MYSTERY RE. TASMANIAN MULTILATERATION

[Dick Smith]

Following is an article which appeared in the Weekend Australian headed, “Airservices Australia ‘lying’ over use of Tasmania’s radar system ”:

Airservices Australia has been accused of lying about why Tasmania’s radar system is not used to control aircraft at low altitude, after the company behind the system revealed it was designed precisely for that purpose.

The government-owned air traffic controller has repeatedly suggested the $6 million TASWAM radar-like system introduced in 2010 was not intended to provide radar control of planes below 8500 feet.

Instead, it has suggested its limited use of the system below this level — as an aid to assist “procedural separation” by tower-based controllers relying primarily on radio contact with pilots — is in line with TASWAM’s objectives.

However, The Weekend Australian has obtained a press release, issued in the US by the company that supplied the system, which categorically states that it was intended to replace procedural separation with full radar control to the ground.

The release by Sensis Corporation, made to global media on November 1, 2010, after TASWAM began operating, says the system means Tasmanian airspace is “now controlled”, allowing radar controllers to “separate aircraft in both en route and (in) terminal airspace”.

It describes this as a “safer, more efficient use of the airspace in a region that was previously controlled with procedural separation”.

However, five years on, airspace below 8500 feet at the Hobart and Launceston airports is still controlled by procedural separation, described by the Virgin Independent Pilots Association as “nowhere near” as safe as radar control and by aviator Dick Smith as a “1930s” system.

Airservices has accused The Australian of inaccurate reporting in suggesting that TASWAM was not being used to the extent originally intended.

However, yesterday, Sensis — now called Saab Sensis — stood by its 2010 statement that TASWAM was intended to provide radar control to 150 metres from ground level, allowing a “safer, more efficient” system to replace procedural separation.

“From a technical perspective, the system is capable of that (radar control to the ground): at the end of the day, it’s up to Airservices and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to determine how they use it,” a Saab Sensis spokesman said.

“We’ve never had any concerns or issues raised by Airservices Australia in relation to TASWAM operational function.”

Airservices insists procedural separation is safe and appropriate for the level of traffic at Hobart and Launceston airports, althoug¬h CASA has ordered a new review of Tasmanian airspace in light of a rise in traffic.

Mr Smith, a former CASA chairman, said the revelations from Saab Sensis showed Airservices had been “lying” to the public to “cover up” its failure to use TASWAM, which uses signals to triangulate plane positions, as intended.

“It just shows that Airservices are not telling the truth,” Mr Smith said.

“We are going to end up with an accident before anything happens. Someone has made a serious mistake here.”

CASA has said it will not approve the use of TASWAM below 8500 feet because it does not provide sufficient coverage.

Airservices air traffic control general manager Greg Hood did not directly respond yesterday to Mr Smith’s claims, or suggestions that Airservices had misled the public, but insisted Tasmanian airspace was safe.

While not commenting directly on whether TASWAM was originally intended to provide radar control to the ground, he suggested it had allowed safer, more efficient use of Tasmanian airspace as stated in the Sensis press release.

“Airservices uses the TASWAM system to safely and efficiently manage over 70,000 aircraft movements in Tasmanian airspace each year,” he said.

A CASA report in December 2011 quoted air controllers and managers complaining that TASWAM was “worse” the previously patchy old-style radar based in Launceston that it replaced.

Minutes of a May 2012 meeting with stakeholders suggest Airservices representative Kent Quigley discussed “coverage issues” with TASWAM and “the infrastructure required to improve surveillance”.

This is really a fascinating story. Why would the company involved in supplying the equipment categorically state in a media release that the system was to give a “control” service across Tasmania and to ground level at Hobart and Launceston if this was not so? Can someone shed some light on this mystery? Why would Airservices spend $6 million and not get a proper air traffic control “separation” service to ground level? Surely this could easily be done for that amount of money?

It’s interesting also how Greg Hood does not “directly respond” to questions from The Australian. Why would this be so?

[Fieldmouse]

http://awesomegifs.com/wp-content/uploads/dead-horse.gif

[Dick Smith]

That's what they want us to do.

Stop trying to find out what went wrong.

So it's only flogging a dead horse if they get away with it.

$1.4 billion was lost on the Super Seasprites with not one person held responsible- probably promoted.

It's clear this system was ordered to actually provide a proper terminal radar separation service. I bet the truth will soon come out.

