Bristow S76 Ditched in Nigeria today Feb 3 2016 [Archive] - Page 2

MamaPut

21st Feb 2016, 23:52

Good Vibs
This happened many years ago with a 212.
The "other" rig was very close to the Calabar field.
Visibility was very poor and the other rig was the sister rig to the one they wanted to fly to, which was also nearby.
I think once on the deck the crew noticed the name....woops!
They discussed the mistake with the rig and departed after all were happy.
If I remember correctly the crew immediately notified Lagos BHL of the mistake.
No it wasn't many years ago, the visibility wasn't very poor and the aircraft was a B412. I thought part of the finals checks in any company are to positively identify the landing area before landing and with 2 crew it's surely not rocket science :ugh:
Were the Equatorial Guineans informed of an incursion into their territorial waters by an aircraft with no flight plan, no overflight clearance and no landing clearance?

Were the results ever published of the reasons for a Bristow AS332 landing on the wrong rig with a training captain in command?

Have the results ever been published of the PAAN Bell 412 which never returned from a night call-out (at a time when PAAN was part of Bristow?

RyRy

22nd Feb 2016, 02:20

"Were the Equatorial Guineans informed of an incursion into their territorial waters by an aircraft with no flight plan, no overflight clearance and no landing clearance?"

Obiang probably shat himself thinking that Nigeria had attempted to commandeer the rig lol

pilonrock

22nd Feb 2016, 02:46

Totally true ! There is very little value in flying around in a straight line everyday . If BHNL really wanted to improve the quality of Nigerian commanders they would insist on several thousand hrs of turbine single engine command time! Hold on what about Escravos? What a perfect place to get every one who progresses into the 76 or larger the "pucker factor" experience they need, so they don't freak out when a Chanel craps the bed ! Might slow down the nationalization program a bit but it's about flight safety isn't it ?

They may even learn skills like hands on flying!! Wow would that be big! Odd how all these Nigerian commanders aren't leaving BHNL and doing aerial construction on the 64 or real helicopter work that requires a skill set. You can make more money after all!

Nothing to do with flight safety I'm afraid everything to do with
saving face me thinks!

This external audit business will in all likely hood be done by a Nigerian company - few paper envelopes for the boys and nothing will evolve.

Taking bets!

EESDL

22nd Feb 2016, 07:15

Annex 13 is very clear on the reporting and investigation requirements of an operator and the State of registration.
They are only guidelines but any differences/non-compliances must be submitted to ICAO for dissemination.
I wonder when the last time a non-Nigerian ICAO audit was carried out?:=

ersa

22nd Feb 2016, 07:23

its been happening for a while sacking expats and putting on local crew with dire consequences.

HeliComparator

22nd Feb 2016, 09:53

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

22nd Feb 2016, 12:07

HC,

:D:D:D:D:D:D

Lots of cliches come to mind (People in glass houses etc, There but for the Grace of etc)

NEO

pilonrock

22nd Feb 2016, 13:32

If this was say a UK crew, and the sort of comments we are reading on here were in the UK press, there would be outrage on here along the lines of not speculating about the cause and blame for an accident before the proper story was known. But it seems that if you are Nigerian you are guilty by default on here.

Maybe there was crew error, maybe not, but at this stage we don't know so why not cut the crew a bit of slack as we would do if they were white?

The unfortunate truth is hard to swallow I'm afraid ! Say did you hear that NATO has recommended that all future advance training of 2 of its tactical helicopter squadrons deployed in Easter Europe should only be trained by Nigerian military pilots ( probably due to the superior training they receive)

If you cannot fly a circuit with the AP off on a 76 you should not fly the 76.

Bahhh

RyRy

22nd Feb 2016, 14:38

Yeah, this forum never sees white male pilots getting publicly skewered for a stupid mistake that may or may not have killed them and everyone on board.

gulliBell

22nd Feb 2016, 20:27

@RyRy: you're wrong. That white male pilot who flew into a crane in bad weather in London a couple of years ago got publicly skewered here pretty good. If I recall. For example.

Copterline 103

22nd Feb 2016, 22:16

NCAA Orders Immediate Safety Inspections On Sikorsky S76C Helicopters

By Samson Echenim (http://leadership.ng/reporter/by-samson-echenim/)
— Feb 22, 2016 4:28 am The Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) has ordered all airlines operating the Sikorsky S76C series to carry out safety inspections on the helicopter type with immediate effect.
The directive came two weeks after the aviation regulatory agency suspended operation of the Sikorsky S76C++ in the country, following two crashes within an interval of only six months and involving same type of helicopter operated by Bristow Helicopter Services in Nigeria.
The NCAA yesterday said as an interim safety measure, the under-listed safety inspections affects all Sikorsky S76C series helicopters operating in Nigeria.
They include Visual Inspection in accordance with relevant S76C AMM 20-32-00; detailed inspection in accordance with relevant S76C AMM 66-00-00 and detailed inspection in accordance with relevant S76C AMM 66-10-00, 66-20-00, 66-30-00, 66-40-00.

“The Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) wants to reiterate that it will not leave any stone unturned to ensure that air transport is safe and secure in Nigeria,” the NCAA noted in the statement signed by its general manager, Public Affairs, Mr Sam Adurogboye"

What these inspections are? Can this be a lead where the root case actually is?

212man

23rd Feb 2016, 07:34

@RyRy: you're wrong. That white male pilot who flew into a crane in bad weather in London a couple of years ago got publicly skewered here pretty good. If I recall. For example.

I may be wrong, but I suspect RyRy was being facetious.....:ugh:

Greeny9

23rd Feb 2016, 08:03

Chapter 66 is normally the blade folding system but maybe different on Sikorskys as I recall their AMM's being very different to 'proper' ones!

twisted wrench

23rd Feb 2016, 08:16

Chapter 66 for the Sikorsky S76 is the Powertrain, main gear box, intermediate and tail gear box , tail rotor drive shafts, rotor brake system, electrical system for the gear boxes ( chip detectors, pressure , temp, warning sensors on the main gear box).

From what I understand the authorities want an enhanced inspection of the flight controls and drivetrain.

Reading between the lines they are not sure what happened and want the aircraft critical systems inspected until they figure it out.

Copterline 103

23rd Feb 2016, 09:50

From what I understand the authorities want an enhanced inspection of the flight controls and drivetrain.

Reading between the lines they are not sure what happened and want the aircraft critical systems inspected until they figure it out.

It is interesting to know how these State of the Art offshore helicopter companies are addressing this risk on their Safety Management System? The risk, an accident that seems to repeat, and associated loss of controllability of the helicopter?

This risk should be taken account in Safety Management System that "S76 could lost its controllability and will come unflyable". This is a Safety risk and predicted probability and severity must be evaluated. If the consequence is the most likely the fatal and probability x time per 1.000.000 flight hours then the outcome will be "RED RISK". The question after this is: how this risk can be mitigated? At the moment I can't see any possibility to mitigate this risk if these aircrafts will be flying?

This will not be limited for SMS/Safety Manager this will be also the matter of TC holder's. What is the TC's holders should create emergency instructions for safe recovery of aircraft in the event where a S76 will lose its controllability and helicopter steering will come illogical?

At least S76 accidents in 1986 in Sutton (4 kills) , 10th of August 2005 Copterline (14 kills) , August 12 Bristow Nigeria (6 kills) and 3 February 2016 (no causalities).

The available information about the last 3rd of February, 2016 accident is supporting assumption that all of these accidents are related loss of helicopter controllability. This is a serious situation and not acceptable that helicopter has a risk to come suddenly unflyable without any warning or any cautions. We are talking about a helicopter which is certified under requirements of Transport Category Helicopter.

This will be the matter what Safety Mangers who are responsible for S76 operations should take account.

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 10:30

@ Copterline 103: I think each of those S76 accidents mentioned were unique of themselves. Except for 3 February which we only have to speculate on, but fair chance I reckon it will be unique of itself also.

If a MR blade comes off in flight, dual servo actuator failure, flight control rod coming undone, all those things will result in the loss of the aircraft. Each of which has only happened once in the whole fleet since it first went into service over 35 years ago (as far as I know). Unfortunately for the crews concerned it happened to them, and there was nothing they could do to prevent the outcome.

Not just the S76. AW139 has had tail booms fall off, and TR blades depart the scene in-flight. It can happen to any aircraft. Sometimes bad luck strikes, when crossing the road, flying helicopters, and anything else we might do in life.

212man

23rd Feb 2016, 10:40

If a MR blade comes off in flight

only happened once in the whole fleet

It depends if you include G-BJVX (https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aar-1-2005-sikorsky-s-76a-g-bjvx-16-july-2002) although I agree with you that each one is unique and cannot be grouped into one 'risk'.

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 11:24

The S76 is a safe aircraft. Esso has been operating them in Australia putting 10,000 hours per year onto their fleet for 35 years. They haven't lost a single aircraft, not even put one in the water. And before that, Bell 212 and B412. And before that, Bell 205 and Bell 47. 46 years total operating in the Bass Strait oilfields, with weather similar to the North Sea, not a single accident. Offshore helicopter flying can be a safe endeavour with the right people and the right systems in place.

Copterline 103

23rd Feb 2016, 11:37

only happened once in the whole fleet

This for sure if that only happen once in the whole fleet. But if you consider all accidnents and also all incidents reported and unreported the the case could be different.

If these kind of identified risks will be e.g. in automotive industry the reactions and the actions will be different. I have been earlier naive that in the aviation the safety is always the first.

I'm counting on the NCAA and Nigerian AIB that they will dig it out what is the root case. My tip is to condider the Mixing Units design "it really mixing the helicopter's controllability if any malfuntions happen in the helicopters's flight controls system".

More than 700 units of S76 still flying and the most likely this 3rd February, 2016 accident is not the last one (related the loss of helicopter controllability). I hope that I'm wrong.

Troglodita

23rd Feb 2016, 11:51

Copterline,

Are you always so cheerful?

Trog

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 12:07

The mixing unit on the S76 is the most ingenious component on the whole aircraft. It was designed by a guy using a slide rule. There is no way Sikorsky will change the design of the mixing unit. No way.

Revolutionary

23rd Feb 2016, 12:38

And why would they? It may be complex but it works just fine.

212man

23rd Feb 2016, 14:24

The mixing unit on the S76 is the most ingenious component on the whole aircraft. It was designed by a guy using a slide rule

The tale I heard (I assume apocryphal, but maybe true!) was that he ended up in an asylum afterwards!

ScotiaQ

23rd Feb 2016, 15:09

I hear that was after he'd looked at the mixing system on the Westland WG30, which was amazing.

S.76 still a very safe aircraft though. Accidents occasionally happen, sad but true.

Sq

albatross

23rd Feb 2016, 15:17

Heard the same tale!
After looking at the one in FSI WPB for a long, long time I concluded he was already in the asylum when he designed it!

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 16:15

...he is now in the cemetery, unfortunately. I recall Nick Lappos pay tribute to him on the forum here a few years ago.

Anyway, my point being, anybody who comes on here and suggests the mixing unit might need to be re-designed might not know the S76 very well. What is the proposed alternative, rip out all the mechanical stuff and replace it with a fly-by-wire computer? I hope not, everybody enjoys those before and after mixing unit jam malfunctions in the simulator! Makes for hours and hours of interesting observations when I'm teaching the stuff.

Remember. Jam after the mixing unit, control inputs have no effect on tail rotor control, expect pedal inputs to cause movement of the collective. Jam before the mixing unit, you still have collective yaw coupling control (tail rotor pitch changes normally with collective movement). With either of these jam malfunction you can still safely land the aircraft, preferrably on a nice long runway, but certainly do not attempt a landing on the water. This causes a lot of confusion. I don't know why.

p.s. I'm not speculating this crew had this malfunction.

Copterline 103

23rd Feb 2016, 20:16

Anyway, my point being, anybody who comes on here and suggests the mixing unit might need to be re-designed might not know the S76 very well.
SIK, NTSB and FAA has used GENHEL flight control simulator to simulate consequences in different scenarios. In addition they have had in use EASYY5/Adams Simulation software.

Accident investigators (Copterline 103) have had a possibility to follow these tests and also they had chance to make a simulated blockage (blocking pin) to the flight control system of the GENHEL. The immediate reaction of a blockage or a partial blockage has made pilot's flight control inputs to be illogical (pushing the control stick forward and helicopter is banking to the left, making the control stick move to the right the helicopter is pitching down....).

The certification requirements insist that the critical systems or components must be redundant systems or fail safe components. This could be an issue?

The S76B Sutton, 1986, Copterline 2005, Bristow 2015 has had similarities. Helicopters have come suddenly, without any warnings or cautions unflyable and each of these has had lateral spin to the right (collective up position and right pedal down due to Mixing Units mechanical couplings to compensate pilots work load for coordinated flight). All of these three cases have so quick and so confusing cases that none of these three accidents crew has not been able to make MAYDAY call...

It looks like the latest accident in Nigeria has had difficulties of helicopter's controllability? The NCAA together with Nigerian AIB will find out what is the root case for this accident. For sure something has went wrong, wrong badly but not deadly in this last case!

[email protected]

23rd Feb 2016, 20:39

Sudden uncontrollability doesn't seem to fit the description of what happened in this case - they made a safe and controlled ditching (water landing) - the question is - did they need to or not?

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 21:54

MamaPut

23rd Feb 2016, 22:11

The landing was captured on cockpit video

Since when has the S76 been fitted with a cockpit video?

HeliComparator

23rd Feb 2016, 22:53

Since when has the S76 been fitted with a cockpit video?

Off the top of my head, ever since Sikorsky sold the S76C++ into the European market with non-compliant FDR. Not noticed on purchase since the people signing the contract didn't have much idea about the technicalities of aviation in Europe and didn't ask anyone who did.

AIUI the camera is just looking at the screens to observe the additional FDR parameters required by glass cockpit helicopters as a substitute (temporary?) for the missing FDR parameters relating to autopilot modes etc. Not sure it would show much about a water landing.

MamaPut

23rd Feb 2016, 23:15

HC,
You obviously don't know much about FDM in helicopters in Nigeria. The system you are referring to is the Appareo Vision 1000, which was never fitted to the S76 fleet in Nigeria and anyway is not just applicable to glass cockpit helicopters. The camera also is only used to monitor instruments and in quite a number of cases in different operations has been blanked off by pilots hanging their hats over the camera, or simply opening the unit and removing the SD card. A number of the older S76s were retrofitted with the Appareo ALERTS (Aircraft Logging And Event Recording for Training and Safety) system (the same as that fitted to the PAAN B206 and 407s), but this has no camera and is capable of recording a very limited 14 parameters.

HeliComparator

23rd Feb 2016, 23:28

I think there are 2 seperate things here, a fudge for the failure of the FDR to meet EASA additional requirements for FDR, and some kit for FDM. As you say though, I don't know what is fitted in Nigeria. For the record I am against cameras for FDM.

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 23:30

It was reported by Nigeria AIB that 3 devices were sent to the UK for assistance with the investigation, the FDR, CVR, and Cockpit video. I've never seen a cockpit video recorder in the S76, I have no idea what it points at. But the accident aircraft had one apparently.

RyRy

23rd Feb 2016, 23:32

...my thoughts, exactly.

Is the UK AAIB likely to release any information publicly, or must they only submit to Nigeria AIB under investigating protocols?

The landing was captured on cockpit video, I'd like to see that, I've never seen a live water landing before. BHNL, knowing far more than we do, must have formed the opinion the crew performed admirably as they "...remain a valued member of the team". Has an S76 crew ever done a successful controlled water landing in response to an in-flight emergency before? I can't think of any.

Was one a few years back in Canada. An A model being flown single pilot and without pax lost a stove on short final to a small floating pad. Pilot blew the floats and landed safe and sound in the water.

Unfortunately while being towed to shore later on, a main gear door (I think) poked a hole in one of the bags, and the machine went belly-up.

At least that's the story I was told.

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2016, 23:52

Lucky then for the operator it turned turtle...I would think it's a much better option to collect the insurance payout on a write-off rather than be left with a repair to an aircraft that's been sitting in salt water.

I'm surprised an empty A-model would have a performance issue with an engine failure after LDP and not making it on the intended landing spot.

gulliBell

24th Feb 2016, 00:06

Interesting that we're now 3 weeks past the event, and with 15 pages of posts on this thread we are still totally under speculation mode. The August 2015 accident after about this same period of elapsed time they were pretty sure what caused it and the Emergency AD was going out.

RyRy

24th Feb 2016, 01:34

With Bristow in Nigeria grounded... who's picking up the slack?

gulliBell

24th Feb 2016, 02:33

Maybe they've gone back to operating 212's? Obviously a much safer aircraft and more popular with the customers than a C++ :p

And it would make economic sense also, much cheaper to operate than a C++, and cheaper to replace should an unfortunate accident occur :}

MamaPut

24th Feb 2016, 08:20

Maybe they've gone back to operating 212's?
The last Bristow 212 left Nigeria many, many years ago ;)

terminus mos

24th Feb 2016, 08:24

Gulli

Interesting that we're now 3 weeks past the event, and with 15 pages of posts on this thread we are still totally under speculation mode. The August 2015 accident after about this same period of elapsed time they were pretty sure what caused it and the Emergency AD was going out.

II had the reason for the ditching in post #196. Investigators are looking for the possibility of a possible chafed wire which may have caused the Autopilot issue.

