything that had ever happened to the 225 before. Arguably a very bold move not to suspend flights at the time due to the fact that they did not know what happened but really, that's aviation. We do not ground every 206 in the world every time one goes missing in the mountains. Likewise, the fix wing world does not ground the type worldwide if an aircraft crashes ..... at least not until a definitive reason is determined or a pattern has established.


Obviously just my opinion and I have been back and forth with whether I believe airbus handled the situation suitably however, hine sight is 20 20.

Totally agree with this comment. I made this comment before... and was just laughed at....

[etudiant]

FAA approves return to flight of the 225.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-faa-approves-return-to-service-of-h225-helicopter-432469/
Am somewhat surprised that they endorsed this in light of the thus far unrebutted assertions made in the 3 plaintiffs lawsuit.

[SASless]

The FAA will argue the Civil Suits are underway and have not been decided thus have no bearing on the matter unless and until all the evidence is heard, argued, and a Decision is made by the Judge or Judge/Jury.....then there will be Appeals...and again the FAA will point to an on-going Legal Process and refuse to act until the matter is settled in Court once and for all.

A separate but related issue....As an Insurance Company providing coverage for an Operator of 225's....how do you countenance the banning of flight by the two Authorities and the approval for flight by other Authorities?

As an Operator.....if you return an aircraft to service...comply with every single additional requirement....and another Fatal Event occurs due to the MGB failing in a similar fashion....then what?

This is not a far fetched question.....remember the 787 Electrical Fires....the 737 Rudder Hard Overs....the DC-10's Cargo Doors.....and several other air worthiness issues that have had similar impacts on the Aviation Industry?

We have to recall....the cause of the latest crash has not been determined with certainty by the Norwegian Accident Investigation.

[etudiant]

Exactly. The risks seem inordinately high.
I have a hard time seeing a US operator blithely relaunching the type into service under these circumstances. After another accident, it would be hard to explain to a jury.
Still, the FAAs 'nihil obstat' may open the door in other jurisdictions that rely on the FAA to set their standards. Don't know however whether any of those care at present.

[terminus mos]

I think there are only 5 225s on the N register?

[etudiant]

Five is also what the Flightglobal article indicated.
I think the SASless note above is entirely on the money. The 225 is incidental at best in terms of jurisdictional interest for the FAA, so they have no reason to try to second guess the EU authorities, but can let the courts resolve the issue.

[S92PAX]

They can return them to service but I know most of the UK offshore workforce are committed to not flying in them again. Pressure is being applied to the UK operators to follow Statoils lead. Confidence has been lost completely and the rush by AH to get them flying again before the accident investigation is completed is doing even more damage to the reputation.

[Richard Fiedorowicz]

The gear that has been identified as the one that probably failed looks small. Working back from the rotor RPM and the related gear ratios can any tell me how many rotations these gears do in a life time?

[Pablo332]

Just to keep the thread alive and generate further posts I’d say impossible to tell, depends on usage.

[Concentric]

From information previously posted on the crash thread, the Service Life Limit used to be 5000FH and the TBO 2000FH but the TBO is said to have been reduced to 1500FH. With a rotor speed taken as 265 rpm and the 2nd stage sun gear rotating at 820 rpm, I reckon the 51 tooth planet gear should ‘rotate’ at approximately 1013 rpm (about its own centre). To achieve the original 5000FH SLL a planet gear would have to rotate approximately 304 million times.

To answer the question asked though, in a ‘lifetime’ the planet gear may rotate anything between 607,800 and 304,000,000 times. That 'lifetime' would be based upon the directive to manually inspect all EC225 MGB magnetic chip detectors every 10 flying hours applicable, it would seem, to even brand new gears. It should be noted for fatigue considerations that cyclic bending stresses occur twice per rev of the planet gear.

[Pablo332]

SLL does not take into consideration ground runs or start up and taxi times etc. so these revolutions should be regarded as min figures/flight time only and assuming a constant Nr of 100% that the EC225 does not have.

[Concentric]

I would say that SLL is a simplistic concept in that it measures time only. Fatigue crack propagation is also a function of load level with each cycle. I would hope that SLL is set with very conservative assumptions on the spectrum of load levels. Otherwise you would need to consider not only Nr but simultaneous Torque during all running. Even then, fatigue damage done in early life can be more significant than later. This was the case IIRC with tests on the bevel gear shafts.

[birmingham]

They can return them to service but I know most of the UK offshore workforce are committed to not flying in them again. Pressure is being applied to the UK operators to follow Statoils lead. Confidence has been lost completely and the rush by AH to get them flying again before the accident investigation is completed is doing even more damage to the reputation.
You make a very valid point. From the outset this was one accident too many. Confidence was already very low when it happened. So the problem is not that the H225 is inherently an unsafe aircraft (I can't answer that), it is that a very high percentage of its passengers are absolutely convinced it is. The problem in an already declining NS is that why would an E&P company persist with this aircraft when current market conditions mean they don't have to. To most E&P corporate types another fatal accident involving a Puma gearbox is quite simply unthinkable! You need to get the culture here this isn't just about aviation.

[Fareastdriver]

The Chinook, a helicopter that has had decades of trustworthy service and is still is was effectively wiped off the North Sea and the international O&G patch because of a fatal accident as a result of a gearbox failure.

They solved the problem by stepping back a little. Perhaps Airbus could step back to modifying the 330/332 gearbox arrangement.

[jimf671]

How many 234 Chinooks were there? Six. Not quite the same. And what happened to British Airways Helicopters in the North Sea is probably as relevant as what happened to the Chinook.

What if there had been accidents as a results of transmission failure in the workhorse type of the time?


S-61: NM in 1970, QA in 1973 (4 fatal), HN in 1977 (rotorhead), SZ in 1977 (rotorhead)(12 fatal), QS in 1978 (18 fatal), NL in 1983 and ID in 1988.

[Fareastdriver]

How many 234 Chinooks were there? Six.

There would have been more. Bristow was prepared to 'buy the bullet' as far as the purchase was confirmed. The hold up was as to whether their customer companies would reinforce their decks. Mine, and other, names were down for the first conversions. The crownwheel gear disassembly put paid to that and so the Tiger (AS332L) was born.

[Pablo332]

The Chinook, a helicopter that has had decades of trustworthy service and is still is was effectively wiped off the North Sea and the international O&G patch because of a fatal accident as a result of a gearbox failure.

They solved the problem by stepping back a little. Perhaps Airbus could step back to modifying the 330/332 gearbox arrangement.
They could engineer the snot out of the gearbox.

What people have problems with is there attitude to safety.

This can never happen again………..oh dear it has………..(Bevel shaft)

This is the only possible cause of the accident……..oh dear apparently it isn’t.

Not confidence building.

[riff_raff]

From information previously posted on the crash thread, the Service Life Limit used to be 5000FH and the TBO 2000FH but the TBO is said to have been reduced to 1500FH. With a rotor speed taken as 265 rpm and the 2nd stage sun gear rotating at 820 rpm, I reckon the 51 tooth planet gear should ‘rotate’ at approximately 1013 rpm (about its own centre). To achieve the original 5000FH SLL a planet gear would have to rotate approximately 304 million times.

To answer the question asked though, in a ‘lifetime’ the planet gear may rotate anything between 607,800 and 304,000,000 times. That 'lifetime' would be based upon the directive to manually inspect all EC225 MGB magnetic chip detectors every 10 flying hours applicable, it would seem, to even brand new gears. It should be noted for fatigue considerations that cyclic bending stresses occur twice per rev of the planet gear.

Good point about the planet gear teeth being subject to a full reverse bending load cycle twice per rotation. The EC225 MGB epicyclic output stage has a fixed ring gear, sun gear input, and planet carrier output. The planet carrier is coupled to the main rotor mast, so the number of planet gear tooth bending load cycles per rotor rev would be the no. of ring gear teeth divided by the no. of planet gear teeth multiplied by two. However, I would point out that the gears used in helicopter MRGB's are typically designed for unlimited fatigue life in tooth bending. Since root fracture of a gear tooth due to bending fatigue is a failure mode you never want to occur.

