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greeners
2nd Sep 2015, 19:20
EASA yesterday issued their Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) covering aeroplane Loss of Control In-flight (LOCI). On-aircraft Upset and Prevention Recovery Training (UPRT) will be made mandatory for new ATPL(A)s but not new CPLs.

One of many items of interest is the training required to be a UPRT instructor.
"FCL.915 General prerequisites and requirements for instructors

(e) Upset recovery instructor training course in an aeroplane.
(1) In addition to (b), in the case of flight instruction privileges for the upset recovery training course in FCL.745.A, the instructor shall:
(i) have completed an upset recovery instructor training course at an ATO; (defined elsewhere as being 5 hours of theoretical training and three hours of on-aircraft training)
(ii) have at least 500 hours of flight time as a pilot on aeroplanes, including 200 hours of flight instruction; and
(iii) hold an aerobatic rating.
(2) The training course shall include the assessment of the instructor’s competence"

So an instructor who has received a total of three hours on-aircraft upset recovery training would be allowed to enter a training course that would enable him or her to train ATPL(A) students in the skills, knowledge and expertise required for UPRT.

Is that an appropriate requirement? How much training would be appropriate to get a minimum entry requirement individual to an appropriate standard?

The document is here: https://easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2015-13

GlobalNav
2nd Sep 2015, 21:29
No worries. The pilots receiving this brief and infrequent training will, of course, hardly, if ever, encounter the situation and will no doubt achieve and maintain the highest proficiency in the "simple tasks" of recognizing, diagnosing, and skillfully intervening for the potentially life-and-death condition. Onset to completion taking less time than asking "what is happening, it cannot possibly be happening, how did that happen ..."

Maybe someone should be working on an upset recovery guidance system that leads the crew safely through these "simple tasks". Creating such a system would not be trivial, but worth the effort.

Terry Dactil
2nd Sep 2015, 23:34
upset recovery guidance system
I thought we already had that with .....
"Roll to put the sky pointer at the top of the ADI then pull or push to get the nose on the horizon".
That always worked. :ok:

Machinbird
2nd Sep 2015, 23:54
Maybe they should be teaching about PIO and how to avoid inducing it.

Seems we have one at least one fairly recent loss of control incident that started with a roll pio early on (AF447) and another one where we are awaiting the accident report but some sort of oscillation appears to have helped take the aircraft out of control. (QZ8501).

A few minutes in a proper PIO simulator and most pilots would probably be "vaccinated" for life against PIO aka Aircraft-Pilot-Coupling.

roulishollandais
3rd Sep 2015, 00:07
@Machinbird
:D:D:D:D:D:D:D
It is my dream since 1992 with divergent dutch roll.
But it seems they don't know or deny APC/PIO:E

Centaurus
3rd Sep 2015, 01:06
What an absolute idiotic over-kill. This is worse than the current Australian CASA mandated MCC course which some flying schools have dragged out to two weeks of class room lectures and 28 hours of simulator time at huge cost for candidates.

A competent simulator instructor with the average instrument rated candidate could teach how to safely recover from unusual attitudes in IMC in 30 minutes. For example, the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual covers upset recoveries in five pages of succinct, easily read material, directly transferrable into simulator training.:ok:

ElitePilot
3rd Sep 2015, 05:14
Ok so they do this UPRT as part of initial training/familiarisation in a light aircraft once in their life.. But I guess it's left up to the airline to decide on what recurrent training is required later when they move onto jets post ATPL?
Appreciate some ATO's include an element of UPRT in the initial type rating stage but not much.

4Greens
3rd Sep 2015, 07:42
The main problem in unusual attitudes is the effect of g forces. This needs to be a part of any serious training course.

Reverserbucket
3rd Sep 2015, 11:48
ElitePilot - no, this is only the first part of the broader UPRT mandate described in EASA Decision 2015/012/R published in May. NPA 2015-13 lays down the requirements for basic training (CPL(A)/MPL/ATPL(A)) and proposed increased instructor competences for FSTD instructors (TRI's/SFI's). The proposals for UPRT for part-FCL licence holders are still being prepared.

greeners

"So an instructor who has received a total of three hours on-aircraft upset recovery training would be allowed to enter a training course that would enable him or her to train ATPL(A) students in the skills, knowledge and expertise required for UPRT."

And an aerobatic rating, which is more in line with pre-EASA/JAA spin/UA awareness/recovery training for the CPL syllabus. It's a bit more than the 5:3 mentioned in addition to the intention that this is only an introduction to UPRT - there will be further training and assessment throughout the career of the qualified pilot.

Centaurus - agree with your second paragraph and with Elite's comment regarding some ATO's including UPRT in initial TR's; the intent of this NPA is to reintroduce through mandate a more thorough awareness and understanding of the recognition of onset of upset situations, prevention of and/or recovery that was apparently lost with the adoption of JAA/EASA.

stator vane
3rd Sep 2015, 12:16
Should be plenty after factoring in the 135 pages of the regulation document!!!!