According to information, the same autopilot issue was evident outbound but the crew landed on the rig without a problem and attempted to troubleshoot Then after departure when the issue came up again decided to ditch.

212man

24th Feb 2016, 08:44

The latest Sikorsky All Operators Letter includes these paragraphs, which tend to support TM and II's comments:

It is the responsibility of the flight crew to continuously monitor all flight and navigation instruments to ensure that the aircraft is on its intended flight path and operating within the approved flight envelope at all times, with or without AFCS engaged. The flight crew has 100% control authority over the AFCS system at all times. All AFCS failure modes can be overridden by the pilot. At any time the pilot can deselect some or all of the autopilot features by depressing the panel switches (Coupled, Trim, SAS, etc.) and can manually fly the aircraft with full control authority. The aircraft is approved for VFR flight throughout the envelope with all autopilot, stability and trim functions selected off.

Investigation of S-76C serial no. 760780 September 2012 (Humberside Airport) incident identified that an electrical short had occurred in a wiring harness located in the cabin overhead area. Subsequent to this finding, the operating company issued a fleet-wide technical directive to inspect the wiring harness for signs of damage and to take corrective action where appropriate.

lowfat

24th Feb 2016, 09:11

didn't all the BRS GOM reject 76Ds get sent too nigeria?

gulliBell

24th Feb 2016, 10:09

@212Man: Nothing mentioned in that 1st Sikorsky All Operators Letter quote that isn't already taught in S76 initial ground school 101. As I think we all know.

[email protected]

24th Feb 2016, 14:26

Still waiting to see some evidence that warrants putting the aircraft into the water.........

212man

24th Feb 2016, 14:50

Still waiting to see some evidence that warrants putting the aircraft into the water.........

I doubt there is any!

ersa

26th Feb 2016, 17:03

NAPIMS Terminates Bristow Helicopter Services Contracts, Articles | THISDAY LIVE (http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/napims-terminates-bristow-helicopter-services-contracts/233027/)

The National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), a subsidiary of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has terminated all Bristow helicopter services contracts with its joint partners.

This followed the accident involving Sikorsky helicopter with registration 5B-BJQ owned and operated by Bristow Helicopters Limited on February 3, 2016, which led to the suspension of the aircraft type in the fleet of the company by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA).

In a letter written to the Managing Director, Total Upstream Nigeria Limited, dated February 14, 2016, obtained by THISDAY, NAPIMS wrote: “Barely six (6) months after a helicopter belonging to Bristow Helicopter crashed in August 12, 2015 killing a number of persons, another Bristow helicopter, a Sikorsky S76C++ with registration 5N-BOJ that departed Erha Platform enroute Lagos ditched into the Atlantic Ocean on February 3, 2016 with eleven (11) persons including two (2) crew members narrowly escaped death.”

The letter, which was signed by Group General Manager, Dafe S. Sejebor said NAPIMS noted that these accidents bring to question Bristow’s safety standards, “inspection programmes and frequency of maintenance, which has culminated in Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority suspending indefinitely Bristow’s Sikorsky S76++ from further operations in Nigeria.’

NAPIMS therefore declared: “Accordingly, all JV/PSC companies are hereby directed to terminate all aviation contracts awarded to Bristow Helicopters in accordance with the provisions of the aviation contracts. Bristow Helicopters may be allowed to participate in bids and operate in Nigeria upstream oil and gas only after a thorough and satisfactory safety audit has been carried out and all observed lapses adequately addressed,” the letter with reference number, NAP/GGM/02.04 said.

“You are hereby requested to invite the next lowest bidders in all tenders that Bristow won for price negotiations and facilities inspection with full NAPIMS participation in order to take the remaining scopes of the contracts presently being run by Bristow, the company told Total.

On February 21, 2016, NCAA issued a statement giving further directives and ordered all airlines operating the Sikorsky S76C ++ series to carry out a safety inspection on this helicopter type with immediate effect.

“The authority must immediately be provided with evidence of accomplishment of this directive. This action is in addition to the suspension of Bristow Helicopters operations of S-76 C ++ series and the ongoing audit. It is pertinent to point out that this directive is without prejudice to the ongoing investigation by the Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB)‎ which the Authority is fully supporting,” NCAA said.

:D Target Zero = Zero jobs

RyRy

26th Feb 2016, 18:03

Holy crap. So how many Bristow S76's just got benched?

albatross

26th Feb 2016, 18:21

Is it only 76s or all Bristow machines?

gulliBell

26th Feb 2016, 19:29

Presumably they meant invite the next highest bidder, as opposed to the next lowest bidder. Assuming of course that Bristow got the contract as the lowest bidder.

I do have time for Total. They are the only company who I've seen send representatives to witness their contract crews undergo annual recurrencey training. Which is a good thing.

The change-over of service providers will obviously need some lead time to manage. In the meantime, who is doing the work?

RyRy

26th Feb 2016, 20:00

If it wouldn't be an absolute nightmare with EG Customs, a lot of those rigs could be serviced from Malabo.

Bummer.

tgvbhy15

26th Feb 2016, 20:14

I guess Bristow is begining to reap the benefits of its nationalization program.
Where is the hero captain now? While more expats will surely lose their jobs, she will no doubt come out of this one a lot higher than she was just before the accident

TIMTS

26th Feb 2016, 21:50

I see the post of it possibly being an electrical fire disappeared?

Maybe it hit to close to what really happened?

If it was electrical fire, and pulling CBs and turning off Gens etc, didn't put it out a ditching might have been warranted. Would tie in more with Bristow being sidelined due to maintenance issues, rather than the crew making an unwarranted ditching.

Somebody knows, and somebody has been told to stay quiet...

gulliBell

26th Feb 2016, 22:07

Trim actuators being inspected by the manufacturer - that is what was said- no previous mention of electrical fire.

No more of this push button flying rubbish, bring back the 212!

fadecdegraded

27th Feb 2016, 03:26

Trim actuators being inspected by the manufacturer - that is what was said- no previous mention of electrical fire.

No more of this push button flying rubbish, bring back the 212!

Bring back the 212, we are still using them

gulliBell

27th Feb 2016, 03:55

Bristow could call their bluff and say they are pulling all their assets out of Nigeria and thus leave all their National staff without a job. It would be interesting to see how that scenario would play out.

I think crews who entirety of experience consists mostly of pushing buttons to get from A to B are likely underprepared when the button pushing works no more. Which is why spending time in a real helicopter like a 212 is worthwhile at enhancing airmanship and other skills. And take away the GPS as well, give them a map to read, a heading to fly, and a time to keep.

megan

27th Feb 2016, 06:11

You are hereby requested to invite the next lowest bidders in all tenders that Bristow won for price negotiationsGo for the next lowest bidder? A sure fire way to increase safety.

It's a pity there is no easily accessible central repository for incident reports. I've spent some time trying to track down an incident report I submitted to our authorities, so long ago I forget the precise details, but involved the cyclic constantly flailing about the cockpit during climb following take off in an A model. Turned off both SCAS and returned home, as problem existed in both channels. Don't recall the problem source, although our FOI at the time expressed some doubt as to whether the aircraft deserved IFR certification with such a single point failure (whatever it was - old age is a bugger).

tistisnot

27th Feb 2016, 07:19

Why seemingly assume a more competitive price is less safe? Perhaps they'd already erred on the high side?!

GoodGrief

27th Feb 2016, 14:31

OAS has been prepping for the last two years...

gulliBell

27th Feb 2016, 22:27

...but OAS don't have any helicopters on their books that would be suitable for the role. They'd need to JV with a bigger International player.

pilonrock

27th Feb 2016, 22:51

That didn't take long.....here starts the fall from grace-( probably more like a long fall of a very high cliff)

Step 1.

Hire some management who have some experience running helicopter operations- OUTSIDE NIGERIA. Give full autonomy to implement tried and true safety practices that are used outside Nigeria.

Step 2

Beg forgiveness from all the extremely capable expats that were sent packing. Get the experience back!!

Rename target zero- TARGET SAFETY.

Hire based on skill, experience and determination, make it mandatory that all Captains have some real industry experience.( other than flying in a straight line) Minimum 2000 hrs turbine before seeing a multi engine A/C.

Set the standards not follow them.

Its a good day for the future of aviation safety in Nigeria.

I hope!

soggyboxers

28th Feb 2016, 00:30

Despite all the naysayers and doom merchants, it seems that Bristow are still flying :ok:

All of the senior management in Nigeria have experience of running operations outside Nigeria (and anyway are closely monitored by managers in Houston.

Sadly I agree that some of the experienced expats who were sent packing should not have been. This seems to have been due to politics rather than ability :confused:

Target zero actually is a great concept, but needs to have more than lip service paid to it, it needs to be given teeth and the highest office in safety should be at least equivalent of that in operations and directly responsible to the CEO.

Hiring of expats always was (in my day) based on skill and relevant experience.

Bristow always used to set the standards and I hope, will in the future. They were not my favourite company after the 'old man' left, but are still one of the leaders in the industry, though I believe, (although commercially more successful than ever) lacking in Alan's buccaneering spirit because of the rise of bean counters, human remains corpses, PCers and generally non-aviation people. No, I don't want to return to the 20th century. Of course automation, safety, monitoring have a part to play, but so do some too the old-fashioned values. Pilots should first and foremost be pilots, capable of flying a basic helicopter, but they also need to be systems managers who have an in-depth understanding of all the systems in the complex machines they fly and how to analyse and cope with malfunctions. It's no good talking of flying the 212 for 100 years. I flew the 212 and it's one of my favourite helicopters ever, but it's almost as old as I am, and I am willing to accept and embrace change for the better. What is really needed is for oil company managers of my (already gone) generation to accept that the training for 21st century helicopters requires a lot more ground, simulator and aircraft training time. This applies to O&G senior managers even more as they ultimately set the limits on budgets for training and safety for the companies dependant on them for their livelihood.

megan

28th Feb 2016, 03:24

Why seemingly assume a more competitive price is less safe? Perhaps they'd already erred on the high side?!Asking only those who originally tendered lower sends a bad message. Why not an open tender, where those who tendered higher than Bristow get a look in?

I'm reminded of a story where an operator lost the bid, to be replaced by a contractor using 76s. The contractor found the 76 wasn't up to the task, and pilots were directed to use the transient limits in an endeavour to achieve what the tender had promised.

tistisnot

28th Feb 2016, 08:56

Because, if they are serious in their statement and empowered to do so, speed would probably be essential - those from the previous tender should all have passed safety audits prior to pricing (another tender process might take too long) - we are in a state of economic crisis with the oil price ....... seems fairly logical to me!!

gulliBell

28th Feb 2016, 10:09

So the wording of the letter was correct, Bristow was not the cheapest option, there were others who came in with a lower bid? And now they are forgoing the more expensive option for a cheaper option? Did I understand this correctly?

Anyway. Whatever they want to do. It's their train set, this little white duck has nothing to do with it. I just want to know what happened and how this convinced the crew to put it in the water. Perhaps I can learn something from it and pass knowledge on to my trainees, whether good or bad.

GoodGrief

28th Feb 2016, 12:24

A little bird tells me the crew experienced a complete electrical failure. No more instruments.Nothing. Just running engines...

terminus mos

28th Feb 2016, 13:50

A little bird tells me the crew experienced a complete electrical failure.You need to find a more reliable bird because that one is wildly inaccurate

Copterline 103

28th Feb 2016, 14:23

A little bird tells me the crew experienced a complete electrical failure.You need to find a more reliable bird because that one is wildly inaccurate

What about this area:"They include Visual Inspection in accordance with relevant S76C AMM 20-32-00; detailed inspection in accordance with relevant S76C AMM 66-00-00 and detailed inspection in accordance with relevant S76C AMM 66-10-00, 66-20-00, 66-30-00, 66-40-00."

gulliBell

28th Feb 2016, 17:13

If they had a complete electrical failure they wouldn't have been able to broadcast a mayday, which they did, and they wouldn't have been able to deploy the floats, which they did. And even if they did have a complete electrical failure, it can still fly no problem at all because you still have a magnetic compass and a clock to get you home.

Fareastdriver

28th Feb 2016, 18:37

you still have a magnetic compass and a clock to get you home

How do you engage those?

ericferret

28th Feb 2016, 18:46

The stick to seat interface unit acquires them manually?

tgvbhy15

28th Feb 2016, 19:12

It is obvious it was a crew related problem. If it had been some major problem with the S76, don't you think it would be in Bristow's interest to reveal it asap and perhaps sue Sikorsky. Bristow is a huge customer for them and if the recent accident was due to a major aircraft malfunction we would all know by now and Bristow would sue Sikorsky for damages. Big contracts being lost and 6 lives last august 2015. So, it was a big, huge, crew related cock-up and thus the stalling, the cover ups and the "yes we'll do an internal audit...but why just us and not the others too?"
Nationalization looks great on paper, it's just hard to explain to customers when their workers "narrowly escape death" and even harder when loosing contracts and the big bosses from Huston are calling for an explanation. Wait a minute! Wasn't nationalization Akin's big plan? Isn't he working in Houston now? Why don't they ask him? And ask him about the few mill that went missing too!

pilonrock

28th Feb 2016, 19:53

So they had an electrical failure!! So i guess they thought the engines would flame out?? Yes it must be those electrically driven engine fuel pumps!! or perhaps the igniters would stop working...???

Next time one of the national crews has a problem with the manifold bypass valve or a carburetor belt they should definitely ditch. anything could happen!!

Try pulling out a map and using your finger!!!!! and looking out the window, has been a tried and proven method of flying for better part of 100 years!!

......

Keke Napep

29th Feb 2016, 00:32

Nationalization looks great on paper, it's just hard to explain to customers when their workers "narrowly escape death" and even harder when loosing contracts and the big bosses from Huston are calling for an explanation. Wait a minute! Wasn't nationalization Akin's big plan? Isn't he working in Houston now? Why don't they ask him? And ask him about the few mill that went missing too!

Actually no, nationalisation wasn't Akin's big plan. It's Nigerian law and the Nigerian Content Monitoring Board requires all companies involved in the oil and gas industry to show what they're doing to replace non-Nigerians with Nigerians and make it very difficult for companies like Bristow to get work and residence permits for the likes of ungrateful expatriates like you.Every Managing Director of Bristow has had to work to expatriate quotas set by the Federal Government and make a case for employing numpties like you. It's one of the reasons that Bristow has been training Nigerian pilots abroad for many years in UK, SA and USA there being almost no facilities for doing so in Nigeria. Akin was being politic and trying to conform with government pressure to employ more locals in the company.

Yes Akin is working in Houston now. I guess Bristow would not have promoted him and sent him to a position there if there were any truth behind your libellous accusations about missing money. I'm amazed the moderators have allowed your libellous statements to remain on here when both you and PPruNe could (and should) be taken to court over them :yuk:

gulliBell

29th Feb 2016, 01:34

When @tgvbhy15 mentioned about a few mill went missing, I just assumed he meant a few Millers Extra Draught went missing off the bar tab. Clearly a minor oversight, just pass the hat around the bar to cover the shortfall. Nothing too libellous about that I would have thought.

As for any connection between the Nigerian nationalisation program and the accident rate. It doesn't worry me too much that Nigerian crews are having accidents in Nigerian registered helicopters in Nigerian Airspace with Nigerian passengers. It's their train set, if it turns into a train wreck occasionally then so be it. Problem belong them.

We don't see any Nigerian recurrent trainees in our simulator, perhaps we should. I've recently acquainted myself with the OGP requirements for helicopter pilots, particularly Appendix A5B. I've been flying offshore for 20+ years and no company I have ever worked for would accept these experience requirements for offshore Captain. A5B has come to me as a complete surprise. 4 years co-pilot only experience for progression to offshore Captain is a joke IMHO.

And 1000 PICUS is also a joke. ICUS should be about giving a guy some initial experience in a particular role, e.g. 10 hours ICUS on a new aircraft type before letting him/her flying PIC, or 10 hours ICUS in-country for the 1st time. 1000 PICUS is just fake PIC time and in my book worth diddly squat SFA. I'm very surprised it can all be used to get an ATPL.

pilonrock

29th Feb 2016, 02:36

gulliBell

29th Feb 2016, 02:54

Just to further extend my previous comments about ICUS.

I'm to understand the Captain of the accident aircraft was a recently minted PIC who came up through that folly ICUS upgrade process. Turn back the clock to when said Captain was a co-pilot undergoing 1000 hours ICUS. I know this is crystal ball gazing a bit, but do you think if faced with the same circumstances which resulted in the ditching, do you think the real Captain would be making the decision to ditch, or the pretend Captain who is really a co-pilot ICUS??

Would they have ended up floating on the big pond if it was an ICUS crew? Perhaps not. Perhaps so. Perhaps we'll never know. Perhaps this aspect is totally irrelevant. As per my usual caveat of ignorance I don't claim to know much about anything.

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 07:35

gulliBell your dinosaur scales are showing. As I mentioned earlier it is standard practice to gain offshore command with minimal P1 time. Including me and most of my colleagues. There is no benefit to droning around SPVFR for hundreds or thousands of hours, it is not relevant and in fact can be counter-productive. Your view makes me think you are one of those arrogant old gits that thinks the way they did things is the only right way. I suspect you are a right pain to fly with.

