V-Force Deterrent Targets

[Pontius Navigator]

I have found reference to the National Plan that identified 98 cities with populations of more than 100,000 as potential deterrent targets - this was a CND site.

I have seen sites citing the SAC 1956 Plan.

And I think I have seen a better UK reference to 38 city targets but blowed if I can find that one on Google or in PPrune. Can anyone point me to that source?

Thanks.

[charliegolf]

Not before you confirm that you have no live nukes, misfired nukes or empty nuke cases in your possession, Sah!

[Pontius Navigator]

Well I have no WE177 dust caps. Does that count?

[Jimlad1]

Have you tried reading Silent Deep by Peter Henessey - good discussion there on deterrence criteria and the desired effect. It covers the evolution of the so-called 'Moscow Criteria'.

[Tankertrashnav]

Are they talking about UK targets? If so CND are making an excellent case for Trident. Keep it up!

[Pontius Navigator]

JimLad, I am looking only for a particular online source that I think I saw. This was specific to the number of cities that were targeted in the National Plan. I don't think that source has been printed in book form. Having read up on the Moscow Criteria that is an entirely different proposition and relates to deterrence from the much later years.

TTN, they mentioned both but that is not quite the definitive source I seek. Mine will be National Archives.

[ORAC]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/uk-government-top-secret-list-probable-nuclear-targets-1970s


http://static.guim.co.uk/ni/1401981345665/UK_USSR_Targets_WEB_060614.pdf

[Pontius Navigator]

ORAC, thanks, but the first is expected Russian targets in UK, not RAF targets in Russia.

The second is the SAC list and the Bomber Command targets are included in this list. I am looking for the UK plan which I think was just 38 targets. Considering force size at the time and at least 5 targeting Leningrad and at least the same on !Moscow, there would still have been enough left for at least 2 per city.

[racedo]

Apparently there was a small town in West Sussex that was targeted with a 3 Megaton nuke, again and again a Russian planner insisted it should be included because it was significant. After research it appears there was a Tea shop where proprietoress was obnoxious and had been so to some visiting Russians in the 1930's.
They figured revenge is best served 3 megaton hot.

[Yellow Sun]

PN,

You might like to look at The book Project Emily, the account of the Thor in RAF service. This is a rather oblique approach to your question but the book does give an insight into target selection vs. system range. If one accepts that the class of target for Thor would share many characteristics with National Plan targets then applying range capabilities for the bombers and pre-allocating obvious targets would probably give a fair indication of the remainder.

YS

[gr4techie]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/uk-government-top-secret-list-probable-nuclear-targets-1970s


http://static.guim.co.uk/ni/1401981345665/UK_USSR_Targets_WEB_060614.pdf

I can't believe Wolverhampton was one of their targets. They'd be doing us a favour.

[Pontius Navigator]

YS, as I said, I know where, it is the political source I seek.

[tartare]

Jeez - they were even going to whack Valley by the looks of that map.
I `spose there's the odd Tonka and other assets stationed there from time to time...

[West Coast]

I found it fascinating to read of some of the tactical targets FJs were to take out. I believe I read on this site years ago of pilot visiting the bridge he was to nuke if the baloon went up.

[Archimedes]

I have a suspicion that this is the 1958 Bomber Command Emergency War Plan; there were 44 targets in 40 cities (more than one target in Moscow and Leningrad, IIRC); the figure of 38 is applicable as this was the estimate of Soviet casualties in millions.

This was referenced in Richard Moore's Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality.

Edit - clearly the source for some of the info Nuclear Weapons: An Accident Waiting to Happen - Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/14/nuclear-weapons-accident-waiting-to-happen) (about half way down page, but do a find in page search for '44' and it'll get you there.

[Barksdale Boy]

PN

Googling SIOP and going from there may get you where you want.

[Pontius Navigator]

Archimedes, thank you, that is certainly points to confirmation of what I know. I can't check all my sources but in 1958 we were looking really at the 4 Victor Sqns, the Valiant (2-3?), and Vulcan Mk 1/1a, perhaps 11 Sqns?

BB, I am not looking at SIOP and already have the SAC references.

PN
Watchfield

[mopardave]

I can't believe Wolverhampton was one of their targets. They'd be doing us a favour.


..........and I can't believe Bradford wasn't........maybe they didn't want to do us any favours?

[Tankertrashnav]

I can't believe Wolverhampton was one of their targets. They'd be doing us a favour.

Reminds me of the old Cornish joke

"There's been a huge explosion in Redruth. Did several million pounds worth of improvements".

[Pontius Navigator]

As an aside, any 90 or 543 crews of the period o n here?

[Minnie Burner]

Nice that Chiv was to be spared! But I'm confused by Salcombe....

[mopardave]

There's been a huge explosion in Redruth. Did several million pounds worth of improvements".
they said that after the Bradford riots......except that joke fell a little flat under the circumstances. (True though)




apologies for thread drift.....serious subject too.

