USAAC deliberate downing of 2 RAF Liberators

[Prangster]

Just come across a quote from Sir Max Hastings noting that the USAAC downed two RAF Liberators carrying French agents back to what was the French Indo China shortly after the Japanese surrender. Washington was determined that France should not re establish colonial rule. Seems odd to say the least. Anyone know more about this?


Mods feel free to move if on wrong page

[Pontius Navigator]

Nothing here only one Liberator
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fatal_accidents_and_incidents_involving_Royal_Air_Fo rce_aircraft_from_1945#1940s

[ninja-lewis]

'The First Vietnam War' by Peter M. Dunn, p87-88

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=kurDWLZ1PZYC&lpg=PA85&ots=p6eKlnOPu0&dq=france%20indo-china%20liberator&pg=PA86#v=onepage&q=france%20indo-china%20liberator&f=false

and

'Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service' by Richard J. Aldrich, p210-211

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=D86lnjjU7PIC&lpg=PA210&ots=IxGNmZxq-I&dq=mountbatten%20wedemeyer%20indochina%20liberator%20black%2 0widow%20special%20duty&pg=PA210#v=onepage&q=mountbatten%20wedemeyer%20indochina%20liberator%20black%20 widow%20special%20duty&f=false

Both make reference to the alleged incident. It occurred during a breakdown in relations, one of the consequences of which was that we weren't informing the Americans of special duty flights into Indochina. Three aircraft were lost on one particular mission. Americans told the British that it was possible two of them had been shot down by P-61 Black Widow night fighters (at that stage of the war, they were shooting down more allied aircraft than enemy apparently) having ventured into range of the US air defences.

Both sides brushed the matter under carpet as relations were repaired shortly afterwards. Both sources point out that special duty missions continued so it seems more likely to be just another tragic fog of war incident rather than a conspiracy to stop the French reclaiming Indochina.

[skippedonce]

a quote from Sir Max Hastings noting that the USAAC downed two RAF Liberators carrying French agents back to what was the French Indo China shortly after the Japanese surrender.

Well, Sir Max apparently has it wrong on at least one count, as the USAAC hadn't existed since 1941 when it became the USAAF.

[k3k3]

I think you'll find it was 1947, not that I was there.


Oops, sorry, I was wrong.

[BBadanov]

No.
1947 was birth of USAF - USAAF became USAF.

[megan]

skippedonce has it correct

Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps August 1, 1907 – July 18, 1914
Aviation Section, Signal Corps July 18, 1914 – May 20, 1918
Division of Military Aeronautics May 20, 1918 – May 24, 1918
Air Service, United States Army May 24, 1918 – July 2, 1926
United States Army Air Corps July 2, 1926 – June 20, 1941
United States Army Air Forces June 20, 1941 – September 18, 1947
United States Air Force September 18, 1947–present

[walter kennedy]

Whatever it was called, what enemy aircraft could have looked like a Liberator and been flying at the time?
Less has been called an act of war when it has suited.

[Bevo]

Whatever it was called, what enemy aircraft could have looked like a Liberator and been flying at the time?
Less has been called an act of war when it has suited.

According to 'Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service' by Richard J. Aldrich” the date was Jan 22/23, 1945 and the incidents took place at night.
To quote the book:

SOE had asked the RAF’s Special Duties squadrons to maintain supplies to the resistance in Indochina by flying especially long and hazardous mission from Burma. Moreover because of the boundary dispute, SOE ceased to inform {Gen.} Wedemeyer’s command of these operations, risking unannounced night-time intrusions into the American air defense network. “

[2805662]

So, in short, SOE/RAF persist in conducting operations by night in an area patrolled by USAAF night fighters, without resolving whatever the "dispute" is, & without coordination with the organisation conducting the patrols. Aircraft are (predictably) shot down, yet somehow it's the USAAF's fault? Sounds like hubris & incompetence came home to roost.

[Prangster]

USAAC my mistake, sorry.

