Vulcan: who pressed THE button?

[ShotOne]

A visit to the Vulcan cockpit at Woodford Avro Heritage Centre (highly recommended by the way) left me asking where in the cockpit a nuclear weapon would have been released from; button/key? And by which crew member?

[John Eacott]

It's all about the Vulcan ;)

In the Sea King there was an authorisation bit of switchology to be done in the front via a panel next to the pilot on the right cockpit wall, which also selected the yield.

The observer would then make the selections in the back to drop the Bomb, Aircraft, HE 600lb MC.

When the RAN purchased the Sea King the wiring was (inadvertantly?) included up to the cockpit. For many years it was thought to be the wiring for the heated clothing which the 817 crews thought to be fairly superfluous to their operating region. Nearly as superfluous as the real use for the wiring loom!

In the single pilot Wasp he did it all by himself, trusted by the ship to carry out directions over the radio :ok:

"Standy-by Dustbin, 2 minutes, Surface Zero Position"

Authentication.

"200ft, 100kts"

"Beware, Beware"

"Dustbin, Dustbin"

[tartare]

Still remember as a kid seeing a Wasp land on the deck of HMNZS Canterbury while she was docked at Lyttelton.
Seems extraordinary that little helicopter could deliver a WE.177 depth charge.
Yes, interested too to know who pressed the button in the Vulcan...

[Treble one]

On the recent Guy Martin documentary about XH558 he actually picked up and used the manual bomb release equipment in another Vulcan-I assume the Nav radar was responsible for that although I'm sure that was a back up to the automatic system (presumably different for the likes of YS than BS).


I do believe the Captain had to authorise release using some switches on a panel on his left hand side though (thought I saw that in another documentary)?

[50+Ray]

The weapon would have been released by a pulse from the NBS if a fully IMC attack was made, the Nav Radar having locked on to his offsets and the system working to specification. There were manual release buttons - one at the front between the pilots for instance - but the system was automated for night/IMC. Numerous checks and authentication procedures had to be complete before any weapon could be released. It was standard procedure to press all the buttons after the NBS release just to ensure the bomb bay was empty before closing the doors and legging it.

[tartare]

Excuse the ignorance - what does NBS stand for?
Navigation and Bombing System?
Hmm question answered I think?
http://www.tatjavanvark.nl/tvve/dduck0.html
Gosh - so it could be a fully automated process?
Makes sense I suppose, given the speed you are travelling at - the need for the weapon to fly the correct profile etc.
There must have been a point in programming the system where you were effectively committed to a release.
Perhaps the OP's question shouldn't have been who pushed the button, but who could abort the weapon release!

[John Eacott]

Still remember as a kid seeing a Wasp land on the deck of HMNZS Canterbury while she was docked at Lyttelton.
Seems extraordinary that little helicopter could deliver a WE.177 depth charge.

The RN WE177 was a smaller and lighter version of the weapon, hence the 600lb designation. Even so, it required the Wasp to be substantially lightened with extraneous seats, etc removed. The weapon was too long to be carried fore and aft as with the Mk 44, so it was offset with the nose to starboard & tail to port.

http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/we177-wasp.jpg

[tartare]

John I've always wondered what those large paddle things above each door were for?

[John Eacott]

John I've always wondered what those large paddle things above each door were for?

They are the flotation bags: designed to keep the aircraft afloat and recoverable, whilst keeping the crew underwater :hmm:

[The Oberon]

I'm sure P.N. will be along later but the automated NBS system went something like this. The Nav. Rad. lined up his range and bearing markers to the target using the target or offset returns, from this , and other inputs, height, airspeed and the ballistics of the weapon etc. I think there were 8 terms in the formula, the NBS calculated a steer signal, displayed on the pilot's panel, and a forward throw value which was displayed on the Nav Panel. The NBS took the forward throw value and used that to calculate 2 other pre release signals, Lock Out and Bomb Doors. Lock Out froze the system and prevented any further input changes from altering the forward throw value and Bomb Doors was a fixed value dependant on the time taken for the doors to open. When Range To Target equalled Forward Throw the weapon was released.


What crew actions were required to permit release I have no idea.

[BEagle]

The 2-man principle was intended to ensured that no 'unauthorised acts or incorrect procedures' were made when the crew was involved in nuclear weapon activity.

As 50+Ray states, it would be most likely that the weapon would have been released automatically. A sequence of checklist items involving the navigators and first pilot would ensure that the bomb would release when the NBS signal was given.

There was an 'instantaneous' manual release button on the centre console between the pilots and another on the co-pilot's side, which was routed via a time delay unit. Another manual release/TDU button was situated at the rear crew's station, as was the TDU. I guess there was another at the visual bombing position, but we never used that in my day.

V-force crews were subject to various security assessment checks; once the positive release code had been received there would have been no question of anyone being so disloyal as to try 'abort' nuclear weapon release.

The 'approved' visual bombing technique in my day included setting up the SFOM bomb sight and calculation of the correct TDU setting from the release initiation point. In practice it was simpler (and achieved better scores) if you tracked the target through the probe and pressed the centre console button just as you thought it was in line with the no. 3 rpm gauge.