[tornadoken]

PN: I have not seen a list of WarPac targets for a UK-solo National Retaliatory War Plan. IIRC you have yourself posted that you did not train for such a thing. K.Stoddart,Losing an Empire,Palgrave,2012,P89, comparing (it) with RAF/SAC Integrated Plan wef 1/7/58: “how (they) differed remains profoundly unclear”.

J.Baylis/K.Stoddart,Br.Nuc.Experience:Roles of Belief, Culture & Identity, OUP, 2014, P221 has a memo 5/10/62: Strategic Strike Planning by BC: “15 cities”. Any such solo sortie would be with weapons not under USAF custodianship. Yellow Sun Mk.2 was deployed from 1 July,1961, probably sufficient by 5/10/62 to address 15 targets. The period where RAF was solo-targeted was from CA Release of Blue Danube: 7/57 (Moore, Illusion, P.112) to target integration with SAC 1/7/58. RAF deployed upto 24 Blue Danube in this period.

R.Lamb: The Macmillan Years, J.Murray, 1995, P.303: Mac 7/61 learnt “doubtful our deterrent (could be used) independently (there are no) serious operational plans (to) do so”.

[Pontius Navigator]

Tornadoken, (thanks for the references) I am not sure where you found me saying we did not train for the national plan. All targets were prepared and studied to the same degree as the SACEUR targets. The QRA crews had go-bags with both targets and only after receiving Positive Release would they know which target to attack.

One thing I never checked was the potential route cross-over. Crews would be flying their primary SACEUR route to the go/no go line and would need to switch flight plans and charts etc to the secondary national targets. I never checked to see how close the two high level transit route were - one of the many details that were overlooked.

In the high-level mission days we used cities as training targets - Glasgow, Newcastle, Liverpool, London - but once we went low level, for obvious reasons we switched to less populated targets although Newcastle remained for some time for pop up attacks.

What was true is that we never had a force generation against the National Plan targets. One reason might have been the necessity of excluding USAF Exchange Officers from play.

I have spoken with Kristian and can say that while MacMillian was undoubtedly correct Murray was 100% wrong. National Plan target plans were generally changed in January each year with plans being issued around November to allow crews time to prepare and study the new routes.

[Pontius Navigator]

As an aside issue, crews used to draw up the route on a 1:3M chart and draw in early warning lines, SAM MEZ etc. They would generally use a common standard such as red for SAM and Blue for Early Warning. SAM site positions and other markings could be displayed in varying styles.

Around 1967 Group issued guidance on colours and styles etc but this still took a long time for the Plotter to draw up the detail. Sqn Ldr George Gayton (later Wg Cdr OC 85 Sqn), Ops 1 at HQ 1 Gp acquired a Mason Dyeline Printer (sic) and created a master chart so that the intelligence base was produced to a common standard and positions double checked. Before that it would have been possible that mis-plotting occurred between different target folders. This saved a lot of time.

[Minnie Burner]

Thank you, Mr J. Missed that on hols. I gather it was the Bolt Head RSG.

[Ken Scott]

Many years ago I flew to Moscow to take a team in to count tanks & planes under the various arms limitation treaties, as we taxied in the Nav got out of his seat, looked out the window & said, 'So that's what it looks like'.

When we asked what he meant he said that the airfield had been his primary target when he was on the V Force.

[Tankertrashnav]

P - N - check your PMs

[Pontius Navigator]

TTN, thanks, I know PF. Yellow Sun has just confirmed something I knew for almost 50 years but not confirmed. Archimedes on the 543 issue had the same feelings as I had, even though refuted by a former CO.

Getting there.

[Fareastdriver]

As an aside, any 90 or 543 crews of the period o n here?

I was on 90 Sqn 1962-65. When all the hooters went at the crack of dawn in the mess corridors and there were all these Victor crews running around like blue-arsed flies I would just roll over and go back to sleep.

[Pontius Navigator]

FED, no ACP role? Or purely fighter support?

[Fareastdriver]

We apparently had an ACP role. I don't know whether I was supposed to run to the squadron like my messmates but nobody ever complained. Anyway my stock excuse for being late, being a bachelor, was that I hadn't got back to the mess until 0730.

On one occasion our squadron commander was walking around with a black cloud above him. All our aircraft on the station were u/s except one and he was supposed to provide an ACP aircraft plus a spare. I suggested that he nominate a u/s aircraft as the prime and the serviceable one as the backup. i.e. Jump in, it's u/s; go to the backup.

A bulb flashed in his head and he zoomed off to his office.

Valiants never backed up fighters for QRA or anything like that.

[Pontius Navigator]

Nice that Chiv was to be spared! But I'm confused by Salcombe....
That graphic was not comprehensive. It included Cranwell, which was correct, but omitted Llanbedr and Pershore, Prestwich and Leconfield. AFAIK Chivenor was not a dispersal. Elvingdon was another missing.

[Exnomad]

I worked on V bomber flight simulators quite a number of years ago, the simulation included target maps, I think a number of targets were in East Germany nd Poland, sites of weapon launch sites.

[Pontius Navigator]

EN, do you remember when and where you were?

The NBS trainer used synthetic charts with a representative topography but wholly fictitious. Towns had names like SSEGRUB or NAELCAM and so on.