RAT 5
3rd Sep 2015, 12:33
Previously, in other threads regarding loss of control, there have been many who advocated aerobatic experience in basic training. At least now there will be more than straight & level, and the QFI will have been inside out and upside down.
I note it is a requirement for ATPL. So those jockeys who have a CPL as an F/O and wish to upgrade to ATPL before their command course will now have to perform more than only a Raw Data ILS. That's going to cause a few headaches. Has anybody seen the UPRT syllabus? Must it be done in a small a/c or can it be a sim thing? If it is given at flight school in a small aerobatic a/c, and should include spins of at least incipient recovery, then that's one thing: if it is something that will be conducted in a sim it must be by definition something much more tranquil. And how many modern day young TRE's have aerobatic ratings.
Perhaps these answers are in the whole EASA document. I admit to not having read it in depth.
It does seem to be a sticking plaster on a bigger problem. "Let's teach guys to recover from a scary semi-out of control situation. Let's drum into the trained monkeys a rigid set of SOP's designed to keep them away from such scary scenarios." It's the bit in-between that is missing. How to train the guys better in handling the a/c the way it was designed to be flown, and well within design parameters, so that they don't reach the edge of their own envelope, or the a/c's, but they know where both are.
If something untoward happens that pushes them over the edge then use Up Set training techniques to recover. You should have then been aware what was going on, perhaps even a guess at why, and then not be so terrified scared about what to do about it. Now, the gap between everyday handling and an upset is so wide that I can understand guys wondering what the heck is happening and freeze; or even worse do the wrong thing. By having a better knowledge & experience of the a/c envelope, indeed any a/c envelope, you can be a true PIC and be more relaxed about recovery.
I remember one old aerobatic pilot who wondered at some real life recoveries. There was a famous one in USA B727 that rolled inverted at high level and they recovered in a very 'over stressing of the airframe' manner with still 20,000' below them. His thought was that they had effected a recovery but then might have negated it by pulling the wings off. A little far fetched, perhaps, but I can follow his thinking. The only time airline pilots are used to being near the ground is on takeoff & landing. height is everything. However, sometimes........?
Back to the main topic: IMHO UPRT should be incorporated in a total rethink of the a/c handling syllabus and not a 'sticking plaster knee jerk' add-on to an inadequate training program.

Reverserbucket
3rd Sep 2015, 13:20
RAT 5 - the intention of NPA 2015-13 is to increase existing instructor training standards for FFS's thereby encompassing TRI's/TRE's and SFI's. I mentioned earlier that this is only part of a broader proposal which will encompass initial TR's and recurrent OPC's etc. eventually.

You are absolutely spot on though, there is genuine concern at regulatory level that a pilot who has only been exposed to highly automated and strictly managed system handling throughout their career is very likely to not recognise the onset of any departure from the 'norm' and rapidly lose the plot because they reach the edge of their personal envelope sometime before the aircraft reaches it's. Part of the problem however is that teaching how to fly the aircraft as it was designed to be flown these days, is precisely why the proposed amendment is necessary. Too little emphasis is placed on basic handling skills during initial training and a reliance on automatics has become increasingly necessary with current types during type training, whilst simultaneously training syllabi have been reduced in hours and content.

I understand you may have done some aerobatics during your career? Your comments to the NPA would be very welcome - but you have to read it first ;)

EASA CRT application (http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/)

9 lives
3rd Sep 2015, 16:49
A few minutes in a proper PIO simulator and most pilots would probably be "vaccinated" for life against PIO aka Aircraft-Pilot-Coupling.

Or a few circuits in a taildragger or flying boat!

jmmoric
3rd Sep 2015, 19:00
Yep, I still haven't figured out why it's not mandatory for airlines to have a fleet of Piper Cub's or something similar, and demand airline pilots keep current in those with a few hours every month.

In these times when flying is not so much about the flying anymore, but more about setting up a computer, we need to address the proficiency of pilots.

RAT 5
3rd Sep 2015, 21:36
Because there are not too many tail wheel airliners.

There is no relevance between a Piper Cub and a pax-jet. There are other, better suited small a/c. If you are suggesting that pilots have more recurrency handling training I would put it another way. In 1980's I flew for a renowned B732 operator. We trolled the routes in & out of major ILS equipped airfields and Spanish/Greek islands. Day, night, summer, winter, CAVOK, TS and fog. The A/P was true Leggo-land, but useful when required. From RHS it was toy-town. You had to fly the damed thing and a visual was the norm, even at LGW, LTN, BHX, GLA and anywhere else that let you. The culture of the airline was TO EMPLOY PILOTS. We had excellent training - pre-line, excellent line training and then damned good demonstration and practice every day on the line. If you got to command and you couldn't fly the a/c you were binned. The fail rate was high, but that was in the thinking/management department not handling.
I then went to a B757/767 outfit. Same stuff, same routes. Big a/c into small places. It had to be visual manually flown. It was necessary and thus it was encouraged into the major places, and visuals whenever possible. This kept us capable for when it was required as the norm.
Todays cotton wool mamby pamby airlines are not employing pilots and have not trained pilots. Then, when those basic skills are required, they are found wanting. Weekend warriors in a Piper Cub will not cut it and solve the problem. In training departments we are taught to identify the root cause of the problem. We all know that unstable approaches and bad landings start very early in the set up for the approach. We identify where & how that occurred and then solve the root cause of the problem which happens some minutes later. This realisation that piloting skills are being eroded will not be solved AFTER the event. The root cause is in the basic training, and then it is compounded in line flying techniques. Basic flying is discouraged, even in safe environments. The solution has to go back to the root cause.
After B732 I flew for various VNAV/LNAV a/c operators in a variety of theatres. What a joy: so much information to make the manual flying so much more accurate and no less enjoyable and challenging. This was in 1990's. We still employed pilots and expected them to perform as such. They were taught to use the automatics when required and as necessary, but otherwise they were encouraged to fly the damn a/c and use Mk.1 eyeball, even at night. And, if it was visual and manual the damn FD was OFF. (if it was ON there was too much talking to PM to reprogram the muppet.) I then flew for various fledgling airlines with modern new shiny wiz-bang jets. The SOP manual grew & grew and the pilots did less flying. I'm not saying line flying should be gung-ho, far from it; but SOP's that deliberately dulled one's skills I found counter productive. When events conspired to present you with a problem/challenge, and I found my young mate drowning in uncertainty as to what to do and how to do it, and the situation was getting worse by inaction, it was not inspiring. It became obvious that the common training methods of the past 20 years are part of the problem and more of the same is not the solution.
And weekend warriors in a Cap-10 is also not a solution. It's not practical, relevant, but it sure a hell is fun. And that's what I now do.
IMHO "Children of the Magenta Line" should be mandatory viewing for every new student and every instructor; but first every CP & HOT. Let the pilots see the wood for the trees and lets KISS.

