Mike Pence's plane skids off runway at LGA

[DocJacko]

CNN reporting live right right now. Rainy weather, poor visibility. Passengers report "pretty hard landing" followed by plane skidding off the concrete. Apparently "significant damage to the runway". All on board are ok.

[barit1]

Mike Pence plane slides off runway at NYC's LaGuardia Airport (http://tinyurl.com/jnqcwcv)

[cactusbusdrvr]

Looks like they went into the EMASS at the end of the runway.

[Airbubba]

Sounds like the callsign was Eastern 3452, a 737 landing off the ILS runway 22.

Wind was given as 110 at 9 by the tower controller.

Anybody know who uses 'Eastern' these days?

[piperpa46]

Eastern Air Lines 2.0

[soidog52]

Small operator out of MIA, last I knew about 5 B737. Saw a huge billboard at LAX for Eastern. Eastern Air Lines Group, Inc - Airlines in the United States (http://easternairlines.aero/)

[barit1]

Into the EMAS at the end of 22 ?

Republican VP nominee Mike Pence?s plane slides off runway at LaGuardia Airport | New York's PIX11 / WPIX-TV (http://pix11.com/2016/10/27/mike-pence-campaign-plane-slides-off-runway-at-laguardia-airport-2/)

[Airbubba]

Looks like this was the flight, aircraft was N278EA, a B-737-7L9:

Eastern (EA) #3452 ? 27-Oct-2016 ? KFOD - KLGA ? FlightAware (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/EAL3452/history/20161027/2010Z/KFOD/KLGA)

[Airbubba]

Les Abend, a CNN aviation analyst, also suggested on CNN's "Anderson Cooper 360" that low temperatures in New York could have made the runway near freezing, complicating the landing.

Plane carrying Mike Pence skids off runway - CNNPolitics.com (http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/27/politics/plane-carrying-pence-skids-off-runway/index.html)

Looks like the accident occurred around 2340Z.

METAR KLGA 272251Z 09009KT 3SM RA BKN009 OVC015 13/11 A3014 RMK AO2 SFC VIS 4 SLP205 P0014 T01330106 $

METAR KLGA 272351Z 10010G15KT 3SM RA BR OVC010 13/12 A3010 RMK AO2 SFC VIS 4 SLP192 P0032 60061 T01330117 10139 20072 58018 $

[Airbubba]

Live atc 27 Oct 2330-0000 at around 11 minutes. Only heard tower # 1.

Tried to do link and failed. Will delete this when someone who knows what they are doing posts it.

I don't claim to know what I'm doing but see if this link works:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/klga/KLGA-Twr-Oct-27-2016-2330Z.mp3

[CONSO]

I don't claim to know what I'm doing but see if this link works:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/klga/KLGA-Twr-Oct-27-2016-2330Z.mp3
go to about 13-14 minutes in ..

[Airbubba]

go to about 13-14 minutes in ..

Why?

At 10:56 : 'Eastern Stop! Stop! Stop Eastern!'

[peekay4]

Make Eastern Airlines great again!

http://i.imgur.com/vaFzVWD.jpg
(Photo AP via The Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/28/mike-pences-plane-slides-off-runway-at-laguardia-airport-in-new-york))

[RobertS975]

Sounds like the callsign was Eastern 3452, a 737 landing off the ILS runway 22.

Wind was given as 110 at 9 by the tower controller.

Anybody know who uses 'Eastern' these days?

Smallish charter company uses B737-800s painted in the final blue strip Eastern livery.

[Airbubba]

Thanks, looks like this is a B-737-700.

[Carbon Bootprint]

Airbubba, it seems you're spot on. According to the Wiki (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Air_Lines_(2015)) thing, the current version of EAL has one 737-700 with 64 "business" class seats. This is the Trump/Pence plane.

I believe it's N278EA, aka "Spirit of the American Soldier." For spotter value, this aircraft originally started with Maersk Airlines in 1998 and then went through some others in its history (https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/Boeing/737/28006/N278EA-Eastern-Air-Lines-2014).

They have a couple other aircraft in the mix other than the four 162-seat 737-800s as can be seen on the Wiki link above.

[ATC Watcher]

Having "Eastern airlines" and making America great again " in the same sentence /airframe is kind or ironic/sarcastic for those old enough to remember ..

[underfire]

https://scontent.fbne1-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/14731180_1148010221943189_3674981853739161483_n.jpg?oh=306f2 518704dcadf5ad1c8fe30da86ba&oe=58872157

[PJ2]

Wondering about flap position, and stowed reversers...Not speculating on either, but the flaps appear not to be in the 30, (and definitely not in the 40) position.

https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-QJdKdD3/0/L/i-QJdKdD3-L.png

Stowed reversers could be just that...stowed after stopping and shutting down, (one can hear the engines winding down in one of the live, interior videos). During the evacuation filming one can hear the APU running.

Just some early observations, nothing implied.

[vapilot2004]

During the evacuation filming one can hear the APU running. Not sure it was on for landing or started later.

On a typical campaign aircraft mission, there are staff and often a press presence. The need for AC power is honored by having it available as continuously as possible. This practice is copied from Presidential and Congressional aircraft procedures.

[vapilot2004]

Premonitions and quotes from inside the aircraft:

For months, reporters traveling aboard Mike Pence’s campaign plane have joked about the hard, bone-shaking landings from small Iowa airports to major metropolitan hubs as the Republican vice presidential candidate has crisscrossed the country. The “Make America Great Again"-emblazoned 737 has been bumping its way across the swing states, prompting one reporter to joke morbidly a few weeks ago that a “Pence plane veers off the runway” story had been pre-written.

Over the course of a few seconds Thursday night, those jokes became a jarring reality as the Pence plane slid off a rain-slicked runway upon landing at LaGuardia airport, injecting near-disaster in the 2016 presidential campaign.


The moments Pence?s plane flirted with disaster - POLITICO (http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/mike-pence-plane-skid-runway-230433#ixzz4OMDn3iAq)

YRP - AP Wire Photo. Look ma, (apparently) no landing flaps, but slats are out:

http://i67.tinypic.com/1445yso.jpg

Could be camera angle aligning with the extended flaps.

PJ2: At F5 perhaps, but beginning with 15, the tilt down begins to be obvious from the rear.

[nicolai]

The Guardian newspaper quotes a passenger: (http:// https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/28/mike-pences-plane-slides-off-runway-at-laguardia-airport-in-new-york)

“When we landed here we had a pretty hard landing and then we felt the back of the plane start to fishtail and you could just feel the plane moving in a way that was not straight on the runway like a normal landing would go,”

and describes how the press corps accompanying Pence have experienced a lot of "rough landings".

[chuks]

"Objects left on seats and armrests began to tumble as the plane thundered down the runway."

How does one thunder down a runway? That's pretty dramatic!

Another question might be, "How did the flaps end up where they are shown to be?" That's hard to understand. Why would they be set that way for landing, but how could they have been retracted if they had been set differently?

[core_dump]

Trump has called LGA a "third world" airport. If it really was a third world airport without EMAS, might this incident have ended differently?

[back to Boeing]

Just an educated guess.

But no slides deployed so decided not to evacuate. Decision made to disembark via rear doors. So whilst there had been an "incident" the crew decided to action the appropriate after landing scan/procedure. Also this would allow any fire services better access to wheel/engine areas.

Hence flaps retracted and thus why flaps not in the 40 position.

[Hotel Tango]

Finally, a sensible post by back to Boeing. I'd put my money on the fact that the flaps were retracted after the event and thus have no bearing on the reason for the overrun.

[back to Boeing]

My money is that the overrun was caused by what happened (or more accurately didn't) at 1000'

[vapilot2004]

My money is that the overrun was caused by what happened (or more accurately didn't) at 1000'

As overruns go, that's typically a safe bet.

[readywhenreaching]

the 737 crushed across the EMAS field to come to rest on the grass.
http://www.jacdec.de/WP/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2016-10-27_N278EA_B737_EA_PEnce-Trump@LGA_ACC2.png
2016-10-27 Eastern B737 with VP nominee Pence ran off runway at La Guardia » JACDEC (http://www.jacdec.de/2016/10/28/2016-10-27-eastern-b737-with-vp-nominee-pence-ran-off-runway-at-la-guardia/)

[Tech Guy]

Looking at the photo in post #31, it appears the paved surface has suffered significant damage. Is this a specially designed frangible surface designed to retard an aircraft in the event on an overrun?

[Hotel Tango]

Tech Guy, if you read the thread you will find the answer. Then google it for more information!

[HDRW]

Wow, never heard of EMAS before, but it seems it's been around a while. Not sure if it's used outside the USA?

I wonder if the fact that they went off the edge was due to not wanting to go right off the end, maybe not knowing about the EMAS? It doesn't look very obvious where it starts, just a black line of the on-ramp.

So do airports with it installed carry spare blocks to replace the damaged ones rapidly when this happens?

Is the runway closed until it's repaired, as it's no longer 100% covered?

[fox niner]

So suppose you're in an overrun, after a landing with flaps 30. Why would you retract the flaps afterwards? And IF you decide to retract them, why not until they are completely up?
Unless of course...if they landed with shown slither of tiny extension.

[oldchina]

I think it's quite Hilarious

[Mozella]

So suppose you're in an overrun, after a landing with flaps 30. Why would you retract the flaps afterwards? And IF you decide to retract them, why not until they are completely up?

I would imagine leaving the flaps extended might be best in case of an evacuation, even if triggered by an enthusiastic passenger sitting near an over-wing exit. Who knows what's really happening for certain after an off-runway excursion into the mud/grass?

On the other hand, if everything is fine and dandy and you decided to perform a normal APU start, After Landing Check List, and Secure Cockpit Checklist, why wouldn't you retract the flaps and leading edge devices all the way if for no other reason than to reduce speculation by people like us? :=

I don't get it.

[filejw]

My money is that the overrun was caused by what happened (or more accurately didn't) at 1000'

On a night like that you better throw in 500' 200' 100' and 50' too. No room for error better have " A " game going.

[Jet Jockey A4]

@ HDRW...

Take a look at this Google Earth link below (hope it works) and you will see that without EMAS an aircraft going off the end of runway 22 at high speed would most likely end up on a major 8 lane highway.

https://www.google.ca/maps/@40.7687957,-73.8844302,199m/data=!3m1!1e3

[noflynomore]

10010G15KT 3SM RA does not make the wet 2100m Rwy 22 sound a wise choice to me. Maybe in the dry, but wet too? Kinda stacking the odds, that is.

Equally retracting flaps after ploughing through EMAS would be extremely foolish unless they had been thoroughly checked for damage and debris first.

Stable approach, was it?

Still, with the incomprehensibly garbled RT from the controller its a wonder anyone gets anything right there.

[Airbubba]

LGA requires more than a bit of planning, stabilization, and discipline. Anyone that has landed a large commercial aircraft knows this.

Has anything larger than a 757 regularly operated from LGA?

I've never flown the 737 except as a pax. I have operated into La Guardia in years past in bizjets and airline 727's.

This article excerpt claims that the MD-80 and 737 are more challenged by the short runways at LGA than other types (I guess e.g. the A320 family):

Though no flight would legally operate unless within those specified limits, there are two aircraft types that serve LGA that are more strained by the runway length than others, and one may surprise you.

The McDonnell Douglas MD-80 is a powerful aircraft, and a workhorse for several airlines. Though reliable and safe, the low-bypass engines respond slower to input than other aircraft types with larger engines. This means that it takes longer for the aircraft to build speed when rolling down the runway, demanding a longer takeoff distance. This is exacerbated on hot summer days when the air is thinner, requiring more speed to develop lift over the wings.

Airlines that operate this type into LGA encounter a difficult time on those dog day afternoons, and they usually deal with it by removing passengers to bring the aircraft’s weight down. A passenger headache? Perhaps. A safety issue? No. It’s actually an example of safety measures working to keep you safe.

