HS 125 reported crashed in Akron

[eastern wiseguy]

http://www.wkyc.com/videos/news/local/akron/2015/11/10/75537888/


WKYC in Cleveland are reporting a 125 down in the city of Akron. At the moment 9 believed dead. Aircraft was en route to CAK from Wright Patterson.

[Airbubba]

Aircraft was en route to CAK from Wright Patterson.

Looks like a Hawker 800 was flying MGY to AKR at the time of the crash. It was operated by a Part 135 outfit based in FXE.

[Airbubba]

Officials from ExecuFlight, the company that leased the aircraft, tell us there were nine people aboard the plane, a pilot, copilot and seven passengers.

The FAA says a Hawker H25 twin-engine business jet left Dayton and was on approach to Akron Fulton International Airport just before 3 p.m.


LIVE: OSHP confirms no survivors of Akron plane crash - WTVM.com-Columbus, GA News Weather & Sports (http://www.wtvm.com/story/30484097/2-killed-after-plane-crash-into-akron-house)

It appears that it was this flight:

Execuflight #1526 ? 10-Nov-2015 ? KMGY - KAKR ? FlightAware (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/EFT1526/history/20151110/1830Z/KMGY/KAKR)

[Huck]

Amazing footage of one lucky young woman....


Teen on Snapchat Captures Moment Plane Crashes Into Apartment Complex - AOL On (http://on.aol.com/video/teen-on-snapchat-captures-moment-plane-crashes-into-apartment-complex-519235465)

[Mark in CA]

Looks like it crashed about 3 miles out from the end of the runway, according to Google Maps. NY Times reports crash near the intersection of Mogadore and Skelton Roads.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/private-jet-hits-building-in-ohio-killing-at-least-2.html?ref=us

[goeasy]

Cant see any apartment complex there. Just a house. Still, very very sad! I hope no one was home at the time.

[wanabee777]

The aircraft was registered to Execuflight out of Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport.

Charter jet owned by Fort Lauderdale company slams into building in Ohio; as many as 9 dead - Sun Sentinel (http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/sfl-local-ohio-plane-crash-story.html)

http://www.wfsb.com/story/30485861/more-about-execuflight-charter

[aterpster]

2015-11-10 15:33 metar kakr 102033z auto 28009kt 4sm br ovc008 10/08 a2995 rmk ao2 rab05e16 cig
004v012 p0000 t01000083 =

2015-11-10 15:24 metar kakr 102024z auto 28010g17kt 3sm br sct006 ovc010 11/09 a2995 rmk ao2
rab05e16 cig 008v012 p0000 t01060089 =

2015-11-10 15:16 metar kakr 102016z auto 27012kt 2sm br ovc006 11/09 a2995 rmk ao2 rab05e16 cig
003v009 p0000 t01060089 =

2015-11-10 15:14 metar kakr 102014z auto 26013kt 1 3/4sm -ra br ovc004 11/09 a2995 rmk ao2 rab05
cig 003v007 p0000 t01060089 =

2015-11-10 15:05 metar kakr 102005z auto 24011kt 1 1/4sm -ra br ovc006 11/09 a2995 rmk ao2 rab05
cig 003v009 p0000 t01060094 =

2015-11-10 14:54 metar kakr 101954z auto 24007kt 1 1/2sm br bkn004 ovc009 11/09 a2995 rmk ao2
slp142 t01060094 =

2015-11-10 14:31 metar kakr 101931z auto 25008kt 1 1/2sm br ovc005 11/09 a2995 rmk ao2 cig
003v009 t01110094 =

http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/dtpp/search/results/?cycle=1511&ident=akr

[barit1]

The aircraft flew from Cincinnati-Lunken KLUK to Dayton-Wright Brothers KMGY Tuesday AM. (Wright Brothers field was formerly known as Montgomery County airport, hence its KMGY id).

The accident flight departed KMGY about 1930Z. It did not operate through Wright-Patterson AFB; that report was local media confusion.

[aterpster]

The crash site is 1.75 nautical miles prior to the Runway 25 threshold, basically on centerline.