Gawd, I need to go and do a few cubans and flicks to calm down and earn a cold one.

P.S. If you identify a problem it is beholden to offer solution, if possible. One idea would be to re-think the 3 year cycle of malfunction/emergency training. Much of this is box-ticking and of little value. How many times do we experience a simple QRH item, read the bible and tick the box. Yawn! In real life the problems are more subtle, often more complex, even multiple. That's when real training and the simulator are useful and positive. Incidents become accidents when events unfold in an unexpected way, often because the initial problem was not noticed and then developed, or it was mis-identified and the wrong solution applied. This is outside the scope of simple/single QRH items. This type of more in-depth training could be used in one of the bi-annual training sessions. The other training session could be focused on basic handling: not micky-mouse upset recovery manoeuvres for 5 minutes to tick a box; real handling. The only time I was ever required to fly FD off in a sim was Raw data ILS. What a doddle. This included total AC failure. Tick in the box.
In one basic type training syllabus, years ago, I used to spend 15 minutes per student FFS 1 with an aerial ballet. e.g. set 220kts, level turns, turn reversals, climb/descend at a given V/S, level turns increasing to steep turns and turn reversal, then level turns accelerating/decelerating 220/250 in the turn, then climbing turns to level off, turn reversal into descending turns to level off and change speed. Of course, no FD. Wow did it get the scan going and learn how to handle an a/c. It gave confidence where to look and how much to use the power. Their eyes were dancing over the instruments - all of them - as the a/c danced across the sky. Big smiles around. After that it was easy. Where did I learn that? My PPL test in a C150. I applied it to a pax-jet. Then the syllabus was re-written and the LST mandatory items took over. The amount of manual handling in a typical TR is minimal. If that is transferred onto the line......... what chance have the newbies got. And they will become the oldies, with little extra in handling skills. No wonder that on fine days some want to 'give it a go' and mess up. It's not that they are out of practice, although sometimes that is the case; it might well be they were never in practice in the first place and are seeking to recover the lost art.
I know some operators have a more pilot/flying orientated approach, but how to make that more common? Ah.........
Given that the basic training and then basic type rating has been diluted so much it will take a major re-think from the authorities. However, this is a situation which can also be solved bottom up rather than top down. It could work either way, if there is a will. The trouble is that first there needs to be a perceived problem. No problem = no solution.
I'm sure opinions are divided depending on which side of the desk you sit. This topic has been going round & round for years, and it does not seem to be slowing down any time soon.

fokker1000
3rd Sep 2015, 22:15
What is the answer? Who knows..

I did my first loop in a Cessna aerobat a very long time ago over Buckinghamshire (England). I'd covered spin recovery training in my PPL etc.

Couldn't afford basic aero training after I got my PPL, so read a book, talked to a very very decent instructor, and went off for some "general handling!"

A couple of years later I did QFI upgrade with a gentleman who was an Empire Test Pilot Instructor…. So modest, so bloody clever and so bloody capable. AND so able to TEACH. I won't mention his name, and very sadly, I think he won't be with us anymore.. A truly sad lose to aviation. EGTB, TG.

Anyway, we should all have had a go at seeing the world from a different angle before we get control of a jet with 200 pax with computers that we think won't let the sun me under us!!

lexxie747
4th Sep 2015, 00:20
@ RAT 5, that is a fine piece of writing Sir,i copied pasted it to my brain. Thank you. Alex

Judd
4th Sep 2015, 01:02
The main problem in unusual attitudes is the effect of g forces


That is a matter of opinion. The main problem is pilot incompetency in basic manual instrument flying skills that allows the aircraft to get into an unusual attitude. This usually stems from automation dependency in the airline industry. Fix that problem by correct training in a simulator and thus minimising the chances of the high g forces situation starting in the first place. Prevention is better than cure

9 lives
4th Sep 2015, 01:21
I quite like the RAT post, though personally find more value in the use of light, somewhat demanding GA aircraft. I am not a jet pilot - 'never flown one. But, back in the early '80's, after a really good read of the flight manual, I was able to totally solo master the full motion, certified DC-8-63 sim our airline had. After more than 40 hours, I never left it anywhere other than at the runway threshold, ready to go next time. I found that the handling skills I'd been taught, and maintained with aerobatic, tailwheel and float flying were valuable even on an "aircraft" of larger proportion. I'm sure the reverse is also true.

I would be pleased to think that the jet pilots are sent for circuits in something light, and a little twitchy, just so they can assure themselves, and the rest of us, that they have maintained the basic hands and feet skills. Better yet, if not one darned instrument works in the plane!

The pilot who trained me on Piper Aztec, and Cheyenne during that period of my life, went on to L1011. I went back to single Cessna (by preference). I took him flying years later, and was very disappointed and surprised to find that his efforts to land my C150 were a fail mostly every time. He'd lost the touch for "flying" the plane. And that was not unusual attitudes, that was just landing it!

I worry that general handling skills I, and many of my GA peers maintain, are less common in the big Jet world now.

ElitePilot
4th Sep 2015, 03:02
Thanks Reverse glad to hear there's more to it...
However its still all very well but with a lot of airlines adopting maximum use of automation policy on the line the stick and rudder skills are naturally decaying so until that gets addressed as well the UPRT will just be familiarisation not a skill.

