A380 low at Melbourne

[slast]

From FlightGlobalThe Australian Transport Safety Bureau is investigating an incident where an Emirates Airline Airbus A380 descended below minimum assigned altitude while on approach to land at Melbourne Tullamarine International airport.

The Bureau’s safety investigations and reports website says that the aircraft, registered A6-EDM (MSN 42), was operating a flight from Auckland on 14 July when the incident occurred. It was positioned around 28km south of the airport at the time.

“When cleared for the runway 34 RNP approach, the aircraft descended below its assigned altitude of A030 and out of controlled airspace. The controller alerted the crew and the aircraft climbed back to A030,” it says.

The operational incident is being investigated, with an expected completion of July 2017.
What would the bottom of the controlled airspace here?

[eckhard]

Melbourne CTA C3 lower limit is 2500ft.

The RNAV Z for 34 has a platform altitude of 3000ft.

The RNAV P (AR) for 34 has a platform of 2000ft but that is only applicable within about 8nm from the THR.

Sector Safe is 3700ft.

[Airbubba]

From context it looks like 'A030' is 3000 feet MSL. Is that an FMS format or something?

In recent years we've had a rash of incidents where the arrival was 'cleaned up in the box' and altitude constraints were inadvertently deleted from the vertical navigation path. And, as Captain VanderBurgh observed two decades ago, we have become 'children of the magenta line' even on visual approaches.

The operational incident is being investigated, with an expected completion of July 2017.

Good thing it's nothing important, so no hurry, right?

[BuzzBox]

The operational incident is being investigated, with an expected completion of July 2017.
Good thing it's nothing important, so no hurry, right?

That's fast for the ATSB. In some cases we're still awaiting reports on serious incidents that occurred over three years ago!

[Capn Bloggs]

From context it looks like 'A030' is 3000 feet MSL. Is that an FMS format or something?
"Altitude 3000". As opposed to F350, being "Flight Level 350".

Standard ICAO format...same as you put in the Flight Notification.

[Airbubba]

Standard ICAO format...same as you put in the Flight Notification.

Thanks, is a Flight Notification some sort of flight plan in Oz perhaps? Or an ATC message?

[Capn Bloggs]

ICAO Flight Notification... every IFR aeroplane flies on one. You might call it the Operational Flight Plan (at least the bit that actually tells ATC what you're doing)?

[Airbubba]

You night call it the Operational Flight Plan (at least the bit that actually tells ATC what you're doing)?

That's it, thanks again. :ok: Just as you will never see 3000 MSL written as A030 in an NTSB report, I've never heard the ICAO flight plan called a Flight Notification.

Fortunately, as an American, I don't worry about that ICAO stuff too much when flying internationally. ;)

I was in KIX a while back and saw a purple trimotor freighter drop down quite low over the bay turning final on that curved ILS to 24L. They then started a climb and I thought they would go missed but they continued to an uneventful landing. I assume it was a case of 'extend me off the runway' (or whatever the equivalent phrase is on the Mad Dog) and a low phony vertical profile was generated and perhaps chased in vertical speed away from the altitude window.

[Offchocks]

Does anyone have any idea what he is talking about?

KIX is Kansai airport in Japan, purple trimotor freighter is probably a FedEx MD11, anything else?

[pattern_is_full]

Kansai International... FedEx MD-11, a.k.a. Mad Dog.... flying published curved step-down approach to stay over water and avoid overflying populated land, involving both a VOR and an NDB, to intercept the ILS at the marker.

http://opennav.com/pdf/RJBB/JP-AD-2.24.32-RJBB-en-JP.pdf

Presumably, swapping NAV sources lost the altitude settings, although I have no idea about MD autopilot logic, either.

(The approach is sort of an all-radio version of the old "billboard ILS" at Kai Tak/Hong Kong.)

Anyway - back to previously scheduled programming....

[Basil]

In recent years we've had a rash of incidents where the arrival was 'cleaned up in the box' and altitude constraints were inadvertently deleted from the vertical navigation path.
So, if pilots can work that out, why don't our flight ops departments insist that positive action has to be taken to delete an altitude restriction otherwise it remains in place even when cleaning up?
Otherwise the tool (FMS) is damaging the workpiece (V-Nav).

[Tee Emm]

During simulator training generally would it be correct to say manually flown visual approaches are rarely practiced. Thus the accent is on following the magenta line via the FD?

[Offchocks]

During simulator training generally would it be correct to say manually flown visual approaches are rarely practiced.