[clean32]

my grandmother younger brother Rnzaf was mid upper gunner on liberator KH277, 385 squadron RAF " special duties" based at Bengal India

Transcribed from the National Archives Records, Kew
Air 27/1765-1769
Draft No. 0 (as typed)
August, 2010
22 I. Operations.
Operational Order No. 2. – 11 aircraft detailed for S.D. Operations over Indo-
China, and took off at intervals from 1430 hours. A/c. 'T' 350 F/O. Robinson,
and A/c. 'Q' 367 F/O. Murray landed at Jessore on return. Three aircraft, 'K'
215, F/Lt. K. H. Brailsford, 'Z' 277 S/L. A. S. M. Pim and 'W' 278 F/Lt. S. D.
Mayhew, and crews did not return to base. Weather at Base was good but
crews ran into adverse conditions, heavy rain and 10/10ths cloud over D.Zs.
only 2 aircraft 'A' W/Cdr. Farr and 'G' F/O. Davison succeeded in locating
targets and dropping their loads. Others brought back loads to base.
III – Personnel.
Missing Personnel.
A/c. 'K' 215
F/L. K. H. Brailsford. Capt. (139520)
F/O. W. Russell. (J.27639) RCAF. 2nd P.
W/O. G. A. O'Toole (1550901) Nav.
P/O. L. Blick (178370) B/A.
W/O. J. R. Swain (1183127) 1.WOP.
358 Squadron January 1945
9
Sgt. J. G?. Gibbs (1338318) 2.WOP.
W/O. W. Lear (1339360) M.Up.Gnr.
P/O. R. J. Wilson (54992) Rear Gnr.
A/c. 'Z' 277
A/S/Ldr. A. S. M. Pim (60566) Capt.
F/Sgt. J. H. Holt (1522039) 2nd.P.
F/Sgt. E. C. Hearn (1595199) Nav.
F/O. W. J. Wallace (149990) B/A.
F/O. E. Clarke (149915) 1.WOP.
Sgt. G. Gittins (1458467) 2.WOP.
F/S. S. E. Sadler (NZ.425047) M.Up.Gnr.
Sgt. J. Robinson (976439) Rear Gnr.
A/c. 'W' 278
F/Lt. S. D. Mayhew (63404) Capt.
W/O. N. C. Kames? (1385163) 2nd.P.
F/Sgt. W. C. Roberts (656237) Nav.
P/O. J. Hughes (164129) B/A.
Sgt. V. Butt (1800854) 1.WOP.
F/O. J. A. Schmidt (Aus.434671) (RAAF) 2.WOP.
Sgt. J. R. Perry (1622796) M.Up.Gnr.
Sgt. E. W. Moore (1699162) Rear Gnr.

