B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don [Archive]

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 02:07

Flydubai passenger Boeing from Dubai crashes in Rostov-on-Don
Published time: 19 Mar, 2016 01:27
Edited time: 19 Mar, 2016 02:04

Flydubai flight FZ981 has crashed in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don killing all 59 passengers and crew on board. The flight was en route from Dubai and crashed during a landing approach.

Air-traffic control and local emergency services confirmed that the Boeing 737 jet crashed near the runway during a second approach in conditions of poor visibility.

“According to preliminary data, the Boeing 737 crashed in poor visibility conditions, some 50-100 meters left of the runway,” the source said.

All crew and passengers on board the plane were killed in the crash, according to the regional Emergencies Ministry.

“During the landing approach a Boeing-737 crashed. It had 55 passengers on board. All of them died,” a regional spokesman told TASS.

https://www.rt.com/news/336185-boeing-crash-dubai-rostov/

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 02:15

Flight radar route of #FZ981 that crashed on landing

https://twitter.com/RT_com/status/711008788741013505/photo/1

p.j.m

19th Mar 2016, 02:17

"unconfirmed" video of crash

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0cWpR8c1ZQ

weatherdude

19th Mar 2016, 02:36

Like all Russian wx observers very generous with seeing CB clouds, the Metar history on site showing showers, quite some wind, but nothing extreme, no lightning recorded either.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Cd4K_aDWIAAmWR6.jpg:large

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 02:39

Appears to have conducted a missed approach before entering hold before landing attempt based on FlightRadar24

p.j.m

19th Mar 2016, 02:47

crash site..

https://i.imgur.com/naLHwx8.jpg

Tarq57

19th Mar 2016, 02:48

If the video posted at #4 is real, it looks like a steep fast descent into the ground.
Impact appears totally unsurvivable.

RingwaySam

19th Mar 2016, 03:03

Metars -

URRR 190030Z 24012G19MPS 6000 -SHRA SCT018 BKN036CB OVC100 06/04 Q0998 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE741/0988

URRR 190100Z 24014G22MPS 3800 -SHRA BKN014 BKN033CB OVC100 06/04 Q0997 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE740/0987

clipped_wings

19th Mar 2016, 03:06

in the video I saw it appeared the aircraft was on fire before a high rate of decent impact. So sad for flydubai which has an excellent safety record.
https://mobile.twitter.com/khalidkhan787/status/711010449920290816/video/1

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 03:08

Wind down the runway as well. Small crosswind component.

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 03:09

Yeah the video appears very strange for a crash as a result of poor weather on landing, you would expect a controlled crash into terrain.

Also the video does appear to fit with come from the main road that runs parallel to the runway

Contact Approach

19th Mar 2016, 03:12

The time difference between both approaches was almost 2 hours!

C.A

Contact Approach

19th Mar 2016, 03:14

Jack,

How on earth can you tell that it 'appears to be a 60 degree decent angle'?

C.A

ironbutt57

19th Mar 2016, 03:15

think thats the video of the one that crashed on go-around previously

thcrozier

19th Mar 2016, 03:21

Whatever the angle, it's way steeper than normal. Depending upon the sensitivity of the surveillance camera, what appears to be fire may just be heat in the infrared spectrum.

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 03:27

Based on google maps/street view the video matches up with being shot from pr . Sholokhov (пр. Шолохова) - thats a road btw

Iron Eagle

19th Mar 2016, 03:33

this is the actual weather reported at the time of accident

URRR 190300Z 25011G18MPS 3900 -SHRA BKN011 BKN030CB OVC100 06/04 Q0997 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE740/0987

URRR 190230Z 25011G16MPS 4700 -SHRA BKN013 BKN031CB OVC100 06/04 Q0997 RESHRA R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE740/0987

URRR 190200Z 25011MPS 4600 1700SW SHRA BKN014 BKN032CB OVC100 06/04 Q0997 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE740/0987

thcrozier

19th Mar 2016, 03:43

The time difference between both approaches was almost 2 hours!

C.A

How long were they in that holding pattern? Were they in it more than once?

Or in other words, if the time difference between the two attempted approaches was 2 hours, and if they held for some time prior to the first, it's almost impossible to imagine they would have had fuel to reach the alternate.

Also, what would their most likely alternate have been?

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 03:46

Not sure if anyone is interested by this is my guess as to location the video came from

https://twitter.com/OFC_videos/status/711035535343505408

If it is correct is means the plane crashed very close to the start of the runway

Contact Approach

19th Mar 2016, 03:56

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/a6-fdn/#922b3bd

Here's the FR24 playback.

C.A

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 04:13

First Video from the crash scene, it appears the plane almost nose dived into the runway
CdvJoN09WAo

mattymagoo

19th Mar 2016, 04:14

Realizing that the radar shows ground speed and not airspeed, it still brings up the possibility of a stall. Someone with some more time tonight can probably calculate the final decent 's VVI.

xyze

19th Mar 2016, 04:19

If the video is real, looks very similar to that of the Tartastan accident at Kazan.

swish266

19th Mar 2016, 04:22

If these guys would have diverted, they might have had to layover... You cannot make it back to DXB in one FDP with 3 sectors.
For sure if you are carrying enough fuel to hold for 2 hours, it means you don't want to divert!
FZ and EK are known to push FDL to the limit!
Poor sods...

p.j.m

19th Mar 2016, 04:29

preliminary passenger list has been published

http://lifenews.ru/news/191188

google will translate
https://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Flifenews.ru%2Fnews%2F191188

Tu.114

19th Mar 2016, 04:44

Careful with those allegations that the aircraft "may have been on fire" judging from those seconds shown on the video.

Aircraft are known to show landing lights during approach; those are a perfectly good explanation for the lights seen and according to Occams Razor much more probable than an inflight fire.

I suggest that respect for the colleagues and their passengers on board dictates a cautious approach to speculating.

PuraVidaTransport

19th Mar 2016, 04:53

16.29 Fairly close to airport at 11K ft.
16.42 On approach then began to climb and increase speed so did a missed approach from an altitude of 1750ft
16.50 climbed out to 8K ft. southwest and from there into a circle towards the northeast
17.15 After circling to the northeast of the airport, increased altitude to 15K ft to fly to holding pattern southeast of runway
17.27 Enter holding pattern southeast of airport at altitude of 15K ft.
18.24 On the 9th circuit of the hold, began decent and approach to airport
18.36 Turned into runway heading on approach at 2750ft
18.38 Began decent from 2750ft to airport
------Approached looks normal, speeds mirror first approach (105-115Kts) until seemingly almost the same point on the approach where they aborted the first time.
18.40 Speed increases and altitude increases from a low point of 1550ft so a second missed approach seems to be happening
18.41 Speed at 185Kts and altitude at 3975ft but next to last data point
18.42 Last data point. Speed up to 197Kts but altitude has fallen to 925ft

So from missed approach at ~16.42 until beginning second approach at ~18.24, pilots obviously troubleshooting or waiting for weather for about one hour and 42 minutes. Approach looks fine before it all went south with the time from the 2nd missed approach to the crash only being around 2 minutes. The final decent seems to be at high speed and high angle of decent (3K feet decent in less than a minute at almost 200Kts). Speeds don't decay low enough to indicate a stall...but that can depend on a lot of other things (AoA, configuration of the flaps, etc.) we don't have yet so could have happened. Fuel starvation (complete) is highly doubtful because they managed to increase speed and altitude which means they had power.

737er

19th Mar 2016, 05:07

Looked at another flight tracker. Looks like they got slow on second miss. About 40 knots GS below what their approach speed was on the second attempt. (Which was 129)

:(

A_Van

19th Mar 2016, 05:20

Local (Rostov) people confirm that the weather was really bad that night: rain and strong wind. But the visibility was not that bad. It was reported on TV that shortly before that tragic crash two Russian planes (one from Moscow, another from St-Petersburg) decided not to land and diverted to Krasnodar, which is just 20 min to the south. Though their crews of course knew the Rostov airport quite well. One more Aeroflot plane managed to land after 2-3 attempts. Why the Dubai plane did not go to another airport???

JanetFlight

19th Mar 2016, 05:23

ATC Comms

-4m0FcsLnEg&

logansi

19th Mar 2016, 05:35

Based on ATC comms above:

Their worry seamed defiantly to be wind/windshear not visibility.
Also noted a few issue with accent and also altitude in meters.
Also confirmation they were in a go around before the crash, sounded very normal and causal reporting of 'skydubai 981 going around' - no issue at that time.

parabellum

19th Mar 2016, 05:41

Just a couple of points:
- does not matter if they was qualified for ALL WX, as the airport was only a Cat 1 airport

1). That aircraft was fully capable of carrying out a coupled approach to Cat1 minima and continue for a manual landing.

2). It is possible that they were tankering fuel, (due cost), if not carrying round trip fuel. Quite possibly plenty of holding fuel and still enough for a diversion.

jfkjohan

19th Mar 2016, 05:59

CNN reported that the aircraft's tail "clipped the runway" ?

Flydubai airliner crashes in Russia; 62 dead - CNN.com (http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/18/europe/russia-plane-crash/index.html)

I heard the ATC recordings as well and unless they declared a go around (verbal comms) and then only went around (action), maybe they then had a tailstrike?

They did sound very calm and collected as well in the recordings, unlike a crew having a low fuel scenario. Inclined to believe they tankered anyway.

HDP

19th Mar 2016, 06:02

From avherald.com

The aircraft carried fuel for trip, contingency, alternate, final fuel reserve (30 minutes) and additional holding for about 2:30 hours, total fuel for an endurance of about 8.5 hours. The aircraft had been airborne until time of impact for 06:02 hours.

After about 2 hours of holding the aircraft commenced another approach to Rostov's runway 22, winds from 240 degrees at 27 knots (14 m/s) gusting 42 knots (22 m/s), but struck a wing onto the runway at about 3:43 (00:43Z), broke up, came to a rest near the end and to the right of the runway and burst into flames.

We are aware of the video but for now have dismissed this video (which appears to be in contradiction to available radar data and official announcements, e.g. by MAK)

http://s23.postimg.org/cyaljau8b/flydubai_b738_a6_fdn_rostov_160319_map.jpg

mickjoebill

19th Mar 2016, 06:04

Room for misreporting and poor translation, Ministry of Emergenciencies says that the "tail hit the ground".

Airliner crashes in Russia; 61 aboard reported dead http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/18/europe/russia-plane-crash/index.html

Re the video:
Using the passing car as a reference, the security camera is sensitive to the IR emitting in Nav, landing lights and flame.

There appears to be two distinct targets (lights) descending that do not alter their relative position on descent.

The online video looks to have been recorded off a screen.

This would explain the curious framing for a security camera.

The original recording should have more detail.

Mickjoebill

logansi

19th Mar 2016, 06:10

logansi

19th Mar 2016, 06:23

Unless we get a time print with the transcript, I would say the "going around" phrase could be from the first G/A...
Its the second attempt because earlier in the recording the pilot asks if the conditions are better than the first time

Tarq57

19th Mar 2016, 06:32

but struck a wing onto the runway at about 3:43 (00:43Z), broke up, came to a rest near the end and to the right of the runway and burst into flames.

This point i feel doesn't make sence to me - all the wreckage (from life news) appears to be very small, more like a crash from altitude, where as this would suggest damage more like the Fedex crash in Toyko
A paradigm that might fit the scenario is that the initial wing strike took place near the beginning of the runway, this rendering the aircraft uncontrollable (for any number of reasons) but, since the crew were overshooting, they had time to gain a bit of height before the final impact sequence.

Not saying that's the case, of course.

ACMS

19th Mar 2016, 06:33

Holy smokes, watch the video again. Those are lights on the Aircraft, a bright Landing light a flashing strobe and maybe a Nav light.......it was a steep impact......

pattern_is_full

19th Mar 2016, 06:59

I don't have a clear picture yet.

The video, compact shredded debris field (as seen thus far) and airport diagram are suggestive of Tatarstan 363. TOGA thrust on go-around without compensating control input, leading to pitch-up, stall and crash on the airport.

However, Av Herald discounts the video, so I'll mark that as (???) for the moment.

Another alternative is hard landing and disintegration along the runway - which should mean daylight will bring a picture of a debris field the length of the runway.

Or as some have suggested, something in between - a hard bounce or other ground contact that rendered the aircraft unflyable and brought it back to earth at the far runway end.

I expect things will become clearer very soon.

snowfalcon2

19th Mar 2016, 07:05

If there was a tailstrike, as some reports say, the aircraft may have lost pitch control, not good if they then went around. The tailplane may have got damaged if the airplane was not on the runway.
Same if they did a wingtip strike and an aileron or winglet was damaged.
At some point in the ATC recording "height" is mentioned - uncommon altimeter setting procedure?
FDR and CVR should give answers soon.

Guy D'ageradar

19th Mar 2016, 07:15

HIALS

19th Mar 2016, 07:19

Snowfalcon - my interpretation of the ATC recording is that both QFE and QNH were being given to the crew. The transition level at URRR is FL050.