Before I retired a couple of years ago, most sim sessions had a segment where you had to demonstrate a manual visual approach without any glide slope guidance, meaning no ILS, vasi/papi or vnav indication.

[filejw]

That's it, thanks again. :ok: Just as you will never see 3000 MSL written as A030 in an NTSB report, I've never heard the ICAO flight plan called a Flight Notification.

Fortunately, as an American, I don't worry about that ICAO stuff too much when flying internationally. ;)

I was in KIX a while back and saw a purple trimotor freighter drop down quite low over the bay turning final on that curved ILS to 24L. They then started a climb and I thought they would go missed but they continued to an uneventful landing. I assume it was a case of 'extend me off the runway' (or whatever the equivalent phrase is on the Mad Dog) and a low phony vertical profile was generated and perhaps chased in vertical speed away from the altitude window.
Ref Airbubbba comment on KIX ILS 24L and FedEx. I most likely caused by hitting app arm to early. The arrival transition calls for LNAV/VNAV in most a/c and if you select APP to early the aircraft will start looking for LOC/GS . Iv seen this happen in more than one type over the years.

[jackharr]

On my final simulator session before retirement 18 years ago, the examiner suggested I might like to fly visually under the Dartford Bridge. That was more difficult than might be imagined but I did succeed. I wanted to follow up with a go through the Dartford Tunnel but it was pointed out that the sim might take a while to reset:)

Jack

[Airbubba]

Ref Airbubbba comment on KIX ILS 24L and FedEx. I most likely caused by hitting app arm to early. The arrival transition calls for LNAV/VNAV in most a/c and if you select APP to early the aircraft will start looking for LOC/GS . Iv seen this happen in more than one type over the years.

That would be my suspicion as well. And maybe they went back out of approach mode when it started to chase, hurriedly tried to reselect things in the box and dropped some constraints.

On the vertical profile you have that mandatory 2600 ft. crossing just as you start the turn to intercept final. I've shot that approach with and without GPS over the years and sometimes the plane does the intercept gracefully but other times it starts to hunt as you turn toward KN. If it doesn't settle down you need to reduce the automation and, in the worst case, fly the plane. :eek:

Perhaps the incident I saw had the ILS extended off the FAF and inadvertently deleted the (at or above) 2000 ft. and 1600 ft. altitude constraints. Maybe they went to 1200 ft. way too soon, caught the mistake and climbed back up on profile.

So, if pilots can work that out, why don't our flight ops departments insist that positive action has to be taken to delete an altitude restriction otherwise it remains in place even when cleaning up?
Otherwise the tool (FMS) is damaging the workpiece (V-Nav).

That's one of the reasons I was hoping we would soon find out more about the A380 incident at MEL.

They were 15 miles from the runway. Looks like a 3000 ft. crossing restriction at SUDOS and 2000 ft. at ML627. If they were still on vectors maybe a misread of the altitude clearance, serious at any altitude but potentially deadly down low.

Or, were they given direct to SUDOS and cleared for the approach and somehow started down early on some faulty vertical guidance? Did they sequence the waypoints to go to ML627 and thought they could descend to 2000 ft.?

Maybe we will know in a year or so.

In this golden era of the FMS there seem to be subtle traps on waypoints and constraints that differ on each aircraft I've flown. On some planes if you get a vector to final you need to do an intercept to a waypoint ahead or it will not become 'active'. On others it doesn't matter and you can concentrate on flying the approach.

I've certainly armed approach mode too soon. And too late. And this RNP stuff is all automatic until it messes up. :D

Does anyone have any idea what he is talking about?

My apologies, I let myself lapse into pilot jargon and perhaps used some terms unfamiliar to you. I wasn't familiar with a Flight Notification and certainly have learned from this discussion myself. :ok:

[RAT 5]

I've read all the 'maybe's & perhaps' and what the automatics might have been doing, or not. No-one has mentioned the weather. IF they were in VMC why were they not looking out the window? If they saw the a/c starting its descent too early; if they wondered why they were 3000'/2000' at 15nm; if they were slightly curious about "what's it doing now?" why did they allow it to continue? Even if they were IMC the parameters seem to suggest something was not kosher. To hell with selecting this & that at the wrong time was the cause of an early descent. Sorry, but 'mind the office.' Or am I being too simple & harsh? A good dinner and even better bottle of red makes me cranky; so my wife tells me.

Before I retired a couple of years ago, most sim sessions had a segment where you had to demonstrate a manual visual approach without any glide slope guidance, meaning no ILS, vasi/papi or vnav indication.