form 501

Route:- A/C "G" and "A" Base-2258N9442E-2203N9845E-2018N10010E-D.Z. -2018N10010E-
2203N9845E-2258N9442E-Base.
A/C "Z" and "C" Base-2258N9442E-2254N9840E-2234N10222E-D.Z. .-2258N9442E-Base.
(A/C "C" Flight abandoned 2234N10222E).
A/C "X" Base-2258N9443E-2203N9845E-2018N10010E-D.Z-2018N10010E-
2203N9845E-2258N9443E-Base.
A/C "Q" Base-2258N9443E-2147N10106E-D.Z.-2103N10519E-2138N10050E-
2258N9443E-Base.
A/C "O" Base-2258N9448E-2244N9840E-2234N10225E-D.Z.-2258N9442E-Base.
Load:- A/C. K. Z.? W. T. Q. X. O. carried 10 Containers each.
A/C. C. & D. carried 11 containers each.
A/C. "A" carried 9 containers and 2 packages.
A/C. "G" carried 9 containers.
Opposition:- No opposition at all was encountered.
Liberator
VI KH215
"K"
F/L. K. H. Brailsford
139520
Capt. 14.45 ------ This plane took off but failed to return
from operation.
F/O. W. Russell
J.27639 (R.C.A.F.)
2nd. Pilot
P/O. L. B?lick Nav.
358 Squadron January 1945
15
178370
W/O. O'Toole, G? A.
1550901
B/A
W/O. Swain, J. R.
1183127
W/OP
Sgt. Gibbs, J. C.
1538318
W/OP
W/O. Lear, W.
1339360
A/G
P/O. R. J. Wilson
54992
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH282
"G"
F/O. M. R. Davison
54090
Capt. 14.50 06.10
F/O. J. B. Smart
171567
2nd. Pilot
P/O. H. J. A.
Johnson 165517
Nav.
Sgt. Simpson, S. A.
1673688
B/A
Weather was very poor on route with
10/10 ths cloud topped at 11,000 ft. DZ.
was located at 21.20 hrs. with clear
weather conditions. "C" type reception
was observed. After dropping all
parachutes were seen to open and fall in
the target area after which aircraft flew
SW. for three minutes then set course for
Base at 21.30.
Sgt. Gaskin, D. S.
605616
W/OP
Sgt. Robertson, A.
W. 1800541
W/OP
Sgt. Whitehouse, G.
S. 1567533
A/G
Sgt. Wallace, K? W?
1568323
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH353
"D"
F/L. H. H. Monks
120514
Capt. 14.35 05.25
Sgt. Goddard, G. D.
1585900
2nd. Pilot
W/O. Philips, F. D.
A.405603 (R.A.A.F.)
Nav.
Target was not located due to very bad
weather conditions. 500 miles away from
target 10/10 ths S. and S/C. cloud above
and below aircraft was encountered. 50
miles from target Capt. descended below
cloud only to find 10/10 ths valley fog
covering target. Did not drop load.
P/O. W. MacDonald
164203
B/A
F/S. Hill, G. M.
A.437419 (R.A.A.F.)
W/OP
F/S. Morris, E. G.
A.437437 (R.A.A.F.)
W/OP
Sgt. Taylor, D. R.
1846508
A/G
Sgt. Miles, H.
1811869
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH277
"Z"
S/L. A. D. M. Pim.
60566
Capt. 14.30 --------
F/S. Holt, J. H.
1522039
2nd. Pilot
This plane took off but failed to return
from operations. Subsequently reported
found crashed in Chin Hills near
Kalemyo. Nothing was observed by other
aircraft.
F/S. Hearne E. C.
1585199
Nav.
358 Squadron January 1945
16
F/O. E. Clarke
149915
W/OP
F/O. W. J. Wallace
1499990
B/A
F/S. Sadler, S.E.
NZ428267
(R.N.Z.A.F.)
A/G
Sgt. Gittins, G.
1458467
W/OP
Sgt. Robinson J.
976434
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH278
"W"
F/Lt. S. D. Mayhew
63404
Capt. 14.35 -------- This plane took off but failed to return
from operations. Nothing observed by
other aircraft.
W/O. Eames, N. O?
1385263
2nd. Pilot
P/O. J. Hughes
164129
Nav.
F/S. Roberts, W. G.
6562?37
B/A
Sgt. Butt, V.
1800854
W/OP
P/O. J. A. Schmidt
A434671 (R.A.A.F.)
W/OP
Sgt. Perry, J. R.
1636796
A/G
F/S. Moore, F.
1699152
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH312
"X"
F/O. K. W. Jones
175022
Capt. 15.10 05.00
F/S. Mills W. R.
1108628
2nd. Pilot
Sgt. Dunn, H.
1549512
Nav.
W/O. Ball, E? T.