Therefore, when cleared to "600 meters" as a 'height' - the crew were effectively being cleared to descend to 600 metres on QFE. This should have been firstly converted to 2,000 ft and then adjusted to a QNH altitude of 2,000 ft plus the runway threshold elevation. The Jeppesen chart for URRR Rwy 22 ILS indicates that 600m QFE = 2250 ft QNH. Note: the Jeppesen URRR charts use the terminology height and altitude in regard to the altitude conversion information.

It is my experience at airports where ATC use metric QFE procedures; that aircraft using imperial QNH altimetry procedures can expect to use the term 'height' to indicate a QFE height as opposed to a QNH altitude or a QNE flight level.

I don't think this has any bearing on the accident. But, it explains the reason why ATC was giving both QFE and QNH and using the phrase 'height' in the altitude clearances.

compton3bravo

19th Mar 2016, 07:21

I see BBC News is still calling it a Russian airliner, the clue is in the name of the airline dozy sods.

CaptainProp

19th Mar 2016, 07:31

Wind gusting 22 - 42 kts, OVC at 100 ft, in those conditions it would be below Cat 1 minima. Yes I know cloud base is not a requirement, but if you think you can get in on a Cat 1 approach with OVC of 100 ft, you seriously should not be doing this job

??

I think some of you need to take a course in reading METARs. The METAR indicates a high overcast at 10,000 ft not a ceiling of 100 feet.

:D

Are there a lot of aviation journalists commenting here? The level of aviation "expertise" on here is really amazing....

Some of the Metars reported to be the accurate ones at the time of the accident are off by several hours if the time of the crash reported here, 18:42, is local time and correct.

logansi

19th Mar 2016, 07:34

Isn't everyone here conveniently forgetting that the a/c executed a go-around, climbing through 3900ft and accelerating, acknowledging a handoff to radar frequency? Not consistent with a tail/wingtip strike.
I feel the same, here is some raw data from Flightradar24, to me is matches with the video - final decent rate above 21,000 feet per minute
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Cd5JdmiXIAAvKbQ.jpg

Also Flightradar24 have informed me that max altitude was 4050 feet after GA

stuckgear

19th Mar 2016, 07:45

From the FR24 track recording it looks like the YEGORLYK 22 ALPHA Arrival procedure.

MAP for 22 is climb to 940' Turn left to 080 to KS NDB, climbing to 2250' then as directed. (May 2013 Jepp Plate)

I'm intrigued as to the detour around, before taking up the hold and going for a second attempt and the period in the hold (10 circuits?) before approach number 2.

Rostov approach plate: http://vatrus.info/sites/default/files/charts/URRR-1317.pdf

Guy D'ageradar

19th Mar 2016, 07:56

Thanks Logansi - 11 seconds from beginning of final descent at 4050ft/182 kts to impact. If I'm not mistaken, that equates to 215kts in the VERTICAL plane!

Alycidon

19th Mar 2016, 08:01

KLMGringo

19th Mar 2016, 08:11

IF the A/P was engaged to DA, there would also be a significant amount of nose up trim upon go around (and AP disconnect), coupled with the pitch up moment from GA thrust. Can be quite disconcerting on a normal night, let alone in sketchy conditions like these.

limahotel

19th Mar 2016, 08:12

Having listened to the ATC recording, it is clear that the controller descended the flight to height 600m on QFE, but the readback from the crew was 900m on QNH corrected by the controller to 600m, the crew then requested confirmation of the QNH which was given correctly by the controller, but if the the crew were using QNH instead of QFE, it was not picked up by either the crew or the controller, this, if I interpreted the RT calls correctly would lead to a descent to roughly 300' below the cleared height.

To me, this would suggest a high level of workload, either before the confusion in setting the altimeter, or resulting in possible confusion in verifying the correct altimeter setting and correcting the error.

Whether or not this had any bearing on the outcome is speculative, but it may have been one of the factors combining to produce the top event leading to the loss of control.

It is quite normal in Russia to mix up the cleared height due to poor radio and inappropriate phraseology (giving cleared height, QFE and frequency for the next sector, all in the same clearance is normal in Russia). However, in this case, the crew asked for height confirmation.

Yesterday, it was very windy in SVO as well, WS on final with a few go-arounds. Poor guys had the crappy weather during the night after a four hour flight.

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 08:21

Alyc: on an "western" equipment such as this 737, the most robust way to operate in height-metric-QFE scenarios is to convert them to altitude-feet-QNH.

Some western operators require their crews to confirm the QNH from ATC, whilst calculated.

Once you learn how to do it, it is very good procedure. The conversion tables are provided on an approach chart.

http://s27.postimg.org/4zdtpy0pb/Bez_n_zvu.jpg (http://postimg.org/image/4zdtpy0pb/)

vlky: My understanding is that FR24 shows ADS-B data from XPDR, that being QNE based altitude. With QNH = 988 the difference from FR24 readout to cockpit indicated altitude is 700 ft. Hence 950 ft on FR24 = 250 on ALT = ground.

Alycidon

19th Mar 2016, 08:22

It is quite normal in Russia to mix up the cleared height due to poor radio and inappropriate phraseology (giving cleared height, QFE and frequency for the next sector, all in the same clearance is normal in Russia). However, in this case, the crew asked for height confirmation.

Yesterday, it was very windy in SVO as well, WS on final with a few go-arounds. Poor guys had the crappy weather during the night after a four hour flight.

Er, height is referenced to QFE, altitude to QNH.

They were cleared to 600m on QFE, listen to the tape, but only read back the QNH, they certainly did not pick up the error from what can be heard on the ATC recordings.

5 APUs captain

19th Mar 2016, 08:28

Full radio communication http://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201603190833-he0x.htm

limahotel

19th Mar 2016, 08:36

Er, height is referenced to QFE, altitude to QNH.

They were cleared to 600m on QFE, listen to the tape, but only read back the QNH, they certainly did not pick up the error from what can be heard on the ATC recordings.
Er, that's the way it should be. The ATC descends you to a HEIGHT (QFE), you ask for a QNH, set it, check the converted ALTITUDE and set it in the MCP. 600 m height equates to 2250 ft altitude (check the LIDO plate, posted by FlightDetent).

seventhreedriver

19th Mar 2016, 08:42

Guys, are you really relying on FR24 data for speed and altitude? And find conclusions based on that? Marginal CatI conditions? No wonder I don't thrust the informations posted here anymore...

limahotel, thank you for the first reasonable post: "Poor guys had the crappy weather during the night after a four hour flight."

jackx123

19th Mar 2016, 08:56

https://www.rt.com/news/336185-boeing-crash-dubai-rostov/

Crash: Flydubai B738 at Rostov on Don on Mar 19th 2016, struck wing onto runway after holding for 2 hours (http://avherald.com/h?article=495997e2&opt=0)

PBY

19th Mar 2016, 09:10

I found out in the simulators that I was teaching that may be 80 % of the airline pilots have they raw data flying skill so deteriorated that they cannot fly a go around where pitch and bank is involved close to the ground. It usually took a 45 minutes of hard manual flying before they would get the skill back at least within private pilot limits. These days we are so dependent on automation that the logical outcome is loss of basic flying skills. There has been many accidents in the past in this type of go arounds, that require a hard turn at low altitude.
In no way I am saying this to draw any conclusions of what happened. I am just saying that under hard workload this could be a factor. Many airlines do not even allow their pilots to manually fly, not even on a nice sunny day. And they think that once in six months is enough to keep the skill.

Brenoch

19th Mar 2016, 09:23

Or even once every 12 months now with ATQP.

HIALS

19th Mar 2016, 09:32

Whilst I don't disagree with the general point you are making - let's remember that this crew appears to have proficiently conducted a go-around the first time. Also, it is my interpretation of the tone and style of the ATC radio calls - that this does not appear to be a crew under stress. Heaven only knows what happened?

F14

19th Mar 2016, 09:43

Crew is quoted as 7. LoCos normally operate as 2/4, so we're there 3 in the flightdeck? Check flight or training? Decode why hang around so long if others were diverting? Conditions didn't forecast an improvement and tower still reporting wind shear. The aircraft in front landed. Did this cause the crew to make one last go before diverting (to where?Baku or Tiblisi?)

too_much

19th Mar 2016, 09:51

FDB normal crew compliment is 2/5

Super VC-10

19th Mar 2016, 10:01

Photohraph of wreckage.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2e/Crash_site_of_flydubai_Flight_981_at_Rostov-on-Don_Airport.jpg

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 10:03

Thoughts to all affected.

I would love to know why they held for 2 hours? Things to consider;
1. Weather didn't improve/move for two hours suggests severity
2. Burning of fuel meant he was eating into his extra fuel
3. Subsequent problems at alternate 2, weather, flap assym
4. Get in itis mindset at destination. Whatever nature throws at me I can land after two hours of thinking time? Whatever the issue

A uk operator nearly lost a 737 in a go around years ago. Mishandled go around at nearly made stall speed over a southern uk.

Sad for all

AtomKraft

19th Mar 2016, 10:03

Nowadays, we are all encouraged to go around for a wide variety of reasons, as if going around is a risk free procedure that will automatically cure all your troubles.

Yes, I know a GA is a normal manoeuvre, and shouldn't cause a regular crew any difficulty, but here's another accident on the go around.

Flying skills are being eroded these days, and maybe the encouragement to 'throw it away' is designed to help poorer crews to not get in over their heads. But sometimes, being forced to GA, for example by the Windshear detection system, is not as useful as it could be.

HIALS

19th Mar 2016, 10:05

Re the photo above. Geez. That didn't scrape it's tail, or strike a wing tip, and then subsequently slide along the runway!! The Asiana B777 at SFO a few years ago had a really hard impact with the runway, and a cartwheel, but the fuselage stayed largely intact. The photo from Rostov shows only a debris field, not a semblance of an aircraft.

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 10:06

For those on the 738, please just remember two figures if it all goes wrong in a go around.

15degrees and 88%

vlkyplky

19th Mar 2016, 10:08

why the f-trucks are in the middle of the wreckage?

bizjetway

19th Mar 2016, 10:09

Anyone know who the pilots were and experience levels?

Brenoch

19th Mar 2016, 10:14

According to Russia Today, the captain was from Cyprus. No info disclosed about experience levels.

F14

19th Mar 2016, 10:17

remarkable similarity to the Kazan accident in Nov 13.

weather today in Rostov is worse, low vis, low cloud and snow

TAF URRR 190800Z 1909/2009 35007G13MPS 0500 +SHSN BKN003 BKN020CB
TEMPO 1909/1915 1200 SHSN BR BKN002 BKN020CB
FM191500 36003G09MPS 3000 -SHSN BR SCT005 BKN020CB
BECMG 2005/2007 34007G13MPS

5 APUs captain

19th Mar 2016, 10:22

PIC Aristos Sokratous 1978, FO Cruz Alejandro Alava 1979

threemiles

19th Mar 2016, 10:23

Missed approach RW 22 calls for straight ahead to 940 ft QNH, then left turn climbing and level off 2250 ft QNH.

They were at 3500 ft QNH / 4000 ft QNE before the vertical fall started, runway track.

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 10:24

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 10:25

Could it not be that whatever caused them to go around for the first time also caused a second go around.

Previous go around accidents have proved that the 737 can be a handful in th go around and the pitch power couple can catch you out. This is the third accident of its type in Russia involving the 737.

The images look eerily similar to the previous incidents too. A video showing a high ROD, a flash following a very high energy impact, and highly fragmented pieces of the wreckage.

The previous two incidents (Aeroflot 821 and Tartastan 363) also happened very close to the airport perimeter.

uncle_maxwell

19th Mar 2016, 10:32

All hypothetical of course, but I wonder if a bus with GS mini would have yielded the same outcome. Boeing does not have GS mini as far as I know. If it was a microburst there might have been a GPWS warning on the CVR (before the stall warning?). In terms of game theory, the legal/company rules might make pilots less inclined to do a go around on second attempt. (i.e. if 'One attempt, two attempt, divert.' applies and you do not want to divert...) All that pressure can take its toll on speed monitoring as well. Anyone seeing similarities to Turkish Airlines in Amsterdam? (aircraft, emerging market airlines, possibly speed issue, possibly go-around not done [in time] when it should have been etc.)

airman1900

19th Mar 2016, 10:39

From the Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2016:

FlyDubai Plane Crashes in Russia, Killing All 62 Aboard - WSJ (http://on.wsj.com/1RUNbPl)

Flyer1015

19th Mar 2016, 10:44

Culture will definitely need to be looked at it. A predominantly out-back airline with minimal overnights. No doubt there is pressure on the crew and a crew in general goal oriented to land and get it done. What happens if they diver and are then forced to just fly back to Dubai? How does management handle that? Lotta questions here.

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 10:49

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 11:06

Not true. Some procedures look akward, but are understandable though one may not agree with them.

There's nothing about diversion in RF that could be a surprise for a knowledgeable Ops Control team. Which I presume FZ do have.

Doors To Manuel

19th Mar 2016, 11:08

I wish the press would stop headlining with the adjective 'low cost' to describe flydubai, and to promote the subtext that all LCCs cut corners and compromise safety.

