Amazing Spin by Airservices re. Lack of Radar in Tasmania

[Dick Smith]

Following the article on Monday 6 July in The Australian, “Pilots Told to Switch Off $6m Radar System” (see below), the spin doctors at Airservices have come up with the most extraordinary claims. In effect they are saying that the multilateration system was never designed to work below 6,000 feet - see HERE (http://newsroom.airservicesaustralia.com/releases/response-to-the-australian-4). I reckon if you’d believe that you’d believe anything!

I love it! They also say,

Procedural separation of aircraft is a procedure used at a number of airports around the country where traffic volumes permit, including many large regional airports.

Yes, but they don’t mention that every other capital city airport has a proper radar control service right to the runway. Why would you bother to spend $6 million on a radar service for Tasmania and not actually provide a separation service below 6,000 feet?

The most likely truthful explanation is that the contract did not go as planned. I can imagine the low morale associated with working for such an organisation. They simply fib their way out by stating the ridiculous.

The contractor for the multilateration system, upon its completion, stated what they thought was the truth. These are their words from their website (see Tasmania Airspace Now Controlled With High Accuracy Wide Area Multilateration | Brolair International (http://www.brolair.com/archives/88) ) :

Enroute surveillance of air traffic across the island and down to the surface at Hobart and Launceston Airports

Watch this space … we’ll try and get the truth to come out. But it may be difficult.

Surely someone must know what is going on? Presumably they did not put enough multilateration stations in or could it be that they located them in the wrong areas?

To spend $6 million of the industry’s money and not even get a service below 6,000 feet is totally ridiculous.

What do others think?

Here is the article from Monday’s newspaper:

Tasmanian pilots told to switch off $6m radar system

A multi-million-dollar, state-of-the-art navigation system installed by Airservices Australia in Tasmania still leaves pilots at the mercy of pre-radar, 1950s-era, air traffic control procedures which are considered inefficient and not as safe.

Aviation industry figures say the failure to use the system for radar-style surveillance approaches to Launceston and Hobart makes it a waste of money and makes those airports virtually unique among big Australian cities.

Some sources said Airservices had intended to use the system for surveillance approaches but was knocked back by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority because it was not reliable enough, while others said Airservices did not want to take on the air-traffic controllers union, which would resist such a move. Airservices has denied both these suggestions.

The Tasmania Wide Area Multilateration system, or TASWAM, was introduced after a near midair collision at Launceston between a Virgin Blue airliner and a light aircraft years ago.

After the near miss, CASA insisted on the installation of transportable radar at Launceston, while Airservices worked towards a long-term solution.

In 2006, Airservices announced TASWAM, which uses triangulation from radio transmitter ground stations to pinpoint aircraft through their transponders, and the system was made operational five years ago.

But rather than guide aircraft all the way to the runway, pilots are told as they descend through 7000 feet that they are no longer covered by radar-standard surveillance. Instead, they are required to switch to the local towers in Launceston and Hobart for procedural approaches.

Whereas under “radar certif*ied surveillance approaches” aircraft are directed by air traffic controllers using precise positioning on radar screens, procedural approaches require the controllers to rely on the pilots informing them of their positions.

Procedural separation is far less efficient because controllers have to allow much greater distance between aircraft, often about 20 nautical miles, rather than five miles under radar surveillance separation.

The president of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, airline captain David Booth, said procedural separation meant it was more likely aircraft would exper*ience air-traffic delays in Tasmania.

While he insisted the procedural standard was entirely safe and equipment on modern airliners provided excellent and reliab*le situational awareness, he said “a radar environment would probably give you a higher level of safety”.

Captain Booth, who has been flying to Tasmania for more than a decade, said he understood TASWAM had been commissioned to introduce radar-*style air-traffic control in Tasmania, but “it never worked well enough for CASA to sign it off”.

A CASA spokesman said the authority had approved Air*services to use TASWAM above 7000 feet, but “the surveillance coverage below this altitude does not meet the coverage requirements to allow air-traffic control to apply surveillance procedures”.

