Launceston 17 th June 2016 737 incident

[Dick Smith]

I hear that the ATSB has information on a missed approach airline incident at Launceston.

When will AsA use the multilateration radar system there to help prevent a CFIT?

After many die?

[porch monkey]

What is the connection between the missed approach and the cfit comment?

[PLovett]

I hear that the ATSB has information on a missed approach airline incident at Launceston.

When will AsA use the multilateration radar system there to help prevent a CFIT?

After many die?

Dick, I know you mean well but this is getting tiresome. You denigrate your case by the use of hyperbole. There is no risk of CFIT in any of the missed approach paths at YMLT or are you banging on about the incident back in 2010 or 11 where two aircraft came within 3 miles following missed approaches where you yet again made hysterical comments devoid of any reality.

[Pavement]

Reading the info on the ATSB site Id have to say (this will hurt) that Dick may have a point on this one.

[scavenger]

There is no risk of CFIT in any of the missed approach paths at YMLT

No sh!t Sherlock. However the incident (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2016/aair/ao-2016-061/) appears to involve an aeroplane flying a path other than that published for the missed approach. Even the densest person will realise the likelihood of CFIT goes up in this case.

[fujii]

Dick,

Will you stop calling it multilateration radar? Multilateration and radar are two different types of equipment which feed into the surveillance system.

[PLovett]

No sh!t Sherlock. However the incident appears to involve an aeroplane flying a path other than that published for the missed approach. Even the densest person will realise the likelihood of CFIT goes up in this case.

Thank you for your erudite comment. You have heightened the standard of debate enormously. :yuk: Now that you have provided a reference to the incident I concede that straying from the missed approach path can heighten the possibility of CFIT but unless the aircraft went astray from the DA there is bloody little it can hit until you go some distance from YMLT.

[Capn Bloggs]

So let's spend a few mill so that ATC can tell us when we're heading for the dirt. Remove all the EGPWSs, will ya? We wont need them now... :D

The pax would have been pretty unhappy, I reckon!

[Dick Smith]

When the two professions pilots on board the crash plane at Benalla allowed an aircraft to stray 7 miles of course and crash into terrain most other professional pilots claimed that a competent pilot would never make such a basic error.

That's why ATSB made no recommendations to upgrade the airspace to E so the advantage of the existing radar coverage could be maximised .

Normally when an approach radar type system is installed as per Launceston it is actually used by controllers to control aircraft. But not in Australia.

Our pilots just don't need such safety features - being superior to those in other countries and not make normal human errors.

[Capn Bloggs]

EGPWS. There are none so blind as those who will not see.

[LeadSled]

There are none so blind as those who will not see.
Bloggs,
Speaking about yourself, again!!
Tootle

[ACMS]

In carrying out the missed approach off the 32 ILS the crew diverted off the published heading..........

Oooohhhh big news Dick, the 737 was probably climbing at 3,000 to 4,000 fpm anyway, what the hell could they hit at YMLT for the 40 seconds they were below MSA?? They'd be nearly over the field anyway..

Besides, even if Radar was fitted the controller wouldn't not have had sufficient time to notice, then call the Aircraft before they reached a safe Alt anyway....

Yes the crew need to be checked/trained in missed approach procedures but don't think that Radar would have made this safer....

[LeadSled]

Folks,
The bottom line really is: Millions have been expended in installing a MLat set of equipment, and it is not being used ---- given the circumstances under which it was installed, it should be used to its capability.
Meantime, in the last week or so, we have seen a widespread demonstration in the western US of the gross shortcomings of planning to rely on GNSS to the degree Australia intends --- but the US does not.
Tootle pip!!

[Dick Smith]

Are you telling me that a properly operated terminal radar service does not reduce the chance of CFIT?

Why does the NTSB say the opposite.

Are you saying that Australian professional pilots are so skilled and faultless that they don't need a terminal radar service ?

Why then have we wasted the money at places like Cairns? Wasn't that the place that the radar operator prevented a CFIT when an airline started too descend to early?

[BlockNotAvailable]

Dick, it might pay to maybe pay a visit to the centre and see what is on surveillance in Tasmania, and how the controllers can use the information. Might be surprised...

[Dick Smith]

Block. Why then does AsA tell the media that the multilateration system is not designed to give a service below 6000' and that procedural control is as safe!

Why also on my last flight into Hobart was handled using a 1950s procedural type system and not a modern radar type system?

Why was $6 million spent on the multilateration system if it can't provide a service to the ground as the supplier said it was designed to do? Why the obvious cover up?