The other aircraft that sometimes needs special consideration at LGA is a more modern type; the Boeing 737-800/900. The reason goes back to the late 1960s when the first, much shorter, -100/200 versions were birthed. You’ll notice that the 737 is a “low rider,” with its fuselage very low to the ground. This is because many airports that the aircraft served at that time did not have jet-bridges, and needed to board passengers walking up to the aircraft. Like a few models back then (such as the Boeing 727, Douglas DC-9), the early 737s offered built-in stairs that appeared from underneath the forward door, making boarding and deplaning simple for any airport.

The problem came years later, as newer versions of the 737 offered a lengthened fuselage. With the main landing gear still residing in the same place, the tail of the aircraft came very low to the ground when raising the nose on landing, risking a tail strike.

This resulted in the aircraft needing to keep the nose lower than it might otherwise aerodynamically prefer while on approach. This smaller angle of attack creates a faster approach speed, which can sometimes be around 15 knots faster than most other jets. The affect on runway length comes into play because the higher speed means it needs more stopping distance. But again, the math is done in advance. If it can’t stop within 60% of the strip, it won’t be allowed to take off to begin with.


Over the Edge: How Safe Are La Guardia's Short Runways? (http://www.nycaviation.com/2015/05/safe-la-guardias-short-runways/)

Still, with the incomprehensibly garbled RT from the controller its a wonder anyone gets anything right there.

I'd say the ATC comms were pretty clear and normal for the EWR, LGA, and JFK area.

[PJ2]

back to Boeing:

Re, Just an educated guess.

But no slides deployed so decided not to evacuate. Decision made to disembark via rear doors. So whilst there had been an "incident" the crew decided to action the appropriate after landing scan/procedure. Also this would allow any fire services better access to wheel/engine areas.

Hence flaps retracted and thus why flaps not in the 40 position.

I realize that's just a guess.

(Not sure of your experience but,) landing flap is either 30 or 40. Normally one leaves things as they are in such events. There are no statements in the FCOM or QRH that require changing configuration (for the reasons offered). The B737 FCOM Evacuation checklist states that the Captain sets the park brake and the F/O extends the flaps to 40, etc., (i.e., nothing about retracting them again).

ed to add:
JACDEC(linked previously by another poster), provides an unverified statement indicating:
Flight phase: LDG – Flare, Landing Roll, Aborted Landing after Touchdown

The recorders will tell us soon enough about flap position, reverse use, (there is no high engine noise on the video of the landing I heard), stability of the approach, approach speed, touchdown point, tailwind component, etc.

[Doors to Automatic]

I wonder what speed the plane was going when it entered the EMAS? Looks to be quite slow in which case they very nearly got away with it.

My guess - a bit fast over the threshold, long flare and touchdown 4,000 feet in.

[neilki]

The EMAS was installed to protect access to the Employee Parking lot :-)
I think it's been made clear that LGA requires your complete attention. Gotta love the lollipop school crossing guards on the repositioned taxiway A. They're in for a long cold winter...

[Mozella]

Has anything larger than a 757 regularly operated from LGA?

TWA, Eastern, and Delta operated L-1011's and United and American operated DC-10's from LGA if I remember correctly. It's been a while.

[Turbine D]

Originally posted by Airbubba:
Has anything larger than a 757 regularly operated from LGA?
I used to fly in and out of LGA (slf) all the time on business trips when I lived in NJ. Flying to Phoenix, my favorite was TWA service on an L-1011. Also, American used B-767s on selected routes out of LGA.

Runway 22 was the prime landing runway as the prevailing wind was out of west or southwest most of the time. I can remember landings in MD-80s where you felt suspended over the East River, making little progress to the runway, the wind was so strong. Also, once landed in a B-737 on 13 with no flaps after a low level circle over JFK to make sure the landing gear was indeed down, a hydraulic failure of some sort and it was windy and raining, remnants of a hurricane. Towed into the terminal from the stopping point.

[KTM300XC-W]

Quote:
Originally Posted by vapilot2004 View Post
LGA requires more than a bit of planning, stabilization, and discipline. Anyone that has landed a large commercial aircraft knows this.
Has anything larger than a 757 regularly operated from LGA?

I've never flown the 737 except as a pax. I have operated into La Guardia in years past in bizjets and airline 727's.

This article excerpt claims that the MD-80 and 737 are more challenged by the short runways at LGA than other types (I guess e.g. the A320 family):

Quote:
Though no flight would legally operate unless within those specified limits, there are two aircraft types that serve LGA that are more strained by the runway length than others, and one may surprise you.

The McDonnell Douglas MD-80 is a powerful aircraft, and a workhorse for several airlines. Though reliable and safe, the low-bypass engines respond slower to input than other aircraft types with larger engines. This means that it takes longer for the aircraft to build speed when rolling down the runway, demanding a longer takeoff distance. This is exacerbated on hot summer days when the air is thinner, requiring more speed to develop lift over the wings.

Airlines that operate this type into LGA encounter a difficult time on those dog day afternoons, and they usually deal with it by removing passengers to bring the aircraft’s weight down. A passenger headache? Perhaps. A safety issue? No. It’s actually an example of safety measures working to keep you safe.

The other aircraft that sometimes needs special consideration at LGA is a more modern type; the Boeing 737-800/900. The reason goes back to the late 1960s when the first, much shorter, -100/200 versions were birthed. You’ll notice that the 737 is a “low rider,” with its fuselage very low to the ground. This is because many airports that the aircraft served at that time did not have jet-bridges, and needed to board passengers walking up to the aircraft. Like a few models back then (such as the Boeing 727, Douglas DC-9), the early 737s offered built-in stairs that appeared from underneath the forward door, making boarding and deplaning simple for any airport.

The problem came years later, as newer versions of the 737 offered a lengthened fuselage. With the main landing gear still residing in the same place, the tail of the aircraft came very low to the ground when raising the nose on landing, risking a tail strike.

This resulted in the aircraft needing to keep the nose lower than it might otherwise aerodynamically prefer while on approach. This smaller angle of attack creates a faster approach speed, which can sometimes be around 15 knots faster than most other jets. The affect on runway length comes into play because the higher speed means it needs more stopping distance. But again, the math is done in advance. If it can’t stop within 60% of the strip, it won’t be allowed to take off to begin with.
Over the Edge: How Safe Are La Guardia's Short Runways?

Quote:
Originally Posted by noflynomore View Post
Still, with the incomprehensibly garbled RT from the controller its a wonder anyone gets anything right there.
I'd say the ATC comms were pretty clear and normal for the EWR, LGA, and JFK area.

Knowing how busy it is there, listening to the recording I think the controller did excellent. Between LGA tower and departure they would have gone from zero to a 100 mph in micro seconds. Also to the crews going around, good job.

[filejw]

TWA, Eastern, and Delta operated L-1011's and United and American operated DC-10's from LGA if I remember correctly. It's been a while.
A300's too.. I used fly a B 757-300 into LGA , not that big a deal just pay attention.

[Airbubba]

I used to fly in and out of LGA (slf) all the time on business trips when I lived in NJ. Flying to Phoenix, my favorite was TWA service on an L-1011. Also, American used B-767s on selected routes out of LGA.

Thanks, looks like DC-10's once flew out of LGA as well:

The Little Airport That Could: La Guardia's Tri-Jet Heavies (http://www.nycaviation.com/2014/08/heavies-lga-1970s-little-airport/)

I remembered vaguely that performance out of LGA was somehow factored into the DC-10 and L1011 designs and maybe LAX-HNL required the third engine in the pre-ETOPS era.

As far as the EMAS save, as Governor Mike Pence put it:

“Our son is a Marine Corps aviator and he says every landing you walk away from is a successful landing,”

Pence calls airplane skid 10 seconds of uncertainty | New York Post (http://nypost.com/2016/10/28/pence-calls-airplane-skid-10-seconds-of-uncertainty/)

We were also taught in Naval Aviation that a Marine knows that he forgot to lower the landing gear when it takes too much thrust to taxi after landing. Maybe that's also how he knows he's rolled into the EMAS. ;)

[billabongbill]

Runway of 7000 ft short for a B737? I think not. In another life flying for MH in Borneo Island in the 1990s, we operated into and out of an airport called Tawau airport...TWU, WBKW which was only 4500ft. Because of two hills close to the extended centreline, the displaced threshold meant that the LDA for rwy 17 was only 4200ft with a downslope to boot! In tropical torrential rain and gusty wind conditions, it was a challenge to land a B737-400. They had Boeing short field markers painted.

If landing is not assured with the Boeing short field TDZ, a wave off or rejected landing is mandatory. Special training and qualifications required. In the years of B737-200/300/400/500 operations, no mishaps occurred. Of course, there were a few close calls, nothing disastrous until a F-50 flown by an ex-AirFarce jockey crashed overshooting the runway in a botched landing.

They have now moved to a different located with rwy 06/24 of 8800ft long.

LGA might really need a little more attention but not that difficult by any means. Maybe, :mad: just happened.

[vapilot2004]

Good one, re Marine Aviators, Airbubba. I know you're kidding but it was funny. Cheers KTM300 for responding to Airbubba and myself. :ok:

[CommonI]

[QUOTE=Airbubba;9559271]Has anything larger than a 757 regularly operated from LGA?

Lot's of DC-10's and L1011's from various carriers in the seventies and eighties, and I believe American flew 767's out of there until fairly recently.

[vapilot2004]

American, Delta, and United all operated 67s out of KLGA. That could expand if the port authority, which operates the airport, would amend rules regarding paired cities. Currently the limit is cities within 1,500 miles of KLGA, although Denver is an exception.

[Retired DC9 driver]

Has anything larger than a 757 regularly operated from LGA? Air Canada operated L-1011 and B-767 aircraft into LGA . I had a few flights in there as a newly minted F/E on the L-1011 in 1980. Later I flew the DC-9 in there a lot, and Airbus 319/320. In those days the controllers would ask, "Have you got the GW"? If you said yes they would clear you for a visual down the Hudson. You could get the right turn in for 31, coming from the North too, if you asked nicely.
Always wanted to do an Expressway Visual in there with the 767 but never got the chance..

[INNflight]

Wow, never heard of EMAS before, but it seems it's been around a while. Not sure if it's used outside the USA?

Yes, very much at various airports - at least here in Europe. I'm pretty sure it's becoming more of a standard than an option, especially at newly-built runways.

[DaveReidUK]

Apart from Barajas, I'm struggling to think of any other EMAS installations in Europe.

What other airports are you thinking of ?

[M609]

Kristiansand/ENCN has EMAS on both ends.

[Doors to Automatic]

Apart from Barajas, I'm struggling to think of any other EMAS installations in Europe.


Manchester has some sort of arrestor bed on 23R - not EMAS but if memory serves it contained ash pellets which could stop a 747 at 60kts

[tdracer]

EMAS is fairly common in the US - especially on the shorter runways (I understand we don't have it at SEA because they have 1,000 ft. of overrun - personally I think this might be questionable logic because at the end of that 1,000 ft. is quite a steep drop-off :confused: ).
My understanding is MEAS is rather rare outside of North America. Perhaps the international publicity of this incident will help expand the use of EMAS outside of this continent.
It would mean something positive came out of this train wreck of a presidential election :*

[peekay4]

Of the > 100 EMAS installations worldwide, only 5 are outside of the US, with 3 in Europe: 1) Madrid-Barajas; 2) Kristiansand, Norway; 3) Zurich, Switzerland.

[FIRESYSOK]

Auto spoilers not armed, or rather deferred on this tail.

Rubber smell in cabin (hydroplaning), etc....should be a straightforward inquiry I think.

[Murexway]

An acceptable conclusion to any approach is a missed approach. But he would have needed to make that decision before touchdown - especially at LGA with a wet runway with a slight quartering tail wind.

Presuming that the airplane was properly configured: full flaps, autospoilers and autobrakes armed, AND that he had a stable approach: on speed and a normal glide path, he might have tried to "plant it" on the end and got a nasty bounce instead.