Your later comment about how the magnitude of load cycles and when they occur during the component's lifespan can have different effects on fatigue life is also relevant. Here is a good explanation of the Goodman relation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodman_relation).

[Steve Stubbs]

Fasreastdriver

There were 10 BV234s, not six. As well as the six BAH bought, Helicopter Service bought four.

[Pablo332]

Good point about the planet gear teeth being subject to a full reverse bending load cycle twice per rotation. The EC225 MGB epicyclic output stage has a fixed ring gear, sun gear input, and planet carrier output. The planet carrier is coupled to the main rotor mast, so the number of planet gear tooth bending load cycles per rotor rev would be the no. of ring gear teeth divided by the no. of planet gear teeth multiplied by two. However, I would point out that the gears used in helicopter MRGB's are typically designed for unlimited fatigue life in tooth bending. Since root fracture of a gear tooth due to bending fatigue is a failure mode you never want to occur.

Your later comment about how the magnitude of load cycles and when they occur during the component's lifespan can have different effects on fatigue life is also relevant. Here is a good explanation of the Goodman relation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodman_relation).
I take it this means bent in one direction at the sun followed by bent in the other at the ring once per rev?

[jimf671]

... ... and so the Tiger (AS332L) was born.

A moment worth remembering.

[SASless]

The 234 continues to be the Star in Forestry and heavy lifting for Columbia Helicopters and are being joined by Surplus US Army CH-47's!

Anyone care to argue that Offshore Passenger flying is harder on the aircraft than Logging work?


Fasreastdriver

There were 10 BV234s, not six. As well as the six BAH bought, Helicopter Service bought four.

[noooby]

Not at all. Columbia have lost a 234 in South America in the last year or two. I'm sure there have been other incidents too.

With no jibbering ballast in the back, logging accidents don't hit the headlines in the same way as offshore accidents.

[jimf671]

If we look at the history of S-61 accidents then the ones in the back may not be the biggest issue. Two other things are going on.

The 234 stood out because it carried a lot of passengers and put a larger number of people at risk in a single event.

The Super Puma stands out because it has been the dominant offshore passenger carrying tool in the internet age when the outrageous views of the ignorant carry more weight than informed alternatives.

[Pablo332]

If we look at the history of S-61 accidents then the ones in the back may not be the biggest issue. Two other things are going on.

The 234 stood out because it carried a lot of passengers and put a larger number of people at risk in a single event.

The Super Puma stands out because it has been the dominant offshore passenger carrying tool in the internet age when the outrageous views of the ignorant carry more weight than informed alternatives.
Who are the ignorant and who are informed?

[Concentric]

If we look at the history of S-61 accidents then the ones in the back may not be the biggest issue. Two other things are going on.

The 234 stood out because it carried a lot of passengers and put a larger number of people at risk in a single event.

The Super Puma stands out because it has been the dominant offshore passenger carrying tool in the internet age when the outrageous views of the ignorant carry more weight than informed alternatives.
There were several other reasons the 234 was rejected, helideck capacity; escape exits; vibration; economics to name just four.

The S-61 did have a number of accidents in the pioneering days of the North Sea but the ones you listed previously were of various different root causes and most of those would be readily preventable with today’s inspection technology. Planetary gears are still only accessible during overhaul. I know you have collated a lot of data, so can you pick out 2 components of the S-61 that failed in very similar manners (at least one component causing loss of life twice) and each time the manufacturer claimed to have the problem solved after the first occurrence?

The issue the workforce and clients have is not so much with the Super Puma per se although that is how it may be labelled; it is with Airbus Helicopters. There is a loss of confidence in the manufacturer, due almost as much to their statements as to the failure of their components. The uncertainty in many peoples' minds is “how well has the rest of the thing been engineered?”.

My particular outrageous view is that the upgrading of the Super Puma gearbox to take the increased power of the L2 and EC225 was poorly engineered. In complex stress analyses, particular stress components appear to have been ignored in both the bevel gear shaft and the 2nd stage planet gear/bearings. I base that view upon the findings of the AAIB into failures of those components in REDL, REDW and CHCN. Safety margins were compromised so it would only be a matter of time before manufacturing quality and assembly tolerances lined up the other holes.

[OnePerRev]

Yes Pablo, but more specific, the sun mesh drives one flank and the ring drives on the other side, whereas in a single mesh you only have loading typically on one side of a tooth. On top of that, as a tooth is loaded it causes the root behind it to load in tension. When the next tooth is loaded the same root location is reversed into compression. When this same root is exposed to mesh on the ring gear, the opposite occurs. The first stress is compression, then tension. Some argue that this t-c-c-t is really a unique application of the goodman correction, and could be treated like a single cycle. Further complicating is that the exact root location of peak stress for each mesh may not and probably is not, the same, nor is the t and c magnitude the same, depending on deflection and other factors....
.. but this digresses. The fatigue in this case is starting at the bearing race ID, so more like a rolling wheel fatigue than gear tooth problem I would venture to guess.


AH may not really understand this, since they don't design the transmission we are told. Likewise, the transmission design team may not understand actual flight loads, since they are not the air vehicle experts. I have said before, parts only break when load exceeds strength. Which path to go here? My guess is load is not fully understood, but there may be a strength differential between suppliers.

[riff_raff]

Yes Pablo, but more specific, the sun mesh drives one flank and the ring drives on the other side, whereas in a single mesh you only have loading typically on one side of a tooth. On top of that, as a tooth is loaded it causes the root behind it to load in tension. When the next tooth is loaded the same root location is reversed into compression. When this same root is exposed to mesh on the ring gear, the opposite occurs. The first stress is compression, then tension. Some argue that this t-c-c-t is really a unique application of the goodman correction, and could be treated like a single cycle. Further complicating is that the exact root location of peak stress for each mesh may not and probably is not, the same, nor is the t and c magnitude the same, depending on deflection and other factors....
.. but this digresses. The fatigue in this case is starting at the bearing race ID, so more like a rolling wheel fatigue than gear tooth problem I would venture to guess.

OPR,

That's a good explanation. Basically, a simple epicyclic planet gear is similar to an idler gear. With regards to tooth root tensile fatigue stress due to bending, AGMA recommends a material knock down factor of 0.70 for teeth subject to the type of alternating reverse load cycles experienced by planet or idler gears.

Another thing to consider is that aircraft gears normally have the tooth root fillet surfaces carefully shot peened. This creates a compressive pre-stress in the surface. Since fractures in the surface initiate/propagate from excessive tensile stress, any residual compressive stress in the surface must be relieved before the surface is stressed in tension. Shot peening, when properly applied, can be very effective at improving tooth bending fatigue performance.

[RVDT]

Interesting comments about the adequacy or otherwise of the design and engineering etc.

The cause of the damage to the gear and why it failed seems to be possibly strongly
connected to the fact that the gearbox fell off a truck in Australia.

That seems to be the angle the AIBN in Norway is taking from their last report.

As has been previously stated the other issue would be that damage of any kind
cannot be adequately determined in advance in service due to various failings
under the existing criteria.

Whichever way you look at it it is a huge clusterfu@k that will take a lot to rectify.

It will be interesting to see if the type survives of course in its intended role.

[S92PAX]

I think calling the passengers "jibbering ballast" and " outrageous views of the ignorant" is really going too far. If you don't agree with a point, that's fine but don't start insulting those you disagree with.

I think the real problem with the Puma family is that it was hated before any of these accidents. The level of discomfort in the back is unreal, especially when this has to be endured for 2 to 3 hours. Only those that have endured this can understand the problems of getting up and trying to walk, especially if you are in the facing double seats on the starboard side. This could greatly impact your ability to get out quickly if you had too.
All those that keep saying what a fine helicopter this is - travel for a few hours in one and then lets hear your views. Throw in the fatal flaws and the aircraft is finished.

[SASless]

Not at all. Columbia have lost a 234 in South America in the last year or two. I'm sure there have been other incidents too.

With no jibbering ballast in the back, logging accidents don't hit the headlines in the same way as offshore accidents.

Call me narrow minded and egotistical if you wish....The Two People in the front end of the Bus are every bit as important as whatever/whoever is along for the ride.

