BA A321 tailstrike.

[sunbird123]

Seems BA A321 had a tailstrike in Glasgow on the !9th of July.

[DaveReidUK]

G-EUXF, inbound, looks like it's still there.

[G-ARZG]

Positioned GLA-MAD 27 July
for mtce

('thebasource.com')

[Flaperon75]

Accident: British Airways A321 at Glasgow on Jul 19th 2015, tailstrike on landing (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=489f6bd0&opt=0)

[Doors to Automatic]

A321 again! And it wasn't even bad weather!

[ZFT]

Our friends in TLS aren't helping matters. Despite 1100+ A321s being built and another 1500+ on order, they refuse to produce a datapack for the A321 so currently all FSTDs are A320 only.

[morton]

At least they noticed the tail strike!
https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422ef4440f0b6134600028d/dft_avsafety_pdf_500002.pdf

When Boeing introduced the B737-400 they also included a tail bumper. Why didn’t Airbus put something in place as well when introducing the A321?

[Bearcat]

In my day I always flew plus 10 on a 321 and it was always a power on landing with little nose up.......yeap totally against the grain.....never scraped a tail and stop dist never an issue. Flew the 73 400s the same.

[BOBBLEHAT]

Who says they noticed the tail strike........?

[Cuillin Hills]

Agreed - I was told that a member of the public had seen 'sparks' on landing and reported it to the airport.

Passengers had disembarked before people (including the fire service) started paying attention to the tail end of the aircraft.

[RAT 5]

When Boeing introduced the B737-400 they also included a tail bumper. Why didn’t Airbus put something in place as well when introducing the A321?

So it's not true then; the pilot can take an AB outside its comfort zone. A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter than resists further pilot input. Being a Boeing man I thought that's what all these Toulouse electrons was about. Don't let the pilot bend the a/c. There have been other demonstrations of this myth being false; here's another.

But I do ask the question as a technician, not a pilot: why not have proximity sensors in the tail linked to pitch channel; both take off and landing?

[Una Due Tfc]

When Boeing introduced the B737-400 they also included a tail bumper. Why didn’t Airbus put something in place as well when introducing the A321?

So it's not true then; the pilot can take an AB outside its comfort zone. A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter than resists further pilot input. Being a Boeing man I thought that's what all these Toulouse electrons was about. Don't let the pilot bend the a/c. There have been other demonstrations of this myth being false; here's another.

But I do ask the question as a technician, not a pilot: why not have proximity sensors in the tail linked to pitch channel; both take off and landing?

I would imagine to allow them to get airborne in an emergency (eg runway incursion) and bigger the tail if needed

[BOBBLEHAT]

I heard that the reporting might even have been more convoluted than that...........

[Flaperon75]

I heard that the reporting might even have been more convoluted than that...........

.....go on then

[swh]

Why didn’t Airbus put something in place as well when introducing the A321?


Because it does not need it, Boeing is removing them from the 777-300ER. Bumpers don't stop tail strikes, or prevent damage.

A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter than resists further pilot input.

No aircraft works that way.

why not have proximity sensors in the tail linked to pitch channel; both take off and landing?

Inertia, with the small ground clearance and pitch rates, you add complexity to a tail strike that is going to happen before it makes contact.

[RAT 5]

A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter than resists further pilot input.

No aircraft works that way.

No a/c worked that way until AB, F16, FBW, Stealth a/c. They have built in anti-stall pitch limiters; alpha floor etc. Until these a/c 'no a/c worked that way.' Remember the 1st autoland; look no hands? Times move on. Telephones were just that; wires and things. then came cordless phones, then mobile phones and then they had cameras, and then they internet and are in fact hand-held computers. But no phones worked that way.
Now they do! It's called evolution and development. 25 years ago there was no TCAS. No need, we have radar ATC. That didn't work so well. It will happen that there will be automatic RA manoeuvres on a/c. Good grief it is already on motor cars with active cruise control and auto braking functions. To save embarrassment there is not auto parking. Talk about dumbing down of PF skills. You don't need to be able to brake or park. point and shoot and get out at the other end. When my phone can 'beam me up' then I know Star Trek has become real. Every year is closer.

[FlyingStone]

It will happen that there will be automatic RA manoeuvres on a/c.

Standard on A350/380 from what I heard.

When Boeing introduced the B737-400 they also included a tail bumper. Why didn’t Airbus put something in place as well when introducing the A321?

The tail skid can only do so much with the tailstrike. Most of the 737 tail strikes seem to do a lot more damage than just damaging the tail skid. What would be beneficial is a tail strike sensor in place of the tail skid - to undoubtedly confirm that you've actually had a tail strike.

[Cough]

swh - How about this, from Boeing (http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2003-10-16-New-Boeing-777-300ER-Bristles-with-Technology)

Flight testing of the Boeing 777-300ER has verified the performance of numerous special features. One such feature, Tail-Strike protection, helps prevent tail contact with the ground on takeoff. Operating through the airplane's fly-by-wire flight controls, the system allows the airplane to lift off at reduced speed, increasing allowable takeoff weight by 4,000 to 10,000 pounds (1,814 to 4,536 kilograms), depending on airport conditions and airplane structural limits.

"It's in the primary flight computer," said Frank Santoni, Boeing 777 chief pilot, of the special feature. "It's a function that looks at rate of closure of the tail to the ground during rotation, measuring how fast and at what distance the tail is moving toward the pavement."

If the tail gets too close to the ground, the system moves the elevator for slower nose rotation. During abuse takeoff testing, where Santoni has deliberately rotated the airplane early and fast, the system has responded as designed.

"It's doing a superb job, which is testament to our engineering team," Santoni said. "On the 777-300 program six years ago we did the same takeoff performance tests and contacted the tail about 12 times, which is expected during flight-test. On this program, we haven't touched once."

[ZFT]

It will happen that there will be automatic RA manoeuvres on a/c.


Standard on Std 1.9 A320 too now

[tubby linton]

Later s/n Airbus have a pitch limit symbol which appears on the PFD at 400ft Radalt to help avoid a tailstrike on landing.

[Derfred]

A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter than resists further pilot input.

No aircraft works that way.

No a/c worked that way until AB, F16, FBW, Stealth a/c.

Really? With a RAD ALT on the tail linked into the pitch computer?

You learn something every day.

[swh]

No a/c worked that way until AB, F16, FBW, Stealth a/c. They have built in anti-stall pitch limiters; alpha floor etc.

What you are referring to is not in effect on the ground or take-off/landing. The way FBW actually works and what you heard in the bar obviously is not the same.

How about this, from Boeing

Boeing has removed the tails skid from new build 777s to reduce weight and drag. Removal from existing aircraft is also available via service bulletin, the tail skid system weighs more than a passenger. Typically you will see one 777 tail strike a year in Narita.

[Fursty Ferret]

[AP/FD RA] Standard on Std 1.9 A320 too now

It's an option, and an expensive one at that. Don't know if any airline has actually gone for it.

[Cough]

swh - Yup, the SKID has gone, but the tail strike prevention software is operational. Reread the article... Or even this from the 777 flight control section from SmartCockpit (http://www.smartcockpit.com/aircraft-ressources/B777-Flight_Controls.html)

Tail Strike Protection
During takeoff or landing, the PFCs calculate if a tail strike is imminent and decrease elevator deflection, if required, to reduce the potential for tail skid ground contact. Activation of tail strike protection does not provide feedback to the control column.

*IF installed!*

[ast83]

The tail skid assembly that Boeing installed on the 737 is positioned for the tail strike on takeoff. Remember on t/o the aircraft is rotating around the main gear so any potential tail strike will be in a fixed position. On landing the tail skid is irrelevant as in the flare the aircraft is now rotating around its c of g. This tail strike (as most are) was on landing and they are the ones that do the serious damage.