581493
B/A
Poor weather was encountered with
10/10ths cloud based at 6,000 ft. On
arrival at D.Z. there was considerable
ground haze and no moon was visible.
No signal was seen and the Navigator
was not certain if he had accurately
located D.Z. Finally aircraft set course for
Base at 21.15 hrs.
P/O. L. J. H. Talbot
186538
W/OP
F/S. Dawson, H. T.
NZ.425654
(R.N.Z.A.F.)
W/OP
W/O. Richards, E. A.
1338958
A/G
W/O. Rozee, F. W.
1332037
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH167
"A"
W/Cdr. P. G. D. Farr
DFC 39936
Capt. 15.15 04.45
F/S. Banks, P. K.
1603971
2nd. Pilot
Very bad weather was experienced on
the route to the target, but a small gap in
the clouds allowed a descent and a
successful drop was made.
F/L. P. L. Ryan Nav.
358 Squadron January 1945
17
125641
F/S. Jackman, R
967248
B/A
F/O. S. J. Brace
162856
W/OP
Sgt. Thirkettle, C.
1025625
W/OP
Sgt. Stanley, J.
1894296
A/G
F/S. Wells, K.
1890474
FE/AG
F/L. P. J. Kydd
82745
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH271
"C"
S/L. S. A. Sharpe
45712
Capt. 14.20 03.25 Target was not located owing to very bad
weather conditions which necessitated
turning back to Base at 22.15 hrs.
F/O. B. J. C.
Edwards 157851
2nd. Pilot
F/S. Kirby, C. S.
1391233
Nav.
W/O. Cross, R. H.
1337426
B/A
W/O. Buchanan, J.
A. 1365057
W/OP
F/S. Noble, F. W.
A.437539 (R.A.A.F.)
W/OP
W/O. Fayle, J. W.
1357609
A/G
W/O. Seymour, E.
W. 1300922
A/G.
F/S. Fenbow, R. C.
1672757.
FE/AG
Liberator
VI KH253
"O"
P/O. J. C. Stuart
184239
Capt. 14.30 03.50
F/S. Drummond, S.
W. 1133124
2nd. Pilot
Poor weather conditions on route 9/10
ths cloud with tops 8/9000 ft. and poor
visibility. At 19.55 hrs Capt. set course for
Base after unsuccessfully trying to find
D.Z.
Sgt. Wright, J. C.
544422
B/A
F/S. Batchelor, J. H.
1316082
Nav.
Sgt. Blackburn, S. P.
1020030
W/OP
Sgt. Vickers, F. E.
1817431
W/OP
W/O. Hendry, W
1123732
A/G
P/O. F. S. Edwards
185307
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH367
"Q"
F/O. J. C. Murray
J27678
Capt. 14.40 05.40 10/10 ths cloud and showers were
encountered over most of the route. On
arrival at D.Z. at 21.10 hrs. Capt. found a
358 Squadron January 1945
18
W/O. Jones, J. H.
527725
S/Pilot
P/O. T. Kay 164079 B/A
F/O. E. P. Field
146307
Nav.
cap in cloud which he circled but no
signals were seen. Finally aircraft set
course Base at 21.30 hrs and had to land
at Jessore at 05.30 hrs. due to shortage
of fuel.
F/S. Bateman, J. E.
A.424944 (R.A.A.F.)
W/OP
F/S. Ashby, A. F.
A.424012 (R.A.A.F.)
W/OP
Sgt. Cosh, A.
653388
A/G
Sgt. Frederick, H. G.
1853345
A/G.
Liberator
VI KH350
"T"
F/O. R. W. Robinson
51159
Capt. 14.30 05.40
F/S. Bullen, R. M.
NZ425880
(R.N.Z.A.F.)
2nd. Pilot
Sgt. Sherwood, A. J.
1583263
B/A
Bad weather was encountered over most
of the route. On arrival at D.Z. at 21.00
hrs. it was found that the target was
covered by 10/10 ths cloud. Aircraft flew
around seeking a gap in the cloud but
was unsuccessful so set course for base
at 21.40 hrs. landing at Jessore at 05.40
hrs. due to shortage of fuel.
P/O. W. H. Bull
165575
Nav.
P/O. L. C. Bartlett
160606
W/OP
Sgt. Andrews, E. H.
1357596
W/OP
Sgt. Clarke, T. F.
636459
A/G
Sgt. Burling, A.
18877098
A/G.
11 aircraft were detailed to carry out this operation which was the first S.D. operation allotted to the Squadron. Only
2 sorties were successful. Three aircraft failed to return and it is not known if they were successful in their missions.
Bad weather interfered considerably and was the determining factor in the final results.