[ian16th]

The NBS trainer used synthetic charts with a representative topography but wholly fictitious. Towns had names like SSEGRUB or NAELCAM and so on.

I can vouch that the original ones delivered by EMI were just that.

[tartare]

A question r/e dispersal - assuming it;'s no longer classified - was it supposed to take place once the likelihood of an attack became significant?
Was there a set of decision trigger points?

[Tankertrashnav]

Slight thread drift but the current edition of Flypast is doing a special V Force issue. As well as an excellent article about tanking on 214 in the 70s ( :ok: ) there is an interesting article on Skybolt. One thing that surprised me was that if Skybolt had got into RAF service there would have been a continuous airborne alert, of the kind operated by the USAF for many years. This was to have involved airborne patrols over Norway and in the Adriatic and Aegean. How this would have worked out in practice we'll never know, but it would have been hugely expensive compared with QRA. This will be old news to many old V Force hands, but coming along a little later I hadn't heard of it myself.

[ian16th]

Slight thread drift but the current edition of Flypast is doing a special V Force issue. As well as an excellent article about tanking on 214 in the 70s ( :ok: ) there is an interesting article on Skybolt. One thing that surprised me was that if Skybolt had got into RAF service there would have been a continuous airborne alert, of the kind operated by the USAF for many years. This was to have involved airborne patrols over Norway and in the Adriatic and Aegean. How this would have worked out in practice we'll never know, but it would have been hugely expensive compared with QRA. This will be old news to many old V Force hands, but coming along a little later I hadn't heard of it myself.

In the summer of 1962, probably in July, 214 carried out an exercise where we operated 24/7 and dispatched Valiant tankers to always keep one Vulcan on continuous patrol. There was an embargo on leave so that we had 100% headcount to operate 3 shifts.

By the end of a week we were desperately struggling to supply serviceable a/c every shift. I think we kept going for a week, but we couldn't have maintained the workload on a continuous basis.

Mind you, for all we were told it might have been an exercise to find out how many more bodies and a/c we would need to do the job properly.

[Pontius Navigator]

TTN, I know of the trial. It was a Mk 1a and it would only have been commenced at a very high alert state.

[Pontius Navigator]

Tartare, yes, known as warnings and indicators against which appropriate responses could be made. The only snag was Red didn't have the same book.

One of the better, but by no means absolute, was streams of missiles spotted by BMEWS. Slightly better was an observed nuclear detonation. In the SAC Command Post was a NUDETS lamp which would light if there was a nuclear detonation in the continental USA.

There were instances where there were no indicators or there were but they were no recognised or not reacted to.

[Treble one]

Tartare, PN will be able to comment much better on this, but I think dispersal of the V Force was seen politically as pretty much as a clear indicator that we were 'on our way'?


In the Cuban crisis, MacMillan deliberately did not order dispersal as he felt that it would be seen as such by the Soviets, and actually encourage them to strike first.

There is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that AVM Cross and other military commanders wanted to disperse the force (for obvious reasons) but MacMillan would not sanction this order.

I believe that The C in C Bomber Command could generate his aircraft and load them with live weapons on his own authority, but had to have political authority to disperse (unless the chain of command had been knocked out)?

Remember, in those days, there were two 'Nuclear deputies' authorised to order retaliation in times of national crisis if the PM was taken out by a Soviet attack (one with the PM, the other at a 'safe location' (probably Turnstile or its equivalent).


It was only if all lines of communication to the political leadership (PM and deputies) had been lost, then the C in C Bomber command would have been authorised to order retaliation on his own authority.


A bit like 'Wing Attack plan R' from Strangelove-without the dodgy 'human factors'.


PS Ian 16th, there were drawing board plans for a Vulcan B3, with extra crew (all with ejection seats) and longer fuselage/upgraded engines with reheat. It was to be an airborne alert skybolt carrier (up to 6 per aircraft)...one can only presume with Skybolt biting the dust, and the extreme cost of mounting airborne alert were reasons it never got off the drawing board?

[tartare]

Thank you gentlemen.
A privilege as always to hear from those who were at the sharp end.
I have stood underneath the Vulcan at Hendon and watched the stream take off film playing on the TV screens in the bomb bay - it is utterly chilling to see.
It's very interesting - I had always assumed dispersal was a prior-step of heightened readiness - a sort of UK Defcon 2 - rather than part of the sequence of actual launch itself.
But I can understand that given the heightened tensions - even the act of dispersing might be seen as strong evidence a pre-emptive strike was almost certain.
PN - do I understand your comment r/e streams of missiles or a detonation as meaning dispersal might only start if missiles were observed in flight incoming, or a warhead landed in the UK?
Given missile flight time from Eastern Europe/USSR to the UK - wouldn't that only have given crews a maximum three to four minutes to get to the aircraft (even if in caravans beside the runway), power up, taxi out (no air traffic control clearance needed) and stream take off - then try and get clear of the blast zone of the warheads that would surely hit their airfield?
Wouldn't it be virtually certain that the tail end of the stream would end up being taken out in an air-burst (or several airbursts if multiple warheads were assigned to targets?
Did pilots use full military power to get as far away from the airfield as possible to mitigate this possibility?