Presumably you also believe that airline pilots should have hundreds of hours droning around in a Cessna 152. And regardless of whether or not it would be of any benefit, it ain't going to happen so get over it.

fadecdegraded

29th Feb 2016, 08:12

HC, after reading some of your posts on this thread and others on this site I suspect it is Gits like you that probably could have benefited from a few thousand hrs of SPVFR, if you actually got that far.
It seems that just because you haven't got hundreds or thousands of SPVFR under your belt you may have a chip on your shoulder about it, and because you came through with minimal P1 that is the only way it should be done.
I would rather have someone up the front if I was a pax that can actually fly as opposed to someone that thinks hand flying IFR is to dangerous or reckless to do with pax onboard (as stated in a post of yours on another thread) than a button pusher that may
Run out of ideas the moment he/she runs out of buttons to push.
But unfortunately you are correct that in this day in age all pilots are going to be like you and come through there respective training and command programs with minimal exposure to anything that is outside there scope of operations and it will be tough luck for all on board when something outside the box happens.

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 08:46

Fd it's interesting how the "thousands of hours SPVFR is the only way to be a real man" comes from the antipodeans. I guess it matches the stereotype!

Anyway trading insults aside you are misquoting me to make your point, that being the easiest way to "score points" but also the most transparent.

I don't have thousands of hours SPVFR, however no chip about it. My way is not the only way, we had plenty in Bristow who did have lots of SPVFR, they were no better or worse as a group than those without. There were a few who were too entrenched in their SPVFR ways to accept such concepts as CRM/MCC and the optimum use of automation. They were problem pilots for the 99.999% of the time when such things were paramount, no doubt they could have been heroes for the 0.001% of the time when things went drastically wrong and they had to reveal their balls - but unluckily for them they never had the chance to show their caveman skills.

Of course there were also a few without lots of SPVFR who also "bumped along the bottom" and were problem pilots. C'est la vie.

The chip lies with those who think that loads of SPVFR is the solution to all ills. Which is clearly BS.

And yes I can hand fly, with or without the autopilot. However I know that in poor conditions the option with the greatest safety margin is to use the automation to its best capability. This is the safest way of doing things for the passengers, even if some are too stupid to realise it.

Your "dissing" of those who understand the advantages of automation merely reveals the depths of your own ignorance. Back to cattle mustering in an R22 for you!

EESDL

29th Feb 2016, 08:51

HC
Be careful dragging the airline brethren into this as it has been universally acknowledged that if certain pilots had obtained more 'stick n rudder' 152 flying then maybe they might have been able to recognise the symptoms of a stall or cope with flying a missed approach and a lot more passengers would still be alive today.
Technology is great but significant resources have to be spent training with it.
Such resources are traditionally allocated by pilots who are left to guesstimate how much training is deemed adequate.
History of O&G incidents indicate that such guess work has been woefully wide of the mark - possibly a factor of the industry determining what the CAA 'rubber stamps' rather than the other way around?
But that is another story.
I agree with you that it is quality not quantity that attend but invariably it is decision-making which lets the pilot down.
The more exposure to all forms of aviation the more experience to base such decisions on. It is as simple as that. Although in this day and age there is a tendency to think one can short-cut the route.
Consider the reduction of experience in airline cockpits now more and more skippers are flying with pilots qualified to touch the gear and do the radio.
A deliberate decision to fill seats with a 'button pusher' rather than someone the captain can trust to be able to fly the machine without an auto-pilot.
Maybe off-topic but let us not pretend that the deliberate dilution of experience requirements is anything to do with improving safety.
It is difficult for bean-counters to account for the experience whose value is only publically-demonstrated to shareholders on very few occasions.
High-time pilots have their foibles but I have experienced arrogant and over-confident low-time pilots who would be of little use once the button-pressing options were exhausted.
Equally, I have flown with some excellent low-time pilots - and by low-time I mean <5000-hrs total of onshore commercial/utility or <10,000-hrs tracking a radial offshore ;-)

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 09:05

EEDSL

Yes there seems to be a bit of a trend for airline pilots to be unable to actually fly! However one has to look at the big picture. Before button-pushing was invented, pilots had to have enormous balls and steely eyes, however despite that they still crashed quite a lot.

After button-pushing they now crash a lot less, but when they do crash it does sometimes seem to be due to a lack of basic skills. But as a passenger I don't particularly care if the cause of accidents has shifted slightly, what I do care about is that the probability of an accident has reduced substantially. It is only pilots who are offended when crashery occurs due to lack of basic flying skills, the flying public doesnt give a flying whatsit which bit of human error caused the crash, they just don't want to be in a crash.

Obviously the optimal solution is that pilots are maestros both of button pushing and also manual flying skills. But given that we don't live in a perfect world and we have limited training and experience building time, that time is best spent minimising the risk of an accident rather than satisfying the purist desires of the manualflightfascists. Most pilot-caused accidents or serious incidents that I am aware of in my (ex) company have at their roots lack of technical understanding, poor CRM and decision making. Not lack of basic flying skills.

Bottom line is that you have to direct the resources where they will have the most benefit. And if you are only going to recruit and promote those with thousands of SPVFR hours, you are going to be very limited and obliged to recruit the dross. That is not going to help flight safety.

EESDL

29th Feb 2016, 09:14

Agree - and the industry knows of experienced pilots who are not 'experienced' with 4-axis autopilots who would rather disconnect all the wizardry when the situation goes Pete Tong - with dire consequences.
However, experience does not care about the colour of ones skin but does care when scant regard is given to it.
We all know it comes down to ALARP - or what should be called 'As Low As what we can get away with without crashing too many times'

gulliBell

29th Feb 2016, 09:23

@HC: all I can say is the proof is in the pudding.

Having worked for the likes of Esso and Saudi Armco, which between them over the past 40+ years have had a grand total of one accident in about a million flight hours (which was a Saudi national crew at night many years ago), neither would ever accept a co-pilot to medium-PIC progression model based on co-pilot only + ICUS time. Aramco sponsored national pilots have to do their initial license, followed by years of co-pilot time, followed by a few years of single pilot light ship time, before they are even considered for PIC of a medium twin-offshore helicopter. And once they get to that stage, they have to do a limited ICUS program as the final step of their upgrade. This is the proper use of ICUS, 1000 hours ICUS is totally bollocks. And as for expats, the minimum for entry level co-pilot is 2000 hours PIC and 3500 hours total.

These standards produce results. I just remain sceptical that the Nigerian nationalisation scheme, as enshrined in the OGP Annex 5, produces a well-rounded offshore helicopter Captain.

Now in my role as a training Captain with a major international airline I see recurrent trainees with ATP licences that do such hair-brain stuff in the simulator it leaves me totally bewildered sometimes. To the extent that I seriously wonder how they ever got a PPL let alone ATP. I don't get frustrated by it any more, I'm happy if the trainees manage to get on the right page of the ECL. Whether they can carry out what's written in the ECL is an entirely different matter.

We have a national cadet pilot program as well. Spoiled rich kids aren't typically selected. Prospective cadet pilots are hired based on a rigorous selection process, much like the military. Those selected attend basic flight training, then get a light jet type rating flown in a real aircraft, then they do their training course for their allocated RPT jet type, then they play second officer for a number of years. Then they play FO for many many years. Perhaps 15 to 20 years down the track they get a shot at command.

And my course mates who did 10 years military flying before earning a gig with an Airline as a FO, they have been flying FO for 15+ years and are now only coming to the top of the FO list for command upgrade. So that is 10 years military + 15 years civilian co-pilot flying before they get looked at for a command slot.

So this is my experience, for what it's worth.

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 09:37

Well my experience is that most offshore pilots have very limited SPVFR time. This is not going to change. So whether you are right or wrong, or (more likely) comparing apples with oranges, you are swimming against the tide and not being realistic. Let's say that the major operators did decide to agree with you and require all offshore pilots to have 1000s of SP hours before getting command, just exactly where are these people going to come from and even if they could be magicked up where is the evidence that, overall, they will be more competent in an airline-type offshore role?

It's all academic because it ain't going to happen. Thank heavens.

John Eacott

29th Feb 2016, 09:58

HC, I'm not sure where your experience is (although Aberdeen is listed as your domicile you no doubt have flown other than the NS?) but to choose to flay 'antipodeans' because not everyone agrees with you is a choice little insult in the midst of a Nigerian accident thread!

Without doubt the management of modern helicopters has changed enormously in the past 20 or so years, and system management has overtaken raw skills to achieve the company objective. But to denigrate those basic skills, especially in the manner that you have chosen in this thread, misses the point entirely.

Should it be found that the loss of the S76 was avoidable had greater basic flying skills been available then it is a valid and valuable issue to be discussed here.

tgvbhy15

29th Feb 2016, 10:22

Actually no, nationalisation wasn't Akin's big plan. It's Nigerian law and the Nigerian Content Monitoring Board requires all companies involved in the oil and gas industry to show what they're doing to replace non-Nigerians with Nigerians and make it very difficult for companies like Bristow to get work and residence permits for the likes of ungrateful expatriates like you.Every Managing Director of Bristow has had to work to expatriate quotas set by the Federal Government and make a case for employing numpties like you. It's one of the reasons that Bristow has been training Nigerian pilots abroad for many years in UK, SA and USA there being almost no facilities for doing so in Nigeria. Akin was being politic and trying to conform with government pressure to employ more locals in the company.

Yes Akin is working in Houston now. I guess Bristow would not have promoted him and sent him to a position there if there were any truth behind your libellous accusations about missing money. I'm amazed the moderators have allowed your libellous statements to remain on here when both you and PPruNe could (and should) be taken to court over them :yuk:

Aaaa truth hurts, doesn't it?
Who's libellous? Is that the name of your tribe's leader?
And what do I have to be grateful for? Being treated like a peace of s***t by my Nigerian bosses for being a white boy while my Nigerian colleague pilots get the favor treatment?
Or perhaps because after paying for my own training and many years experience (including single P and multi P) I was given a shot at Command? Just like my Nigerian pilot colleagues who after just 4 years from day 1 and after being rushed to a flight school to fly traffic patterns at night in a schwizer to fulfill the minimum ATPL requirents get promoted to Comand? All free of charge??
Or perhaps I should be grateful I still have a job while our ex HR director Femi was caught stealing, yet he was given 2 mill $ to go "quietly and peacefully"?
Or perhaps I should be grateful (like the passengers of BQJ) for ending up swimming in the ocean and not dead because the hero Captain managed to safely "land on water" a perfecly flyable helicopter. Jeez! After all these years I never knew you could LAND on water!!

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 10:36

John, it was just a jibe at the two manualflightfascists who happened to be antipodeans, one in particular who was insulting many pilots including myself. Don't take it to heart!

If you read my posts you will see that I did not denigrate manual flying skills, I merely said that they were not the be all and end all and actually, in the context of an airline-type offshore role, other aspects were a more important target for training when you consider that having gained your licence you are supposed to be able to fly, whereas you have had no practical training in MCC/CRM or automation.

As to this accident being down to a lack of manual flying skills that seems a most improbable cause to anyone except a manualflightfascist because AIUI they retained control of helicopter throughout and made a satisfactory landing on water with no significant injuries. To me that suggests that their manual flying skills were adequate. What may or may not have been an issue is their technical knowledge of the aircraft systems and ability to make the best decision when presented with a malfunction (but of course we don't actually know yet). What has that got to do with "manual flying skills"?

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 10:40

Aaaa truth hurts, doesn't it?
Who's libellous? Is that the name of your tribe's leader?
And what do I have to be grateful for? Being treated like a peace of s***t by my Nigerian bosses for being a white boy while my Nigerian colleague pilots get the favor treatment?
Or perhaps because after paying for my own training and many years experience (including single P and multi P) I was given a shot at Command? Just like my Nigerian pilot colleagues who after just 4 years from day 1 and after being rushed to a flight school to fly traffic patterns at night in a schwizer to fulfill the minimum ATPL requirents get promoted to Comand? All free of charge??
Or perhaps I should be grateful I still have a job while our ex HR director Femi was caught stealing, yet he was given 2 mill $ to go "quietly and peacefully"?
Or perhaps I should be grateful (like the passengers of BQJ) for ending up swimming in the ocean and not dead because the hero Captain managed to safely "land on water" a perfecly flyable helicopter. Jeez! After all these years I never knew you could LAND on water!!

Now that is some impressive CHIP! May I suggest that you consider getting a job elsewhere if your current one makes you so unhappy? Or perhaps no-one else will have you?

John Eacott

29th Feb 2016, 10:50

HC, I haven't referred to "manual flying skills", my comments were about "basic" skills and "basic" flying skills which (to me) incorporate the essentials of good decision making and a sound understanding of the aircraft that you are flying.

I'd also suggest that your overuse of deliberate insults about manualflightfascists could equally be used against you as an automatedflightfascist, and would be just as meaningless. Neither dogma adds to the debate, simply showing a base level of poor discussion skills.

gulliBell

29th Feb 2016, 10:58

I see ATP offshore helicopter pilots who, if you fail the GPS, get lost. And what's worse, they have no idea how to get found again. I've seen ATP offshore pilots, give them a minor technical malfunction in the traffic pattern, they get totally pre-occupied with it, lose SA and fly downwind for 15 miles, bust their ATC clearance, and eventually realise they are lost and have no idea how to get back to the 7000' long runway they took off from 10 minutes earlier. I've seen ATP offshore helicopter pilots fly 60 minutes out to a platform and then decide the wind is coming from the wrong direction so they can't land, and then fly 60 minutes back to the starting point.

And I've seen many ATP offshore helicopter pilots hit the GA button in a 76 at (or more often after) the DH in IMC on an OEI ILS approach, and the outcome is virtually certain from that point. Airspeed bleeds off, climb performance bleeds off, helicopter pitches up, then heads tail first towards the ground. They have a final big clue to help them out, the gear up warning audio comes on. What do you think they do most of the time? Nothing but cancel the audio, and then both crew thinking "what do I do now". Relying on the magic button to do all the work for them doesn't work in this flight critical situation, because it's not designed to do what they're asking it to do. The systems knowledge is just not there. These are the things I see in the simulator, if the same malfunction happened in real life do you think the outcome would be the same? Something is fundamentally wrong here with the training that they've undertaken to get to that point.

Of all the hair-brain things I've seen helicopter pilots do in the simulator, I've never seen a crew put a 76 in the water in response to an AFCS malfunction. With regards to a ditching decision for whatever reason, I don't remember a situation where a crew ditched a helicopter un-necessarily. The vast majority of bad decisions are made in continuing to fly when they should be ditching. So I would be staggered if it turned out this crew ditched un-neccessarily, because I just don't see this outcome in training.

I find the guys who've had some solid single pilot time, generally, can at least fly a compass heading if the GPS goes belly up, and they can read a map, and if they happen to find themselves temporarily geographically unaware they have the savvy to come up with a plan to get themselves found again. Because when you're flying alone you have to be able to do all this by yourself. This is the sort of airmanship and skill sets that builds a solid foundation for the button pushing offshore airline environment. Because a lot of multi-crew flying I see, neither pilot has any idea once a deviation from plan vanilla becomes necessary.

Variable Load

29th Feb 2016, 11:05

To tgvbhy15

Given that every one of your 27 posts to date have added absolutely nothing of value to this forum, why don't you take your racist, extreme and obnoxious opinions elsewhere. They certainly are not welcome here and I suspect you would not be welcome in Bristow if you openly demonstrate those kind of opinions and attitudes.

A word of advice - it's a very small industry, be careful who you upset :ok:

tgvbhy15

29th Feb 2016, 11:15

Dear VL,
I love you too! And thanks for taking the time of reading all my valuable inputs. I'm glad you enjoyed them ;-)

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 11:18

HC, I haven't referred to "manual flying skills", my comments were about "basic" skills and "basic" flying skills which (to me) incorporate the essentials of good decision making and a sound understanding of the aircraft that you are flying.

In that case, naturally I agree with you, except to say that I don't see those as basic flying skills, just as flying skills. Essential flying skills perhaps?

As to the rest, just giving as good as I get (not from you).

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 11:27

.. and they can read a map ...

...which of course is a really useful skill for an offshore pilot. "Ooh look, there's a wave, see if you can find it on the map and they we will know where we are"

Hmmmmm, anyway there are incompetent pilots of many flavours - the ones you describe plus the ones who alienate their copilots by being knowall "When I were a lad we did it properly, like this..." (and then majorly departs for SOPs), want to disengage the automation because they don't understand how it works or how best to use it (and then stuff up), insist on getting bogged down with trivia and fatuous things like map reading offshore because it puts them back in their comfort zone (seen a HUGE amount of that in my time as a copilot). etc etc.

gulliBell

29th Feb 2016, 11:48

@HC: In the context of my discussion, being able to read a map points to a much wider and useful skill set also being available in the pilot, it has nothing to do with the competence at reading a map when flying over 8/8ths of water.

And for the record, my only criticism of co-pilots is when they allow the PIC to crash a helicopter, not having said or done anything to alter the outcome. Unfortunately I see that all the time. The reasons for this are very complex, and it's not something I understand. Cultural aspects certainly play a part.

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 11:54

@HC: In the context of my discussion, being able to read a map points to a much wider and useful skill set also being available in the pilot, it has nothing to do with the competence at reading a map when flying over 8/8ths of water.