RAT 5
4th Sep 2015, 08:22
Regarding the training philosophy these days: firstly I'm concerned that the basic CPL flight training has been reduced from 250 - 150hrs. Not every pilot will end up in an airline jet. There are Air taxis & biz-jest our there. OK, the amount of VFR nav-ex we used to do was fun, but with GPS these days perhaps that should be reduced, but 100hrs seems a lot. MPL courses with a lot of sim based training might be considered OK for airliners, but it must be at the expense of developing manual handling skills. Perhaps that is where the problem lies; there is an attitude that manual handling skills above 500' are not required......until they are. Consequently airlines with modern a/c do not want to spend time teaching beyond the basic base check and do not like it when the number of Go-rounds increase on sunny days. So they discourage such frivolous activities as manual visual approaches; and the downward spiral continues.
I think back to B732 training. It had the most simplest of autopilot and the nav system was the same as you saw in flight school: a HSI with VOR/LOC display, a DME and a basic T instrument panel. It did not take any extra training. So we first learnt to fly/handle the a/c; then we learnt operate the a/c; then we added some systems non-normal, and then we added some emergencies. Todays TR syllabi is biased towards the operation of the a/c under normal & non-normal conditions. Because of the new sophisticated systems there is more FBS time, but then the FFS hours are also absorbed by a/c operation with systems non-normals and much FMC programming and briefing and set-ups and use of automatics. There is little time for handling, except for those mandatory in the LST. The basic mandatory manoeuvres required are the same as B732 35 years ago. V1-cut, SE LS & G/A are still the same. There has been very little evolution of modern day testing in modern day a/c. It has been static. The amount of FFS time is much the same. One possibility would be to add 2 sessions to the TR for handling, but that's cost, and for whom? The XAA's say their job is to set a base standard of handling and the operators can set their in-house standards and train their crews as required. To me that should include the manual skills that the TR course does not have time for. Base training is not enough to achieve all that is required. It needs daily practice and exposure, and principally that means approaches. Every take off is manual and following the FD up to CRZ with constant thrust is hardly difficult. Manual flying from FL100 down is another matter, busy TMA's excepted. There is a time & place; but even there, from 5000', it should not scare the horses or small children.
How many airlines encourage this? What does your employer encourage? And I'm not thinking just of EU airlines, but worldwide. We, the pax, climb aboard partner airlines from very different cultures. Their standards might not be the same as the host airlines we bought the ticket from.
It might be dream to have a worldwide standard and similar philosophies, but the first step on an adventure is always the most difficult and the most important. Who will take it? FAA? EASA?

Reverserbucket
4th Sep 2015, 09:40
The basic training content is indeed part of the problem - too greater emphasis on completing the disproportionate solo cross-country element (typically navigating (by satellite) to the same destinations and turning-points over sparse, practically featureless landscapes) with far too little G/H in place beforehand only leads to practicing bad habits picked up in the early hours of training which cannot be corrected adequately as the instructors simply don't get a chance. This is no criticism of instructional standards - simply a case of insufficient time to teach the air exercises thoroughly enough before the solo components. By far the majority of the CPL course is spent engaged in straight and level and this is one of the root causes that needs to be addressed. MPL - even less basic handling. UPRT is a 'Bandaid' to a far greater issue which needs addressing properly, as RAT 5 suggests, and with the increasing emphasis on CDA and 4D trajectory based traffic management, it's one that needs addressing soon.


fokker1000 - TG still takes the C150A out for a 'spin' or two on Saturdays I understand ;)

Dan Winterland
4th Sep 2015, 09:40
Appreciate some ATO's include an element of UPRT in the initial type rating stage but not much.

The problem with simulators is that they do a poor job of UPRT. The motion is not representative of the real manoeuvres and the UPRT I have done has been of poor value. There is no substitute for real hands on practice at the early stages.

As an RAF pilot, I was subjected to lots of such training at an early stage. Although some of the manoeuvres are not necessarily relevant to modern commercial operations, the basics are. I frequently surprised sitting next to some pilots that they have never seen extreme attitudes for real - 60 degrees angle of bank is their limit. My company trains a lot of pilots through a cadet scheme. They all get 5 hours in an aerobatic aircraft learning how to recover from extreme attitudes and are better pilots for it. This is a company initiative and not a regulatory one.

deptrai
4th Sep 2015, 10:10
RAT5, MPL courses with a lot of sim based training might be considered OK for airliners, but it must be at the expense of developing manual handling skills.

A lot of the MPL sim training is "hand-flying". There are fresh MPL graduates with very good (procedural) manual handling skills, for the type they have been trained for, within limitations of a sim. For airline cadets, I can see how MPL make sense (no sarcasm). Acquiring 80 more hours of manual handling skills in a real aircraft (classic ATPL path) also has it's place, but frankly there are limits to how much of those skills are transferable from a much smaller, prop a/c.

Rather than 80 more hours of cross-country cruise in real aircraft (they'll get that quickly on the line), I think 5 hours of aerobatic training as Dan Winterland suggested is a better idea to improve cadet training.

RAT 5
4th Sep 2015, 11:39
Guys: I agree the time to correct this is at basic training stage. The students are enthusiastic pilots who are then not being allowed to fly. It is sad to meet some disillusioned souls stuck in RHS of an aluminium tube not being encouraged to fly. If the basic training issues can be fixed they will only bear fruit if the skills can be carried forward and kept sharp on a daily basis.
I wonder how many incidents were converted into accidents not because of lack of skills, specifically, but by boredom and complacency that allowed the situation to go undetected. I include in this the simple scenario where you are sucked in hot & high and do not react in time: and ultimately do not go-round.
The best lessons I ever learnt in my jet apprentice days was: by my first PNF G/A due not visual at DA; by my first PF G/A from an SRA (not visual); by a G/A as PNF from a visual circuit flown by an ace. A thermal tailwind kicked in <500' on a shortish runway, right in front of the terminal and all the pax. No compunction to toss it away and go again. Best lesson ever.
Now that would be an interesting practice. An a/c that becomes subtly unstable <500' with no windshear warning. PF has to decide. That is a +ve lesson, plus more practice at one of the most realistic possibilities - a normal all engine G/A - that is most often routinely messed up.
In the sim the mandatory G/A is of little value as you know it's coming. It's the same with RTO's. At the end of the detail you always finish with RTO & Pax Evac. There is no surprise element.
V1-cut. I once had a TRE give me the engine failure at TOGA from an NPA. Now that was a real +ve experience. Vref40+5 = V2F15 so it was classified as loss of thrust <V2. Ticked a box, but in a very educational manner.
More imagination vicar.