Anyone who has met the flydubai management team and CEO as I have will know that this is a professionally run outfit, part of the Emirates Group. Shoestrings in the UAE can be made of gold thread!

RAT 5

19th Mar 2016, 11:17

I see the ILS requires 800m vis and has a DA at 200' agl. One assumes they had something better than those to make a 2nd attempt. I also assume that during their 2 hours holding some local operators also made G/A's and diverted. Hint, Hint. Was the ILS working? The NPA requires 160m & 461'.

In post #30 it mentions they seem to make both G/A's from >1500'. Why? If true that is very high and early and they would have been IMC. Even in WS this is quite early unless they had a "WS ahead" warning.
The other curiosity, if FR is correct, is their choice of such high altitudes for their GA's & holding, unless this was a fuel saving measure, but they had plenty. (I have used high holding levels to both be above uncomfortable weather and be at an efficient TOD for return to destination or the diversion alternate.) Against this is the time taken from Wx improvement to FAF on approach.
#77 then tells us that they rose to 4000' on 2nd GA before plummeting. That's 2500', and if they were pitched up by GA thrust and 'lost it' could explain the profile, but 4000', with correct technique, should be enough to recover from a stall. FDR will tell us.
If they did make a GA from 1500'QNH = 4nm from THR and they struck the ground at the THR it does suggest a steep climb & descent. They'd already made 1 GA so were current with the manoeuvre. Do FlyDubai use monitored approaches; manually flown GA's or re-engage CMD; had the crew been there before?
There must have been pressure from somewhere, FTL's or other, not to divert to a close alternate and sit in the ground for an improvement. With loads of fuel and perhaps 2 - 3 sector FTL considerations I can understand their decision might have been coloured.
I hope they find the CVR as well. I would expect that to have much valuable information and put meat on the bones of the sterile FDR.

Kulverstukas

19th Mar 2016, 11:24

I also assume that during their 2 hours holding some local operators also made G/A's and diverted. Hint, Hint.

22:16 FZ981 commences descent from FL360
22:23 S71159 (an Airbus A319 from Moscow-Domodedovo) lands after it's first approach to runway 22
22:28 U62758 (an Airbus A320 from Khudzhand) lands after it's first approach to runway 22
22:39 FZ981 commences final approach to runway 22 at Rostov Airport
22:42 FZ981 aborts first approach at 1725 ft, 6.7 km short of the runway
22:49 FZ981 reaches 8000 feet and heads towards the northeast of the airport
22:54 SU1166 (a Sukhoi Superjet 100-95B from Moscow-Sheremetyevo) aborts the first approach to runway 22
23:07 SU1166 aborts the second approach to runway 22
23:17 SU1166 aborts the third approach to runway 22
23:20 SU1166 diverts towards Krasnodar
23:27 FZ981 enters holding pattern at 15000 feet to the southeast of the airport
00:28 FZ981 leaves the holding pattern and descends for a second approach
00:36 FZ981 intercepts the runway 22 localizer at 10 NM from the runway
00:40 FZ981 aborts second approach at 1550 ft, 5.6 km short of the runway
00:41 FZ981 impacts airport terrain after a steep descent from 3975 feet

EK380

19th Mar 2016, 11:37

Flightdata show that they flew for more than 6hrs. Never flown the 737NG, but that must be pretty close to max endurance not? Would they still have the fuel to divert?

Given the "light pax load (thank god for that one) and a low fuel load, the aircraft must have been very light. This together with a dark stormy night (likely IMC), would have been the perfect scenario to create visual illusions in the G/A... Look up GulfAir in BAH, Afriqiyah in Tripoli, B737 in Kazan...

I know it is too early to speculate, but feel awfully close to the Kazan B737 crash!

jfkjohan

19th Mar 2016, 11:39

Holding for 2 hours in those conditions. Temp was 6, dew at 4, -SHRA, i'm wondering if icing could be a factor.

Just a thought.

B772

19th Mar 2016, 11:44

After a 4+ hour flight from DXB and 2+ hours of maneuvering/holding I suspect fuel starvation unless they departed DXB with full or close to full tanks.

log0008

19th Mar 2016, 11:47

Footage from another angle has appeared online, this time it appears to be from an Airport security camera. Not much detail but matches the original video. Quite amazing to have 2 angles though!

jEThAV3Y2_I

Tourist

19th Mar 2016, 11:49

this is a professionally run outfit, part of the Emirates Group.!
So which is it?

Chesty Morgan

19th Mar 2016, 11:51

After a 4+ hour flight from DXB and 2+ hours of maneuvering/holding I suspect fuel starvation unless they departed DXB with full or close to full tanks.
Which they did according to AvHerald on the link previously posted.

jiggi

19th Mar 2016, 11:52

After a 4+ hour flight from DXB and 2+ hours of maneuvering/holding I suspect fuel starvation unless they departed DXB with full or close to full tanks.
This is from Avherald:

"The aircraft carried fuel for trip, contingency, alternate, final fuel reserve (30 minutes) and additional holding for about 2:30 hours, total fuel for an endurance of about 8.5 hours. The aircraft had been airborne until time of impact for 06:02 hours."

But if my memory serves me right, it's originally from companys announcement.

mercurydancer

19th Mar 2016, 11:52

Airport within 250km would be Krasnodar. Volgograd, Mineralnyye Vody and Sochi are approx 450km away and the weather for MRV was ok yesterday. Wet and cold but very little wind. Cloud base about 3000 ft.

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 11:53

Windshear warning only come less than 1500Ft aal
PWS warning can only come from 1200ft or less all.

Fuel wise. They were very light so shouldn't be a major factor at this point. If it had been full load then yes. Could be wrong on that one.

Why did they hold for 2hrs? 30 mins yes, 1hr maybe but 2hrs!!!!

atakacs

19th Mar 2016, 11:53

From various pictures emerging after the crash it seems that this was a very high speed impact, probably at a very steep angle. There is more here than bad weather IMHO

flash8

19th Mar 2016, 11:56

GA and then stall?
Not again???

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 11:57

The NG will only issue reactive WS warnings below 1500 ft AGL, and predictive WS warnings below 1200 ft. FZ also use HGS, a piece of kit that will help you with the monitoring if you know how to use it.
I dropped by the FZ ops center a few years ago when I attended pilot selection in DXB.
Just wanted to say hello and see how they did their stuff.
I was immediately told pilots are not allowed to enter the ops center. That struck me as really weird and was part of the reason why I turned them down.
For me it is essential to have a good working relationship with ops.
Said a thing or two about the company culture and attitude toward their pilots.

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 12:03

just said that.

GA issues happen, see my previous post, a major UK airline nearly took a 737 into a UK city.

bluepilot

19th Mar 2016, 12:03

The 737-800 can accumulate residual icing on the tailplane area, (vref ice comes to mind on the NG flap 15) ? weather and temp at the time perfect for ice build up, a GA with rear trim and ice with pitch power couple could lead to a very violent pitch up and one that is difficult to recover from if you are not very quick. Crews that are use to flying in mild / hot temp zones can get rusty regarding winter ops.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 12:09

The NG is very resistant to icing. I'm not saying it's not possible for this to be ice related, but it will carry a lot of ice without falling out of the sky.
The ground temp was +6, so even if they picked up ice on the way in, most should be gone during when they approached the runway.
Ice on the NG (in flight) does not worry me much.

bluepilot

19th Mar 2016, 12:16

The stabiliser on the 737 has caused issues before on GA, particularly with a dual coupled approach and trimming back for autoland, (Thomsonfly BOH one example) this with the addition of ice plus pitch power couple is not a nice combination, it looks like they went around too high for the dual AP to have started to trim back, however many carriers load the -800 with a rear CofG for fuel efficiency reasons, this could all add up. Anyway all speculation until we see an accident report. My thoughts with the families and friends.

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 12:19

sadly we are all talking about so thankfully we may all become safer. Watch that pitch up on the GA people, forward trim!!!

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 12:20

I vaguely remember that the 737 starts trimming a fair amount of nose up during an autoland.

I also remember that, when disconnecting the AP during a G/A, you had to quite significantly push the nose down and also aggressively apply nose down trim in order to compensate for the pitch up couple from the wing mounted engines.

I doubt they were trying to do an autoland on a cat 1 airport in Russia in gusty and WS conditions.
If they did a dual channel approach, there would be no reason to disconnect the autopilot as you then have auto go around capability.
Finally, they went around way above the altitude where the auto pilot will input trim during auto land. That happens at 400 (or is it 350) ft.

bluepilot

19th Mar 2016, 12:43

Going around from higher altitudes brings in other startle factors, it becomes a non standard manoeuvre, (speed window open etc on coupled GA) , that combined with weather factors (icing) fatigue (long and stressful FDP), rear load CofG. This could really be one to learn from.

TypeIV

19th Mar 2016, 12:56

Usually, "piloting error" is the preferred cause by aircraft manufacturers and bean counters so you have to read between the lines unless the investigating authority is an honest one.

What strikes me here is that the airplane only climbs approx. by 2500' during G/A before starting to descend towards impact. I think that a readout from the FDR will reveal the cause pretty quickly. Does anyone have the published G/A procedure for the runway?

bluepilot

19th Mar 2016, 12:59

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/norwegian-near-stall-to-spur-737-modification-393527/

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 13:10

I work for a LCC. Never once had a message encouraging us to do A or B. Perhaps 'what are your intentions if you can't get in.....' so they can have the ground staff on standby. But not once have they tried to influence the decision making. Ever.

Ive never once had a commander mention that they've had a fuel descision. And I've been on flights where we've landed 2/3 tonnes over CNR* and never been questioned. Not once. The flight plan has a box where we write why we take additional fuel. Not once has it ever been questioned.

Let's not tar every LCC with the same brush.

*NOTE this does NOT mean I've been on flights that have landed 2/3 tonnes over weight. Rather that they have landed with 2/3 tonnes of back up fuel. At no point was any other plane too heavy to land.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 13:12

What strikes me here is that the airplane only climbs approx. by 2500' during G/A before starting to descend towards impact. I think that a readout from the FDR will reveal the cause pretty quickly.

Yes, it's weird. The aircraft must have been under positive control to climb that much. Plenty of time to engage the auto pilot. What happened at that point that would send the aircraft straight down?
A stall would give them stick shaker first and plenty of air to recover.
A dual engine flamenout due fuel starvation? Not likely given no info about low fuel from the pilots, and no stress in the voice of the pilots.

I don't get it. It was not an unfamiliar procedure as they had done this one time already. Did they suddenly loose the plot completely? Why?

Kulverstukas

19th Mar 2016, 13:14

Question: Will the recorders be given to Boeing for analysis or to FZ?

As of Country of Accident rule I think recorders will be analyzed at MAC in Russia. With Boeing and FZ reps presented for sure.

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 13:16

ManaAdaSystem:

I suggest you read up on Aeroflot 821 and Tartastan 363 and to a lesser extent Thomson Airways at BOH and Turkish at AMS. The first two on the face of it look eerily similar to this incident. The other two can help your understanding as to what can go wrong whilst low and slow.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 13:19

Bluepilot,

I don't think this FZ was deiced in DXB before departure, and I don't think the temperature in DXB was minus 17 degrees.
Nor was the temperaure in Rostov low.
Comparing this flight to the Norwegian one is just not possible.

UK019

19th Mar 2016, 13:19

Hearty Meatballs, I for one agree with every single word you posted on post 116. I was with "LoCos" for 14 years and I also NEVER had any pressure from above to do anything other than turn up to work on time, and when I was a manager, I never applied any either.

I know a lot of people working for this particular airline and they are very fine airmen indeed.

Accidents happen in every field of aviation. Statement of the obvious maybe, but Low cost does NOT automatically equal low standards.

weatherdude

19th Mar 2016, 13:21

Can anyone retrieve and post the Weather radar ( Rain Radar / Satellite images) of the area around time of the accident ?
Available every 5 minutes, nothing especially high reaching. For sure no downbursts and such, just showers and wind.

Satellit Top Alarm-Bild vom 19.03.2016, 01:45 Uhr - Ukraine | Wetter von kachelmann. (http://kachelmannwetter.com/at/sat/ukraine/top-alarm-5min/20160319-0045z.html)

With mouseover you'll get the Cloud Top Temperature over the site.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 13:27

suggest you read up on Aeroflot 821 and Tartastan 363 and to a lesser extent Thomson Airways at BOH and Turkish at AMS. The first two on the face of it look eerily similar to this incident. The other two can help your understanding as to what can go wrong whilst low and slow.