[Treble one]

Tartare-I was never at the sharp end-its just that period of operations is something I am extremely interested in from a historical perspective.


PN on the other hand-he did it for real.

[Pontius Navigator]

PN - do I understand your comment r/e streams of missiles or a detonation as meaning dispersal might only start if missiles were observed in flight incoming, or a warhead landed in the UK?

No. I was suggesting, slightly tongue in cheek, were just two of many warnings and indicators. Recalling one's ambassadors is a potential early one although they would more likely to have been sacrificed.

The two examples I cited were at the extreme end on the spectrum but were in no way absolute indicators of the outbreak of hostilities. A nuclear detonation may well have resulted from an accident and as for the stream of missiles, I know that has happened at least once.

[tartare]

Ah - I see - humour. ;)
In all seriousness though, I've read about Mickey Finns etc.
I assume dispersal was an intermediate step?
"We're ready - make another move and we take off" ??
Sort of like cocking the weapon...

[Pontius Navigator]

Given missile flight time from Eastern Europe/USSR to the UK - wouldn't that only have given crews a maximum three to four minutes to get to the aircraft (even if in caravans beside the runway), power up, taxi out (no air traffic control clearance needed) and stream take off - then try and get clear of the blast zone of the warheads that would surely hit their airfield? Wouldn't it be virtually certain that the tail end of the stream would end up being taken out in an air-burst (or several airbursts if multiple warheads were assigned to targets?

For aircraft on the ORP they would be on the telescramble from Bomber Command, any ATC facility was merely backup.

Any generation and scramble from main base, before dispersal, would be the least desirable from a survival point of view but least escalatory before that.

Did pilots use full military power to get as far away from the airfield as possible to mitigate this possibility? No, we used Combat power IIRC which on the Mk 2 - 301 engines delivered around 103% power.

I learnt recently that it was likely that a missile launch would be in sequence from all sites so that they would not arrive simultaneously. This would give distant dispersals such as St Mawgan, Brawdy, Ballykelly, a significant advantage in survivability.

From Readiness 02 the first aircraft would probably be airborne in around 40 seconds, the second 55 and the 4th in 90 seconds. Assuming the validity of a 4 minute warning (more a media sound bite) the last aircraft could be 12 miles or more away from the airfield. However missile accuracy was such then that distance from the burst might vary between 7 and 17 miles.

[tartare]

Thanks PN - fascinating insight for the Gen X-ers like me who were born in the mid 60s.

[Pontius Navigator]

Dispersal had several functions. As you surmised, easier to launch 100 bombers from 25 bases than 4. It also increased the targeting problem requiring far more missiles or bombers. With the increase in targets it increased the chances that all weapons (1 or 2) on a target might fail or miss. It gave a visible display of readiness.

Equally it had the disadvantage of longer lines of logistics though RAF resources were planned to maintain near and far dispersals. Initially we had our own Anson which could carry a full V-bomber crew. Also organic Hastings and Varsities with any available Transport Command aircraft pressed in as well.

It also moved most of the bombers outside the ring of steel, the Bloodhound sites surrounding the bases from Finningley to Honington. The Thor bases at the time were also inside that ring.

[PhilipG]

As I understand it, I think I was told here on PRUNE, no British V Bomber ever took off or landed in the UK with a live weapon aboard.

If that is not the case, forget the rest of this post.

There is an inherent danger of accident every time an aircraft takes off and lands, this is increased when taking off and landing at unfamiliar locations I think we can all agree.

So where I am going to is that besides giving a message to the Warsaw Pact that the UK was getting ready to go to war, there was a danger when dispersing the V Force that there could be an accident involving a weapon either at the dispersal airfield or on return to the main base. Not an outcome that would be desired...

Of course if Dispersal had been ordered and actioned, for the Diplomats to then defuse the situation, what was the SOP?
Fly back to the main base with the weapons on board

Or remove the weapons from the aircraft before it flew back to base then transport the weapons by road?

Brings up a number of logistical and security nightmares.

Just interested if anyone knew.

[Pontius Navigator]

In your latter case, unloading at dispersal for overland recovery would have been a logistical nightmare. It would have been militarily stupid like a Blackadder farce sending troops home for leave during the Christmas truce.

Reverting from a dispersed state was not, AFAIK, written in BCARs. However BCARs and the accompanying operational documents were brief in the extreme. The operation order for a bomber wing ran to about 34 pages of which 24 were individual target briefs. The SOP was 110 pages including none essentials like preamble, distribution and page check sheets.

Our orders for RTB from a nearby Bolthole was simply come home, bring with you all that you took. It was left to sqns, fits and sections to do the necessary. It was all well practised routine and tempting as may be I am sure we mounted QRA at home and then unloaded at the bolthole.

[Yellow Sun]

PhilipG

There is an inherent danger of accident every time an aircraft takes off and lands, this is increased when taking off and landing at unfamiliar locations I think we can all agree.