[aterpster]

Google Earth crash site:

N 41 03 18.09

W 081 25 24.69

[B2N2]

MDA's for the non precision approaches into RWY25 area round 1500'-ish with an airport elevation of 1067'.
With an overcast of 600'-800' that is a non-precision approach to minimums in my book.
Statistically the highest chance of CFIT......

[wanabee777]

No approach lights. Ugh!:\

4° PAPI. Double Ugh!:\:\

[aterpster]

wanabee777:
No approach lights. Ugh!

4° PAPI. Double Ugh!

No VDA on the RNAV approach. That means 20:1 penetrations in the visual area. But, they never got that close.

[Airbubba]

An interesting report from ABC News:

A federal source told ABC News on Tuesday that the cause of the crash "appears to be mechanical."

7 People Confirmed Dead in Akron Plane Crash - ABC News (http://abcnews.go.com/US/people-confirmed-dead-akron-plane-crash/story?id=35129090)

[wanabee777]

Nine killed aboard charter plane that crashed Tuesday into Ellet apartment building in Akron - Break News - Ohio (http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/nine-killed-aboard-charter-plane-that-crashed-tuesday-into-ellet-apartment-building-in-akron-1.639413)

[wanabee777]

CAK with full ILS about 7nm south of AKR.

[simon001]

The flight appears to be here:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/EFT1526/history/20151110/1830Z/KMGY/KAKR

After making a 180 turn, the last 3 minutes shows they were level at about 1800' AGL, slowing from 155 to to 127kts.

[simon001]

Weather right on minimums.

- The last radar return on final was at 2:51:34pm.
- The METAR at 2:31pm was 1 1/2SM BR OVC005.
- And at 2:54pm, 1 1/2SM BR BKN004 OVC009.

- Minimums on the RNAV GPS are 461AGL (LP) / 501 (LNAV) amd 1 mile for Cat A/B or 1 3/8 for Cat C/D.
- For the localizer, it's 492AGL and 1 for A/B or 1 1/4 for C/D.

[simon001]

A surveillance video caught the final seconds of the flight.

Surveillance video shows moment plane crashed into Ohio apartment complex; 9 dead | Q13 FOX News (http://q13fox.com/2015/11/11/surveillance-video-shows-moment-plane-crashed-into-ohio-apartment-complex-9-dead/#ooid=1meTFzeDpOB-1uKhrWIt3AKIkx-b0gtA)

There's only about 3 seconds from when the aircraft comes into the frame to when it impacts the ground, but it appears to be descending rapidly. From the angle and the wing position, there's no doubt that it is in a steep bank.

[Airbubba]

Not much new in the November 11 3 pm NTSB briefing by Dr. Bella Dinh-Zarr.

She gave the aircraft type as a Hawker 125-700A but I did not hear a registration mentioned.

The pilots went from Minneapolis to Moline to St. Louis to Cincinatti on Monday, arriving at 7:40 pm to overnight. They then flew to Dayton and Akron after a departure at about 10 am Tuesday morning.

The left wing hit the ground first and then the plane slid into the building. It was on an instrument approach controlled by ATC at the main Akron airport. The security camera video was being reviewed and another pilot on approach to AKR had been interviewed. The pilot interviewed said there had been no distress call and he was on the same unicom frequency as the accident aircraft.

The CVR is on the way to Washington on the plane that brought the NTSB investigators.

Parties to the investigation are the FAA, Honeywell (engines) and Textron (aircraft manufacturer).

Here is the video of the press conference posted on YouTube: https://youtu.be/LnZv-Z8-VCQ

[ctrautve]

More details (including tail number) in this AIN story: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2015-11-11/ntsb-investigating-hawker-700-crash-akron

[n6330v]

Avid browser and rare poster. But this accident caught my eye. I remembered having a conversation with a Hawker pilot a couple of years back at a transit FBO. Conversation was in reference to the Hawker's stall characteristics. More specifically, it was in reference to this article (glad I was able to find it).

Post-maintenance stall tests raise safety concerns | Business Aviation News: Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2006-09-13/post-maintenance-stall-tests-raise-safety-concerns)

[Old Boeing Driver]

Not to be picky, but that article referenced an 800A Hawker.