If the fault was caused by Sensis they should not be given further work until they explain why they failed. What could be fairer?

[Capn Bloggs]

Meanwhile, how's your CBA on "radar" approach services to most regional aussie jet ports (including Hobart and Launy) coming along, Dick?

[PA39]

Stick it to them Dick. We are paying for a "service"!!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Fieldmouse:ok: Love your work:D

[Jabawocky]

Dick, do you know the ACTUAL and real safety implication of that article which confronted the staff in Hobart and Launceston on the weekend?

You really need to think things through. The exact issue you spruke about, safety in the Tas region, was no doubt compromised by the distress created by your lies and BS in this article.

I am actually calling BS here and calling you out over it.

I know I have the support of many ATC's in TAS.

Bad act Dick…………………. :=

If only you knew………………………………..you have no idea how lucky you are.:ugh:

But hey…………..I know nothing about flying IFR or ATC…..you know that and you told Tasmanians that several years ago on ABC radio….so just ignore me. I never posted here :rolleyes:

[Jabawocky]

And while I am having a cranky moment, although I have vented my steam a bit. How about an "Apples with Apples" comparison.

You have listed incidents that were not even ATS attributable in Tasmania, pilot error etc to paint a bleak picture for the great unwashed, particularly the Political class.

If what you are doing is honorable, compare data with Surveillance areas . How about the Gold Coast or Cairns for the last 5 years just as a random sample.

[le Pingouin]

So Dick, you're willing to take the word of a press release on face value of a company with a vested interest in portraying their product in the best light possible to support possible further global sales? As if they're going to say "sorry, we hyped the press release" when questioned.

Now where's that "like" button Jaba :ok:

P.S. Procedural separation is a "proper" ATC separation service - you'll find it applied all over the world every hour of every day.

[Hempy]

Dick,

Seriously. Take a few days off, contact one of the OMs at either BN or ML (I'll supply the phone numbers if you like..), get a visitors pass, and spend 4 or 5 days plugged into a console next to someone at the coalface*. You think you know how it all 'works', but really you are making assumptions/accusations based on flawed 'knowledge' and an underlying 'pilots' bias tbh.

*pity you didn't do it 20 years ago..

[Dick Smith]

What amazing justification for the unjustifiable. In Tasmania we’re using a procedural approach system. This is a system invented no doubt in the 1930’s. No one can kid anyone that procedural separation using radio and position reporting can ever be as safe or as efficient as one using an approach radar system. But the last posters are trying to justify that. Why could that be?

For those who are reading this thread and don’t understand the full details of air traffic control and radar separation, under the Tasmanian system at the present time aircraft have to call up air traffic control and state the position which has been worked out by the air crew. If that position is wrong the air traffic controller normally has to accept it. This has resulted in many hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths over the years. A common form of accident causing fatalities by professional pilots is a “CFIT” – controlled flight into terrain. The NTSB states that the best way to mitigate against CFIT accidents is to use controlled airspace and radar. It’s clear that the $6 million was spent in Tasmania to give a radar service at both Hobart and Launceston airports. Why else would the money be spent?

There has clearly been some major stuff-up and I simply can’t understand why air traffic controllers would be protecting this. Or could it be that the controllers who control the airspace in the towers want to keep that air space for some reason – i.e. “it’s what we’ve always done” - and have insisted on being trained to use radar separation standards when this is simply not feasible.

All around the world controllers standing in visual towers are not trained to use radar separation techniques for obvious reasons.

One day the truth will come out - why doesn’t someone expose it on this thread? Then we can go ahead and get the system working properly.

[Capt Claret]

For those who are reading this thread and don’t understand the full details of air traffic control and radar separation, under the Tasmanian system at the present time aircraft have to call up air traffic control and state the position which has been worked out by the air crew. If that position is wrong the air traffic controller normally has to accept it.

Codswallop!

Speaking for ops to/from Hobart, unless bugsmashing quite low, one is radar identified until handed off to Hobart Tower at 45 nm, inbound. Even then one is generally on a prescribed airway, so reporting position is not a huge feat.

Departing Hobart, depending on the traffic mix, one can be officially radar identified as early as 3000' or 4000', and unofficially observed well before that.

You're scare mongering Dick, a bit like Abbott & Co did for 3 years in opposition, and most of their 2 years in power. Now it's bitten them on the neither regions!

