rogerrapoport
21st Apr 2016, 05:43
When Gary Helmer was writing his dissertation on Deceit and Misrepresentation of the Qualifications of United States Army Flight and Combat Mission Simulator Instructors he was determined to find out if there was a correlation between simulator training and actual aircraft accidents.
"I was unable to make a direct connection between the hiring of unqualified applicants who have apparently aggrandized their previous experience and education and the substandard training of aircrew members."
Dr. Helmer, now chief of the National Transportation Safety's Board's safety division, was not the only person asking this question.
Shem Malmquist, a veteran accident investigator and international MD-11 Captain has pointed out, "the simulator can't replace actual flight. We can use simulators to validate ideas on new training. But a simulator can't replicate every in-flight situation.
"Without correct parameters there is no way to accurately program a simulator. A classic example was incorrect simulator training that misled the pilots of an American Airlines Airbus 300, which crashed shortly after takeoff from New York's JFK in November 2001. The accident investigation revealed that a procedure created in an airline simulator recommended a new approach to handling an unexpected roll. The standard technique, using the aircraft's ailerons, was replaced with rudder deflection. Here, best intentions worked great in theory and failed dramatically in the air.
"Pilots are only as good as the instruction they receive. If they are simply handed a training DVD where they grade themselves on a multiple-choice test, or rushed through a short class that skips over critical details, they may not have the critical skills needed for a once-in-a-lifetime challenge. Likewise, simulators only work when manufacturers have the fundamental data required to make these machines effective for training. Unfortunately they are still limited in their ability to replicate the motion of actual flight. An inadequately trained pilot or an incorrectly programmed simulator can lead to unexpected consequences."
Over the past seven years three high altitude airliner stalls over the South Atlantic (Air France, 2009), the Java Sea (Air Asia, 2014) and in Mali (Air Algerie, 2014) have led to crashes taking the lives of 506 people.
Approach to stall and stall recovery training for these aircraft at cruise altitude was based on designing test standards rather than actual real world flight procedures. In addition there was an assumption that an actual stall at cruise altitude in a transport airplane was extremely unlikely. Government regulators accepted theoretical engineering data in lieu of in-flight cruise high altitude stall data.
In all three cases high altitude convective storms disrupted normal flight and the Airbus and MD-80 aircraft entered aerodynamic stalls. Although all three aircraft were flown by highly experienced pilots, including several with aerobatic training, none of these pilots had been trained how to recognize high altitude stalls. None of them had received correct training on how to recover from aerodynamic stalls at cruise altitude. They were also unfamiliar with the special icing conditions creating problems like unreliable airspeed.
A review of accident data shows that only a few well-trained test pilots had the training necessary to recover from these stalls. Following several accidents and after considerable study, the FAA saw the need for more robust stall training. The agency began collecting the data necessary in flight on Boeing 737 and Airbus 330 aircraft. These in flight 2014 cruise altitude stall tests and related data supplied independently demonstrated that industry wide simulator training for flight at stall and beyond stall angle of attack and stall recovery at high altitude was modeled incorrectly.
"Although my PhD thesis was more concerned with the quality of teaching there was a bigger unrecognized problem: the doctrine was wrong," says Dr. Helmer who also teaches at Embry-Riddle. "Combine bad information with bad instruction and you have an even bigger problem."
The FAA, the European Air Safety Agency as well as regulatory agencies in other countries are correcting the problem by requiring that all air carriers reprogram their simulators to make sure pilots can be correctly trained on approach to stall and stall recovery.
The FAA announced the new flight simulator regulation March 30, effective May 31. The simulator training upgrades must be completed by 2019. It is anticipated that carriers worldwide will eventually implement similar programs. This is already happening in Canada, Australia and the Middle East. Some carriers such as Alaska and Southwest are already making these simulator modifications well in advance of the 2019 deadline.