This flight was not low. Slow, yes, at some point that must have happened, but you don't climb 2500 ft if you are slow.
That takes time.
Normally, pilots screw up at low altitude, or when they are in transit from one flight phase to another.
It's weird to loose it after climbing 2500 ft, but this looks like the most likely scenario just now.

swish266

19th Mar 2016, 13:29

I can tell for sure, that more accidents like this will follow if LCC do not introduce reduced FDLs.
Regulator limits are exactly THAT - LIMITS!
You cannot do 500 block hours in 5 months "because the airline business is becoming more seasonal"!
The kind of medium haul return trips that do not allow for any leeway in case of diversion is a very bad practice!
Wizz Air flies from Eastern Europe to DWC and back in one go - same like this poor sods had to fly to Rostov.
In case of diversion the s--t hits the fan.
On top of the FDL that grounds the crew, there are issues with handlers, refueling, pax convenience, to name a few...
So SURPRISE, SURPRISE - some guys diverted, some poor sods didn't!
I believe the so called slogan that LCC/UCC wave at us - 'NOW ANYBODY CAN FLY" is wrong!!! It puts unbelievable pressure on crews and presents unacceptable risks for happily unaware pax...
IMHO!

bluepilot

19th Mar 2016, 13:48

ManaAdaSystem, i do not think you are giving this any real thought, the purpose of posting the Nor incident report was more about the 737 characteristics on GA, the startle factor for them was a frozen stabiliser, the temp on the ground on this FZ accident was +6, that means at 3000' it would be zero, there was heavy cloud cover with precipitation, worst icing build up is between +5 and -5 with moisture present, as I said in an earlier post the conditions were perfect for heavy airframe icing to accumulate. Couple that with all the other factors could lead to a sudden pitch up on GA with resulting stall, believe me it happens very very quickly on the 737 and you have to be on your game to recognise and deal with it. This one was another close shave https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aar-3-2009-boeing-737-3q8-g-thof-23-september-2007 , have a good read then add in other unknown factors that have been discussed here.

The 737 can bite you in the ass very hard in the GA, it has happened many times before.

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 13:52

ManaAdaSystem - with respect with TOGA selected the slower you are the quicker you'll climb. With just 35% load factor, what I assume to be not a huge amount of fuel, relatively few bags, it would likely have been a light plane. On selection of TOGA the nose is going to come up at you FAST, you're going to climb like a homesick angle. Even if the go around was initiated during the flare it would take no time at all to get to 2500'. You'd be there before you know it.

Ericsson16 - the other incidents I mentioned started off with planes in the approach config at an approach speed, only to find themselves obliterated in or around the airfield perimeter. I don't know what rodent you're smelling, but I don't think there's anything untoward.

Swear_in_GIN

19th Mar 2016, 14:02

Dark? No visual reference? Fatigue?
Followed by a very rapid descent.
Somatogravic Illusion on the Go Around could be a possibility.

Somatogravic Illusion - AviationKnowledge (http://aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:somatogravic-illusion)

flash8

19th Mar 2016, 14:06

suggest you read up on Aeroflot 821 and Tartastan 363 and to a lesser extent Thomson Airways at BOH and Turkish at AMS. The first two on the face of it look eerily similar to this incident.
Have you ever read the 821 report? If so how you can say there is any possible relation is beyond me, and I am extremely familiar with that accident. As for 363, whilst the scenario may fit a more probable explanation is a weather related issue.

FullWings

19th Mar 2016, 14:11

This is an interesting accident as they had already performed a G/A from a similar position earlier which seemed to go OK, so why the LoC after the second one? From the initial reports, it seems they climbed away to a decent altitude but then descended rapidly to crash within the airfield perimeter.

If the fuel load and flight timings are to be believed, after substantial holding they appear not to have been under time pressure, even keeping an alternate.

A windshear issue seems less likely as they had plenty of energy (height & speed combined) plus the climb potential at their weight and density altitude would have been very good. No pan, mayday or even a hint of a problem, so logically it was sudden/startling. Even a dual flameout in rain/hail wouldn't lead to the RoD we see on the flight traces and video - that was really “falling out of the sky” material. :confused:

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 14:12

On selection of TOGA the nose is going to come up at you FAST, you're going to climb like a homesick angle. Even if the go around was initiated during the flare it would take no time at all to get to 2500'. You'd be there before you know it.

No, the NG flies quite nicely if you go around. It produces thrust to give a climb rate of 1000-2000 ft/m unless you press TOGA a second time. It climbed 2500 ft, not to 2500 ft if I understand it correctly.

The NG flies well with ice on it. It flies well with a lot of ice on it. They would have been pretty much ice free when they went around, and I don't see how they could have accumulated enough ice to fall out of the sky in a 2500 ft climb.

weatherdude

19th Mar 2016, 14:21

No, the NG flies quite nicely if you go around. It produces thrust to give a climb rate of 1000-2000 ft/m unless you press TOGA a second time. It climbed 2500 ft, not to 2500 ft if I understand it correctly.

The NG flies well with ice on it. It flies well with a lot of ice on it. They would have been pretty much ice free when they went around, and I don't see how they could have accumulated enough ice to fall out of the sky in a 2500 ft climb.
Considering the +6 degrees in the METAR limit of freezing level/0 degrees can be expected 1000 m/3300 ft above AD at the time, no or very limited icing below.

liider

19th Mar 2016, 14:28

"At 15.22:51 (6 seconds after initiating Go Around) engine power reached 83% N1. By 15.23:11 pitch angle increased to more than 25 degrees, and the first "push" movement of the yoke was registered. At that moment airplane was at 2000', climbing 4000'/min. During next 5 seconds pitch decreased from 25 degrees to nearly normal horizontal flight condition and continued to decrease. Plane stopped climbing at 2300'. G-force = 0,5g. At 15.23:16 the second "push" movement of the yoke was registered. As a result of it, pitch changed to -20 degrees, speed to -5000'/min, G-force =0g, speed 140 kt, increasing 10kt/s. At 15.23:21 the third "push" movement of the yoke was registered. As a result of it, G-force changed to -0.9g, pitch angle to -60 degrees. At 15.23:28 airplane collided with the ground close to runway with an airspeed 245kt and pitch angle -75 degrees."

17.11.2013, Tatarstan 363, Kazan.

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 14:31

821 - whilst there were extenuating circumstances (drunk CP and asymmetric thrust levers) is was essentially a loss of spatial disorientation following a discontinued approach (an EXTREMELY messy one at that) followed by a high nose attitude (soon after applying 'almost' take off power) which went unchanged, followed by a steep turn of up to 76 degrees before performing almost a complete 'barrel roll' then impacting the ground at very high speed with the wreckage highly fragmented spread over a small area.

That's how I can say there is a possible relation. In this instance I'd bet my house on there being no alcohol in the FZ crew's system.

ManaAdaSystems - the aircraft was likely very light, it would have climbed quickly.

Anyone know if it's FZ policy to 'double click' during a G/A balked landing?

Syntax Error I totally agree. However UAE does have some high standards. In fact the world does, apart from South East Asia. I'd have no problem boarding an FZ flight, any European, North American LCC and in Australia I'd even board a Tiger Airways flight. These days on a whole LCCs are extremely safe.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 14:40

ManaAdaSystems - the aircraft was likely very light, it would have climbed quickly. Anyone know if it's Faz policy to 'double click' during a G/A balked landing?

Why are you saying this?
It climbs with a rate of 1000-2000 ft/m no matter how light it is.
That is how the aircraft works.
Now, if you hit TOGA a second time you will go up like a bat out of hell if you are light. 5000 ft/m+

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 14:49

lyubko

19th Mar 2016, 14:58

Guys !
Somebody worn you some time (posts) ago :
'Do not rely on FR24 data... '
What about if this "climb 2500' " were wrong signal , or if ... etc. ...

5 APUs captain

19th Mar 2016, 15:02

The biggest problem for them was a V-bar Flight Director; the rest of their fleet had Cross-bars.

5 APUs captain

19th Mar 2016, 15:03

Message above was for HeartyMeatballs about 821 flight

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 15:18

The x-axis is just timestamp, not lateral distance. Data taken from FR24. The corrections are mine, back of the fag-packet. The wind would indeed increase with height, but also veer keeping HWC similar - that's the assumption.

http://s14.postimg.org/qkp5aumkd/FZROV.jpg (http://postimg.org/image/qkp5aumkd/)

Logansi's raw data (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/576325-b-738-crash-russia-rostov-don-3.html#post9315231) is much finer resolution, but I do not know how to obtain those to my spreadsheet.

JumpJumpJump

19th Mar 2016, 15:49

Obviously the reasons are very different, however, I am posting this video of the 747 crashing after a stall in Afghanistan. Would you agree about the similarities in the descent angle between this video and what is apparent from the CCTV footage shown from this accident in Russia?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGnSYiXv8hE

Wisepilot

19th Mar 2016, 15:51

Excessive pitch during GA is a normal occurrence on 737.. it should be grounded.

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 15:51

Tatarstan airlines flight 363 anyone? Many posters above, all wrong.

The data on this one show speed to increase during the go-around, crew well organized on the radio. Tatarstan did not touch the controls, approached stall at peak and botched the recovery. To begin with, they got lost over familiar airport.

Personally, I struggle to se any significant similiarities. Do you?

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 15:52

Refer to the following B737-800 botched Go Around in Bournemouth in 2007

The report says 737-3Q8, did you post the wrong link perhaps?

GA and then stall?
Not again???

Nowadays, we are all encouraged to go around for a wide variety of reasons, as if going around is a risk free procedure that will automatically cure all your troubles.

Yes, I know a GA is a normal manoeuvre, and shouldn't cause a regular crew any difficulty, but here's another accident on the go around.

And until very recently, most of the training I've had in this area was a go around from near minimums. When you perform a go around at other phases of the approach, there are nuances of the speed window opening, altitude capture, autothrottle modes and number of autopilots engaged that sometimes puzzle even the geniuses over at the sim building.

On the widebody Boeings that I've flown you leave the autopilot on but disconnect the autothrottles and manually apply full thrust on a windshear escape maneuver on a coupled approach. Would this be the same on a B-738?

TRF4EVR

19th Mar 2016, 15:54

I am posting this video of the USAF 747 crashing after a stall in Afghanistan

Not USAF, National Airlines. USAF would still be on the ramp programming the FMS in 2016.

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 15:56

Airbubba,
my typo IT was a B737-3 in the UK in 2007
and the 737 does not have the same logic as wide body boeing.
The A/P on the 737 will disconnect , once you press the TO/GA buttons
You fly the initial Missed Approach manually, and then re-engage at an appropriate time

Wisepilot

19th Mar 2016, 15:59

Airbubba is very right.. a not close to ground GA can get nasty..and the most probable scenario...+ 6 hours flight in a cockpit designed for 1,5..night, bad weather may be some icing.. and probably already tired and stressed out crew. I wonder why they did to go to their alternate...well I know the answer... Start getting used to this events in low cost non unionized or partially unionized airlines squeezing life out of their crew ..

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 16:00

B737-3 in the UK in 2007

BOURNEMOUTH: "During the go-around the aircraft pitched up excessively; flight crew attempts to reduce the aircraft’s pitch were largely ineffective. The aircraft reached a maximum pitch of 44º nose-up and the indicated airspeed reduced to 82 kt."

How is this similar to FZ, who climbed by 2500 feet whilst increasing speed from 150 to 220 kts?

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 16:02

The A/P on the 737 will disconnect , once you press the TO/GA buttons
You fly the initial Missed Approach manually, and then re-engage at an appropriate time

Thanks for the insight, I appreciate it! :ok:

Denti

19th Mar 2016, 16:03

The A/P on the 737 will disconnect , once you press the TO/GA buttons

And that depends on system status and SOPs. If you always use a dual channel approach, as some carriers do, then no, the autopilot will not disconnect and fly a nice and easy automatic go around with reduced thrust, as long as you press that TOGA button only once. Even in manual flight, if using the AT ARM mode (SPD deselect), reduced go around thrust will be set on the first click, and not more. Of course, it has the downside of the uptrim at around 380ft AGL, but that is a non-issue if trained for it.

tatelyle

19th Mar 2016, 16:05

The biggest problem for them was a V-bar Flight Director; the rest of their fleet had Cross-bars.
Wow, is this true?

I had a f/o try to turn the aircraft upside down one dark night because of V-bars (only one in the fleet again). We were 4 or 5 seconds from being upside down at 2,000'. And I was heads down with a frequency change.

Left the company and warned the authorities, but nobody seems to care. Tombstone regulation.

P.S. Nothing wrong with V-bars, I think they are brilliant. But you cannot mix and match, just as you cannot have half the fleet with western ADIs and half with Russian.

T

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 16:06

FlightDetent,

did I say it is similar to FZ incident? NOPE

I was simply pointing out the A/P logic during a Go Around, to clarify an earlier misconception, and to highlight the Missed Approach is flown initially manually by the pilots.

HighLow

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 16:11

Why am I saying this? How do you know they didn't hit TOGA a second time? Would make sense to me. If there are CBs about or WSHR it would make perfect sense. Notwithstanding the fact that pressing it once will give you a margin above buffet speed to account for any turbulence or shear surely it would make sense to use all power available. A windshear go around is an escape manoeuvre after all. I'd rather escape with a big margin than just what is required for certification. Wouldn't you?

Well, I don't know, that is why I told you what happens if you press TOGA a second time. It is not normal procedure as far as I know. You make it sound like a go around in a 737 is a near uncontrollable maneuvre if the aircraft is light. It is not.
The only reason you would need full go around thrust on a light 737 is if you are about to crash., or you need the performance for other reasons. Reactive WS happens below 1500 ft, so I don't think they entered that territory.
IF they pressed TOGA a second time, they could very well have made problems for themselves.