BEagle
4th Sep 2015, 12:14
Although Option 1 is fully in line with ICAO, Option 2 requires more than ICAO does, because the proposal also includes LAPL(A) and PPL(A).

EASA strikes again! Anything which EASA admits to requiring more than ICAO does should be rejected on principle.

GlobalNav
4th Sep 2015, 19:08
Questions.

The limitations and shortcomings of piloted simulation - a given. The potential educational value of flight training - in a relatively small trainer - a given.

How does any of these help a pilot understand how to skillfully handle a heavy transport at FL350, let alone provide a meaningful level of control proficiency? How many pilots ever manually maneuver a heavy at FL350 under normal conditions when all indications are normal, correct and expected?

Considering the surprise, suddeness, and confusion surrounding an upset at altitude, coupled initially with disbelief and the likelihood of missteps that compound the problem - what are the chances that a typical, "experienced and trained" line pilot will recover safely?

Would the amount and content of a mandated training campaign, that operators would accept, give time for and pay for - hence that authorities would actually mandate - be an effective solution?

Is something more than training needed?

Lonewolf_50
4th Sep 2015, 19:27
The main problem in unusual attitudes is the effect of g forces. This needs to be a part of any serious training course. That isn't what I saw when I was teaching it. (Granted, over two decades ago).

Did you find this to be true with people who have developed instrument scans, or those who haven't yet?

Dan Winterland
5th Sep 2015, 09:00
Questions.

Answers.

How does any of these help a pilot understand how to skillfully handle a heavy transport at FL350, let alone provide a meaningful level of control proficiency? How many pilots ever manually maneuver a heavy at FL350 under normal conditions when all indications are normal, correct and expected?


It gives them the confidence to handle an upset and a good idea of how to recover.

Considering the surprise, suddeness, and confusion surrounding an upset at altitude, coupled initially with disbelief and the likelihood of missteps that compound the problem - what are the chances that a typical, "experienced and trained" line pilot will recover safely?


Much improved as the pilot will be better prepared and less likely to suffer any 'startle effect'. Also, see answer above.

Would the amount and content of a mandated training campaign, that operators would accept, give time for and pay for - hence that authorities would actually mandate - be an effective solution?


Probably yes, but we don't know until someone turns around and says "thank God I did my upset training in that CAP10". Until then, it's best guess.

Is something more than training needed?

What do you suggest - a power-point brief? From my experience as a military QFI, you can't brief a severe upset. the student only gains confidence by experiencing the recovery.

alf5071h
5th Sep 2015, 21:40
This NPA is a sad reflection of the state of safety regulation in Europe.
EASA has a bureaucratic style, aligning safety documentation more with the EU legal processes than those aspects required by operators; how can a 135 page NPA be justified to introduce small changes in training requirements.

The NPA fails to provide a convincing argument of what the nature of the safety problem is; LOC is the result of previous activity or lack of it, surmised to be deficiencies in knowledge or training. Yet with the same logic, the vast, overwhelming majority of European operators who apparently do not suffer LOC incidents, have satisfactory LOC prevention training. The industry has yet to understand what ‘good’ operators do well in training in order to avoid LOC situations.
If these operations represent an improved method of training then why not identify and share these aspects, perhaps avoiding the risk that additional requirements might detract from training which is now well executed.

The safety process represented in the NPA is reactive; it is not a wide ranging human centred view, but instead it is adversely human specific to the point of blame and train.

What is the root issue; it is difficult to be specific in any operation involving human activity. The NPA reflects this uncertainty and the resultant is a shotgun approach which attempts to cover a wide range of aspects, none of which appears to provide the certainty of improving avoidance of a LOC accident.

There is little if any correlation with the primary factors in the referenced accidents (3). The accidents involved technical weaknesses, but all of the incidents used technical protections to mitigate weak human performance; perhaps the critical issue is with the availability of technical protections in the event of poor awareness. Thus perhaps EASA should be looking beyond human activity for the ‘root issues’ which might provide better focussed regulatory action.

GlobalNav
5th Sep 2015, 23:53
"What do you suggest - a power-point brief? From my experience as a military QFI, you can't brief a severe upset. the student only gains confidence by experiencing the recovery."

Hardly. I'm no more a fan of Powerpoint solutions than I sense you seem to be.

This is a case where education, alone, is insufficient, a change in behavior and performance/proficiency is required, in my judgement. Training is good, if there is enough of it, carried out in the right venue, with the proper syllabus and training objectives. While I would not totally discount some of the items that have been mentioned, I just don't see them as truly meeting the need. Unfortunately the frequency of occurrence is probably to low to convince the operators to invest the time and resources needed for sufficiently effective training.

I'm no inventor, but it seems to me that today's modern transports should have a flight guidance mode that provides the command guidance to detect and recover from the upset. We need to shorten the interval between occurrence and recognition/belief that it is happening, accurate identification of the condition and immediate correct intervention. The conditions are too critical to bear the delay of recognition, misinterpretation and wrong actions. I think the FGS needs to tell the crew what has happened, and unequivocal cues what to do and how.

Judd
6th Sep 2015, 08:35
What does your employer encourage? And I'm not thinking just of EU airlines, but worldwide
A general question calls for a general answer and that is, it is a good bet the world's airlines demand the pilot engages the automatics a few seconds after lift off and stay engaged until short final.