We had a back-up dayglo band around the probe on one aircraft, it corresponded to the release parameters used for an earlier bomb comp. When asked at air shows why it was there, the usual reply was "It's just lipstick"...:eek:

[Pontius Navigator]

FT=Vg x (sqrt 2H/g+H dot/g+Tau+Time Advance) + H Tan Lamda x Cos delta

Vg = Groundspeed
H = Height
H dot = rate of climb/descent
Tau = Bomb ballistics IIRC
Time Advance = 0.55 seconds IIRC to allow for firing train
Lamda = trail angle
delta = drift

There are your 7 terms I think

Bomb doors took 7 seconds and would be opened by the NBS pulse

Lock out was IIRC 10.55 seconds

In the 70s it was decided that bomb doors should be opened manually somewhat earlier in case of unknown battle damage or the failure of one of the hydraulic pipes. BEagle would be better to advise on that as it was after my time.

Finally, Strangeglove like, it would have been possible to set the NBS on BOMB around 140 miles out, set all the switches, and then bail out. The main problem would have been the speed for a rear crew bail out if cruising at 325 kts or the risk of the auto pilot dropping out when the pilots stepped out.

[Pontius Navigator]

Just a point of the bomb firing button for the nav rad or visual bomb aimer; initially this was a simple bomb firing tit identical with that on WW2 bombers.

A simple wire to a small, bulb-like, housing with a protruding button. Someone twigged that this was not exactly a piece of sound engineering and it was replaced around 1965 with a flexible reinforced sheath around the cable, a substantial case, a recessed button and, I think, a metal flap that could be wire-locked shut with a tell-tale lead seal.

[BEagle]

During weapon acceptance, part of the check was that all bomb release button flaps were closed with a lead sealed restraint wire - and that it wasn't possible to reach the button without breaking the seal.

This was tested during the annual visit by the team from Collyweston - woe betide any crew who cocked up their weapon procedure. During one such visit, our Nav Radar brought the test to a halt by claiming that his bomb release button hadn't been sealed properly - although it didn't seem to have worried the previous 3 or 4 crews.....:(

We stopped the test, got out and waited for the loading team to reseal the nav's bomb tit. As I walked out of the zone, I noticed something metallic poking out of a pile of snow in front of one of the undercarriage legs. It was a large picketing pin - which would have undoubtedly have destroyed the tyres if the aircraft had been scrambled. So I picked it up and gave it to the WST umpire - "Oh bugger, we didn't put that there and no other crew noticed it...." I don't know what they decided, but we passed our test OK in the end.

I'm sure that we still used 'Bomb Doors...AUTO' when I was flying the Vulcan?

[Treble one]

Beagle, PN, thanks for that, fascinating stuff.


Personally, I'm glad you and your colleagues were there to prevent it having to happen for real. All due to the credibility of the deterrence you all manned so ably.


Many thanks
TO

[Pontius Navigator]

BEagle, having been on WST, we never criticised a crew where an issue was discovered after the event.

I did criticise a couple of sqn cdr though.

One, a frequent visitor to these rooms, gave an absolutely impecable performance during the questionnaire. So knowledgeable was he that I had to make an adverse comment as he had not allowed any of his crew to answer. While he didn't fail he put himself up for a retest at our second visit.

The other was my ex-boss. He and his crew swanned out to the aircraft, passed the RAFP and gathered at the locked entrance door. Meanwhile, in the line hut we waited with crew chief and 700. He was LIVID; he still failed :)

Another time with some Bucc crews, ex-V-Force that I knew, they suggested a reverse questionnaire. So I gave them the answers.

A. 46 metres. Q . . .

A. Flocculating particles. Q . . .

[t7a]

Q -NLZ?


Q - What do you get with a conventional only explosion?

[Pontius Navigator]

T7a,
Q1, close but no.
Q2, close too

V-bomber dispersal were set out 50 yards between centres. This set the distance between nuclear armed aircraft. When everything became metricated it became 46 metres. Really there was no logical reason why aircraft on large aprons should be parked at that interval.

The other question you suggested would have been What is single point safe?

[Above The Clouds]

Finally, Strangeglove like, it would have been possible to set the NBS on BOMB around 140 miles out, set all the switches, and then bail out. The main problem would have been the speed for a rear crew bail out if cruising at 325 kts or the risk of the auto pilot dropping out when the pilots stepped out.

Would it not have been better to stay with the aircraft and continue East or South instead of parachuting in to a burning waste land ?

[Pontius Navigator]

ATC, Sweden? Tall leggy blondes, beautiful furs or rancid butter, animal skins and a comfy yurt. Difficult choice.

The continue east suggestion was actually a realistic option for CENTO missions with UK some 3000-4000 miles away. For western Russia there were other options, how realistic I could not say.

[PersonFromPorlock]

Sounds pretty much like the B-52: and in addition, in the overhead of the bomb/nav compartment, the BUF had a couple of pull-down handles that operated a (very last-ditch) cable system that dropped the bombs mechanically. Through the bomb bay doors, IIRC, but it's been forty years.

[Mick Stability]

Mmmmm, sorry to raise this.

Are your former duties still not covered under an act you signed?