It points to a wider and yet redundant skill set cluttering up the mind of a pilot living in a past role, not the current one. Some skills that you seem to set store by are not relevant in some roles. Therefore in fact no store should be set by them in that context. I liken it to the amount of effort I expended learning how to maintain the rotor rpm of the Bell 47 I learnt to fly on with the twist grip throttle. I now (used to) fly a helicopter type with absolutely zero manual throttle control, so that is a completely obsolete and redundant skill. Manually flying an ILS on that type was nearly, though not quite, and equally redundant skill. Skill sets move on, some folk get left behind. Don't be one of them!

tistisnot

29th Feb 2016, 13:48

It's just like UFC here ...... one knockout, one submission - Ultimate Flying Club!

I have seen excellent 4 year captains emerge from the OGP Ab-Initio scheme. As ever it all depends upon initial background, suitability, their selection, initial training, IR training, sufficient simulator exposure, offshore role training, LOFT - and of course the necessary grooming on-line, training and checking, yet more effective role training and checking.

It behoves the OGP auditors to approve the program, monitor it (if they have a pilot on the ops side!), and grant the eventual command. So a huge part of this is the extensive operator's training program to cover all situations for the offshore role and the execution thereof by competent and honest instructors. On-line grooming from all PIC's following SOP's is essential to help the process.

This brings us to culture where pressures from pilots' unions, customer and authorities can make things extremely awkward and delicate, requiring great diplomacy, to faithfully produce the required article. Perhaps this is where we need to concentrate any remedial actions if we are to believe things stated here.

As for gulliBell - I am a mere spring chicken with only 10,000 offshore - but have had nothing remotely untoward as described by you. I do not know whether to put that down to luck, or choice of employer, his aircraft and his maintenance team!!

Fareastdriver

29th Feb 2016, 13:58

Never mind, gulliBell. Dinosaurs like you and me walked this Earth for 135,000,000 years. These modern human wiz kids will be lucky to reach 200,000.

Um... lifting...

29th Feb 2016, 14:19

Ah, map reading.

In the days when portable GPS units were still to be found in company helicopters in Nigeria, had one die on me while on deck the platform offshore while the new-in-country (but otherwise experienced) expat copilot was outside supervising the deck activities. This was somewhere offshore Andoni or thereabouts if memory serves. Once he clambered back aboard I shared these glad tidings.

However were we to get back?

I proposed if we were to take up a compass heading West by Nor by West or thereabouts we might find ourselves with a panoramic view of the Nigerian Coast presently where we might identify say Bonny, and thence Cawthorne Channel or summat and pick our way up to Samki and thence to the aerodrome where we might have a word with the greenies about the state of the GPS. We might even tune up the POT VOR or an ADF or some such for confirmation if the things were working.

When I later brought up this cautionary tale about the precarious battery life of the portable GPS, several pilots in the crew lounge looked at me as if I were a sorcerer... or worse.

pilot and apprentice

29th Feb 2016, 14:39

It points to a wider and yet redundant skill set cluttering up the mind of a pilot living in a past role, not the current one. Some skills that you seem to set store by are not relevant in some roles. Therefore in fact no store should be set by them in that context. I liken it to the amount of effort I expended learning how to maintain the rotor rpm of the Bell 47 I learnt to fly on with the twist grip throttle. I now (used to) fly a helicopter type with absolutely zero manual throttle control, so that is a completely obsolete and redundant skill. Manually flying an ILS on that type was nearly, though not quite, and equally redundant skill. Skill sets move on, some folk get left behind. Don't be one of them!

HC, I have to answer some of that.

These skill sets may be, as you stated, approaching redundancy on the 225 in the NS, but they are by no means redundant for the vast majority of offshore pilots.

First, outside that highly regimented environment, from an employment perspective, even if the rest of us manage to get onto a very highly automated type there is a high possibility that soon we will be back on something older (ie 76) where we will again be working with less technology. The basic skill set should still be with us and ready to have the rust shaken off.

Second, in the environment where the incident in this thread happened any pilot who cannot read a map should be grounded. Beyond map-reading as a broad skill it encompasses so many finer skills and pieces of basic knowledge that I can only assume that you denigrating the skill itself either to make a point, or because you have learned it so long ago that you no longer recognize how much of 'airmanship' and 'situational awareness' is dependant on these basic skills. Like Gullibell, I have failed the one GPS source on a line check and watched mayhem ensue. This is a realistic and benign fault!

Just read your response tistisnot, and I agree. I leads into mine. The issue the bigots on here are missing about Nigeria, cadet programs, and the rest is that it is not a question of race, it is a question of industry culture. Many of the expats working in companies that are running strong nationalization programs are in an environment completely foreign to how their career progressed. They are in developing countries to start. Without a domestic aerial work industry the big single-pilot hours aren't going to happen. And on the maintenance side the new techs will not get to experience keeping an aircraft healthy cut off from the world.

Back in the USA, Canada, OZ, NZ, Europe, etc there was a huge component of competition to getting started in the industry. Getting a licence was just the first step and with each rung of the ladder not everyone made it through. Some didn't have the technical skills, or the drive, or the diplomacy. If one didn't work hard, tow the line, learn, and grow he/she was weeded out.

In the nationalization programs this is very likely to be politically difficult so it doesn't happen. The weak candidates progress along with strong. The bad attitudes are not shown the door, they are tolerated and it poisons all the relationships. The same can often be said of the expat who was so expensive to bring on staff in the first place. I've sat in the crew room at NAF base (yes Bristow) and looked around and was amazed at was tolerated of both Nigerians AND Expats. Cadets who have less than 100 hours on the 76 but felt they already knew it all and captains who used the system slide by with minimum effort, complaining not mentoring. The massively bigotted comments came from both sides and had no place in any work environment.

What does this have to do with this accident? Maybe nothing, I don't now what happened yet. Clearly anything written on here is so tainted with hate it must be ignored. But having been there, flown with the crews in both recent accidents, and seen the changes that have gone on on the maintenance side, I know where I would be looking!

I know very well that the job I had, as an expatriate in Nigeria (or anywhere else), was to train the person who would take my job. I was and am OK with that. Too many have lost sight of this. They need to be shown the door!

At the same time, it was my job to tell management, the training system, and the copilots I worked with, what needed to be fixed, what was going well, and who shouldn't be in the job. When they refuse to listen, and I feel safety is being compromised, it is time for me to go. So with disappointment, I did.

I flew with Nigerian copilots who were as sharp (sharper!) than some I fly with now, but the opposite was true too. 90% wanted to learn. When the system recognizes that the 10% who won't, and any who can't, must be shown the door then Nigeria will have the safety record of anywhere else.

Yes, I'd hold the captains, of any nationality, to the same standard.

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 14:49

pilot and apprentice

29th Feb 2016, 15:03

P&A on the first bit, as I keep saying the pilot skill set needs to match the role. If you can afford the luxury of expending training time on skills sets not appropriate to the role then that is fine provided it doesn't reduce the training and competence in the skill set that is appropriate. The trouble is that both human psyche and training budgets are limited, and so to fill them will irelevant though no doubt "worthy" stuff would be a mistake.

Agreed, I was just countering what I interpreted as a more blanket statement. Training budgets are limited.

It's interesting that you point out that certain skills should be maintained just in case the pilot has to go back onto a lower-tech type, whilst you don't suggest that a pilot on a lower tech type should maintain the skills of operating an aircraft with advanced automation just in case they have to go back to the advanced type. Hmmm, what is at the root of that is the thought process (am I allowed to say paradigm?) that use of automation is cheating and not "proper flying". A bolt on extra which is not important and can be dispensed with.

There is the root of the problem of oldies being in charge of modern fleets.

Actually, I try to do the same for myself if the machine is equipped. Generally, it is easier to go back than forward. In a straight VFR 212 I can't couple much but I can look at a map in a 92. Sometimes it is just a matter of staying in the books when I don't have to.

But yes, I will try to exercise my button pushing as often as my stick wiggling when workload permits. I do find that some SOP's make it a challenge these days to practice much outside the sim or the normal ops.

It's more work to do it this way, but it is how I prefer to keep myself sharp.

gulliBell

29th Feb 2016, 15:06

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 15:13

Being able to read a map is like learning to ride a bike, once it's done there is no need for on-going training. So I don't quite get your point @HC.

The crux of the problem that I see is, those who can't read a map etc are also the ones who push the wrong buttons in the advanced automated cockpit. Those who lack the basics also lack the advanced stuff.

I agree, so the question is, how come someone with a licence - for which they have had to prove competence at map reading- is in fact incompetent at map reading? At least map reading is taught in basic training, unlike use of automation which even these days seems to be an afterthought (maybe less so in FW these days).

I think I can summarise what you are saying above as "there are some pretty crap pilots out there" - a sentiment with which I agree. Fortunately they are in the minority.

EESDL

29th Feb 2016, 15:28

All good points and maybe completely irrelevant to the latest Bristow accident - seems like we're all shooting the breeze and waiting for the report to come out - and there are probably quite a few of us who do not believe the report will be published in a credible and useful format .........

PS - on the subject of map reading, whilst there is little use of a paper map 'offshore' the skill-set and ability to form the 'big picture' comes from such a basic skill.
I have been sat on a deck visual with our next destination - confirmed by approximate heading and distance blah blah - whilst co had been delaying checks to update gps of next location - laudable but we were on the fuel line and had just come from there!
I just hope that more ap work is mandated in OPCs etc - rather than rushing through the box-ticking and catching the last flight home........

The trouble is - until the proverbial hits the fan - no one knows how good your training has been

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 15:43

EEDSL I think your copilot is to be commended. Offshore flying is very routine and it is easy for complacency to drift in. Perhaps in that instance there was only one other deck in the vicinity, but in other occasions there may be several. It is all to easy to see an installation, talk to it, and thus be convinced it is the right one to land on, when in fact it is not. The only way out of this trap is to ALWAYS put the next destination in the GPS. It should be mandatory in you SOPs (it certainly is in Bristow) but if not, it is only a matter of time before you land on the wrong deck.

Personally I have taken off from the BraeA, early morning (never my strong point) turned left and pointed it at the next destination (BraeB) only to notice shortly afterwards that the GPS was pointing at something completely different. Yes, I was pointing at the Miller. Oops, but it happens. A good pilot (and good SOPs) does not rely on him being perfect, rather he builds in safeguards (error tolerance, if you like) so that one error doesn't become a catastrophe.

As I said, you should be thanking your cojoe not slagging him off for doing his job properly. If you had insufficient fuel to do the job properly without cutting corners, that was your fault.

Fareastdriver

29th Feb 2016, 18:25

Went into Bristow one morning to do a Thistle trip. My co-pilot and I had done most of the planning and had passed the payload through when I was called into operations.

"Can you do a quick Forties instead of the Thistle because the RNAV is u/s on the Forties aircraft and the crew have refused to take it."

For this not familiar with the North Sea the Forties is about 95 miles off the coast and on a good day if you coast out high enough you can practically see it. Not only that the outbound and inbound routes are on separate VOR radials that are almost co-incidental to an NDB beacon. On top of that the Forties field is an unmistakable pattern of platforms which shouts at you via the weather radar.

The poor dears wouldn't have been able to find them.

We were back and in the bar at the Craighaar whilst they were refuelling on the Thistle.

nowherespecial

29th Feb 2016, 19:16

Outside of the causes of this particular accident which I have no personal view on owing to a lack of evidence at this time...

The arguments in this thread about automation vs hands on 'stick time' (and who therefore has a larger/ older/ better appendage) are very strange. I can't think of any other profession where people at the top would claim that they are so advanced that they don't need to worry about skills they learnt when they were training.

Can you imagine having a conversation like that with a lawyer, accountant, banker, engineer, etc? They'd laugh you out of the room. All add experience and expertise on top of basic skills they were taught when they started. Have we really evolved to such an extent that pilots are claiming that actually flying an ac with our hands is beneath them now because we are so advanced? These skill sets should complement each other, not be exclusive. :ugh:

EESDL

29th Feb 2016, 19:21

With that Chip?
Wow HC, steady on, take a breath.
You have jumped in fairly aggressively there.
No one was 'slagging' anybody - I believe I said his actions were laudable and we had enough fuel at that point as we were on the line, not below it.
Finally, the destination (and our recent departure point) was the only other rig in the Jubilee Field.
Have a think about your reaction there and take it as a free CRM lesson ;-)
From an old salt who has managed to stay away from the NS.....
Anyway, all valid points raised here and no surprises. Just be aware that there was an incident in the SNS due to an 'inexperienced' captain (despite having done the pre-requisite number of Winters) who still tried to use the upper modes even though they had been playing-up. A severe lack of logic and reasoning that very nearly had people swimming.

fadecdegraded

29th Feb 2016, 21:17

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 21:21

With that Chip?
Wow HC, steady on, take a breath.
You have jumped in fairly aggressively there.
No one was 'slagging' anybody - I believe I said his actions were laudable and we had enough fuel at that point as we were on the line, not below it.
Finally, the destination (and our recent departure point) was the only other rig in the Jubilee Field.
Have a think about your reaction there and take it as a free CRM lesson ;-)
.

Fairly aggressive, yes, intentionally. Although you said "laudable" your post was actually a swipe at the foolish copilot who wanted to put the next waypoint in when clearly it wasn't necessary to a competent old hand, been doing it for years etc, like you. If not that, then what was the point of your post?

So my free CRM lesson to you is that if you add an insincere "laudable" to an otherwise sneering comment, it doesn't make it any better.

John Eacott

29th Feb 2016, 21:37

HC, when you reach the bottom of the hole, stop digging. I would rather see you recover some of the respect that I had for you than persevere with your disparaging comments throughout this thread.

Back to the thread: this photo has just been posted on Bristow Group FB site. Whilst it shows confidence in their operation by sending the CEO for a ride in an S76, it would send a much better message were they to release some basic details of the cause of the accident.

If only to stop the interminable posturing by some Rotorheads.

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/7547-2/Bristow+CEO+S76+Nigeria.jpg

Bristow Group (https://www.facebook.com/467830136636415/photos/a.468242063261889.1073741835.467830136636415/966366423449448/?type=3&theater)

CEO Jonathan Baliff met with employees, clients and government officials in Nigeria last week. Here's a quick pic of him readying for his non-revenue S-76 test flight at Port Harcourt.

HeliComparator

29th Feb 2016, 21:47

John my disparaging comments are aimed at folk who can only bang on about how great things were when everything was hand flown using maps, and/or how Nigerian pilots are incompetent by definition and/or how automation is the root of all evil and/or diss their young copilots for doing their jobs properly. If such comments continue I will continue to disparage them.

As to any feelings of respect that is up to you, but I certainly won't be modifying my posts simply to win your respect. That would indeed deserve a lack of respect!

ersa

29th Feb 2016, 22:58

Putting the CEO on a non revenue trophy flight won't solve anything , it's a joke

rotor-rooter

1st Mar 2016, 00:40

Wasn't there a Super Puma lost in China after some sort of GPS issue, and having to ditch after running short of fuel? Or did I imagine that?

gulliBell

1st Mar 2016, 00:42

It looks like the driver of that non-revenue CEO confidence flight might be a white boy. If so, maybe the message intended might not be the message received. Just saying. I could be wrong.

tistisnot

1st Mar 2016, 02:15

And not a life-jacket in sight!

gulliBell

1st Mar 2016, 03:09

They've missed out on a golden PR moment, the "hero" Captain should be flying!

(said person being that referred to as such in the Nigerian press, not my words).

Frying Pan

1st Mar 2016, 07:26

Nice PR photo...

I have a similar photo of me in front of an Apache.....must mean that I flew in that too. :*

Fareastdriver

1st Mar 2016, 09:53

Wasn't there a Super Puma lost in China
That was a Chinese registered 332 on a national contract. The pilots, neither of who were particularly good with English, got confused with the Trimble GPS, itself not the most user friendly even if you are English.

It basically jumped and they followed the instructions, ending up in the middle of nowhere.

Fareastdriver

1st Mar 2016, 10:03

After the Boeing 234 crash in 1986 Robert Maxwell had a flight and a photoshoot in a Chinook to show the world how confident he was in the helicopter.

Maxwell didn't last very long and the 234 soon left the North Sea.

I hope the CEO doesn't go yachting.

P2bleed

2nd Mar 2016, 07:21

Just to add to the comments on that accident, there was also a huge CRM issue between the two Captains plus the fact the wind was not being displayed on the route outbound.

gulliBell

2nd Mar 2016, 09:31

Needless to say, helicopter pilots need to know the wind, whether it is indicated on a display or not. This is typical of what I am seeing in the recurrent training environment now, helicopter pilots get so mind-dumb with automation doing all the stuff helicopter pilots used to have to do as second nature, that basic skills such as figuring out the wind has gone to the wind. Fail a GPS and it's virtually game over now.

By the way...long shot, but any S76D training Captains out there with FAA that can do a differences course for two trainees in China in the next week or so??

[email protected]

2nd Mar 2016, 13:14

Gullibell - both you and GeoffersinCornwall have the same opinion of many pilots you see coming through your training systems and the low quality of their basic skills.

That is a worrying trend but there are some who just won't see that management of automation is best added to basic pilots skills - not used to replace them.

HeliComparator

2nd Mar 2016, 17:16

That is a worrying trend but there are some who just won't see that management of automation is best added to basic pilots skills - not used to replace them.

Not sure who they are but what is more worrying is that there are some who just won't see that management of automation IS a basic pilot skill for a pilot flying an automated type. It is not some bolt-on after-thought.