In a 737 you get what you ask for. If you don't know what you are doing, it will bite you.

HeartyMeatballs

19th Mar 2016, 16:13

FlightDetent. All we know is that during an approach somehow the aircraft ended up on the other end of the runway with a hight rate of descent and a high energy impact. We do not know what altitude or speed it was going at. The only data we have seen is ameature data and not from an official source. So to say it climbed and increased in speed is not necessarily true. And notwithstanding that fact, you can stall the aircraft at ANY airspeed. It's angle of attack that will spoil your day and not necessarily airspeed or 'speed' to which you refer.

ManaAdaSystems - like I said before, if windshear is reported then it could very well the reason why the did it. If there was a sign of windshear then I'd want to get the hell out as quickly as possible, not at a leisurely 1,000-2,000 FPM. That simply is not enough for an escape manoeuvre for my liking. And which one it is? It is 1000FPM or 2000FPM. They're both very different figures!

CanadaKid

19th Mar 2016, 16:16

Could any B738 pilots comment whether their aircraft had A/T and Radio Altimeter issues similar to the larger wide body Boeings? i.e false RA readings in precipitation, with the false RA affecting, amongst other things, A/T logic
Thanks.

RAT 5

19th Mar 2016, 16:17

FZ does not do autoland approaches. They do Cat3A manual landings when required.

WTF. Why would anyone do that? And I still have no idea, nor heard one, why both GA's were executed at such a high height? Why hold 2 hours in hope of an improvement, then decide it's worth a 2nd shot, and then cancell it 4nm from the runway/ In that case the GA is not a 'surprise', nor it is a rushed manoeuvre; well no need to be. They would have had plenty of time to brief the 2nd attempt. They would have reviewed their 1st effort and decided if they would do the same or perhaps modify their techniques. There should have been no internal surprise factor. Hence my comment that the CVR will prove very interesting. I hope it has more than 30mins. More questions than answers at the moment.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 16:20

FZ does not do autoland approaches. They do Cat3A manual landings when required.

WTF. Why would anyone do that?

Because it's cheaper to fly Cat 3 with HGS rather than keeping the aircraft autoland system certified and maintained.

Pin Head

19th Mar 2016, 16:32

for those that do fly the ng and those that are interested I strongly recommend all to read the TOM incident report over Bournemouth, UK.

There is a lot to be learnt from that article.

Bed time for me now. RIP the victims.

bluepilot

19th Mar 2016, 16:35

a good read GO-AROUND RISKS | Flight Safety Foundation (http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/april-2015/go-around-risks)

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 16:41

And I still have no idea, nor heard one, why both GA's were executed at such a high height?

They encountered windshear indications early in the approach and decided to go missed perhaps? Continuing the approach to see if the windshear abates is not an option at the places I've worked.

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 16:43

FR24 is non-professional, but the data source is aircraft's ADS-B direct from ADR1. The altitude is correct, FDRs will show no different.

Ground speed is exactly that, if it increases over straight path in climb, the IAS was not decreasing towards a stall point. That's all I say.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 16:43

Airbus flyer here. I don't have any NG experience and therefore I asked. Instead of acting like a child, answer the question or don't bother. Or is that you just don't know the answer or flightsim doesn't quite replicate the real thing?

Thank you for those nice words.
I will not bother you with my credentials, but I will never try to tell you how your Airbus works, how you should fly it or how it performs. I just don't know anything about them.

It will give you between 1000 and 2000 ft/m. That is from the FCOM.
My take on those numbers? 1000 ft/m on a heavy -8 or -900, 2000 ft/m on a light NG, the rest somewhere in between.

rudolf

19th Mar 2016, 16:44

I'm not sure about FZ, but on some older NG the AP will disconnect at TOGA press on a dual channel approach unless the self test is complete, this starts at 1500RA and usually completes at about 1200RA.

They were flying a Cat 1 approach which would almost certainly have been single channel so the go-around would be manually flown. Because of the weight the N1's would have driven to around 80% N1 (or maybe less) on TOGA press to give a sensible rate-of-climb; what I have seen quite regularly in the sim is when 'check GA thrust' is called the PM increases thrust to full GA N1 which increases workload and required scan rate significantly. Couple this second pitch up effect with the awful conditions then I think there is a good chance as already mentioned of some sort of somatogravic illusions occurring.

Lots of speculation here including mine; sufficed to say that the 737 (all variants) can be a handful in a go-around and it's about time this became a mandatory item on a proficiency check.

iraatc777

19th Mar 2016, 16:51

Having listened to an ATC record via the given link there s one thing that caught my ear -1min 38 sec spot .an ATC gives them SEVERE turbulence and moderate wind shear on landing ...it's all speculating now and of course we could all do better but maybe a bit more of an attention should be been given to that ,wacha all think ?

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 16:52

rudolf,

I agree with your last statement.

An A/C flying a missed approach with all engines operative is not part of any proficiency check, and if indeed, it is incorporated in some regions around the world, these examples would be, in my opinion very few and far between.

I second that, that whatever the results of the upcoming investigation, one recommendation should be that this maneuver(flown manually) should become a mandatory check item in any future proficiency checks.

rudolf

19th Mar 2016, 16:54

Like i said earlier fyi... FZ dont do autoland/dual channel approaches. rwy 22 only has a Cat1 approach.

Thanks, I was scan reading the thread and just giving my general opinion. There is nothing to stop you flying a dual channel approach on a Cat 1 runway as long as you prepare for the trim change if you disconnect below 400RA. It's not as big a deal as you may think, unless it's blowing a storm obviously.

I'm not suggesting for one second that flying dual channel here would have been appropriate because I don't think it would have been, just giving general info.

autobrake3

19th Mar 2016, 17:01

Heartymeatballs...... There is tacit bullying pressure in the low cost airline in which you work. It may not dictate such decisions as fuel and your choice of diversion but the rediculous abuse of FTL's the bullying of cadet f/o's with no meaningful experience, the "wellbeing chats" and a host of other little stabs have increased the operational pressure many fold. Consider where you got your Heartymeatball moniker from......commercial pressure and planes don't mix well.

NOT ORANGE

19th Mar 2016, 17:02

I would be interested to know how much sleep the crew had had.Was this a series of night flights and were they flying in ****ty weather in their circadian low?I know from experience that flying at 5a.m. with probably an hour or two sleep I would be 50% switched on at best.

fantom

19th Mar 2016, 17:10

An A/C flying a missed approach with all engines operative is not part of any proficiency check, and if indeed, it is incorporated in some regions around the world, these examples would be, in my opinion very few and far between.

Rubbish. It is part of every low-vis check.

OrganisedDesk

19th Mar 2016, 17:11

This airline has a Preferential bidding system were flights are allocated based on crew bids differentiated on the basis of seniority / date of joining the airline.

This has the effect that popular flights go to the airlines seasoned and experienced crews and unpopular flights get given to the new hires.

So if its a deep night flight, with a long duty period into a place with limited alternates with poor weather and over the weekend which in Dubai is Friday Saturday then chances are both the Captain and first Officer will be new (ish) to the company.

PBS can result in inexperienced Captains and First Officers either new to the company new to the type or new to Command being crewed together for sectors that those with more experience choose not to do if they can be avoided.

Deep night Russia in winter at the weekend how many old hands bid for that?

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 17:15

fantom,

rubbish? no

a low vis go-around is automatic, yes that is correct,
but again, following the logic of my previous posts, I was referring to a manual go-around being part of any future checks.

Standby, I will clarify my earlier post (since it seems to be required),

aguadalte

19th Mar 2016, 17:18

Quote:
FZ does not do autoland approaches. They do Cat3A manual landings when required.

WTF. Why would anyone do that?
Because it's cheaper to fly Cat 3 with HGS rather than keeping the aircraft autoland system certified and maintained.

Please stop saying bull...CAT IIIA Approaches must be Auto-Landed by Law. The only difference from CAT IIIB is that they have a decision hight and pilots must make visual contact to let the aircraft continue and make an auto-land. Only CAT II or CAT I Approaches may be landed by hand!

flaphandlemover

19th Mar 2016, 17:26

We did Cat IIIa approaches no Autothrottle and no Autopilot with HUD on CRJ for years.....

Aguadalte..... you are wrong....

airsound

19th Mar 2016, 17:37

I've just listened again carefully to the audio recording from 5 APUs captain at post #57.
???????????? ?????? ??????????? ??????? ???????????? Boeing ? ???????????? - ????????? «??????» (http://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201603190833-he0x.htm)
(That link should take you there - if not, go to post #57)

I was struck by the calm normality of the crew voice at the end. He acknowledged the change of QNH to 997, then said "Going around." Tower responded with "contact approach 121.2". Crew said "121.2, bye bye".

After that there's some Russian speech, presumably with another aircraft, and we don't hear the change to approach frequency.

But if that was the last thing heard from 981, it sounded completely normal, with no apparent stress or sign of trouble.

Of course, we don't know how much editing there was in the recording.

airsound

sierra_mike

19th Mar 2016, 17:46

could it be an unreliable airspeed event which remained undetected by crew?

Wisepilot

19th Mar 2016, 17:49

Does FlyDubai SOPupsets includes engaging the 2nd autopilot on ILS regardless of the visibility?

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 17:53

Please stop saying bull...CAT IIIA Approaches must be Auto-Landed by Law. The only difference from CAT IIIB is that they have a decision hight and pilots must make visual contact to let the aircraft continue and make an auto-land.

Huh? So you're saying that no CAT IIIA approaches have an alert height (AH)? That's news to me and Mr. Boeing. ;)

Go around is: turn left at 940 ft (QNH), then climb to 2250 ft (QNH).

My Jepp 11-2 dated 5 FEB 16 has climb to 2260 feet on QNH (or 600 meters on QFE for the controller I suppose). As pointed out earlier in the thread, the QNH QFE stuff shouldn't be a huge deal and FlyDubai did acknowledge the QNH altimeter settings.

But, on the ATC tape, the FZ981 crew advises the ATC that in event of a missed approach they will maintain FL 80 (QNE). ATC says 'roger'.

So, would they have 8000 feet set in the window for the miss on a B-738 shooting the ILS 22?

And, even after ATC said OK to FL 80, was there confusion over whether to level off at 600 meters QFE, i.e. 2260 QNH on the miss?

Did they think they had overshot the published level off and nosed the plane back down after the go around pitch change? Or, was the lower altitude inadvertently set in the window and a throttle rollback occurred when the autothrottles were reengaged (perhaps by a vertical mode change)?

Didn't Korean have an MD-11F crash in PVG where they were confused over meters and feet for the level off altitude and nosed the plane down into the ground on departure?

QFE, QNH, QNE, feet, meters, windshear, hours of holding, a long day at the office for sure...

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 17:57

For all CATIII operations, autoland is and has always been mandatory. CATIIIa requires flare/touchdown capability and CATIIIb requires rollout.

It's illegal to hand fly to touchdown with a DH below 100ft, as well as pretty silly to even consider doing it.

Where?

FZ do manual Cat 3 with the use of HGS only.
It may be illegal in your area, but it's a big world out there.

RAT 5

19th Mar 2016, 17:57

Sounds like a full TOGA climb for which we are trained for at windshear warning.

WS escape initial FD guidance is 15 degrees attitude. To achieve full power with A/T engaged you'd need to disconnect A/T or push TOGA twice. 15 degrees attitude does not give 3500-4000fpm.
If they were making a 2nd approach from FL 150 they would need certain weather. Other a/c had diverted. If ATC are giving severe turbulence & WS why make that 2nd approach? They had cancelled the 1st, but we don't know why. Perhaps they told ATC, but we don't know, yet. On the 2nd, WS warnings are not available until <1500'. If ATC advised of WS before then they might have decided to cancel, but then no panic or surprise, just imitate the 1st time.
No-one has yet answered if FZ use monitored approaches for this approach, but either way it seems the GA was made well above DA. ?'s are why, and why the mess up 2nd time.

Regarding the comment about sim GA's, "check GA thrust" and PM gives full power. IMHO that is lack of briefing or SOP. "In the event of a GA I will set approx 90% and ask you to check power." If TOGA was pressed once and PM pushes TL's towards full PWR they will reduce. He'd either have to push again or disconnect. If either happens that's weak MCC technique, or strange and unnecessary SOP's.
We don't yet know who was PF/PM, unless it was a monitored. But if ATC was still giving WS & turbulence, and IF that was the reason for the early GA No.1, they why not divert rather than enter the lion's den again? Henk my interest in the CVR. I think we will all learn more about crew dynamics from tat than from the FDR. The 'why' can be more educational than the 'what'. It will help better with prevention of repeats.

Chesty Morgan

19th Mar 2016, 18:00

For all CATIII operations, autoland is and has always been mandatory. CATIIIa requires flare/touchdown capability and CATIIIb requires rollout.

It's illegal to hand fly to touchdown with a DH below 100ft, as well as pretty silly to even consider doing it.
No, it's not.