Wish it were common all over; but then that topic has been beaten to death numerous times. Let's not reopen it. Lucky you had an enlightened training dept. Sadly, I'm associated with an outfit who prides itself on in-depth training but has reduced the amount of manual flying in the sim. There are the enlightened ones and there are the others. Nowt so curious as folk and none so blind as they who do not see.

[Willie Nelson]

As the facts in this case are yet to be revealed I cannot comment specifically on what happened to the A380 however, what I can say regarding any type of GNSS approach (RNAV-Z or RNP-AR) is that you must not arm the approach pushbutton unless the ATC assigned altitude and the IAF (or suitable Direct to waypoint) altitude are the same, otherwise the FMGC switches from NAV to FINAL APP mode and therefore will drop down to the NEXT altitude constraint as per the FMGC constraints, thereby bypassing the relevant safe altitude even if it is still selected in the FCU.

This was why, some time back Airservices changed the terminology to "when established cleared Runway xx x approach" that is to say:established on the approach itself and not simply tracking to intercept a waypoint on the approach.

In simple terms, selecting APP mode early on the FCU has the same effect as (spuriously) being in LOC capture but you're only tracking to the IAF and not yet runway aligned, therefore you might get G/S capture on base for example.

In FINAL APP mode the aircraft likes the track so it descends, it's not smart enough to see that a direct to is not necessarily on the approach itself.

If the A380 did what I'm referring to (yet to be determined) then it's not the first time it's occurred on YMML 34.

[glofish]

To hell with selecting this & that at the wrong time was the clue of an early descent. Sorry, but 'mind the office.' Or am I being too simple & harsh?

No RAT 5, you are spot on. It is a disgrace that after DME has been invented and now GPS is on every cheap smartphone, professional pilots still go below a 3deg path within 10nm of the runway with heavies. There is no reason to do so, distance to go is omnipresent in all airliners, so there is only inherent danger.

Those who continue do it, do it so without being aware and should be removed from such cockpits asap.

[RAT 5]

Willie: That is an informed explanation for a non-AB pilot. You may be correct, BUT.......
what would any pilot do, in any a/c, if it captured a false ILS Glide Slope and started descending. I hope there would be an instant disconnect and level off until the a/c was re-positioned to capture the correct GS. Whether a full GA would be necessary would depend on circumstances. A false GS was not uncommon at some airfields. The solution at every airfield was to have a gross error check ticking away in your mind. When it happened you were aware and knew what to do about it. On later versions of some a/c it became impossible to capture GP before LLZ. This helped the dummies who were asleep.
It has been known for decades that the approach phase is perhaps the most critical phase and during which most errors occur and incidents result; thus one would hope crews are at their most alert. After hours of safe sky underneath you most of it s now above you. Senses should be heightened.
If there is a known gotcha in the automatic system then surely the manufacturer should be taking steps to design it out AND publishing alerts to the crews. SOP's could be another level of avoidance. If Willie is correct this is a case in point; as too was the Korean B777 gotcha in San F.
Every a/c is trying to bite you in the backside. Don't let it.

[framer]

It has been known for decades that the approach phase is perhaps the most critical phase and during which most errors occur and incidents result;
I'm in furious agreement with you Rat5 about all your comments on flying the plane and knowing what your profile is/ should be ( a basic 3x profile isn't that hard even if the airfield is above sea level) but I think it is worth pointing out that the above sentence is only half right.
The approach and landing phase is the most critical as you said, but more errors are made in the pre-departure phase of flight. I think that is something worth knowing and thinking about when I see people rushing like mad to claw back 5 minutes.
Cheers

[RAT 5]

Agree about the errors: I defer to your statistics.

[Tee Emm]

If it doesn't settle down you need to reduce the automation and, in the worst case, fly the plane. http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/eek.gif



So you "reduce" the automation and see if that works. How long do you wait for reduced automation to give the desired result before gasp horror you actually are forced to fly the plane. I suggest that instead of "reducing" automation if it doesn't settle down, it would be prudent to disengage the automation immediately and seamlessly fly the plane where you want it to go. Of course if the pilot lacks the manual flying skills to do so, then simply reduce the automation as you say and send out a PAN before resorting to manual flying.:E

[Airbubba]

So you "reduce" the automation and see if that works. How long do you wait for reduced automation to give the desired result before gasp horror you actually are forced to fly the plane. I suggest that instead of "reducing" automation if it doesn't settle down, it would be prudent to disengage the automation immediately and seamlessly fly the plane where you want it to go.