There is an inherent danger of an accident every time an aircraft flies and steps are taken to mitigate the risk. If the risk was too high, you wouldn't go flying. Equally if the urgency of the task is such then you may deem it acceptable to reduce the normal safety margins and operate to different criteria.

The dispersal airfields were not unfamiliar to the crews. We operated into and out of them on a regular basis and I would not accept that this represented any higher than the normal level of risk.

As PN says, there was no plan or SOP visible to us at the coalface. One can only surmise that anything that did exist started with:

"Breathe a huge sigh of relief and come up with a plan to revert to some lower state of readiness."

If you anticipated recovering the weapons by air, the first thing you had to consider was how to defuel the aircraft with the weapon on board? Sorry, no can do. So, you have to unload the weapon and having done that you might as well convoy it back by road, at least from the closer dispersals.

It would seem more likely that any scenario would involve a phased return to a "normal" alert state and remember that we could be held at RS15 for 30 days. By selectively standing down dispersals on a rotation basis this could probably be significantly extended, who knows?

One thing you can be sure of is that it wouldn't have all wrapped up with a tannoy message of "Endex" and everyone going to the bar. Things would not return to normal for a long time.

YS

[ancientaviator62]

We used to do QRA on Hastings and Hercules and supported the V force when they dispersed. I have been to places as far apart as Macrihanish and St Mawgan and several in between. But never outside the UK on one of these tasks.

[papajuliet]

UKWMO worked on a 3 minute warning time.

[tornadoken]

PN: KS' dismissal of Lamb's "no serious {solo-UK} plans" will derive from Baylis/Stoddart, Experience, Appendix 3, P.221: 5/10/62 RAFBC targeting memo: National Retaliatory War Plan as 15 cities, (which could have been addressed (wef 12/62) by 80xYellow Sun 2). UK role in integrated SIOP (inc. SMF Thor) is in P.221 as 98 targets, comprising 16 cities, 44 “offensive” sites (airfields), 10 ADCCs, 28 IRBM sites; all for next review 7/63. Hennessy,PM,P114 has that as “down to 16 cities (due to) improvements (in) air defences”. Skybolt would address all, from 1966. But, on 21/12/62: no.

Lamb, P.319 has ex-CAS MRAF Slessor, on Nassau: “It is a really appalling thought that a couple of Ministers and a zoologist {S.Zuckerman} can skip off to the Bahamas {and} commit us to a military monstrosity {SSBN/FBM} on the purely political issue of nuclear independence - which anyway is a myth.” What might the MRAF have meant?

A UK-solo target-set applied between 7/57 (Blue Danube CA Release Moore/Illusion,P.112) and 1/7/58 (target integration, RAFBC: USAF/SAC). None of Wynn's 653 pages of Official History, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, addresses a NRWP: nearest is P.273, CoS Committee paper 28/5/57 Strategic Target Policy, 2 eventualities: co-ordinated w.USAF, and "Action on an emergency basis in a situation in which UK was forced into unilateral retaliation". That paper led by 5/58 to: “a fully integrated (target) plan wef 1/7/58 taking into account BC's ability to be on target several hours before (main SAC force ex-US; RAF/SAC) examination of separate BC and SAC plans had shown that every BC target was also on SAC's list and (both) had doubled-up strikes (to) ensure success”. (SAC then had 217 targets, ea. for 3 bombs; we had 24 BD by 3/58, so 12 targets). VCAS 20/1/56: SoS/Def “agreed 17/12/53 that one of (MBF's) primary tasks (would) be retardation operations (to assist Saceur)”.

1/10/58- 17/3/62 MBF carried more US Project E weapons than Made-in-Britain models (so launch was subject to USAF custodials-on-Base, so to US CinC). From 23/5/63 MBF was Tasked by Saceur...bar “where (supreme) national interests are at stake”. (Today: SEADS) was our job. Wynn,Pp.103/4/261/271.

As PN did train for a "National" Plan...are we at weasel words on "serious ...operational?" 16...ever decreasing.."cities"...Might the MRAF have meant: navigation exercises, fine (SAC B-47Es used The Gramophone Co., Hayes as a target); not to be confused with the real thing?

[Pontius Navigator]

Tornadoes well assembled, I think that covers it well. I knew several SACEUR targets where an earlier missile strike was planned. I knew of only one SACEUR target where two attacks were planned. A nit of double bluff as both routes were identical with just 10 minutes between strikes.

That is not to say one of the other wings might have covered some of ours, indeed thinking about it, it would be entirely logical and sensible.

[Tankertrashnav]

Initially we had our own Anson which could carry a full V-bomber crew.

And later you had the Bassett which was ideal for this purpose - as long as the crew consisted of five racing snakes! Not sure how it was in the bomber force, but I can think of a few tanker crews who would have severely tested the Basset's take off performance.

(Sorry, six racings snakes, I forgot the crew chief. As I recall most of our crew chiefs were "built for comfort" too.

[Pontius Navigator]

TTN, apart from the provision of a toilet and a navigator the Bassett was indeed fine. For 5 man crew with kit, the nav bags alone were heavy enough, two Bassetts could do the job.

