Engine Fire - Stopping into wind?

[RedsBluesGreens]

Hi Folks,

Just wanted to canvas your professional opinions on stopping an aircraft on the runway with an (engine) fire. Do your SOPs promote stopping straight ahead or swinging it round into wind?

The operator I work for places quite an emphasis on stopping into wind; yet it seems RFFS would prefer you to just stop ASAP and let them get on with their job without worrying about an aircraft swerving all over the runway.

I guess there are two separate situations - the RTO where one would have to wait up to 2 minutes for the fire services to arrive, so into wind may be beneficial. If it was a landing with the crews alerted, then the best course of action would be to stop straight away.

Any advice or thoughts from pilots, fire crews, etc would be much appreciated!

RBG

[wiggy]

Our OM "likes" the idea but also says stopping shouldn't be compromised to achieve it.

Given fuselage length (long) and some door positions ( long way back) on one of the sub types I operate I'm inclined to stay on the centre line, especially at some airports where the "rough" isn't friendly to fire crews and/or slides....

[flyingchanges]

Ideally put the fire on the downwind side to keep smoke away from fuselage. This may or may not even be possible in a strong crosswind.

There are other things I would worry about first, but if I had the spare mental capacity to add this into the situation, I would.

[lomapaseo]

I view this as insignificant if only because the real risk is pooled fire under the engine. data-data-data

Most fire indications are short lived because of limited fuel and thus the primary action is to shut off the fuel after control of the aircraft is ensured.

[EcamSurprise]

I don't think it has been forgotten but there is certainly different schools of thought.

Some say that if it's a headwind, turn towards the fire.

Others say that they will turn into wind.

[tdracer]

It's probably worth pointing out that in both the British Airtours 737 and the recent British Airways 777, they didn't know they had a fire until after they'd stopped. When a fire is external to the engine nacelle, the fire detection system doesn't work.

A fire that's internal to the nacelle (and hence detected), is unlikely to be a major threat to evacuation.

[Right Way Up]

TD Racer....In the 737 Manchester accident they actually got the fire warning whilst still moving approximately 80 kts decelerating.

One simple way to deal with a fire, is to turn towards the fire in a headwind and away from the fire in a tailwind.

[lomapaseo]

Since the BT B737 was brought up. The fire that got the fuselage was from the ground pool fire caused by fuel leaking from the wing and not the engine.

I'm pretty sure for most that are cited as examples they will be uncontroled fuel leaks from the aircraft associated with an engine failure.

Not much can be done if you stop and pool the fuel that has already ignited.

[Goldenrivett]

Not much can be done if you stop and pool the fuel that has already ignited.
If you look at the second photograph in the link which 7-cylinder man posted (#5), you'll notice the tyres are still inflated. They did not catch fire from the pooled burning fuel because they were up wind of it.

If the tyres survived that inferno, then surely it's worth attempting to put the fire down wind of the fuselage.

[lomapaseo]

f you look at the second photograph in the link which 7-cylinder man posted (#5), you'll notice the tyres are still inflated. They did not catch fire from the pooled burning fuel because they were up wind of it.

If the tyres survived that inferno, then surely it's worth attempting to put the fire down wind of the fuselage.

The reason the tyres are not burned is because they were underneath the flame front from the pool fire.

yes downwind from the fuselage is a logical desired result but in this case it was the side component into the fuselage that was significant and not the first thing in a crews mind while stopping the aircraft.

In this one unique case There was also the initial effect of the deployed thrust aft reverser deflecting the fuel stream flow sideways while underway (before fuel pooling underneath)

[eckhard]

Priority should be to stop on the paved surface, with enough of it around the aircraft to facilitate evacuation, fire crew access, etc.

Then consider the orientation of the main structure with respect to the source of the fire and its likely propagation.

If it is indeed an engine fire, it would be helpful to put as much as possible of the structure upwind of the engine. The actual direction and amount of turn will depend on the location of the engine, the size of the aircraft and, of course, the wind direction.

As most modern Boeings and all Airbus have wing-mounted 'pitot' installations for the engines, it is useful to have a quick 'rule of thumb' to help in the stressful few seconds after the event.