[swh]

Yup, the SKID has gone, but the tail strike prevention software is operational.

Read you own quote "reduce the potential", not eliminate. There are still multiple 777 tailstikes a year. Most of the tailstrikes at Narita are related to environmental conditions, not what the pilots is asking the aircraft to do.

[Localiser Established]

No aircraft works that way.Completely wrong there. The E190 employs a very similar system called Tail Strike Avoidance (TSA). The fly-by-wire system limits pitch angle to 8 degrees nose up during take-offs, landings and go-arounds if an impending tail strike is sensed.

Protection during landing is based on the height above ground level (calculated using two radio altimeters) and protection during take-off is based on vertical speed.

[Goat Whisperer]

When the A340-600 was introduced it was the longest airliner airframe, and it had anti-tailstrike software.

[Chesty Morgan]

Completely wrong there. The E190 employs a very similar system called Tail Strike Avoidance (TSA). The fly-by-wire system limits pitch angle to 8 degrees nose up during take-offs, landings and go-arounds if an impending tail strike is sensed.

Protection during landing is based on the height above ground level (calculated using two radio altimeters) and protection during take-off is based on vertical speed.

True to a point however, it will not cater for gross mishandling. If the E195 is the same it didn't limit pitch but reduced elevator authority based on a number of factors but you could still whack the tail if you tried hard enough.

[Bigpants]

How about equipping the Airbus range with a wide angle HUD and fly the approach on Angle of Attack? Include a CCIP dot in the picture and train pilots to fly a constant Alpha approach with a brief check in pitch as the rad alt counts down through 20 feet.

Works in the FJ world believe it would work on the Bus.

[vapilot2004]

Our friends in TLS aren't helping matters. Despite 1100+ A321s being built and another 1500+ on order, they refuse to produce a datapack for the A321 so currently all FSTDs are A320 only.

This seems very strange. Could you confirm ZFT?

From the report:
The non-discovery of the damage during the engineer's external inspection for the turn round is difficult to understand.

This is the primary function of a tail skid, to visually give a clear indication of a tail strike. They are not sturdy and therefore not designed to protect the aircraft unless the force of the strike is minimal.

[TURIN]

SWH


A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter that resists further pilot input.
"No aircraft works that way."

Cough beat me to it.

B777-300 have just such a system and have removed the tail skid as a result.

The semi-levered MLG also helps. :ok:

It also has a contact sensor just in case.

[DaveReidUK]

I believe the 777-300 TSP system works by computing pitch angle/rate, rather than being directly driven by a Rad Alt in the tail.

[thump]

The Embraer E190/195 has had tail strike prevention in the FBW software for as long as I can remember.

[Tinribs]

The purpose of the tail skid on the 737.400 is being oversimplified here. The tail skid had dimples which told you if you had just touched with no damage, there were many of those. There was a crush cartridge which told you of a bad one, you or someone else, so there was an element of warning/training in that system

[ZFT]

vapilot2004
Quote:
Originally Posted by ZFT http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/565328-ba-a321-tailstrike-post9063058.html#post9063058)
Our friends in TLS aren't helping matters. Despite 1100+ A321s being built and another 1500+ on order, they refuse to produce a datapack for the A321 so currently all FSTDs are A320 only.

This seems very strange. Could you confirm ZFT?
I confirm.

Not just the A320 family either.

For the A330 you have single choice of an A320-200 datapack, the A350 an A350-800 datapack etc..

So for operators such a CX and VNA (and others) who operate or will operate A330-300, A350-900/1000 and A321s only, their FSTDs are not fully representative.

[vapilot2004]

ZFT:

I confirm.

Not just the A320 family either.


This seems unreasonable. My guess would be because the FBW system tends to mete out flight dynamics differences between aircraft sub-types, although that leaves operation in Direct Law hanging.

Yesterday, a Check Airman stated his informed thoughts on the matter and the reasons given were: proprietary data concerns, regular flight control software updates rendering previous flight dynamics models obsolete, how Airbus prefers to train thoroughly for the base model, then focus on differences training, and finally and most importantly (to the airline), cost.

Any of this ring true for you, ZFT?

[yannickue]

i just want to intervene either guys..
I've just flown the A321 Simulator from
lufthansa, D-AIRN, its a company choice if you order your aircraft with tailstrike protection which is definetly highlighted in the pfd with symbols or you order a gpws warning which warns you from a potentially tailstrike "pitch pitch" My a321 didn't had both of these systems. And tailstrikes in an a321 are nothing special.. the a321 is the most difficult aircraft in the a320-line or in general in the complete airbus series. Just my 2 cents..

[ZFT]

yannickue

That particular FSTD is around 20 year old. Airbus in those days would produce a datapack for a specific tail number and IIRC DLH and Swissair ordered specific A321s. However today Airbus will not longer supply.

[ZFT]

vapilot2004,

I concur that the Airbus policy is to train thoroughly for the base model, then focus on differences training and indeed they have stated this at various conferences. Many operators have also strongly disagreed with Airbus at said conferences, especially those that only operate A321s.

I would disagree re cost as Airbus generate massive revenues (and profit) from Datapacks and the additional tests (whether flight or engineering) to support an A321 variant would be really quite insignificant and as pointed out by yannickue, they did provide A321 data in the past. (Many of the tests within the current datapack are years old and are as applicable now as when initially produced).

The issue of regular flight control updates is already addressed by bi annual datapack updates which currently Airbus provide FOC for 10 years although I understand this is being reduced to 5 years.

Don't quite understand the proprietary data concern.

[Boeing man]

What ever happened to 2.5 to 3 degrees per second basic pilot training

[vapilot2004]

I would disagree re cost as Airbus generate massive revenues (and profit) from Datapacks and the additional tests (whether flight or engineering) to support an A321 variant would be really quite insignificant

Apologies ZFT, I may have unintentially obfuscated information given by our check pilot on this. The cost issue is from the airline's point of view and/or by extension, the FFS operators & manufacturers. I would imagine even on multi-platform sims available for certain sub-types, money is still spent acquiring the data packs and on programming support. I now see how it can be a money maker for the provider of the data. Thank you.

Proprietary issues - I will revisit and ask for clarification.

Other than what you've kindly remarked upon, have you any idea what the motivation would be for a manufacturer to withold flight test data packages from simulator manufacturers?

[vapilot2004]

What ever happened to 2.5 to 3 degrees per second basic pilot training

Good for takeoff, yes sir, BM. :ok:

This particular strike was during landing (apparently the flight segment involved in all A321 tail strikes) by a relatively low-time on type commander, who very likely would have benefitted from a FFS with fidelity to the A321's flight dynamics.

[ZFT]

vapilot2004
Other than what you've kindly remarked upon, have you any idea what the motivation would be for a manufacturer to withold flight test data packages from simulator manufacturers?Oh yes. It all boils down to money. The major OEMs are all positioning themselves for the major slice of the (future) training market and this is why datapack costs have skyrocketed to upwards of US$8M for the new generation aircraft. Makes any independent or even 3rd party airline operation totally non competitive.

(This is why LM bought out Sim Industries, Textron acquired Mechtronix and so forth so that their internal markets were also both closed to competition and protected).

Boeing and Airbus will eventually have more or less total control of the training market via data costs and be able to dictate training policy and prices and until then they need to ensure that the industry 'toes their line'.

Ask anyone about the "Boeing Model" and you may be surprised. This was the start!

[vapilot2004]

Boeing and Airbus will eventually have more or less total control of the training market via data costs and be able to dictate training policy and prices and until then they need to ensure that the industry 'toes their line'.