In fact my old company did the first ever CAT3 manual landing in Europe and I was trained to do so.

G SXTY

19th Mar 2016, 18:11

For all CATIII operations, autoland is and has always been mandatory. CATIIIa requires flare/touchdown capability and CATIIIb requires rollout.

Incorrect. To be absolutely clear, CATIII autolands are not permitted at FZ. The last person to try one was sacked. CATIII approaches at FZ are hand flown by the commander, using the HGS.

None of which, I would suggest, is likely to have any relevance to this crash.

ManaAdaSystem

19th Mar 2016, 18:14

G SXTY,

Are you allowed to do dual channel approaches/go arounds, or is that done manually as well?

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 18:18

So, which one is it? Max thrust or TOGA buttons pressed only once for WSH?

http://s30.postimg.org/alekzhict/737wshtoga.jpg (http://postimg.org/image/alekzhict/)

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 18:23

FlightDetent,
the Windshear Escape is flown manually; no A/T and no A/P
assuming you have already been alerted via a Windshear Warning, the TO/GA is pressed, the reason being the TO/GA give you F/D guidance for the windshear escape

B737Pilot3

19th Mar 2016, 18:23

Herod

19th Mar 2016, 18:24

Just looking quickly at Google Earth, and the point at which they seem to have initiated both go-arounds is about 400' amsl. Could they have descended to 630 FEET instead of 630 METRES, and encountered a GPWS alert? There is no mention on the ATC that we have available of being on the glideslope.

threemiles

19th Mar 2016, 18:26

https://www.google.de/maps/@47.2692582,39.8202104,3a,75y,306.92h,76.5t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sVCIU3APJZ4Zuz0vVIRwuhQ!2e0!7i13312!8i665 6

https://www.google.de/maps/@47.2692582,39.8202104,3a,75y,129.24h,69.93t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sVCIU3APJZ4Zuz0vVIRwuhQ!2e0!7i13312!8i665 6

Still under construction in May 2013

B737SFP

19th Mar 2016, 18:33

With the first push of either TO/GA switch:

• A/T (if armed) engages in GA and advances thrust toward the reduced go–around N1 to produce 1000 to 2000 fpm rate of climb. The A/T Engaged Mode annunciation on the FMA indicates GA

• autopilot (if engaged) disengages

• pitch mode engages in TO/GA and the Pitch Engaged Mode annunciation on the FMA indicates TO/GA

• F/D pitch commands 15 degrees nose up until reaching programmed rate of climb. F/D pitch then commands target airspeed for each flap setting based on maximum takeoff weight calculations

• F/D roll commands approach ground track at time of engagement. The Roll Engaged Mode annunciation on the FMA is blank

• F/D roll commands hold current ground track at or below 50 feet AGL. Above 50 feet AGL, LNAV will engage. The Roll Mode annunciation will display LNAV engaged above 50 feet AGL.

• the IAS/Mach display blanks

• the command airspeed cursor automatically moves to a target airspeed
for the existing flap position based on maximum takeoff weight calculations.

With the second push of either TO/GA switch (if A/T engaged and after A/T reaches reduced go–around thrust):

• the A/T advances to the full go–around N1 limit

TO/GA mode termination from F/D go–around:
• below 400 feet RA, both F/D switches must be turned off.
• above 400 feet RA, select a different pitch or roll mode.

• if the roll mode is changed first:
• F/D roll engages in the selected mode
• F/D pitch mode remains in TO/GA.

• if the pitch mode is changed first:
• F/D pitch engages in the selected mode.
• F/D roll mode automatically changes to HDG SEL

• the A/T GA mode (if engaged) is terminated when:
• another pitch mode is selected
• ALT ACQ annunciates engaged

B737SFP

19th Mar 2016, 18:35

The WindShear Escape Maneuver can be flown using the AP.

http://i.imgur.com/KuW7V3N.png

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 18:38

to HIGHlow: To me it wasn't exactly clear from the FCTM page I posted. PF: press TOGA and verify GA thrust

Thank you for clarifying. I assume then that WSH escape as trained includes use of TO/GA FD's limited to 20° NU and full available thrust. Thus, in stable airmass, yielding climb rate consistent with the recorded data 3500-4500 fpm. Quite possibly modest speed increase too.

Then full power level-off in IMC or worse: preceived level bust (imagine: after handover to APCH they're told of having busted the altitude), nice stomagravic illusion of climbing due acceleration, speed-tape confusion with some flaps still out, GPWS yelling do not sink! And the strobe lights reflecting in IMC and snow too.. ... and all this at nice 04:00 morning of your body clock.

B737SFP

19th Mar 2016, 18:39

http://i.imgur.com/nndc9in.png

B737SFP

19th Mar 2016, 18:40

Not trying to correct anyone here guys...

Just posting this to clarify !

We all need to refresh our knowledge from time to time...

Where I'm flying nowadays, we're trained to always manually fly the bird when facing this kind of situation. I believe most of the operators adopt this kind of procedure... Probably the best way to not kill anyone ! But this is the kind of thing that can lead to a LOC-I situation caused by over controlling the aircraft.

Great discussion btw.

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 18:42

yes and correction to my post,
on the 737 you can fly it automatically.
the brain is fried and informative discussion i agree

and to flightdetent
from memory, i believe when out of the WS, the flight directors will actually give u guidance above 20 Degs..... to keep the increasing speed in check
the danger is not to follow above 20 degrees ( talking about the manual case).

we will soon find out the cause, loss of control during GA or W/S escape , aircraft damage,
all speculation at this point ,

FlightDetent

19th Mar 2016, 18:48

Uff, sorry, still not clear.

When TO/GA button is pressed (as per FCTM guidance), on an ILS approach with single-channel AP, will it be automated WSH escape or AP trip-off?

Flyer1015

19th Mar 2016, 18:49

Flyer1015 - so you think an airline that doesn't nightstop needs looked at because they don't night stop? Where do they find people like you??? It no two bob outfit from the Middle East, it's a serious player, has had a great record until now. Let's keep things in perspective and not forget that there is no correlation between LCCs and legacy airlines (in the non Southeast Asian world) when it comes to safety. If you do have any information to the contrary please point us to it.

As we have learned from MH17, MH370 and many others 'officials' often make statements that they are not qualified to make. They good posts that they are not qualified for and believe that because they have a title that they know what they're talking about and are empowered to make comments on subjects that they know nothing about.

I had a filling yesterday. In some cultures that would qualify me to be a minister for health.

Yes, that's exactly what I said. And please sir, flyDubai is a brand new airline in the overall scheme of things. You know how these Middle Eastern airlines all are. Extremely reactionary and firing any pilot 'mistake.' Emirates Melbourne crew forced to resign after a weight and balance bungle-up and resulting tail strike takeoff. Qatar crew mistakes MIA runway intersection T1 as an intersection instead of a notam for something else. They're also fired.

flyDubai does out and backs predominantly. How do they really handle pilot issues? What if this pilot decided to hold for only hour and then divert? Does management support him? Or do they call him in for a meeting and say "hey, you still had 2 hours more fuel, you should have held more." It's crazy to think they had a 4 hour flight to Ros Dov, and then another similar 4 hr flight back to Dubai, and after one approach they held for nearly 2 hours. Holding that long for a place like Heathrow is one thing. But freakin Ros dov? One has to start questioning the ADM of the crew and you can't really do that until you look at and evaluate their safety culture.

I'm probably sounding from a high horse as an American, but these ME carriers have a very bad safety culture in terms of management relations with pilots, and especially their reaction to when a pilot/crew makes a mistake. They go into a "fire-them-all!" mode. That's not a safety culture. That is just dangerous.

Airbubba

19th Mar 2016, 19:07

DM - Decison Making, besides all the dangers with High Energy GA, why even attempt to make the approach?

Windshear reported on the Runway! Given the amount of fuel the crew had, they had plenty of options. However this comes down to company culture in my opinion, pressure on crew to get in no matter what!

I was thinking the same thing when the controller seemingly reported severe turbulence and windshear in the weather sequence. :confused:

The approach plate for runway 22 has this note: 'Increased turbulence and windshear may be expected on final.'

SMT Member

19th Mar 2016, 19:16

If you're heading into Ros Dov in the middle of a wintery night, you know very well that diverting to any of the nearby airports will induce massive amounts of operational headache. It will basically be you and your crew, trying to sort out everything for yourself and your passengers. In the middle of very, very rural Russia, that is a daunting task which is bound to result in passenger complaints and, quite possibly, a social shyte storm when the inevitable happens, and you find yourself, your crew and passengers stranded onboard an increasingly frigid 737.

Those thoughts are bound to enter the mind of a commander, and is very likely one of the reasons why he decided to press on with the landing - even after a two hour hold and reports of WHSR.

HighLow

19th Mar 2016, 19:16

flightdetent;

my understanding of the system is as follows
Single Channel ILS - Pressing TO/GA will disconnect the A/P regardless of W/S Warning (TO/GA after W/S Warning gives Pilot F/D Escape Guidance)
Dual Channel ILS - Pressing TO/GA will keep the A/P engaged.

Following a Windshear Warning;
Single Channel ILS,: Follow The W/S Escape(manually)
Autopilot disengages after TOGA Selection

A Dual Channel ILS: The W/S Escape
TO/GA will drop A/P to single channel the A/P will remain engaged
Follow the Escape Maneuver (Automatic Flight)
If the pilots are not satisfied with the performance at any stage, follow the Manual Flight procedure as published above.

That is my take on it :)
(open to correction)

FlyingStone

19th Mar 2016, 19:23

Excessive pitch during GA is a normal occurrence on 737.. it should be grounded.

If pilots can't fly a normal go-around in a 737, that doesn't mean the aircraft should be grounded. Its characteristics in a go-around are not to be unexpected in a high-performance jet aircraft with under-wing mounted engines and virtually zero flight control augmentation. But if people think you MUST pull hard during a go-around on a 737, then somebody should change their mind with training, not by grounding the aircraft.

Passenger 389

19th Mar 2016, 19:42

Couple of questions from an SLF:

Question #1: Does accident craft have only a 2 hour CVR? If so, might lose everything said/done prior to and during first approach and GA, which potentially would have shed additional light on what thinking, etc.

Question # 2: After FZ981 reported were going around, Tower responded with "contact approach 121.2". Crew said "121.2, bye bye".

Any thoughts on when FZ981 (probably) would have made that frequency change?

I realize frequency changes are a routine task, but I ask that question partly because of this comment on the thread:

We were 4 or 5 seconds from being upside down at 2,000'. And I was heads down with a frequency change. (emphasis added)

Which makes me wonder if PM on FZ981 (who I presume is making frequency change) may briefly have been distracted by it about the same time as a possibly excessive pitchup on GA and/or a somatogravic illusion or whatever may have transpired there. When things suddenly go bad, might that have added a critical hole to the swiss cheese (or removed a critical slice, however one cares to view it)?

Shaggy Sheep Driver

19th Mar 2016, 19:43

The one thing we do know is that it was a steep and fast impact into the ground, as the video evidence, and the highly fragmented relatively compact wreckage field, appears to confirm.

It may or may not be relevant here, but the accident report on the Bournemouth 737 loss of pitch control on GA is worth a read.

Sky1971

19th Mar 2016, 19:48

Flydubai flight FZ981 crash. According to different media sources:
The plane was Boeing 737 manufactured in 2011, operated by airline FlyDubai (United Arab Emirates) a budget low-cost airline.
The Cypriot Captain, Aristos Socratous with over 5,700 flight hours.
The Spanish Co-pilot Alejandro Álava Cruz, from Tenerife, had flown 5,769 hours

22:16 FZ981 commences descent from FL360
22:42 FZ981 aborts first approach at 1725 ft, 6.7 km short of the runway
23:20 SU1166 SSJ-100 (a Sukhoi Superjet 100-95B from Moscow-Sheremetyevo "Aeroflot-Russian Airlines") decided to proceed towards Krasnodar alternate airport.
00:40 FZ981 aborts second approach at 1550 ft, 5.6 km short of the runway
00:41 FZ981 impacts airport terrain after a steep descent from 3975 feet
Flightradar24 shows the aircraft descending to an altitude of 1550 feet when it began to climb again at 3 NM (5,6 km) short of the runway. It reached about 3975 feet until the airplane entered a steep descent before impacting airport terrain.

No distress message was stated by the crew.
The crash appears to have been caused by gale-force winds, poor visibility due to fog and torrential rain, and possible pilot error.

My personal supposition: The plane was not on fire, just with all onboard lights on as usually during landing. It happened due to Bad weather conditions plus B737 Auto Flight System particularities sometimes difficult to manage with during go-around procedure.
It looks identically to Kazan B737 crash.
Let's wait for official investigation result.

LLuCCiFeR

19th Mar 2016, 19:50

For those wondering, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7orMIfJx-uw
a FZ low vis approach into BTS, from cockpit. As can be seen here, it's Single CH all the way until the AP disconnect. Also what's interesting is the VSD on both sides, Pm and Pf.