Yes, a 234 crashed and killed all of the occupants....as can happen to every type of aircraft. So...one fatal crash out in all the years since the North Sea event and that somehow suggests a problem in the design to you?

Let's compare the 234/CH-47 in Civilian Usage compared to the L2/225 shall we.

The 225 is getting bad Press AFTER two Crashes....unlike the 234 which got its bad Press BEFORE the crash. If you are old enough and still young enough to remember those days....a certain Operator very much did not want the 234 on the North Sea and worked towards that end.

[Fareastdriver]

a certain Operator very much did not want the 234 on the North Sea and worked towards that end

I'm mystified by that statement having been in the front line of the operator that you are possibly referring to. At the time the was a severe fatal in Germany with a military Chinook at an air display and another with the RAF in the Falkland Islands. These were both attributed to a gearbox failure.http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/ee224/fareastdriver/74-22292_one_half_second_before_impact_zpsjgwichfl.jpg

[diginagain]

I think calling the passengers "jibbering ballast" and " outrageous views of the ignorant" is really going too far. If you don't agree with a point, that's fine but don't start insulting those you disagree with.

I think the real problem with the Puma family is that it was hated before any of these accidents. The level of discomfort in the back is unreal, especially when this has to be endured for 2 to 3 hours. Only those that have endured this can understand the problems of getting up and trying to walk, especially if you are in the facing double seats on the starboard side. This could greatly impact your ability to get out quickly if you had too.
All those that keep saying what a fine helicopter this is - travel for a few hours in one and then lets hear your views. Throw in the fatal flaws and the aircraft is finished.

Where's the "like" button when you need it.

[Shackman]

The US Army Chinook above was particularly sad as it was carrying civvie parachute teams (including one from Swansea). It was also an early example how Health and Safety Inspectors can stop a process so as to protect factory workers - they reduced the pressure on air hoses which were used to clean transmission parts before reassembly; The lower pressure failed to remove some small particles which went on to block the lubrication nozzles and 46 people died.

[Fareastdriver]

I think the real problem with the Puma family is that it was hated before any of these accidents

I would challenge that remark. Having had 35 years on Pumas of various guises I have never had a passenger, of which I have met socially, innumerable times, who has put forward that opinion. Inconvenient, yes, with low headroom and claustrophobia with a compact cabin that is consistent with its military pedigree but at the time there was nothing to compare except the S61 and the S58T. The S61 was too slow and the 58T was a joke.

I was too close to dying off so I was not considered for the 225 and in retrospect, being a professional pilot and having read Helicomparator's enthusing about the Flight Management System I am glad I wasn't.

My personal opinion which I have stated before was that the Puma family was stretched too far. A helicopter that entered service at 6,000kgs and expanded to 11,000kgs whilst keeping the aerodynamics at a similar size was a bridge too far, no matter how much more power or blades you added on.

The Chinook is a splendid helicopter. It ticks all the boxes as far as efficiency, speed and ease of handling. As a passenger aircraft it suffers from the problem of getting two rotor systems to stop arguing with each other. Floating floors, you name it, it doesn't work. I was told that on the inaugural trip to the Brent the cabin attendant planned to provide tea and biscuits en route. The tea was served but when they opened the locker to get the biscuits there was just a carpet of writhing crumbs.

Mass transit of Civilian passengers in helicopters didn't happen until they started drilling for oil offshore, up to then it was always military. The present litigation atmosphere did not exist so if a helicopter speared in with a load of grunts on board it was just one of those things. The transition to airline standards of safety have been hampered by the paucity of offshore operators and the accountants in the oil industry so it has lagged behind what could be regarded as satisfactory.

There is no demand for point to point travel with the general public so all the dreams of vertical take off airliners that have been put up in the past have come to nothing. It will continue to be so in the helicopter industry so we are lumbered with what we have now. There will not be any magical transition to a new era in the foreseeable future.

You are just going to have to clatter away hoping that that the designers and producers have got there figures right and whatever is holding you up stays in one piece.

[gasax]

I've already owned up to being one of those "jabbering ballast" in the back.

To Fareastdriver - you have obviously never sat in the back for 3 hours plus. The 332 family are at best an unpleasant passenger experience.

I still recall my first ride in the 'new' 225 - marginally better seats but the same crush, where was the new aircraft?

I also remember riding in the 234. Frankly the only people you could force into the damn thing would be squaddies. Noisy, vibration levels which could shake you out of the seat and a seat pitch which makes the 332 seem spacious. Only oil companies thought them a good idea as they represented potential cost savings.

Obviously this is a pilot's forum, but I never cease to be surprised by helicopter pilots not understanding that they only have jobs to get, offshore at least, passengers safely from one place to another. All the pilot aids and wonderful other stuff counts for nothing. Then remember that if the passengers were actually paying for the flights and choosing the carrier / aircraft a lot of these aircraft would be lying in the back of a hangar.

The S-92 is the best of a poor lot. Still got high vibration levels and noise and the windows are far too small. But is just about does it. 139 just big enough and almost pleasant. 76? great with half load not nice otherwise. 200 series Bells? squaddy material again.

Worth remembering that the jibbering masses are the reason offshore types have jobs. Comparing the early days of offshore exploration with today's timetabled, mass transport very much ignores most of the progress of the last 30 odd years. On a modern platform just getting to and from it represents half the risk an offshore worker faces. They feel they have some control over their half, they have none over the helicopter portion. So then the new, "better, safer" types come in, and set the safety improvements a long way back........

[jimf671]

... "outrageous views of the ignorant" ...
is not going too far when you consider the social media campaigns and the misinformation in the press across the last few years. People who had never been near a helicopter were posting total rubbish on Facebook and then journalists were believing them. Then there was the sizeable group of people who have worked with helicopters for decades without bothering to learn anything about them.


... I think the real problem with the Puma family is that it was hated before any of these accidents. The level of discomfort in the back is unreal, especially when this has to be endured for 2 to 3 hours. Only those that have endured this can understand the problems of getting up and trying to walk, especially if you are in the facing double seats on the starboard side. ...

Is it you that's been trying to steal my seat? Second row, starboard side, where I can see the instruments (and take control of the door release).

I have enjoyed my flying in Super Pumas. I felt a little less safe in some of the older ones with the smaller windows and dodgy liferaft stowage but since that won't be happening again I can happily feel some sense of history having flown in some of the original Tigers.

I am happy with the Super Puma 225. Here is why.
- It is a helicopter. "If it was meant to fly it would have wings." This is never going to be like getting in a A320.
- With hundreds of thousands of flight hours, much of it in a very demanding environment, across more than a decade, the 225 has had only one fatal accident that was not related to warlike operations. One fatal accident is one too many but nevertheless this is the best there is.
- Plenty large escape windows.
- Gearbox run-dry certification that people can believe.
- SS6 float certification.
- Smoooooooth.

I am aware that there are many thousands of people out there both in the offshore community and the SAR community who currently do not understand that there are helicopters that you cannot stand up in. Unfortunately, the Super Puma cabin height of 1.4m is normal for helicopters. A tall helicopter is not a good plan.


(By the way gasax, when I was last in a Chinook a few months ago, the guys thought I was nuts to describe it as quiet. None of them had ever been in a S-92.)

[gasax]

Jim - are you serious?
Quoting a partial accident record utterly undermines your creditability. Quote the full record or nothing at all. It is the easiest thing in the world to select a 'golden period' and then make an argument from it. Now try the 4 accidents and tell someone that the 10 year mean it is a really. really, safe aircraft an these accidents are just a statistical anomaly.

With a bandwagon rolling. all sorts will join in - however do not let that lead you to believe the whole thing is rubbish. Rotors ripping off the top of an aircraft carrying people who cannot choose which one they fly in, is a very powerful argument.

[albatross]

Gear box run- dry we can believe in ...pray tell me more!
ELUBE used twice on the 225 ...failed twice....ditched twice.
100% record.

[jimf671]

Gear box run- dry we can believe in ...pray tell me more!
ELUBE used twice on the 225 ...failed twice....ditched twice.
100% record.


AAIB S2-2014
"38. In both accidents the emergency lubrication system, once activated,
appeared to have successfully cooled and lubricated the main rotor
gearbox."