Thank you ZFT. Ah yes, money, the root of all things good (advancement) and evil (profit motives). This makes some sense, although OEM sim companies are likely not happy about this new direction. What do you think about this development? Good or bad for flight safety?

The Boeing Model - I'm not sure I know this one and there was no consensus found in open discussion. Would this relate to Alteon?

[X-37]

Memories of the Tech Log entry in a Tristar.....
Tailskid used

[Doug E Style]

vapilot2004, your information re. this incident in post #44 is incorrect.

[vapilot2004]

vapilot2004, your information re. this incident in post #44 is incorrect.

DES, care to enlighten then? Thanks.

[TURIN]

This seems very strange. Could you confirm ZFT?

From the report:
Quote:
The non-discovery of the damage during the engineer's external inspection for the turn round is difficult to understand.
This is the primary function of a tail skid, to visually give a clear indication of a tail strike. They are not sturdy and therefore not designed to protect the aircraft unless the force of the strike is minimal.

My bold.

A couple of clarifications.

1. BA shorthaul a/c do not get inspected by an engineer/technician/mechanic during turnrounds. The flight crew do it (Rumour is they got a pay rise to accept this responsibility some years ago). Engineering staff only attend on request, or if there is a controlled inspection that is scheduled to be carried out during the turnround.

2. Even though BA has an engineering presence at GLA, it is hangar based. There is no BA line maintenance at GLA, it is subcontracted to a 3rd party (not sure who).

3. None of this is relevant as the damage was discovered during the turnround and the a/c taken out of service for repair.

[vapilot2004]

This is from the report, Tur:

The non-discovery of the damage during the engineer's external inspection for the turn round is difficult to understand.

3. None of this is relevant as the damage was discovered during the turnround and the a/c taken out of service for repair.

Actually I believe some sort of damage was discovered when the aircraft failed to pressurize during the climb after the first (post-strike) turnaround. Otherwise, thank you for the BA specific information. :ok:

[TURIN]

Thanks for that.

Where is the report? All I can find for the above info is the Av Herald.

[vapilot2004]

Turin, I am mistaken and this could have been what Doug E was on about. Apologies. Cross-linked this event and one from the past regarding a Dublin BA flight from 1998. :O

Thanks again for the information regarding turn around.

[TURIN]

No worries pal.

If you search my posts over the years I've made some cracking bloopers. :ok:

[ZFT]

vapilot2004

Whilst standardisation should be good for safety, in this case I fear it will have the opposite effect for 2 significant reasons. The Airframers are in training for the financial reward and no other reason. Yes, they harp on about safety but its lip service and nothing more. If safety really was their priority then their training courses and datapacks etc. wouldn’t be priced out of reach! Unfortunately this industry is now totally financially controlled and more expensive training equates to less training quantity and training costs once the airframes have control will skyrocket just as they have already done so with the rotary wing and business jet markets where independent competition has been virtually eradicated.

Secondly, all things are not equal, as much as they would like to maintain they are. Crews operating in this part of the world face very different challenges to the crews operating in say Europe and the training must reflect that. The OEM way isn’t necessarily right under all circumstances yet in the not too distant future, the rigid OEM way is likely to be the only way.

The Boeing model or subsidy isn’t discussed much due to the fear factor. (Although a few months ago FSI did refer to it in a Flight International article). Some 4 years ago or thereabouts, Boeing announced that to ‘protect their IPR’ they were introducing a 15% charge on anything to do with activities on Boeing simulators. 3rd party training, updates etc. In effect any revenue generated on a Boeing simulator whether from training or from say replacing a visual system attracts a 15% commission for Boeings.

Needless to say this gave them yet another significant advantage on top of the obvious free data they enjoy plus other benefits such as free Jeppeson FMS and ARINC 424 data and just adds to the overall problem and is of course yet another element in the scheme for total training control.

Other OEMs haven’t followed yet but adopt different ways. Some refuse to supply data, some charge ridiculous subscriptions for OEBs, ADs and SBs but all are designed to both frustrate and drive up costs and eventually drive away any competition. The sad thing is, they will succeed.

[Doug E Style]

vapilot2004, the incident you refer to in 1998 was British Midland, not BA, as stated in your post #53.

[vapilot2004]

I read a quote somewhere around the turn of the century stating engineers have less say in the manufacturing of commercial aircraft at the C-suite level and pilots are becoming fewer and fewer in airline upper management. Over a decade down the road, the quote was prescient.

ZFT: To your excellent second point: A good airline is like a stable ecosystem with all of the parts and people working to support the whole, by design. A shift away from company training programmes towards anything mandated by manufacterers has great disruptive potential, I agree. Standardized OPS, one of the hallmarks of safety culture, will also suffer.

"The Boeing Model" 5 years or so ago? That was about the time Boeing's training arm was renamed and restructured. Interesting. Thank you.

ARINC ramblings: A few years ago, in a valiant quest to solve a minor flight data issue, one of our engineers used his own money to purchase ARINC data or documents that were not provided by the company, the aircraft manufacturer, nor the LRU OEM. He figured it out, and altruistically forwarded his fix to all parties, resulting in a form letter from the manufacturer, nada from ARINC, with the LRU guys the only ones following up with personal thank you and discussion during a dinner on them.

[vapilot2004]

No worries pal.

If you search my posts over the years I've made some cracking bloopers. :ok:

You, sir, are a gentleman. Cheers!




Doug E, thank you for the correction. I missed by more than a decade and an entire airline.

[parkfell]

Do we know what crew retraining occurred following this unfortunate event?

[Iron Duck]

I read a quote somewhere around the turn of the century stating engineers have less say in the manufacturing of commercial aircraft at the C-suite level and pilots are becoming fewer and fewer in airline upper management. Over a decade down the road, the quote was prescient.

I'm not a pilot; just an SLF. I have no dog in this fight. That said, along with everyone else I've been waiting for the LoCo business model to result in worsening air safety. And yet, 2015 has been the safest (and busiest) year ever for aviation. According to FlightGlobal (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/air-transport-safety-reached-new-peak-in-2015-ascen-420521/), last year Western-built jets few 3.7 billion people on 32 million flights without killing anyone in accidents [FG treats GW and MetroJet as non-accidental].

That's over half of the world's population.

It's never pretty to watch global corporations extending their monopolies: look what's happening with Internet corporations. Yet it must be said that unless last year was an aberration, jet-powered commercial aviation is doing something very right. Well done to you all, and thank you.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Duck, it's not just LoCos that have this accountant driven culture - most of the airlines do now, and as demonstrated, so do the manufacturers. Even the authorities have little concern over safety, focusing almost exclusively on money.

[RVF750]

I would hazard a guess that luck and statistical anomaly would play a part.

When I started flying, there was a lot of difficult and unpleasant aircraft to master. Many a cruel dinosaur to placate and also many old wizards to learn from.

My last type rating was onto the 737 after years of flying more primitive and temperamental beasts.

The Standard Alteon CBT and FSTD training were the "modern way". I of course went through the system fine and came out able to follow SOP and fly the thing easily and safely, like all the others before me. I still basically knew nothing about the aircraft... But that's seemingly how Boeing want it.

I have spent the last 2 years correcting that... On the line, in the hanger, anywhere I can. Watching my colleagues looking at the Wx radar trying to figure it out because they can't work out what the flippin' great black cloud in front of us is or them busily tapping at the FMC to build a pink line to give VNAV guidance as they simply cannot figure it out by looking out the window is saddening.

Yes, the everyday safety of modern avionics is great. But the lack of airmanship, common sense or basic flying ability is growing daily and just once in a while it still comes in handy.:

AF447. BA038 (meant to say this being the exception!!), in fact the various ATRs, Airbus Boeings and others that have either crashed because of mis handling or not because of good airmanship over the last few years.