Also, as I read somewhere, Rostov is captain's airport only, so capt was PF i'd guess.Notice the good amount (close to 3 seconds) NU trim at 0:49, followed by a little bit ND trim at 0:59.

Then notice how much ND trim the captain gives after shut down (from 4:34).

Sunamer

19th Mar 2016, 19:56

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TtkoUT76CMk

Steve6443

19th Mar 2016, 19:56

How many here, would attempt this approach when reported Moderate Turbulene, Windshear on Runway and OVC 100 ft? If so maybe you should be fired straight away!

Why are you still harping on about OVC 100feet? The METAR was showing (amongst others) OVC100 = 10.000 feet overcast. OVC001 would be 100 feet overcast......

San Diego kid

19th Mar 2016, 20:25

With all regards, but if you cannot read a METAR, maybe you should restrain yourself a bit when commenting.

Horrible accident, hope there will be more clearance about what happened soon.

Capt Fathom

19th Mar 2016, 20:30

Perhaps everyone can refrain from commenting, because no one knows why this happened.
Too many here just love the sound of their own keyboards!

olasek

19th Mar 2016, 20:39

something must have pushed the column violently forward
Not necessarily "something". It could also be a pilot losing control of the aircraft, happened numerous times before, happened also 2 years ago in Russia in Kazan during another botched attempt to land 737 at night in marginal conditions. Aircraft hit ground at very steep angle in Kazan, overall very similar circumstances.

Starfox64

19th Mar 2016, 20:51

Sorry my bad, you are right. Tempo brain freeze, still I personally would have never even tried this approach, and I don't think anybody I know would have given it a go either!

It will be so easy to give the pilot the blame, while I rather thing there is a deeper culture issue here.

Also another problem in this area of the world, there are not many Cat 2 or Cat 3 airports around, so that is a reason often you need to carry tons of extra fuel.
In my previous company we had often on late flights 3000 kg extra fuel just to be able to reach the nearest Cat 2 airport in the vicinity.

If one airport was fogged in or windy, they would normally all be that in the same region, and they would normally be max Cat 1 or NPA.

It's a bit lottery to wait for 2 hours over one airport making your options around less and less!
Really? Everyone has their own limits but from the METAR it's doesn't look any different to the type of weather we routinely operate in and around the British Isles when a storm rolls in. Gusting 30knots+ pretty much down the runway, possible windshear, bit of cloud is par for the course.

Nothing wrong with holding for 2 hours if you have the fuel. Just have an exit strategy and a defined time/fuel amount at which you head off to the suitable and agreed alternate.

Teakettle15USN

19th Mar 2016, 20:56

The A/P on the 737 will disconnect , once you press the TO/GA buttons
You fly the initial Missed Approach manually, and then re-engage at an appropriate time
True enough in the "old days" Not true on the latest--which have "TOGA to LNAV" mode that will keep aircraft coupled. Not saying that's what happened here (FDR will tell that story), just clarifying system.

S7EVIN

19th Mar 2016, 21:00

Teakettle15USN about what version are you talking about? As far as I know on the 738 if you are on single AP as you push TOGA you get reduced go around thrust and the AP disconnects immediately.

whitelighter

19th Mar 2016, 21:04

This may be a daft observation/question but:

From the cctv video and the 3D flight path renderings I was expecting to see a large impact crater (for want of a better word). The ground/runway seems remarkably intact from the helicopter film. Is this normal and my expectation is wrong or does this suggest some breakup prior to impact (of the then smaller lower energy sections)

iraatc777

19th Mar 2016, 21:15

Repeated messages of Turbulence on approach, and Windshear, with plenty of fuel, there needs to be some digging into company culture, and not just a stupid discussion of how dangerous the 737 is in the Go Around!
Of course there could have been some catastrophic failure, but most likely the first part of the Swiss Cheese, is why did they attempt the approach at all?

Diversion could have been outside Russia too, Turkey, Georgia, Baku, there was enough fuel, head ache yes, but also alive to tell the story!

In the end this ends up with pilot given the blame, while it most likely was his training and company culture that coached them to encourage these actions, we had this with the Polish aircraft who attempted the NPA in Russia few years ago, pressure from the non flying forces.

How many here, would attempt this approach when reported Moderate Turbulene, Windshear on Runway If so maybe you should be fired straight away!

The OVC was my bad, sorry, tempo brain freeze, still the Turbulence and Windshear was the main points of never starting this approach in the first place!

Good point considered turbulence was reported as SEVERE on landing with a Moderate wind shear ,was given on the frequency by an atc

olasek

19th Mar 2016, 21:20

The ground/runway seems remarkably intact from the helicopter film. Is this normal and my expectation is wrong or does this suggest some breakup prior to impact (of the then smaller lower energy sections)
I din't see any helicopter film that would seem to be of sufficient quality and coverage to arrive at conclusion whether there was a crater or not. But there is also a video available that shows aircraft hitting ground pretty much intact - you can recognize all 3 lights (in triangular fashion) and aircraft at high bank. Also for mid-air break up to occur aircraft needs sufficient altitude for that to occur. Mid-air break ups do happen occasionally - usually when aircraft falls down uncontrollably for tens of thousands of feet (say emerging from an icing event or CB) but there is zero indication here that any mid air break up took place and like I said the available video contradicts it.

JanetFlight

19th Mar 2016, 21:27

negativeclimb

19th Mar 2016, 21:39

No, that accent seems typical of Spanish people speaking english

Contact Approach

19th Mar 2016, 22:01

This is clearly a botched G/A into a stall.

ZOOKER

19th Mar 2016, 22:01

Until this incident, I had no idea that some ANSPs reported wind speeds in m/sec. Surely, if airspeeds are in knots, W/V should be reported in the same units?
Approaches that are 'thrown away' at 5-6+Km from touchdown would imply serious Wx conditions.

Wageslave

19th Mar 2016, 22:05

In the (my) usual manner of judging likelyhood by what seems to have happened this has all the hallmarks of the classic B737 dual coupled approach to manual g/a pitch trim gotcha. It's just such a good fit it's hard to imagine another scenario.
Walks, talks and sounds like a duck I'm afraid.
So my guess it's a duck but time will tell.

But why on earth hang around for 2 hours in the hold when there seems little chance of improvement and there are viable diversions not far away?

Surely 2 hrs in the hold tells you something....?

RAT 5

19th Mar 2016, 22:15

It's just such a good fit it's hard to imagine another scenario.

The question is why, after a successful 'practice' 2 hours earlier, would the 2nd one be a cock up? And when commenced from quote a height with no panic?
For interest was the captain ex-Helios? And the F/O ex-Fuetura?

TRF4EVR

19th Mar 2016, 22:17

This is clearly a botched G/A into a stall.

Well that's sorted, then. What's for dinner?

XLNL

19th Mar 2016, 22:36

Just one question....having in mind someone said according FlyDubai this aerodrome/rwy is only a "captains landing" and the accent of the ATC clip speaking pilot is not spanish for sure, could we suggest PIC was doing both Flying and Comms?:confused:

I'm not from either country (Greece/Spain) and I think for anyone not from either country it would be difficult to distinguish between the accents especially from a low quality recording.
Also capt landing does not mean capt has to be PF for approach, could be monitored app.
All speculation and not really relevant.

B737SFP

19th Mar 2016, 22:42

Guys: just one thing: I read somewhere that they went around like +3nm from the Runway Threshold, is that right ?

If it is true, then, at a 3 deg GP, 3nm give us something around 1000FT AAL...

At this altitude, no NOSE UP trim has been added in case of a Dual Channel Approach !

The Acft starts trimming around 400 ft RA.

I'm much more inclined to think that those guys ended up with a high nose up attitude during the Go Around (Low ALW, High Trust Setting, Maybe Somatogravic illusion), stalled and lost control of the aircraft.

pattern_is_full

19th Mar 2016, 22:47

@ Mr. Optimistic: So far as the evidence thus far - strong and gusty winds, which likely made it impossible (or at least very difficult) to achieve a "Stabilized" approach (speed stable, guidance needles centered, etc.) at the required point(s) (500/1000 feet above ground).

Doing a go-around because the approach "goes wrong" is (or should be) a routine procedure. And indeed this crew did one with no problem. The question is, what caused the second GA to deteriorate into a crash?

tubby linton

19th Mar 2016, 22:57

The ILS glide slope for this runway is very flat at 2.67 degrees. The Jepp chart also has warnings about turbulence and windshear on final.
Cat 1 minima is 480(200)- 700m RVR

olasek

19th Mar 2016, 23:08

The question is, what caused the second GA to deteriorate into a crash?
The investigative boards are not required to answer questions "why?" (as far as human performance is concerned), instead they want to answer questions "what happened?". If there are some contributing factors (poor training, inadequate rest, etc.) they will mention it but rarely a cause-effect connection can be established.

It is a known thing in aviation - a second attempt at landing at the same airport (due to marginal weather) has very poor odds at succeeding at least as far as General Aviation is concerned. Pilots are strongly encouraged to go somewhere else.

too_much

19th Mar 2016, 23:30

Just pull up the ATC recording of the taxi out of DXB and compare the voices.

Taxi out is always FO on comms.

tsenis

19th Mar 2016, 23:48

I'm not from either country (Greece/Spain) and I think for anyone not from either country it would be difficult to distinguish between the accents especially from a low quality recording.
Also capt landing does not mean capt has to be PF for approach, could be monitored app.
All speculation and not really relevant.
The person speaking at least in first couple of minutes has characteristic Cypriot English accent.
I am not sure though same person speaks at the end of the transcript. Probably not.

ATCO1962

19th Mar 2016, 23:58

Accents mean nothing. I'm a New Zealander who sounds like an American, due to a comprehensive American education in Japan. You can't judge a book by its cover, I'm afraid.

al599

20th Mar 2016, 00:02

No, that accent seems typical of Spanish people speaking english

The accent of the person heard here at the beginning is definitely that of a Cypriot. Haven't heard the end yet.

pattern_is_full

20th Mar 2016, 00:15

@log0008 - Basic aerodynamic question. Can a wing stall at any airspeed? Answer - Yes, a wing can stall at any airspeed. All that matters, for a stall, is angle of attack. We don't know that THIS aircraft stalled - but the recorded speed tells us nothing one way or the other on that subject.

@ olasek - I used "cause" in the exact same way the NTSB uses the word in "probable cause." In virtually every report they publish, except those where no cause can be determined. Sometimes "cause" means simply "what happened," which is how I used it in this case. But sometimes the NTSB has been very - emphatic - in discussing "why" something happened, if they feel it involves a serious systemic safety issue (CRM, faulty maintenance practices, VFR flight into IMC, etc.)

dick badcock

20th Mar 2016, 00:19

Until this incident, I had no idea that some ANSPs reported wind speeds in m/sec. Surely, if airspeeds are in knots, W/V should be reported in the same units?

You obviously don't fly to (or over!) CIS or China then. Winds are always reported in mps and this is well understood by crews who operate in these areas (including the unfortunate FZ crew). Converting from mps to kts is a non-event and requires no mental capacity, just multiply value in mps by 2 to get kts.

notapilot15

20th Mar 2016, 00:42

Just listening to truncated 9 minute audio is fatigue inducing. One has to appreciate aircrew holding two hours patiently in addition to unknown numbers of hours they already put in on that day.

RIP.

JET_A1

20th Mar 2016, 01:07

Been a few accidents in the past with aircraft holding for long periods in Icing conditions then when back to approach speeds have stalled. Lets hope this is not the case.

As far as I am aware all holding should be done in the clean configuration, no flap in the 73 for this reason.

I haven't looked at the Wx at the time..... Just putting it out there

porterhouse

20th Mar 2016, 01:36

or is it entirely the prerogative of the pilot?
Yes, technically totally up to the pilot. But pilot maybe in touch with the airline dispatchers and be under pressure to land at the destination, airlines hate such disruptions as alternate airports, it costs them $$$.

ACMS

20th Mar 2016, 03:23

Has anyone thought that maybe, just maybe during the second missed approach with a high body angle one Engine flamed out from fuel exhaustion from low fuel qty in that main tank? They were holding for quite a while. When it flamed out, the other one at high thrust, high nose attitude....... speed fell below VMCA.......stalled spun in......
It's possible......

Otto Throttle

20th Mar 2016, 03:33

iflytb20

20th Mar 2016, 04:01

@ACMS

It was posted very early in the thread that they had around 8.5 hours endurance and the accident happened around 6 hours into the flight. They still had 2.5 hours worth of fuel left as per the above figures.

ACMS

20th Mar 2016, 04:08

Fair enough, we'll see in good time.

Machinbird

20th Mar 2016, 04:20

This is clearly a botched G/A into a stall. Given the apparent lawn dart impact, and the second approach GA profile, all those expecting the full stall scenario are likely to be disappointed. A stall which continues would result in a much flatter impact attitude at much lower speeds.

The Tatarstan Boeing 737-500 which crashed at Kazan accident will be much closer to what happened in this accident. In that accident, MAK could only suggest the possibility of a push into a dive caused by Somatogravic Illusion, because the CVR was inoperative. I suspect we will have an operable CVR which may this time confirm an instance of Somatogravic Illusion.