[Pontius Navigator]

MS, indeed, however in addition to knowing that many of us also know the rules. THere are two topics that I would not comment upon and curiously have never been asked.

[charliegolf]

MS, indeed, however in addition to knowing that many of us also know the rules. THere are two topics that I would not comment upon and curiously have never been asked.

Holiday destinations would be one! (No question asked!)

CG

[charliegolf]

Q -NLZ?


Q - What do you get with a conventional only explosion?

No cigar?

CG

[PingDit]

The one incident that I do remember, was that at STM, the first pilot and Nav going through the cordon and then splitting up to check both the aircraft and the 177. They were both nearly shot by the surrounding US Marines! They never did it again! (2-man principle etc.)

[goudie]

We may assume that the nuclear bomb drill for the Vulcan equally applied to the other two V-bombers but what of the Canberra and Buccaneer?

[Kitbag]

Or even the single seaters; Jaguar, Harrier (did they carry THE bomb), and that Wasp with everything stripped out. How do you maintain the 2 man principle when erm... there weren't 2 men?

[pontifex]

I was involved with all this at the same time as PN. But, to be honest, I now find the whole thing rather distasteful. Surely we have moved on from such discussions.

[Pontius Navigator]

The Buccanner was an interesting case, well they all were really.

As the pilot couldn't see the nav and vice versa the control was split with both requiring to complete but only one to abort. In the training rig though they sat side by side.

On one check the nav made all the correct switch movements and reported the correct lamp indications. As the checker sitting behind and the pilot sitting to the side we both saw the nav make a further improper switch action. While the reported lamp indications were correct the weapon would have dudded. It was an automatic fail.

However my boss, an engineer, guessed that the Sqn Cdr wanted the man chopped and my boss did not want us to be responsible; that crew were rechecked and passed.

The Valiant (TBF), F4 and Canberra had a US system with different security arrangements. The Nimrod had a US weapon but procedures were more akin to British procedures.

I can't answer for the Jag - British single man (or F104 NATO single man)

[Pontius Navigator]

Pontiflex, I see your point but I think Peter Hennessey would disagree. Indeed in his radio broadcast cast, Finger on the Button, he had extracts from a drill on an SSBN and that it current ops.

The discussion is really how did it work, was it safe, and would we have done it.

[The Oberon]

Although I had NBS experience with free fall weapons, I had previously worked on Blue Steel Victors. As the Blue Steel had it's own inertial nav. was the same release precision required or was it just a case of being within range and launching in the general direction of the target ?

[tartare]

It's an important part of history Pontifex.
To stand under the Vulcan bomb bay at Hendon Museum and watch the film of a streamed take off brings home the terrible solemnity of what it would have been like if it had ever happened.
As does imagining being on board and seeing that blinding flash through the windows (probably the last thing your non-eye patched eye would see).
Personally, as a child of the digital age, it's highly instructive to learn in detail about the analog systems that made the weapons system work, particularly their precision - all well before GPS.

[tdracer]

Apologies for the thread drift, but given there are some people here very knowledgeable about the Vulcan, I have long wondered something.
Many (non-British) people know of the Vulcan largely because of the James Bond flick Thunderball. (one of my favorite Bond flicks, BTW).
After ditching the hijacked Vulcan, the pilot lowers the gear - an important step in making the stolen bombs readily accessible so important to the plot. But is it plausible that he could lower the gear after a water landing and the engines stopped?

[Thelma Viaduct]

https://youtu.be/oJDGcxAf9D8

oJDGcxAf9D8

[Willard Whyte]

My (late) RadNav stepfather claimed it wa he wot had the pickle button in 'is 'and.

[flipflopman RB199]

tdracer,

It depends on how hypothetical you want to get I suppose, but as nothing more than a straight answer to your question, notwithstanding the structural damage to the underside of the aircraft that would occur, yes you would be able to lower the undercarriage, but not via the normal system. For normal operation, the Vulcan was fitted with three engine driven hydraulic pumps, plus an electrical hydraulic pack, which operated the U/C system, the braking system, Nose Wheel Steering system, Bomb Doors and randomly enough the AAPP inlet scoop.

In the event of failure of the normal system and in line with most military aircraft, the U/C could be 'blown down' using high pressure nitrogen from stored bottles. This, in our hypothetical Thunderball situation, is how the U/C could be lowered as we dropped to the sea bed! :ok:

I'm still not sure how we would manage to swim from the cockpit, through the No2 fuel tanks and into the Bomb Bay though!! :E


Flipflopman

[Pontius Navigator]

Flip flop, I would need to see the film again but wonder if it was the radome hatch they used.

As for damage on ditching, I seem to recall a wheels up landing with minimal damage given the huge ground effect from the delta.

[Pontius Navigator]

WW, indeed. Nav Rad would hold the button and watch the NBS lights, plotter would have his finger on the button in the table. Both pilots would have theirs on the control stick.

Every button would be pressed.

Remember the aircraft would have flown the gauntlet of fighters, SA 2, SA 3, ADA, and maelstrom of hell. Who knew what damage it may have sustained or who might be incapacitated at the last moment.