Complete details on the FAA's new 14 CFR FAR 60 final ruling, implemented at an estimated cost of $80.8 million can be viewed at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-03-30/pdf/2016-05860.pdf. American carriers must comply no later than March 2019.
"I was unable to make a direct connection between the hiring of unqualified applicants who have apparently aggrandized their previous experience and education and the substandard training of aircrew members."
Dr. Helmer, now chief of the National Transportation Safety's Board's safety division, was not the only person asking this question.
Shem Malmquist, a veteran accident investigator and international MD-11 Captain has pointed out, "the simulator can't replace actual flight. We can use simulators to validate ideas on new training. But a simulator can't replicate every in-flight situation.
"Without correct parameters there is no way to accurately program a simulator. A classic example was incorrect simulator training that misled the pilots of an American Airlines Airbus 300, which crashed shortly after takeoff from New York's JFK in November 2001. The accident investigation revealed that a procedure created in an airline simulator recommended a new approach to handling an unexpected roll. The standard technique, using the aircraft's ailerons, was replaced with rudder deflection. Here, best intentions worked great in theory and failed dramatically in the air.
"Pilots are only as good as the instruction they receive. If they are simply handed a training DVD where they grade themselves on a multiple-choice test, or rushed through a short class that skips over critical details, they may not have the critical skills needed for a once-in-a-lifetime challenge. Likewise, simulators only work when manufacturers have the fundamental data required to make these machines effective for training. Unfortunately they are still limited in their ability to replicate the motion of actual flight. An inadequately trained pilot or an incorrectly programmed simulator can lead to unexpected consequences."
Over the past seven years three high altitude airliner stalls over the South Atlantic (Air France, 2009), the Java Sea (Air Asia, 2014) and in Mali (Air Algerie, 2014) have led to crashes taking the lives of 506 people.
Approach to stall and stall recovery training for these aircraft at cruise altitude was based on designing test standards rather than actual real world flight procedures. In addition there was an assumption that an actual stall at cruise altitude in a transport airplane was extremely unlikely. Government regulators accepted theoretical engineering data in lieu of in-flight cruise high altitude stall data.
In all three cases high altitude convective storms disrupted normal flight and the Airbus and MD-80 aircraft entered aerodynamic stalls. Although all three aircraft were flown by highly experienced pilots, including several with aerobatic training, none of these pilots had been trained how to recognize high altitude stalls. None of them had received correct training on how to recover from aerodynamic stalls at cruise altitude. They were also unfamiliar with the special icing conditions creating problems like unreliable airspeed.
A review of accident data shows that only a few well-trained test pilots had the training necessary to recover from these stalls. Following several accidents and after considerable study, the FAA saw the need for more robust stall training. The agency began collecting the data necessary in flight on Boeing 737 and Airbus 330 aircraft. These in flight 2014 cruise altitude stall tests and related data supplied independently demonstrated that industry wide simulator training for flight at stall and beyond stall angle of attack and stall recovery at high altitude was modeled incorrectly.
"Although my PhD thesis was more concerned with the quality of teaching there was a bigger unrecognized problem: the doctrine was wrong," says Dr. Helmer who also teaches at Embry-Riddle. "Combine bad information with bad instruction and you have an even bigger problem."
The FAA, the European Air Safety Agency as well as regulatory agencies in other countries are correcting the problem by requiring that all air carriers reprogram their simulators to make sure pilots can be correctly trained on approach to stall and stall recovery.
The FAA announced the new flight simulator regulation March 30, effective May 31. The simulator training upgrades must be completed by 2019. It is anticipated that carriers worldwide will eventually implement similar programs. This is already happening in Canada, Australia and the Middle East. Some carriers such as Alaska and Southwest are already making these simulator modifications well in advance of the 2019 deadline.
Complete details on the FAA's new 14 CFR FAR 60 final ruling, implemented at an estimated cost of $80.8 million can be viewed at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-03-30/pdf/2016-05860.pdf. American carriers must comply no later than March 2019.