Of course it is not a replacement for other more "traditional" pilot skills but it is just as important as them. That said some of these "traditional" pilot skills do eventually become redundant, as I have alluded this includes things like manual throttle control and even, on some types, the need to fly a manual ILS to near-perfection. No doubt other skills will become redundant in the future in the same way that use of a sextant has. It would be futile to expend a lot of effort maintaining a redundant skill.

Same again

2nd Mar 2016, 20:14

It seems to me that this discussion is a between people who have most possibly never flown for one of the offshore majors and those who have most possibly been trained by one of them and have spent their whole flying careers in offshore O&G. Offshore flying these days is all about automation in very reliable large, twin-engine helicopters and requires little manual intervention so why require pilots to have years flying onshore SPVFR?

It would most certainly mean better flying skills and airmanship but is not necessary and many pilots with that background would quickly get bored with the monotony of offshore flying. The present system of recruiting young pilots straight from ab-initio training as co-pilots with PICUS and eventual captaincy seems to work well (in UK anyway).

I do feel that they have missed out on a fulfilling career as a helicopter pilot which has so many more exciting and rewarding opportunities.

pilonrock

2nd Mar 2016, 23:48

Kick back put on the popcorn and watch!

If it happens again in the next few months then the proof is in the pudding!

Evidently judgement, experience and stick time is no longer required and we have been replaced by machines and computers!

Well I'm getting tired of CD players that skip! Bring back the 8 track an carburetor !

gulliBell

2nd Mar 2016, 23:57

We see trainees arrive on recurrent courses that don't know the aircraft limitations, don't know the immediate (memory) actions in the ECL, don't take notes in class, can't correctly answer straight forward questions on aircraft systems, some don't even know whether their aircraft has a SLA or Nicad battery installed. Unfortunately not isolated examples. It can be quite challenging teaching because without these basic fundamentals the flight manoeuvres training suffers. But the most frustrating aspect I see regularly is a NFP not saying or doing anything when the FP has put the aircraft in imminent danger of an adverse outcome. In other words, the NFP is just a passenger arriving at the scene of the accident.

I'd be interested in the CRM aspects of this Bristow accident, particularly the extent to which the co-pilot supported the decision of the Captain to undertake a ditching under the circumstances faced.

pilonrock

3rd Mar 2016, 02:27

That's surprising!?

You can select the R242 battery with the selector switch and revert back to the nicad if it's overheating. Surely CRM is clear that this must only be done after confirming rate of decent above 750fpm with the disc fully loaded but only if the bypass reversion switch is armed prior to entering into LTE.

Surely you Jest!

[email protected]

3rd Mar 2016, 06:04

It would be futile to expend a lot of effort maintaining a redundant skill. Unfortunately that leads to a slippery slope where what is and isn't a redundant skill gets mixed in with which skills cost the most to attain/maintain.

Depending on your area of operation you might decide almost all manual flying is redundant and end up training and assessing pilots as competent but only in a very narrow field of ops.

If that is what is desired by companies/operators then fine but don't come crying when your 'plastic pilot' spears in if the airborne situation suddenly changes to something outside that very narrow field of experience.

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 08:09

Crab a couple of points:

It is interesting to note that EASA's Prof check doesn't require AP out flying. It's something covered in the initial skills test (IIRC) only. This applies to all ME types. I don't subscribe to that view for the many types with limited autopilot redundancy / reliability and of course an operator can always choose to add stuff. But it does go to show the Authority's view on the subject.

Secondly and more importantly we are fortunate compared to our FW colleagues in that every takeoff, final approach and landing is flown manually, as often is inter-rig shuttling. (Well except for the SAR guys who seem to need a button to fly an approach and to hover:E). Landing offshore at night can be quite challenging. Therefore I don't think there is a risk of us getting to the state of inability to fly that some of our FW a colleagues seem to have reached.

As to fields of operation I always maintain that aviation is very role specific. Yes offshore flying is one such narrow role but it is hard to see the benefit, and certainly not feasible, to train offshore pilots in other role skills that they will never need. So for example we had a small group of pilots rated for winch and underlslung, they received the relevant training and practice, but if we had done that for everyone there wouldn't have been enough opportunity to actually carry out the role and so it would have been counterproductive since no-one would have been current.

By the way when I was a trainer on the SAR L2 I found that role equally narrow. Yes the guys were great at dangling things over the side and fishing things out of the water (much, much better than me) but in other areas many were pretty poor simply because they never needed to do it and so lacked the motivation and practice. C'est la vie!

[email protected]

3rd Mar 2016, 08:15

(Well except for the SAR guys who seem to need a button to fly an approach and to hover) so just how often do offshore guys make an approach to 50' hover over the water with no visual references? Horses for courses but we used to train to do it manually as well, just in case you needed to in order to save lives.:ok:

Geoffersincornwall

3rd Mar 2016, 08:57

There is a growing realisation amongst regulators that role-related training is becoming a 'must do' rather than a 'nice to do'. In other words there are teams working to identify possible ways forward in this conundrum.

Personally I see an advantage in a role-related rating that at least recognises that some relevant basics have been delivered prior to going 'live'. The crucial benefit of that rating would be the date that it was issued. Such a rating is deliverable for SAR, HEMS, OFFSHORE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, FIRE FIGHTING and maybe CORPORATE. As Crab And HC point out there is s relationship between pilot performance and the length of time since the relevant training was delivered. Keeping track of recency is a crucial element in the equation.

My latest hobby horse is to bang on about Ebbinghaus (German psychologist in Victorian times) and his 'FORGETTING CURVE'. The trouble is we keep forgetting how fragile imparted knowledge is. In many cases 80% of imparted knowledge is lost after 2-3 weeks. That doesn't work well in our world.

I wonder how much of her technical training was the young lass in this incident able to recall when the proverbial hit the fan? Essinghaus went on to emphasise the value of continued repetition as a teaching tool. Repeat it enough times and you remember for ever. What 'post-graduate' support is offered to TR graduates - NIL. We need to look at that. If we has some intensive post-course, on-line Q&A routines with a live instructor and CBT then maybe we could hang on to the vital elements of system knowledge a little longer.

G. :ok:

[email protected]

3rd Mar 2016, 09:15

Very good points Geoffers, I give both the technical and the flying instruction on my present type so I know exactly what the pilots were taught and can reinforce the tech training during the flying and sim sorties.

Repetition is definitely the key.

As for the 'forgetting curve' - mine seems to have steepened as I have got older!

HC Secondly and more importantly we are fortunate compared to our FW colleagues in that every takeoff, final approach and landing is flown manually, as often is inter-rig shuttling. you have changed your tune from a previous thread when you assured me it was in the passengers' interests that the automatics were used as much as possible.

By the way when I was a trainer on the SAR L2 I found that role equally narrow. Yes the guys were great at dangling things over the side and fishing things out of the water (much, much better than me) so how did you have credibility as a SAR trainer if you couldn't do it as well as the crews you were 'training'? That is certainly something that wouldn't have passed muster in the mil.

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 09:37

HC you have changed your tune from a previous thread when you assured me it was in the passengers' interests that the automatics were used as much as possible.

so how did you have credibility as a SAR trainer if you couldn't do it as well as the crews you were 'training'? That is certainly something that wouldn't have passed muster in the mil.

1/ No I don't think I said that. It is in the passengers' interests that the automatics be used as much as possible in poor conditions / at night. When there are reasonably good visual references it is a good thing to fly manually especially for the young chaps with limited exposure to manual flying. But even in poor conditions/at night the very last bit had to be flown manually since we don't have auto-land but typically by then you are very close and the visual references are OK even if the vis is poor.

2/ Oh the winderful mil. If only everything could be run by the mil there would be no more accidents!

But you misunderstand the structure of civilian training. I was a TRE on the L2, I was not a SAR pilot. In order to be a SAR pilot you have to have a licence, and in order to have a licence you need to be able to do, and be tested on, such things as OEI Cat A procedures, procedural instrument approaches etc. In other words, pass an LPC. That was my role, doing type conversions onto the L2 and taking LSTs, LPCs and OPCs, technical ground school refresher etc. This ticked the necessary box for them to be a licenced L2 pilot. There was then another set of Line Trainers who were the SAR experts, would train and test for the SAR-specific elements which of course on a day to day basis was the most important bit.

That was my problem, some of the pilots didn't see why they needed to be able to do all the stuff in a standard LPC since some was not relevant to their role. But of course my answer was that in order to be a SAR pilot you first need to be a pilot with a licence.

tistisnot

3rd Mar 2016, 09:50

Aaaw, come on now Crab ...... of course it's manual for the first and last 30 seconds - I think that was the point. And a little humility and self-deprecation is a good instructor's trait.

I reckon if we put all you guys in the same room, a day of CRM training and a few beers at night - you'd all come out thinking better of each other and realize you are all aiming for the same goals ......

We need look how the knowledge can be better imparted to your trainees, through broader oversight from the operator and authority.

Phone Wind

3rd Mar 2016, 09:59

so how did you have credibility as a SAR trainer if you couldn't do it as well as the crews you were 'training'? That is certainly something that wouldn't have passed muster in the mil.
Hmmm. Tin gods comes to mind. We seem to have a lot of those in aviation :bored:

[email protected]

3rd Mar 2016, 10:18

HC - I just wanted to clarify that being a trainer on a SAR L2 does not make you a SAR trainer on the L2 which is what your post rather implied:ok:
some of the pilots didn't see why they needed to be able to do all the stuff in a standard LPC since some was not relevant to their role can't see whay any of that LPC stuff isn't considered relevant - maybe your pilots needed a bit of military re-briefing about professionalism:E
When there are reasonably good visual references it is a good thing to fly manually especially for the young chaps with limited exposure to manual flying isn't that even more important to do in less than CAVOK conditions so they gain experience?
Phone WindHmmm. Tin gods comes to mind. We seem to have a lot of those in aviation the difference is in being able to show you can do it better, rather than just telling them you can:ok:

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 10:41

HC - I just wanted to clarify that being a trainer on a SAR L2 does not make you a SAR trainer on the L2 which is what your post rather implied:ok:

Definitely not a SAR trainer. And old piloty adage sprinter to mind "never assume - check!"

isn't that even more important to do in less than CAVOK conditions so they gain experience?

So what you are saying is that passengers' safety should be sub-optimal on that one flight in order that the pilots can do some "on the job" training to improve safety overall? Unfortunately the passengers on that one flight don't like that very much. I will agree that it probably would be good for pilot competence but unfortunately we are not the military (we can't do what we like at taxpayers expense, and we even need licences!) and have to do what the customer wants, which is increasingly restrictive. If you think about it, it is not really a tenable position to deliberately increase risk to passengers even slightly, or even at discomfort, just to satisfy some training need.

In my youth we used to, for instance, fly a whole rig trip AP out including a rather wobbly landing offshore, but for many years this has been verboten by both the customers and the CAA. We are not allowed by the CAA to intentionally degrade the aircraft's systems in any way with passengers on board. Once the CAA wakes up they will realise that that includes failing to make best use of the automation. (OK to be fair, they are starting to wake up to that point).

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 10:49

Phone Wind the difference is in being able to show you can do it better, rather than just telling them you can:ok:

This is the thing I hate most about military culture, it is all about point-scoring. If you are an instructor or examiner in civvy world you don't have to say you are the best pilot in the company. You don't have to prove you are the best pilot in the company. What you have to is have a good instructional technique (that doesn't function on having a "superior" attitude), know the syllabus, the required standard and relevant technical knowledge. And a bit of humility helps!

In the military so much time is spent getting the callipers out to measure the size of each other's balls that I wonder there is any time for flying!

terminus mos

3rd Mar 2016, 11:31

Our Offshore facilities are in the Tropics and we don't routinely fly passengers at night. As a client, we have to pay for our Contract Pilots to remain current for night flying in case of emergency, which we are happy to do.

With offshore facilities are > 200nm from our operating base, there is not a closer deck to use, we have some significant transit time each way. When our Pilots complete their 3x landing in 3 month night deck landing currency, we have a requirement that we take 3 crew to maximise the benefit.

Since its revenue flying without passengers, we specify the outbound and inbound sectors are used as much as is reasonable to practice manual flying skills. We also encourage crews to take a slightly extended routing to land and take fuel onshore rather than offshore so that they have another landing at night at a different place for some variety.

nigelh

3rd Mar 2016, 11:46

HC don't be so stupid . They don't make calipers big enough for TC and Crabs balls !!

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 12:07

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 13:18

After of course, we never cut costs
Why would they be classified as expendable HC? Supernumerary they may be for one sector but their well trained and professional colleagues are flying so their safety is guaranteed, surely?

Expendable as in you find it OK for pilots to be practising flying a degraded aircraft when the only passengers are other pilots, but not when the passengers are oil workers. Can you explain your double standards?

Fareastdriver

3rd Mar 2016, 14:17

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 14:41

If a captain, not a co-pilot, cannot fly an AP out trip offshore without the passengers noticing, then he shouldn't be a captain. When I first flew for Mr Bristow we were paid to fly the aircraft, not the autopilot. Should the single channel AP go u/s that was tough, you went without it.

HC, you bleat on about how much safer the North Sea is since everybody is slavishly pushing buttons instead of flying it. Can you back that up with all the accidents in the North Sea that would have been avoided if a Flight Management System had been in operation instead.?

Did you live in a paper bag in the middle of the road too?

Anyway, it depends on the type. The S61 is quite docile AP out, the EC225 at 150kts much less so. Why would it be a prerequisite to be able to fly AP out without the passengers noticing when you have a quadruplexed AP with triplexed sensors and duplexed actuators? Whereas if you fly a single channel AP aircraft powered by coal it is obviously reasonable to expect you to be pretty good at flying AP out. And the handling traits of the aircraft may well also match the level of AP redundancy to some extent.

Regarding you second point, obviously the ETAP springs to mind but most of the N Sea accidents occurred before advanced automation existed. I suspect if the Cormorant Alpha aircraft had been a 225 using the automation as we now do, that wouldn't have happened but it is pretty pointless trying to relate accidents from yesteryears technology and SOPs, to modern ones. The Sumburgh L2 accident wouldn't have happened in a 225. So yes I believe that, just as in fixed wing, modern highly automated aircraft are much safer. Mostly because the weakest link is often the pilot. It's just the old and bold tend to block out human failings (that being a human failing of course!). But of course that said, competence in the use of that automation is just as important as the importance of being able to fly a trip AP out used to be when you were a lad sometime in the middle of last century.

ShyTorque

3rd Mar 2016, 15:11

This is the thing I hate most about military culture, it is all about point-scoring. If you are an instructor or examiner in civvy world you don't have to say you are the best pilot in the company. You don't have to prove you are the best pilot in the company. What you have to is have a good instructional technique (that doesn't function on having a "superior" attitude), know the syllabus, the required standard and relevant technical knowledge. And a bit of humility helps!

In the military so much time is spent getting the callipers out to measure the size of each other's balls that I wonder there is any time for flying!

Don't fall into the trap of tarring everyone with the same brush from your possibly own limited experience of military (or ex military) pilots.

From personal experience of about twenty years of both military and civilian flying, I'd say military aviation is all about getting the job done in the most efficient way. Just like the civilian world, really.

The difference is that the military are not constrained by making a profit and are able/must take more risks in training. The very nature of the military job demands great flexibility from their pilots and therefore must expose them to a far broader band of operations. Most military trained helicopter pilots (at least the SH ones) can safely low fly, operate on NVG (or off), carry out USL work, carry VIPs, fly close formation, winch over water or land and even transit to and land on an offshore installation etc etc. They are unlikely to be as competent at any one role as the "role specialists" (I'm thinking both SAR and/or N.Sea pilots fall into that definition) but they can usually get most jobs done. They are selected with that in mind.

However, long time role specialist experts can become blinkered and type cast. I recall flying with "old and bold" pilots who seemed to know everything there was to know about their branch of aviation and were regarded as demi-gods within their own field. But take them out of that environment and they just couldn't cope. For example, one highly regarded RAF QFI and chief examiner (head of standards) once took me to one side and quietly quizzed me about landing on a grass strip by night with no centreline or approach lighting. He was obviously very concerned at the thought of doing so on a future detachment. I was very inexperienced on the aircraft type (fixed wing) but thought nothing of it because as a helicopter pilot I had spent very little of my time landing on brightly lit tarmac runways and had been trained to land on unlit grass. He thanked me for helping put his mind at rest by imparting what knowledge I had. I was quite humbled that he saw me as far more knowledgeable than he was, at least in that respect.

I've also known a number of instances where fairly highly experienced "North Sea trained" helicopter pilots try to move onshore to the corporate world and really struggle because it's beyond their previous level of experience. Some of them go back to the more predictable role of IFR route flying. I've known one ex N.Sea pilot who was completely freaked out by flying below MSA to totally unlit landing sites by night in the casevac/SAR role and quit the job very soon after his arrival. I know because I replaced him. Got those calipers out... not very big, in fact just small (but beautifully marked).

[email protected]

3rd Mar 2016, 15:14

This is the thing I hate most about military culture, it is all about point-scoring HC that just goes to show how little you know about military aviation culture and your perspective must be coloured by some previous nasty experience.

Just remind me what is wrong with an instructor who has the technical knowledge, the ability to impart that knowledge, good flying skills and the ability to teach those skills to others (along with some humility of course).

If a student can't fly a manoeuvre to the required standard, surely the instructor demonstrates it so the student can see how it should be done - or am I missing something in the civvy world - and how is that 'points-scoring'.