[Pontius Navigator]

Oberon, I was not on Blue Steel and only have an outline of the system. In the final run the missile would indeed been on its own. Prior to that a series of radar fixes would have been taken and a procedure based on fix-monitored-azimuth performed. Essentially was the missile inertial navigator properly aligned. Was its stable table stable. Values of kE and kN would be input and inertial drift minimised.

While the launch point was not as important as a bomb release point it was still important as it would determine the safe route for the missile.

[Timelord]

Did the Isolation Switches (two toggle switches to the Nav Rad's left) have any effect on a WE177 release? I can't remember!

[Pontius Navigator]

TL, not really. They enabled or inhibited the bomb door open signal provided the bomb door selector was set to Auto and the same for the bomb firing pulse

The bomb doors could always be opened manually and the bomb firing buttons were not inhibited.

The firing pulses were probably routed through Panel ER to initiate the detonation sequence.

[t7a]

Single seaters - Jaguar, (Harrier not equipped) 2 man principle was maintained by using the RAFP HAS guard as the second man. He would not open the HAS without a valid release. Buccaneer, pilot had the attack selector and bomb door control, nav had the weapon switches.

[Pontius Navigator]

T7a, I wonder what training was given to the RAF P. As everyone had to do a course at RAFSupU so that they could be assessed as competent I would have thought the RAFP would need since training too.

[Tankertrashnav]

Interesting that in this whole thread nobody there has only been one passing mention of the aircraft which actually did drop nuclear weapons, ie the Valiant. A number of weapons of differing types were dropped during Operation Grapple at Christmas Island in 1957 and 1958. I suppose it is understandable that since they were withdrawn from service in 1965 the Valiants have become, to some extent, the "forgotten V bomber", but they do hold this unique distinction, if distinction it is.

In the 70s it was decided that bomb doors should be opened manually somewhat earlier in case of unknown battle damage or the failure of one of the hydraulic pipes.

Somebody had obviously been watching Dr Strangelove!

[Pontius Navigator]

TTN, my uncle dropped one. I only ever went in a Valiant once but that was a tanker. By 1964 the Valiant had been transferred to the TBF and the only V at the time with a lay down weapon.

In a way the Victor was also little remembered as a bomber as it too went out of service in 1965. The Victor 2 was a missile carrier and not a bomber.

[t7a]

PN - I think you might be confusing Command and Control of the release and maintenance of the 2 man principle with the RAFSupU role in ensuring crew procedures were correct. All the plod had to do was compare what he was told with what he had in writing. (admittedly not always as straightforward as might be imagined!)

[Pontius Navigator]

T7a, thank you, not confusing just wondering to what extent he could identify an improper action. I know the US Air Police were indoctrinated to 'no initiative' but were trained to give the nav the SEF code if automatic PAL failed.

[Fonsini]

I wonder if any of you flew during the period when Denis Healey was Defence Secretary - I clearly recall an interview much later in his political career when he was asked about the UK's nuclear deterrent and said simply:

"oh that, well we would never have used it of course"

Although that certainly wasn't what he said earlier in his career when he referred to a deterrent as being essential. It did make me wonder if we were bluffing it out for at least 6 years though.

Is it also true that Navs were told the location of their targets in Mother Russia and sworn to take it to the grave with them - I remember that being announced at the end of the original "Fighter Pilot" series, albeit said in reference to Buccaneer Navs (for the guy who made it through the course). I would have thought they handed you one of those red snap cards as you dashed out to the jet - why risk it being compromised in advance ?

[dragartist]

Interesting book about Grapple. ISBN 978 1 84415 747 1. May still be available from P&S. I read it several years ago. it stimulated my interest in the topic.

[tartare]

Fonsini
There's an interesting interview clip in the Guy Martin Channel 4 programme on the Vulcan which may answer your question.
A Vulcan nav(?) talks about many years later meeting a Russian woman, talking to her for a while then asking where she was from - it turned out she was from his target city. He admits to being so shocked that he had to walk away.
He also speaks about spending time memorising target details from intel (presumably satellite photos) so that they knew their targets incredibly well.
Pontius may be able to elaborate.

[BEagle]

Target study was an essential part of a V-force crew's work. Yes we had maps and other material, but to this day most of us will not reveal our actual targets, no matter what alleged de-classification might now exist.

As for the crocodile tears from some of the ex-Vulcan aircrew in that programme featuring Guy Martin, well, let's just say that their views certainly weren't typical.

As for scramble authentication codes, they came in 2 parts, half of which were held by the pilots and the other half by the lower deck, both halves in double sealed envelopes in polythene. When the scramble order came over the RT or telebrief, each part was checked and if the code was valid, off you went. We weren't supposed to open the envelopes until the order came, but most of us who'd been around for a few exercises made sure that the envelope was opened in advance, so that there wouldn't be any fumbling at a critical moment....

On one exercise, the wind was out of peacetime limits for a take-off from the ORP end, so we were ordered round to the other end. Then came the scramble order; about a dozen Vulcans released their brakes and charged forward, only to stop suddenly because the first aircraft hadn't launched. After about 30 seconds, he did so and off we all went, somewhat perplexed.