[Blacksheep]

In going off to dispersal (Micky Finn) I had some miserable times. Valley was probably the worst - the Bomber Command accommodation on the far side was badly run down with broken windows, a leaky roof and unserviceable heating / electrics. The cook managed to rustle up some beans on toast over a camp fire, but that was it. I spent a whole detachment down on the ORP where we at least had heating in the shack, but fell asleep standing up at the GPU and missed the scramble. The Crew Chief woke me up after they had gone. So much for the so-called "Vulcan Howl" :rolleyes:

On one Mickey Finn (Honington I think) we were given pep pills to help us stay awake.

[racedo]

On one occasion our squadron commander was walking around with a black cloud above him. All our aircraft on the station were u/s except one and he was supposed to provide an ACP aircraft plus a spare. I suggested that he nominate a u/s aircraft as the prime and the serviceable one as the backup. i.e. Jump in, it's u/s; go to the backup.

Cunning plans like that could have got you the nickname of Baldrick :)

[Blacksheep]

We ground crew travelled in style in the tail boom of a Beverley. At least we had a toilet and could wander about. The general idea was that half of us would deploy and prepare the dispersal site while the other half generated all the base aircraft. Once we finished the "Combats" they would fly off and be received and re-generated at the dispersal. The base party followed in the Beverleys and Hastings. That could take a long time in a Beverly if there was a headwind!

Once our aircraft scrambled, we had about five hours to pack up, fly back and receive our aircraft at Waddington, where we'd do all the post flight servicing and rectifications. It wasn't unusual to spend 50 or 60 hours without a formal break which is probably where the 'Mickey Finn' title of the exercise came from.

[The Oberon]

We ground crew travelled in style in the tail boom of a Beverley. At least we had a toilet and could wander about. The general idea was that half of us would deploy and prepare the dispersal site while the other half generated all the base aircraft. Once we finished the "Combats" they would fly off and be received and re-generated at the dispersal. The base party followed in the Beverleys and Hastings. That could take a long time in a Beverly if there was a headwind!

Once our aircraft scrambled, we had about five hours to pack up, fly back and receive our aircraft at Waddington, where we'd do all the post flight servicing and rectifications. It wasn't unusual to spend 50 or 60 hours without a formal break which is probably where the 'Mickey Finn' title of the exercise came from.
As I remember the worst ground crew dispersal I experienced was Marham to Kinloss in the old 32 seater Bedford coaches, by the time we got there, the flying crew chiefs had turned them round and they were back on state. We launched the the following morning, packed up and then travelled back in the same coaches.

[Pontius Navigator]

TO, for a Distant dispersal you should have flown. somat wrong then

[The Oberon]

TO, for a Distant dispersal you should have flown. somat wrong then
I did fly Scampton - Kinloss and a couple of others. Another unusual one was with Blue Steel Victors. One of the Victors carried a "wet one" i.e. HTP and Kerosene. After a couple of days an HTP emergency offload was called for. No dump pit available so straight onto the grass whilst the Fire Section hosed down. Still left a huge burn mark on the grass.

[Pontius Navigator]

TO, a Scampton aircraft did the same at Waddo, OC Ops requested a bag of grass seed.

[Tengah Type]

Oberon #65
If it was the deployment I think you mean it was in Feb 1982. Some time previouslyMarham had enjoyed a Part One Taceval at 1800 on a Sunday evening. All the Victor Tankers had been fully fuelled and Combat Checked on the Friday afternoon, as was SOP, for an Akrotiri trail departing early on Monday morning. Needless to say generation was achieved in a very short time, as all the crews and groundcrews were just about to go to bed ready for the early start. Taceval accused the station of cheating, so called a No Notice Part Two. Again this coincided with a trail, this time Buccaneers to Goose Bay. Plan was (after Tanker - Tanker top ups) to trail the Buccs to 32W and RTB. On return the Tankers were diverted to Leuchars, which was on Maxeval, and put on state ASAP by the aircrews and crew chiefs. We were expecting the ground party to arrive by air, but no AT available hence the bus ride, leaving late at night after a full working day. 32 people plus luggage, tools, rifles, gas masks etc in each 32 seat coach!!

We flew the aircraft a couple of times each with crew turnrounds before the groundcrew arrived. When we saw the "Zombies" getting of the buses after their 48 hr ordeal we refused to let them anyway near the aircraft, until fully rested, for Flight Safety reasons. The crews flew and turned the aircraft on Wednesday as well. The ground party turned the aircraft ready for the survival scramble and endex on Thursday.
I had won the star prize of a scenic coach ride back to Marham on Friday as my seat on the aircraft was taken by a Flight Commander. So after a pleasant evening at the OM Guest Night ( allowed to the after dinner drink in flying suits) it was on the road. This time via a night stop at Leeming as it was felt that the ground party would not accept another direct journey. Finally home on Saturday afternoon after a pretty awful couple of days on the road in a very much overloaded coach. But at least I only had to do it one way!!