Taking off with a headwind component? Turn towards the fire.
Taking off with a tailwind component? Turn away from the fire.

Even I can remember that!

With rear fuselage-mounted engines (MD-80, 727 and most bizjets) it may be better to stop with the nose directly into wind.

With piston twins and singles (apart from pusher config) it will be best to stop with the tail directly into the wind.
This class of aircraft is small enough to accomplish this on most runway widths.

The few seconds that it takes may buy the occupants some valuable extra time in which to escape.

I agree that with fires resulting from pooling and/or flowing fuel, it is more complicated and it may be difficult to recognise the optimum orientation.

In a serious fire that is rapidly taking hold, the priority must be to just stop and get everyone off. Getting information about the location, nature and extent of the fire is vital when forming a picture of what is happening and deciding what to do.

[RAT 5]

May I expand this slightly. I've flown under many SOP's regarding RTO's with fires. Some had 'stop straight ahead', others 'consider turning'. I never came across the SOP that told you to turn with an engine fire RTO. The thought being you get it wrong and make it worse.
What I have come across with teaching new pilots from a non-familiar airline is their SOP NOT to use thrust reverser on an engine fire during RTO. Is this a local preference? Does anyone else do this? If it's such a good idea why is it not standard Boeing, or any engine manufacturer?

[lomapaseo]

I also support not deploying the thrust reverser in an engine fire.

Some engine fires can exit the nacelle in a chimney effect through deployed reverser cascades.

[DaveReidUK]

Given that the Manchester accident has been cited, it might be worth quoting two of the relevant Safety Recommendations made in the investigation report:

Procedures should be developed to enable the crew to position an aircraft, when a ground fire emergency exists, with the fire downwind of the fuselage. Visual indicators of local wind direction located within the manoeuvre areas would be valuable aids to the implementation of such a procedure.and

Operators should amend their Operations Manuals, if necessary, to direct crews on any rejected take-off or emergency landing to stop on the runway and review the situation before a decision on clearing the runway is made.

[RatherBeFlying]

One video of the 777 RTO at LAS, the thick smoke from the pooled fuel fire is obvious from the rear cabin while the PA is admonishing the pax to remain seated.

They were lucky that time. The next RTO with a pooled fuel fire might require a more urgent evacuation.

[FullWings]

This one comes up fairly regularly at work as a discussion item.

I think it’s one of those “it depends” scenarios. If I was rejecting at LHR (or LAS, given their demonstrated performance) due to a fire warning, I’d want to stop as quickly as possible and leave as much room for the emergency vehicles as I could as I know they will be there very quickly.

There is also the issue of *how* to position the aircraft. Do you let the auto brake bring it to a halt then set off again or do you take it out and manoeuvre? If you haven’t practiced this it may be more difficult than it appears and will certainly delay an evacuation if required. Cabin crew with some operators are authorised to initiate an evacuation in “catastrophic” situations: flames running up the side of the aircraft and possibly smoke coming in through the AC would probably trigger this, especially if the aircraft has come to a halt. Setting off again with the slides trailing behind you and and people trying to use them is not an ideal outcome.

If it happened at LOS instead of LAS, I think I would be more proactive in aligning the aircraft as you have to assume you’re on your own.

As far as the Airtours 737 goes, one of the major points was that it took a long time for the aircraft to be slowed to a halt plus the runway was vacated, all the time while the (external) fire was burning fiercely. When they eventually stopped, the whole thing was well alight and fuel was pooling underneath. In light airs, a large fire will draw in air from all directions, creating a local wind.

In summary, I think it’s a good point to consider but there are other factors that may override it as an SOP, such as a big aircraft and narrow runways. Also, if you are unfamiliar with the manoeuvre, it may not go quite according to plan.