[OBK!]

BA038? Mishandling?

[misd-agin]

What ever happened to 2.5 to 3 degrees per second basic pilot training





Well that doesn't work on different a/c.


Consider this statement - "2 to 2.5 degrees per second, reaching a target of 7-9 degrees in four seconds." That's an actual pitch rate of 1.75-2.25 degrees per second.


Knowing the actual limits, and techniques, of different a/c is important.


Boeing has tail strike guidance on it's HUD's. Dotted line, keep the VV (velocity vector) at or below the limit. What's the basic limit? Two degrees less than tail strike angle.


That's not that tough to see. Tail strike limit of 9.5 degrees on the 321? Freeze the pitch attitude at the 7.5 mark on the ADI and wait for the plane to fly.


11.5 degree tail strike limit on the 319? Freeze it at the 10 mark until liftoff.


737NG? Target/freeze of 7.5 degrees (HUD limit display at 8 degrees)


757-200? 10 degrees.


767-300? 7.5 degrees.


777-200? 10 degrees.


777-300? 7.5 degrees.


Rotate - freeze/pause if necessary at target limit, liftoff, mini pause, continue rotation. Done smoothly it's unnoticeable to the passengers.

[glad rag]

When Boeing introduced the B737-400 they also included a tail bumper. Why didn’t Airbus put something in place as well when introducing the A321?

So it's not true then; the pilot can take an AB outside its comfort zone. A RAD ALT on the tail link into the pitch computer and a filter than resists further pilot input. Being a Boeing man I thought that's what all these Toulouse electrons was about. Don't let the pilot bend the a/c. There have been other demonstrations of this myth being false; here's another.

But I do ask the question as a technician, not a pilot: why not have proximity sensors in the tail linked to pitch channel; both take off and landing?

http://cdn-www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/photos/9/7/4/0967479.jpg

[Consol]

I agree with Glad Rag, Airbus FCTM A320 say that although it is 3 degrees a second but anything down to 2 degrees has no significant degradation of performance. I always ease off and hold near before the critical pitch, aircraft flies fine. Most tail scrapes do occur on landing though, more variables and different geometry.

[wanabee777]

Rotate - freeze/pause if necessary at target limit, liftoff, mini pause, continue rotation. Done smoothly it's unnoticeable to the passengers...........:ok::ok:

[Flaperon75]

AAIB BA A321 G-EUXF (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5768084ced915d622c000052/Airbus_A321-231_G-EUXF_07-16.pdf)

[Sqwak7700]

No mention of the barely 300 hrs total time for the PF as being a factor?

Talk about ignoring the big white elephant in the room.

[HeartyMeatballs]

So the PF flies the aircraft then when visual the PM becomes the PF and the now PM retards the thrust leaver? How utterly bizarre and in contraction to the airbus FCOM.

Surely if people retard at different and inconsistent rates its going to make flaring that little bit more difficult and create more of a challenge for perfectinf the technique.

Chop the thrust and down she goes. Smoothly and progressively closing them can aid a good touch down. Not having clue as to when and how quickly the other guy will cut the thrust just seems a bit odd.

BA has used cadets since then days of Hamble has it not?

[Chesty Morgan]

Squawk7700 - Apart from the top of page 8!

[DaveReidUK]

So the PF flies the aircraft then when visual the PM becomes the PF and the now PM retards the thrust leaver? How utterly bizarre and in contraction to the airbus FCOM.

Where does it say that in the report?

[student88]

Meatballs - you've totally misinterpreted BAs monitored approach technique. Assuming visual and stable, at 1,000' the PM (who became PM at TOD) takes over and lands the aircraft, they handle the thrust levers until touch down when the PM selects reverse. I used to be skeptical about the monitored approach before joining BA but seeing it in action, I actually think it's quite a good thing.

[HeartyMeatballs]

Oh. I get it now! I feel for the guy/gal. I can't think of a worse thing to happen so soon into their career. I hope s/he is back online and hopefully moving on.

[AngioJet]

From the AAIB report
In addition, the operator is considering introducing an
experience restriction for co-pilots performing landings on the A321.
Have BA put such restrictions in place and if so, what are these experience requirements? Do other operators of the A321 limit landings to crew of a certain experience level?

[DaveReidUK]

From the AAIB report

Have BA put such restrictions in place and if so, what are these experience requirements? Do other operators of the A321 limit landings to crew of a certain experience level?

The report is from the current month's AAIB bulletin and can be assumed to be reasonably up to date. It makes a clear distinction between safety actions that the operator has already implemented, like specific A321 differences training, and those that are so far just being considered.

So if co-pilot experience restrictions are already in place, that's only been done in the last few days.

[Flaperon75]

The report is from the current month's AAIB bulletin and can be assumed to be reasonably up to date. It makes a clear distinction between safety actions that the operator has already implemented, like specific A321 differences training, and those that are so far just being considered.

So if co-pilot experience restrictions are already in place, that's only been done in the last few days.
That's incorrect.

New cadets cannot fly A321 aircraft until they have been line flying for 6 months. This policy has been in place for some time (6 months or so)

[AngioJet]

That's incorrect.

New cadets cannot fly A321 aircraft until they have been line flying for 6 months. This policy has been in place for some time (6 months or so)

Many thanks, you beat me to it!

[Sqwak7700]

Squawk7700 - Apart from the top of page 8!

That's just giving the data, Chesty.

My comment was in regard to experience not being listed as one of the factors to the accident.

The airline certainly thought it was a factor, which is why not only do they have some measures in place already, but also state they will evaluate restricting A321 landings even further for inexperienced crew.

[parkfell]

I am sure the Operator has learnt a lot from this event.
The benefit of hindslght is a wonderful thing.

Two days post completion of line training still requires very careful handling, and I doubt very much even if "PITCH" had been called by the Captain it would have prevented the incident.
A similar event occurred at KOS a few years ago, and was subject to an AAIB enquiry. Worth reading as it highlights the importance of being fully and consistently competent at landing the beastie.

As to why the non handling pilot has the task of selecting REVERSE must lie in some ancient SOP [Boeing 707? VC10?] as a sensible procedure in a stonking crosswind where the handling pilot had both hands on the control column initially. ?? Hardly applicable to the BUS.
Perhaps someone can shed some light as to this procedure?

[DaveReidUK]

That's incorrect.

New cadets cannot fly A321 aircraft until they have been line flying for 6 months. This policy has been in place for some time (6 months or so)

The restriction referred to in the AAIB report was that co-pilots flying the A321 would not be allowed to perform landings until they had sufficient experience on type.

So not the same thing at all, unless you're suggesting the AAIB have got the wrong end of the stick.

[AngioJet]

The restriction referred to in the AAIB report was that co-pilots flying the A321 would not be allowed to perform landings until they had sufficient experience on type.

So not the same thing at all, unless you're suggesting the AAIB have got the wrong end of the stick.

I guess a total 'ban' until 6/12 of line flying may be an effect of trying to make rostering more straightforward, even though the AAIB report only refers to landing.

[wiggy]

I guess a total 'ban' until 6/12 of line flying may be an effect of trying to make rostering more straightforward, even though the AAIB report only refers to landing.

I'm a bit out of the loop at the moment and have no "special " insight ;) into this but knowing how fluid the operation at BA can be I would have thought a total ban on operating the A321 with < 6/12 would make rostering a nightmare. Day to day ops, most especially anything requiring a last minute equipment change would be a minefield, given the number of down route crew changes you have around the network.......