[jimf671]

Which 4? Just the 4 NS with the 225? The 4 Super Puma 332 & 225 in the NS since the 2012 panic-fest?

When I look at the incidents involving the EC225, frankly, I see nothing unusual compared to other helicopters. There is just less of it.

The numbers tell me that modern types, of which this is one, kill fewer people than older types. There are fewer accidents and it is easier to get out alive.

[etudiant]

Are we losing sight of the purpose of safety systems?
If the ELUBE was so successful, why the ditching?

[jimf671]

In both cases (DW & CN), although EMLUB had been correctly activated and was functioning correctly, a warning of EMLUB failure was indicated shortly after activation and the crews followed procedure and ditched. It subsequently turned out that there was a design fault in the warning system.

[Satcomm]

This will be a never ending debate about safety systems and safety records but stats don't lie!! Currently both the 225 and the 92 each have a single accident causing fatalities. Both types have numerous other incidents/accidents on their records that flaw their safety records. Unfortunately for the 225, it just happens to share its life with the "super puma family." If you could separate it from the family and just look at it, it's quite a safe aircraft statistically.

The 2 bevel gear ditchings of the 225, luckily ended up as good as one could hope for in that situation ... By that, I mean the aircraft made it safely to the water and everyone made it home to their families.

I haven't done any official research on the next comment but since the 225 accident, how many emergency landings has the direct competitor had? How many emergency landings have you guys heard of in total for the other guy? I think there has been a many of right time right place for her so far ... Always seems to be a rig, farmers field, rice paddy, jungle ... Something nearby, to prevent the next big ditching.

[henra]

Jim - are you serious?
Quoting a partial accident record utterly undermines your creditability. Quote the full record or nothing at all. It is the easiest thing in the world to select a 'golden period' and then make an argument from it. Now try the 4 accidents and tell someone that the 10 year mean it is a really.



Hmm, not disagreeing with the rest of your statements but Jim was referring to only one fatal accident in the 225. You are referring to 4.
Which 4 fatal accidents of the 225 do you have in mind. And he didn't say anything about 10 years. Perhaps you should wipe the Foam off your Mouth and take the time and properly read what others are writing before trying to set them straight on things they never said just because you disagree.


And before you think I try to support the 225: Yes: I agree that the 225 in the current situation is in my eyes not acceptable for Offshore operations or any commercial operations for that matter. AH have very obviously not properly understood why things went wrong and how to absolutely make sure it won't occur again. Worse: They don't seem to have a clue how the event unfolding can be detected/predicted reliably.
But let's stay fact based and not rage get us carried away and denigrating other based on half- read posts.

[etudiant]

Think that the 10 years were from this part of the posting: 'across more than a decade, the 225 has had only one fatal accident' .


Meanwhile it is not fair to say the ELUBE system worked fine when in the event the instrumentation indicated that it was not. That actually compounds the failure, at least imho.

[jimf671]

That was simply a reference to there being one fatal accident in its entire service.

[Twist & Shout]

Some people seem to be interchanging "Super Puma", AS332L, L1, L2, and EC225.

My understanding is that the AS332L2 (one member of the "Super Puma" family), and the EC225* have a different gearbox to the "L" and "L1" Super Pumas.
This new gearbox has failed several times with fatal results. These failures have not been adequately explained, let alone fixed.

Does that sum up the factual situation?

Lots of statistics quoted on this thread, try to cover the whole family, from AS330 - EC225, and blur the actual current problem.
IE Not that the family of helicopters doesn't have an acceptable or unacceptable safety record. Not even that the EC225 has an unacceptable or acceptable safety record.
But simply the transmission design used in the the L2 model, and the EC225 model has failed fatally, and there seems no reason why it won't fail fatally again if they continue to fly.

That is the problem, and I believe the basis for grounding of those two variants by every responsible aviation authority.

*(not generally refered to as a "Super Puma" by anyone in the industry. Sometimes referred to comedically as a "Super Doopa Pumu")

[birmingham]

That was simply a reference to there being one fatal accident in its entire service.
Your statement is of course correct but any inference that the 2009 epicyclic incident has no relationship to this year's crash because of a minor difference in designation would be disingenuous. It was considered a close enough relative to be grounded for the same reason. The two ditchings were as a direct result of trying to mitigate the 2009 incident and the failure mode of the 2016 incident was remarkably similar to the 2009 one. Epicyclics failed twice resulting in multiple fatalities and there have been four hull losses related to gearbox issues. There is no way that confidence can be restored if we just re-quote statistics to suit our own purposes.

As has been said many times here perceptions alone will ground this aircraft

Does anyone want to flame me for saying that AH have made a very difficult situation worse to the point it may be irreparable? Anyone want to defend their management of this problem?

[Pablo332]

In both cases (DW & CN), although EMLUB had been correctly activated and was functioning correctly, a warning of EMLUB failure was indicated shortly after activation and the crews followed procedure and ditched. It subsequently turned out that there was a design fault in the warning system.
Failure of the collection of suspect parts that constituted the EM LUBE system was the only good bit of luck for AH following the shaft failures.

Chances of the aircraft making it back to land with a third of the shaft supporting bearings not present not guaranteed hence the AH flight manual requirement after the events to land immediately even with functioning EM LUBE system in the event of shaft failure if memory serves me correctly.

[Concentric]

Regarding the EMLUB, it may have been forgotten that in the first ditching, REDW, there was loss of MGB oil pressure followed by a chip indication to the cockpit via the VMS. The previous accident to that was the REDL fatal one and the AAIB report on it, which the later crew would likely be familiar with, gave FDR data showing chip indications followed by loss of MGB oil pressure. I.E. Similar warnings although presented in reverse sequence (within 15 secs). Even without the EMLUB caption illuminating there may have been some concern that ‘something’ was breaking up inside the gearbox (which indeed there was). When you get a chip indication how many metal chips do you know there are?

[Torcher]

Logs to the fire gents.

1. Lies: Passengers prefer the 225 vs 92...I think not...

2. Damn lies: The performance of the 225 is better than the 92... Only until u have to calculate take off performance with any climb above 150 feet per minute OEI...(As in required climb gradients)

3. (Safety) Statistics: There really is no comparison...Really...

The 225 will not be welcome in NS operations anytime soon.
It is hard to trust a manufacturer who points his finger to the operator, as soon as anything bad happens..

Torcher

[riff_raff]

When you get a chip indication how many metal chips do you know there are?

The obvious answer is, "enough ferrous debris to bridge the sensor gap".

In reality, magnetic chip detectors are mostly helpful at detecting the types of gear/bearing failures that are not catastrophic. Modest surface spalling failures rather than fracture failures.

Emergency lube systems are designed to keep a gearbox functioning in the event a loss of lube oil flow occurs. Assuming everything else in the gearbox is still working OK.

[henra]

3. (Safety) Statistics: There really is no comparison...Really...




Hmmm, it is not so much the statistics. They are not very different between the S-92 and the 225. Each had one fatal accident with 18 and 13 fatalities, respectively. Admittedly the S-92 fleet is a bit bigger, so the statistic for the S-92 is indeed a little bit better. That said, statistics with only one fatal accident don't tell much. Concorde went from safest Airliner of all times to unsafest in one single unfortunate day.


The difference is that Sikorsky was able to address the issues that led to the crash and there is a strategy how to avoid a similar accident in the future. AH currently is not on top of the issue.
And not speaking of communication strategy of both Manufacturers. This is where there is really no comparison. At all.



The 225 will not be welcome in NS operations anytime soon.
It is hard to trust a manufacturer who points his finger to the operator, as soon as anything bad happens..



Fully agreed and not much to add.

[henra]

Regardless, 46 people have been killed as a result of gearbox issues since 2009. With technology available today, the industry should be able to do better.