[Don Coyote]

CAP 789 had some guidance as follows, I have emphasised the relevant part:

2 Actions that Should be Taken in the Event of an Uncontrolled Aeroplane Fire on the Ground
2.1 Fire During Take-Off
2.1.1 An uncontrolled aeroplane fire, often involving an engine on one side of the aeroplane, may result in a rejected take-off followed by an evacuation. The flight crew should include in their pre-departure brief the required actions in the event of a fire before V1, taking into account all the prevailing circumstances. The main priority must be to stop the aeroplane safely on the runway. An automatic rejected take-off system, where fitted, is usually the best way of achieving this.
2.1.2 Where it is possible, at an appropriate speed before stopping, a turn towards the side with the fire in headwind conditions and away from it in tailwind conditions is recommended, so as to place the fire downwind of the fuselage, unless other risk factors are more significant. Other risks increase with aeroplane size, and crews of larger aircraft should consider, for example, the risks of turning at too high a speed or placing the fire outside the paved surface with possible restriction of access for Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS).
2.1.3 If turns are recommended, then simulator training and checking in rejected take-offs from close to V1 due to fire should be required at an appropriate frequency. The conditions simulated should include crosswinds (with a tailwind component on occasions), and occasionally a wet runway.
2.2 Fire During Other Ground Operations
2.2.1 Many of the factors that apply to fires during take-off will apply to fires during other ground operations. However, turning to take the wind into consideration may be easier during taxiing as speeds are lower and there may be more time. There may be occasions where turning is not possible, for example whilst parked. In this case the main priority will be, as always, the safety of passengers and crew.

[Centaurus]

In my book, deliberately reversing an engine on fire is not exactly sound airmanship. Reverse is used to help decelerate the aircraft during a landing run and is most effective at high airspeed especially if normal braking efficiency is affected by a wet surface.

It is quite possible that due to the urgency of a rejected take off caused by a engine fire warning, pilots will grab a fistful of throttles and pull all reversers hard back even though one engine may be on fire. Such is the excellent braking efficiency of current wheel braking systems, it takes only a few seconds of ground roll at max braking for the aircraft to have decelerated into ground speeds where reverse thrust is not very effective anymore.

According to the B737 Classic FCTM, there is only ten feet difference between effect of reverse thrust engine-out RTO, brakes, spoilers and one thrust reverser and effect of reverse thrust all-engines RTO, brakes, spoilers and two reversers. In other words practically no stopping performance difference.

That would suggest there is no advantage of reversing an engine on fire as part of the rejected take off procedure in terms of a quicker stop. On the other hand the disadvantages really stand out. Primarily the danger of spreading the fire via the reverse plume especially at low ground speeds.

[RAT 5]

I can agree with you Centaurus; although I've flown for only 1 airline which had this restriction as an SOP. When I had my eyes opened to consider this I was sadly disappointed by the lack of interest in my colleagues in other airlines. It was not written down so they didn't do it or think about it as an option. They had become SOP blinkered. Surely the manufacturer should include this option in its FCTM. If they consider turning with wind, surely the TR use is also relevant?

[Goldenrivett]

Hi Centaurus,
there is only ten feet difference between effect of reverse thrust engine-out RTO, brakes, spoilers and one thrust reverser and effect of reverse thrust all-engines RTO, brakes, spoilers and two reversers.
True on a dry runway, but the difference on a runway which has braking action reported as "Poor" is 530m (for A320).
Take OFF Flap + Ground Speed + Reverse selected is also the logic for Ground Spoilers and Auto Brakes on most aircraft.

RTO with REV selected on all engines is to keep things simple with just one procedure for all conditions.

There haven't been that many RTOs due engines fires which have sprayed fuel over the fuselage.

[JammedStab]

According to the 747 QRH which is similar for the 777, concerning an RTO:

When the airplane is stopped, perform procedures as required.
Review Brake Cooling Schedule for brake cooling time and precautions (refer
to Performance Inflight chapter).
Consider the following:
• the possibility of wheel fuse plugs melting
• the need to clear the runway
• the requirement for remote parking
• wind direction in case of fire
• alerting fire equipment
• not setting parking brake unless passenger evacuation is necessary
• advising the ground crew of the hot brake hazard
• advising the passengers of the need to remain seated or evacuate
• completion of the Non-Normal checklist (if appropriate) for conditions
which caused the RTO

[RAT 5]

They have really covered their backside with greyness & guidelines. Not perhaps a bad thing.

"perform procedures as required." = your judgement.