[FlightDetent]

Are we still speaking of an executive configured, low payload, B737 on a 2100 m LDA?

[b1lanc]

tdracer:
We have it at MHT 06 also. Nothing on 24 which also has a drop off towards the river. The 300 ft on 06 was added during the runway expansion in 2001 if I recall correctly.

[Tech Guy]

Tech Guy, if you read the thread you will find the answer. Then google it for more information!

Thank you. I appear to have missed that bit. :\

[underfire]

A device intended to automatically help slow aircraft upon landing wasn’t operating when a jet carrying vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence skidded off a La Guardia Airport runway Thursday night, federal investigators said.

The pilots had to manually deploy panels that pop up on top of the wings, called spoilers, delaying by some seconds their effectiveness, the National Transportation Safety Board said Friday.

Mike Pence?s Jet Had Faulty Device - WSJ (http://www.wsj.com/articles/mike-pences-jet-had-faulty-device-1477701580)

[oldchina]

And then the Penny dropped ...

[Airbubba]

With autospoilers inop there is normally a runway table that gives adjusted landing lengths. On some versions of the 737 there appear to be weight penalties associated with manual speed brakes, I'm thinking this probably depends on the rules in effect when the model was certified on the basis of the long-grandfathered 737 airworthiness certificate.

After the Southwest B-737-700 overrun at MDW in 2005, the FAA has been big on doing a landing performance assessment at the time of arrival.

Hopefully the crew explicitly did this, discussed and briefed the landing conditions and the autospoiler MEL.

And, remembered to raise the speedbrakes on landing.

EMAS is great stuff from the several saves in recent years. Like grooved runways, I'm sure it will eventually catch on overseas.

[A0283]

Was reading a number of 737 overrun cases the last few weeks. Just wondering if there was a good picture of an actual overrun through an EMAS when Mr Pence obliged.

Interesting to read in those reports how the NTSB covered post-dispatch-release and post-takeoff landing performance assessment issues already for a number of years, and @Airbubba pointing out that the FAA is following up.

For those interested. The spoiler issues from literature (at least from what i am reading) amongst others shows a number of important issues. First arming spoilers at all, and second armed spoilers automatically deploying but retracting again, and third automatically retracting spoilers with or without the crew manually deploying them again.

Will be interesting to compare for instance the case of American Airlines 1420 (MD82) of 1999 with the present case.

[wideman]

[tangent alert]

So what's the expected result if an a/c lands short on a rwy w/EMAS .. that is, the MLG touches down on the stuff?

[pattern_is_full]

Well, with the particular EMAS in question at the approach end of LGA 04, if you are low/short enough to touch down on it, you likely already took out the top of a semi or bus on the highway (Grand Central Parkway) that is only 300 feet or so south of the EMAS end.

But in general, depends on whether you plant the landing hard, or grease it on, such that the full weight only settles on the wheels after passing the EMAS.

Edit for correction.....

Durrh! - peekay is correct. Picture shows ramp (also blast deflector to prevent take-off thrust in the other direction stripping off the EMAS) and EMAS positioning on top of runway surface:

http://www.ainonline.com/sites/default/files/uploads/2013/06/citation-3.jpg

[misd-agin]

Is there a 'ramp' under the EMAS to ease the transition to the runway if you land short?

Or would it be like the MC-130 that landed at night in Iraq on the closed runway? Closed because there was a 4' deep ditch across the runway.

Iraq C-130 Crash Photos (http://gruntdoc.com/2005/01/iraq-c-130-crash-photos.html)

[peekay4]

If you penetrate the EMAS, you'd get sharp deceleration, but the main problem would be that after 500 feet sunk in the EMAS, you's hit the "step up" to the actual runway surface, with still-significant speed. Could rip off the gear at that point.

There is no "ramp" or "step up" if you land short. It's the other way around -- EMAS actually sits "on top" of the paved surface. The "bottom" (base) of the EMAS is at the same elevation as the runway.

The issue if you land short is if the EMAS bed is too soft (think of landing into soft mud that's unable to withstand the aircraft's weight -- you can easily lose control). So EMAS including its base must be constructed to some minimum strength and density.

Since EMAS is actually "on top" of the runway surface, then there is in fact a ramp, but on far side. I.e., if you land long, there is a gentle ramp past the runway end that supports the plane up onto the EMAS bed.

[Doors to Automatic]

Is there a set height to cross the threshold or on a short runway can the PF use discretion and come in a little lower?

[FlightDetent]

50 feet. Not much room for any lower with regards to tail clearance. And it would not be an authorized technique anyhow.

Short version: yes, we can.

[JW411]

Ducking under is a BIG NO NO nowadays.

[172_driver]

Ducking under is OK and used by professionals on a day to day basis where I work. E.g. a contaminated runway with displaced threshold. Plenty of flat surface under you before the 'real' threshold. The point is not to land on it but land earlier than normal to maximize stopping distance. You can gain a couple of hundred meters if needed. If visual references are poor, then you might not want to try it. Your call.

[PJ2]

Ducking under is OK
I certainly concur with JW411 that ducking under the 3deg approach path is a very big no-no.

To fine-tune this point, if one decides to do so or it is condoned at one's carrier, one must know one's aircraft and the runway.

One never, ever ducks under with a wide body due to gear clearances at the threshold - THAT is a no-no. If one is feeling the need to do so because one has even slight doubts about stopping distances, redo the actual landing distance calculations using all applicable factors in the charts, (which normally do take reverse into consideration, at least on the Boeing).

If it is close, one should not be there in the first place. Don't do the approach, period. How one then resolves that, (divert, different runway, hold), is a PIC decision.

With smaller transports, (B737/A320, etc) one may make a decision to do so if one knows the airport and one's clearances and knows what a displacement of say a half-dot low means in actual height above the threshold, (a dot low at the threshold is a big no-no even though it can be technically done).

In those rare situations where one diverges from SOPs, one must think, "Now is the 30" I have in hand, which I may wish I had, 45" from now..."

There is simply no percentage in hitting a light or worse, just to satisfy your passengers' need to get to their destination. I should think that very few companies these days will question the resulting diversion if that's what it ends up being.

[framer]

a dot low at the threshold is a big no-no even though it can be technically done).
Can you elaborate on what you mean there ? Surely a dot low at the threshold is better than a dot low at any time prior to the threshold? From memory I think a dot low is only about four feet low by the time you are at the threshold on a standard 3 degree slope.

[RAT 5]

A friend of mine has heard it touched down well into the runway leaving <1000m to stop. Is that correct?

[PEI_3721]

172, there are many issues with 'duck under'. The threshold crossing altitude considers the preceding obstacle free surface, penetrate that at you own risk.
A duck under manoeuvre destabilises the approach; there is plenty of evidence that this adds risk to the landing.
If you feel that you need an extra 'two hundred meters' then the pre-landing assessment has been misjudged; go around.
The objective of calculating landing distance with appropriate safety margins is that if there are no aircraft failures or gross pilot mishandling then the landing risks are minimised. The safety margins should accommodate most system failures or mishandling, but perhaps not both together. Then and only then might EMAS be considered, but this is a risk mitigation strategy for inadequate or special emergency overrun areas, not for pilots to plan on having.

framer, you assume that duck under can be done whilst maintaining a 3 deg slope; and perhaps overlook that the GS abeam is angular. Thus linear extrapolation of a 'little bit low' at the threshold could be much larger before that.

[RAT 5]

Landing closer to the Threshold than the 3-400m touchdown zone was a question for judgement on the day, and only on a very clear visual approach. A Devil's Advocate comment might be: "if the 3 most useless things to a pilot are 1. runway behind you, 2. sky above you & 3. fuel in the bowser," then why is No.1 only for takeoff?
OK, I know all the arguments about obstacle clearance and safety zone penetration, and beat it into my students for years. Now, OFDM that includes 'below G.S' data has stamped that out on ILS. However, I remember a day many years ago, before Big Brother, going into Inverness (short) in winter (patches of ice & snow and an 'finger in the wind' BA assessment) with no headwind, even swirling: (a previous F27 had said it was OK) we decided that leaving excessive tarmac behind us at touchdown was not desirable, and we might 'pinch a bit'. This was before OFDM and an NPA in any case. Neither of us considered this a dangerous or destabilising manoeuvre. Risking going off the end was considered the worse option.
RW32L MAD has a huge displaced threshold. The displacement is a short runway in itself. Totally clear of any obstruction. So what would you do if you had an anti-skid landing to make? Would you leave 300-400m behind you when Mk-1 eyeball says the air underneath you is clear & free. I'm not talking of death defying dives, never; but equally I can't say never to pinching a bit. There need to be mitigating and extenuating circumstances. As a matter of course on a clear & dry day with fully functional a/c? No.
Watching the landings in ST. Maarten makes one wonder. Look at the wheel height over the beach B747 and wonder if they've flown on the slope all the way down. Pinching a bit on that runway, in such a high eye height, would be fraught with danger. If you do it correctly, on speed, with a head wind, on a clean & dry runway with all the buffers included, there should be no problem to the skilled.
There were some very short looking runways in the european tourist network where we took B767. They did look short at 2-3 miles out, but the brakes are made for MTOW RTO's so stopping a light weight landing was never a problem, if you arrived on schedule and not 5 secs late. 2 seconds early was not required.

[JammedStab]

I certainly concur with JW411 that ducking under the 3deg approach path is a very big no-no.

To fine-tune this point, if one decides to do so or it is condoned at one's carrier, one must know one's aircraft and the runway.

One never, ever ducks under with a wide body due to gear clearances at the threshold - THAT is a no-no. If one is feeling the need to do so because one has even slight doubts about stopping distances, redo the actual landing distance calculations using all applicable factors in the charts, (which normally do take reverse into consideration, at least on the Boeing).

If it is close, one should not be there in the first place. Don't do the approach, period. How one then resolves that, (divert, different runway, hold), is a PIC decision.

With smaller transports, (B737/A320, etc) one may make a decision to do so if one knows the airport and one's clearances and knows what a displacement of say a half-dot low means in actual height above the threshold, (a dot low at the threshold is a big no-no even though it can be technically done).

In those rare situations where one diverges from SOPs, one must think, "Now is the 30" I have in hand, which I may wish I had, 45" from now..."

There is simply no percentage in hitting a light or worse, just to satisfy your passengers' need to get to their destination. I should think that very few companies these days will question the resulting diversion if that's what it ends up being.
It is not uncommon top be slightly low on the glideslope when crossing the threshold. Used to do it intentionally on the occasional short runway where we were in tight confines in the old days before the aircraft were so closely monitored. On the turboprops, we really used to "dip the PAPI's" close in. I remember one particularly short runway where the PAPIs had you landing halfway down the runway. Unsafe. Still did it in the narrowbody jets at one location that was max landing weight and runway limited weight together. Haven't felt the need to on the widebodies....yet.

Is there really any difference between a smaller jet and a larger jet in the threshold crossing height? As far as I know there is an adjustment in the avionics in order to ensure a similar gear clearance over the threshold.

For example, the Boeing FCTM's have a table for "main gear over threshold" with pilot eye height over threshold/main gear height over the threshold. For the 737-600 the two numbers for a 3.0 degree glide path are 49'/33'. For the 747-400 the numbers are 66'/31'. So being a dot low on either is practically the same reduction in main gear clearance. The real difference between the widebody and the narrowbody is the pilot sitting higher for a given glideslope location.

Who hasn't seen near full scale glideslope deflecton below 100 feet? You might need that extra couple of hundred feet of rollout on a slippery runway that was supposedly "braking action reported as fair/medium".

[RAT 5]

You might need that extra couple of hundred feet of rollout on a slippery runway that was supposedly "braking action reported as fair/medium".

Especially in the non-normal landing direction, on a rainy day, with all the rubber at the stopping end.
I used to adjust flaps & thrust for takeoff in a similar situation; in case of an RTO to gain a few more meters. It caused various interesting reactions from the other seat when we 'didn't just use the numbers'. But that's another topic and I do to wish to 'creep the thread'.