The old adage 'Explanation, Demonstration, Imitation' is surely the bedrock of flying instruction

If you want your pilots to have a high level of skill then your instructors need to have at least that level - it's not about gonad measuring, it's about showing what can be done and to what degree of finesse and accuracy. Otherwise, how do your pilots ever improve?

keithl

3rd Mar 2016, 16:11

Out of order, HC!
If what really counts is instructional technique, why did you have an ex QFI teaching it? I mean, if military instruction is so substandard?

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 16:46

Out of order, HC!
If what really counts is instructional technique, why did you have an ex QFI teaching it? I mean, if military instruction is so substandard?

Keith - No need to take offence! I was generalising of course and reacting to the egos on here. Anyone who thinks that the behaviour of a large bunch of people could be categorised by their employer would be foolish. So I wasn't doing that, I merely seemed to be!

I will say though that, whilst there are all sorts in mil and civvy, in my experience there is a higher % of arrogant and point scoring in ex mil instructors than civvy ones. Of course I will also say that we had some excellent ex mil instructors without a hint of arrogance or point scoring, you being one of them (phew, have I dug myself out yet?).

There is banter on here, don't take it too seriously!

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 16:54

Just remind me what is wrong with an instructor who has the technical knowledge, the ability to impart that knowledge, good flying skills and the ability to teach those skills to others (along with some humility of course).

Nothing, of course.

If a student can't fly a manoeuvre to the required standard, surely the instructor demonstrates it so the student can see how it should be done - or am I missing something in the civvy world - and how is that 'points-scoring'.

If you want your pilots to have a high level of skill then your instructors need to have at least that level - it's not about gonad measuring, it's about showing what can be done and to what degree of finesse and accuracy. Otherwise, how do your pilots ever improve?

No, I don't think the instructor has to be better than the student. He merely has to be adequate and know how to get the best out of the student. Whether he can hold a speed to +-1kt or whatever is not that relevant, what is relevant is that he keeps the aircraft safe and is a good instructor. When I want to give praise I sometimes say "that was better than I could have done it" and sometimes it is even true!

There is a subtle but important difference between a demonstration aimed at showing a confused student how it should be done (demo worth a thousand words etc), vs a demonstration whose purpose is primarily to show the student what a numpty he is and how clever the instructor is.

HeliComparator

3rd Mar 2016, 16:59

ShyT don't disagree with much of that. On the blinkering effect I have taken a few folk, highly competent on the N Sea, to Marignane to collect new helicopters. Hmmm. Out of their comfort zones, definitely. Say no more!

nigelh

3rd Mar 2016, 17:00

HC .... I think you need a lie down . I think you have lost the plot a little !!

keithl

3rd Mar 2016, 17:00

OK, OK, HC, that'll do.

I had intended (being now retired) to confine myself to lurking, but your remarks just goaded me out of my passivity!

I would though just reflect that I noticed more prejudice against the military among those who were never in it, than vice versa.

Returning to Lurk Mode...

ShyTorque

3rd Mar 2016, 17:11

ShyT don't disagree with much of that.

Especially the beautifully marked bit... :E

Boudreaux Bob

4th Mar 2016, 03:15

HC don't be so stupid . They don't make calipers big enough for TC and Crabs balls !!

Or a Tape Measure long enough to measure their Hat Size!

terminus mos

4th Mar 2016, 08:33

HC Wrote

Expendable as in you find it OK for pilots to be practising flying a degraded aircraft when the only passengers are other pilots, but not when the passengers are oil workers. Can you explain your double standards?

If voluntarily en route "hand" flying an S-92 or 225 without the upper modes and holds engaged at 5000' on a training sortie under the guidance of a Training Captain for night deck landing practice with 3 crew is considered to be flying a degraded aircraft to the extent that it unacceptably increases risk and categorizes pilots as expendable (in your opinion) then the world is going mad.

When else should pilots practice their "manual" flying skills?

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 08:41

HC Wrote

If voluntarily en route "hand" flying an S-92 or 225 without the upper modes and holds engaged at 5000' on a training sortie under the guidance of a Training Captain for night deck landing practice with 3 crew is considered to be flying a degraded aircraft to the extent that it unacceptably increases risk and categorizes pilots as expendable (in your opinion) then the world is going mad.

When else should pilots practice their "manual" flying skills?

No I agree that flying without the upper modes is not "intentionally degrading the aircraft" and of course we would do that with your passengers too. I was more thinking of AP out flying, trim failures, switching off NAV systems, failing screens etc.

You did say "practice manual flying skills" but I don't see plodding along for 200nm without the holds engaged, but instead just tweaking the beep trim every few minutes, to be of much benefit for manual flying skills.

DOUBLE BOGEY

4th Mar 2016, 09:29

HC you make some vary valuable points but lose half your audience with the Mil versus Civvy debate.
There is a very clear difference between Mil and Civvy pilots. Mil pilots ALL survived not only a rigorous formal selection process but the intense scrutiny of a military flying course. Civvies do not suffer anything like this.

Of course, some Civvies may well have the aptitude and resolve to pass a military course but as such ALL of them remain un proven in that regard.

For those of us who did a military course we are quite justifiably proud of what we achieved and that does, whether you like it or not, set us apart from our Civvy colleagues.

I never flew in combat but many of the later generation of mil boys have or certainly been close to it. Flying in such conditions must surely add depth and breadth to those pilots.

Modern helicopters, as you point out, have such redundancy of systems that the result is we retain all capability until the last redundant system fails and then we end up degraded. In some instances, severely. In the 225 this is manifested by there being no failure that leaves you in ATT mode!

AP out (no stab) is so far down the line should we even go there much. I don't know the answer to this one but sure it may be different based on the type being flown.

I note with alarm the number of events arising from poor auto techniques especially in twins. Have we gone too far in assuming we should not practise this regularly and also in the real aircraft?

These debates are really important in the right context, with the right spirit, without tearing each other apart of waving our Willies in the wind.

Automation is appropriate where it adds value. That value is almost always increased capacity for the crew provided the automation is fully understood and does not in itself sap capacity!

In my view, poor core flying skills (manual flight path control) both when everything is working or not, can never truly be masked by automation. The FW boys are learning this regularly and so should we.

Automation does not and should not change the fundamental requirement to fly the aircraft. In HIGHLY regulated and controlled environments like O&G our opportunity to practise and maintain these skills are minimal compared to a Mil pilot spending lots of time doing general handling.

The challenges we face are to find the right balance of core skills recurrent training and checking with advanced skills such as automation.

Geoffersincornwall has alluded to this in his frequent posts.

So HC try to keep your blood pressure down and keep the positive stuff coming.

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 09:49

DB please bear in mind that my comments were only to counter Crab's constant banging on about how wonderful everything in the mil is including the pilots, and how crap it is in civvy. Do you think that should go unchallenged? (In which case you've just pinned your colours to the mast!).

I learnt to fly FW in the UAS. Some of the instructors were excellent. One or two were appalling. Most were, as you would expect, average.

I then did a 9 month cadet scheme with Bristow, at the time nearly all the instructors were ex mil. Same applied.

Now we have mostly civvy-born instructors and I don't see a difference in quality, it is the same old same old.

You may well be proud of having passed your mil course (why wouldn't you be!) but trust me, you are no better a pilot as a result of it than lots of folk from civvy backgrounds. I speak with the experience of being a TRI/TRE for many years in a "mixed race" company. ie I have trained and tested many folk both mil and non - mil. I haven't noticed a difference although of course each group has a wide variation.

Well actually to be honest there are perhaps a few civvy folk who really should have found a different career and yes they would have been weeded out from the mil, in the same way that they would have been weeded out from a company-sponsored course such as the one I did with Bristow. It is the advent of the self-funded that has introduced a small minority of unsuitable people, but then again it has also given us many highly competent people too.

Anyway, surely that is enough banging on about mil vs civvy but that applies to both sides!

Nescafe

4th Mar 2016, 11:14

An S76 ditches in Nigeria and it morphs into a Civ v Mil debate?

Only on pprune!

Rotorbee

4th Mar 2016, 11:39

Happens all the time. Just sit back and watch the show. It never achieves anything, but that's the boys.

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 12:36

An S76 ditches in Nigeria and it morphs into a Civ v Mil debate?

Only on pprune!

Yes I appreciate it was totally off topic, but on the other hand with no hard information to discuss about the event, I don't think anyone is missing out! And it is a distraction from the racism.

[email protected]

4th Mar 2016, 13:15

No, I don't think the instructor has to be better than the student. He merely has to be adequate and know how to get the best out of the student do you send your kids to school/college/university to be taught by 'adequate' teachers?

Is 'adequate' what people in any profession should aspire to?

Getting the best out of your student usually means pushing them outside their comfort zone or showing them that the 'adequate' level of their performance (whether it be flying or playing a violin solo) can be bettered with practice and application. Just how do you do that if you yourself as the instructor/teacher are only adequate?

Perhaps this is the problem with what Geoffers and Gullibell see in their sim checks on pilots - 'adequate' is all they need to achieve and there is no reward for being any better so why bother.

Excellence is what many in the military strive for - in whatever their profession - if that is missing in civilian flying then that isn't the fault of the military.

Torquestripe = most britmil aviators are pilots first (despite what some in the heirarchy pretend) and soldiers/sailors first. They all go through a few months of basic Officer training before their flying training but that is it.

Only the Army have non-officer pilots who are usually from other Regiments outside the Army Air Corps.

Training takes place on light FW, then single engine turbine (AS 350) and includes touchdown EOLS and a whole lot more and then advanced training on a twin for operational conversion.

Oh, and I'm not the one complaining about civilian flying standards - it is those who check them that are! There are a wide range of abilities among mil pilots and instructors - that is why we have had a categorisation scheme for so many years so the good ones are allowed and encouraged to get better, rather than a box-ticking LPC OPC which just has to be passed 'adequately'.

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 14:21

do you send your kids to school/college/university to be taught by 'adequate' teachers?

Is 'adequate' what people in any profession should aspire to?

Getting the best out of your student usually means pushing them outside their comfort zone or showing them that the 'adequate' level of their performance (whether it be flying or playing a violin solo) can be bettered with practice and application. Just how do you do that if you yourself as the instructor/teacher are only adequate?

Perhaps this is the problem with what Geoffers and Gullibell see in their sim checks on pilots - 'adequate' is all they need to achieve and there is no reward for being any better so why bother.

Excellence is what many in the military strive for - in whatever their profession - if that is missing in civilian flying then that isn't the fault of the military.

Torquestripe = most britmil aviators are pilots first (despite what some in the heirarchy pretend) and soldiers/sailors first. They all go through a few months of basic Officer training before their flying training but that is it.

Only the Army have non-officer pilots who are usually from other Regiments outside the Army Air Corps.

Training takes place on light FW, then single engine turbine (AS 350) and includes touchdown EOLS and a whole lot more and then advanced training on a twin for operational conversion.

Oh, and I'm not the one complaining about civilian flying standards - it is those who check them that are! There are a wide range of abilities among mil pilots and instructors - that is why we have had a categorisation scheme for so many years so the good ones are allowed and encouraged to get better, rather than a box-ticking LPC OPC which just has to be passed 'adequately'.

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz..........

Hmmmm, callipers out again. Funny how all that BS doesn't make them better pilots when they move into the real world! Looking at my (ex) circle of colleagues who are training captains, it is funny how most are civvy trained, whilst so many mil trained pilots languish as line pilots.

helimutt

4th Mar 2016, 14:33

first time i ever ran out of popcorn!!!;)

[email protected]

4th Mar 2016, 14:37

Hmmmm, callipers out again. Funny how all that BS doesn't make them better pilots when they move into the real world! Looking at my (ex) circle of colleagues who are training captains, it is funny how most are civvy trained, whilst so many mil trained pilots languish as line pilots. Hmmm - time in the company perhaps since that is how it is done in the civvy world apparently - it's not down to how good or suited you are, just that you are next in line - great system:ok:

Perhaps you are guilty of seeing the helicopter world through that very small prism of NS offshore ops and making your judgements about pilot skills in a pretty undemanding role.

helimutt

4th Mar 2016, 14:42

Not quite next in line. It's more next in line, if your face fits, and they think you're suitable. Oh and then passing a Command course, which, I know for a fact not everyone passes successfully first time. :ok: (Bristow)

Oh and getting back to the thread.....Anyone know what happened yet? The suspense is killing me!

[email protected]

4th Mar 2016, 15:37

At least we have kept the crowd amused while we wait for real info on the S76:E

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 15:38

Hmmm - time in the company perhaps since that is how it is done in the civvy world apparently - it's not down to how good or suited you are, just that you are next in line - great system:ok:

Perhaps you are guilty of seeing the helicopter world through that very small prism of NS offshore ops and making your judgements about pilot skills in a pretty undemanding role.

No, not time in the company. To get command, possibly. To get a TC role definitely not. You really have no idea what you are talking about. As usual. If it were time in the company we would have a lot of very old mil TCs, but we don't.

As to NS flying being undemanding, it is generally routine, I'll grant you. But a pilot's attributes and relevant skill set are nevertheless important, for example an ability to get on with your colleague who has to sit next to you for maybe 8 hours is more important than the ability to fly an ILS in a gale AP out with one hand, whilst using the other hand to measure your fellow pilot's attributes with callipers. So, if you interview anything like you post on here, you would have no hope of getting such a job. You just don't have the skills.

helimutt

4th Mar 2016, 15:45

Job Posting seen on a website:

Helicopter Pilot required

Skills required

Type rated and current on B212/412/S92/S61/S76/AW139/AW189
Balls the size of watermelons / Female pilot applications welcome but must have balls

Ability to use Vernier Calipers
10 experience in Offshore flying
10 years experience onshore HEMS flying
10 years experience onshore VIP flying
15 minutes SAR experience because thats all you need to be an ace
5 years Mil flying
NVG
Know when to keep quiet
Know when to pipe up
Enjoy the smell of rubber
Enjoy having the piss taken by management at every downturn

Have I missed anything?

500e

4th Mar 2016, 15:51

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 16:24

Toung in cheek or am I missing something

But a pilot's attributes and relevant skill set are nevertheless important, for example an ability to get on with your colleague who has to sit next to you for maybe 8 hours is more important than the ability to fly an ILS in a gale AP out with one hand

Helimutt - yup, I think you have everything covered.

500e in a MP environment on a modern highly automated aircraft, CRM/MCC is more important that some ball-clutching feat of heroic flying. The former is required day to day and failure to get that bit right causes a lot of problems and even accidents. The latter will never be needed except in the pilot's wet dreams. So give me the former every time. That's life in modern aviation. If you think it should be otherwise, get a job cattle mustering in a ropey piston heli with no hydraulic boost, it will suit you better.

I'm guessing you don't operate in a multi pilot airline-type role, otherwise you would understand.

DOUBLE BOGEY

4th Mar 2016, 16:48

Oh.......HC, you keep pushing Crabs buttons!

I thought the key attribute of a NS pilot was his/her ability to consume their body weight in bacon rolls each month without dying.

God I miss those bacon rolls and a big shout out to the Clyde! Best breakys on the NS!

Also the ubiquitous "Millionaires Slice". Got to be lesson number one on offshore catering school course!

Let's talk more about food while we wait for something official bout the 76.

If we gonna thread creep lets go somewhere more interesting than testicles (steady HC), calliper so and the worn out Mil versus Civvy debate. Civvies suck anyway! I hated my mum and dad when I realised they were civvies!

RyRy

4th Mar 2016, 16:52

Anyone have info on which companies are now bidding, or "allowed" to bid?

I'm sure CHC would jump at it, but unsure if they've kissed enough rings to be given a fair chance after the train wreck with Aero.

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 17:51

Oh.......HC, you keep pushing Crabs buttons!

Yes, but then they are EMORMOUS buttons. Allegedly.

Rotorbee

4th Mar 2016, 17:55

RyRy, don't ruin a perfectly good thread with factual information or questions. I still can't sleep.

One wonders if HC and Crab know each other personally and after a few beers in the pub, go home and are digitally at each others throat the rest of the night.

Torquestripe = most britmil aviators are pilots first (despite what some in the heirarchy pretend) and soldiers/sailors first.

Err, what?

HeliComparator

4th Mar 2016, 18:27

One wonders if HC and Crab know each other personally and after a few beers in the pub, go home and are digitally at each others throat the rest of the night.

No, I think I can safely say we have never shared a set of callipers.

[email protected]

5th Mar 2016, 06:46

HC As to NS flying being undemanding, it is generally routine, I'll grant you. But a pilot's attributes and relevant skill set are nevertheless important, for example an ability to get on with your colleague who has to sit next to you for maybe 8 hours is more important than the ability to fly an ILS in a gale AP out with one hand, whilst using the other hand to measure your fellow pilot's attributes with callipers. So, if you interview anything like you post on here, you would have no hope of getting such a job. You just don't have the skills. Whereas on a SAR flight you have to be able to enjoy your full crew's company for a 24-hour shift in close proximity as well as flying for hours day and night with them and persuading them that you have the skills to put their lives at risk in order to save the lives of others.

You won't have had to put brave and highly skilled friends over the side of your helicopter on a very thin piece of wire in horrendous weather to do their job whilst they are relying 100% on your 'redundant' flying skills to keep them from smashing into rocks/boats/cliffs/mountains. Oh and that might include flying a manual ILS to get back to the hospital:E

If you want to lecture someone about CRM I think SAR crews probably have forgotten more about it than you have ever experienced:ok:

Rotrbee - torquestripe was highlighting that he avoided the mil because he wanted to fly straight away rather than spending years on the ground first, but that is exactly what the mil do, less than a year of basic training and then straight into a cockpit.