I don't know much about the differences between the 700A (which was involved in the crash) and the 800A.

Can anyone comment on this?

From the video, it would appear they are in a stall situation.

[B2N2]

Thank you for posting the link.
Airplanes don't go wing down and nose down ( witness reports ) just because of bad luck.
I'm curious about flap settings in a missed approach situation.

[simon001]

A federal source told ABC News on Tuesday that the cause of the crash "appears to be mechanical."You could substitute "A federal source" with "The Easter bunny". It's about as credible.

[Jilted]

From the aforementioned article:
"While conducting the wing-maintenance stall check in November 2000 in a Hawker 700, he wrote, “I needed six flights to correct the flick [roll at the stall]. An engineer came with us on the second flight to witness the violent flick. He came again when it was nearly fixed to see the improvement. It seems strange to me that [the Lincoln Hawker] stalled so far above the expected stall speed [20 knots]. There must have been something else that caused the roll. I have never used the autopilot and, whatever type of aircraft, have always aimed for a decrease of one knot per second.”

[safetypee]

Memory fades, but there were significant differences between the 700 and 800 wings. The latter had a ‘high-speed’ outer section and a reverse-profile aileron. Although both retained the inboard section stall-breaker strips, there were differences in vortex generator number and location; the 800 also had ‘underwing’ vortilons.

The 125 stall characteristics were often challenging, particularly if wingtip panels were slightly misaligned or with gaps between the TKS strip / leading edge panel and the wing ahead of the aileron (800’s had laser drilled leading edges?).
The stall breakers would require fine tuning if moved, but any error did not primarily cause roll problems, more likely with the stall speed and stick push relationship.

The stall characteristics of a well set up aircraft were generally benign, but some were sensitive to lat / dir trim condition. Stalls were never flown with the autopilot or yaw damper engaged which could lead to interesting results (also there were differences between avionic vendors).
A mis-set aircraft would in general not ‘flick’, but often suffered a rapid wing drop more likely due to aileron ‘snatch’, including movement the rams-horn control sufficient to break a lightly help grip or rap the knuckles of a free hand.

Did this aircraft have wing tip extensions?
AFAIR the type designer never approved winglets – the Hatfield design view was that they would only improve a bad wing – "Hatfield does not design bad wings" (although latterly the Airbus wing had ‘winglets’).
Winglet stall certification appears to be subject to localised approval – FAA, which could be via a DER where I suspect that the extent of any investigation of stall characteristics was limited by test instrumentation and safety devices; - any one able to clarify this?

Did the aircraft descend through an icing layer?

[Art Smass]

Hi Safetypee

No 125-700's are fitted with winglets - they are unique to the 800 family and 900XP

cheers

AS

[HawkerBeech1]

The 700 has a very different wing than an 800. Length is different. 700 has a "stall fence" on top of wing. 800 has vortelons on bottom fwd section as well as "stall strips".

[Old Boeing Driver]

I sit corrected. I read that part and just focused on the first part.

Thanks for the clarification.

Regards,

OBD

[Evanelpus]

I don't know much about the differences between the 700A (which was involved in the crash) and the 800A.

They are as different as chalk and cheese, the only thing the same is the DH/HS125 tag that goes before the variant.

[Smott999]

Sounds scary:
"While conducting the wing-maintenance stall check in November 2000 in a Hawker 700, he wrote, “I needed six flights to correct the flick [roll at the stall]. An engineer came with us on the second flight to witness the violent flick.

Violent flick roll at stall? Yikes.

[Lonewolf_50]

Sounds scary:
"While conducting the wing-maintenance stall check in November 2000 in a Hawker 700, he wrote, “I needed six flights to correct the flick [roll at the stall]. An engineer came with us on the second flight to witness the violent flick.

Violent flick roll at stall? Yikes.
One hopes that in the years since 2000 such things have been addressed and corrected. :eek: It might be useful to look into what updates have been done to the maintenance manual for that type to see if the repair procedures got an change.

[Airbubba]

Another NTSB presser today by vice chairman Dinh-Zarr.