[The Oberon]

TT
You've got it!, I knew I hadn't imagined it and apart from the destination base I nearly got it right. I don't remember being armed as, like several others, I could have easily shot someone when the bus trip back was announced.

[ancientaviator62]

TT,
the lack of AT for your call out is a bit of a surprise as all the Herc sqns had a crew on BCSB (Bomber Command Standby) later called QRA. We knew the code names as 'Mickey Finn' and 'Clip Key'. According to my log book I did a lot of NI 'Banner' tasks that month so your AT may well have been diverted to support one of the regular 'surges' to that location.

[Tengah Type]

AA62
I think the problem was that the deployment was for ONLY a Taceval, so it did not rate the AT that was on Standby for a PROPER deployment. Some Senior Officer Jobsworth would have kept hold of "his" asset in case a "REAL" deployment came along!!

[Pontius Navigator]

Bomber exercises always lower priority to Transport ops or scheduled AT. If the Taceval tasking had not been pre-booked, really a Taceval team responsibility, then getting AT would always be difficult.

Once we had a 6 week det to Malta but Command hadn't booked AT. We flew out BUA with DanAir doing the freight.

[ancientaviator62]

Take your point chaps but I have been called out on several occasions to support a practice dispersal. If we were not expected to turn up for the practice events then we would struggle come the day.
One of the problems with supporting units like yourselves and others is that many stations were virtually on 'care and maintenance' outside normal hours. This precluded us actually landing there.
I recall a FJ recovery from Akrotiri having to be deplaned at Lyneham instead of their home base. Their Sqn boss had a rant at the captain who put him on to our ops. The controller told him that his station flatly refused to remain open to allow us to go there. This was not an isolated case by any means.

[Tengah Type]

AA62
The receiving station refusing to stay open was a frequent occurrence. However, sometimes they did. One time a Lincolnshire F3 base stayed open for the detachment Tristar KC1 to deliver the troops. The info we had at Group said that the station did not have the correct equipment for handling said aircraft. The Station Commander affirmed that the station was fully capable of handling a Tristar KC1, so we agreed to offload there.
The Tristar arrived and a long time was spent unloading the passengers and baggage down a stepladder placed on the back of a 4 ton truck! The freight stayed on the aircraft back to Brize for collection later. We did not fall for that one again.http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/embarass.gif

[ian16th]

Once we had a 6 week det to Malta but Command hadn't booked AT. We flew out BUA with DanAir doing the freight. 6 weeks at Luqa, must have been a 'Sunspot'!

214 did one Sept/Oct 59 when we had HDU's fitted in the bomb bay's!

Group or Command decided it was too much trouble to send a real 'bomber' sqdn as it would upset the organisers. Though we were taken off the roster after that.

BUA would have been luxury, we went by Beverley.

[Pontius Navigator]

Ian, no wonder as that was 2 years before Charioteer. In 67 we still took all the targeting material. Stationery boxes secured with special FCO lead seals. The special bit was the way they were secured. We could open the boxes without cutting the cord or seals.

[ancientaviator62]

TT,
offload was not normally a problem for the Hercules, but often the reason given for not accepting us was lack of the appropriate level of fire cover !

[Pontius Navigator]

AA62, that stirred the brain cells. Bomber Command could increase local fire cover by deploying the BC Reserve. I seem to think this was based at Scampton foir obvious reasons. Whether it could meet short notice requirements was something else.

[BEagle]

Having been on the receiving end of 'All VC10s go to Brize' in my brief time on fighters, when I eventually had the opportunity to do so, if we were bringing back FJ aircrew from a detachment in the VC10K Super FunBus, I'd ask the AARC if we could be re-tasked to land at their bases instead. Amenable AARCs such as TT would usually agree, so we'd land, have a quick customs clearance, then do the 30-45 min back to Brize. Which beat the heck out of the 32 seat coach journeys I remember with much loathing!

Of course there'd be the odd know-it-all ex-AT Air Engineer who'd try to screw things up, such as 'Caring Ken the Airman's Friend', who once tried to tell me that we couldn't bring the FJ mates' LSJs with us as they were 'Dangerous Air Cargo'...:rolleyes: So I invited him to look under his desk at his own LSJ, which was just as much DAC as the ones double wrapped in poly bags lashed down in the tank bay...

Another delightful habit of some FJ stations was their refusal to send MT to collect their chaps until they'd been told that the aircraft had landed at Brize. Bringing some F-4 crews back from ASI once (we didn't have the fuel for their destination and back to Brize), I asked what their onward travel arrangements were "The buggers at will probably send us a bus when we've landed", they told me. Great - after the usual Movs faff, they'd have to sit and wait hours until a bus arrived to drive them to Wattisham? No problemo though; just off the sticky-out bit of Africa..."Architect, Architect, this is RAFAIR nnnn on 11s upper, request phone patch with Wattisham extension nnn....." "Hello, MT Control" "Good day, just to let you know that the pax are just landing at Brize, so could you send the bus please?" "OK - they must be early, but we'll send it now...."

And lo and behold, just as they emerged from customs, their coach arrived - I love it when a plan comes together!