[Airbubba]

Years ago a lot of these personal techniques were common in my experience. Folks would add knots to the approach speed for the wife and kids. Non-standard additives would be made for wind with autothrottles in use.

Seems like some of the Air Force guys would brief 'I'm going to duck under a dot on short final since the viz is good' while landing a widebody. Was it taught in the T-38, the C-141 or the C-5 perhaps?

One of the regional carriers decades ago had a non-approved B-737 short field technique of pulling up the speedbrake handle before touchdown so that the boards would fully deploy the moment there was weight on the wheels. When a newer version of the 737 arrived, ground spoiler mode was triggered by radar altitude, the boards fully deployed before the wheels were on the runway and a hard landing mishap occurred.

In recent years, thankfully, most of these cowboy techniques seem to be less common where I've worked. However, with all the airline 'mergers' I'm sure non-standard 'we did it this way at Brand X' procedures will give the feds and the training department a lot of job security for years to come.

[172_driver]

Doors to Automatic asked if there is a set threshold crossing height or if discretion can be used by the PF.

There is a published threshold crossing height yes. Judging from the replies there's no consensus about discretion of going low. Could it be the ones who fly into short/slippery runways in small(er) jets and turboprops take it lighter than those flying widebody jets?

[misd-agin]

Crossing the threshold how many feet lower does being a half dot low equate to? Or a full dot?

[PEI_3721]

"near full scale glideslope deflection below 100 feet"

"how many feet lower does being a half dot low equate to? Or a full dot"

Depending on the type and location of GS ground installation the aircraft indications will progressively show below the ideal path because of the parabolic nature of a reflected beam. Thus the GS scale is not a suitable indication of height or deviation at lower altitudes.

[misd-agin]

Crossing the threshold a half dot, or a dot, is a relatively small displacement. IMO a bigger issue is demanding "don't do this, don't do this" so guys make relatively large changes in aimpoint/touchdown point because of an over concern about being slightly low.

At 100' a half dot is roughly 2.5 feet. A dot is five feet(+/-). If your aimpoint/flight path is correct you'll cross the threshold 1-2' from ideal. That's not the end of the world. Making a significant correction and losing your aimpoint/flight path, and perhaps requiring a secondary correction, puts you at risk of a bigger deviation from acceptable performance.

[FlightDetent]

Hmm. Rule of thumb for stabised approaches (1 dot high max, no lower than 0,5 below) is the error becomes +20 % and -10% of the height. Your numbers would be wrong by factor of four. Anybody care to do the math?

By the way I'm in the "aim to land as calculated using as much muscle memory/visual drill as possible". The humble observation being, that "out of the box" / "this one time only" techiques make for longer landings, at least on 50% of the attempts. Uglier ones for about 90%. (A320)

[JammedStab]

Years ago a lot of these personal techniques were common in my experience. Folks would add knots to the approach speed for the wife and kids. Non-standard additives would be made for wind with autothrottles in use.

Seems like some of the Air Force guys would brief 'I'm going to duck under a dot on short final since the viz is good' while landing a widebody. Was it taught in the T-38, the C-141 or the C-5 perhaps?

One of the regional carriers decades ago had a non-approved B-737 short field technique of pulling up the speedbrake handle before touchdown so that the boards would fully deploy the moment there was weight on the wheels. When a newer version of the 737 arrived, ground spoiler mode was triggered by radar altitude, the boards fully deployed before the wheels were on the runway and a hard landing mishap occurred.

In recent years, thankfully, most of these cowboy techniques seem to be less common where I've worked. However, with all the airline 'mergers' I'm sure non-standard 'we did it this way at Brand X' procedures will give the feds and the training department a lot of job security for years to come.
As I said, we used to land turboprops(no reverse by the way on the engines) on a short runway less than 3000 feet(and some that were a bit longer). Was 100% hard pack snow all winter.

Now some folks might call you a cowboy if you don't follow the official flight path all the way down and land at about 13-1500' down the runway(which has a downslope in both directions for the latter half of the rollout) because you followed the PAPI and had your 50' wheel clearance....

...but in reality, you would be a fool if you were anything but a so-called cowboy. And yes, it was done during a check flight. Some 10,000 foot plus runway guys have a hard time understanding stuff like this.

[FlightDetent]

Why the gripe? Different OPS, different standard techniques... Carry one across to the other field, and you're set for trouble.

BTW it is not wheels at 50', but G/S antenna, the wheels are at 33 over the greens. LOT of difference. 33' wheel clearance also illustrates, why "going low" brings little benefit.

Airbus: pilot eye / antenna / gear
320: 56 / 50 / 34
330: 59 / 50 / 28

[B2N2]

There seems to be an excessive amount of 'this is what I did' versus 'this is what they did'.

How do you recognize an Airline Pilot at a party, he'll tell you comes to mind.
Enough about me let's talk about my boat.

What you did 30-40 years ago in your 3-holers has no relevance to this accident.
Why they were doing 130kts GS 4600' down the runway does.

[PJ2]

FlightDetent, re calculating deviation in feet from dots above/below the glideslope and, "Anybody care to do the math?"

I looked this up some time ago on PPRuNe when I was working on FDM Program determination of touchdown points to ensure the correctly-calculated distance from 50' to touchdown.

The matter was discussed, along with the mathematics, at:

http://www.pprune.org/questions/362264-glideslope-deviation.html#post4719685

[FlightDetent]

That post suggest's one dot below equals to 0,2 degress angular displacement. Some other sources on the web state 0,15 and 0,35. Difference too large to draw conclusions. Off the topic, anyhow.

Thanks still.

[peekay4]

There isn't a "standard dot". Some instruments have 5 dots per side (full deflection), while others might have only 2 dots or 3 dots for the same deflection. At the extremes I've seen older instruments with no dots at all and one with 10 dots per side.

Assuming a 3 degree GP, on a 5-dot display one dot is approx. 0.15 degrees. On a 2-dot display, one dot is approx. 0.35 degrees.

[RAT 5]

Has anyone closed in on factual truth behind this over-run. One assumes the landing performance was adequate, so what lined up a few holes? All this talk of dots & degrees & slopes & displacements is giving me a headache. KISS. Keep the crash point fixed in the window at the correct speed and you should have a modicum of success more often than not.

[PJ2]

B2N2, re, "Why they were doing 130kts GS 4600' down the runway . . . ", where'd you get the "130kts" & "4600ft" from?

[FlightDetent]

Firstly, with as little personal input as possible:

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=190959

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/n278ea#b70e06f

https://s19.postimg.org/nj5b30wq7/pence_chart.png (https://postimg.org/image/nj5b30wq7/)

https://s19.postimg.org/674yhl38v/pence_raw.png (https://postimg.org/image/674yhl38v/)

my notes:
. FR24 claim to use "FAA data", what it means I do not know, however the recorded altitude seems to be corrected for QNH (which is not the case with ADS-B raw values)
- For ADS-B raw data, speed = ground speed
- Typically for ADS-B raw data, altitude = 0 means "positive weight on wheels", not the actual value
- ALT = 0 at time 23:40:34 should be interpreted with extreme caution as the speed for that frame is invalid.

Based on the above, the time lapse to slow down on ground from 135 >> 132 kt is 18 seconds, which translates to 1200 meters of distance covered. This is ignoring the suspicious reading at 23:40:34.

Fact: LDA = 2100 m
Observation: B2N2's quoted figure of 4600 ft = 1400 m.

[misd-agin]

Link provided by PJ2 shows 1 dot = 6.6' at 100' AGL.

So one dot = roughly 3' crossing the threshold.
1/2 dot = 2'(rounding error).

I'm not saying ignore the vertical deviation but IMO aim point is a significant factor in the entire process.

[PJ2]

FlightDetent;

Oh, okay, thank you. I just took it for granted that with a number that precise, that accuracy was also implied from an NTSB communication or something that I'd missed.

That kind of accuracy can't be done from FR24 etc., for the reasons you've stated so we'll see what the Interim Report says.

[peekay4]

FR24 claim to use "FAA data", what it means I do not know, however the recorded altitude seems to be corrected for QNH (which is not the case with ADS-B raw values)

Other than ADS-B, sites like FR24 get a "near real-time" data feed from the FAA (called the ASD feed). This feed contains flight plan and position data (including lat / long, ground speed) for all IFR aircraft in the US air space.

[DaveReidUK]

Oh, okay, thank you. I just took it for granted that with a number that precise, that accuracy was also implied from an NTSB communication or something that I'd missed.

That kind of accuracy can't be done from FR24 etc., for the reasons you've stated so we'll see what the Interim Report says.

Don't confuse precision with accuracy. :O

FWIW, that's almost certainly ADS-B-derived data, it's too granular to have come from ASDI.

[FlightDetent]

PJ2: The FR24 data is not authoritative, but still coming from the A/C's data buses, precise.

The position recorded at time frame 23:40:49 is here https://www.google.co.uk/maps/place/40%C2%B046'28.4%22N+73%C2%B052'46.9%22W/@40.7747541,-73.880118,15z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d40.774548!4d-73.879684. Distance measured from the threshold 4650 ft, GS = 132 kt.

From that point the distance remaining to DERA is 710 m, figure just about enough to stop with max braking effort corresponding to AFM. Already tested in real life: http://avherald.com/h?article=463e0584

[PJ2]

DaveReidUK, re, "Don't confuse precision with accuracy. http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/embarass.gif",

Yes, agree - if the writing came across that way, it wasn't intended - I'm aware that one can be both precise and inaccurate, etc.

FlightDetent;
My larger point is not to rely upon FR24 for any serious data work, particularly lat/long. The system isn't designed for it and we don't know the concurrence between a commercial, non-specialized system such as FR24 data and a system engineered for such data recording like the flight-recorder/QAR data.

[DaveReidUK]

Another way to look at it is to consider that ADS-B data is designed principally for surveillance (i.e. as a radar substitute) - that's what the "S" stands for - so it's perfectly adequate for use by ATC to ensure separation.

But attempting to use it as if it was a mini-FDR is fraught with difficulties, not least because all those FR24 data points before touchdown that purport to show both a lat/lon and a velocity are fabricated from two separate transmissions from the aircraft at different points in time, one with each of those two parameters.

Incidentally the QNH at the time of the incident, according to the METARs, was about 1020 mb so the height readouts are likely to be about 200' adrift from true AMSL values.

[FlightDetent]

P2J, your point is valid and agreed with. No official conclusions to be drawn on data recovered from FR24 amateur/DYI channels. It is not designed for such purpouse neither certified.

Yet you know well, that on your A/C, the DMC feeds ADIRS data to QAR, FDR and the ADS-B out unit. Unless the transport layer - FR24 - corrupts or adjusts that data, all readouts will eventually turn out to be the same.

Case study:

A) Unofficial source "FR24" overlayed by an anonymous internet enthusiast (me) over non-purpouse built resource "Google Maps":
1256

B) NTSB findings:
Pending

C) Unofficial source "photography" taken by a non-licenced, commercial journalist:
1253
1252

Now :), everybody's welcome to not draw their own conslusions.

Overlay of FR24 recorded positions where ALT = 0.
1255

[PJ2]

Thanks FlightDetent. I understand your pov as well. The data is there, "why not use it to see what happened."

If I may...

The industry is recognizing that it is becoming a significant challenge in flight safety and investigative work that unofficial sources like everyone's cellphone, Twitter and FR24 can influence widespread understanding and the drawing of conclusions of an incident or accident. It is true that both can be helpful in the "official" investigation but only in the hands of trained and experienced investigators.

I know the tide cannot be stopped from coming in and that today, "official" & "unofficial" have become maleable concepts. However, from a retired airline pilot's and safety investigator's pov, the above cautions, which apply to all aviation incidents, ensure that as solid a set of conclusions are derived from the sources designed for the work and that appropriate corrective actions are enabled.