Today she described the aircraft as a Hawker 700 built in 1979. Was it actually a -700A as I believe she said yesterday? And what is the difference?

Cant see any apartment complex there. Just a house.

The plane hit a four unit apartment, it does look like a house.

There was no evidence that the plane was not intact upon impact. All 'four corners' were found at the accident scene.

Gear and flaps were down. Flight control continuity was established in the wreckage.

Cockpit voice recorder was a Fairchild GA100. 30 minutes of 'poor quality audio' on the tape was initially downloaded last night at NTSB headquarters in DC. The pilots discussed setting up for the LOC 25 approach and weather on the CVR was 240/8 1 1/2 miles and 6 OVC. Slightly different weather was given in today's brief for the time of the accident. Altimeter setting 29.95

There is no FDR and the NTSB is searching for data modules from the digital engine controls to see if they yield further information. Both engines have been removed from the accident site.

Both pilots were rated in the plane with ATP's. Captain had over 5000 hours total time, FO over 4500 hours.

The pilots were talking with Cleveland Center, received a vector to intercept the LOC 25, when established they switched to unicom (or whatever it's called these days, it's been a while since I've flown into an uncontrolled airport).

[Evanelpus]

The A signifies for the North American marketplace.

[peekay4]

Full briefing:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41MrfSgaVPM

[Airbubba]

They got the YouTube video up very quickly this time. :ok: Dr. Vinh-Zarr refers to the aircraft as a -700A at :16 in the clip, and as a -700 at 1:53.

It caught my attention but may just be a minor slip of the tongue.

And perhaps both designations are present in the various aircraft type documents involved in the maintenance and certification records.

The A signifies for the North American marketplace.

Were any of the stall fences or stall strips different on the 700A to comply with FAA requirements?

[Art Smass]

As Evanelpus said - the 700A aircraft were built at Chester for the North American market and were mostly(though not always) ferried to the US in "green" state - i.e. unpainted and unfurnished for completion.

700B aircraft were delivered from the factory complete painted and fully furnished for the rest of the world (even to the lengths of stocking the liquor cabinet and soap in the toilet).

No such animal as a Hawker 700 existed during production. It is likely a convenient tag to group the lineage following the Hawker 800/850XP/900XP/750
marketing tags adopted by Raytheon then Hawker-Beechcraft.

My recollection is of standard wing configuration between 700A/700B models.

AS

[DaveReidUK]

Dr. Vinh-Zarr refers to the aircraft as a -700A at :16 in the clip, and as a -700 at 1:53.

It caught my attention but may just be a minor slip of the tongue.

I'd be surprised if any of the differences between the -700A and -700B turn out to be relevant to the NTSB's investigation, so referring to the aircraft as a generic -700 to differentiate it from earlier and later series seems perfectly reasonable to me.

[Mike Echo]

My memory may be a bit faulty but I carried out several 700B to 700A conversions, and A to B's back in the 80's and cannot remember any modifications to the wing. There used to be a SB to carry out the work but I can no longer access it.

Regarding post #26 "appears to be mechanical." I cannot recall any fatal Hawker accident caused by mechanical failure over the last 30 years, although they have had the usual undercarriage not coming down over the years and the odd engine blown off by a missile. May be somebody could correct me?

Mike Echo

[aterpster]

Apartment house. 60' (approximately) power lines across the street:
http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/Akron%20Apartment_zpsudl68d6o.jpg

[simon001]

I think it's actually the building to the left of this one. There's three, all of which are nearly identical. You can see on the video of when they're extinguishing the fire.

Not that it matters of course.

The one news story I noticed was of the tenant, a fellow of around 30-35 years old, who left his unit and drove down the street to buy some 'Hot Pockets' (Processed pastries), returning home 20 minutes later to find his apartment in a heap of flames. Just chance.

Initially, seeing the weather and the approach, it was easy to dismiss this one as pilot error - getting a sneak peak below minimums. But upon seeing the video, it seems there might be more to it. No FDR, but a poor quality CVR. I hope if it was mechanical, that the pilots can be vindicated. An unfortunate set of circumstances nevertheless.