[alphacentauri]

The NTSB states that the best way to mitigate against CFIT accidents is to use controlled airspace and radar

Actually no Dick, the NTSB states no such thing. The NTSB offers that the best way to prevent CFIT is to establish as many barriers against it as possible. It then goes on to list these barriers such as GPWS, TAWS, GPS, ADSB, assisted recovery....and then it lists ATC as barrier. They then go on to ellude that approach surveillance and ATC on its own is not an effective barrier against CFIT because it is only a ground based defence.

No one can kid anyone that procedural separation using radio and position reporting can ever be as safe or as efficient as one using an approach radar system.

Why do you think CASA are going down the path of introducing PBN? Effective next Feb all IFR aircraft need to be equipped with GPS as primary means nav. This basically eliminates the risk that an aircraft will ever report in the wrong position. PBN will allow efficiency within the existing airspace structure, without the need for more infrastructure and cost

Then we can go ahead and get the system working properly

Apart from you telling us the system is broken...you have not yet provided any evidence to prove this

[le Pingouin]

Why else would the money be spent?



Wouldn't possibly be anything to do with the VFR plonker in a Tobago who had an AIRPROX with a 737 in E now would it?

That's why we got the temporary radar in Tassie in the first place.

[Dick Smith]

Alpha. The 50 passenger airline that was involved in a CFIT in Irian Jia a few weeks ago was fitted with GPWS. TAWS GPS and ADSB plus a fully trained expat two pilot crew and the accident still happened.

Are you telling me that an approach radar service would not have helped prevent the deaths of 50 people ?

Why bother to have such a service at Canberra - lets go to 1930's procedural like Hobart , She'll be right mate!

[fujii]

Capt Claret.

Proscribed airway?

Proscribed (adj.) excluded from use or mention

[PLovett]

As someone who has bugsmashed his way around most of Tasmania including one memorable time of filing IFR to Bathurst Harbour (that got some interest from Centre) I can verify Capt. Claret's comments about how low one can be verified. The coverage does drop off early when going to the west coast and you get outside of the airways route between Smithton and Hobart but is generally good elsewhere.

Just how good was brought home to me recently when I was able to observe an Airservices record of a flight. It indicated that the system would certainly work down to an initial approach fix. It makes me suspect that Airservices either don't want to train the tower staff in radar procedures or don't want to load centre with the approach phase.

My understanding was CFIT as the most common form of industrial homicide has been replaced with loss of spatial awareness and nothing Airservices can do will fix that. Please don't misunderstand me. Radar or TASWAM to initial approach fix would be great. I have lost count the number of times I have had to hold enroute to give the jets time to put in the procedural distance approaching Hobart and wouldn't have to do that with radar separation. You can guarantee a worried question from clients as to why we are "turning back". However, being without it is not the end of civilisation as we know it. Dick there is a far bigger fight that needs to be fought and this is not it.

[Capt Claret]

fujii my humble apology, all fixed. :ok:

[alphacentauri]

Dick,

A) prove that a radar service would have prevented that accident. Don't just say that it would have PROVE IT!
The entire aviation risk model is based on evidence ...you have only presented your opinion.

B) My post was to point out that you were talking cr*p. If you want credibility mate, you have to stop selectively posting peices of information out of context

[Dick Smith]

I did not state an absolute. ie " prevent"

I said approach radar "helped prevent"

I stand by that statement as it is commonsense .

[alphacentauri]

Just like reducing the speed limit to 60 will 'help prevent' accidents.
A it's impractical
B it wont totally eliminate them

You're argument has holes big enough to fly an aeroplane through

[Lead Balloon]

The entire aviation risk model is based on evidence.I fell off my chair laughing, until I realised that some words had disappeared in the web. Let me fix that for you ... The entire aviation risk model in Australia is based mostly on political responses to the cognitave bias of an ignorant public, as can be seen by the evidence of:

- CASA's treatment of pilots with CVD,

- an ARFFS at Ballina, and

- another government about to give Dick Smith something to play with as a distraction leading up to the next election.

[alphacentauri]

LB, I see your point but I wasn't referring to Australia. If anything Australia should be the shining example of how not to do aviation risk modelling. The least I can ask for is for someone who preaches that he takes the best from overseas and implements it here is to use international methodologies...not Australian ones.