This reducing the level of automation is the modern training speak for what you are saying, i.e. turn the magic off and make the plane do what you want it to. :ok:

The FAA and Boeing talk about 'levels' of automation from one to four. I think Airbus talks about similar levels with less automation being more 'direct'.

As Airbus says in their SOP treatise on 'Optimum Use of Automation':

At any time, if the aircraft does not follow the desired flight path and/or airspeed, do not hesitate to revert to a more direct level of automation, i.e.:

Revert from FMS-managed modes to selected modes; or,

Disconnect AP and follow FD guidance (if correct); or,

Disengage FD, select FPV (as available) and hand fly the aircraft, using raw data or visually (if in VMC); and/or,

Disengage the A/THR and control the thrust manually.

http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_gallery/files/safety_library_items/AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS_SOP_SEQ02.pdf

As usual, a lot of this philosophical stuff about levels of automation finds its way into the company pubs as CYA boilerplate paragraphs and filters down to the line through the training department.

On the particular KIX approach I was discussing earlier, you could go into a heading and vertical speed or altitude hold mode and let the plane settle down as it made the turn to intercept the ILS and then reselect LNAV/VNAV (on a Boeing) and then go to approach mode when the signal was stable.

You certainly could turn the autopilot off and hand fly the approach but recently that is somewhat frowned upon where I work since you had briefed a coupled approach.

Even following the glide path down with vertical speed if it doesn't capture for some reason is now considered a deviation from your planned procedure. I'm told that you should go missed, request holding, reassess your nav status, call the company and speak to a subject matter expert if required and rebrief the approach with reduced nav automation capability. You've got plenty of gas, right? ;)

[aterpster]

If, in fact, the flight was cleared for an RNP AR approach, not only is that an instrument approach, it requires specific training and flight crew operating procedures. The database isn't supposed to be messed with. Performance-based navigation actually means what it says with RNP AR IAPs. Deviation from the VNAV path, exceeding maximum segment speed, or deviating from the lateral path all invalidate the approach.

[White Knight]

And these RNP approaches are NOT flown in APP mode, but rather in NAV/DES so should follow the vertical constraint...

I have personally however had a colleague try and stuff up the approach to 34 in MEL with finger trouble and only intervention from my side stopped us going below a waypoint altitude constraint...

Easy to have finger trouble on such a tiring pattern that we fly here!

[aterpster]

Attached is the Austrian AIP chart for the RNAV-P (RNP) RWY 34 approach. If entering at either LAVER or GOOLA the specified speed (or less) and RF legs must be followed. The vertical profile (VNAV or VPATH) must entered not less than 2,000. 3,000 or higher must be maintain untl ML632 or ML642. ATC cannot intervene on either of these transitions other than to assign a speed less than the maximum specified. ATC can vector to an extension of the final approach course, in which case the approach must begin not later than MEXUN. In the case of a vector to the final outside of MEXUN the last assigned altitude should be maintained until intercepting the VPATH, but descending to 2,000 after SUDOS to intercept the VPATH at 2,000 would be acceptable with ATC concurrence.

Oz also provides an OEI procedure with their RNP AR approaches. Page 2 would apply only in that case and only with a declaration of the engine failure.

[haughtney1]

As a general comment regarding RNP approaches in MEL, I've found over the years that it all goes well, until ATC decide to vector you off, or worse keep you high and then expect you to be back on profile and speed etc.
I even asked the ATCO why clear us for the approach and then vector us off..etc his reply "because that's what we do"
As I said, just a general comment, but it does add complexity to an approach that is further complicated by various operator restrictions and physical limitations.

[oscar zoroaster]

At what point does the reliance on, and extended use of, automation create a critical dysfunction in the thought processes and mechanics of flying?
And at what stage of training (prior non-automation flight experience) does that impact occur?
As an example, at some point (already in testing), there will be automobiles with with autopilot modes which can be engaged and/or disengaged. Theoretically, the disengagement mode would be activated for problem situations to allow the human with driving experience to control the situation. That would be appropriate for a skilled driver. At some point however, there will be "drivers" of automobiles who have essentially been passengers for a decade and will be highly unskilled for actually driving even in basic control situations (breaking distance calculations, turning at speed, etc.) let alone high traffic situations and poor road conditions such as ice, rain, snow.