[Tengah Type]

BEagle
It was not "Caring Ken"s fault, but the Duvet Fluffers who originally banned the FJ guys from carrying the LSJs with them, as "they might fiddle with then in a dangerous manner". When it was pointed out that the FJ guys needed them if they were to operate a trail leg, they agreed that LSJs could travel on the same aircraft. But, the gas bottles and miniflares would have to be removed. A Safety Equipper could travel on each tanker to reassemble the kit when required!! Their thought processes did not run as far as independent checks on the work.
After very lengthy discussions ending up at 1* level they accepted the need for the LSJs. But they would have to be double bagged and kept in the freight bay. We did not enlighten them about the arrangements on the Tristar K versions, or ask about double bagging the used ones. As you say there were several LSJs and other safety equipments on the aircraft, plus up to 120 tonnes of fuel.

[Pontius Navigator]

TT, unlike a 9mm that we were encouraged to strip and reassemble I had no such desire with an LSJ, or more recently LPA as I had no confidence in my ability to get everything in right place, right way up and still serviceable.

[tartare]

Gents - what are those two acronyms short for?
I assume you are talking about sidearms of some kind?

[Pontius Navigator]

Life saving jackets which were replaced by life preserver aircrew.

The rest of civilisation calls them life jackets.

PS, the firearm was the mini-flare pen not to be confused with a mini-gun.

[Wensleydale]

Another delightful habit of some FJ stations was their refusal to send MT to collect their chaps until they'd been told that the aircraft had landed at Brize.


Not only FJ Stations - Waddington used to do this as well. I remember waiting for a few hours for MT at Brize after a 4 month det to Stanley. There were 3 of us on the flight for Waddington who duly sent an Astra for 3 pax plus 4 months kit. Bless.

[sandym]

As an aside, any 90 or 543 crews of the period o n here?
Hi , Sandym. I was on 90 from 58 to 62 . Flew with Duke N . I was only 20 then.In at the deep end ,learned fast, still flying, never going to grow up .

[Pontius Navigator]

What was your war role then before tanking?

[ivor toolbox]

been following this thread with some interest; found another web-sit here
nuclear-weapons.info (http://www.nuclear-weapons.info/vw.htm)


which pretty much implies the dispersal plan would never have worked due to limitations of flying with armed weapons; AND they (weapons) couldn't be transported by road assembled as too dangerous.




ttfn

[Yellow Sun]

which pretty much implies the dispersal plan would never have worked due to limitations of flying with armed weapons; AND they (weapons) couldn't be transported by road assembled as too dangerous.

True with respect to Violet Club\Yellow Sun Mk1. I cannot comment on Blue Danube. However not true once WE177 came into service. As for Blue Steel, well let's not go there......:ooh:

YS

[Pontius Navigator]

Igor toolbox, you appeared to have picked up only part of the story. It is true that Violet Club and Red Beard were never cleared for Service use. They were deployed and could have been issued had HMG been so minded.

This was not true of either Yellow Sun 2 or WE177.

PS

Posted at same time as Yellow Sun. The point about RB is that it was deployed, training rounds were available, air and ground crews were trained and operational plans were in place. However all documentation was PROVISIONAL and not cleared for use with operational weapons. APPROVED documentation was never issued.

I once saw a Buccanner make a simulated LABS attack, bomb door open and RB visible (overland) when pictures of the bomb were still classified

[Lordflasheart]

I once saw a Buccaneer make a simulated LABS attack, bomb door open and RB visible (overland) when pictures of the bomb were still classified


One of our allegedly better qualified and more responsible chaps was selected to long toss a '2000 lb shape' ... ;) ... at Tabones. After release, rather than continuing with the escape manoeuvre, it was said he rolled and 'flew wing' on the shape for a while, to see what it would do. Normally, the floating scrap metal merchants would flop around on the oggin, catching the rays, while waiting to paddle in and dive to pick up their raison d'etre ( it was a dummy range only, unlike Crow Valley, but there was still money to be had) It was subsequently said that when they eyeballed this unusually large incoming, they bomb burst outwards on a 'magtampisaw para sa iyong buhay, amigos!' basis.

LFH

.........................

[Pontius Navigator]

LFH, El Adem range was cleared to 1,000lb HE. For live drops the staff would withdraw to the Quads at 6,000yr s, now this might be how the Arabs knew to keep away. With the close Quads manned the Arabs used to hide behind the target and collect the practice bombs.

[binbrook]

PN, the move to the outer Quads was prudent. In the late 50s it was decided to let the detached Canberra squadron at Luqa - us - get rid of some of the 1000lb HE left in Malta after Suez. The cunning plan was for a squadron (16 UE) night FRA at El Adem, one bomb per a/c, using a NBS wind passed by a Valiant ahead of us - what could go wrong? Well, the Boss got a 7000yd undershoot - the static line to the bomb had snapped, the pin didn't come out so the fins hadn't flipped out. It went off alright but the burst was so far back that the crew logged a UXB.

[Pontius Navigator]

binbrook, as good as the Victor at Song Song. Not sure how many but certainly HE and according to the Aussie RSO that told me, heard but not seen.