[Jabawocky]

It's late….been an 18-19 hour day again…..but here goes.

PLovett, How ya doing :ok:mate

To be totally correct, longitudinal spacing in Hobart is all to do with runway occupancy times for Jets. RWY12 (normally with a downwind component above 1000ft AGL) greater than 90% of all landings and takeoffs require backtracks. From touchdown to vacated can be up to 5 mins due to there being only two midfield taxiways.

Were full length taxiways available, Tower Approach could run the spacing down to as tight as 5NM. Surveillance has nothing to do with it. Add to that the fact that 99% of all traffic in to and out of Hobart operates with 66degrees of lateral splay, well you get the picture.

It is what it is. ;)

[Hempy]

Jaba. 20 DME is 20 DME. Dick doesn't accept or understand 'procedure'.

Again, he's barking up the wrong tree. He has an opinion on how it 'should be done' with little to no understanding on how the regulations and standards say it 'has to be done'.

Dick. I say again. Visit ML centre. Talk to the ATC's. Get an understanding of what you are talking about instead of making assumptions. You think you know, but you really don't.

[Dick Smith]

Hempy - re: your post #26

Any success I’ve got in life is by surrounding myself with capable people and taking their advice.

All lateral thinking air traffic controllers I have spoken to tell me that an approach radar service is better than a non-radar procedural approach service. It won’t matter how much time I spend in the Melbourne centre, I’m sure experienced air traffic controllers are going to verify that.

The fact that you’re trying to justify that procedural is as safe as a radar based approach service, shows me that there is something else you’re hiding. That’s of course the secret of this whole issue.

To have air traffic controllers trying to justify that radar is not necessary is almost unbelievable. Could it be that the tower controllers want to keep their airspace of the size that it is and that means the status quo i.e. not using a radar approach service from the Melbourne centre?

So is anyone going to suggest that if we turn off the approach radar in Canberra that the system will be as safe as when it was operating? Of course not.

[malroy]

Dick, I am confused.
As I understand it, the reason for different classes of airspace (and hence the control service applied) is to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The higher the unmitigated risk the higher the level of control applied - from 'G' to 'A'.

Radar or other surveillance airspace is not safer than non-surveillance airspace, it just allows more traffic t be processed in the same volume of airspace. Separation is still 1NM + the positional uncertainty.

We could impose class A to the ground everywhere, with blanket Mode S coverage. Approach and tower at all airports! This would be expensive, and would massively over service most locations.

Yet you are arguing here and in the Ballina thread for higher service (and it will be higher cost), yet at the same time you are fighting against increased surveillance coverage, and against actions that would help to increase efficiency, safety and service.

Which do you want? Higher cost and higher service, or a level of service commensurate with the level of risk?

To compare Hobart and Canberra is not a valid comparison. The airport layout, traffic mix and traffic density and route structure are different, so of course the type of service required is different.

[Dick Smith]

Malroy - Thanks for your post (#28).

The facts are quite simple.

I’m looking at a little yellow booklet at the moment which is headed

Airways Transition Project -AMATS -The Dates

and it’s has the date

By 12 December 1991

On Stage 4 for June 1993 it says

• IFR/IFR Separation provided in low level airspace.

Now this date seems to be 22 years ago. I was involved in the AMATS changes and the plan was to test some low level Class E controlled airspace at an airport like Ballina. The reason we were going to do this is we found that every airport in the United States which has IFR traffic is a minimum of Class E controlled airspace.

As you know in Australia all non-towered airports with instrument approaches are in G uncontrolled airspace. Now when you see such a staggering difference it’s normal to say “why should we be so different? Is it worth us testing what they do in other leading aviation countries to see if it has any benefits?”

As you know, due to resistance of change we haven’t even tested one airport with Class E like they have at every IFR non-tower airport in the USA. Yes, I am arguing that we should test the proven US system at Ballina. Yes, it will give a higher level of service but I don’t necessarily believe it will be at a higher cost.

To use the existing enroute controller (as they do in the USA) to provide a separation service rather than a traffic service at Ballina may be revenue-neutral, i.e. other than the small cost of training the controller.