[aterpster]

huatney1:

As a general comment regarding RNP approaches in MEL, I've found over the years that it all goes well, until ATC decide to vector you off, or worse keep you high and then expect you to be back on profile and speed etc.
I even asked the ATCO why clear us for the approach and then vector us off..etc his reply "because that's what we do"
As I said, just a general comment, but it does add complexity to an approach that is further complicated by various operator restrictions and physical limitations.
The second time they did that, I would refuse the RNP AR approach.

[Chris2303]

Does the approach need to be redesigned?

[aterpster]

Chris2303:
Does the approach need to be redesigned?

The approach is fine. It should have been designed with air traffic management in mind. If not, then the Oz aviation authority issued incorrect specs to the procedures designers. I doubt that was the case. Sounds like an ATC facility problem to me.

[Airbubba]

ATC can vector to an extension of the final approach course, in which case the approach must begin not later than MEXUN.

From your chart it looks to me like the approach could begin inside MEXUN as long at it was not later than ML627 which is the FAF. Not a huge difference but I've received these direct to FAF RNAV-P clearances in Europe before. And sometimes I've gotten vectors that seem to closely mimic the published side approach transitions.

From ATSB website these guys were 15 nm south though and perhaps vectored for the long final.

[aterpster]

airbubba:

Check the note referenced with "#." Jepp makes it clearer; the note appear alongside MEXUM.

[Airbubba]

airbubba:

Check the note referenced with "#." Jepp makes it clearer; the note appear alongside MEXUM.

Thanks! :ok: I'm not used to that chart format, hopefully I wouldn't have missed it but I certainly might have. :eek:

As the facts in this case are yet to be revealed I cannot comment specifically on what happened to the A380 however, what I can say regarding any type of GNSS approach (RNAV-Z or RNP-AR) is that you must not arm the approach pushbutton unless the ATC assigned altitude and the IAF (or suitable Direct to waypoint) altitude are the same, otherwise the FMGC switches from NAV to FINAL APP mode and therefore will drop down to the NEXT altitude constraint as per the FMGC constraints, thereby bypassing the relevant safe altitude even if it is still selected in the FCU.

This was why, some time back Airservices changed the terminology to "when established cleared Runway xx x approach" that is to say:established on the approach itself and not simply tracking to intercept a waypoint on the approach.

One possible way down the primrose path would be if they had one of the approach transitions from the side loaded, got vectors to a long final instead and saw that they could go to MEXUN without reselecting the approach since it was already in the box and the rest of the approach is the same for all the transitions. Unfortunately, the 3000 feet restriction at SUDOS would not be seen by the FMGC.

It will be interesting to see whether they were cleared for the approach out over the water and selected approach mode too soon with a missing waypoint constraint.

[Rule3]

Re post27 by aterpster.

"Austrian AIP" Mate, there are no Kangaroos in Austria.;)

[aterpster]

Rule3:
Re post27 by aterpster.

"Austrian AIP" Mate, there are no Kangaroos in Austria.

I caught one of those, obviously missed that one. In any case the chart I posted should make the location obvious. :)

[aterpster]

Aibubba:

Thanks! I'm not used to that chart format, hopefully I wouldn't have missed it but I certainly might have.

Attached are the Jepp charts for the procedure in question. However, Emirates was likely using Lido charts.

[aterpster]

LIDO chart:

[Airbubba]

Thanks again for the charts. :ok:

[WeeWinkyWilly]

Bit off topic but recently read an interesting (but incomplete) dissertation on the FMS and the whimsicalities of some systems when dialling up waypoints. Mention was made of how the Helios 737 flew to Athens and entered a holding pattern (presumably via the correct sector entry at the holding fix). However that got me wondering what would happen when you weren't enroute to a destination and overflew that way-point which had no associated instrument appch and/ or onwards waypoint in the same direction beyond that waypoint. What would that FMS do as far as onwards tracking/heading goes? It surely wouldn't orbit that way-point. Would it just maintain locked to its last track or heading? If so and turbulence/cloud deflected it from that track/heading, what tracking could be expected?

[aterpster]

It will maintain the desired track. Track, by definition, is corrected for wind.

[Airbubba]

However that got me wondering what would happen when you weren't enroute to a destination and overflew that way-point which had no associated instrument appch and/ or onwards waypoint in the same direction beyond that waypoint. What would that FMS do as far as onwards tracking/heading goes?

On some planes I've flown if you overfly the last waypoint into a discontinuity the aircraft will go into a heading (not track, I believe) hold, altitude hold mode.

On others, like the A310/A306, seems like the autopilot kicks off with an aural warning (to wake up the pilots :eek:).