The photograph of the flaps I referenced at the beginning of the thread, showed them in the takeoff position. Why were they in that position and not the 30 or 40 position? The question can't be answered by FR24 or anyone here until the NTSB releases their interim work. In the meantime, we dont' know the flap position's contribution to the overrun, if any. Did they have a hydraulic issue - likely not, but we don't know.

Again, thanks for your clarifying response.

[FlightDetent]

The feedback is my reward. :ok:

--

The thread had run off on two tangents, threshold crossing height and techniques, plus data usability from public domain. Back on track now?

Runway overruns are rather simple physics. Either the landing is deep, excess energy is carried, or braking performace is degraded. Typically any single one is not sufficient enough to cause an exursion. A 737 touched down in Jamaica, December 2009, with 162 kt GS, 4100 feet past the THR and thrust well above idle - then the result becomes inevitable (http://www.jcaa.gov.jm/NEWS_UPDATES/FINAL_REPORT_AA331/AA331%20FINAL%20REPORT%2002%20May%202014.pdf).

In this case, however, the FR24 data (to be verified if accurate) show optimal if not shorter touchdown position, and quite normal, stable speed. What is little perplexing, is that for the 65% of overall ground run no speed reduction is recorded.

[PJ2]

"What is little perplexing, is that for the 65% of overall ground run no speed reduction is recorded."

That may be a function of the ADS-B not transmitting after ground-mode is set by the touchdown.

Re, "Runway overruns are rather simple physics."
Agree of course, but then it becomes much more complex. The first key in data analysis of air distances from the threshold to touchdown is accurate determination of the touchdown point. That is nowhere nearly as easy as it sounds. It's slightly better if one has good, on-board GPS-derived lat/long data.

Perhaps the following is orthogonal to the thread topic but as long as we're determining causes and prevention of overruns, the following may be tangentially-useful.

The NLR provides some very good papers on such determinations. At the 2nd Conference of the European Operators Flight Data Monitoring forum (EOFDM), Gerard van Es was invited to present "Monitoring Landing Overrun Risk using FDM: Tips and Tricks". The presentation can be found here.
http://essi.easa.europa.eu/ecast/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/EOFDM_CONFERENCE_2013_VAN_ES_Monitoring_RunwayExcursions.pdf

This page gives you some general information about runway excursions. What are the statistics telling us, what initiatives are taking placing to prevent runway excursions etc.
NLR-ATSI Runway Excursions (http://www.nlr-atsi.nl/services/runway-safety/runway-excursions/index.html)

The FAA Document, (DOT/FAA/AR-07/7) provides a very good discussion of all aspects of landing performance. It has a $30 title, but is well worth reading!
DOT-FAA-AR-07-7_A Study of Normal Operational Landing Performance on Subsonic Civil Narrow Body Jet Aircraft during ILS Approaches - ar077 (http://www.pprune.org/www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar077.pdf)

[FlightDetent]

"What is little perplexing, is that for the 65% of overall ground run no speed reduction is recorded."

That may be a function of the ADS-B not transmitting after ground-mode is set by the touchdown. I lead you astray ... the altitude is zeroed, yes. Both heading and speed are however alive:
1258

[PJ2]

Ah, okay - thanks for the screenshot by the way - the original FR24 data is no longer available to non-members.

[DaveReidUK]

Yes, it is.

CSV and GE/KML here:

Flightradar24 Data Regarding Runway Excursion at La Guardia Airport (https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flightradar24-data-regarding-runway-excursion-at-la-guardia-airport/)

[PJ2]

Appreciate it, thanks.

[A0283]

On EMAS and ILS

Does anyone know if there is information about installation of EMAS and the effect of that ground-plane change on ILS LOC and G/S signals?

Did the installation of EMAS at LaGuardia require new modelling and is EMAS included in the latest reflection models? And were these used at LaGuardia?

Also, is it possible to widen the EMAS beyond the width of the runway without having a negative impact on ILS signals?

[FlightDetent]

The reference to AA in Jamaica was only made to exemplify that (out of three) more than just one element needs to go wrong - and in a significant manner - for a runway overrun to happen. In this respect that accident report is like a box of chocolates. And if it were not for the contradictions there would be no excursion to report on. :suspect:

On the contrary, from the little that is known, the accident in KLGA seems somewhat unusual as both the touchdown point and energy at landing look quite allright.

[XATAguy]

91.129(2) Each pilot operating a large or turbine-powered airplane approaching to land on a runway served by an instrument approach procedure with vertical guidance, if the airplane is so equipped, must:

(i) Operate that airplane at an altitude at or above the glide path between the published final approach fix and the decision altitude (DA), or decision height (DH), as applicable; or

(3) Each pilot operating an airplane approaching to land on a runway served by a visual approach slope indicator must maintain an altitude at or above the glide path until a lower altitude is necessary for a safe landing.

[PJ2]

NTSB Issues Investigative Updates for LaGuardia 737 Runway Excursion, Fort Lauderdale MD-10-10F Gear Collapse, Fire
Nov. 22, 2016

WASHINGTON — The National Transportation Safety Board issued investigative updates Tuesday as part of the agency’s ongoing investigation of a Boeing 737 runway excursion at New York's LaGuardia Airport and a Boeing MD-10 landing gear failure accident in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. Both events happened in late October.
Eastern Air Lines Runway Excursion

A Boeing 737-700 (registration N278EA), a chartered flight operated by Eastern Air Lines Group, overran Runway 22 during landing at LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York, Oct. 27, about 7:42 p.m. EDT. The airplane veered to the right during the overrun and partially transited the Engineered Material Arresting System before it came to a stop on the turf about 200 feet from the runway end. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. The 11 crew and 37 passengers, including then vice presidential candidate Mike Pence, deplaned via the airstairs. The flight originated at Fort Dodge, Iowa, about 4:23 p.m. CDT.

NTSB investigators document the B-737 involved in the runway excursion. Photo: Peter Knudson/NTSB

Initial findings include the following:
- The airplane was manufactured in 1998. It had accumulated 48,179 total flight hours with 17,098 total flight cycles at the time of the incident.
- Investigators retrieved the flight data and cockpit voice recorders shortly after arriving on scene. The recorders were transported to the NTSB recorders lab for download. Both recorders contained good quality data.
- The flight crew reported the landing followed a stable approach.
- The flight crew reported sighting the runway when the airplane was about 700 feet above the ground; they said that the airplane “floated” during the landing flare; the main landing gear touched down on the wet runway about 3,000 feet beyond the runway threshold.
- The speed brakes were manually engaged about four seconds after touchdown. Thrust reversers were deployed about seven seconds after touchdown.
- The flight crew did not report any mechanical irregularities or abnormal braking action, which was corroborated by the flight data recorder.
- Investigators interviewed flight crews of the four airplanes that landed immediately prior to the incident airplane; none reported any problems with braking action on the wet runway.

The on-scene investigation was completed Oct. 30, after which the airplane was released to the operator. The performance of the EMAS will be examined to determine its effect on the deceleration of the airplane.

Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Air Lines Group and Boeing.

[safetypee]

200 ft for every second of late lift dump. (4 x 200 ft)
200 ft for every second above 2 sec for late deployment of reverse. (~ 500 ft)
How much reverse, what level of braking was chosen for the reported runway condition?
Add that the the reported long flare (3000 ft?) and compare with the landing distance available.

Then consider at what point during the landing roll-out the crew could be aware that the aircraft might not stop in the distance remaining; would use of all available deceleration devices at this point be able to stop the aircraft in the remaining distance.

'Avoiding an overrun' http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-79A.pdf

[PJ2]

SafetyP, I wondered the same things. They have all the data. Why not comment on deceleration efforts? Why the comment that the speedbrakes were "manually engaged", (thinking here that they weren't armed prior to touchdown, or there was some hydroplaning?).

Guess we'll have to wait for the report.

[JammedStab]

I believe that the auto function of the speedbrakes were MEL'd.

Pence?s skidding plane had inoperable speed reducer, NTSB says | Newsday (http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/mike-pence-s-airplane-skids-off-laguardia-runway-1.12518698)

Which means that you want to get them and the reversers out quick in a situation like this. Can be done in 1-2 seconds after touchdown. Best to make sure of a 1500' touchdown or less as well.

Curious about the autobrake setting.

[Old Boeing Driver]

"- The speed brakes were manually engaged about four seconds after touchdown. Thrust reversers were deployed about seven seconds after touchdown."

It seems to me that 4 seconds is a long time to get the spoilers up. Just me, as soon as I had the thrust levers at idle and was on the ground, I was pulling the spoilers up (707/727 and 737 with inop auto-speedbrake)

3 seconds after speedbrake deployment might be OK for the T/R's to be fully open.

Maybe he was pulling on the reversers first, and being unable to get them up due to no weight on the squat switches, then remembering to pull the speedbrake handle?

[JammedStab]

A good thing to review in a situation like this is what the hand maneuvers will be after touchdown. Especially if you were never on the old style manual deployment aircraft or haven't done it in a long time.

[Airbubba]

Looks like Eastern kept the contract after this overrun.

Vice President-elect Pence is enroute DSM-IND at the moment on the sister plane N277EA, a B-738, using the callsign of 'TYSON TWO'.

President-elect Trump is enroute DSM-LGA on 'TYSON ONE', N757AF.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Should have gone around... (CVR)

https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=59915&StartRow=16&EndRow=28&CurrentPage=2&order=1&sort=0&TXTSEARCHT=

[Airbubba]

Thanks for posting this. A lot of detail is in these dockets.

I think this link will take you directly to the CVR report:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59915/604111.pdf

Some excerpts from the CVR transcript:

18:48:22.5 CAM-2 i-l-s one three please. autobrakes three. flaps thirty.

18:48:26.8 HOT-1 (you have to go) flaps forty don't ch'ya?

18:48:28.8 CAM-2 na-ahh.

18:48:29.3 HOT-1 seven thousand feet.

18:48:30.4 CAM-2 we don't need it. autobrakes three will do it.

18:48:34.0 HOT-1 alright.

18:48:49.2 CAM-2 when you landed back there...you still had a lottttt of runway after we stopped.

...

18:52:53.5 HOT-1 oh well. # happens. life’s a #.

...

19:01:43.7 CAM-2 autobrakes three. flaps ah thirty. questions

19:01:47.5 HOT-1 no questions.

19:01:48.2 CAM-2 alright.

19:01:48.6 HOT-1 live long and prosper ha ha ha.

...

19:25:54.1 HOT-2 what an interesting trip.

19:25:58.5 HOT-2 the most important thing is that we're safe. you know. we've been safe all the time. so.

19:26:03.3 HOT-1 ah these two are pretty good girls. you know. they try really hard.

19:26:06.4 HOT-2 yeah.

19:26:08.9 HOT-2 you know what this lady said. that they are here because of the (pretty) faces. she said that.

19:26:15.6 CAM-2 so wrong man. she's.

19:26:17.5 CAM-1 @?

19:26:18.2 CAM-2 yeah. she said that.

19:26:18.8 CAM-1 wow.

19:26:20.2 HOT-2 they're here because of the pretty faces.

19:26:22.7 HOT-2 well. guess what. they hired ugly people here too.

...

19:40:09.8 CAM-1 raining like a mother #.

19:40:12.3 HOT-2 okay autopilot's coming off.

19:40:12.9 AWM [sound of three low to high frequency tones, similar to autopilot disconnect]

19:40:13.5 EGPWS approaching minimums.

19:40:17.5 CAM-1 cleared to land.

19:40:21.1 EGPWS minimums.

19:40:22.2 HOT-2 landing.

19:40:22.9 HOT-1 roger that.

19:40:27.4 HOT-1 that's slightly left.

19:40:31.6 EGPWS one hundred.

19:40:35.1 EGPWS fifty.

19:40:38.2 EGPWS thirty.

19:40:40.3 EGPWS twenty.

19:40:43.3 CAM-1 ** down.

19:40:46.0 EGPWS ten.