In relation to Hobart and Canberra, the situation is quite different to what you explain. That is, we have spent $6 million of air passengers’ money in putting in the very latest multilateration radar service in Tasmania. The supplier of the equipment has unequivocally stated that the system was designed to provide a surveillance service across Tasmania and to the ground at both Hobart and Launceston airports. They maintain that the system does provide this service and they have never received any communication from Airservices Australia to say that it does not.

Now if you’ve paid the $6 million for the service, why would you use it? – i.e. radar instead of 1930’s radio operated procedural.

So, Malroy, don’t be confused - it’s all incredibly simple. There is a cover up going on here and no doubt it will be exposed. Maybe next week in the Senate.

[alphacentauri]

Dick, if you turn off radar at CB I guarantee the only thing that will happen is the airspace will become less efficient. There will be no reduction in safety.

Stop scaremongering

There will be nothing 'uncovered' at the Senate next week because despite your insistence.....there is no cover up.

Happy to support a trial at Ballina, but you also must undertake the following to ensure the trial has an outcome;
1. You must establish the current level of risk at Ballina ( no you saying it is high is not good enough)
2. You must establish how acceptable that level of risk is ( no you saying it is unacceptable is not good enough)
3. If it is found that the risk is unacceptable, then you must establish what level of risk would be acceptable
4. The aim of the trial would be to see if your proposal would decrease the risk level in step 1 to the level in step 3....you must have a clear goal
5. If it does then proposal can be considered as a permanent fix.
6. If it doesn't, we would need to consider other options. (In this case you would need to be man enough to admit you were wrong)

If you are not prepared to follow these steps and establish a goal for your trial, then all you are doing is pushing a personal agenda. In which case why should we give you an opportunity to do so?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

A bit of light reading if we are going to study history-

Senate Report Airspace 2000 (http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999_02/airspace2000/report/report_pdf.ashx)

Review of AMATS 1991-1993 (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/760388/review_amats_1991-1993.pdf)

You just have to love the internet;)

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Dick, why are you wanting this in place? It wasn't that long ago you firmly believed that non radar E was.perfectly safe to mix VFR with fast jet IFR. Why the change? Surely, your jumping up and down about spoofing is the realisation of WAMLAT even being trialled...it works but Tas airspace is not set up with a dedicated approach control service for Launie and Hobart...do the airlines even want to pay for that level of service?

Too right it works...like tracking aircraft in the circuit area at RAAF Sale from the installation in Tassie.

[buckshot1777]

A bit of light reading if we are going to study history-


And a bit more:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/30791/sir199911_001.pdf

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Big Sky!

Thanks Buckshot!....more reading to refresh my memory.

[topdrop]

I wonder who this referred to:
The influence of the CASA Chairman’s involvement in airspace reform and management style
contributed to the project management deficiencies associated with the demonstration.

[Dick Smith]

OZBUSDRIVER - There has never been a time when I have said that “non-radar E was perfectly safe.” What I have always said is that non-radar E with Australia’s mandatory transponder requirement is clearly safer than non-radar G without a transponder requirement.

I have also said that C above D is ok as long as it is adequately staffed so the air traffic controller responsible for the circuit traffic is not having his or her attention taken away by low risk traffic flying over the top at higher levels. That is, if safety shows that Class C link airspace is required a proper terminal radar service must be provided with both primary and secondary radar. Otherwise there is absolutely no way of knowing if a VFR non-transponder equipped aircraft flew across the airspace.

TOPDROP - I’m really shaking in my boots to be criticised by some unknown, dead loss, non-achiever from the ATSB. In fact, I took the statement as a compliment.

To the air traffic controllers on this thread who are all trying to keep the status quo - never fear! I’m in the process of selling my IFR aircraft – I’ll be donating the money to good causes and I won’t be flying IFR at all in Australia. But it’s strange. If I was an air traffic controller I would be proud to give an actual control service, not charge a pilot for service from, say, Bankstown to Ballina but where the service was really required in the terminal area on approach to Ballina then not give a control service at all but give a 1930’s traffic service. If I was an Aussie air traffic controller I would want to be trained to the skills of controllers in North America where this terminal air space is under control using a trained enroute controller who is no doubt multi-skilled compared to Australia. Especially after the terrible Benalla accident where five were killed, I would want to be trained to give an actual control service so I can help prevent avoidable accidents like that.

Also, as a controller when I’ve heard of an incident where two professional pilots were in cloud at Bundaberg trying to shoot the same approach at the same time, I would say “Hey, I’m an air traffic controller. Why can’t I provide an actual control service at Bundaberg like they do (as I’m told) in all other modern aviation countries?”