HeliComparator

5th Mar 2016, 15:11

If you want to lecture someone about CRM I think SAR crews probably have forgotten more about it than you have

Maybe. But since in military jargon CRM is Calliperise Round Manbits I'm not sure I knew much about it in the first place.

Fareastdriver

5th Mar 2016, 19:22

Give it rest., will you. Your're getting boring.

[email protected]

5th Mar 2016, 19:34

No-one is making you read it:ok:

pilot and apprentice

5th Mar 2016, 20:25

No, but it is all in a thread devoted to something else.

Having to wade through pages of pi$$ing match while waiting for word on the real issue is tiresome. We have to look to see if the new post is at all relevant

gulliBell

5th Mar 2016, 22:45

The Bristow S76 fleet is back flying again in Nigeria, they must have passed all the audits etc with flying colours. Also interesting to note they intend continuing with all their existing contracts.

What a relief, back to business as usual. It's like as if nothing happened.

Latest News - bristowgroup.com (http://bristowgroup.com/bristow-news/latest-news/2016/bristow-resumes-service-sikorsky-s-76-aircraft-nig/)

RyRy

5th Mar 2016, 23:25

So I'm sure the veil of secrecy will be lifted any moment now, and we can finally know what actually happened.

tgvbhy15

6th Mar 2016, 09:41

Don't hold your breath. We'll never know the truth about what went on. If and when a report comes out it will be no doubt a decaf version with lots of Bristow propaganda of Target zero. The combination of Nigeria and Bristow is very murky and crooked. Ask anyone. But you'll have a very difficult time finding the truth about that too. After all, we're all threatened daily with the possibility of loosing our jobs (expats) and right now, getting another job somewhere else is very tricky. We're just pilots, not MDs.

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

7th Mar 2016, 07:51

Relieved and happy for all, safe flying :ok:

[email protected]

7th Mar 2016, 10:58

Is the term 'whitewash' considered racist in Nigeria?:E

Greeny9

7th Mar 2016, 11:31

One week(ish) from being grounded, all offshore operators told not to use Bristow's, a full and comprehensive audit?? on all aspects of the operation (Ops, maint, etc etc), report written by auditors, submitted to NCAA and NNPC for consideration and all back flying a few days later!

Yes, that is perfectly normal!!!

imuney

7th Mar 2016, 12:22

The exchange of stuffed brown envelopes expedites these comprehensive audits enormously in this part of the world. Or was it the hat in hand admission that this was a human/CRM issue rather than mechanical?
Anyway, I'm glad everything is back to normal and the logic free zone will continue to expand :D

peterperfect

8th Mar 2016, 20:56

So which organisation/audit consultancy firm did the assurance audit that got them flying again ?

keithl

8th Mar 2016, 21:08

gulliBell

9th Mar 2016, 05:13

If this whole episode becomes purely a Nigeria "thing" then unlikely anything to be learned that can be applied to the real world, in which case I'd rapidly lose any further interest. Leave them all to their own train wreck, not of my concern at all. I've done enough time in Nigeria to know my time there was enough.

Senior Pilot

9th Mar 2016, 05:58

Did anyone else notice a couple of posts disappear just then?

Yes, yes, I know deletions happen for various reasons, but at my age I need reassurance that I wasn't imagining things.
News about resignations for example. Be careful, you could cause me to make a quite unnecessary doctor's appointment.

No.

The last deletion was on the 2nd March by a Rotorhead removing his own post commenting on an inappropriate remark by someone else, which was deleted after a report/complaint.

nbl

9th Mar 2016, 07:34

Did anyone else notice a couple of posts disappear just then?

Yes, yes, I know deletions happen for various reasons, but at my age I need reassurance that I wasn't imagining things.
News about resignations for example. Be careful, you could cause me to make a quite unnecessary doctor's appointment.
No need for the doctor - I saw them as well. :confused:

Senior Pilot

9th Mar 2016, 08:14

No need for the doctor - I saw them as well. :confused:

You'll need to be more specific then, because we have a full edit history of this thread and there are no deletions or edits (apart from keithl latest post) in the past seven days.

212man

9th Mar 2016, 08:15

News about resignations for example

Is that not in the West Africa thread?

Senior Pilot

9th Mar 2016, 08:18

Is that not in the West Africa thread?

Which hasn't had a post edited for more than a month :p

nbl

9th Mar 2016, 08:54

SP - They are in the whats new in west africa thread. Beats me?

Senior Pilot

9th Mar 2016, 08:58

SP - They are in the whats new in west africa thread.

They are: and nothing there has been deleted nor edited for over a month :=

This post (http://www.pprune.org/9303815-post5220.html) is still there, but there seems a reluctance to accept it. The old censorship bogey?

Blue

You are right.

The BHNL Dierctor has resigned. Currently replaced temporarily by Mike Imlach. The Pan African MD has also resigned I hear.

Phone Wind

9th Mar 2016, 09:33

nbl and keithl,
There's no great mystery or conspiracy here. I contacted the site administrators about a post which I believed to be libellous and they apparently thought so too as it was removed. I contacted another poster about a reference he had made to the removed post, with individual names and he/she was kind enough to remove that post too.

immuney,
Brown envelopes in Nigeria are long gone for Bristow. This may well be what caused the action by NAPIMS. NAPIMS is a part of the disgraced NNPC which has long been mired in corruption as a result of which yesterday the government announced that it is being split into 7 operations units and 20 separate companies.

gulliBell,
Although no longer grounded, sadly not all the S76 fleet is back flying and there is a possibility some of them will not return to the contracts they were formerly on which would obviously lead to further redundancies.

peterperfect,
The fleet was allowed to fly by the NCAA after Bristow conducted checks and audits acceptable to them. The external audit is still in progress and is being conducted by the UK company AviateQ International whose details are available on their company website.

Unlike some of the naysayers on here, I for one wish Bristow every success in getting as many aircraft as possible back on contract.

rotor-rooter

9th Mar 2016, 09:48

nowherespecial

9th Mar 2016, 09:53

Phone,

I think the comment about BRS and envelopes is accurate to some extent but it does not disguise the fact that long standing BRS customers in Nigeria are writing tenders that they know only BRS can accommodate. Precisely where that falls under FCPA and other Anti Bribery legislation is unclear but it does smell a bit when operators write a tender they know only 1 party can respond to. Why would they do that? I doubt they'd get a good rate if only 1 party replies. Maybe there's something else at play?

Bravo73

9th Mar 2016, 10:17

A rather innocuous stand down?

AIB issues preliminary report on Bristow helicopter?s crash | National Mirror (http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/aib-issues-preliminary-report-on-bristow-helicopters-crash/)

This is the photo which accompanies that report:

http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Bristow-Helicopters-crashed.jpg

That should confuse the issue nicely!

212man

9th Mar 2016, 11:22

Yes, another example of those incompetent local crews flying serviceable aircraft into the water. Where are all those expats when you need them? Oh, wait......

soggyboxers

9th Mar 2016, 11:48

nowherespecial,
You talk about it being a 'fact' that long-standing Bristow customers in Nigeria are writing tenders that they know only Bristow can fulfil. If it's a fact, then substantiate it. If not I'll treat it as yet more rubbish on this thread on which so much drivel has been spouted.

nowherespecial

9th Mar 2016, 11:55

Soggy,

So touchy. OK so lets call a spade a spade: XOM with the tender which states S76D experienced operators only. Only operator at time of writing was BRS. XOM knew that. Hard to compete with that knowing how long it takes to get new ac into the country and BRS being launch customer.

Happy?

212man

9th Mar 2016, 12:11

Only operator at time of writing was BRS. XOM knew that.

I wonder where the XOM Aviation management come from....

nowherespecial

9th Mar 2016, 12:25

Oh 212..... nail head etc :ok:

soggyboxers

9th Mar 2016, 15:42

nowherespecial,
'XOM with tender which states S76D experienced operators only', is merely what you are saying and you have substantiated nothing.
Some XOM management in Houston (which after all is where these things are actually decided) may be ex-Bristow as are a lot of aviation managers in many oil companies. That's scarcely surprising as Bristow is one if the world's largest operators and has both trained and employed from other sources a lot of good aviators. In Nigeria that a lot of Nigerian aviation managers in oil companies are ex-Bristow is scarcely surprising when Bristow was the only company paying for ab-initio helicopter training for very many years

Bravo73

9th Mar 2016, 15:57

Yes, another example of those incompetent local crews flying serviceable aircraft into the water. Where are all those expats when you need them? Oh, wait......

Apologies for the slight thread drift but do we know that it was a 'serviceable aircraft'? Was any report ever published (for public consumption)?

nowherespecial

9th Mar 2016, 17:11

Soggy, have you read the tender? It's not public source so I will not be able to share it openly but I feel like I'm talking from a position of strength on this topic having, you know, read it.

212man

9th Mar 2016, 17:30

Apologies for the slight thread drift but do we know that it was a 'serviceable aircraft'? Was any report ever published (for public consumption)?

Yes, and yes and no. Well, serviceable in respect of its flying functions but the WX RADAR was u/s (can't remember if totally or partially). Report was internal to BHL and although it 'padded things out' with micro-burst discussions and comments about Wx forecasting, for the lay audience, it appeared - to me - that it was a classic case of loss of IAS whilst turning 'blind' 180 degrees in a DVE, with both sets of eyes outside. Caught too late to avoid water contact after power application.

Bravo73

9th Mar 2016, 17:55

Yes, and yes and no. Well, serviceable in respect of its flying functions but the WX RADAR was u/s (can't remember if totally or partially). Report was internal to BHL and although it 'padded things out' with micro-burst discussions and comments about Wx forecasting, for the lay audience, it appeared - to me - that it was a classic case of loss of IAS whilst turning 'blind' 180 degrees in a DVE, with both sets of eyes outside. Caught too late to avoid water contact after power application.

Thanks. If I can find the old thread, it might be worth copying that post over to there.

megan

10th Mar 2016, 00:33

Pardon my ignorance 212, but what is DVE? And thanks in advance, would have been nice to see the report since we can all learn, being the whole point behind reports after all.

finalchecksplease

10th Mar 2016, 05:24

Megan,

Degraded Visual Environment is a term coined for environmental conditions that impair the visual orientation of a helicopter pilot during flight or landing. These conditions include brown-out, but also white-out, night, glare, fog & mist (and any combination of these). DVE can lead to reduced situational awareness (SA), increased pilot workload, and the partial or total loss of aircraft control.

https://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Final%20Report%20EASA.2011.02.pdf

Cheers,

Finalchecksplease

rileyemi

10th Mar 2016, 05:59

Off subject, just heard Aero Contractors C/P has been recruiting capable 139 pilots as they are taking over the AGIP contract with four 139's. He has made quite a few phone calls. Any comments as again Bristow loses another contract. When will they just throw in the towel and realize the Nationalization program will never fly (pardon the pun) and corruption has been and always will be the way of life in that country.
:=

Nescafe

10th Mar 2016, 08:38

I can hear it now

Aero Contractors CP "Are you capable, we're only hiring capable guys?"

Pilot "If I was capable, I wouldn't be applying to you!"

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

13th Mar 2016, 11:58

BKJ crew had DVE ? Au contaire. Farnborough analysed all cockpit/aircraft data and concluded it was caused by a microburst.

NEO

Copterline 103

13th Mar 2016, 21:17

Farnborough analysed all cockpit/aircraft data and concluded it was caused by a microburst.

In the Baltic Sea accident there was intentions to explain helicopter's loss of the controllability by "water spout theory". A lot of efforts were made by the interest party to have a focus outside of the helicopter.

This 3rd of February accident case looks like to have similarities that the Baltic Sea Accident had. All information is hidden, reports are delayed and even the preliminary report is ready but not published yet.

NCAA has ordered an additional maintenance checks to be completed within 72 hours. If you are looking ATA numbers you are able to "locate the area of technical interest".
Bristow's legal Director Tolu Olubajo has stated on the 10th of March that all the Sikorsky S76 series pilots will be sent on simulator training "...we have sent all pilots on simulator.... simulator training on current handling of the aircraft, we are conducting test like hydraulic test....

For me this all is telling the area of interest (mandatory additional maintenance within next 72 hours and the focus for "hydraulic test". The S76 hydraulic text is the Stick Jump Test. This test is checking that the both channels of each Servo Actuator is in the same condition. This check is only able to isolate defaults if the leakage rate is different on # 1 and #2 channel.

The idea of microburst is like an idea of water spouts. If the case has been a microburst or even several microburst case the helicopter wouldn't be affected long time of these microbursts. The helicopter should be recovered and after this the helicopter should normally be flyable. The event "loss of helicopter controllability" was located quite far away from shore line. What is the likelhood for microburst's so faraway from shoreline??? Why the problem persisted for a long tiem and finally ended with the controlled landing to the sea?

I would like to see the FDR data and to have information is the hydraulic fluid contaminaed. If the hydraulic fluid is contaminated then the problem is in the Servo Actuator. This Servo Actuator default without any cautions (Master Caution and Servo Jam) helicopter will come unflyable.

This all above could be a relevant also in to 12th August, 2015 accident. The top question is "is the fluid contaminated or not?"

I really hope that I'm wrong!

industry insider

13th Mar 2016, 21:39

Copterline

Waterspout was relating to BKJ which was a 332L not an S-76.

August 15 accident has no determined official cause but since nothing has come out of the NAIB other than the control rod end, you can draw your own conclusions (which you clearlly have already done)

3rd February accident will not show any mechanical defects with the aircraft which would make it necessary to ditch.

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

13th Mar 2016, 21:49

Copterline,

We are definitely posting at cross purposes ?!

Cheers,

NEO

Keke Napep

14th Mar 2016, 01:20

NEO,
There is no report on 5N-BKJ on the UK AAIB website. I thought it was the Bristow global safety department in Aberdeen which concluded that it was caused by a microburst (nothing to do with a waterspout as mentioned by II).

Geoffers,
I think your explanation of the Taiwanese CG crash is more likely from my experiences flying Dauphins in my last company, though I await the official report rather than indulge in speculation.

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

14th Mar 2016, 07:20

Keke,

IIRC in the case of BKJ the microburst conclusion was reached after Farnborough analysed the data having been requested to do so by the NAAIB.

Although a lot of water has passed under the bridge and I stand to be corrected.

Cheers,

NEO

industry insider

18th Mar 2016, 08:55

HeliComparator

18th Mar 2016, 09:10

Here is the prelim report:

http://www.aib.gov.ng/files/pre-report-bristow-5N-BQJ.pdf

Yaw trim issue, fighting the DAFCS and maybe some uncoupling and PIO? Combined with a mental picture of August 12th?

So do you think the mentioned instrument problems were imaginary, or linked to some sort of electrical issue with the DAFCS? (I've no idea how the avionics works on a S76).

Anyway the fact they made a fully controlled ditching with no damage presumably means they were actually in full control even though they didn't think so.

Copterline 103

18th Mar 2016, 17:15

Yaw trim issue,fighting the DAFCS and maybe some uncoupling and PIO? Combined with a mentalpicture of August 12th?So do you think the mentioned instrument problemswere imaginary, or linked to some sort of electrical issue with the DAFCS?

I have more than 4.500hours on type (S76C+) and more than 10.000 hours to study S76 flight control systems, S76 accidents where the loss of the controllability has been an issue. Also I have studied a lot of related accidents (H-53 and UH-60 the loss of controllability). In addition I have had a access to read more than 60.000 pages of non-public documents of this issue.

The investigators should have also an different approach. It looks that they are now following (preliminary report) the consequences, not the root cause.

The cause of TRIM and DAFSC caution could be also related to a jam or a partial jam of the helicopter flight control system. If the there are a jamming somewhere in flight control system (Servo Actuators, Control tubes and rods, Mixing Unit) it is possible that the Mixing Unit's mechanical compensations are really "mixing helicopter's steering" and the helicopter flight controls responses will come illogical. This could be the reason why the helicopter has come partial unflyable.

The perliminary report is stating:
1. TRM FAIL lights illuminated twice and were reset on the outboard leg
2. The EHSI and compass, the instrument readings inaccurate/inconsistent, the aircraft started a turn to the right with a high rate of decent
3. The PF called my attention to the collective being heavy and the power dropping anytime he pulled to maintain power
4. I noticed the controls not responding properly
5. I noticed the cyclic not responding to lateral movement
6. Relayed message "Okey they lost all their instruments"
7. Relayed message by two aircrafts "the aircraft was not responding to controls inputs"

The reasons for 1 to 7 findings could be:
1. There are partial jamming and the helicopter is not able to maintain stabilization or autopilot commands ==> the stabilization deviation or the system deviation will activate TRIM and DAFCS cautions
2. The possibility that system EHSI #1 and #2 together with compass will come crazy at the sametime is impossible ==> the most likely the helicopter has been acting precisely as flight insturument's information to the crew has been or what they have been able to see on the instruments
3. The collective "heavy" and "the power dropping anytime he pulled to maintain power" ==> the most likely this indicates that the problem has been in Servo Actuators side because two independent hydraulic system will keep the hydraulic power needed all the time. The cause could be a partial "kick back of the ServoActuator channel I or channel II jamming (without any Servo Jam caution as onthe other cases has been).
4. The controls are not responding ==> the cause could be in the servo actuator (swash plate position is not in correct position as it should be for stady flight and the autopilot computer are indicating this as a deviation and activates TRIM FAIL and DAFCS cautions. This together with Sikorsky's Mixing Unitis really mixing helicopter controllability (if this was the case then the crewand all passengers are very lucky that the helicopter wouldn't come totally unflyable and the decision making by the Captain has been a brilliant life saving action).
5. "The cyclic not responding to lateral movement" ==> as stated on 4. and the FDR read out will have the readings of all controls position vs. the helicopter attitude and ....."
6. "Okey they lost all their instruments" ==> impossible situation for a Certified Transportation category helicopter and the loss of "magnetic compass"confirms that the readings has been the most likely correct behaving of the helicopter in IMC and the helicopter has been in partially unflyable (loss of controllability from 3000 ft. to 1500 ft.)