[sooty3694]

I am not suggesting that the aircraft in question was stalled or not, but while the topic has moved to stall tests I add this;

There must be hundreds if not thousands of Hawker pilots like me who have done the post maintenance stall tests regularly following removal/inspection of LE anti icing panels.

The auto pilot should NOT be engaged, and crucially following the stall there should be NO attempt to recover with minimum loss of height :=. (Like we were all previously required to do in the sim, but which has now, sensibly, been dropped from the training).

If the autopilot IS engaged when the aircraft stalls - it will disengage of its own accord anyway.

As soon as the back pressure is released (and believe me there is a LOT needed to get it to stall) and thrust is added, the aircraft should be allowed to descend and accelerate before attempting to regain altitude - bearing in mind that you should have a LOT of space between you and the ground.

There is a requirement to calculate the expected IAS for activation of the stick shaker and stall, but from memory Hawker do not provide a table that gives this data for 17,000 feet that was mentioned in the highlighted AIN article. (IAS stall speed increases with altitude, as we all know).

Sometimes one wing or the other may drop violently, but I never had a Hawker enter a fully developed spin. My experience is that even a violent wing drop is easily contained as soon as the back pressure is released and both wings are fully unstalled. From memory (I'm no longer on the Hawker) any wing drop of more than 10 to 15 degrees requires rectification and re-testing before release to service.

[aterpster]

Simon 001:
I think it's actually the building to the left of this one. There's three, all of which are nearly identical. You can see on the video of when they're extinguishing the fire.

I used the street address published in the Akron newspaper the day after the accident.

[Iron Duck]

the Hatfield design view was that they would only improve a bad wing – "Hatfield does not design bad wings"

So Hatfield didn't design the Mosquito with its bad stall (according to Winkle Brown), or the Comet 1 with its ground stall, or the DH110 with its flutter, or the Trident which went through half a dozen wingtip designs in drag reduction attempts before the wings were finally clipped to preserve fatigue life?

Preserve us from designers' hubris.

[uncle8]

IAS stall speed increases with altitude

That should be TAS

[safetypee]

Sooty, :ok:
With fading memory the AP should disengage at stick shake, not at ‘stall’ (stick push). The use of the AP (autotrim) at low speed in the 125 may be of greater importance because of the ‘short coupled’ design. This implies that more tail up-trim could be applied which detracts from stall recovery.
Planned stall tests should limit the start trim condition to 1.3 Vs (similar to Vref, i.e. a margin ~ 30kts), stick shake is nearer 1.1 VS (~ 10kts). The difference is like having to fly normally with the aircraft out of trim by 20 kts.

Iron … its not for me to defend a reputation, but inaccuracy demands comment – pickled not preservation.
In the heat of war, having building a wooded aircraft with higher capability than most others, who worries about the sensitivity of a stall.
Ground 'stalls' are linked to the aircraft configuration – tail arm and elevator effectiveness.
The DH110 was a structural failure (rolling g), not flutter.
The Trident is a classic example as why the operator should not be allowed to ‘design’ an aircraft.

[sooty3694]

Uncle 8:

You are correct; for the same IAS, TAS does increase with altitude.

Unconnected with this though it is a fact that the indicated 1 G stall speed at altitude is greater than that at SL.

[wilyflier]

Sooty, :ok:
With fading memory the AP should disengage at stick shake, not at ‘stall’ (stick push). The use of the AP (autotrim) at low speed in the 125 may be of greater importance because of the ‘short coupled’ design. This implies that more tail up-trim could be applied which detracts from stall recovery.
Planned stall tests should limit the start trim condition to 1.3 Vs (similar to Vref, i.e. a margin ~ 30kts), stick shake is nearer 1.1 VS (~ 10kts). The difference is like having to fly normally with the aircraft out of trim by 20 kts.

Iron … its not for me to defend a reputation, but inaccuracy demands comment – pickled not preservation.
In the heat of war, having building a wooded aircraft with higher capability than most others, who worries about the sensitivity of a stall.
Ground 'stalls' are linked to the aircraft configuration – tail arm and elevator effectiveness.
The DH110 was a structural failure (rolling g), not flutter.
The Trident is a classic example as why the operator should not be allowed to ‘design’ an aircraft.