[Plazbot]

What specifically is unsafe about a procedural system?

[Dick Smith]

A survailance based system shares the risk more as the ATC is instructing the pilot when to descend depending on where the aircraft actually is- not where the pilot thinks the plane is.

Also any surveillance based system worth its salt has minimum safe altitude alarms or similar.

That's why the NTSB makes the safety claims about controlled airspace and survaillance.

[Stationair8]

Had a look at Flightaware, Dick it shows two B737 freighters into YMLT.


Looking at the tracks, the ILS missed approach seems to have been followed as per Jepps by both aircraft. There is a non standard holding pattern, in one case to the north west of the aerodrome, could that be the trigger?


Should the tower be open at night, for the freighters?

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

Should the tower be open at night, for the freighters?

Why? They're not RPT, and that's where the money goes. Freighters operate into strips all over the country. Should we put a TWR at all of them too?

Don't know who will provide this enhanced terminal service. ATC didn't have the staff to provide APP around YBBN the other morning.

[BlockNotAvailable]

Block. Why then does AsA tell the media that the multilateration system is not designed to give a service below 6000' and that procedural control is as safe!


Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that might be a CASA implemented restriction? I'm not up on it too well myself. Procedural control is safe, there are separation standards to keep the aircraft separated, not put them in an unsafe situation...

[Capn Bloggs]

EGPWS and Cost Benefit Analysis. Dick doesn't understand either of them.

[jack red]

never had these problems when Oz Cargo 3&4 were operating down there!

[ACMS]

I'm sure a fully staffed Radar site for all Airports in the World would indeed make it safer in some circumstances where CFIT is an issue. Yes Cairns is one.

For this example in YMLT during a missed approach in a high performance 737 it's my opinion that a fully staffed Radar facility wouldn't have made it any safer.....

And yes where I spend most of my flying ( VHHH ) HKG APP/DEP have indeed saved a few stupid operators from heading toward Lantau peak....

Doesn't it all come down to affordable safety?

Cost benefit analysis etc etc....

[Plazbot]

I reckon that the pilots of this aircraft probably decided that there was no collision risk with the ground much like the knob in the Tobago deciding there was no collision risk with the 737.

[ACMS]

No I reckon they probably stuffed up, it happens. Lucky for them they were not going to hit anything........

I just don't think Radar would have stopped this particular mistake....

[Dick Smith]

AsA have now claimed that they use the radar ( OK - multilateration) operated from the Melbourne centre for separation when the tower is closed but use non radar procedural when the tower is open and airline passengers are flying.

This seems the opposite to commonsense.

Can anyone explain?

Block. Procedural control surely can't be as safe as a servailence based service. What happens if a pilot makes a simple error and descends too early coming in from Flinders Island to Launy? It happened at Cairns and was only saved by the radar operator.

Or are our professional pilots perfect?

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick, Dick, Dick! The tower can do procedural control quite satisfactorily, which includes runway separation. An approach controller can't do that. When the tower's closed, approach just goes to MEL (and we have the poxy system where the crew are conversing on two separate frequencies at the same time...)

Procedural control surely can't be as safe as a servailence based service
Safe enough! On the one hand, you were quite happy to have no-radio VFRs mixing it with A380s at major airports, and RPT jets at regional airports, and on the other you're implying that procedural is so unsafe we've got to have radar everywhere? It's so illogical it doesn't make sense!

Or are our professional pilots perfect?
Err, no, that's why we have EGPWS. It's the third time I've mentioned it and you refuse to even knowledge it. You know that EGPWS has largely shot down your "radar prevents CFIT" argument, but aren't prepared to admit that technology has advanced from 30 years ago and now saves money as well as keeping airline passengers safe.

[AerocatS2A]

Why? They're not RPT, and that's where the money goes. Freighters operate into strips all over the country. Should we put a TWR at all of them too?

I think you will find they are RPT.

[le Pingouin]

Dick, what happens when the radar controller makes a simple error and assigns you an unsafe level?

ATC surveillance systems are primarily for separating aircraft from each other. They aren't designed to separate aircraft from anything else.

[Dick Smith]

Le ping. That's ridiculous. The NSTB claims the best way to reduce CFIT accidents is controlled airspace .

and radar.

With proper training and procedures the ATC could have informed the pilot in the Benalla accident so the accident could have been prevented.

Blogs. I have never supported non radio aircraft mixing with airline aircraft. My AMATs changes introduced MBZs

However if you want a traffic information service on VFR that's a minimum of ICAO class D airspace.