"consider the following." = your judgement.

Surprisingly not using the effected TR is not included. Anyone from Boeing know why not?

[wiggy]

As has been said - consider it.

At many airports in many parts of the world turning a 777-3 into wind could put a door 1 slide and both doors 5 over the bondu/storm drains/edge light (ouch) or worse - possibly in the dark, and you're often dealing with places where the fire services kit has worse head lights and a poorer off road capability than my old Citreon Saxo. So that's "turning" considered......:oh:

As for the TRs, as has been implied on the 777 according to Boeing you should try for reverse on both, regardless of the failure, I believe on the 744 you try to select all to reverse. and like others - no idea why.

[Goldenrivett]

Hi wiggy,
according to Boeing you should try for reverse on both, regardless of the failure,....and like others - no idea why.

We have one simple RTO procedure for all runway conditions, so when the chips are down - there is a better chance that you will do it correctly.

https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/takeoff_safety.pdf

Page 2.8.
"Reverse thrust is not used to determine the FAR accelerate-stop distance (Figure 9), except for the wet runway case for airplanes certified under FAR Amendment 25-92. FAR criteria provide accountability for wind, runway slope, clearway and stopway.
FAA approved takeoff data are based on the performance demonstrated on a smooth, dry runway. Recent models certified according to FARAmendment25 92 also have approved data based on wet, and wet skid-resistant runways.
Separate advisory data for wet, if required, or contaminated runway conditions are published in the manufacturer’s operational documents.
These documents are used by many operators to derive wet or contaminated runway takeoff adjustments."

2.32.
"Most ofthe takeoffs planned in the world do not include reverse thrust credit. This is because the rejected takeoff certification testing under FAA rules does not include the use of reverse thrust, except for the wet runway case for airplanes certified under FAR Amendment 25- 92. An additional stopping margin is produced by using maximum reverse thrust. We stress the word “maximum” in relation to the use of reverse thrust because of another commonly held misconception. Some pilots are of the opinion that idle reverse is “equally or even more” effective than full or maximum reverse thrust for today’s high bypass ratio engines.
This is simply not true. The more EPR or N1 that is applied in reverse, the more stopping force the reverse thrust generates."

[lomapaseo]

Some pilots are of the opinion that idle reverse is “equally or even more” effective than full or maximum reverse thrust for today’s high bypass ratio engines.
This is simply not true. The more EPR or N1 that is applied in reverse, the more stopping force the reverse thrust generates."
24th May 2016 04:20

From my read on this forum most believe that max reverse is not significant in comparison to brake function at low aircraft speeds.

[Max Angle]

They not add much in terms of total stopping power but in a high speed reject on a limiting runway you are going to need every ounce of retardation you have to avoid an overrun and even that might not be enough. Use max. reverse on every RTO regardless of the failure.

[RAT 5]

Use max. reverse on every RTO regardless of the failure.

A wild sweeping statement IMHO. I've had a takeoff config warning at 95kts. First reaction was "this can not happen and must be false." 2nd reaction was, "something is not correct so let's stay on the ground." RTO sped about 105kts RWY 2400m, dry. Pulled full reverse so F/O didn't go crazy at non-standard actions, and then set them to idle almost immediately and disconnected auto brakes. Turn-off was at the end. QED.

Remember TR's are not included in the stop calculation on non-slippery runways. Look out the window and retard as necessary, surely.

[Derfred]

Use max. reverse on every RTO regardless of the failure.


Boeing recently changed it's policy on using reverse during a low speed RTO. Use of any reverse thrust is now at pilot's discretion.

[Chu Chu]

The thread on Korea Air 2708 says that the right aft evacuation slide blew under the aircraft and became unusable. (The aircraft is stopped with the damaged #1 engine downwind in what looks like a pretty stiff breeze.) Maybe a disadvantage to stopping with a burning engine downwind?

[Otto Throttle]

As usual, a fascinating and informative debate. Thank you.

The data regarding stopping distance on the 73 classic was particularly interesting, but it does assume a failed engine with zero thrust. An engine fire does not necessarily mean a failed engine (in thrust terms), but certainly food for thought.