Now this criticism is not against the small number of controllers who have contacted me to say that I am 100% correct and we should provide a proper Class E upgraded control service at these busy, non-tower airports.

Yes, I realise Civil Air has actively worked against this. But talk about an unprofessional organisation! It should be running amateurs, not professionals, because it doesn’t support its members – who are actually called air traffic “controllers” - to actually control aircraft, rather than use a 1930’s flight service traffic information service. Every time I flew into Ballina in my CJ3 in cloud I cringed when on descent, where I really wanted a proper control service to be delivered by a professional controller who I was actually paying to actually give me a control service. However, I had to become the air traffic controller and separate myself from other planes in cloud – it’s quite pathetic.

But don’t worry, I have given up on this. I realise there will have to be more fatalities before the majority of you dumbos realise that control means just that, control, and that’s the way of saving lives.

For those who think terminal radar is just for efficiency purposes, please think again. Terminal radar, if properly equipped with an alarm system, can help prevent a controlled flight in terrain. It’s done so all around the world.

Yes, resist change and wait until a major accident occurs. I certainly hope it’s not your loved ones who are involved.

[Lookleft]

I’m really shaking in my boots to be criticised by some unknown, dead loss, non-achiever from the ATSB. In fact, I took the statement as a compliment.

I'm fairly certain that you do know who the ATSB person was and I think he would consider your assessment of him as a compliment as well.:ok:

[le Pingouin]

Says the person who continually displays a total and fundamental lack of understanding of everything we say and thinks we're just being dinosaurs for the sake of being dinosaurs.

As you've been told countless times before and have chosen to ignore every time: it's about the resources. You can't just magic the extra controllers, extra consoles, extra training, extra surveillance coverage out of thin air. It all costs money and lots of it.

Is the reason you've been going hammer and tongs at Airservices recently so you can convince the government to eject the board and management and then have them install one more to your liking who will do things the way you want?

[Dick Smith]

Lookleft. I have no idea who wrote the ATSB report or who made that statement.

Le Pingouin. I have no idea who you are or whether you know what you are talking about. For all I know you could be a Philby doing as much damage to Australia as you can.

And it's not just about resources. It's about leadership. US ATCs reckon they can procedurally separate IFR aircraft in non radar E with less workload than giving a pathetic Australian 1930s Marconi amateur service. But Aussie ATCs would never know because in 23 years there has never even been a one day trial. That's resistance to change for you.

I have no doubt that if the president of Civil Air made a public announcement that actually controlling traffic at non tower airports- like they do in leading aviation countries - was safer , that a trial would take place.

How many more deaths like Benalla? Blame the pilot and the system- never take any individual responsibility .

[thorn bird]

"How many more deaths like Benalla?"


Yup Dick, one came within a whisker of that last week, could have dwarfed Lockhart river.

[le Pingouin]

Thanks for playing Dick. You've degenerated to the usual level of name calling when you've lost.

[Lookleft]

up Dick, one came within a whisker of that last week, could have dwarfed Lockhart river.

You got any more info on that TB? Thats a very big statement to make without anything to back it up with.

[Jabawocky]

That is, if safety shows that Class C link airspace is required a proper terminal radar service must be provided with both primary and secondary radar. Otherwise there is absolutely no way of knowing if a VFR non-transponder equipped aircraft flew across the airspace.

So now you say PSR and SSR is required in Tassie, even though VFR REQUIRE a clearance AND Transponder in the current class C above 4,500ft and are Separated by ATC. So TASWAM (secondary surveillance) is no good no matter how well it works? :confused:

Yet you are suggesting that Non-surveiled class E (where IFR do NOT receive an ATC separation service from VFR) over Ballina is all good!? Is that REALLY what you are suggesting?

[Dick Smith]

No. I am not. I would use the proven North American airspace system in Tassie

After all it works with over 15 times the traffic and far worse weather conditions.

But I won't mention here what it is because the troglodytes will go berserk

But it doesn't include class C link airspace !

But keep our " Nomad " airspace system. What would the Americans know- they only built the 747 and we know Aussie ATC 's would not dare let their family fly in one of those.