"Oooooh look blogs, they've sent us a 321.......":ooh:

A landing restriction makes more practical and operational sense to my tiny mind but those on the fleet in question I'm sure have chapter and verse.

[RexBanner]

Pilot incap? It's all very well having these new recruits under operational limitations (no landings of the A321/crosswind limitations etc) but it's naff all use if the Captain is incapacitated. It does happen, an easyJet cadet F/O under line training was on her own just last year when the trainer became incapacitated.

[WindSheer]

There seems to be a lot of focus on the pilots hours, naturally.
But may I ask, has an 'experienced' pilot ever scraped the tail of a 321?

[ZeBedie]

But may I ask, has an 'experienced' pilot ever scraped the tail of a 321?

Airtours, Funchal, to name one.

[AngioJet]

I'm a bit out of the loop at the moment and have no "special " insight ;) into this but knowing how fluid the operation at BA can be I would have thought a total ban on operating the A321 with < 6/12 would make rostering a nightmare. Day to day ops, most especially anything requiring a last minute equipment change would be a minefield, given the number of down route crew changes you have around the network.......

"Oooooh look blogs, they've sent us a 321.......":ooh:

A landing restriction makes more practical and operational sense to my tiny mind but those on the fleet in question I'm sure have chapter and verse.
Yes you're right, that seems like a logistical nightmare... 😂

[Teevee]

Not a pilot so flame me if needed, (though I did once have a 'flying lesson' but are the A321 landing characteristics so different from the A320? The reason I ask is that the first couple of sectors were on an A320. I would have thought that if they were significantly different then going from A320 to A321 on the same duty could be tricky if you haven't had enough time on type to develop the 'habit' of landing the thing, and if they are subtly different then it would be even more tricky?

[RexBanner]

I've had the pleasure of operating the A321 recently after about 2000 hours A319/320 at other airlines. I have to say I prefer the 321, certainly to the 319 and possibly even the A320 in terms of being able to grease it on. It is subtly different, the approach speed is slightly higher and that results in being able to drive it on that much more. I've not been close at all to smacking the tail yet, whether that's because of experience or not I don't really know. I think a competent pilot just instinctively knows when the nose attitude is looking a bit high and knows not to go any further. This is something the cadets possibly haven't had time to develop and their landings in the Warrior and Seneca may still be fresh in the memory hence the temptation to pull full back stick.

[RAT 5]

The restriction referred to in the AAIB report was that co-pilots flying the A321 would not be allowed to perform landings until they had sufficient experience on type.

Is this indeed correct? If so, could someone with inside knowledge of the training philosophy at BA give us an explanation as to why it is a good idea. You perform base training to gain landing experience in the real a/c and achieve the final link in gaining the type rating, but you are then not allowed to consolidate that skill for another 6 months, after which you have forgotten the nuances you developed during the base training? Curious.
How does 6 months line flying in LNAV/VNAV & auto-throttle, twiddling knobs and FMC inputs to 'operate' the a/c, help you in becoming competent to fly a stable approach to a manual tail-scrape free flare and touchdown? Does not sound good for confidence building. You pass the base training and are then told you are not yet good enough to do the same with pax on board. Does this apply only to cadets or type conversions from other types? What about DEP's?
The PM activating thrust reversers sounds another BA quirk from yester-year. Was that not an FE function on old oil burners? What if it is a slippery X-wind runway and reverse is giving control difficulties and needs to be modified? If ailerons need to be kept into wind on landing in severe winds it is no problem on an AB. If I needed to do so on a Boeing I briefed it that the PM would ensure the ailerons would be held into wind on touchdown. It seems another quirk where the risk might be greater than the benefit.

[Denti]

But may I ask, has an 'experienced' pilot ever scraped the tail of a 321?

Sure, airbus test pilots on their A321NEO during landing...

[RexBanner]

RAT 5, the point is that the FPP's are not doing their base training in the A321. They have plenty of sectors to fly and land in the A320/319 in the meantime to consolidate their experience before moving on to the larger aircraft. I'm a DEP and have no restrictions on operating the A321 which I thought I had made clear in my above post.

Thrust lever handling is another matter entirely and I agree with you totally. The PM setting reverse is a relic of a bygone age and not at all appropriate any more. There is talk of this SOP changing in the near future but nothing changes quickly in BA.

[6f1]

"At 50 ft agl the flare was initiated, using a progressive aft sidestick input, and at 25 ft agl the thrust levers were closed".
A quote from the AAB report I think this is where the problem started,followed by a firm landing,with a bounce then the incorrect technic used to arrest the rate of descent.
Having flown many hours on most Airbuses 50 ft is far to high to initiate a flare.
Pilots these days with low hours are taught to fly by numbers which this incident shows.

[average-punter]

Surely the best thing to do is to train the FPPs to land the A321 properly, rather than some blanket ban which only covers the problem rather than fixing it. Why don't they spend a little money and take them out base training in the 321 for a second day? As for the reverse handling, that has to be one of the most ridiculous SOPs I've ever heard.

[Denti]

In my outfit with no ban on landing for cadets the FOQA data show that the tailstrike risk is highest on the A320 variant. Apparently everyone is extra careful on the A321 (not to mention that it is the easiest to fly and land) and somewhat too relaxed on the A320. However, cadets do receive thorough linetraining on all three variants we use and have to demonstrate of course that they can land them. No limit on crosswind either apart from the official max demonstrated (which is treated as a limit).

Pilots these days with low hours are taught to fly by numbers which this incident shows.

If that is the case with BA and their cadet provider they should change it to a company that conducts meaningful training. If the problem is inhouse training, it might be indicative of problems in their own training department.

[HeartyMeatballs]

Am I reading it right that there's no FO x wind limit at BA? Pretty good if so.

[RexBanner]

Incorrect, 2/3rds of the airframe limit.

[RAT 5]

the point is that the FPP's are not doing their base training in the A321. They have plenty of sectors to fly and land in the A320/319 in the meantime to consolidate their experience before moving on to the larger aircraft.

Thank you Rex for the informative response. Good to know.

[Flaperon75]

The restriction referred to in the AAIB report was that co-pilots flying the A321 would not be allowed to perform landings until they had sufficient experience on type.

So not the same thing at all, unless you're suggesting the AAIB have got the wrong end of the stick.

Absolutely correct and my mistake - the limitation is on the landing of the A321 and not on the flying of it. Apologies for the confusion.

[Stocious]

"At 50 ft agl the flare was initiated, using a progressive aft sidestick input, and at 25 ft agl the thrust levers were closed".
A quote from the AAB report I think this is where the problem started,followed by a firm landing,with a bounce then the incorrect technic used to arrest the rate of descent.
Having flown many hours on most Airbuses 50 ft is far to high to initiate a flare.
Pilots these days with low hours are taught to fly by numbers which this incident shows

It's not so much flying by numbers as teaching people new to the type, some sort of datums to hang their hat on. "Just judge it by Mk1 Eyeball" isn't exactly brilliant advice to someone inexperienced is it? A heavy 321, with a hefty ROD, perhaps it is suitable to start a flare about 50ft? I don't know, I haven't flown one for a long time. Doesn't Airbus even suggest a flare height in it's FCOM? The report also states "However, in practice it is not necessarily apparent to flight crew when an aircraft has bounced and neither crew member perceived the bounce" so criticism about the flare technique after a bounce is perhaps a little unfair.

If that is the case with BA and their cadet provider they should change it to a company that conducts meaningful training. If the problem is inhouse training, it might be indicative of problems in their own training department.

BA use several different companies to train their cadets, all pretty well established and with proven records. Even so, I'm still not convinced what the 'problem' is. Many many cadets managed to land 321s adequately in the almost two years that the FPPs had been flying before this incident. Hardly indicative of a history of poor training is it?