Tee Emm
6th Sep 2015, 08:59
The problem with simulators is that they do a poor job of UPRT Must disagree with you on that point, Dan. Having taught unusual attitudes in 737 simulators from fully inverted after simulated wake turbulence encounter, to a 60 degree vertical pitch up on initial take off climb (unload and roll to the nearest horizon as per Boeing FCTM recommendations,) my experience is the flight instrument indications work exactly as one would expect in a real aircraft. OK the "G" forces are not there of course.

Nearly all the well publicised loss of control situations have been at night or in IMC where prompt instrument interpretation and manual flying skills would have saved the aircraft. I have flown in many 737 simulators and control forces (not "G" ) and flight instrument indications, have been satisfactory whether in inverted or steep nose high or nose low attitudes.

After 15 minutes of this training in IMC, every student I have seen trained comes out of those simulators with a smile on their face and armed with the confidence and technical skill how to manually fly out of trouble in IMC. Really, it is no big deal although there are those in the Regulator who make a big song and dance over UA training as if it is something new. As long as the ADI's in the simulator are capable of rolling through 36 degrees (which most are) then UA recoveries on instruments simply require average handling skills.

DirtyProp
6th Sep 2015, 09:54
Well, amazingly I agree with easa this time (but I still think its training sucks).
It's also my opinion that the syllabus should include minimum mandatory training in a glider.

PS: am I the only one who's getting fed-up with all those acronyms?

RAT 5
6th Sep 2015, 10:11
alf507iH: Excellent post. The solution will always be unsatisfactory if the problem has been mis-identified. More research vicar.

Tee Emm: After 15 minutes of this training in IMC, every student I have seen trained comes out of those simulators with a smile on their face and armed with the confidence and technical skill how to manually fly out of trouble in IMC.

Oh that this was a common training scenario. In the 3 year cycle of box ticking I've been subjected to the sim data based stored UA's for 2 manoeuvres, perhaps 3. My oppo also had 3 attempts. Total time <10mins total for 2 pilots. Box ticked. Move on to more 3.4/3.6 items and tick the boxes. AGH!

fdr
9th Sep 2015, 03:58
Centaurus, concur with your observation, but the problem goes well beyond CASA's following of the nonsense being exported from EASA and caught by FAR 61.

On a side note, as one who is relatively frequently stalling jet transports, i assure the people assuming that the simulator has validity of the fact they are basically mistaken. At the point of a g break, being a substantial distance in front of the cg becomes much more interesting than any simulator. The control resposes are correct when the aircraft gets unloaded, but otherwise are different enough to merit thorough briefing.

The planes still recover nicely, if the finally incorporated non involvement of thrust application is adhered to. Otherwise, my large jets behave similarly to my learjet through the early stall. Stalling smaller military jets does not give much of the control issues that the swept wing transport has inherently.

Training recovery in some small/mid size jets may be reasonable training, but otherwise, the limitations are that the simulator does not accurately model the handling, dynamics, vertical and longitudinal loads, or lateral loads that are experienced at the cockpit. The intensity if the buffett in the aircraft relative to the simulator is enough to give pause.

Personally, i think that upset in a Pitts while lots of fun, has general confidence but limited direct applicability( inhave changed my view on that) but, any aircraft or device that reinforces the universal recovery technique of neutralising the controls, reducing thrust, attaining a wings level attiude and recovering from the upright or inverted dive remains valid in our B737, 777. And even Airbus aircraft if loss of control is identified.

The biggest single issue IMHO, is the failure of recognition of loss of control, which was evident very early on in 447, but not recognised. Aircraft unless impacted by a change in dynamics (National etc) want to fly, they are failing as flight crew are not recgnising the loss of control occurring, and then do not follow very simple recovery techniques. These do need to be ingrained, as in the real case, the loads can become quite a factor towards cognitive overload.

MCC itself is a bureaucratic irrelevancy to the pernicious issue of lack of fundamental flying skills. Additional issues are the trends towards prescriptive solutions towards compliance that reduce the skill ,aintenance of our flight crews. My flight crews fly mulltiple jet transports in R&D, as well as maintaining skills on various aircraft with varied configurations and handling qualities. Loss of control is a briefed item prior to every test flight, and is practiced routinely in the sim sessions we undertake for proficiency training. We do around 4 times the sim sessions the airlines do, but all training in unusual manoeuvers is prefaced by the understanding that the simulator is limited in validity.

Any program assuming that the existing and proposed standards will give solutions to issues of operational safety may be ill prepared for the realities of stochastic system behavior... Compliance is not safety per se. Loss of SA at all levels remains the primary problem, as in 447, at I, II, (and level III on occasion)

Good luck out there.

Linktrained
14th Sep 2015, 17:40
Perhaps all stalling training is done with power off or at Flight Idle. And well below F/L 20.0 as well.

If a pilot has never hand-flown above this, then he may not be aware just how sensitive the controls may feel.. Does a Simulator give a sufficiently accurate a "FEEL" in some fairly ordinary S/L flight at height ?

( I have thought about G and cannot see how provide enough in each direction even in an accellerometer! It will just have to be briefed.)

At some moment on 447, Flight Idle was selected and the nose lowered, but that was as it would tend to do with the engines mounted under the wings.

I do not recall what comment was made (if any) before TOGA was re-selected. Or afterwards...

The Captain returned to the Flight Deck. I do not know whether he had heard a change in the engine power or not. ( It might be thought to be unusual at cruising level and might have helped to hastened his return.)

Someone must know. Perhaps it is still in the FDR.