19:40:46.6 CAM-1 down down down down you're three thousand feet remaining.

19:40:52.1 CAM [sound of rumble, similar to touchdown]

19:40:57.3 HOT-2 manual braking.

19:41:00.6 CAM-?**.

19:41:00.7 TWR Eastern stop stop Eastern.

19:41:01.9 CAM [sound of increased background sound, similar to thrust reverser application]

19:41:03.4 CAM [sound of click]

19:41:05.3 HOT-1 ahhhh.

19:41:07.4 HOT-1 errhm [sound of exertion].

19:41:08.3 CAM [sound of rattle and rumble, similar to exiting runway]

19:41:11.2 HOT-1 #. **.

19:41:13.5 TWR we have an issue on the ah airport.

19:41:15.9 CAM [sound of decreased background noise, similar to reduction of thrust reversers]

19:41:18.1 CAM [sound of thump, thump, thump, similar to wipers, continues for next 9 seconds]

19:41:24.5 HOT-2 should have go around.

19:41:25.2 PA-1 remain seated. remain seated.

19:41:27.4 HOT-1 see that's what.

19:41:30.5 HOT-1 # me.

19:41:35.4 CAM-1 my career just ended.

19:41:37.3 HOT-2 we should have went around.

19:41:38.3 HOT-1 yeap.

19:41:40.0 HOT-2 #.

...

19:47:56.0 CAM-1 see unfortunately. I should have gone straight ahead and we would have been fine. when I made the turn is when I screwed up.

19:48:00.6 CAM-2 yeah I was- I was- I was fighting you. because I was trying to stay on the centerline.

19:48:05.1 HOT [sound of siren]

19:48:06.2 CAM-2 I was- I was trying to stay on the centerline and-

19:48:10.7 CAM-1 well.

19:48:13.7 CAM-2 we would have been fine. I- I- *** stay on centerline. you were fighting.

19:48:22.0 CAM-2 we would have broken just a few lights and that's it.

[Airbubba]

I've never flown the 737 and some of this stuff depends on the regs and aircraft certification. But wouldn't the crew be required to do some sort of slippery runway inflight landing performance assessment?

In the larger Boeings I would have to go to a QRH table for minimum flap and autobrake settings for actual conditions and reported braking action.

Also, a new runway condition reporting scheme came into effect a few weeks before this mishap, don't know if this will be a player in the analysis.

To me the CVR sounds like an experienced crew trying to get it right. They will inevitably be gigged for a little non-pertinent conversation below FL 180. Landing with flaps 30 instead of flaps 40 will be questioned.

As they repeatedly observed in their post-landing assessment, a go-around was definitely indicated.

Also, sounds like the captain got on the controls on rollout perhaps trying to take the plane off the right side of the runway instead of going into the localizer antenna and the expressway.

[Airbubba]

Here's the preliminary Boeing FDR analysis sent to the NTSB on November 17, 2016:

Preliminary Data Observations:

• F30 approach to Runway 22 at LaGuardia (LGA) with a runway length of 7001 feet, at a gross weight of 116,560 lb. at landing (Max Landing Weight [MLW]=129,200 lb.).

• Turbulent atmosphere with an increasing tailwind as the airplane approached the runway. At touchdown, the tailwind was approximately 10 knots.

• Autopilot was disconnected at approximately 300 feet radio altitude, with the autothrottle disconnected approximately 7 seconds later at 200 feet radio altitude.

• Shortly after autopilot disconnect, the glideslope deviation began to increase indicating the airplane was deviating above the glideslope beam.

• The airplane crossed the runway threshold at a radio altitude of 66 feet with the glideslope deviation increasing beyond 4 dots and a descent rate (negative vertical speed) of approximately 750 ft/min.

• The descent rate was reduced to near zero by 2500 feet beyond the runway threshold, resulting in the airplane floating down the runway.

• The initial touchdown occurred at: 1) approximately time 9127.5 seconds, 2) a distance of 4242 feet beyond the runway threshold (~1900 feet beyond the recommended touchdown zone), 3) an airspeed of 123 knots (Vref-4), 4) a ground speed of 130 knots, 5) a sink rate of 3.3 ft/sec.

• Upon main gear touchdown, maximum manual wheel brakes were commanded.

• The nose gear touched down approximately 2 seconds after main gear touchdown, but then rebounded back into the air due to commanded aft control column. The nose gear was held off the ground until it touched down a second and final time approximately 5 seconds after main gear touchdown.

• Speedbrakes were manually extended to full approximately 4.5 seconds after main gear touchdown (the speedbrakes were not armed for automatic extension upon landing). After initial touchdown, the airplane traveled approximately 1250 feet down the runway before the speedbrakes were extended to full deflection.

• Max reverse thrust was commanded by time 9135.5 seconds (8 seconds after initial touchdown). From initial touchdown to max reverse command, the airplane had traveled approximately 1650 feet down the runway.

• The airplane achieved good deceleration with speedbrake extension, maximum wheel brakes, and maximum reverse thrust, reaching 0.5 g’s of deceleration (negative longitudinal acceleration).

• Preliminary calculation of airplane braking coefficient indicates that during the period of friction-limited braking (beginning when the nose gear touched down at time 9133.5 seconds, 5520 feet beyond the threshold and ending as the airplane entered the EMAS) the calculated airplane braking coefficient varied between 0.2 and 0.4.

• As the airplane decelerated, increasing left control wheel was commanded, reaching 50 degrees of left control wheel by time 9145 seconds. The increasing left control wheel reduced the spoiler deflections on the right wing, per design.

• The calculated in-air crosswind component indicated there was a left crosswind of 7 to 8 knots, reducing to 3 to 5 knots before touchdown. The winds that were present while the airplane was on the ground could not be calculated, but a left crosswind would typically result in a right rudder pedal input to maintain centerline (and left control wheel if the crosswind magnitude was large enough).

• Some left rudder pedal was commanded as the airplane rolled down the runway, until it was removed and right rudder pedal was commanded at 6650 feet beyond the threshold. The airplane responded to the right pedal by deviating right of the runway centerline.

• The airplane departed the end of Runway 22 while deviating right of centerline at a ground speed of approximately 40 knots.

• The airplane crossed through the right corner of the EMAS and came to rest to the right of the EMAS, approximately 7180 feet beyond the runway threshold, and 114 feet right of centerline.

• Preliminary analysis of the data indicates all systems were operating as designed. The automatic speedbrake functionality could not be verified as the system was not armed for landing and was reportedly on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) as inoperative.

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59915/604054.pdf

[atakacs]

The initial touchdown occurred at: 1) approximately time 9127.5 seconds, 2) a distance of 4242 feet beyond the runway threshold (~1900 feet beyond the recommended touchdown zone)

Wow ! Actually they are quite lucky that everyone walked from this one IMHO !

[B2N2]

Captain got demoted and FO got fired on this one.
Both should have been fired.

[Airbubba]

Some possible answers to 'what were they thinking?' in the pilot interviews here:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59915/604022.pdf

[rottenray]

When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late.Wow. Just wow.

5,000 feet down the runway was too late for a go around?

Didn't remember the EMAS was there?

Actually, the whole last paragraph needs pasting here.

When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late. He stated that the moment he rounded out they should have gone around. He said he is now going to now require at least 8,000 feet of runway length for first officers to land. He said that that if the landing would have been
firmer they would have stopped on the runway. He said he will reiterate with first officers in the future that they must land in the touchdown zone. He said again that he did consider a go around before touchdown but there was little time to verbalize it, and he said to “put it down” instead of Go around.

and

When asked if he had been terminated before, he said that he had been terminated from Arrow Air.

That would be a fun bit to learn about.

[framer]

There is a lesson in here specific to Captains as well as the myriad of lessons for all crew.
The Captain thought that flap 40 was the wise choice, enough so that he said


18:48:26.8 HOT-1 (you have to go) flaps forty don't ch'ya?
The f/o, ( with 220 hours on type) replies " nah, auto-brake three will do it" to which the Captain replies
18:48:34.0 HOT-1 alright.
Obviously not calling the go-around at the end of the touch down zone was a major mistake but that lack of assertiveness/command whatever you want to call it was evident during the briefing when the f/o didn't take the hint and the Captain failed to ensure the ship was configured how he thought was appropriate.

[JammedStab]

That would be a fun bit to learn about.

"When asked about the captain’s proficiency or for areas that could be improved, when compared to others he had flown with, he declined to answer."

"When asked if he had heard of any other crewmembers complain about flying with this captain he declined to answer."

[noflynomore]

Just an educated guess.

So whilst there had been an "incident" the crew decided to action the appropriate after landing scan/procedure. Also this would allow any fire services better access to wheel/engine areas.

Hence flaps retracted and thus why flaps not in the 40 position.

Very questionable practice, that. They've overrun into the bundhu, the aircraft is covered in mud and who knows what else and they retract the flaps without any engineering inspection, just hoping they were not damaged by debris and would do five times more damage on retraction?
On second thoughts, I'd call that grossly unprofessional, if that is what happened.
To allow fire services access! What a joke! Surely no one really "thinks" like that - do they???

But having read the rest of the reports/transcript I take that back. It is entirely in keeping with their level of "professionalism".
The people who should be fired along with them are the idiots that hired that company to fly Mr Pence and his entourage - or were thet secretly Democrats?

[Loose rivets]

. . . that thought crossed my mind.

When such a notion makes more sense than any other scenario, life seems almost surrealistic. Bewildering, doesn't come close.

[IcePack]

briefing when the f/o didn't take the hint and the Captain failed to ensure the ship was configured how he thought was appropriate.

Ah imho a result of poor CRM training. Whilst it was never the intention, some take the opinion it is now a democracy up the front.

[JCO7]

According to their statements they didn't train flaps 40 at the airline. The FO had probably never done a flaps 40 on the Boeing. I certainly wouldn't push my FO into a 40 if he is completely uncomfortable with it. Flaps 30 wasn't the problem here, they would've had plenty runway if technique was proper, 30 or 40.

[IcePack]

JC07 then doing the landing yourself would be appropriate. (As you thought 40 was prudent)
Ah but that "might" upset the CRM dynamic.
Just saying.

[RAT 5]

Whatever happened to 'captaincy' and accepting that is where the buck stops?

I hope to xxx that no-one claims this accident was caused by bad CRM.

[JCO7]

JC07 then doing the landing yourself would be appropriate. (As you thought 40 was prudent)
Ah but that "might" upset the CRM dynamic.
Just saying.

A big part of multi-crew flying is risk assessment. As a Captain some things you can compromise on if in your professional judgment it does not adversely affect safety. The Captain accepting a flap 30 would be a case in point - based on any performance graph no doubt flap 30 was more than adequate. Flap 30 is a perfectly acceptable landing flap setting in the 737.

The Captain was used to flaps 40 from his previous operation, but this company used 30 as standard. Also playing in his mind no doubt was that the FO exhibited excellent flying skills during the previous approaches and landings. These are all things a commander takes into account.

But by his own admission his failure was in not calling the go around after the float. I don't think this was a CRM failure. It was just a bad call during a very dynamic situation.

[framer]

I certainly wouldn't push my FO into a 40 if he is completely uncomfortable with it. Flaps 30 wasn't the problem here, they would've had plenty runway if technique was proper, 30 or 40.
I agree that with a wet runway, 7000ft, wind straight across( ie potential tailwind) , and an f/o with 220 hours on type, that pushing him into a flap 40 would be a bad idea. If the f/o didn't want to do a flap 40 then then do it yourself. The Captain clearly thought flap 40 was the best idea, yet he failed to translate that into reality. That's a problem.
As a Captain some things you can compromise on if in your professional judgment it does not adversely affect safety. The Captain accepting a flap 30 would be a case in point - based on any performance graph no doubt flap 30 was more than adequate. Flap 30 is a perfectly acceptable landing flap setting in the 737.
Would they have gone off the end if the Captain had said "I think flap 40 is the way to go here, tell you what, I'll do it and you can take us to Chicago tomorrow" ?
The answer is probably no.
Obviously not making a go-around as they left the landing zone is the main problem but, the lack of 'command' displayed as they sailed past the landing zone is ( imo) the same lack of command shown when the f/o , ( with 220 hours relevant experience) wrote off the Captains suggestion that flap 40 was the most appropriate.
In situations like this something along the lines of " yeah I'll tell you what, I'm stuck in my ways so we'll do it flaps 40 and then chat about it in the van on the way to the hotel" usually does the trick.