Agreed.
The problem is both Manufacturer's Gearbox issues have a common denominator: Weight saving + a bit carry over of components from their predecessors. And that is driven by the cut- throat cost driven competition in O&G. When you bring a new type of Helicopter it has to be much more efficient than its predecessors and it mustn't cost twice as much. Unfortunately Helicopter Technology is so much matured that there are no easy gains any more. Only by shaving off every ounce possible an advantage can be generated. The difficulty is to foresee where it is one ounce too much saved. Both manufacturers found out the hard way now. Sikorsky was in so far lucky that their weak spot was easier to fix (at least the immediate cause -the Gears themselves remain too weak to work without Oil for much more than 10 minutes). Their airframe had more Greenfield portion where they were not limited by existing components. Coincidentally its Achilles heel is also the Element where things were carried over from the smaller Blackhawk.

[Shell Management]

And that is driven by the cut- throat cost driven competition in O&G.

Of course Shell would never join the race to the bottom or prioritise payload range or economics over safety:):) (those three accidents were with BP, Exxon or Statoil:=:=).

Of the S92


Coincidentally its Achilles heel is also the Element where things were
carried over from the smaller Blackhawk.


Perhaps Blackhawk accidents should be put in the mix.

[roscoe1]

Still waiting to hear the severity of the damage due to the gearbox being involved in a road transportation accident. What actually was performed after that incident and how deep did they go on the repair ?Until that is revealed all of the folks who are swirling gearbox engineering formulas and stress analysis are just blowing smoke. Maybe it's a fat red herring but maybe fate was sealed as a result of something that happened (or didn't happen) half a world away and a long time ago. l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about.

There is a work order somewhere that has the details and an insurance report on the accident with photos and descriptions. I suspect that stuff won't see the light of day outside a courtroom but it might be interesting.

[Shackman]

Originally Posted by Concentric
When you get a chip indication how many metal chips do you know there are?

Posted by rifraf
The obvious answer is, "enough ferrous debris to bridge the sensor gap".


I would add - if you're lucky. I had a Chinook gearbox which started to make a loud whining noise whilst flying across Falklands Sound - but no indications, so we turned round and went back to San Carlos. On shut down we didn't need a rotor brake -they slowed down so quickly. When the engineers pulled the mag plug on the combining box it was christmas tree'd with metal debris, and even more fell out of the hole! The plug was proved to work on the ground, however, it seemed there was so much debris it never made the connection to give a chip warning. The gear box was a write off. My lucky day.

[Concentric]

Still waiting to hear the severity of the damage due to the gearbox being involved in a road transportation accident. What actually was performed after that incident and how deep did they go on the repair ?Until that is revealed all of the folks who are swirling gearbox engineering formulas and stress analysis are just blowing smoke. Maybe it's a fat red herring but maybe fate was sealed as a result of something that happened (or didn't happen) half a world away and a long time ago. l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about.

There is a work order somewhere that has the details and an insurance report on the accident with photos and descriptions. I suspect that stuff won't see the light of day outside a courtroom but it might be interesting.

And who knew about the RTA (because they themselves had repaired the epicyclic module, perhaps even with reports and photos - but I am only guessing about those) before they started hypothesizing about suspension bar pins, then attachment bolt torques? “Blowing smoke” did you say?

Shortcomings and omissions in the stress analyses of both the 2nd stage planet gear and the bevel gear shaft that I have referred to are not hypotheses. They are documented in AAIB reports. I generally give references. If I have missed some please point them out and I will cite the relevant source(s) for you.

If AH were sure it was the RTA that caused the planet gear to fail, why remove the -07 gear from service and why increase MCD and oil filter inspections on the -06 gear to every 10 flying hours?

[roscoe1]

Concentric,
Perhaps I was rude in that you feel I was addressing you in specific about blowing smoke. Not so, I respect the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of the posts from folks who apparently have the engineering background which I lack. Perhaps the planet gear was the point of catastrophic failure but consider that perhaps the initiator was the thud that may have happened when it fell off the truck. AB could not be expected to say "we think its good, just don't let the unit fall more than half a meter if you should drop it". My only point is that perhaps if they had thrown away the guts of this GB after the road accident, this never would have happened. If they did that my point is moot. They do the next best thing at the worst time (post catastrophe) and address what failed. Not saying there weren't serious design weaknesses, just suggesting that they might not have manifested themselves at this time and place if the truck didn't crash.

[albatross]

Well there should be a teardown and overhaul report.

[SASless]

My lucky day.

Shackman,

Is that some of the notorious British Understatement I have heard so much about?

I hope folks did not wear out your Shirt...for rubbing on your Shoulder trying to gain some of your very good luck!

[Concentric]

Roscoe1,

I didn’t think your post was rude at all, so I apologize if you think my reply was a bit sharp. You are absolutely right that details of the RTA seem a long time in coming out, particularly (I would add) when you consider that against the backdrop of other unilateral statements by AH. But then again, your later comment regarding courtrooms could well explain that and a certain desire by AH to cloud the actual cause, for instance by removing -07 gears from service and imposing daily inspections with -06 gears fitted. Red herrings, possibly.

That was why I thought your comment “l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about” had a certain irony about it (although I am not sure if irony is appreciated in all cultures) that I turned in the direction of AH (not you) and suggesting they had been laying a smokescreen.

Any report on that post-RTA inspection and ‘repair’ would probably fall short of expectations in identifying the root cause, since if it did then AH would (hopefully) have done exactly what you suggested right there and then and binned it. It would only be gaps in the report that would open up more hypotheses.

[albatross]

I would hope that the accident investigators would have complete access to the teardown and overhaul report of the transmission and if not, why not?

[roscoe1]

Agreed. We'll possibly never have all the answers. The overall irony is that as much as we all are concerned with having the safest aircraft possible and operating it in the safest manner possible it always comes back to money. I say this in the sense that behind the safety talk, there is also the cutthroat requirement of having the most efficient aircraft in terms of what it can do for what it costs. If we all really wanted safer flying we'd slow down, carry less , ask for less, never push the envelope we are given and not worry about empty weight. Who among us has never looked at an airframe fitting that has cracked and thought" if they'd just made it out of steel or beefed it up just a bit, it wouldn't have cracked". Occasional tragic accidents are the price we seem to pay for leaving the ground in any kind of way that allow a company to make money. Not that there is anything wrong with that. I firmly believe everyone does their best when designing a transmission. There will always be risk attributable to this issue. It just has to be true (in my world) that every OEM knows in their financial hearts that nailing down a problem and fixing it to the point where, notwithstanding abuse of the parts (like falling off a truck), it will never happen again is so superior to covering up or inadequate fixes that they do what needs to be properly done. If that gearbox had 50 kilos more metal engineered into the critical parts I think nobody would notice the reduced capability. Unfortunately it seems that has to start in the design phase, not in the fix the problem phase.

[Twist & Shout]

roscoe1
Isn't the point here that even though the gearbox in the latest fatal crash was involved in a shipping accident, at least one other gearbox has failed in a similar fashion with no previous report of a transport incident?

Also the "money v 'Occasionally tragic accident' " conversation:
No one thinks we can do our job risk free. Many of us think we shouldn't be exposed to a KNOWN FAULT.
Lots of safety improvements have come paid for in blood. We don't fly in airliners with square windows for e.g.

The L2/EC225 transmission fault detection has been paid for in blood. Now we need a proper fix if anyone is expected to fly it again. In my opinion.

[Twist & Shout]

A little Xmas levity.

Although it's an explanation of a different incident, this seems to be the explanitive model AH have adopted.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=3m5qxZm_JqM

Merry Xmas, and give thanks we are not flying people in a helicopter with an apparently known and unresolved fault.

[SASless]

Now we need a proper fix if anyone is expected to fly it again!


I have asked this question before....what is the "proper fix"?

How does one engineer a Detection System for a MGB that can detect, identify, and warn the Crew of every critical failure mode in advance of a catastrophic failure serious enough to cause a Fatal Event?

[Twist & Shout]

I have asked this question before....what is the "proper fix"?

How does one engineer a Detection System for a MGB that can detect, identify, and warn the Crew of every critical failure mode in advance of a catastrophic failure serious enough to cause a Fatal Event?
I think there is a difference between the above, {...warn crew of every critical failure mode in advance of a catastrophic failure....} and flying a machine with a known fault (rotor system detachment during flight) and a proven history of killing people due to that fault.