A POWER ON STALL at or above cruising level would have been a bad start.
LT

RAT 5
14th Sep 2015, 20:06
The sim stall training I've experienced is always at idle power, low level, and anticipated. I've never experienced a power ON stall at high altitude. Yet real life scenarios of stall have often been in that environment. Pitot/probe heaters off at FL 270CLB = stall: an unmonitored inadvertent auto election of V/S stalled the a/c at high FL in climb. These are real life power on stalls. Never trained in my 35 year life time.
We should include UA upset that results in a stall warning. This is what we should be training in the sim. Real life is not the time to wonder what the heck to do. That is what sims are for. IMHO sims have become mandatory or recurrent box tickers. I admit some of my operators have introduced some very worthwhile scenarios to experience as a LOFT. Excellent, but then the rest of the session was tick in the box items.
All I'm saying is IMHO the use of simulator time is often not used to its best value. Many airlines have sim time to the absolute mandatory annual minimum time. That tells me all I need to know bout the attitude of the airline training dept. It should also tell the relevant XAA the same. But, sadly, the mandatory minimum is sufficient for the XAA to sign off, and with airlines being run by profit motivated accountants that is what you are going to get.

misd-agin
15th Sep 2015, 15:32
There is no fear in a simulator. Nothing can simulate the actual experience being in an airplane can give you. And yes, that includes stress and fear. In a sim you can always decide to walk out. That is NEVER an option in the airplane. That is a night and day difference.


Rat5 - you said there was no relevance between a Piper Cub and an airliner. Currently there is no relevance between stalling a sim and stalling a jetliner. Aviation Week&Space Technology had several articles, to include interviews with Boeing and Airbus, on this issue. Boeing and Airbus have agreed to a generic post stall model for n/b a/c. They've said that w/b post stall behavior is different. Why a generic model? IDK. But can you imagine the internet fire storm, and marketing nightmare, if it people found out that the A or B product had worse post stall handling qualities?


Anything you'd experience in a simulator right now would be the software impression of a TRE/CKA that gives the simulator it's annual(?) fidelity check. Is that how the airplane performs? Tweak and certify. Next question - how many stalls does the TRE/CKA have in the airplane? At high altitude? See the problem? A guy with no experience is tweaking the simulator to what he thinks it will do.


A friend said that he'd done a w/b stall in the simulator at altitude and it was pretty docile. If it was pretty "docile" was does the AF 447 report show cyclic bank angle changes of up to 30-40 degrees from left to right? Company had a high altitude upset. Guy involved in the investigation asked me what bank angles I thought they experienced. I guessed 30 degrees. He said "not even close".

RAT 5
15th Sep 2015, 15:59
Rat5 - you said there was no relevance between a Piper Cub and an airliner

That's a little out of context, and I can't remember the exact discussion. I fly both types and enjoy both, in their different way. I think basic CPL training should be rethought. Whether light a/c recurrency during an airline career is a necessity is another point.

About stalling: airline stall training in a sim is always at stick shaker. It is not stall recovery, it is not even incipient stall recovery. It's a manoeuvre accomplished BEFORE the stall is reached and to avoid getting into the stall. When I had freedom how to teach B737NG TR I used to get the students to hold into the stall and feel the stick nudger. I get them to let go of the elevator and see what happened. I'd get them to stabilise at SS and waggle the wings. I'd get them to stall with A/P and ALT HLD and idle thrust and recover with A/P remaining engaged. In manual flight I'd get them to recover at SS with level flight and with descending flight and different power applications. They'd do SS exercises in turns, increasing bank to cause SS or pulling more g. And I always said reduce attitude/load BEFORE adding thrust, by a split second. FCTM said apply thrust and reduce attitude. Now it has been reversed with greater advise about allowing SS to cancel 1st. The truth of aerodynamics was rediscovered.
The point is the stall training was an in-depth training session to learn about the a/c and at different altitudes, configurations and speeds. We even included stick shaker caused by UA at low speed and low thrust, i.e. mishandling. It might take 30-45 minutes per student. Now it's about 10 mins and very low-depth.
Pitifully minimal.
It should have been covered extensively in basic flight school training. It should have been continued into TR sim training. It hasn't been. Would small a/c recurrency experience fill the void? I'm not sure.

misd-agin
15th Sep 2015, 16:40
Here's the problem - what experience did the TRE/CKA have in the airplane maneuvering the a/c at SS? If he has no idea how the a/c handles how can he program the simulator to model .... what?


You weren't doing stalls simulating the aircraft's behavior. Both Boeing and Airbus have said that many times - 'current simulator modeling does not replicate the real aircraft.' You were teaching the students a non existent world. That can be a huge negative training event.


We used to teach (fake) stalls in the simulator until the training folks realized the simulator wasn't modeling reality.

RAT 5
15th Sep 2015, 17:02
We used to teach (fake) stalls in the simulator until the training folks realized the simulator wasn't modeling reality.

I've got to admit, having just remembered the experience, that in my HS-125 rating days in 1978 we took the a/c unto 10,000 and stalled it, properly. The wing drop and nose down pitch was worse than any small a/c stall I'd ever seen then or since. It was scary & fun at the same time. This big hunk of metal pitching & rolling and dropping out of the sky. A previous experience of aerobatics, a love of adventure and 10,000' of sky softened the shock. It was amazing. Now that might add much worth to a pilot's CV.

misd-agin
16th Sep 2015, 02:10
The USAF had a training maneuver called 'the confidence maneuver'. I called it 'the scare the sh*t out of the students maneuver'. Pull up to 70 degrees nose high, hold the pitch there, and set the throttles at a mid range power setting (compressor stall protection), and let the plane just run out of energy. A little bit more aggressive than the standard civilian trained stall.


After a while it became fun. A buddy and I did it line abreast(obviously with significant spacing) trying to see if we could time the stall at the same time. The plane would kind of flop around, and you'd be hanging from your lap belt/shoulder harness, so it was neat to look over and see my buddy's jet flopping around - "so that's what it looks like from the outside". I forget what the plane would pitch over to but it was pretty steep, probably in the 60-80 degrees nose down. Pretty impressive from 70 degrees nose up a couple of seconds earlier.