[aterpster]

Like all this "magic," vendors have different methods of implementation. In my view, having the autopilot disconnect is not good safety engineering. Aural warning, yes. Disconnect, no.

[Airbubba]

Over here in FAA land, the feds are now offering this conservative guidance about last minute changes to an approach:

b. POIs will work with their operators to ensure that operators have procedures that explicitly state that any changes to an approach after the initial briefing should be re-briefed in accordance with accepted crew briefing procedure. Last-minute runway or approach changes should be accepted only if pre-briefed as a backup to the planned approach. The PM should update the FMC to reflect an approach change, and verify with the PF that the new approach is properly set up in the aircraft. If time does not allow for re-brief and verification of proper FMC/cockpit setup, the flightcrew should ask for extended vectors or holding until briefing/setup can be accomplished.

c. POIs will also work with their operators to develop information about how the FMS could provide an incorrect presentation in the lateral and/or vertical profiles if waypoints are incorrectly entered, or a route discontinuity exists that is not corrected before conducting an approach.

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.311.pdf

I don't know how EK does it these days. And we won't know for a while if a botched route mod or mode selection caused this MEL altitude bust.

Seems like some operators, like Air Canada, had a rule that you couldn't do any button pushing on the FMS below 10,000 feet and if there was a runway or approach change, you would go to raw data. Of course, these days on approaches like the one discussed above at MEL, there is no raw data, at least not in the traditional sense of ground based navaids.

And, I've seen the other extreme in years past where the sim instructor would have the PNF typing all the way down to the runway to demonstrate proficiency with last minute route mods and runway changes that were very unlikely in the real world. For training, of course...

[White Knight]

Unlikely to be a modification to the approach as the RNP AR with RF leg is not permitted to be modified.

And generally once ATC (in Australia) clears you for the approach they will expect you to do exactly as it says on 'the tin'.

As I said this is flown in NAV/DES and there is a whole section in the FCOM about how to fly these approaches; which we are required to have a look at as part of the arrival briefing before TOD. Personally I don't like the NAV/DES way of doing it and I have seen finger trouble with these more than once!

[RAT 5]

To my knowledge no-one has yet posted the weather at the time. Will this who know please do so. i.e. were they visual or IMC?

[aterpster]

White Knight:
Unlikely to be a modification to the approach as the RNP AR with RF leg is not permitted to be modified.

There are three choices offered in the FMS when this approach is selected, all of which begin at IAFs, LAVER, SUDOS, or GOOLA. If the SUDOS IAF is selected all inbound RFs drop out of the approach. Since the scant report states he was 28 KM south, presumably he was cleared off-route to SUDOs and presumably told to maintain 3,000 (or, at or above 3,000) until crossing SUDOS.

And generally once ATC (in Australia) clears you for the approach they will expect you to do exactly as it says on 'the tin'.

If they were cleared off-route to SUDOS, they would have been "on the tin," as you characterize it.:) But, anything less than 3,000 would presumably have violated the "pre-tin" portion of the clearance.

[Trent 972]

If you listen to ATC Live, you will hear that they were recleared off the STAR to "direct PIERS".
PIERS is 14nm to run to the runway and 6nm before SUDOS. Refer Ports Nine P STAR
(14nm = 26 kilometres)

[aterpster]

Trent 972:
If you listen to ATC Live, you will hear that they were recleared off the STAR to "direct PIERS".

If they crossed PORTS at 9,000, and been on a VNAV path, they should have crossed PIERS at 4,900, or so.

[Airbubba]

If you listen to ATC Live, you will hear that they were recleared off the STAR to "direct PIERS".
PIERS is 14nm to run to the runway and 6nm before SUDOS. Refer Ports Nine P STAR
(14nm = 26 kilometres)

Later in the recording, which scans several freqs and misses a lot of the transmissions, you hear EK407 acknowledge a clearance to maintain 2000 feet. Then possibly a truncated approach clearance readback. After that you hear EK407 call approach again, perhaps from on the ground to discuss the incident.

EK407 checks in at 3:22 in this recording:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/ymml/YMML-YMMB-YMEN-Jul-14-2016-0930Z.mp3

[RAT 5]

Back to my question: what was the Wx? IF VMC and insight, all this playing around with FMC approaches for X or Y or Z and being vectored off the expected approach etc/etc. If you want to fly via automatics why not just use basic modes; if confused why not go manual? Rule No. 1. If confused DO NOT connect FMC to autopilot and then ask "what's it doing now."