[clean32]

if you look at the 501 closely you will see that not all aircraft were heading to the same place Nor had the same load.
i assume i know what " package means???

[glad rag]

So, in short, SOE/RAF persist in conducting operations by night in an area patrolled by USAAF night fighters, without resolving whatever the "dispute" is, & without coordination with the organisation conducting the patrols. Aircraft are (predictably) shot down, yet somehow it's the USAAF's fault? Sounds like hubris & incompetence came home to roost.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/190th_Fighter_Squadron,_Blues_and_Royals_friendly_fire_incid ent#Unauthorised_leak_and_subsequent_de-classification_of_video_evidence

[2805662]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/190th_Fighter_Squadron,_Blues_and_Royals_friendly_fire_incid ent#Unauthorised_leak_and_subsequent_de-classification_of_video_evidence
Relevance?

[clean32]

So, in short, SOE/RAF persist in conducting operations by night in an area patrolled by USAAF night fighters, without resolving whatever the "dispute" is, & without coordination with the organisation conducting the patrols. Aircraft are (predictably) shot down, yet somehow it's the USAAF's fault? Sounds like hubris & incompetence came home to roost.

well to be more accurate and factual for the time.
the only Night Fighter Squadron 426th was based in china.
there job was to escort american bombers to japan
these escort operations were far to the north. "obviously"
By the middle of January 1945 the Japanese were not trying to intercept the bombers. the Japanese has assessed correctly. that the cost of these operations in man and material versus the poor results, that the yanks would not continue these raids for long. which was true.

Japanese records show that they had no aircraft flying on the night of the 22/23 january.

american an american 426th P61 pilot was credited with 1 kill and 1 damaged

KH277 and KH217 both crashed into high ground on there pre designated track. ( IE they were where they were supposed to be.)
The weather was a bit iffy on the way out. but the weather was clear on the return ( but it was night).

[clean32]

Summing up

Although circumstantial it is quite clear once you add the all the little stuff as well. Like the P61 pilots log book being taken and not the records but the missing records of his squadron for that 2 day period. And that those 2 days are the only missing records.
The fact that the P61s were no longer escorting due to the lack of opposition but were casting further afield. They were in fact operating within Sempai 61’s operational area. Both well documented facts.
We do know that 3 Liberators were shot at, one went down in flames as reported by the P61 crew, they also reported another damaged and that they made a total of 6 passes. I would surmise that they actually damaged two aircraft and not the one as was claimed.
Officially the two damaged aircraft were losed, reason unknown, there is some speculation about weather, but all the reports from the other aircraft was that the weather was good. But bad over target DZ. Both crash sites are quite close. About 20 miles apart. The first is on a reverse slope the second is on a slope at right angle to the line of flight.
There are two points. The weather was bad over the DZ, this could have played a role in the lack of the P61s ability to ID what would have been very familiar lines of a Liberator to an American pilot. The second is that it would appear that the aircraft did not just fly into a granite cloud and that some pilot input was needed or that the pilot was unable to control the aircraft. Give that this is the same ground flown over on the way out. Leaves me to guess that both aircraft tried to reverse course because they could not gain altitude, why? Because of damage? Or mechanical problems?
Politics
The Poms. And Mountbatten. Well they did their best to arm every resistance fighter who would kill a jap they could, Communists in Malay, independence fighters in Sumatra and the French resistance in Indochina. America was big of forcing or had the view that France England and the Dutch should not get there old colonies back after the war. To that end they had policies while under Stillwell or Vinegar Joe to just hinder or prolong the war if it suited there end. Refusing to provide American shipping to get British troops from BBK to Sumatra for example or refusing or even getting Chinese patrols to hunt French resistance fighters in Indochina or at least disarming them. In the meantime the Americans were training the Vet Mhin in china?. So based on this facts it looks highly likely that there was a conspiracy to hinder or that the Americans found it acceptable to shoot down RAF aircraft . but not so. We also know that SOE was not informing the Americans what they were doing. So how did the p61 know they were there? Also given that there were a number of aircraft operating that night. Why was only the 3 aircraft attacked on the same track? Why were there not more P61 flying and attacking the other aircraft at their targets?
Back to politics. October 1944 Stillwell got the boot, he was a bumbling fool anyway. His replacement was much smarter and was well known to have seen the communist threat as much more of a problem than as the possible recolonization. This panned out when Truman took over. From a really ani colonization policy to a policy of do nothing.
It is in my opinion that these 3 aircraft were losed because of 1, Lack of training of the Yanks, 2 lack of experience of the Yanks 3, The Americans Not informing SEATC of a change in SOP 4, the breakdown in communications in SEATC firstly between Stillwell and Mountbatten, secondly Stillwell’s American first policy over a win the bloody war policy. Which lead to the operations guys on both teams not talking to each other?

[glad rag]

Relevance?.

The all persuasive need to "win" no matter what the actual outcome.