Surely the best thing to do is to train the FPPs to land the A321 properly, rather than some blanket ban which only covers the problem rather than fixing it. Why don't they spend a little money and take them out base training in the 321 for a second day? As for the reverse handling, that has to be one of the most ridiculous SOPs I've ever heard.


The restriction is until completion of LCT, in which training is given on Flap 3 and A321 landings. A second days base training is not deemed necessary. I'm sure you have SOP's that would seem alien and 'ridiculous' to us as well. ;)

[framer]

The aircraft touched down with a nose-up pitch attitude of 7.4°, just less than the 7.5° threshold at which the PM is required announce ‘pitch’.
Who dreamed up this call? Is it an Airbus thing or a BA thing?
Is the idea that the PM should be looking inside at the PFD monitoring pitch angles during the flare? If not, is there an HGS to provide the PM with an indication of when to make the call " pitch" ?
I would have thought it better to be looking down the runway judging sink rate and pitch visually.

[parkfell]

Stocious

Perhaps you would care to explain why the non handling pilot operates REVERSE on landing?
Different SOPs may seem to be 'alien' until they are explained.

What is wrong by adopting AIRBUS standard SOPs ?

The AAIB report on the Airbus incident at KOS, July 2007, makes very interesting reading about the vagaries of training on the BUS

[champair79]

Base training in the A321 won't happen simply because there aren't that many in the fleet compared to the A319/320s plus of course it costs the company slightly more.

The 6 month restriction on A321 landings for FPP cadets only really affects the line training on an A321 sector as the majority of new FPP's are sent to LGW where the A321 doesn't operate from. By the time those that request transfers up to LHR get their moves, they will be relatively experienced and well past the 6 month restriction.

Champ

[RexBanner]

Re BA unusual SOP's. I had a BA Line Trainer express a genuine belief to me that it was Airbus SOP to select a speed below green dot. News to me and a big no no in all other airlines operating Airbus only fleets. I just continue to manage speed and select it once the flap is out.

[RAT 5]

Perhaps you would care to explain why the non handling pilot operates REVERSE on landing?
I'm sure you have SOP's that would seem alien and 'ridiculous' to us as well.

Regarding the latter, indeed. I've always been amazed how different airlines try to invent the wheel; trying to out-smart each other, even the manufacturer. To be fair, operators do sometimes evolve good techniques that are an improvement on FCTM. I wonder how much feed-back there is from them to the author of the FCTM. Most communication seems to be the other way round.
Regarding the former; is this a company standard on all types? If it is then there is a company culture: if it is just AB then someone in that fleet's management has to justify it. I did fly for a B767 operator, one of many, whose SOP manual had been written by a fleet manger who had been the private jet pilot of the boss in his early days and before that a B707 pilot. Knowing this it explained some plain whacko inclusions. B707 is an old steam driven 3 crew cockpit. He needed a clean sheet of paper to write SOP's for a B767, but tinkered with much of what he knew from a coloured past. Wow, weird.
I used to fly for another whose CP didn't understand much of the new wiz-bang VNAV & TOGA functions; so he by-passed them and we cleaned up in V/S until end of noise abate?????
I apologise for topic diversion/creep, but sometimes I wonder why we don't question more often, but act like dumb sheep.

[tubby linton]

I believe that the NTSB are having a serious look at how BA handle thrust levers after the incident in Vegas.

[parkfell]

RAT 5

I think that you have hit the nail firmly on the head.
Why did I get a distinct sense of deja vu when reading it........

Migrating from the B727 through to B737 200/300 & then the NGs, remnants 727 operations still found its way through.
As you say, start with a clean sheet, based on the manufacturer's "suggested" operating procedures (SOPs)

[Max Angle]

Regarding the former; is this a company standard on all types?

It is unfortunately, apart from the A380 because Airbus wouldn't approve it which says a lot about the policy. A hangover from the 747 Classic apparently, ludicrous that it is still being done, there has been talk of changing it for years, perhaps they might finally get on with it now and join the rest of the airline world.

[35000feet]

To be clear, BA have implemented the process of the restriction until Line Continuation Training already. There have been many 'near misses' as well as this, and many cadets having issues. As someone previously says, perhaps indicative of an in-house training problem.
Anyway not to worry, they got rid of the pilot involved in this incident so problem solved, eh?

[Meikleour]

Max Angle: This BA "foible" regarding the non-handling pilot selecting REV after touchdown goes even further back - in fact that was SOP on Vanguards, Tridents and B707-436 in the '70s.!!! A deeply ingrained cultural issue within BA.

[BEL1000]

Do not forget to say if it was during the take off or landing.

[RAT 5]

I suspect this is a hang back to FE days and >2 engines. OMG, what does the single pilot PF do in a pilot incapacitation NNC: AND more importantly what happens in an RTO? Surely PM does not activate TR's then? Surely an RTO should be as similar to a normal landing as possible to avoid 'forgetfulness'. In BA who actions the RTO? If it is always captain, and F/O is PF it does make it sound very complicated if they then become PM and have to operate TR's. If they don't do that then why on a landing?

[MacSheikh]

So a combination of low overall experience, low type experience, SOPs that have the PM (was the PM before being the PF before being the PM !!!) instinctively looking down at a critical moment of flight contrived to catch the FO out.

Airbus SOPs have the PF always in control of the thrust levers, including non-normal events. In the days of turbo-props with flight pitch locks etc, the PM may have needed to be involved but in modern jets this is ridiculous!

If, as stated above, BA got rid of the pilot then shame on them. Where were BALPA?

[RexBanner]

Either crew member can call stop (although there are limited items which an FO is allowed to call stop for to aid ambiguity). PF retards the thrust levers to idle and PM selects max reverse. Once the engines are at forward idle and parking brake is set Captain takes control and roles are reversed to CM1 (who is effectively now PF) and CM2 (who runs ECAM, paper checklists) sounds complex but actually no big deal.

Pilot Incap: Hopefully you'll remember to set your own reverse! (Not a problem for us ex easyJets who still have it in the motor memory).

[6f1]

'Re BA unusual SOP's. I had a BA Line Trainer express a genuine belief to me that it was Airbus SOP to select a speed below green dot. News to me and a big no no in all other airlines operating Airbus only fleets. I just continue to manage speed and select it once the flap is out."
This is standard airbus procedure with a heavy A321 to select a speed below VLS,so the VFE flap 1 is not exceeded then you can return to managed speed as the BA trainer stated.

[RexBanner]

Not on a light 319 nowhere near any flap limiting speeds though...

[RAT 5]

Either crew member can call stop (although there are limited items which an FO is allowed to call stop for to aid ambiguity). PF retards the thrust levers to idle and PM selects max reverse. Once the engines are at forward idle and parking brake is set Captain takes control and roles are reversed to CM1 (who is effectively now PF) and CM2 (who runs ECAM, paper checklists) sounds complex but actually no big deal.


This is IMHO an astonishing method. I suspect, if the a/c goes off-road during an RTO, that the XAA's and insurance company will have some acerbic comments. It suggests that a low/medium experienced F/O is in charge of stopping & steering the a/c during a high speed RTO. Strong cross wind, short slippery limiting runway, auto brake disarms and max braking not applied, captain searching for the thrust reversers and is head down.
"I'm my defence, m'lud, I was only obeying SOP's. I know I am the captain and take final responsibility for the safety of the operation, but.............."

[RexBanner]

RAT 5 I've never once had to search for the thrust reversers, they're not exactly difficult to find, as to directional control well how is that any different to directional control during a landing in the same conditions you've just described? Or are we not to allow F/O's to do anything much less steer the aircraft?