[aterpster]

RAT 5:
"Back to my question: what was the Wx? IF VMC and insight, all this playing around with FMC approaches for X or Y or Z and being vectored off the expected approach etc/etc. If you want to fly via automatics why not just use basic modes; if confused why not go manual? Rule No. 1. If confused DO NOT connect FMC to autopilot and then ask "what's it doing now."

Absolutely! And, that goes even more so for RNP AR approaches where special training is supposedly required.

Having said that the STAR they were on melds perfectly with the RNP AR approach at issue.

[Derfred]

RAT 5, the problem with that argument is that if you can't use the automatics properly in VMC, what hope do you have in IMC?

If you've been taken off the approach, then fine, basic modes or manual flight.

But they weren't.

[aterpster]

I would like to think that an RNP AR crew that must be specifically trained and qualified on the ins and outs of RNP AR would not screw up one, especially this one that is designed and set-up so perfectly.

Then again, Turkish Airlines really messed up at VNKT and so did Nepal's aviation authority. But, I'm confidant the Australians don't have QC issues.

[Capn Bloggs]

Watch it on Webtrak:

WebTrak (http://webtrak5.bksv.com/mel3)

Click the Historical tab, then choose 14 July, 7 40 PM.

Interestingly, it looks like they descended to and maintained 2500ft. The didn't climb back to 3000 as stated by the ATSB.

[aterpster]

It will be interesting to read the final report, which will be accurate. At present, too little info, too much "static."

[Airbubba]

Watch it on Webtrak:

WebTrak (http://webtrak5.bksv.com/mel3)

Click the Historical tab, then choose 14 July, 7 40 PM.

Interestingly, it looks like they descended to and maintained 2500ft. The didn't climb back to 3000 as stated by the ATSB.

I agree, looks like somehow they went down to 2500 feet early and then picked up the descent path at MEXUN.

Hopefully the ATSB report will have distances in nautical miles instead of kilometers since that is what is on the charts and instruments the pilots were using.

[Capt Fathom]

Webtrak displays altitude referenced to Standard. So you need to know the QNH to see what their actual altitude is.

[Airbubba]

Webtrak displays altitude referenced to Standard. So you need to know the QNH to see what their actual altitude is.

From the Webtrax Help tab, Other (emphasis mine):

Remember that the aircraft's altitude is displayed. Altitude is relative to mean sea level and not your home location. However if you know the elevation of your home location then you can work out how high above your location the aircraft is at a particular time (the height with reference to your location). You can find more discussion of Altitude in Aviation on Wikipedia.

And Webtrax certainly knows the QNH, it is given as 30.4 [sic] inHg, must be another Oz format I'm not too familiar with. ;)

As a crosscheck, EK407 altitude on rollout is 453 feet, in close agreement with the upwind threshold elevation of 432 feet.

[Capn Bloggs]

End of Civil Twilight was 1749 local/0749 UTC.

[Airbubba]

Back to my question: what was the Wx?

I'm thinking these were the weather reports around the time of the incident:

SA 14/07/2016 09:30->
METAR YMML 140930Z 33009KT 9999 -SHRA SCT030 BKN043 10/04 Q1029 NOSIG=

SA 14/07/2016 10:00->
METAR YMML 141000Z 35009KT 9999 VCSH FEW034 BKN050 10/04 Q1029 NOSIG=

[RAT 5]

Thank you guys. It would appear VMC, but night.

[aterpster]

Portion of the PORTS STAR and the RNP AR Rwy 34:

[underfire]

Here is the webtrak over the procedure. They image shows the ac at the low altitude of 2500 feet @ 5km from SUDOS...at SUDOS, the ac had climbed to 2550 feet momentarily. (SUDOS is about at the intersection of FP and Francis St) There is no ILS on RW34.

http://i67.tinypic.com/2psit00.jpg

http://i63.tinypic.com/2j4rhfp.jpg

Thanx terpster, your post shows the Jepp chart is crapp to read. While the Jepp chart misses the bust, the real chart sneaks in the bust in the LAVER approach, that is due to a political disconnect, not a procedure design one.

[Capn Bloggs]

While the Jepp chart misses the bust
The Jepp chart shows min 3000ft at LAVER, SUDOS and GOOLA and BOLTY. What do you mean, Underfire?

[aterpster]

Bloggs:

...What do you mean Underfire?

Don't hold your breath. Political disconnect? Say what? The Jepp chart is irrelevant other than it shows the correct procedure. Emirates uses LIDO, which I posted earlier.