[rlsbutler]

Taking up Clean32’s observation at #13, all of the eleven aircraft might indeed have been heading for the same place. For each aircraft the target is not specified – just named as DZ in all cases. All we get from the 501 is a selection of different routes to various points on the Indo-China border. I would have thought that the 501’s author would have numbered the DZs if they were different, even if he was concerned not to reveal their locations. Still I would agree that to drop all eleven eggs into one basket would be surprising and very different from the practice established with the Resistance in France.

I note that KH277 “Z” crashed well away from any USAAF operations, about half way between its base at Digri and its first turning point. It fell either after only a couple of hours flight or near to the end of its sortie – we do not know which. If it fell due to a night fighter attack, it kept airborne for several hours afterwards. In that case, with two W/Ops on board, one would have thought the aircraft would have informed the squadron of the trouble it was in.

The 501 tells us the wreck had been found behind XIV Army lines. It was probably found by a contingent of what was known there as V Force. Surely whoever found it would have reported any gun damage ? I suggest “Z” was lost by accident rather than by blue-on-blue.

[Lonewolf_50]

So, in short, SOE/RAF persist in conducting operations by night in an area patrolled by USAAF night fighters, without resolving whatever the "dispute" is, & without coordination with the organisation conducting the patrols. Aircraft are (predictably) shot down, yet somehow it's the USAAF's fault? Sounds like hubris & incompetence came home to roost.
There is a cottage industry that continues the attempt to attribute to malice that which is caused by error or confusion. And then there are those like wk who have a never ending ax to grind.

[Fareastdriver]

Was I to be flying over enemy territory with no information of friendly aircraft being in the vicinity and found an airborne radar target I would shoot it down too.

[Trim Stab]

Was I to be flying over enemy territory with no information of friendly aircraft being in the vicinity and found an airborne radar target I would shoot it down too.

Your clausal verb should be in the imperfect subjunctive tense. This is not Arsse.

[Fareastdriver]

Your clausal verb should be in the imperfect subjunctive tense.

Qué? Sorry.

[2805662]

KH277 and KH217 both crashed into high ground on there pre designated track. ( IE they were where they were supposed to be.)



The point being - from whose perspective were they "where they were supposed to be" and was this shared information (in this case with the USAAF)?

If that information was not shared, and operations (both RAF & USAAF) persisted without deconfliction/coordination, the result is almost inevitable.

[ShotOne]

"...found an airborne radar target..would have shot it down." (in whatever tense) The fighter pilot wouldn't have been shooting at a radar target but an aircraft located by radar, according to one account, after multiple passes and the Japanese had very few four-engined types. On the other hand, conspiracy sells and much hinges on the loaded word "deliberate" in the title.

[Fareastdriver]

I cannot imagine an American pilot identifying a Liberator with RAF markings deliberately shooting it down unless he felt that it was a captured aircraft being flown clandestinely.

As the Black Widow was a specialised night fighting aircraft I can believe that it was not identified in daylight.

[clean32]

Taking up Clean32’s observation at #13, all of the eleven aircraft might indeed have been heading for the same place. For each aircraft the target is not specified – just named as DZ in all cases. All we get from the 501 is a selection of different routes to various points on the Indo-China border. I would have thought that the 501’s author would have numbered the DZs if they were different, even if he was concerned not to reveal their locations. Still I would agree that to drop all eleven eggs into one basket would be surprising and very different from the practice established with the Resistance in France.

thank you, you have raised a number of points. form 541 ( not 501 my bad) gives the RAF ww2 Grid references or as known in the RAF as a plotting map. not Longitude or latitude as Normal, i does indeed show the DZ as the grid reference is preceded by the letter DZ. the complete form %$! and ESA command maps are all available on the internet.



I note that KH277 “Z” crashed well away from any USAAF operations, about half way between its base at Digri and its first turning point. It fell either after only a couple of hours flight or near to the end of its sortie – we do not know which. If it fell due to a night fighter attack, it kept airborne for several hours afterwards. In that case, with two W/Ops on board, one would have thought the aircraft would have informed the squadron of the trouble it was in.

It was Burma, the least radio friendly theater next to north italy

you missed the point the P61s were working out of there area, and did so with out informing any one. they did so because the japanese were offering No air resistance to the bombers the p61 were originally assigned to escort to Japan

The 501 tells us the wreck had been found behind XIV Army lines. It was probably found by a contingent of what was known there as V Force. Surely whoever found it would have reported any gun damage ? I suggest “Z” was lost by accident rather than by blue-on-blue.