I agree I don't think it's ideal splitting the control of thrust levers and reversers, for one it adds in additional reactional delay, but let's not overstate the issue here.

If a skipper deems it necessary and it's appropriate conditions he can nominate himself PF for the sector. It really is as simple as that.

[Teevee]

But (and again remember I'm not a pilot!) if I'm reading the report correctly that's seems to have been what happened to the commander in this instance? i.e. distracted by looking for the reversers right when things were about to get critical? I have another question too. Again according to the report the PF says he seemed to remember being told by a Trainer that the angle for an A321 tail strike was 11 degrees? (which was incorrect?) How important is it to actually know the correct angle yourself because this kind of implies he didn't? Can you sense when you are at too steep a pitch?

[wiggy]

Max Angle: This BA "foible" regarding the non-handling pilot selecting REV after touchdown goes even further back - in fact that was SOP on Vanguards, Tridents and B707-436 in the '70s.!!! A deeply ingrained cultural issue within BA.

I don't quite go that far back..I can't recall for sure exactly how it was done on the 747-136/236 ( suspect the FE fine tuned reverse after the initial selection but can't remember for sure).

AS I recall it when we got the 744s things became logical (i.e. Boeing) for a while and the handling pilot operated the reversers..(certainly on landing). Then, as you say, " cultural issues " and the BA way intervened and the SOPs changed.

[Nil further]

Amazing this , really quite amazing . So one of you is handling the aircraft the other the reversers , maybe on a slippy contaminated runway and that's safer/better than what the rest of the world does including the people who make , test and certify the aircraft ?

I had heard somewhere the Airbus refused to sign off on BA method of operating the 380 , is it true that there are still aspects of the way that BA operate the aircraft that Airbus aren't happy with ?

[tubby linton]

Another BA foible is PM calls the armed (blue) modes and the PF the active (green) ones.
There are also other procedures which do not conform with the manufacturer sop including flap retraction.

[RAT 5]

This is not a criticism, only an observation. I suspect many of us on here have flown for a few different operators; I suspect BA pilots are one horse jockeys. That gives a very different perspective. There are indeed other ways to skin the cat. Some of the more flexible/younger operators are not afraid of using a clean sheet of paper & listening to learned opinions, including the manufacturers.

[PJ2]

Perhaps I am misperceiving the problem or the characterizations of "SOPs", but in a final analysis, aren't SOPs the purview of the airline?

By this I mean that the manufacturer will have a set of SOPs for their product based upon their obvious in-depth knowledge of their product but I've found at least with Boeing's products that SOPs and in particular, explanatory notes as to how or why something works the way it does, very sparse, and in the past have seen my own and other airlines modify SOPs to fit the culture they have built and consider 'normal'. Airbus on the other hand do seem to provide far greater details and prescriptions for SOPs and between what I had used on the Airbus prior to retirement was coincidental with what Airbus had issued.

This is more for a historical perspective for those who believe that SOPs are strict rules which must slavishly be adhered to in all circumstances rather than "formal guidance" for the knowledgable and experienced.

I have to say, 302hrs isn't nearly sufficient "time-in" to provide a basis for comprehending the nuances of transport work, let alone appreciating and placing the observations in the AAIB Report or even responding the verbal call, "pitch!" quickly enough. It IS indeed a factor in this incident and not discussing I think is a disservice to the maturing of the cadet process.

[Chris Scott]

Hi PJ2,

I agree that the inexperience of the PF was more than worthy of discussion in the report. A dusk landing close to max landing weight on an a/c well-known for its susceptibility to tail-strike was a tough call considering it was his/her first A321 landing since completing line training six days previously.

Never flew the A321 but, FWIW, the landing technique that worked best for me on the A320 at higher weights included a momentary forward movement of the stick at or immediately before main-wheels touchdown. (Rather like the B707...) This anticipates the pitch-up effect of ground-spoiler deployment (the latter being particularly noticeable at higher pitch angles) and slightly reduces the normal acceleration on touchdown. When both pairs of main-wheels are on the ground, the de-rotation rate is obviously controlled with the stick to achieve a smooth nose-wheels touchdown. Perhaps experienced A321 pilots will comment.

[PJ2]

Hi Chris Scott;

As always, data for these events is happily sparse, but from flight data and discussions, a light, quartering tailwind, (~10kts), seems associated A321 tailstrikes, (I note that the wind was ~5kts, and a headwind). It makes sense particularly if the wind is slightly increasing in speed and other factors such as higher weights with that "transitional" lighting between day/dusk/night.

FWIW, I'm surprised that cadet-level experience appeared to be unrestricted. At 300hrs there just isn't enough experience even in the muscle-memory (autonomic) to handle some circumstances. I know well, the "how do you get experience except by experience?" argument, but I think handling these aircraft for a thousand hours or so within a reduced "bracket" of landing conditions will give the muscles and the hand-eye work time to cement, particularly if one has had some initial difficulty with the landing as has been commented here.

Like many who fly these aircraft, I've used the technique you mention on every aircraft I've flown and, judged well, it works. I do have experience proving the counter-example, especially on the B727. One can try it with the A330/A340 to beat the forward set of wheels to the pavement when the tilting mechanism "unlocks" the tilted bogies - they can slam the airplane down hard on the front set of wheels.

[champair79]

One would've expected BA to at least take note of the bmi SOPs when bmi was taken over. Aren't some ex-bmi Airbus bods in pretty senior Airbus positions at BA?

With the IAG group as a whole growing, I'd like to think there'd be some knowledge sharing between Vueling, IB, Aer Lingus and BA flight ops departments on how best to operate the aircraft. These are all big Airbus operators!

Champ

[Permafrost_ATPL]

Nilfurther:

I had heard somewhere the Airbus refused to sign off on BA method of operating the 380 , is it true that there are still aspects of the way that BA operate the aircraft that Airbus aren't happy with ?

To be fair, the 380 top brass tried hard to keep the SOPs as close to Airbus as possible. And my feeling is a majority of BA pilots would agree that having the PM select reverse does not make a lot of sense nowadays. However you must consider the substantial threat that would be introduced by such a critical change in SOPs. And besides the potential for mishaps on the line once the new SOP is in place, there is there is the very difficult problem of how to introduce it and train for it. You can't really use the normal sim cycle to introduce it two pilots at a time and I would be surprised if the CAA were happy for BA to make it law without a sim sign off. I have a feeling this SOP is there to stay on the existing fleets and will only be changed with the introduction of new aircraft. I'm sure the 350 launch team will carefully review the safety data from the 380 to determine whether this change of SOP caused an unacceptable level of delayed reverse selection (I don't believe that's the case).

Regarding your question about Airbus still being unhappy about some A380 SOPs, I have not heard it from the horse's mouth. I could see why they might not like the speed selection below green dot, but that's pretty much it. The unusual announcement of FMA changes by both pilots (depending on colour) takes a while to get used to for DEPs, but I doubt Airbus would be that bothered about it. Other than that, it's pretty much Airbus SOPs.

[Capt Ecureuil]

The Classic 747 was originally operated as a Boeing... PF handled reverse on landing and RTO.+ no monitored approach.

The -400 was always operated the "BEA" way, eventually the Classic fleet fell in to line and had to operate the same SOP's.

So now there is back to Boeing :-) ... well all except the monitored approach and reversers.

[Permafrost_ATPL]

Capt Ecureuil, how was the change to -400 SOPs introduced on the Classic?

[wiggy]

The -400 was always operated the "BEA" way, eventually the Classic fleet fell in to line and had to operate the same SOP's.

So now there is back to Boeing :-) ... well all except the monitored approach and reversers.