These findings 1 to 7 is not supporting the theory that the root case is TRIM FAIL or / and DAFSC FAIL. The most likely these cautions has come after the helicopter DAFSC system (autopilot computers are realizing that the control of stabilization has been lost) and the Autopilot computers has been generating these cautions.

The main question will be: What about hydraulic fluid contamination? If the cause is the jam in the Servo Actuators (e.g. pistons) the Teflon-Carbon piston rings will make the fluid almost immediately to look dark black and also some of the debris’s could be identified in the hydraulic fluid.

The root cause and consequences should be identified and separated. A lot of information could be picked up from the helicopter’s DAU, GPS/FMS, on other data systems which collects data in addition of the FDR and the CVR.

I would like to know: is the hydraulic fluid contaminated or not? This question NO or YES is very important to analyze the root cause and this information could be a very important for the future actions to maintain the safety of the crew menbers and the passegers.

I hope that I’m wrong!

Copterline 103

18th Mar 2016, 21:42

"Investigation so far discovered some defects with both the Cockpit Image Recording and the Flight Data Recording Systems. The Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU) also indicated internal FAULT. A significant number of the parameters on the FDR data such as heading, cyclic, collective and yaw control inputs were not retrieved."

Hah, hah!

Sorry to say but not nothing new since 1979.

gulliBell

19th Mar 2016, 01:39

What is particularly interesting is AP2 cycled off/on 5 times in the cruise at 3000' before the rapid descent, and AP1 cycled off/on twice over the same period. Both times AP1 went off AP2 also went off. That has to be an action of the crew, because whilst an AP can switch itself off for whatever reason (e.g. electrical interruption), the only way it can come on again is by pilot action. And both AP switching themselves off at the same time is impossible to believe.

AP2 is powered off the essential bus, as are the stick trims. Interruption of essential bus power the collective stick trim system no longer holds the collective in the set position and it will probably lower slightly. This is consistent with observation of the FP reporting to the Captain. Passenger reporting burning smell on the previous sector could also be indicative of an electrical problem. Spinning EHSI might also be indicative of an electrical problem (the report didn't mention whether both were spinning, I would be surprised if both EHSI were doing the same thing). The spinning compass makes no sense. The standby magnetic compass is completely removed from the electrical systems, it just aligns itself with the earths magnetic field and the aircraft pivots around the compass fixed in space. If the compass was spinning, it is the aircraft spinning around the compass. It is impossible to believe the aircraft was spinning.

Also the Captain report of the aircraft not responding to lateral cyclic movement is impossible to believe, unless the control itself couldn't move which would be indicative of a mechanical jam forward of the mixing unit, or a lateral cyclic damper jam. If the control moves but the aircraft fails to respond, a control tube has come undone and it would be impossible to land the aircraft.

Without the full set of FDR data this one will take quite a bit of thinking to sort out what was real, and what might have been confused.

I am wrecking my brains contemplating why a crew might switch an AP off/on 7 times during the course of a flight. Reason being. An AP that keeps turning itself off is telling you that it doesn't want to be turned back on again, so leave it off. Or, if there is an AFCS malfunction of some sort, if turning an AP off/on once doesn't solve the problem, turning it off/on another 2+ times isn't likely to result in a different outcome.

It is an onerous responsibility on a pilot to decide to land a $10 million helicopter on the ocean with 11 people on board, particularly for a Captain with only 306 hours PIC time. Very lucky that the sea state was calm.

picudo

19th Mar 2016, 18:41

Copterline 103

19th Mar 2016, 19:50

I had same problem in one S76C+ in Nigeria also. 7000 feet IFR bad weather, both channels AP1 and 2 went to off at same time, I went down looking for VFR conditions flying with stand by horizon (analog), 300 feet I got VFR conditions, copilot tried several times to recover APs as emergency check list demand, pulling CB on top Pilot head, but never wait 5 seconds to back in, and then press APs switches, on VFR conditions we followed step by step emergency procedures, recovered the APs and back home (Port Harcourt)

AP1 and AP2 are isolated systems with different AP computers, different electric sources..... AP systems can't have any failure at same time (AP1 and AP2). It will be easy to understand that this dual AP failure is a consequence.

AP1/2 system will be automatically switched off if the autopilot systems electrical line actuators are not able to maintain selected couplings or if the autopilot system is not able to maintain helicopter's stability (AHRS information vs. helicopter selected heading and attitude is deviated).

The most likely the dual AP failure is a consequence and the root cause could be a blockage or a partial blockage of the flight control system.

Did you make an incident report of this dual AP failure? What was the company's conclusion for this event?

A half an year I was contacted by a pilot who has been able to follow very closely of two different events where (S76) the flight controls temporary jammed during flight. A few years later he was interested in to know what was the company's safety management systems conclusion of these two events. This major operator's (SMS) event dats base was clean and noboby could not memorized that these event has ever happen. It's like this FDR, FDAU, CAMERAS data are missing of 3rd February, 2016 accident. Coincidence?

12th August, 2016 S76C+ total loss of controllability! (six kills) Coincidence?

3rd February, 2016 S76C++ partial loss of controllability? Coincidence?

10th August, 2005 S76C+ total jamming of flight controls and total loss of helicopter's controllability (14 kills) Coincidence?

S76 helicopters are certified according Transportation category (FAA) and should not come suddenly unflyable without any warning - caution!

Troglodita

19th Mar 2016, 20:18

Picudo (Spanish for weevil)

Did your co-pilot try pushing the AP RESET buttons rather than "pulling circuit breakers on top pilots head"?

Then wait until the respective off flags had cleared on the respective EADI's before attempting to re-engage AP1 and AP2?

May have had more success!

Just a thought!

Trog

gulliBell

19th Mar 2016, 21:01

@picudo. In that example, why did you need to fly on the standby attitude indicator? Are you saying you had a total loss of electrical power resulting in AP1/2 off and both EADI/EHSI off, etc etc?

picudo

19th Mar 2016, 21:16

gulliBell

19th Mar 2016, 23:03

I wasn't aware CHC were teaching that condition. I don't demonstrate or train AP off flying with students (either VMC or IMC) unless they can first complete all the other training sequences with both AP on. If we complete all the syllabus training within the allocated time to an acceptable standard then we will attempt AP off flying. I don't recall ever seeing a student get from IMC to VMC with both AP off. After double AP failure in IMC the students are usually totally out of control within about 10 seconds.

megan

20th Mar 2016, 01:57

AP1 and AP2 are isolated systems with different AP computers, different electric sources..... AP systems can't have any failure at same time (AP1 and AP2).Yes they can, because I've had it. Trouble is, I can't recall the root cause (we're talking 20 or more years ago), but the regulator was wondering if the aircraft should be certified IFR capable with such a single point failure. Nothing eventuated. Contact with Australian ATSB or the CASA Moorabbin office should elicit a copy of the incident report.

gulliBell

20th Mar 2016, 02:19

...simultaneous AP failure is about as likely as both engines failing at the same time, not something to be too worried about I should think.

In the Nigeria accident the FDR shows both AP were on when it ditched. I'm curious why they were flying/hovering around for 5 minutes at 25 knots or less when faced with a malfunction so dire that required a ditching: you'd think the landing profile would be more timely (unless it's a recording anomaly with the aircraft engines left running for a few minutes whilst in marine mode). This together with the seven AP2 resets and two AP1 resets has me quite puzzled.

industry insider

20th Mar 2016, 09:10

Much easy to me fly analog horizon with no APs than EFIS (very sensitive), if you have a chance try it to fly IFR conditions with no APs, with EFIS equipment, you will have a lot of fun. After that emergency CHC start to train crews in the sim with that condition

But not too hard to fly the EFIS AP out if you slow down to 120 knots, especially if you have selected the AP off so you know its coming.

I still see no real reason for a ditching here.

gulliBell

20th Mar 2016, 09:18

Has there been any mention whether the CVR was operative? Or was it like the FDR, didn't record much of what it was supposed to record.

Copterline 103

20th Mar 2016, 12:22

@gulliBell
AP2 is powered off the essential bus, as are thestick trims. Interruption of essential bus power the collective stick trimsystem no longer holds the collective in the set position and it will probablylower slightly. This is consistent with observation of the FP reporting to theCaptain

This is not consistent with your conclusion of loss of the force trim. PF’s statement is “the collective being heady and the power dropping anytime he pulled to maintain power” and this doesn't support your conclusion that the case is the lost of the Force Trim.

The most likely scenario is the jamming or the partial jamming of one rod of flight controls. If one of the rods is jammed then the whole rod line is jammed. The jamming could be located in to the Mixing Unit, or before or after the Mixing Unit. If the jamming is in somewhere in the rod line of the collective then the collective movements are transferred via Mixing unit forward. Because of the collective rod line in not able to move (due to jamming) then the whole movement of PF’s collective will be transferred to be movements of the other freely moving flight control rods (collective rod line stucked or partial stucked).

If the case is that the “the collective rod is jammed” (doesn’t matter where) but still the collective is able to move even its feels very heavy (“The PF called my attention to the collective being heavy and the power dropping anytime he pulled to maintain power”). In this case the all of the collective movements has been transferred only to the Mixing unit’s compensating rods. Then the all movements of collective rod have been transferred in to Mixing Unit’s only the freely moving rods. These only freely moving rods will transfer PF’s control inputs incorrectly. This has the most likely caused the loss of the controllability of the helicopter.

It doesn't matter which "control rod line is affected" the Mixing Unit behaves like in the scenario of jammed collective rod. In every case the jamming on of the control rod line is "really mixing helicopter's steering and it will make the helicopter's flight controls to be illogical. This scenario will be the most likely and it will lead to the loss of the helicopter controllability or partial controllability and to the situation where the helicopter is unflyable.

@gulliBell
...simultaneous AP failure is about as likely as both engines failing at the same time.

I agree that! It is possible to lose both of the AP's at same time. It will be very likely in a case where e.g. the flight controls are jammed or partial jammed. In this situation where the helicopter AP computers / electrical line actuators are not able to maintain a helicopter's stability or AP computers commands to the line actuators has lost. If this is the situation then the AP1 and AP2 will be kicked off immediately (ATT and SAS modes).

I assume that the "loss of the autopilots" means in this case that they have lost the both of ATT and SAS modes?

These both scenarios are logical, and it will not be a surprise to for certain S76 accident investigators of accidents which have occuered in tha past.

Copterline 103

20th Mar 2016, 12:41

@megan
Yes they can, because I've had it. Trouble is, I can't recall the root cause (we're talking 20 or more years ago), but the regulator was wondering if the aircraft should be certified IFR capable with such a single point failure. Nothing eventuated. Contact with Australian ATSB or the CASA Moorabbin office should elicit a copy of the incident report.

I did that already 2008. I got the incident report and other related material from Australian ATSB.

Think about it? Is this event to the lose of Dual AP's a root cause or is this the consequence? For me it was very clear after receiving these Australina ATSB's document which was verified and evaluated together with the other non-public documents which were on my hands.

This is a known issue in general but the all related documentations are non-public and classify. You can wonder why?

gulliBell

20th Mar 2016, 13:40

@Copterline 103. I disagree with much of your #505. The PF reporting heavy collective doesn't mean he needs more force than normal to move the collective, it's just his way of expression to describe the collective not remaining where he left it (because the collective force trim is no longer holding it in position).

Binding in the controls must be before the mixing unit if only one axis is affected, in this case only lateral control problem was reported. There is nothing I've seen here to indicate any binding in the collective, and nothing to indicate any hydraulic servo actuator problem.

I do not see anything to suggest the AP turning itself off (due to flight control binding or whatever). The FDR shows the AP turning off and then back on again within only a few seconds, which to me says the AP turning off was by pilot action (in all 9 instances). I would expect to see FDR data show the AP off for a much longer period before coming on again if it had turned itself off, because generally it takes pilots a while to notice that a single AP has dropped off.

The AP were never lost, the FDR shows they were on all the time (except when they were cycled off/on several times presumably by pilot diagnostic action).

Obviously something happened to spook the crew, my bet is an electrical gremlin of some sort got interpreted as a mechanical problem. A crew wouldn't ditch a helicopter for an electrical problem unless it was an electrical fire that couldn't be contained following emergency checklist action. The salt water bath all the electrical bits and pieces received wouldn't be helpful for replicating the problem, but the cause of a burning smell reported should leave some physical evidence in a loom or other component that an investigator could find.

Copterline 103

20th Mar 2016, 22:50

@gulliBell
Binding in the controls must be before the mixing unit if only one axis is affected, in this case only lateral control problem was reported. There is nothin

I have been able to study Sikorsky’s GEN HEL Simulator data together with the integrated EASY/ADAMS modeling analyzes. This modeling will explain how the S76 series helicopter‘s flight control systems behaves in certain situation and how the aerodynamics behaves on these situations.

Before Mixing Unit there are four different rods which will bring PF’s controls inputs to the Mixing Unit. The PF’s controls inputs are shared with the all other dimensions inside the Mixing Unit (lateral servo bell crank, the aft servo mixer, the collective pitch mixer, and collective roll mixer and the forward (quad) yaw angle). After the Mixing Unit there are three control rods which will transfer control rods inputs to the three Servo Actuators (via three control rod tubes, each one to the each Servo Actuator).

In the past the accident investigators have been able to simulate a blockage of some of the control rods by using this GenHel simulator and ADAMS –EASY5 software modelling. The test findings were that if one of the rods is blocked by a locking pin (which means that the whole specific rod line is blocked). After this simulated blockage the investigators made a simulation by the GenHel / ADAMS-EASY5 simulator – modeling. The simulation was run for 11 seconds, 1100 output steps, completing the full simulation.

This GenHel simulation data has been compared to the FDR’s print outs. The simulation data was fully matching FDR’s data from the 10th August, 2005 S76C+ accident in the BalticSea.

I have good understanding how the S76 flight control behaves and what are the consequences and what is the root cause. Due to this I will still keep on my opinion and understanding how the S76 helicopter behaves and what might be the cause why S76 will come unflyable (if it will come unflyable, and how the helicopter will lose its controllability).

QUICK READ OUT FROM THE FDR’S PRINT OUT
The latest accident data 3rd February, 2016 (the parameters which was recovered from FDR data base) shows that the event has been started by a slight increase of IAS to 130-135 KTS (cruising speed has been a steady 125 KTS) and which after by pitch up (about +250 ft).

During next minute the helicopter ISA has dropped down to 90 KTS and the helicopter has started to descent.The descent rate after one minute after the event has been started was averagely –2100 ft. per minute but the last 40 seconds the descent rate has been almost double (4000 ft. per minute). During these first 20 seconds the IAS has been around 90 KTS but during the high rate of descent about 4000 ft. per minute the IAS has increased up to 148 KTS.

When the helicopter has reach 1000 ft. and immediately after this the helicopter has gain an additional altitude of + 500 ft. During this climb the IAS has drop down to 64 KTS. During these first two minutes the both of AP’s has been switched on and no MASTER WARNING or any CAUTION has exist. After these two minutes MASTER WARNING has illuminated for next 60 seconds without any CAUTIONS. The event has lasted an additional 20 minutes. The FDR data shows that the crew has had difficulties to maintain a constant IAS. The IAS has been fluctuated during the last 20 minutes. During the whole event the both AP’s has been switched on excluing on reset of AP1 and two reset of AP2 (this resets has happen about 10 minutes after the event has started when the IAS has been about 80 KTS and the ALTITUDE 1200 ft.).

It looks that the cruising IAS has been 125 KTS all the time since the helicopter has reach 3000 ft. altitude. Is this 125 KTS Bristow Company’s operating speed for S76C++ helicopter? Or is this an indication that the crew has already prepared to be faced some difficulties? Maybe due to the AP1’sand AP2’s repeated disengagement the crew has decided to use reduced cruising speed???
Whatever is the cause for this ditching this accident together with the other related accident is aserious situation for the S76 series heliopter. The future operation of S76 series helicopters will insist that this and the other accidents and quite many related incidents are carefully investigated.

I’m wondering how and why the FDR, FDAU and cockpit camera systems all data could be lost? Also the information of hydraulic fluid condition could be very valuable information to verify if the Servo Actuator’s do not have any inclusion. The information that the hydraulic fluid is clean or the hydraulic fluid is contaminated will be very important information for the decision making to maintain crew and passenger safety.

I hope that I’m wrong but all the facts and the knowledge are supporting my conclusions. Everyone have a right to have their own opinions and their own assumptions. I’m ready to defend my views if needed. I'm pleased to give more specific information if needed?