RAT 5
16th Sep 2015, 11:36
Yep; sounds fun and a great idea. It's a bit like a mariner out on a large boat and experiencing a rolling sea with dutch roll and pitch involved for the 1st time. Most of life is straight & level. They've no idea how far the boat can go and where the tipping point is. Sometimes over controlling to try and stop the natural motion can make it worse. No simulators, but perhaps they had the chance on a rough day with an old salt to show them. The confidence that going near the edge can bring is enormous and invaluable.
With AF447 I never understood why they didn't remember they had 33,000' underneath them and use it. Shoving the nose down was not going to be so hazardous. TA only and do want you need to do. No MSA's to worry about; lots of sky to let aerodynamics do their thing, if you didn't fight it. Too much time spent keeping it all within +/-100'. Sometimes you need to get out of the box.

Centaurus
16th Sep 2015, 12:40
With AF447 I never understood why they didn't remember they had 33,000' underneath them and use it. Shoving the nose down was not going to be so hazardous

I can readily understand how they got into trouble. Their whole career apart from CPL training was spent on button pushing the automatic pilot. In addition neither pilot had manually flown the aircraft in IMC at high altitude cruise either in the simulator or in the real aircraft. It took only one unexpected event (autopilot disconnected while in IMC at high altitude) to start the chain of events that culminated in a crash into the ocean.
My guess is that with MPL graduates with almost no real hands-on flying experience apart from VFR light training singles, taking their place on flight decks as second in command of big jet transports, we should expect the occasionally statistically improbable event like AF 447; whether fatal or not. Whatever that event may be, it is highly probable to involve IMC conditions, combined with lack of manual basic instrument flying ability on the part of the handling pilot.

Smilin_Ed
16th Sep 2015, 14:40
With AF447 I never understood why they didn't remember they had 33,000' underneath them and use it.

It's simple: They didn't know that they had stalled it. :ugh::ugh::ugh:

RAT 5
16th Sep 2015, 15:41
Guys: I don't want to reopen an AF447 thread and the circular debate about basic flying skills and scans. It was just a comment that perhaps too many pilots think they have to recover, whatever upset they find themselves in, ASAP and not use all the space they have. This could be true of lateral manoeuvring as well as vertical. Too tight turn with too much bank can stall an unstalled a/c and exacerbate your problems. Height can be used to experiment with an a/c and find out what's going, what works & what does't work. Hauling back on the stick may not always be the best option if there is sky below you.

peekay4
16th Sep 2015, 17:10
December 1996 (Narrows, Virginia) -- an Airborne Express DC-8 entered a full stall at 13,500' during a post-maintenance flight evaluation of the aircraft's stall warning system, which failed to operate.

The test flight crew recognized the stall immediately but failed to recover. The DC-8 impacted terrain with the control column held in the aft nose-up position. There were no survivors.

Among the contributing factors:


The outdated practice of recovery from incipient stall primarily by using power instead of reducing pitch
FAA and Airborne Express check objectives requiring stall recovery with "minimum altitude loss"
Lack of an AOA indicator to provide awareness of the critical angle of attack
Unrealistic stall model in the DC-8 flight simulator resulted in negative training of the flight crew


From the NTSB report (http://asndata.aviation-safety.net/reports/1996/19961222-0_DC86_N827AX.pdf): "(the) simulator’s benign flight characteristics when flown more into the stall provided the flightcrew with a misleading expectation of the handling characteristics of the actual airplane. The PF’s initial target pitch attitudes during the attempted stall recovery (from 10 degrees to 14 degrees) may have resulted in a successful recovery during his practice and teaching in the simulator."

In part due to the negative training, there is evidence that the crew believed that they had recovered from the stall and were now in a simple dive, while in fact they were still in an accelerated stall. The PF might have held aft yoke pressure to pull out from the perceived dive, which only made matters worse.

The FAA and Airborne Express performance standards that stalls are to be recovered with "minimum altitude loss" may have also resulted in pilots applying only "the minimum reduction in pitch attitude" which may not be adequate in actual stall conditions.

All this may be changing.

In the aftermath of the Colgan Air crash, the FAA has mandated new Part 121 upset recovery training and updated Part 60 Flight Simulator standards to include "extended envelope" flight models covering full stalls. I believe the new standards will start to take effect in 2018.

parkfell
21st Sep 2015, 09:41
Cast your minds back prior to JAR introduction in 1999.

At BAe flying college Prestwick, the course included five flying progress tests in the single engine phase.
The final test was on the AS202 ~ Bravo, a fantastic Swiss aerobatic trainer.
As part of the G/H test, the five basic aerobatic manoeuvres had to be demonstrated.

So the basic skills were learnt by junior birdmen during basic training. Mainly BA, Cathay and Gulf Air students from 1988 under CAP509 approval.

Compare that to what EASA requires now for licence issue............and what is proposed........

You need to teach it prior to licence issue to an appropriate standard. Sticking plasters don't work.

Linktrained
22nd Sep 2015, 17:35
How long before the century ?

I cast my mind back to 1948, when Auster's Chief Test Pilot would not have allowed me to go SOLO until I could Stall and Spin. And then Recover.

( Later, at Hamble similar exercises were done towards a CPL. And in the Link Trainer, too.)

Horatio Barber's 1917 edition of " The Aeroplane Speaks" says:

Stall, to - " To give or allow an aeroplane an angle of incidence greater than the "maximum" angle, the result being a fall in the lift-drift ratio, the lift consequently becoming less than the weight of the aeroplane, which must then fall, ie. "Stall" or "Pancake".

Spinning recovery was tested at Farnborough in about 1917, by Frederick Lindemann, a 29 year old physicist, who had learned to fly.

LT