[no_one]

Dick,

If you want the US Airspace system surely you want all of it. Like no transponders in class E below 10,000 feet, outside or not above Class C?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

From a post back in 2004-
Does AusNAS save money for our Aviation Industry?
Most certainly. Already aircraft are not having to divert many extra miles in Class C airspace above Class D. I’m getting reports all the time of the quite substantial savings being made by aircraft. For example, the pilot of the VFR aircraft involved in the Launceston incident says that before the 27 November 2003 changes, on up to 50% of occasions when he overflew Launceston he would be diverted up to 15 miles off track in CAVOK conditions if there was an IFR aircraft – even a Navajo – present in the controlled airspace. This was because there was no radar at Launceston and so procedural separation of 10 minutes had to be given quite often if aircraft passed through the same levels. 10 minutes at 180 knots is 30 miles. That is a lot of extra flying and a lot of extra cost.

This is the entire answer.Take note of-
the pilot of the VFR aircraft involved in the Launceston incident says that before the 27 November 2003 changes, on up to 50% of occasions when he overflew Launceston he would be diverted up to 15 miles off track in CAVOK conditions if there was an IFR aircraft – even a Navajo – present in the controlled airspace. This was because there was no radar at Launceston and so procedural separation of 10 minutes had to be given quite often if aircraft passed through the same levels. 10 minutes at 180 knots is 30 miles. That is a lot of extra flying and a lot of extra cost.

This implies you thought it perfectly safe to mix VFR with fast jet IFR in non radar E...no clearance, no need to talk to ATC, just have the transponder on and blast through...incident pilot had it all under control, Virgin had the RA and had to avoid but no worries, you thought it was safe back then. Before NAS2B, the VFR needed a clearance to cross the airspace....suffered from diversions in CAVOK...post changes, he could blast through without a clearance and do his own thing....safe to mix VFR with fast jet IFR in non radar E!

[Dick Smith]

You are like a child. I feel sorry for your partner if this is how you discuss things you don't agree with.

Nothing is " perfectly safe" and I have attempted to explain this to you.

We have lots of airports serviced by airline traffic where VFR mix ( or blast through) in the way you have described. Look at Ballina or Bundaberg.

There is not even a transponder requirement for VFR aircraft.

No not " perfectly safe" but most airline pilots claim it is acceptably safe.

If it is not safe ,under NAS , you would put in class B airspace.

Do you really drive a Bus? May explain why you are posting here without proper logic to your arguments?

[Jabawocky]

Does he drive a bus http://www.beechtalk.com/forums/images/smilies/rofl02.gif



Ok back to serious for just a minute.

But Aussie ATCs would never know because in 23 years there has never even been a one day trial. That's resistance to change for you.

Yes they do know, remember your American NAS Airspace, that was foolishly trialled, where large tracts of your beloved Class E airspace were introduced, some replacing safer Class C. Your Airspace ideology WAS ROLLED BACK due to the number of incidents between IFR & VFR aircraft.

You call people Troglodytes, Dumbos and resistant to change. Who is resistant to change Dick?

Dick, from my personal point of view, the American way would be wonderful IF and only IF we had the primary radar, SSR and complete ADSB coverage (low level) backed by VHF coms (to us little guys not King Air/CJ's and -8s) on the ground at all aerodromes that are covered by E down to 700AGL. This is looking forward not back, and ADSB is coming like it or not.

Get the infrastructure in place and then lets have a look. We can't have it half baked.

[Dick Smith]

Ok. I understand. Just like CASA people you will only accept a one way ratchet of making any change more restrictive and expensive - never fix a MIS allocation of resources.

Why then won't Civil Air loudly support changing G terminal airspace at Ballina to E ?

Then Air Traffic Controllors could actually give a control service to IFR aircraft- now that would be amazing!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Dick, stop surrounding yourself with yes-men.

This is what it means when if you do not learn from history you are doomed to repeat it. 1992...and you still keep trying?

Forget who I am, Dick. Jaba is so very correct. Infrastructure enables change!

I could murder paragraphs of electrons expounding aspects of airspace way above my pay grade that has already been explained by many pilots far better than me. However, it comes down to those three words.