Like most of us, I have flown many different types (inc AS332, and EC225).
I can't think of another type currently flying that has suffered a catastrophic inflight break up, for an as yet undefined, let alone rectified reason. The report on the latest tragic crash has not even been finalized.

Examples (some of many)
Airliners explode - traced to stress risers from window corners. Round windows only.
Tail rotor damaged by lightning - earthing strips added.
Turbine wheel coming apart - turbine wheel redesigned.
Rotor fails - traced back to repair following lightning strike. No implications for unrepaired blades.
Loss of transmission lubricant - oil filter studs replaced with upgraded version.

All seem reasonable outcomes from bad situations. Not any sort of guarantee, but offer a logical and very reduced likelihood of repeat fatalities.

Rotor system detachment with no warning - "just fly it, we think we know what might have happened. It might not happen to you."

Doesn't seem reasonable.

Remember Einsteins definition of madness : Doing the same thing, and expecting a different result.
I personally don't want to fly an EC225 expecting the rotor system to detach.

My personal answer to SASless's question:
A re-designed gearbox that is up to the task.

Is it guaranteed to be perfect? No. But unlike the current design, it's not a proven killer. Many other gearboxes are up to the task, so it's not quite rocket science.

[thelearner]

http://i1056.photobucket.com/albums/t362/georgemck/225%20photo_zpsljfii1s9.jpg (http://s1056.photobucket.com/user/georgemck/media/225%20photo_zpsljfii1s9.jpg.html)

I passed 3 x 225's on the back of lorries heading North today - this was a bit North of Dundee on the road to Aberdeen.

I have not been SLF for a good while, spent many flights in 225 and previous variants - the S92 recent incident - the pax and crew seemed lucky with that one.

[ABZSpotter]

These were the three that were in storage at Norwich moving north for continued storage in Aberdeen I believe.

[Fareastdriver]

Maybe they are going on the Apache contract.:):):):):):)

[twisted wrench]

would be a little soon to take them out of storage the Apache contract for CHC is still 8 months away before it ends.

[Pablo332]

Apparently there is recruiting for 225 engineers in ABZ. Anyone know what’s the low down? Return to service? Or UN white machine contract?

[birmingham]

Which 4? Just the 4 NS with the 225? The 4 Super Puma 332 & 225 in the NS since the 2012 panic-fest?

When I look at the incidents involving the EC225, frankly, I see nothing unusual compared to other helicopters. There is just less of it.

The numbers tell me that modern types, of which this is one, kill fewer people than older types. There are fewer accidents and it is easier to get out alive.
Would agree up to a point - it depends as always on how you interpret the numbers. In the case of the large aircraft modern types certainly significantly reduced the fatality rates for quite some time but in the last few years the figures have really been nothing to shout about. There remains inherent risks in this type of transport that are not always mitigated by advances in technology.

[nowherespecial]

Pablo, my guess is a whole glut of people got let go or re-trained and now there is head-scratching at who is looking after the 225 airworthiness for when they come back. Just because they are not flying it doesn't mean they are not being maintained.

[lowfat]

depends what storage its in. If long term very little maintenance is required until you want to fly it.

[Tango123]

https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/north-sea/130091/airbus-pledges-rebuild-north-sea-confidence-super-puma/

Personally I can't see, in the present environment, that it is really necessary for the industry, to put the 225 into service again. The 189 and the 175 can easily cover the gap the 225 left. More in UK (Aberdeen) than in the Norwegian sector, where they basically have been using the 92 only, which gives them no cover if the 92 is grounded.

Half a year ago, I was quite sure that the 225 was done in the Northsea, but not so sure anymore. It would be sad to see the 225 in service again, and the passengers not feeling confident about it, only driven by Airbus motivation to get it back.

[jimf671]

The 225 is needed because if the pressure is sustained on the S-92 then it is likely to end in tears. Especially if exploration ramps up again. Lots of tears.

[tu154]

The 175 is where it's at. 16 is the new 19.

[birmingham]

The 225 is needed because if the pressure is sustained on the S-92 then it is likely to end in tears. Especially if exploration ramps up again. Lots of tears.
Certainly more than one type is needed. Whether we want to go back to the status quo of providing lowest cost transportation using contracts that have brought most contractors to the brink of bankruptcy though i'm not so sure.

Using 175s, 189s etc alongside the 92s could cover any short-term increase in demand and mitigate the consequences of the grounding of a particular type. Using smaller helicopters though would increase the unit cost of transport and necessitate significant operational changes on the platforms. So less efficient. Whether it would improve safety of course is also debatable as if the 225 returns to service it will be its record going forward - not its past history that would be relevant. AH has vowed to rehabilitate the 225's reputation. But to do that in the North Sea it must surely know that it is not just its helicopter's reputation that needs rehabilitating.

The passengers and their unions continue to tell the oil companies, operators and manufacturers that they want still safer and more comfortable transport. They understand that flying to a platform will never be as safe as taking a 737 to Stavanger, but, they are being very clear that they are not satisfied with the rate of progress especially as manifested in recent Puma incidents. One of the difficulties that AH will face is that their employers may finally be starting to listen.

[SASless]

Until AH Management and Engineering accept they have a MAJOR problem with their MGB on the 225 and not only determine the real cause of the failures and then engineer a solution that not only addresses the failures but sees that it never repeats itself....will the 225 be accepted in the Oil Patch.

If the various Authorities approve anything other than than that....they shall complicit in any other Crashes/Deaths that occur.

A wise Bureaucrat would never sign off on something that leaves him and his paycheck in jeopardy.

Are you 225 Supporters fully confident that is what AH is doing....or has done?

Did they get over the "Damaged in Transit"/"It was a Maintenance error!" attitude and really determine exactly what caused the failures?

If you think that....lay out your evidence for arriving at that determination will you?

[Pablo332]

The adults in the UK and Norway at this moment in time consider this an unairworthy aircraft. That’s good enough for me.

[Tango123]

The Danish offshore sector is also done with the 225 - Dancopter now flying the 175, with back up EC155

The new Maersk tender starting mid 2017, and running for 5 years, has been changed from the 225 to the 189/175, meaning that both Dancopter and Bel Air is in the bidding process. Maersk has left the 19 pax version, but used to have the 225 with Dancopter, the S92 with CHC Esbjerg untill year 2011, taking over the 332L2.

Guessing that mid Februar it will be decided who will be the (only) helicopter operator in the future in the Danish offshore sector.

[jimf671]

Although I want the accident investigators to discover a credible cause and AH to engineer a credible solution, I am very concerned about the industry running for cover in the wrong direction.

Two new types? Well how many times has it been written on pprune that it's unwise to expect new unproven types to solve all your problems? And one of those types is from the same manufacturer whose name is regularly smeared over the 225 affair.

The S-92? Now listen, there have been so-o-o-o many times that I have been very glad to see a S-92 arrive, and there will be again, but I try to be realistic about its capabilities and history. Heavy, escape windows are not very 21st century, noisy, shakes like a rock crusher, 10 year old tail rotor bearing problem, MRGB run-dry issue, 17 fatalities in civil ops, ...


If the AW189, for instance, had space for 19 fat Europeans, 5 years of solid crew change service, with a big fleet hours number and still no accidents then I might feel we were in a different place.

[HeliComparator]

I do find it amazing that even folk on here see the 175 /189 as the panacea. The EC225 did a few hundred thousand hours before the catastrophic issue manifested itself. Do folk really think that the 175 and/or 189 don't have some lurking issues with the probability of a catastrophic incident occurring in a few hundred thousand hours? Well maybe they don't, but if so it will be a first in history. Otherwise it is just foolish naivety.

[Ex Machina]

Why 19 though Jim? This is a number plucked out of the regulatory ether as a maximum allowable without an attendant. It could have just as easily been another figure. Average pax loads out of Aberdeen are still between 14 and 16, so the economics of insisting on a 19 seat capacity does not make sense.

[S92PAX]

But HC - ignorance is bliss. The current choice being a heli that definitely loses its rotor blades to one that might. I will take the might option every time.

[SASless]

17 fatalities in civil ops, ...


Please be fair....those were the direct result of a Captain's decision to continue flight in direct conflict with the ECL and the Co-Pilot's remainder of that.