When the lead crew came to hand their codes back to the vault after the exercise, the pilots' code card was torn and rather soggy. It transpired that the brand new co-pilot, flying with his Flt Cdr, hadn't pre-opened the envelope and couldn't then rip the polythene open with his gloved hands - so he'd dropped his oxy mask and bitten the thing open, following his captain's 'enthusiastic suggestion'!

[salad-dodger]

Pontius may be able to elaborate.

I doubt he will be able to resist.

S-D

[Pontius Navigator]

Talk of which were targets seems to have been 'yes you can' and changed some years later to 'no you can't' probably as some targets are now in friendly nation states.

As for authentication, the process has changed a number of times. In the mid-60s it was rather less formal than BEagle relates.

In the vault I had a large board. On the board was a large number of cup hooks. In each was a bulldog clip and secured in each was a number of HMSO envelopes - RELRED, SCRAM, SCRAMCAN, POSREL. In each envelope was the appropriate code.

At one time the code was a word. For one exercise only the lead aircraft was given the code and all other aircraft were ordered to write down the codeword transmitted. We all dutifully wrote down the word APPLECART as relayed by ATC. At the debrief we were asked what we had heard and duly reported it. Subsequently we were told the actually transmitted codeword was APOTHECARY.

The exercise release codeword was easier NOURISHMENT but of course that was a lot word to broadcast in clear or by morse in a jamming enviroment. Later the codewords were changed to a simpler trigraph such as JULIET FOUR BRAVO. The same HMSO envelopes were used.

I have also come across stiff waterproof paxolin resin cards that had to be broken up (not easy) and waterproof foil envelopes - both very secure.

[salad-dodger]

As I said.....

S-D

[814man]

Ta17 and PN. As one of these RAFP back in the day, well late 70’s early 80’s, I can tell you that there was little or no training for the HAS guard tasked with the enforcement of the NLZ and release of the aircraft. Remember at this time shifts of RAFP at bases such as Bruggen, where I was based from 84 to 88, consisted of over 50 of us guarding SSA and QRA as well as “blues” duties and so we were frequently undermanned. HAS guard was just about the lowest job on the shift often allocated to the newly arrived LAC/A/Cpls as well as being a punishment job for those that were not to be trusted on blues. At its simplest of course there was no need for training – you were issued with a sealed envelope and the instruction that if the hooter went off (QRA for real, Sqn dispersal on exercise) your task was to open envelope and compare the 4 digit number with the one that the pilot would write (on something?) and hold up to you. If they matched you could open the HAS door and stand well back, if they didn’t under no circumstances were you to open door. I presume that if numbers didn’t match for whatever reason you could summon assistance by radio to sort out any issues although we were told that on exercise it could be a test that a WST team could throw in. The main complication that came up was in a HAS where there were 2 Jaguar aircraft and the one at the back was released first. Again this was an exercise scenario that seemed to be regularly practiced, although there was no formal instruction on what we should do if the front aircraft instead of just taxying forward to allow the other to pass just carried on and launched, although thinking now we could have stopped it at the outer dispersal gates which also had to be opened by the RAFP SAT Team.
Although individuals were not formally tested of course the whole Security Squadron was annually tested by the WST Team from the ASU on the overall procedures, just don’t mention Bruggen 85 when the Sqn failed for the only time – that was a fun few months before the retest, with leave and stand-down’s cancelled and even training off nights. Oh the memories.

[tartare]

Without revealing your target cities (perfectly understandable - even now) I assume that assets such as factories, broadcasters were targets and not just general entire city areas?
I realise that in itself may be an even more sensitive question to ask - but wonder if you can talk in generalities.
Most people without detailed knowledge would assume that because a nuclear weapon is so destructive, you just need to target the general area - i.e. an entire city, rather than a specific part of it, or feature, or building.
I ask because when working at TV Centre in London, I had always assumed that it would have been at the centre of a smoking thermonuclear crater from a Russian Warhead if anything had ever happened (although some of you may think that might not necessarily be a bad thing)!

[Pontius Navigator]

Tartar, actually none of those featured on the target lists. Our targets were always military targets, of course there may have been collateral damage.

[Jimlad1]

A fascinating thread, may I thank the participants for their recollections of a chilling part of our history please?

If you are interested in target philosophy, may I recommend 'the silent deep' just published by Hennessey. Its a history of the Cold War UK Submarine Service, but has a long section on deterrence including a memo from the 1970s on what effects the deterrent was intended to achieve and how this could be done. It lays out in some detail the options open to the UK at the time, and what effects could be gained from different options and why.

Its a chilling piece of staffwork, and well worth reading as part of an excellent wider book.

[Above The Clouds]

Tartare
Without revealing your target cities (perfectly understandable - even now) I assume that assets such as factories, broadcasters were targets and not just general entire city areas?
I realise that in itself may be an even more sensitive question to ask - but wonder if you can talk in generalities.

Look around were the old Soviet borders used to be you can get an idea, if anything was left at that point there were others further east. Its kind of strange as I now work there to think it could have been a waste land.

