Centaurus
25th Jul 2016, 12:59
The Oxford Dictionary of Idioms explains the term "If the cap fits, wear it" is used as a way of suggesting that someone should accept a generalised remark or criticism as applying to themselves.
There have been recent Pprune contributions on the subject of limited panel flying. Rather than add to the thread I felt a new thread might attract more attention. The following article was published in the NZ CAA flight magazine “Vectors.”
During a dual IFR trip in a Cessna 172 it was noticed the turn-coordinator damping mechanism was over-sensitive. In the air, even the slightest turbulence would cause the instrument to oscillate wildly and it was obviously marginal for accurate instrument flying. The instrument was electrically powered and when the master switch was turned on the power failure flag stayed on until the glass was lightly tapped. This meant that a power failure may not cause the failure flag to operate.
During an NDB approach the student (who was under the hood) remarked that the AH was indicating a left climbing turn. Reference to the other flight instruments indicated the aircraft was in a right hand descending turn. Although the AH was fitted with a gyro warning flag, this did not appear. Later it was discovered the AH gyro failure flag was only actuated by low vacuum – not by any internal failure within the AH which in this case had not occurred. The POH for this aircraft made no reference to the presence of a gyro failure flag as an integral part of the AH.
It was fortunate that the flight was in VMC. The aircraft was in a procedure turn on to final when the AH failed without warning. The inoperative AH coupled with an unreliable turn coordinator could have proved a fatal combination in IMC or at night. We flew back to base VFR and the defects logged in the maintenance document. Enquiries revealed that not only had the AH failed on previous flights but the pilots concerned failed to record this defect or the unreliable turn coordinator.
A few months later I acted as a safety pilot during simulated instrument flying practice in a Baron B58. VFR conditions existed throughout. A second AH had been installed to meet IFR charter requirements. This AH was placed in the right hand instrument panel and was partially blocked from the view of the pilot by the radio stack. To use the AH the pilot was forced to lean well over to the right and in front of any occupant of the right hand seat. From the pilot normal seating position there was a parallax error of around 60 degrees when viewing this instrument. I had seen many similar AH installations in Navajos, Senecas and Barons.
During taxiing, the turn coordinator continued to show a turn after the aircraft was lined up and stationary on the runway. The fault was confirmed during airborne manoeuvres. We also found the electrically operated elevator trim and autopilot were inoperative. During flight beyond 10 miles from the station, it was not possible to obtain any ATIS on the ADF. The ADF needle had significant lag. Despite all these defects the maintenance document was a clean sheet. The aircraft had flown 25 hours since the last 100 hourly inspection.
Part of the flight sequence included covering the pilot’s AH to simulate instrument failure. The pilot then attempted several turns by leaning well across the cockpit and using the second AH on the right side instrument panel. His attempts were unsuccessful resulting in flight well outside instrument rating tolerances. The difficulty being while the pilot could scan the ASI, VSI and altimeter which were in front of him, he soon became disorientated when forced to split his instrument scan to include the second AH way out of his normal field of view.
Because of the difficulty experienced by the pilot in using the second AH, he elected to switch his scan to the turn coordinator as primary reference. The main AH was still covered up to simulate an inoperative instrument. Accurate instrument flying became almost impossible because of the already faulty turn coordinator which was slow to recover from turns. Fortunately conditions were VMC and there was no danger of loss of control.
Somewhat disturbing was the fact this aircraft was touted for IFR charter. Worse still, after the flight the pilot elected not to record any of these defects in the maintenance document. By now I was beginning to get the message that in general aviation the recording of defects often appears to be treated in a cavalier fashion.
There have been recent Pprune contributions on the subject of limited panel flying. Rather than add to the thread I felt a new thread might attract more attention. The following article was published in the NZ CAA flight magazine “Vectors.”
During a dual IFR trip in a Cessna 172 it was noticed the turn-coordinator damping mechanism was over-sensitive. In the air, even the slightest turbulence would cause the instrument to oscillate wildly and it was obviously marginal for accurate instrument flying. The instrument was electrically powered and when the master switch was turned on the power failure flag stayed on until the glass was lightly tapped. This meant that a power failure may not cause the failure flag to operate.
During an NDB approach the student (who was under the hood) remarked that the AH was indicating a left climbing turn. Reference to the other flight instruments indicated the aircraft was in a right hand descending turn. Although the AH was fitted with a gyro warning flag, this did not appear. Later it was discovered the AH gyro failure flag was only actuated by low vacuum – not by any internal failure within the AH which in this case had not occurred. The POH for this aircraft made no reference to the presence of a gyro failure flag as an integral part of the AH.
It was fortunate that the flight was in VMC. The aircraft was in a procedure turn on to final when the AH failed without warning. The inoperative AH coupled with an unreliable turn coordinator could have proved a fatal combination in IMC or at night. We flew back to base VFR and the defects logged in the maintenance document. Enquiries revealed that not only had the AH failed on previous flights but the pilots concerned failed to record this defect or the unreliable turn coordinator.
A few months later I acted as a safety pilot during simulated instrument flying practice in a Baron B58. VFR conditions existed throughout. A second AH had been installed to meet IFR charter requirements. This AH was placed in the right hand instrument panel and was partially blocked from the view of the pilot by the radio stack. To use the AH the pilot was forced to lean well over to the right and in front of any occupant of the right hand seat. From the pilot normal seating position there was a parallax error of around 60 degrees when viewing this instrument. I had seen many similar AH installations in Navajos, Senecas and Barons.
During taxiing, the turn coordinator continued to show a turn after the aircraft was lined up and stationary on the runway. The fault was confirmed during airborne manoeuvres. We also found the electrically operated elevator trim and autopilot were inoperative. During flight beyond 10 miles from the station, it was not possible to obtain any ATIS on the ADF. The ADF needle had significant lag. Despite all these defects the maintenance document was a clean sheet. The aircraft had flown 25 hours since the last 100 hourly inspection.
Part of the flight sequence included covering the pilot’s AH to simulate instrument failure. The pilot then attempted several turns by leaning well across the cockpit and using the second AH on the right side instrument panel. His attempts were unsuccessful resulting in flight well outside instrument rating tolerances. The difficulty being while the pilot could scan the ASI, VSI and altimeter which were in front of him, he soon became disorientated when forced to split his instrument scan to include the second AH way out of his normal field of view.
Because of the difficulty experienced by the pilot in using the second AH, he elected to switch his scan to the turn coordinator as primary reference. The main AH was still covered up to simulate an inoperative instrument. Accurate instrument flying became almost impossible because of the already faulty turn coordinator which was slow to recover from turns. Fortunately conditions were VMC and there was no danger of loss of control.
Somewhat disturbing was the fact this aircraft was touted for IFR charter. Worse still, after the flight the pilot elected not to record any of these defects in the maintenance document. By now I was beginning to get the message that in general aviation the recording of defects often appears to be treated in a cavalier fashion.