Had they ditched as required by the ECL...those Fatalities might have occurred during the Dtiching due to the Sea State, Water Temp, and Winds but the primary cause was the bad decision to continue flight and a slow descent to the surface. prior to the really serious failure.

AH's name is not being smeared.....it is their Management Attitude and patent refusal to aggressively pursue a real diagnosis of the causes of the failures and then coming up with a fix that prevents another occurrence of the same faults.

[Rigga]

In my experience, AH might well be chasing the diagnosis of this matter as a matter of quite some urgency, but just not saying so to external or uninvolved sources. Test facilities and specialists may have to be sought and that all takes time. Tests themselves take time to devise and test, then there is the analysis and any rework required....It is not the first time they (AH) have worked quietly in the background. Their PR decisions may be quite different to expectations of publicised openness. Sometimes the less said, the better.
Having said that, the agreement of EASA to a theroretical 'risk management' approach is, I think, diabolical. The UK and Norwegian authorities have the right approach.

[212man]

In my experience, AH might well be chasing the diagnosis of this matter as a matter of quite some urgency, but just not saying so to external or uninvolved sources.

I believe you are right.

[SASless]

End of January....no report from AH laying out the exact cause for the 225 MGB failures? I thought it was something quite simple....such as the Gearbox being damaged in Transit somewhere (well one of them anyway) or a Maintenance failure (the other one I suppose).

[henra]

End of January....no report from AH laying out the exact cause for the 225 MGB failures? I thought it was something quite simple....such as the Gearbox being damaged in Transit somewhere (well one of them anyway) or a Maintenance failure (the other one I suppose).


Sorry but this is unhelpful. I know you are a dyed in the wool EC/AH hater but them not coming up with a cheap explanation is a good thing IMHO. I much prefer them silently chasing the real cause over simply blaming it to transport damage or other 'simple' explanations. If they haven't really figured out what caused it it is better to continue investigating and saying nothing than sending out Wild Guess explanations. They did enough of that in the early phases of this tragic accident.

[birmingham]

Sorry but this is unhelpful. I know you are a dyed in the wool EC/AH hater but them not coming up with a cheap explanation is a good thing IMHO. I much prefer them silently chasing the real cause over simply blaming it to transport damage or other 'simple' explanations. If they haven't really figured out what caused it it is better to continue investigating and saying nothing than sending out Wild Guess explanations. They did enough of that in the early phases of this tragic accident.
tbh whatever side of the fence you sit we all pretty much agree on what happened. So the only way forward here is a convincing explanation of why it happened followed by an equally convincing explanation of what can be done to stop it happening again. Let's hope part one of this isn't too far off. Surely that is something we can all agree on.

[SASless]

henra, You are quite wrong about my view of EC/AH aircraft.

Ascribing "hatred" to anyone you do not even know is a bit over the top.

I am not alone in my view the management has handled this situation poorly.

Perhaps it is your own prejudices you might consider before you go slanging other folks.

For sure....they appeared to have dropped the ball between the two fatal crashes or perhaps they might have been better able to have avoided the second one don't you think?

[Satcomm]

There is no doubt Airbus are working extremely hard to determine the root cause, the future of the 225 depends on it. Honestly, Airbus's future in the O&G world largely depends on it. Frankly these days, they are probably better off putting their efforts else where anyway, the O&G world is so cut throat, they will soon be expecting operators to pay to fly for them.

One thing that has struck me a bit odd is all the design questioning. All the load anaylsis, material anaylsis, cycle counts, bearing types, rotation counts, number of blades, number of suspension bars, weight reductions, power increases, and on and on ........All, over the top blabbering IMO ...... The L2 flew for how many years? About 18-19 years before that gearbox failed. I don't care who you are, after almost 20 years of operation of any mechcanical item, do you go straight into believing there is a design flaw or a structural integrity problem? Probably not! The next similar failure of the same component, 7 years later, 25-26 years after design and about 12 years into the 225 life .... Design problem? Again, probably not.

We all know they have a problem and Airbus knows they have a problem. Have they probably found a common denominator with the one bad planet gear manufacturing? Has something changed in the manufacturing of that gear ... It's been working for 20 years? Was that part number available from design conception or was it brought into play XX years after gearbox design to keep up with demand? If yes to any of the above, is removing them from service and just running the more reliable gears an acceptable solution? Maybe the later coupled with the lower TBO and increased maintenance monitoring (10 hour chip and filter inspection) is enough? Maybe there could have been rough handling of the gearbox? Could there have been a maintenance error? In my opinion, all valid questions and probabilities ... None that seem anymore or less out to lunch then a poorly designed gearbox that managed to work faithfully for 20 years. Some have been ruled out while they continue to hammer away at others I'm sure.

Unfortunately, no matter what cause is determined, they will probably never be able to convince us that enough is done .... The pure nature of the accident, fatal with little to no warning (I says this lightly, REDL did try to throw some failure indicators in time), makes the solution hard to swallow.

[lowfat]

If you use the gearbox oil shaft failure as an example .
AH changed the original manufacturing process. It stopped countersinking the 2 stress relief holes from joining the two part shaft.
The Plastic bung was no longer a snug fit,ergo condensation got in ,corrosion, failure, two helicopters in the sea.
Reputation ruined.
All caused by one minuscule "Saving".

[jimf671]

... ... One thing that has struck me a bit odd is all the design questioning. All the load anaylsis, material anaylsis, cycle counts, bearing types, rotation counts, number of blades, number of suspension bars, weight reductions, power increases, and on and on ........All, over the top blabbering IMO ...... The L2 flew for how many years? About 18-19 years before that gearbox failed. I don't care who you are, after almost 20 years of operation of any mechcanical item, do you go straight into believing there is a design flaw or a structural integrity problem? Probably not! The next similar failure of the same component, 7 years later, 25-26 years after design and about 12 years into the 225 life .... Design problem? Again, probably not. ... ...


Probably not.

[Pablo332]

You’ve probably hit the nail on the head. Unfortunately most people who currently have a 225 on their books has had the EC/AH experience, customers and authorities.
Buying experience consists of legions of shiny suited salesmen saying the obvious we are no 1 performance wise.
What creates problems down the line is when things go wrong, from cutting edge technology it’s flashbacks to the school yard. He did it, it’s not me. It can’t happen again ( oh yes it can).
It’s a shame the EC225 will die due to corporate/product support arrogance and their default position of this is one for the lawyers as opposed to this is one for the engineers.

[Concentric]

One thing that has struck me a bit odd is all the design questioning. All the load anaylsis, material anaylsis, cycle counts, bearing types, rotation counts, number of blades, number of suspension bars, weight reductions, power increases, and on and on ........All, over the top blabbering IMO ...... The L2 flew for how many years? About 18-19 years before that gearbox failed. I don't care who you are, after almost 20 years of operation of any mechcanical item, do you go straight into believing there is a design flaw or a structural integrity problem? Probably not! The next similar failure of the same component, 7 years later, 25-26 years after design and about 12 years into the 225 life .... Design problem? Again, probably not.
Which L2 are you referring to? G-REDL didn’t fly for 18-19 years (it was built 2004; crashed 2009). Its first MGB epicyclic module certainly didn’t either. From the AAIB report 2/2011:

“1.6.8 In June 2004 the epicyclic module (manufacturer’s serial number M2088) was removed for overhaul due to the presence of metallic particles being found on the magnetic chip detectors. The module had accumulated 844 flying hours since new. During this overhaul all the first and second stage planet gears were replaced with new units”.

Not a design issue? Halfway through its first year of service? Remind me what the designers originally set as the TBO and SLL for epicyclic components, and for MCD physical inspections? What are they now? There appears to be a huge variation in life expectancy on this planet gear component. Why? How long had the gearbox been in LN-OJF? If it is not a design issue, are you in effect saying the MGB is well designed but badly manufactured?