I thought in the early days of the 744 (I moved to it from the Classic in 91) we were on something akin to Boeing Sops ( we certainly flew our own coupled or visuals to land, the "monitored approach" was used for non-precision stuff) but the head shed decided that was a bad thing and it morphed into the BEA way by, I am guessing, the mid nineties.... If I am wrong I stand corrected..and anyway all this is a bit of a tangent given the context of the thread, but nevertheless an example of how BA works, or not.

[Capt Ecureuil]

Capt Ecureuil, how was the change to -400 SOPs introduced on the Classic?
It was nearly 25 years ago so happy to be corrected....

A notice that it was going to happen.
A practice in the sim.
A manual amendment.
Then one day it came in to force.

Much the same as (nearly) Back to Boeing

Wiggy....Sorry, always thought that -400 came in with "BEA" way, it was the mid 90's that I transferred from the Classic

[Chesty Morgan]

However you must consider the substantial threat that would be introduced by such a critical change in SOPs. And besides the potential for mishaps on the line once the new SOP is in place, there is there is the very difficult problem of how to introduce it and train for it.

You need to be trained to select reverse if you're a BA pilot?

[Permafrost_ATPL]

Are you really saying it's so hard to fathom a situation where no one selects reverse, in the heat of the moment, if you have a PF who reacts according to the old SOP and a PNF who reacts according to the new SOP?

[Chesty Morgan]

What?! The cream of UK aviation forgetting to select reverse, surely not. But what has happened to communication? A simple call of "no reverse", or similar, will rectify the situation. In fact I'd hazard a guess that BA already has a similar call out. I presume one of you will be monitoring?

[parkfell]

Do we have any feedback as to how the transition onto the A380 went with regard to REVERSE selection?
Not that difficult I suspect...!

[RAT 5]

However you must consider the substantial threat that would be introduced by such a critical change in SOPs.

Let's consider another threat. It s a common held idea that the landing is committed to once TR's have been unlocked. Many over-run's have occurred when the smart move would have been to make a GA from the runway after touchdown. Who makes that decision? Certainly the captain and hopefully the PF. If they are one & the same it can be easier. Now, as the Capt/PF is just about to abort the landing and go off again, the PM selected TR's. Ouch. Never say never.
Back to the SOP. I've heard the defenders say "it is no problem, even RTO's." I've not heard a solid reason persuading us it is a better idea than the more common alternative. Until then I think we shall all agree to disagree.

[WindSheer]

Surely a manual ammendment including the risks of regression for seasoned pilots in readiness for a go live date would suffice? This is not a technical thing.....it's more HF.

[Whinging Tinny]

''It s a common held idea that the landing is committed to once TR's have been unlocked.''

It's actually a known fact that you have landed, with weigh on wheels and other parameters when the T/Revs unlock.
Just saying.
And before anyone comments about Lauda Air, that is why the third/tertiay lock was installed in modern systems.

[Permafrost_ATPL]

Easy boys and girls, this threat has been mentioned to me by people pretty high up the food chain. Yes of course there is a call of No Reverse. But if I had a dollar for every time I had to issue it to my sim partner (decades on Jumbos) during the 380 conversion course... To discard this major change to two pretty crucial stages of flight as trivial is not wise.

[Chris Scott]

Some in this discussion may not be aware that the BA Airbus operation had its roots in BCAL, which ordered the first ten (CFM-powered) A320s as joint launch-customer with Air France. BA had always demurred from acquiring Airbus types.

The first BCAL pilots' course started at Blagnac a few days after the sudden announcement of the BA takeover, and we fully expected it and the aircraft order to be cancelled by Boeing (sorry, British) Airways once the penny had dropped at Heathrow. In fact, following delays due to the necessity to reconfigure the type's electrical system prior to certification, the first a/c was delivered to LGW on the day that the BA AOC supplanted BCAL's (1/4/88).

The BCAL SOPs for the A320, as had been the case on our short-lived A310 operation, were in line with Airbus's as far as a/c handling was concerned, so the PF handled reverse for landings and rejected take-offs. With notable exceptions, very few BA pilots joined the fleet in the first year, although we successfully standardised a modernised version of the monitored-approach procedure.

The practice of the PNF selecting the reverse came, IIRC, sometime in the 1990s, in the interests of cross-fleet commonality. The throttles and thrust-reverse levers on the A320 are possibly the easiest to use of any jet - particularly nice compared with older, 4-engined types like the B707, on which the Boeing SOP was for the PF to select his own spoilers and reverse (the latter consecutively in symmetric pairs). No doubt BOAC had a different policy.

But, to pick up the point made by RAT 5 above, the worst aspect of the new SOP was that the PNF selected reverse at his/her discretion, without any command from the PF. This was a policy discredited - to cite an example close to my own experience - by the accident to G-ARTA at LGW in 1972 (https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19720128-0). The a/c had been completing an empty ferry from LHR in the early hours of the morning with a very aft CG in a gusty crosswind. In compliance with the current BCAL VC10 SOP, the PNF had selected reverse as the a/c touched down - albeit heavily - and bounced. This presented the PF-captain with a fait-accompli, and the a/c broke its back during the series of bounces that followed.

Assuming that most landings in limiting, gusty crosswinds on short runways are performed by captains, can an inexperienced co-pilot be trusted instantly to remove his/her hand from the throttles in the event of a G/A call at or immediately after touchdown?

Long in retirement, I'd nevertheless be interested to hear the story of the evolution of A380 SOPs in BA, and to what extent they may be non-common with its other fleets, including the B787.

[Capt Ecureuil]

However you must consider the substantial threat that would be introduced by such a critical change in SOPs.

Let's consider another threat. It s a common held idea that the landing is committed to once TR's have been unlocked. Many over-run's have occurred when the smart move would have been to make a GA from the runway after touchdown. Who makes that decision? Certainly the captain and hopefully the PF. If they are one & the same it can be easier. Now, as the Capt/PF is just about to abort the landing and go off again, the PM selected TR's. Ouch. Never say never.
Back to the SOP. I've heard the defenders say "it is no problem, even RTO's." I've not heard a solid reason persuading us it is a better idea than the more common alternative. Until then I think we shall all agree to disagree.
Rest assured Ratty, the folks at BA have thought of that and it's all taken care of. Either pilot can call go-around any time until the reversers are pulled. Although I prefer to do it all the traditional way the BA SOP does work fine.
To be clear... No reverse is selected until the handler is ready for it (and the in the BA way, so is the NHP).

What concerns me more is a slide in slippery conditions and getting the reverse off.

[4runner]

60 sectors?????? 60!!!!!! Proof that P2F does not get the best candidate in the cockpit. Try that at an airline with N registered a/c. They start asking questions after 30 hours if you haven't been signed off. We invented it, YOU perfected it.

[Capn Bloggs]

It's all ridiculous. :ooh:

[Stocious]

The BA cadet scheme is hardly P2F. It's probably one of the better ones around.

[centropy]

Stocious, you are right but it's sad that that's as good as it gets. Just under £100k on training and I was told today half DEP salary for 7 years! Still better than what I did though :)

[Stocious]

It's not half DEP salary either! Starts off about half but ramps up very quickly. In fact the total remuneration package for FPP compared to DEP only works out at around £35000 less over the first 7 years, and in later years actually involves BA paying cadets more than DEPs if you include the bond repayment.

[parkfell]

But that is repaying them their loan money, or otherwise financed, in the first place.
Pleasing to the beancounters where the layout (cash) for training is minimised.

Not money representing purchasing power....

[Stocious]

Which is why I said total remuneration package.

Such is the world today that even if you joined as a DEP straight (or even a few years) out of training, you'll usually have some sort of training loan to satisfy anyway. My point, is that the FPP scheme is hardly making their cadets destitute, and hardly P2F.