[Fair_Weather_Flyer]

According to the QRH, using F40 for landing only saves a few hundred feet of runway over an F30 landing. If the FO, had no experience of F40 landings, a wet La Guardia, was not the place to try it. It was the long landing that caused the overun and it sounds like the MEL'd speedbrake was extended late and the late reversers may not have helped.

The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain. Two engine go arounds are not well taught in my airline and there is no shortage of evidence saying that they are a real problem on the B737. There are so many possible go around scenarios and you have think out how you are going to carry out each one without scraping the tail, stalling out, nose diving in, overspeeding the flaps etc.

If go arounds are not well trained, "hoping" that the aircraft will stop will seem like the better option in the heat of the moment....like in this case.

[noflynomore]

The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain.
It's actually simpler than that.
The real issue is why the Captain (clue is in the name/title) did not call a go around. End of.
What the F/o did is largely irrelevant. That Capt was in charge - rather he was supposed to be. And clearly wan't. The Capt manifestly failed to ensure his crew did a proper job and to manage his flight, yet the poor F/O got fired and the lousy incompetent Capt just got demoted.

That is just so, so wrong.

[framer]

The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain.
I agree but,According to the QRH, using F40 for landing only saves a few hundred feet of runway over an F30 landing. If the FO, had no experience of F40 landings, a wet La Guardia, was not the place to try it
the above doesn't wash with me because the Captain wanted to do a flap 40 ( ie his experience told him it was the best flap setting for the conditions), and, if there is a chance of tailwind in the flare flap 40 results in a better touchdown point, and, they only over ran by the amount the QRH says is the difference between 30 and 40.
That said, I agree with you that the primary problem is the lack of a go-around.

[misd-agin]

314' landing distance decrease with F40 vs F30. They went maybe 75-100' off the end?

The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float.

My company uses F30 as standard. That's probably true for most operators. But everyone was exposed to F40 landings in training and IOE/LOE.

[framer]

The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float.
Yip. And that's the sort of thing that contributes to the Captains notion that flap 40 was the better option. There is a reason why decisions like aircraft configuration for landing is the Captains domain and not that of someone with 220 hours on type. I feel for this guy but he should have stuck to his guns.

[B2N2]

There's more to this story then meets the eye.
Crew composition being one of them.
Company culture and all that.
No doubt this incident cost Eastern its future as an airline.
Simply the wrong people were flying the most important highest profile contract in the existence of this startup airline.

[Airbubba]

Captain got demoted and FO got fired on this one.
Both should have been fired.

From the Chief Pilot's interview last year:

Both pilots are currently off line with full pay. He wanted to ensure that their retraining was good. The airline plans on recreating the night of the incident in future training and it should be complete within the next 15 days. He has elected to downgrade the incident captain as a first officer until the NTSB’s final ruling on the incident.

Do you have more recent information?

"When asked about the captain’s proficiency or for areas that could be improved, when compared to others he had flown with, he declined to answer."

"When asked if he had heard of any other crewmembers complain about flying with this captain he declined to answer."

The captain seems to get pretty good reviews in the personnel interviews:

There have been no previous issues with the captain. He recalled that when he was in the simulator he had difficulties in flaring to [sic] high since he was flying bigger airplanes.
...

Flew with incident captain a while ago. He would have been the incident captain’s first officer they did not dual captain together. He would characterize him as a “by the book” individual. The captain would have been one to criticize and he felt comfortable doing so if it was necessary. Very open minded great communication. He enjoyed flying with him. They were never in an emergency or abnormal situation.

He has only flown as a dual captain on maybe 3 times in a year and half, unless it was training. With two captains there was no standard on who was the pilot in command it would be just a discussion to decide at the gate.
...

He had flown with the incident captain at Eastern Air Lines, and has known him since flying the DC-10 with Centurion Air Cargo. He characterized the incident captain as friendly, polite, professional, and fair. He further stated that that incident captain was always providing explanations for what he wanted to do. The most recent flight with the incident captain was about a week prior to the incident. He was to fly with the incident captain on the incident flight; however, they were rescheduled because he had family issues and needed to return home. No issues with the captain, always helping and stated “no issues at all.” The incident captain was always helping with the weight and balance.

He felt the captain was one he could ask questions to and considered him a friend as he has known him for about 10 years. He stated that the incident captain was a “pleasure to fly with.” He was “very friendly” and they joked about politics. He has not flown with the incident captain often at Eastern; however, he had flown with him a lot at a previous employer. He flew to Havana and also on the campaign with the captain. He felt comfortable with asking the incident captain questions.

When asked about the captain’s proficiency as a pilot, he felt the captain was a “sharp guy” and always reading and checking. He was very detail oriented when it came to the standard operating procedures.

He felt the captain’s greatest strengths were that he was one of the finest captains he had flown with. The incident captain was one that was preferred to fly with, by first officers, at the previous employer. Her felt that the incident captain flew very well and followed the procedure. When the incident captain needed to take a leg he was very polite and explained why he had made that decision. He had flown 10 hours straight with the captain in the DC-10 and reiterated that he was a pleasure to fly with. In the 737, they did short flights and felt that he could tolerate anyone in that time frame.
...

When asked to describe any weaknesses that the incident captain could improve on, he said that he couldn’t recall any. At Eastern, the captain was flying very well. They’ve flown into windy with nice weather and short runways. The captain always took those legs.

There were requirements for which airports that captain must land at, such as special use airports. He did not feel that the incident captain needed to provide a reason why he wanted to fly a certain flight, as the incident captain was a “gentleman” and respectful and friendly. When he had flown with the incident captain it was windy and when there was a short runway, the captain flew those legs. He could not recall if there was a specific wind limit for first officer.
...

He has observed captains make minor mistakes such as forgetting to set missed approach altitude, adjusting airspeed for windy conditions, flying the appropriate speed. He has not seen the incident captain make any mistakes since he has been flying at Eastern Air Lines.
...

He also stated that he flew with the incident captain June 2, 2016. He was a first officer at the time when he flew with the incident captain; however, they only flew one flight together from Phoenix to Atlanta. He remembered that the captain was the pilot flying and thought that he was a good pilot, open, and very experienced. There were no issues with the flight that he could recall and he felt as though he could have brought up any issues or concerns with the captain when they flew that flight.
...

He clarified that he does not consider incident captain to be a friend and does not have a relationship with him. He described the flight as “all good.” The incident captain had him conduct the takeoff and fly most of the leg, and the incident captain landed the aircraft. He described the incident captain as nice. He further stated that the easy part of the flight was to be the PF and PM had a lot of paperwork which the incident captain completed. They transferred controls before descent. He said that the incident captain wanted to do the landing because Georgetown was a shorter than average runway. He didn’t consider it short as he’s landed on a runway less than 4,000 foot long runway in a Boeing 737-SFP25. The weather for the flight to Georgetown was good. There was no rain or wind and the visibility was “okay.” He said that there was good CRM and that incident captain was “open.” He described the incident captain as professional, and a normal guy. He said he was comfortable speaking openly with him. He enjoyed flying with the incident captain and said he was treated fairly, treated well, and felt comfortable. He said the landing at Georgetown was on the touchdown zone and he didn’t remember anything being different from normal. He said that before OPT, everyone [pilots] complained, but he described the incident captain as “not the kind of person to complain.”

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59915/604028.pdf

[JCO7]

From the Chief Pilot's interview last year:



Do you have more recent information?



The captain seems to get pretty good reviews in the personnel interviews:



https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59915/604028.pdf

I also got the impression from the CVR of a good operator. Let's remember this guy is a 20000hr+ pilot we had flown for US Airways amongst others. He knew what he was doing. The personnel interviews shows he has no problem taking the landing if he feels it's necessary.

And no doubt he will rue the lack of a go-around for the rest of his days. But boy the armchair critics can be unforgiving. I guess you have to take that when you're in the hot seat. I think it's easier for people to try and make you out as an incompetent fool after an incident rather than acknowledge that the same can happen to them. One mistake, uncorrected.

[framer]

For me it's not about forgiving or blaming, it's about dragging lessons from it.
The lesson for me ( apart from the go-around call that never happened) is that the Captain should not be persuaded from what he or she thinks is most prudent without serious consideration. (equally important is that they do consider different assessments from the f/o ).
It's like the Captain of a ship deciding not to enter the harbour until full tide and the first mate saying "nah I'll take it in now, you had miles of clearance at that last harbour we entered". And the Captain replying " alright".

[chimbu warrior]

After shutting down the engines and starting the auxiliary power unit, the pilots opened the cockpit door to provide an assessment of the situation to a Secret Service agent.
“Nice. Nice job,” the agent said, after being briefed.
“Huh,” the captain replied.
“Nice job,” the agent said. “You stopped it, at least.”

From Pence Pilot: ?My Career Just Ended? | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/pence-pilot-my-career-just-ended?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20170605_AW-05_797&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1&utm_rid=CPEN1000002751680&utm_campaign=10289&utm_medium=email&elq2=b091ba8b3c9942b8bc12ecaa7ad0c1b8)

[noflynomore]

Is American "Airline" training really so shonky that an FO can have never done a flaps 40 landing, and his Captains is scared to ask/tell him to? What goes on in US type rating courses? Coffee and poker? How can anyone convert to a type and not practice all the landing configs? It doesn't seem possible.

WTF?

Is there some mystery to a F40 landing? Because if so I missed it. For several years.

What other config would you even consider to use on a wet runway with a tailwind component? Is there one? - apart from asking for a runway change?

Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA.

[misd-agin]

737NG has some different handling characteristics with F40. Creates the increased possibility of lateral PIO's. It's something to be aware of. And it's hard to land smoothly with F40. So some pilots are leery to use it. Short, wet, tailwind? F40 it is. Plant it and park it.

[HundredPercentPlease]

That Capt was in charge - rather he was supposed to be. And clearly wan't. The Capt manifestly failed..

It's so easy for the armchair, macho experts to shout "Capt at fault" and that's it. Beginning of story, end of story.

There's something up with the human being. Give that captain a description of his scenario before it happened, and he'd tell you that he'd go around. 20,000 hours, and of course he knows that a long landing in those conditions mandates a go around. And sure enough, just after his scenario he verbally wonders why he didn't go around.

I have had it. Different scenario and I got away with it. It was an instant loss of nearly all visibility in the flare, due to a freak shower. Should have gone around, but the startle factor causes 2-3 seconds of non-thinking, or an attempt to continue with the thinking you have been doing, even though you know you need to change thinking, but the thinking-inertia needs to be overcome. I was left (after a very untidy landing) wondering why I didn't go around.

We need training and exposure to this phenomenon. Of course flying gods and Pprune retirees need not apply.

[framer]

Hundredpercent, I agree with you that more training and knowledge is required about startle factor. I think you're being a bit harsh on those who identify errors the Captain made though. If someone believes that the Captain made an error of judgement/leadership/ communication ( whatever) and they thInk there is a lesson in it for themselves and others, suddenly they're macho and an armchair expert/ flying god?
We have to be able to say what we think if we want to use a site like this for learning and it is inevitable that others will disagree.

[HundredPercentPlease]

framer,

Pilots want a no-blame culture or a "just culture" when it comes to dealing with mistakes. A culture that looks at the source of the mistake, learns from it, and then passes on the newfound wisdom to other pilots in order to improve safety.

Yet pilots come on here, point the blame finger, and deride. It's those that I have issue with.