Sorry to go off at a small tangent. I remember seeing clear slo mo images of DH110 Control surfaces detached and flying a foot or two behind the aircraft-- interpreted as flutter

[clunckdriver]

Iron Duck, you forgot about the 87A model Hornet Moth with its tip stalling in the landing flare, followed by a sharp wing drop resulting in an impresive cartwheel acros the airfield, DH did of course replace {free of charge it is said} with " square wings". to solve the problem, however this made the aileron controll marginal to say the least, also the chief test pilot, Hubert Broard was fired for not finding this fault in the test program. I happen to own a "Hornet", its handling is quite "entertaining" to say the least, but this is what makes it" interesting "to fly, lots of fun!

[Piper J3]

This was sent to me by a friend. Sorry I don't know the source. Images did not reproduce and I don't see how to attach to this post. Full post with images should be here: https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B9_1pLgz8yXga1JLSDMzUHhZVzg

------------------------------------

As a pilot that has flown in and out of the Akron Fulton airport hundreds of times and utilized the very same instrument approach procedure that was being used by the Hawker jet, here is My assessment of what happened to the plane that crashed at Akron Fulton.

I've been looking at all sorts of evidence available online. I've looked at the FlightAware radar tracks. The coordinates, the altitude, the airspeed, the flight path. I have listened to the recordings of the air-traffic control exchanges with the pilots which indicate nothing remarkable. I have made overlays of the flight path and transferred coordinates onto the approach plates and the aviation navigation charts.

Here's what I have concluded based on everything I can see. Understand that I am relying on data from sources I believe to be accurate and also that I presume I have correctly interpreted.

All the information gleaned indicates the plane was flying normally and was vectored by Akron-Canton approach control to intercept the final approach course for the localizer 25 approach into Akron Fulton airport. The radar coordinates log shows that at 2:48 PM as they turned west to intercept, they were at the proper intercept altitude of 3000 feet for the localizer final approach course. They were still traveling pretty quickly at this point (at 180 knots). Vref in a Hawker is 108 knots.
image1.PNG

You can see above that as they turned Southwest to align themselves with the localizer approach course they were pretty much leveled and beginning to reduce their excess airspeed. Note the trend with from 2:49-2:50 pm with the ground speed slowing from 178 mph down to 146 mph. Of course if you are trying to slow down significantly you normally cannot begin the descent at the same time as you're trying to bleed off (slow) the airspeed as the two dynamics counter one another. The last line on the above chart shows that they were still at 2800 feet and slowed to 146 mph. This would be Vref + 20 for a Hawker or right about where they'd want to be at that point.

Notably, when you plot the latitude and longitude coordinates shown in that last line of position track onto the aviation chart, that is exactly at the point of the localizer outer marker beacon (LOM) but they're still a bit high at 2,800 feet. Referring to the approach plate, you ideally want to be at 2,300 feet by the time you reach the localizer outer marker. With that extra 500 feet of altitude, instead of just descending at a more stabilized rate of 500 ft./m, the pilots were faced with losing 1,300 feet of altitude to get down to the minimum permitted descent altitude of 1,540 feet and they now only had about 3 miles in which to accomplish that descent.

Considering the speed at which they were flying, they'd had to have reduce power rather drastically (to high idle) and descend at about 1,000 + feet/min to get down to the MDA of 1,540 in the time and distance available. In fact, they reached the impact point in just 1.8 miles so they lost 1800 feet of altitude in less than one minute meaning my guess that they were descending very quickly is probably an accurate one - probably 1500 to 1800 ft./m descent over that short stretch .

Incidentally, an Akron-Canton air traffic control communication that occurred just seconds after the accident pilots made their frequency change to Akron Fulton read off weather conditions to another pilot of 400 feet overcast, 1-1/2 miles in rain. So even when our subject plane reached the permitted MDA of 1540 feet MSL it would still have been in the clouds at about 500 feet above the ground. Descending so rapidly and being consumed with looking outside the cockpit for Visual ground contact probably created a recipe for disaster.