[The Oberon]

PN - I think you might be confusing Command and Control of the release and maintenance of the 2 man principle with the RAFSupU role in ensuring crew procedures were correct. All the plod had to do was compare what he was told with what he had in writing. (admittedly not always as straightforward as might be imagined!)

t7a. I never made it to Germany having been trapped in the Lincs. V force for most of my career. I would like to learn more about the Jaguars role, a quick Google doesn't say much, any pointers would be most welcome, similarly Buccs.

[Treble one]

I presume that the Buccaneer Navs were told their targets in advance , as the V Force crews were, so they could do some detailed route planning/timing (SAM and other AD avoiding routes) in the event of the Cold war turning hot? Having said that I'm not aware they were part of the SIOP as were V Force/SAC crews....I may be wrong.


There doesn't seem to be as much information out there regarding Cold War Nuclear Ops from Germany (I've read some Canberra stuff but nothing much about Bucc/Jag etc)-maybe I'm not looking in the right places, or maybe there's a good reason for that...

[Dougie M]

When the Canberras stood on Q in Germany during the 70s they were loaded with a U.S. weapon which needed the constant supervision of a U.S. Executive Actions Officer. There was one particular specimen of uninspiring EAO who used to paint plastic models in the Q shed. A cunning plan to enervate him was during target study when the brief went "O.K. then we are agreed. When the balloon goes up we head east till out of range then turn west, drop the cookie in the Atlantic and head for Bermuda".
The EAO snuck out of the briefing and picked up a phone next door. The crew picked up at the same time as he dialled his boss. They heard him say in a quavering voice, "Sir, they're talking like that again"
It passed the time.

[t7a]

Treble One - The SIOP is the US national nuclear war plan. The UK nuclear deterrent was/is assigned to NATO along with the other nuclear armed NATO countries (including those US forces assigned to NATO). The NATO plan would have been carried out in conjunction with the US SIOP.

[Treble one]

Thank you-I stand corrected.
Apologies
TO

[Pontius Navigator]

I have just recalled another exercise codeword that trips off the tongue:

bandolero

Also, not long after Anthony Gray's book, The Penetrators was published I noticed that he used the same codeword in his novel as was in the Bomber Command Alert and Readiness Plans. In BCARs the order for implementation of Alert Condition One was Prometheus and Gray used the same codeword. The next codeword he used was Apocalypse. Had he compromised our codewords?

I reported what I found and an investigation found that it had been a coincidence, a bit like the D-Day crossword, and the BCAR codeword had been chosen after Gray's novel was published.

[Fonsini]

Thanks all - I suppose it makes sense to research your target in advance and learn the entry and egress routes, although I assume the comment about "Buccaneers targeting SA-2 sites" was with conventional weapons, not tactical nukes ?

As an eager spotty teenager I remember getting a map of Europe and placing pins in all the RAF bases and then tracing radius of action arcs for each type of aircraft. It was surprising how little penetration into "enemy" territory there was for anything that wasn't a Vulcan. Especially the much hyped 200 foot low level attacks which burned off so much fuel.

Of course it never occurred to me that some of those missions may have been planned and briefed as one-way only.........

[Vzlet]

Plenty of just-released SAC targeting details from 1959 available here (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-War-Nuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/).

[Treble one]

I was rather surprised to hear in a recent documentary, the final V Force release code word stated during the programme.

I presume it referred to the position of the 'start line' ?

[Pontius Navigator]

As for RoA, it was an error to assume either one-way missions (the idea was anathema to the crews when it was posited to crews in Cyprus) or that we planned to return to base.

Just checked one of our routes. The whole route was 2,200 miles with 700 miles at low level and a total of 900 miles in enemy territory. From take-off to top of descent was about 850 miles.

[t7a]

I can assure you that Buccs were not targeted against SA2 sites with nukes.

[LOMCEVAK]

On the Bucc one way missions were never, to the best of my knowledge, discussed. However, the planned landing airfield was not always the same as the one used for take-off so there was an option to increase strike radius that way. Some of the targets also required a climb to high level rather soon after the strike in order to have the fuel to reach the planned destination; a somewhat high risk option!

[pr00ne]

t7a,

Agreed, like the RAFG toom fleet they were more likely to be strike committed against SA-3 and SA-6 sites and associated command and control.

[Fonsini]

I confess to being obsessed with radius of action questions, fuel burn and tactical range has always fascinated me for reasons I can't explain - a Tornado laden down with 8 thousand pounders on the fuselage stations, 2 drop tanks, max internal, and ECM/chaff Flare pods on the outers just never seemed to have much in the way of range if it was committed to a draggy flight at 200 feet through East Germany - at least that was the equation I could never get straight in my adolescent brain, then there was the line I recall from TSR2 development notes about it being able to "take a triple to Moscow" - really ?

In short I could never reconcile the vast distances required for flights into the former Soviet Union, the warload required, and the need to maintain highly inefficient low level flights. Except for the Vulcan as always which had the legs of course.

Apologies for derailing the nuclear weapons discussion, because as interested as I am in that topic (the Green Grass device deserves a discussion of its own for example) I do find the question of fuel and range more interesting.

[Capt H Peacock]

The Bucaneers in Germany were probably on there way to zap the Blinder bases just inside the curtain, as their residents would probably pass them on the way to do the same to Bruggers, Wildy, and Gutersnipe.