[Jabawocky]

In your Jet you may have coms below circuit height, Ballina has a ground com for some good reason, but I wonder what the SSR and ADSB is like there. :confused:

Take Hervey Bay Vs Bundy. I would be happy with E at Bundy but not YHBA. If I was at Hervey Bay with near take off minima, I can't get a clearance on the ground and at 700' I might be fine, but I can't be identified until 5000' yet the climb into E would be without a clearance. I can not win. Let alone leave the circling area in IMC and I can't get back on the ground because I can't do the RNAV without coms and a clearance. I circle till it clears up or I run out of fuel. I know its knit picking but thats the case.

Bundy on the other hand they can see me taxiing, have me all ready to go before I even call. :ok:

Infrastructure enables change. Whoever the busboy is he seems to work it out. :ok:

[Fieldmouse]

I remember listening to a gaggle of Pa28's out of Bankstown chatting happily on the local CTR frequency that 'they didn't have to talk to the tower and the RPT aircraft they were preventing from descending could 'go around them'.
Brilliant airspace concept that one.

[Dick Smith]

Fieldmouse

Love your post and just think how much worse it is in the USA. There’s 15 times the amount of traffic. That must mean there would be 15 times the number of VFR aircraft “chatting happily” and jamming up the control frequency.

An important point is that E air space under ICAO and as used in North America and Europe has nothing to do with radar coverage. Somehow the controllers are skilled and provide a separation service without radar that has no measurable more delays than our Class G system.

Could it be that if an aircraft is doing an approach say into Ballina in IMC that a departing aircraft awaits until it becomes visual? – just common sense.

I think we should all move back to what we did in the 1950’s. I notice an AFIS has been put into the tower at Port Hedland. It’s good to see that the old flight service station is still there at Cooma. I just can’t wait to see it manned again so when we bring in the mandatory, full position flight planning for VFR traffic that fly’s more than 50 miles or above 5,000 feet can have a place to file the flight plan.

Yes, and we should put the fire engines back in at the secondary airports. They might have been expensive but it really felt good to have them there and what about “operational control” – we should take that away from the pilots and the airlines and give that back to the air traffic controllers. That will cost another $6 million per year and employ even more people, which will be great for aviation!

And what about the first of type changes I bought in as Chairman of CAA in 1990. We should reverse those so in future any new aircraft type requires a CASA trip to the country (a technical wine tasting) so we can use our wisdom in advising these countries how to modify the aircraft to our higher Australian standard.

There’s probably 20 or 30 more things I can think of to reverse us back to the 1950’s. Then again, there probably will be hardly anyone flying in GA aircraft and that’s the way we’re going.

[Capn Bloggs]

Keep it up, Dick, you're sounding more ridiculous as time goes on.

[sunnySA]

I feel sorry for your partner if this is how you discuss things you don't agree with.
Dick, time for your medication, perhaps a Bex and a lie-down.
Seriously, I don't know how Pip does it.

You are becoming more and more irrational every post. Have you ever thought it is perhaps YOU and YOUR tactics that so many posters are objecting to.

You want to bash everyone who objects to, points to holes in your diatribe from the cockpit.

Shall I list the names and organisations that you have bashed this year, long and distinguished...

[ferris]

Dick, your post No. 53 above points to a number of times you have reduced services, thus saving the industry a lot of money. Clearly, you believe those services were unnecessary.
In this thread, however, you appear to be arguing for imposition of additional cost on the industry, without any cost benefit analysis being put forward. Despite others requesting one, you have studiously ignored them. Has one been done?
You do understand that additional costs will arise due to your proposal, do you not? Should you not also be aware of the amount of those costs? Surely you must agree that increases in safety should be affordable?
As somebody has mentioned, the U.S. has 15 times the amount of traffic. 15 times the amount of traffic to pay for these services. 15 times the traffic in order to require more services. 16 times the number of controllers working on much smaller screens with much smaller sector sizes enabling a different array of services to be offered. Surely you knew this? After all, you do accept the advice of experts, right?

Looking forward to the CBA. Or, we could just have more of your change-resistant, recalcitrant, lazy unskilled Australian ATC line of flip-flopping argument.

[missy]

Ferris,
The issue of sector volumes, appropriate resources (human and facilities including frequencies, Eurocrat data and if appropriate, surveillance) has been pointed out to Dick on a couple of different threads.

My personal experience is that Richard Harold Smith, AC doesn't communicate effectively, he simply preaches and doesn't listen, his sermon is out-dated, and belongs in the last millennia. Crash or crash through comes to mind but perhaps isn't appropriate given that we are talking about aviation safety.