[underfire]

As always, terpster, virtually no clue what you are talking about.

The lower plate is directly from ASA AIP.
Look at the LAVER approach. Notice on the turn to MEXUN, it is 2.4nm and 2.4nm and does not connect to MEXUN as the GOOLA approach does. What is between the end of the turn and MEXUN? The original design had the RF leg end at MEXUN, tan to the TF leg...why doesnt it?

On the Jepp plate, the turn is 2.3 and 2.5, but if you put in the actual waypoints and turns, the turn is not tangent to the TF leg. They have massaged it, but it is a disco.

[aterpster]

underfire:

As always, terpster, virtually no clue what you are talking about.

If that makes you feel good, have at it.

I have previously posted the AIP, the Jepp and the Lido charts. What is relevant is: Emirates uses Lido charts.

what is particularly pertinent: they had an altitude excursion, not a track deviation so far as we know from the short report.

[underfire]

Your comments on post 67 created the dialog. Why did you post the Jepp AR charts, they were not on that procedure. Neither the Jepp nor LIDO chart that you provided shows the profile from SUDOS.

what is particularly pertinent: they had an altitude excursion, not a track deviation so far as we know from the short report.

Yes, and that is what is shown in my post, in overlaying the webtrack with the straight in from SUDOS including the profile. The profile is important to show from SUDOS as it shows the surface.

My comments on the Jepp chart that you provided is that it does not work.The LIDO chart is busted as well, and in that one you can see visually that the turn does not connect with MEXON. Again none of your posts shown the profile.

[Capn Bloggs]

Underfire, the tracking/turn design is irrelevant. Why don't you accept this? The aeroplane doesn't follow the paper, it follows what's in the database. Unless the nav display shows the radii on the RF legs of the approach, who cares what they are?

There is a profile on the Jepp chart; it is precisely the same as the AIP chart. Don't you realise that Aterpster's image shows only the top of it? In any case, it was posted in full earlier on.

As clearly shown on all the charts posted, Lido, Jepp and AIP, the min is 3000ft at SUDOS.

So, back to my question to you:


While the Jepp chart misses the bust
The Jepp chart shows min 3000ft at LAVER, SUDOS and GOOLA and BOLTY. What do you mean, Underfire?

[underfire]

I have explained where the bust was in several posts, it is on the turn..can you not see that? As explained, the comment about the bust was an add to the post, it was not about the ac being low, but about the Jepp procedure on the turn being incorrect.

The turn design is relevant if it does not work. Why cant you accept this? If you have coding that does not connect, the system will disco. If you have RF legs that are not tangent to TF legs, the systems will disco.

The image shown by the terp was of the AR procedure, which was irrelevant to the thread, and did not show the profile. While that chart may have, the image provided did not. As what the terp provided was not relevant, I made comments on what twerp provided.

I provided the profile from ASA that includes the MSA of the procedure. The ac in question was at 2500. What is the MSA of that segment on the charts?

Time to evolve.

[Capn Bloggs]

In other words, all the turn stuff is irrelevant. May I suggest you take it up with the designers/chartists. And surely any discos in the database would have been obvious during flight test. Besides, it looks like they came through SUDOS, so any turn glitches would have been irrelevant.

The image shown by the terp was of the AR procedure, which was irrelevant to the thread, and did not show the profile. While that chart may have, the image provided did not.
The full chart/s, all of them, were posted earlier, as I have already said above. The aircraft was doing the 34 RNP. How can that chart posted by Aterpster be irrelevant?

What is the MSA of that segment on the charts?

I'll say it again, all the charts, ASA, Lido and Jepp clearly show it as 3000ft. As noted in the OP, the aeroplane got to 2500ft. What's your point?

[Derfred]

How on earth are you guys concluding the turns do not end up at MEXUN?

They do.

[Capt Fathom]

The original post was....The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is investigating an incident where an Emirates Airline Airbus A380 descended below minimum assigned altitude while on approach to land at Melbourne Tullamarine International airport.
What the hell do all these turns and diagrams have to do with it?

[le Pingouin]

The RNP is immaterial here as they hadn't even commenced it but were still flying straight in on the PORTS STAR (via PORTS and PIERS) until SUDOS. They'd busted their assigned level and busted the level on the STAR. The RNP also clearly says 3000ft at SUDOS.

[jack schidt]

Looks likely that the RNAV approaches into AUS might be suspended for EK by those flying the aircraft from Costa!

J

(EK top 3 thread lines!)