[air pig]

17a

Treble One - The SIOP is the US national nuclear war plan. The UK nuclear deterrent was/is assigned to NATO along with the other nuclear armed NATO countries (including those US forces assigned to NATO). The NATO plan would have been carried out in conjunction with the US SIOP.

Peter Hennesay's new book on the British nuclear submarine fleet and it was the same for the V Force that the deterrent was able to be used by the RAF/RN for national issues. Polaris and Trident come under the Bermuda Agreement signed by McMillan and Kennedy.

WE 177 was all British in design development and deployment whilst integrated into the NATO war plan.

[t7a]

air pig - true, and it also included the RAFG Buccs and Jaguars. Whether a National plan was credible was another matter!!

[Pontius Navigator]

In the 60s the V-Force target plans were coordinated at SAC. When the French withdrew from the integrated command structure their staff at SAC became observers :)

Our target data sheets had both SAC and Bomber Command ALNs.

It was the loss of his Valiants that SACEUR was most concerned with as they were allocated to him, the Vulcan and Victor force remained under British control.

[Pontius Navigator]

A crucial factor was timing.

As a retaliatory force we would have followed any Soviet attack whereas a premptive attack could be at a time of our choosing.

So, would the Russians plan for TOT in USA during the night? Assuming 2100 start in US it could be 0200 UK (roughly) but how did that accord with exercise 0400 alerts to generate but daytime scrambles a couple of days later?

Having experienced an operational alert on a Friday lunch time and another at 2000 I can attest to which was more difficult and confusing. With an 0400 alert everything ran on rails. For the real deal confusion reigned.

[MOSTAFA]

Surely nobody, or wouldn't we have heard!:)

[BEagle]

I understood that TSR2 certainly had the range to reach Moscow from the UK and return.

However, the traitorous bunch of pinko lefties which was ruining the UK a few years later made a political decision that Tornado could not do so - no doubt at the insistence of their Communist masters in the Kremlin.

[tornadoken]

Targets: P.Hennessy, Secret State, 2nd. Ed,2002, P.330 has a 22/10/64 brief for new PM: "it is estimated that the V-force could destroy some 20 major Russian cities". P.333 plots Baltic ingress targets (posters here assisted this). P.211-215 has 2/11/67 Intelligence Appreciation of Soviet targets in UK. J.Baylis/K.Stoddart, The Br.Nuclear Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity, OUP, 2014,Ap.3, P221 has 5/10/62 Bomber Command targeting memo: the notional National Plan as 15 cities; the SIOP-integrated Plan, 59xThor+39xMBF Mks.2, as:
- “previously”: 57 targets: 48 cities, 6 Air Defence Centres (ADCCs), 3 (LRAF) bomber bases;
- now: 98: 16 cities, 44 “offensive” sites (i.e: airfields), 10 ADCCs, 28 IRBM sites. Next review 7/63. Hennessy,The Prime Minister, 2001, P114 has that “down to 16 cities (due to) improvements (in) air defences”.

By 4/76, when confirming funding for the Chevaline Penetration Enhancement of Polaris, Ministers accepted the Moscow Criterion: its: "“effect does not come (from 1xFBM but) probably (32xwarheads) of 1xSSBN. (It would be hard) to disentangle the system to take on a number of targets at once”. L.Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Macmillan, 2nd.Ed,1989, P148.

Much of this was laid out 2005-ish in a display at Kew, including a WE177B. We paid for all this: it is ours; nothing of current military novelty.

TSR.2: BE: the pinkos: in 1965 bought 4 SSBNs; 1974 bought their penaids; Jan. 1979: extracted Jimmy Carter's agreement to supply Trident II C4 (Maggie T made it D5). And more besides. A factor in deletion of TSR.2 was the Airships cluttering this tactical Canberra replacement (WE177A small Bang) with Big Bang WE177B and/or a stand-off weapon, to retain a deep "strategic" role post-SSBN. The asset became HI-VALU, so would never have been risked in an opening, iron phase...yet that precision, to find moving targets, was the core of its avionics suite, time and cost. TSR.2 was “an albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (Conservative SofS Defence Thorneycroft. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) it was just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” B.Jackson/E.Bramall,Chiefs,Brassey,92,P361

[Haraka]

The asset became HI-VALU, so would never have been risked in an opening, iron phase...yet that precision, to find moving targets, was the core of its avionics suite, time and cost.

Beags ,I think tornadoken has hit on a critical point. You may well remember one of Sir Humphrey's minions lecturing in College Hall c.1969 on this very point, in answer to a question from the floor.
"To have lost a TSR2 would have been the political equivalent of losing a destroyer".
Financially about 8 million pounds (when 8 Million pounds was a lot of money :) )

[Pontius Navigator]

TSR 2, cheap.

In 1964 the loss of a Vulcan in a conventional war was equated with the loss of a capital ship, yet the Conservative Government at the time deployed a number of Vulcan s to replace 8 Victors. Whether they retained the final authority for release I don't know.