The Somatogravic Illusion is a complicated sounding name, but all it really means is that linear acceleration can fool you into thinking you are pitching up when you are actually pitching over into a dive. If you pull up too steeply on the initial go around and need to pitch over a bit to maintain airspeed, you must use your attitude indicator to make the adjustment. If you get behind the aircraft and unconsciously start flying by the seat of your pants, you can get yourself in trouble very quickly. Modern twin jets are capable of pretty good acceleration rates, especially when light. More than enough to cause that Somatogravic Illusion effect in an unsuspecting aircrew.

To those professional pilots who have a good understanding of the pitfalls of hand flying, I apologize for the fundamental nature of the above paragraph, but I feel it is necessary to write to the LCD (Lowest Common Denominator) in the current situation.

As to why the crew was able to execute a safe GA on the first approach and failed to do so on the second, it is probable that the Go Arounds were just done differently.

FullWings

20th Mar 2016, 05:12

What have we got so far in terms of evidence, taking in into account the source/reliability?

* The weather wasn’t great but not limiting in terms of surface conditions
* Two approaches were made, with a period of extended holding between them
* Two missed approaches were flown, both from >1,000’ AGL
* Fuel quantity does not appear to be an issue
* No urgency/distress calls were given
* Up to and including the last RT exchange, communications appeared normal
* During the first part of the final missed approach, speed and altitude increase
* After getting to c. 4,000’, speed carries on increasing but altitude decreases rapidly
* The final descent to impact is short, in the region of 10s

As the FDRs have been recovered it shouldn’t be too long until there are accurate figures, assuming they are readable. At the moment we only have the FR24 data, which although should not be taken as gospel, is at least internally consistent. As it’s all we’ve got to go on, it shows in speed vs. altitude pretty much what you would expect from a GA flown with TOGA thrust, right up to the moment it starts a rapid descent. It doesn’t show the speed -> altitude trade and excessive RoC that you’d expect from a pitch excursion. Also, the extrapolated speeds appear to be well removed from unaccelerated stall speeds, in any configuration.

All in all, a bit puzzling at the moment. Why did they GA approaching 1,000’? Could be as simple as they did not make their SAC or there was a WS caution/warning. Whatever was happening, they obviously didn’t like it so threw it away before getting any closer to the ground. Something happened during the missed approach that turned a 4,000fpm climb into a 10,000fpm+ descent within seconds, if the trace is to be believed. Very odd...

ramble on

20th Mar 2016, 05:24

Spatial disorientation - awful feeling on a dark stormy night.

Similar to Gulf Air 72, Flash 604......

Duck Pilot

20th Mar 2016, 05:26

I always brief the go around actions with the other pilot if I'm ever in doubt that we may need to go missed in bad weather. What I mean by actions, is what we as a crew are going to physically do interns of reconfiguring the aeroplane, additional to the turn at ****, climb to ****. I've nearly killed myself twice by botching up missed approaches when I once flew in single pilot ops.

wanabee777

20th Mar 2016, 05:41

I've nearly killed myself twice by botching up missed approaches when I once flew in single pilot ops.

I got the stick shaker during a high altitude go around at KSEA in a 767. The cause of the go around was a flap malfunction and I was trying to make the go around without using the TOGA switches.

Scared the luv'n ****e out of myself. Bought the F/O a steak dinner at Morton's for that eff up.

weatherdude

20th Mar 2016, 06:35

As far as icing is concerned, I was under the impression that the aircraft had been holding at FL150. I suspect given the weather in that area at the time, this was in clear air. There has also been speculation as to why the crew requested a climb to FL80 after the missed approach, and I would also suspect that this is related to a suitable level of clear air and to facilitate a subsequent diversion.
They were definitely not in clear air at FL150. Again, check the Cloud top temperatures here (mouseover, indication top left on screen): With -25 to -35 degrees clouds higher up by far.

Satellit Top Alarm-Bild vom 19.03.2016, 01:45 Uhr - Ukraine | Wetter von kachelmann. (http://kachelmannwetter.com/at/sat/ukraine/top-alarm-5min/20160319-0045z.html)

Centaurus

20th Mar 2016, 06:54

The Somatogravic Illusion is a complicated sounding name, but all it really means is that linear acceleration can fool you into thinking you are pitching up when you are actually pitching over into a dive. If you pull up too steeply on the initial go around and need to pitch over a bit to maintain airspeed, you must use your attitude indicator to make the adjustment. If you get behind the aircraft and unconsciously start flying by the seat of your pants, you can get yourself in trouble very quickly. Modern twin jets are capable of pretty good acceleration rates, especially when light. More than enough to cause that Somatogravic Illusion effect in an unsuspecting aircrew.

With all the jet transport go-arounds in one day around the world and add to that all the catapult assisted take offs of jet fighters from aircraft carriers around the world every day and night, you would think there would be hundreds of crashes due to Somatogravic illusions. But obviously there are not.

Often the sort of airline transport crashes we are seeing where an IMC go-around has turned into a steep climb followed by a stall and dive into the ground, turn out in the end to be nothing more than poor instrument flying ability by the pilot.

Somatogravic Illusions are often used as the catch-all excuse for crashes like these because it's hard to believe there are airline pilots out there simply cannot fly on instruments when most of their career has been watching an autopilot do its work.

neville_nobody

20th Mar 2016, 07:17

Any thought that they just flew right into a cell and got spat out the bottom?

weatherdude

20th Mar 2016, 07:21

Any thought that they just flew right into a cell and got spat out the bottom?
There was no such thing as a cell. It is not summer. There was no thunderstorm. It was just an average wintry crap weather which happens at 100 places every day in this time of the year.

neville_nobody

20th Mar 2016, 07:53

Have a read of page 1 of this thread and the wx posted there has CBs on it. I would agree that it would be unlikely however still possible

weatherdude

20th Mar 2016, 07:58

Have a read of page 1 of this thread and the wx posted there has CBs on it
As I wrote in my Post on page 1, in Russia the observation of CB is 20 to 50 times more frequent than in any other country in the world. The reason for this unknown is unknown to me. They do so in ANY kind of non-stratiform precip. If there is a shower, it's always a CB in Russia. There was not one lightning flash and again, just look at the sat imagery of the time, no "cells" and there was also technically no CB. Over the town itself top cloud temperature was -26, you can check it yourself with mouseover. This has nothing to do with a CB. At least some rules in Meteorology also apply for Russia.

Satellit Top Alarm-Bild vom 19.03.2016, 01:45 Uhr - Ukraine | Wetter von kachelmann. (http://kachelmannwetter.com/at/sat/ukraine/top-alarm-5min/20160319-0045z.html)

Jonty

20th Mar 2016, 08:24

I'm struggling to understand why he was hand flying it, surely at 1500ft the autopilot would still be engaged? And therefore the GA would be flown via the autopilot too. It's a dark and stormy night, not a time to exercising your hand flying skills.
Or are all GAs on the B737 hand flown?

His dudeness

20th Mar 2016, 08:47

It's a dark and stormy night, not a time to exercising your hand flying skills.

So during severe turbulence very close to the ground one should use the A/P ?

@weatherdude: I was told by a russian guy that this has to do with liability. I do fly a lot into Russia and the forecasts are just a joke.

Jonty

20th Mar 2016, 08:53

If the autopilot isn't coping with it, fair enough, but not as a matter of course.

Sorry, I see he was probably visual, so PFs choice.

Didnt realise the autopilot would be lost after a single AP approach. Is there a reason you would do a single AP approach over a dual approach on an ILS? Apart from a US autopilot.

Jonty

20th Mar 2016, 09:26

Just trying to understand 737 ops.

essexboy

20th Mar 2016, 09:39

Single a/p is standard for a cat 1 approach. Duel channel is used for autoland. In fact FD don't use duel channel landings at all they fly cat111 using the hud.

microscalewx

20th Mar 2016, 09:49

Just decided to sign up to inject some extra weather information into an already compelling discussion, and to back up some of weatherdude's input.

I am an amateur, not a professional, and do not hold any kind of pilot/aviation credentials.

The METAR report is a good source for surface conditions and observations from there, and I'd like to add that the CB report is quite likely correct. Any cumulus cloud (Cu) that rains is by definition a cumulonimbus (Cb), the discriminator for a thunderstorm is in METAR code as TS, with +/- for each to indicate rain rate. The reason for this is that any Cu is technically convective and thus can cause upset, with TCu also used to warn of non-raining but potentially strong updrafts. The METAR reports around the accident time correctly state showers and broken low clouds, hence CB's, with stratiform cloud cover at 10k ft. Given the immediately pre-frontal nature of that night's weather at Rostov this is a likely cloud pattern.

A better source for weather conditions, if you can find one nearby to an accident time/location, is a sounding; it just so happens a balloon was launched from Rostov-on-don at 00z (likely just prior, so perhaps 1hr before accident). The lowest levels up to 700mb are available here: 34731 URRR Rostov-Na-Donu Sounding (http://weather.uwyo.edu/cgi-bin/sounding?region=europe&TYPE=GIF%3ASTUVE700&YEAR=2016&MONTH=03&FROM=1900&TO=1900&STNM=urrr) in which on either side of the diagram you can see the height of a recorded measurement and wind information (bearing, strength) from this you can infer a wind shear difference of 40kts within ~600m of the surface. Additionally, there is slight vertical directional shear (difference in wind bearing with height), both of which would suggest shear-induced wave action, ie: turbulence. This amount of low level shear is quite extreme, and on an airfield already known for turbulence.

The synoptic scenario on the night was a strong frontal zone advancing from the NW that had just reached the Black Sea area at 00z, and was at it's strongest point for that location. Here is the 850mb wind chart for that part of Asia taken from the initial chart of the GFS model (note: this would be mostly assimilated actual data, just gridded, before the model started to compute anything): http://www.tropicaltidbits.com/analysis/models/gfs/2016031900/gfs_mslp_uv850_asia_1.png A quick look on Google maps at the local terrain shows that the wind fetch was coming straight off the Black Sea up into a valley where Rostov is with an elevation change of 78m. Adding to the vertical turbulence effects would have been the possibility of further horizontal eddying from orographic wind effects of the valley coupled with the approaching front maxima. All in all a very bad weather situation to head into.

As for icing, the complete diagram for the 00z Rostov sounding shows saturation between 0C and -20C: 34731 URRR Rostov-Na-Donu Sounding (http://weather.uwyo.edu/cgi-bin/sounding?region=europe&TYPE=GIF%3ASKEWT&YEAR=2016&MONTH=03&FROM=1900&TO=1900&STNM=34731) (note for non-weather folk, that diagram is a skew-T which means temperature on the x-axis relates to the blue lines that are the most skewed to the right from immediately above their labels, the black lines are the instrument measurements so to read off the temp see where they intersect at your chosen height) which means riming was possible. It also shows that at above 5.5km there was less saturation (separation between the lines of temp and dewpoint measurements), so quite possible there was minimal icing risk in the hold (esp being off to the SW of this reading) but perhaps some icing in the descent to the 2nd attempt.

brb an associate is running a GFS-WRF simulation at 2km grid scale

Daermon ATC

20th Mar 2016, 09:59

Spanish ATCO here. If the guy speaking at 5:55, 6:27 or 7:14 was not a spaniard (or heavy cultural influence from Spain as a newzealander mentioned), I shall personally eat my tower.
I wouldn't be sure only from the "going around" but the rest is 100% sure.

Edit: this refers to post #230 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/576325-b-738-crash-russia-rostov-don-12.html#post9316157

Leg

20th Mar 2016, 10:03

Magplug, read the whole thread before posting :ugh:

They stated they would climb to FL80 in event of a go around,
also no weather report or METAR (for what they are worth in this
part of the world), showed viz anywhere near minimums.

As Pete says, let's wait for some official response.

A37575

20th Mar 2016, 10:06

Plenty of time to engage the auto pilot

Here we go all over again. Why the blinding hurry to engage the autopilot when a competent pilot (not too many around it seems) could easily manually fly on instruments until it was an appropriate time to engage the automatics.

The question is why, after a successful 'practice' 2 hours earlier, would the 2nd one be type of dog up?

No correlation at all. Just because you do a greaser landing on one landing doesn't necessarily mean you will do a greaser an hour later.

And indeed this crew did one with no problem

Just because the first go-around was successful (it didn't crash, that is) only the CVR/FDR read-out will prove "no problem". There could have been almighty stuff ups in the first go around but the crew got away with it on that occasion.

there needs to be some digging into company culture, and not just a stupid discussion of how dangerous the 737 is in the Go Around!

Right on, that man..

Years ago I was told by a "Chief Pilot" of a major, "flying skills are not a priority in our airline.

At least he was up front about it. "Flying skills are not a priority in our airline" is almost certainly true of all major airlines along with the vast majority of other operators of jet transports. Lip service is almost invariably paid by ops management to the desirability of maintain instrument flying skills, but they don't really believe it of course. The term `Technical Corruption` comes to mind. As one Boeing 787 test pilot was heard to say: "We built the 787 with the assumption it will be flown by incompetent pilots".