V force, get real



the crash sites of Both 277 and 215 are not far from what was a large village or is today a small town. the bodies were recovered by the locals

[megan]

I cannot imagine an American pilot identifying a Liberator with RAF markings deliberately shooting it downIt happens. A RAF Spitfire shot down a C-54 believing it to be a Condor. Aircraft was carrying four hundred urgently needed flap mod kits for P-38.

The Germans used captured allied aircraft for clandestine operations, did the Japanese?

[clean32]

LOOK GUYs forget about the ID of aircraft at night.

anyone who has lived close to the equator knows that sunset is lights out, in there winter. its Dark Dark black.
the P61 shot down a ****load of there own mainly c47 aircraft.

so just forget about that line ok

[rlsbutler]

Clean32 #27: I cheerfully acknowledge your greater acquaintance with this material.

Quite right about F541 - sorry to persist with the mistake. I found it on a 358 Sqn site where it is easier to read than in your transcription at thread #12.

I would not have known that the locations were grid rather than Lat/Long – I would be interested to have a link to something that decodes the grids we are discussing. I have plotted each of the locations as Lat/Long and note that the last location before “DZ” seems in each case to be exactly on the border of the then Indo-China. I would have thought that agents already planted would be nearer to civilisation than that.

You say that the last location before “DZ” in the F541 record is the location of the DZ. How to explain that the routes, in the case of aircraft “G”, “A” and “X”, are recorded as such a location to the DZ and back to the same location ?

You refer earlier to KH 217; for the record I take it you mean KH215 “K” in each case.

“V force, get real”. I am uncertain what is the point of that remark. You are not thinking of big white bombers are you ? I was of course guessing as to the actual administrative arrangements at this time. During Japanese occupation, the Chins were almost entirely loyal to the British and the quasi-guerrilla V Force units provided the necessary contact with the empire. Although, as the XIV Army advanced into the plains, V Force units were meant to keep ahead of the advance, they were manned very largely by officers and auxiliaries acquainted with only the one locality. They stayed put and probably stood in while the peacetime administration was being restored.

That is the context in which the note in the F541 about the crash site of KH277 will have been made. I think it was always meant for F541 to be written and submitted quickly, so that real information was not lost through squadron untidiness. I infer that the report of the crash site came in quickly. That speaks of some admin link reaching into Kalemyo (as it was then) – if you do not like “V Force” you can guess for yourself what there was instead.

“ … not far from what was a large village”. In the Chin Hills, we are talking of fearsome terrain. If, as I suggest, this was a case of controlled flight into the terrain, then “not far” might be a few miles to the West and several thousand feet vertically in deep jungle. Nevertheless while our administration will have been very keen to recover and bury the aircrew, the locals will no doubt have been equally interested in spiriting away the containers. The wreckage could have been inspected if any of the visiting party was interested.

Conventional air radio might be bad in the Burma war, but HF contact would make up for that, as we found in Malaya in my time on Canberras. I assumed that HF would be standard in B-24s and only wondered whether aircraft transmissions were discouraged or even forbidden for security reasons.

By the way I note from Wikipedia that the USAAF had B-24s operating out of China from March 1944.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

It happens. A RAF Spitfire shot down a C-54 believing it to be a Condor.


And in an autobiography I read a while back, the author (flying a Spitfire) described opening fire on a Hurricane with drop tanks which he had mistaken for a German floatplane. If he was happy to admit to that publicly, imagine other recce cock-ups which were buried!

And the circumstantial evidence of missing USAAF records doesn't prove deliberate intent - it could equally be embarrassment at an inadvertent error by the P-61 crew. Barring a deathbed confession, we will never know the exact facts.

[FlightlessParrot]

Quote:
Your clausal verb should be in the imperfect subjunctive tense.
Qué? Sorry.

I'm not sure about "clausal verb" but he means you should have written "Were I to be flying ...." This is actually a rather interesting question of appropriate grammar for different stylistic registers: if you had written "If I was flying ..." I would have thought "correcting" it to "were" would be pretty hyper. On the other hand, since you used the highly formal, nay, archaic, inversion, then the formal. nay, archaic, use of the subjunctive is pretty much required.