So they inadvertently descended right down through the MDA, break out of the clouds at just 400 feet above the ground and they're descending at 1,500 fpm with the power throttled way back. This leaves virtually no time to pull up or spool up the engine power to level off. In just 12 seconds you drop 300 feet.

Result -- the plane flies right into the ground in essentially "controlled" flight. The house which which they impacted lies exactly under the extended centerline of the runway, which would seem to indicate the plane was tracking the approach path very precisely from a horizontal standpoint but there is no vertical electronic guidance for altitude on this approach. The altitude must be carefully managed by the pilots on this type of instrument approach and that needed to start well before the outer marker. Having not done so, the pilots then needed to descend at an abnormally high rate resulting in a non-stabilized approach. Particularly Bad news when weather is at or below minimums.

The FlightAware plot below shows the flight path of the plane (in blue line) and that their turn in to the final approach course occurred sufficiently far enough out to the East (approximately at the Akron VOR) to allow getting the plane properly stabilized from an altitude and airspeed perspective.

image3.PNG


Here are the Akron Fulton weather observations 10 minutes before and 10 minutes after the crash. At best the ceiling was 500 feet and at worst it was 400 feet which put the conditions right at or below the permitted minimums for the instrument approach that was being attempted

image4.PNG

Here is an excerpt from the instrument approach plate diagram for the approach that was being flown. Note the recommended altitude of 2300 feet at the localizer outer marker (LOM). Also note the minimum descent altitude of 1540 feet

image5.PNG

[yzpilot]

With that extra 500 feet of altitude, instead of just descending at a more stabilized rate of 500 ft./m, the pilots were faced with losing 1,300 feet of altitude to get down to the minimum permitted descent altitude of 1,540 feet and they now only had about 3 miles in which to accomplish that descent.

Considering the speed at which they were flying, they'd had to have reduce power rather drastically (to high idle) and descend at about 1,000 + feet/min to get down to the MDA of 1,540 in the time and distance available. In fact, they reached the impact point in just 1.8 miles so they lost 1800 feet of altitude in less than one minute meaning my guess that they were descending very quickly is probably an accurate one - probably 1500 to 1800 ft./m descent over that short stretch .

Simuflite trains to use a 1,200 fpm rate of descent between the FAF and MDA in the Hawker 700. The configuration would be flaps 25, speed ref +20. The training material doesn't specify a power setting, but power is not at idle.

[Smott999]

Did we not see that they were left wing down, nearly vertical at impact? I.e. Certainly not wings level at ground impact.
Was ther e prior impact which flicked the aircraft wing down?

[Old Boeing Driver]

I went back and looked at the video from the construction company several times.

To me, it does not look like they were vertical or in a bank.

It appears they were moving fast, and fairly level, which would go along with the comment that they started out high and fast.

We don't know of the VNAV capabilty of this aircraft, so one might assume they were using the "dive and drive" technique.

Just another observation.

RGDS

OBD

[Art Smass]

Sorry OBD but having stopped that video a few times just prior to impact, the wings appear vertical to me - cabin towards the camera.

I concur that when the aircraft was behind the trees it appeared to have a reasonably level wing attitude which suggests that impact with trees or power lines may have flicked the aircraft over.

AS

[Old Boeing Driver]

Thanks. I do not have that capability, so just watched through it several times.

Looks like they were moving pretty fast.

RGDS

OBD

[Zeffy]

FAA oversight of Part 135 operators and Part 142 trainers turns out to be not worth very much...

NTSB Docket (http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=58493)

Group Chairman's Factual (http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58493/588827.pdf)

On the subject of training for CDFA at CAE/Simuflite:
Execuflight training guidance did not contain language for CDFA on non-precision approaches. While several CAE Simuflite instructors indicated they may teach CDFA as a technique, there was no formal instruction on CDFA.

[westhawk]

Reading the CVR transcript made it pretty clear to me what occurred. They conducted themselves quite differently than one must in order to pass training. You train like you're supposed to fly. Unfortunately not everyone flies in the manner they did when they were trained and checked.