[Algy]

In the BBC radio documentary mentioned elsewhere it was mentioned that Healey at one point at least stood in as PM when the actual PM (Callaghan???) was unavailable for reasons that I forget. Healey was asked by the interviewer if he would ever have authorised a retaliatory strike and answered a flat no. Personally I doubt that he was alone in having taken that view (for which I have no evidence.)

[Pontius Navigator]

Algy, without checking, I think Peter Hennessey said that AOCinC Bomber Command could launch on his own authority should he be unable to contact the PM. I don't know if that extended to Positive Release as well.

[Treble one]

PN-You are correct


Henessey's text states that the AOC Bomber Command could, if all efforts had failed to contact the PM of the day and his nuclear deputies, authorise the V Force to attack their targets.


Ironically, this was apparently a similar strategy to the 'Wing attack Plan R' in Strangelove, and was built in as a nuclear failsafe in the case of the 'bolt from the blue' attack where the Soviets may have tried to decapitate the political command and control structure with a targeted attack on London/Turnstile?? and other important political sites.


Interestingly, when the RN took over the deterrent, no such authority was passed to the C in C Fleet (or similar). As Hennessey states 'special communication arrangements apply' in the same eventuality-presumably the 'letters of last resort' that all SSBN's carry.

[Tankertrashnav]

One thing I have sometimes wondered. Say there are four aircraft sitting on QRA, all bombed up and waiting the order to go. The crew of one aircraft mutually agree they are off anyway, and scramble independently and head off Eastward.

Once they are airborne, I have always assumed they had total autonomy and as long as all crew members carried out the correct procedures there would be no external way of stopping them releasing the weapon, other, of course, than shooting them down (which I guess would have happened).

Pretty unlikely scenario I agree, but in theory could a rogue crew have got through and carried out a nuclear strike? In the Dr Strangelove scenario, the box which receives the authorisation code has been damaged in the missile attack, but as far as I know there was no equivalent to that box in V Force aircraft.

[sitigeltfel]

I think the scenario of a rogue crew would be hard to develop given that all five would have to be in on the plan. Unless the core conspirators were able to "immobilise" any of the five outside the loop!

[Treble one]

I think TTN, in the highly unlikely event of a rogue crew doing something like that, you are right, i.e. assuming we knew their QRA target (well defined I would be sure), we would then know their ingress routes and be able to alert Soviet/WP AD.


Of course, if they decided 'sod it we're off to Moscow' that would be slightly more problematic.

[Tankertrashnav]

My question was highly theoretical, particularly as sitigeltfel said they would all have to be in on it. I'm sure one way or another somebody would have shot them down, but what I really meant was that other than that there would be no external way of preventing the weapon being released.

[Pontius Navigator]

TTN, on your new post, indeed.

The big question would be what would a crew do if they saw lots of mushroom clouds behind them but did not get a release message. Would they have obeyed orders or thought what the hell?

An interesting aside, on a dispersal flight the weapon would have been safed and the fuel enough only for the dispersal flight. Crews were briefed to make this transit not radio silent but with all radios switched off so as not to hear any confusing messages.

You can imagine what these might be.

[Treble one]

PN-If weapons started falling on the UK during the dispersal flights, were there plans and procedures to deal with this?


Staggered dispersals perhaps?

[Pontius Navigator]

111, not as far as I know. We would have been in the ring of steel as at Cuba with all aircraft generated at main base. The next stage of alert was fraught with danger. Aircraft would have been defuelled, uncocked, and dispersed with radios off. Apart from about 20 aircraft at main bases the force would have been down until after turn round at dispersal. They would start to come back on state (RS15) in about 2 hours at a near dispersal and much longer for a Blue Steel aircraft.

Dispersal was all at once with only hangar aircraft recovered as time went on.

It was anticipated, given political release, to disperse the force early on in any conflict.

[Pontius Navigator]

I have to say though that when we had a real generation in 1969 the timing was completely different from exercises, the orders were different and the tried and practised procedures went out the window until things stabilised. I don't think we even set up the GDOC.

[Exnomad]

Worked on design of release units for those, and for equivalent Sea King ad Lynx ones.
I imagine WE177 would have made a big splash
If a enemy nuclear sub was target, the chopper would have been the only thing that could keep up in rough seas. A frigate would have been limited in extreme weather.

[Treble one]

Dispersal at an early stage make complete sense of course, and although it protects the integrity of the deterrent, it also sends a very powerful signal to the enemy-the pistol is very much cocked, and the force becomes a potential First Strike option-hence Chamberlin's reluctance to disperse during the Cuban Crisis presumably?

[Pontius Navigator]

Wrong PM or wrong crisis.

Try Chamberlin-Munich
MacMillan-Cuba

[Treble one]

Yes, of course PN, Chamberlin was the chap waving the paper.

MacMillan was the one with the very sleepless nights on the precipice of Armageddon...

[Exnomad]

Was involved with TSR2 and V bomber weapon release equipment, and TRS2 simulator, until it was cancelled. TSR2 simulator was going to have radar mapping incuded in simulation, and that included target maps. Saw where some of those were.

[Pontius Navigator]

Exnomad we were shown some SLAR fix point predictions for the nav to match with the radar. The FP prediction was a photograph of a 3 dimensional model. Hedge rows for instance were pipe cleaners.