You may be right though, the planet gear issue may be a manufacturing problem more than a design error, although manufacturing parameters and limits have to be set by design engineers to keep the product within design assumptions otherwise the design and any certification thereof is simply invalid. But the architecture of the 225’s MGB is such that fracture in a single planet gear is enough to bring down the aircraft and that gear and failure mode is one of the hardest things in a helicopter to actively condition-monitor. That is where it has a very, very serious structural integrity problem. Not just the planet gear itself; that is just one of the 16 eggs in the basket, the basket itself (ring gear) being rather fragile and critical in retaining the mast.

How many other manufacturers have planet gears that fragment in flight? How many other AH helicopter models suffer that catastrophic failure? Not a design issue? I find that pill hard to swallow. Then again, no-one is forcing me to.

[henra]

I am not alone in my view the management has handled this situation poorly.


Ohh, you're definitely not alone on this. AH management totally f***ed this up. Royally.
And that is why I consider silence on their side already a progress. They need to properly understand the real cause before coming up with the next half baked excuse.


Perhaps it is your own prejudices you might consider before you go slanging other folks.

Which prejudice? I noticed a severe attack from your side against AH/EC for not coming up with the next explanation and I was genuinely confused why you would damn them for thinking before speaking out after (absolutely rightfully) crucifying them for prematurely coming up with an explanation (that put the blame wrongfully on others)


For sure....they appeared to have dropped the ball between the two fatal crashes or perhaps they might have been better able to have avoided the second one don't you think?
Absolutely. This should serve as an industry example how not to deal with a technically caused catastrophic failure.

[Satcomm]

Concentric,

My reference to G-REDL would be the date it crashed (April 2009, you are correct). The original type certificate for the L2 was EASA approved 12 June 1991. Guess I was off slightly, not quite 18-19 years ... More like 17.5 years. That said, the L2 variant operated for 17.5 years with the "design" of gearbox and epicyclic before it failed in that way. Obviously REDL's epicyclic wasn't physically 17.5 years old, but the design was .... That's my point. In that 17.5 years, how many epicyclic modules went to the full TBO, the original TBO. If they never made TBO, they held together to bring everyone home safely. So what has changed ... Not the design.

When OJF crashed April 2016, the "design" of the epicyclic would have been about 20 years old in total and would have been sitting in the 225 for about 12 years.

What I'm saying is, I do not personally find a component design that has operated for 17.5 years a poorly designed component. The eggs in the basket theory may be a bit out there as well. I would say "every" gearbox out there has one rotten egg that if it cracked it would spoil the whole carton.

[Concentric]

Concentric,

My reference to G-REDL would be the date it crashed (April 2009, you are correct). The original type certificate for the L2 was EASA approved 12 June 1991. Guess I was off slightly, not quite 18-19 years ... More like 17.5 years. That said, the L2 variant operated for 17.5 years with the "design" of gearbox and epicyclic before it failed in that way. Obviously REDL's epicyclic wasn't physically 17.5 years old, but the design was .... That's my point. In that 17.5 years, how many epicyclic modules went to the full TBO, the original TBO. If they never made TBO, they held together to bring everyone home safely. So what has changed ... Not the design.

When OJF crashed April 2016, the "design" of the epicyclic would have been about 20 years old in total and would have been sitting in the 225 for about 12 years.

What I'm saying is, I do not personally find a component design that has operated for 17.5 years a poorly designed component. The eggs in the basket theory may be a bit out there as well. I would say "every" gearbox out there has one rotten egg that if it cracked it would spoil the whole carton.
I appreciate your rationale. It seems to point to a manufacturing change - either a step change or some kind of drift in quality.
However, it was noted in the REDL investigation report that the original design analysis of the planet gear overlooked a frictional shear component in loading between rollers and the outer race which enabled a crack to radiate beyond the residual compressive zone that had been an original design assumption. The manufacturer had another 2nd stage planet gear removed from a gearbox in 2005. When sectioned (at an undisclosed date) that exhibited just such an example of an outward radiating crack proving that original design assumptions had been incorrect.

There was another design failing reported by AAIB on the bevel gear shaft stress analysis that I have mentioned before so won't bore you with here except to say that it didn't even meet the manufacturer's in house minimum factor of safety. At least AH redesigned that and the difference is actually promoted in a PR video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJKZPbf_kPI) available on youtube.

[SASless]

Which Model/Type of "Puma" did they have to reduce Cruise Speeds on to stop their going through MGB's like unsupervised Kid's going through the contents of a Cookie Jar? It was told to me that getting to TBO on the Gearboxes was impossible until Power Settings (thus cruise speed)were reduced then all was well.

[The Sultan]

MCP wasn't changed so no change in cruise. It was reinforcement of the max speed above which TO power was not allowed.

The Sultan

[212man]

MCP wasn't changed so no change in cruise. It was reinforcement of the max speed above which TO power was not allowed.

The Sultan

No, on the 332L (Bristow Tigers) MCP was reduced from 16.5 degrees to 15.5 degrees of pitch. Cruise dropped from about 145 to 130 its.

[SASless]

Sultan sure knows so much....that is not true.:rolleyes:

[TTFD]

Wonder how Airbus Helicopters will persuade offshore workers after this survey then?

https://www.oilandgaspeople.com/news/13286/two-thirds-of-workers-would-refuse-to-fly-if-super-pumas-return/

[finalchecksplease]

TTFD:

You believe they will get a choice? Unless you call "get on this aircraft or stay at home and we will employ somebody else" a choice. Sadly money talks and fact is the EC225 performs much better than a S92 in payload & range terms.

[rotor-rooter]

The unsatisfactory safety record in the North Sea — which is not solely due to technical problems, Faury noted — has led Airbus to do some brainstorming.

Can someone interpret what the above statement means? Are there other issues at play?

- See more at: https://www.verticalmag.com/news/airbus-helicopters-ceo-hopes-stable-sales-2017/#sthash.GuvajtO8.dpuf

[jimf671]

Dying to see how they'd react if somebody presented them with the unknowns involved in navigating wells or mooring rigs and objectively compared those with aircraft design and manufacturing processes.

The lower number of events; wells or rig moves; allows the cracks to be papered over.

[212man]

Can someone interpret what the above statement means? Are there other issues at play?

- See more at: https://www.verticalmag.com/news/airbus-helicopters-ceo-hopes-stable-sales-2017/#sthash.GuvajtO8.dpuf
Probably something to do with two perfectly servicevable aircraft being flown into the water!

[Concentric]

Dying to see how they'd react if somebody presented them with the unknowns involved in navigating wells or mooring rigs and objectively compared those with aircraft design and manufacturing processes.

The lower number of events; wells or rig moves; allows the cracks to be papered over.
Who exactly are "they"? Do you have a particular stereotype passenger in mind? "They" could be the directional drilling specialist who knows more about what is happening 15,000ft below him than the flight crew know about what is going on in the MGB. "They" could be on their way to a semi to control and manage that rig move. In any single day's NS flying there are usually more technical specialists in the back than in the front (no disrespect intended). Everyone is entitled to their own opinion and to make their own choices, even the hard ones. For many that is an educated choice. And not just those who upgrade themselves to 'Business Class' beside the bigger escape window or the door jettison handle.

[FC80]

Which Model/Type of "Puma" did they have to reduce Cruise Speeds on to stop their going through MGB's like unsupervised Kid's going through the contents of a Cookie Jar? It was told to me that getting to TBO on the Gearboxes was impossible until Power Settings (thus cruise speed)were reduced then all was well.

A similar thing has been done with the 92 so I'm not sure that can really be held as a black mark against the Puma.

A certain operator that did cruise at 80% Q is now using 70%, commensurate with most other operators - allegedly due to a higher number of rejected MRGBs in comparison.

Of course the RFM says you can sit at 86% all day... :hmm:

[jimf671]

'They' are the 90.1% in that survey who are not happy for the aircraft to return to service.

[Variable Load]

A certain operator that did cruise at 80% Q is now using 70%

The 80% SOP never made sense. Not only did it result in more stresses on the powertrain, more importantly it resulted in a much worse specific fuel consumption.

Commercially it was plain dumb :ugh:

[SASless]

FC80,

The point I was hoping to make is....and you reinforce is operational practices have a direct effect upon reaching TBO targets. That a specific TBO is published initially it is based upon a "model" that overtime might have to amended as real life results are obtained. That applies to every new make/model/type of aircraft.