I designed and built the first beep back units so pilots would at least know if they were transmitting a carrier wave. Better than calling in the blind because there is so much resistance to US style Unicoms.

[Derfred]

Can any class D Tower operators confirm whether they have an ADS-B (or multilateral) display in front of them while processing traffic procedurally?

It seems to me they must have because they seem to know were I am and how high to a greater degree of accuracy than procedural techniques would allow.

If so, they would be in a position to caution me re CFIT even if that is not officially their job.

[le Pingouin]

Aerocat, scheduled perhaps but I don't think freight counts as fare paying passengers.

Dick, how is it ridiculous? WAM only shows transponder equipped objects. Any terrain avoidance is provided by controller monitoring referencing a terrain chart or the surveillance system effectively doing the same. Neither of which is an inherent property of a surveillance system.

[PLovett]

Derfred, I have been in the Launie tower and seen the display. It gives much the same information that a conventional radar display gives; ident, speed and height. From memory the display is also marked with distance and controlled airspace boundaries.

[Awol57]

I think all Class D towers now have some sort of TSAD. Broome may be the exception with INTAS.

As stated it gives similar info to a normal radar, plus we can select various maps (mostly approach over lays).

Up here, we only show ADSB traffic, the nearest SSR is to far away to pick up anything below about FL180.

[AerocatS2A]

le pingouin, RPT is scheduled passengers OR cargo.

[Dick Smith]

In a properly designed ATC system with safety at the fore the pilot remains with the radar centre controller when in IMC at a class D airport. This is to maximise safety and allows an alarm system to be enabled in the centre and warn if the pilot descends below certain pre determined altitudes when in cloud. Just commonsense really. Even though resisted by some dopey ATCs and pilots.

A class D tower controller should be concentrating on traffic where the collision risk is greatest. That is close to and on the runway. Once again just commonsense -but not in Australia. There is simply no way the same controller can also provide an effective radar service at the same time. The class D tower controller needs to be looking outside- not down at a radar screen.

It took a five year fight by myself and others to get our radar used properly in en route un controlled airspace Before the AMATS changes pilots in un controlled airspace in good radar coverage under the J Curve were forced by law not to be able to talk to the radar operator.

It was the prime reason that the pilot of VH- MDX was not informed at any time by the radar controller that he was heading at right angles to the stated track for over 20 minutes.

Not at any time before the crash that killed all onboard was the pilot able to communicate to the radar controller directly despite being in some of our best radar covered airspace in Australia.

I was told endlessly at the time " Dick you don't understand- un controlled airspace is Flight Service airspace and Flight Service is not trained to operate radar- you are so ignorant Dick "

After the BASI investigation no change was made because investigators, pilots and controllers had minds set in concrete and supported the way we did things before radar was introduced.

Just like Le Ping 30 years later.

[fujii]

More personal attacks Dick?

[Capn Bloggs]

There is simply no way the same controller can also provide an effective radar service at the same time. The class D tower controller needs to be looking outside- not down at a radar screen.

Tower controllers don't provide a radar approach service.

[Dick Smith]

No. No dopey ATCs or Pilots post on or read this site.

It's only the really bright lateral thinking ones so I can't possibly be offending anyone personally.

Bloggs. That's my very point. In the UK Europe, Canada and the USA at non radar class D towers or equivalent the airspace to the minima remains with the centre when IMC exists and the pilot remains on the centre radar frequency.

Only in Australia are we forced to change to the tower frequency when below 10,000, in many cases , even though the tower controller is not radar rated. Crazy. No doubt fixed when there is an accident.

And I reckon this resistance to change is the primary reason that the multilateration system in Tasmania is not properly used in the terminal area to help reduce the chance of a CFIT.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

RPT is scheduled passengers OR cargo.

The only references I can find in the various regs is a/ passengers, or b/ passengers AND cargo. I reckon cargo only is not RPT. Cargo is not the "public" in Regular Public Transport.

[AerocatS2A]

Dictionary in CASR Vol 4 defines RPT as commercial ops in accordance with CAR 206 1 (c) which defines it as passenger or cargo.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

Well there you go! It seems cargo is the public after all.

[PLovett]

Well there you go! It seems cargo is the public after all.

Well, the way the airlines treat you then you may as well be cargo.

[Capn Bloggs]

They/we don't call "it" Self-Loading Freight for nothing... or after eons, do we need to change SLF to SLC?? :{

[AerocatS2A]

Well there you go! It seems cargo is the public after all.
Your point stands though, the money goes to passenger ops. Nobody cares about freight and a couple of bods up the front.

[Squeek25]

www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2016/aair/ao-2016-061/