I like to look at incidents like this as deeply as possible, to try and work out what caused (in this case) an experienced captain to not go around when clearly it was required - and he knew it. I would suggest others do too, it may help one day!

[JCO7]

Exactly. As a 737 commander myself you bet I have learnt from this incident. The modern "just culture" has been hard-won yet those on here who noflynomore or those who never did, want to crucify the crew for their mistakes.

Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA.

Wow.

[noflynomore]

As usual the prune professional slaggers crawl out from under their stones to deride anyone with an opinion that isn't exactly in line with theirs or that they think they can belittle for not being exactly like them - ie retired - generally considered in our society a very boorish and unacceptable, bigoted thing to do while ignoring the fact that the retired are quite likely to be more experienced than they are, but of course they cannot know but shoot from the gob anyway.

50%Nothankyou, it may have escaped your notice that there is a chain of command on an aeroplane and that the Captain is at the top of it. I gather you take the modern view that no one is ever at fault for anything but believe me you are just plain WRONG. The final responsibiity rests with the Captain. I this case he didn't just make one cardinal mistake, he made a whole string of them, none of them excusible and as NHP without the possibility of being maxed out by flying. These errors are so fundamental that there can be no excuse.

No one has said we shouldn't learn from this incident or examine it deeply, least of all me, yet this accusation seems to have been pointed in my direction in the usual prune baseless slagging-off style by people who invent things others have never written.

Equally I have never suggested crucifying anyone in this case - an utterly baseless accusation as ever - I merely stated the obvious that no one else could shoulder the blame. Because they can't.
"Just culture" involves not crucifying people for human errors, not gross professional misconduct which imo is the only definition possible for landing on a wet runway downwind with a spare stage of flap unused, and then failing to go around after the f/o floats half the length of the runway. "the monment had passed" had it? Bloody long moment, that one, he had what must have felt like aeons to think about it. No-one at fault my @rse!
Even so I haven't suggested any form of punishment - merely responsibility. A fact that some holier-than-thou false accusers who can't be bothered to actually read other peoples' posts before slagging them off - like JC07 might like to take on board. Talk about pot/kettle! You are a paragon, sir!

I may be considered old-fashioned by taking the view that Professionalism involves Responsibility - and that includes shouldering the responsibility, even when your colleague screws up, because YOU ARE IN COMMAND. I am certainly not a crucifier and believe 100% in a just culture but I also cough to my errors and am happy to take what's coming if I deserve it. I do NOT agree with the namby-pamby notion that finding fault is undesireable and people shouldn't suffer sanctions if they get things culpably wrong.

Also, perhaps actually reading what is written and not inventing stories/opinions/scenarios between other peoples' lines might result in a more "just culture" here... think about it.

[Old Boeing Driver]

I first flew the 737 in the Middle East a long time ago. We used only flaps 15 or 40 for all landings. Was not a problem.

Used 30 and 40 years later in the BBJ.

[noflynomore]

Interesting, shows how company culture affects such things. I never did a F15 landing in 12 yrs on the 737-3/400. We (3 UK companies) only ever used F30 and occasionally 40 as we were seldom length limited.

[Airbubba]

I first flew the 737 in the Middle East a long time ago. We used only flaps 15 or 40 for all landings. Was not a problem.

Used 30 and 40 years later in the BBJ.

Interesting, shows how company culture affects such things. I never did a F15 landing in 12 yrs on the 737-3/400. We (3 UK companies) only ever used F30 and occasionally 40 as we were seldom length limited.

I've worked enough places with Boeings (but not '73's) to experience similar cultural divides. Autobrakes are another area where a couple of operators always used them, another never did.

And, I can see where the FO might not want to do flaps 40 if it wasn't a normal flap setting covered in the company training program. And, I'll agree with those who say that the flap setting was not the probable cause of the mishap.

[Old Boeing Driver]

Interesting, shows how company culture affects such things. I never did a F15 landing in 12 yrs on the 737-3/400. We (3 UK companies) only ever used F30 and occasionally 40 as we were seldom length limited.

We flew into some high elevations at high temps. Single engine go around performance was the reason for the flaps 15 landings.

[Jwscud]

I believe I'm correct in saying that F15 was not approved for normal landings under JAA/EASA. F30/40 are the only options.

Europe doesn't really offer the kind of terrain or elevation that might need that kind of performance.

[Airbubba]

Here's the NTSB's announcement of the release of the final report on this accident:

Pilot Actions, Decision Making, “Lack of Command Authority” Led to New York LaGuardia Runway Excursion

9/21/2017

Several failures in close succession by a jetliner’s flight crew were the probable cause of Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion at LaGuardia Airport, according to the National Transportation Safety Board’s final report issued Thursday.

The Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700, a chartered flight carrying then vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence and campaign staff, overran Runway 22 during landing on the rainy evening. The airplane departed the runway and partially transited an arrester bed of crushable concrete before coming to a stop about 170 feet past the end of the runway. None of the 11 crewmembers or 37 passengers were hurt in the incident. The plane sustained minor damage.

Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it “floated” for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.

The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet’s wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.

During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn’t announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain’s failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, “a lack of command authority.” This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.

Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.

The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.

More information about the excursion, including a link to the accident docket, which was opened to the public June 1, 2017, is available at https://go.usa.gov/xNNCf.

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/pr20170921b.aspx

[vapilot2004]

Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it “floated” for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.

The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet’s wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.

The inability to plant it firmly in the TD zone on a contaminated runway describes far too many 737 runway excursions to date.

[IcePack]

Back in the day I was taught to "drive" a 737 onto the rwy. None of this pussy footing about trying to land it like a light aircraft. Seems to me, to be poor training in jet techniques that are causing more than the fair share of over runs. Maybe training departments should look back to when pilots were being converted from heavy props to heavy jets and re introduce some of those lessons.

[RAT 5]

No apologies, but this is plagiarised from my post on Tech Log B737 Over-runs thread.

I found many pilots were not advised how to 'put it down'. If it became necessary it was often caused by too much back elevator; thus the answer was to relax the nose and land flat; or worse. The other danger is pulling back even more. My technique, if tending to float a couple of feet above the tarmac, was to 'drop a wing', remembering of course where the wind was. Immediately a main wheel touches down the speed brakes deploy and the a/c sits down.
It's a simple technique, it works, and is not emphasised; but I used to teach it.

[JuniorWoo]

Seen that 'fishing technique' lots of times, but it does tend to eat the runway up rather a lot...

[filejw]

[QUOTE=RAT 5;9909507]No apologies, but this is plagiarised from my post on Tech Log B737 Over-runs thread.

I found many pilots were not advised how to 'put it down'. If it became necessary it was often caused by too much back elevator; thus the answer was to relax the nose and land flat; or worse. The other danger is pulling back even more. My technique, if tending to float a couple of feet above the tarmac, was to 'drop a wing', remembering of course where the wind was. Immediately a main wheel touches down the speed brakes deploy and the a/c sits down.
It's a simple technique, it works, and is not emphasised; but I used to teach it.[/QUOTE

Don’t know about on a 737 but in other types that’s an easy way to drag a wing tip or engine pod. We used to correct that technique if it was noticed on a line check .

[Miss Management]

I taught myself to sideslip just before touchdown and it worked every time and a smooth TD on one main gear. This has always prevented any floating and gave me a pleasant feeling of being in control!!! 16 years 737 LHS, now retired.

[RAT 5]

filejw. B737 ground contact threat is outside training edge/corner of the flaps. Complete side-slip to touchdown is limited by X-wind = bank angle at touchdown. I can expect a 4 engine short gear a/c would have other problems. Like I said my technique is when you are stuck in ground effect at <2'.
In light/medium winds I liked the side-slip approach at <300'. I found on B757/767 it worked a treat and then transferred to B737 if wind limits allowed. Boeing offers 3 methods. I've heard some operators teach only 1 technique. I wonder why a correctly trained pilot is not allowed to choose whichever method from the manufacturer's list is best for the conditions at the time. But we are then back to a common subject about how deep or shallow some training syllabi are.
I used to ask students what they would do if they found themselves floating down the runway. What was the best technique to land the darned recalcitrant beast? Silence, but to their credit they recited the well known get of of jail free card of Go Around. True, but that is some seconds after the flare & float. The wing nudge is something that can be done immediately after you realise the flare was too high. It's not such a good idea if the flare was too strong. That needs to be recovered with elevator first and then see what the state of play is. Nose high and wing down can end in tears.

[Centaurus]

But we are then back to a common subject about how deep or shallow some training syllabi are.

And therein lies the rub. I have met countless pilots who are apprehensive of cross-wind landings in Jet transports. During their type rating training in the simulator, the syllabus invariably glosses over strong crosswind landings and these are cut short to ensure all the other boxes are ticked. The inevitable result is that once these pilots get to fly on line, they are usually restricted as first officers to landings with no more than 10-15 knots and there are captains that are nervous on giving the F/O even that amount.

As most type rating syllabus in simulators require the "student" to cover all the sequences required of a command type rating, then before being certified as competent on crosswind landings the competency should include landings up to the crosswind limit for the aircraft type they are trained on.

Rarely does this happen mainly because the syllabus is tight, is biased towards full use of automation and thus little time is available for manual handling. It is a good bet that the complete type rating syllabus on (say) a 737 would include not more than three or four crosswind landings spread over ten sessions - and then only 15 knots crosswind component.

For pilots new to type - especially cadet pilots going directly into the right hand seat after a few hours on light twin trainers - max component crosswind landings are daunting if not terrifying. I cannot count the number of times I have seen in the simulator pilots failing to adequately remove drift before touch down. If only the simulator instructor could take the time to slip into a control seat and personally demonstrate how to handle a 35 knot crosswind then his student would have some idea what ideal to aim for. That never happens of course in a time poor simulator environment. More likely few instructors would risk their reputation by trying their luck for fear of loss of face if they stuff up.

Some students have difficulty "seeing" drift at the flare and then assault the runway with stacks of drift still applied. A technique some instructors find useful is to freeze the simulator at the instant the main wheels impact the runway. This permits the student to observe the difference between aircraft heading and runway heading at his leisure.

With simulators, another method to get practice over a short period of available time is to position the aircraft at (say) 300 feet with max crosswind set in the simulator and allow the student to get continual practice at the flare and touch down technique to pull off a safe landing with drift removed. This includes day and night scenes.

Often at least ten practice attempts at touching down with no drift at max crosswind component will be needed before the student can be relied upon to consistently touch down with drift removed. If, as some argue, a simulator cannot accurately replicate a strong crosswind landing, then a fidelity check on the simulator is in order.

[aterpster]

Back in the day I was taught to "drive" a 737 onto the rwy. None of this pussy footing about trying to land it like a light aircraft. Seems to me, to be poor training in jet techniques that are causing more than the fair share of over runs. Maybe training departments should look back to when pilots were being converted from heavy props to heavy jets and re introduce some of those lessons.

In my day we were expected to make a nice smooth landing on a long dry runway, and to "put it on" on an icy runway such as LGA (which I went to more than I care to remember.)

[RAT 5]

Centaurus: a man after my one heart. We speak the same truths. You are spot on. I've had to tick the box on cadet x-wind landings. There were more important things in the syllabus (IHO of HOT), but as a confidence booster or crusher a x-wind landing is high up there. We were told to "train to a satisfactory standard", but how when the session is filled with other exercises which are deemed by the powers that be to be more significant.
Then, oh my word, I hear from mate that some airlines, to boost the cadets' flying skills are dropped in th deep end with 35kt x-wind sim training. How can you train that to a satis standard to a 150hr prop pilot in the 3 attempts the syllabus gives you time for. Of course a demo is the best option, and doing so building up from 15-20-25-35; the is if you think that 35kts is a good idea in the first place. I've no idea of their command course, but I wonder how much x-wind & gusty training is given to the gu who 2 weeks earlier was limited to 15kts as an F/O. Windshear training is not the same; the idea is to GA not land. And s Sod's law is that in the 1st 100hrs of command a testing x-wind will raise its ugly head.