When TASWAM was announced, media releases from Airservices and the manufacturers of the system, Sensis Corporation — which is now part of the Swedish Saab group — gave a clear impression that surveillance approaches were the objective, talking about “accurate coverage of 150m or better from the ground level”.

“Sensis WAM’s precise surveillance of aircraft enables air traffic controllers to implement five nautical miles of aircraft separation for safer, more efficient use of the airspace in a region that was previously controlled with procedural separation standards,” a Sensis press release said.

Asked the separation standard in Tasmania below 7000 feet, an Airservices spokesman said “in most cases, 20 nautical miles”.

However, Airservices said it had never intended to use TASWAM, which cost $6 million, for surveillance approaches, saying it had achieved the goal of “improved situational awareness for controllers”.

Saab spokesman Sebastian Carlsson declined to comment.

[Jabawocky]

Dick, I could give you a bunch of really good answers, from accurate and reliable sources in both places.

But, who am I and what would I know about aviation….. :E

[Dick Smith]

Jaba. Could you send me a private message. Or even give me a phone call?

A free jar of OzeNuts would be coming you way!

I would imagine there must be plenty of glowing statements about 7 years ago re how fantastic the multilateration system was going to be.

[Dick Smith]

If AsA ordered a new "terminal area survailance system" for Hobart and Launy what airspace dimensions would that normally cover?

What is the "Terminal Area" for an airport? Surely someone can help with this?

[alphacentauri]

Terminal area is normally considered to be 30nm, well at least that is where the automated nav spec changes in most rnav systems.

[PLovett]

Dick. The tower controllers have the screens for the TASWAM but not the training to be able to use them. So centre can use it for separation but for the handover to the towers at around 45 miles traffic has to be at procedural spacing. I have heard that there have been issues with its accuracy preventing its use for terminal separation. I have no idea whether that is true or not, just what I heard.

[Jabawocky]

Class C into D, you get what you get because of the airspace and not because of the multi-lat. The MLAT does give the tower guys and girls greater confirmation, comfort and assurance that what they are doing to D rules is working now, and in a few minutes time because they have good SA.

What about YBSU? I think they were the first D to get a feed after a CHOGM event.

Broome ? do they have anything at all?

Whats the point here?

[rr007]

Happy with procedural separation if it means not equipping ADSB but claim it's not safe in TAS and Ballina?

[Capn Bloggs]

Whats the point here?
Dick is continuing his publicity campaign for president. That's the point.

they don’t mention that every other capital city airport has a proper radar control service right to the runway.
Hobart is not a capital city and plenty of towers have identification services down to the top of D.

Why would you bother to spend $6 million on a radar service for Tasmania and not actually provide a separation service below 6,000 feet?
Because of the extra millions it'll cost to provide a "radar" approach service! Have you ever flown in a procedural environment during climb and descent?

Ever heard of affordable safety? :rolleyes:

[Dick Smith]

Bloggsey. I love the way you always support the status quo.

"We have never had a terminal radar service in Tassie so we never need to"

Forget that the most common form of fatal accident by airline pilots is a controlled flight into terrain and the best way of preventing such accidents as per the NTSB is to use ATC with radar.!

And what is the capital city of Tasmania?

[Capn Bloggs]

"We have never had a terminal radar service in Tassie so we never need to"

Clean your glasses, Dick, I never said that. When all of you lighty jokers get your ADS-B, we can have REAL safety improvements, which will include big-brother monitoring to prevent CFIT by private pilots.

Forget that the most common form of fatal accident by airline pilots is a controlled flight into terrain
No it isn't. LOC is. Stick to the facts or step out of the way.

And what is the capital city of Tasmania?
That place just down the road from where your famed Class E airspace nearly creamed hundreds of Virgin passengers because a private pilot thought he was better at ATC than ATC themselves.

[Capt Claret]

And what is the capital city of Tasmania?

Hobart, the only capital city in Australia without an AFP presence at the airport, thanks to federal govt. funding cuts.