Obviously this is not ARRSE, since there are no swears. </pedant>

[rlsbutler]

Clean32: further to my #30.

As to the location references, I forgot to mention my belief (which might be fact) that grid mapping has always been denoted by Eastings followed by Northings, while Lat/Long is always Northings followed by Eastings. I am virtually certain, on this count, that the turning points in the F541 were in Lat/Long.

[clean32]

Clean32 #27:

That is the context in which the note in the F541 about the crash site of KH277 will have been made. I think it was always meant for F541 to be written and submitted quickly, so that real information was not lost through squadron untidiness. I infer that the report of the crash site came in quickly. That speaks of some admin link reaching into Kalemyo (as it was then) – if you do not like “V Force” you can guess for yourself what there was instead.

.

you raised a good point, actualy two good points. Timing of information.

Form 540 is the form filled out on the day, and i understand there was quite a bit of pressure in place to make this happen.

Form 541 was a summary of the months activities, i understand that in practice the form 540 keeped by the squadron had hand written notes of any late arriving information. this was just all typed up verbatum and the end of the month +10 days before being sent off.

now having said all that. form 541 would show the recovery of aircrew at a latter date one would assume. in this case not so.

so who did recover the air crews. two aircrews interned in different places suggests that they were recovered at different times?? i know 277 was re interned. ??

[clean32]

Clean32 #27: I cheerfully acknowledge your greater acquaintance with this material.

Quite right about F541 - sorry to persist with the mistake. I found it on a 358 Sqn site where it is easier to read than in your transcription at thread #12.

I would not have known that the locations were grid rather than Lat/Long – I would be interested to have a link to something that decodes the grids we are discussing. I have plotted each of the locations as Lat/Long and note that the last location before “DZ” seems in each case to be exactly on the border of the then Indo-China. I would have thought that agents already planted would be nearer to civilisation than that.

You say that the last location before “DZ” in the F541 record is the location of the DZ. How to explain that the routes, in the case of aircraft “G”, “A” and “X”, are recorded as such a location to the DZ and back to the same location ?

.

As i understand it and as it has been explained to me by pilots and navigators of the day. mainly a radio/gunner/navigator RNZAF 25 squadron SPDs. that a hunk of the globe was IRONED flat and longitude and latitude was straightened out. this left you with a distorted map but more accurate for the range and distance for the day. so if you plot longitude and latitude on a normal map you may be close or a bit off. have to try it to see. But your question about converting got me to googling. so you learn something everyday. that europe plotting grid system seems to be something else again?

as for the DZs you have northen thailand just north of chong mek in the horse shoe. next is north of that again on the Lao Chinese border the third where no aircraft returned from (3) is just east of what is now Hanoi.
all DZ were in Japanese hands at that time. all 3 Dzs are close to transport or population centers

[Heathrow Harry]

Clean - don't open up the can of worms that is long/lat conversions to grids - this whole forum isn't big enough

Let's just say there are many many ways a conversion can go wrong

Also be very very careful about assumptions - in most of the world grid refs are East then North - but in Romania it's often the other way round for example

I know for a fact that there are very large differences in WW2 mapping systems especially between the Japanese maps (based on Tokyo) and the US Army maps (based on Sydney) and then you throw in the good and not-so-good local mapping ................ chaos

[clean32]

Clean - don't open up the can of worms that is long/lat conversions to grids - this whole forum isn't big enough

Let's just say there are many many ways a conversion can go wrong

Also be very very careful about assumptions - in most of the world grid refs are East then North - but in Romania it's often the other way round for example

I know for a fact that there are very large differences in WW2 mapping systems especially between the Japanese maps (based on Tokyo) and the US Army maps (based on Sydney) and then you throw in the good and not-so-good local mapping ................ chaos

UMM your comments appear to be correct. the more i look the more confusing it gets. different theaters different allies all had different systems at different times and places. or so it appears.
i wish i could get my hands on more information. there was a book " picture scrapbook" written by a Corsair RNZAF pilot who came though the empire training program ( IE canada) but then came back to the pacific. i remember the comments in that book about navigation and the different and ineffective way the americans went about things regarding maps and plotting.