[swh]

Dick,

They would probably install a combined Thales STAR2000 + RSM970S, giving around 250 mn of secondary radar, and 60-90 mn of primary radar. The primary radar is what most people call terminal radar, not to be confused with terminal airspace.

Claret,

The AFP seen at most airports in the states are state police dressed in AFP uniforms.

[Capt Claret]

That may be so SWH but at HBA we have neither AFP officers dressed as AFP officers. TasPol officers dressed as AFP officers, nor TasPol officers dressed as TasPol officers.

Unless on a routine pass through, the airport is void of a police presence, which probably persuaded a recalcitrant passenger yesterday to utter words to the affect, "you've got no effin' police here so what are you effin' gunna do about it"?

Fortunately, at the time, there was a large police presence nearby in Cambridge and said 'lady' and her family are enjoying a 48 hour travel ban. However, most times, if the authorities are required, it's a phone call to Police Comms, and get into the queue.

[sunnySA]

Dick Smith
We have never had a terminal radar service in Tassie so we never need to"

Forget that the most common form of fatal accident by airline pilots is a controlled flight into terrain and the best way of preventing such accidents as per the NTSB is to use ATC with radar.!

SWH
They would probably install a combined Thales STAR2000 + RSM970S, giving around 250 mn of secondary radar, and 60-90 mn of primary radar.

Yep, can just see Emirates and all the other International airlines agreeing to that one. You only have to look at their submissions to the current debate about the Long Term Pricing Regime and network costs.

I'm sure the boys and girls in LT & HB would love the extra surveillance capability of primary radar but at what cost? And what other projects would have to be delayed or cancelled to provide sufficient project resources, technical staff and $$$.

Dick Smith
Presumably they did not put enough multilateration stations in or could it be that they located them in the wrong areas?
There is some truth to this, remembering that Tasmania has large areas of National Park and wilderness (I've seen all the glossy pictures in Australian Geographic) and so sometimes the locations might be a compromise, next best option. And with ADSB sites, more is better but once again $$. Contractors usually underestimate the number of sites required, often this is a "ploy" to gain contract variations, a bit like building a swimming pool and the contractor saying we needed extra steel, extra concrete, extra tiles, larger pump, higher pool fence.

[CaptainMidnight]

I'm told by someone who doesn't wish to be identified that the reason TASWAM doesn't deliver is because to save money and increase their bonuses, Airservices managers deliberately had it installed without a key piece of equipment, a Gonkulator.

[Capn Bloggs]

to save money and increase their bonuses, Airservices managers deliberately had it installed without a key piece of equipment, a Gonkulator.
Typical, although can you blame them? They cost the earth at Dick Smiths. I can get them on Ebay for half that; if you're prepared to run them on MEL occasionally (ie you get what you pay for/affordable safety) I'll do you a deal!

[Dick Smith]

The last two posts are rediculous and probably intended to get the thread locked so the truth is not exposed.

This is a hidden bomb. AsA have expended millions of dollars on a system that was purchased to provide terminal survailance but clearly does not work as planned.

Why was SAAB SENSIS paid for this? Who was responsible for this major waste of industry money? Were AsA performance bonuses paid that year?

Let's hope SAAb are not being considered for other Government work until this is resolved.

[Capn Bloggs]

Shock! Horror! Humour is not permitted on Prune!

Lighten up, Dick. Laughter is the best medicine.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Dick, are you inferring raising HB and LT to class C airspace?

[growahead]

Dick Re #18

TASWAM was not intended to provide terminal surveillance at HB and LT.
It's main purpose was provide an en route and arrivals function, feeding to the procedural Class D towers. Generally, a reasonable plan. As I remember it, ASA decided to try and save some money on the installation by using fewer ground stations than recommended by the suppliers. You get what you pay for. Despite a common view, procedural approach at Class D towers works pretty well, especially as the controllers can monitor the display, for monitoring and adjusting sequences. Procedural control, Class D can often be more efficient and flexible than radar separation.
However, I agree that surveillance is overdue at places like these. ASA pays the government a handsome "dividend" every year. That dividend should be going to fund relevant infrastructure(such as surveillance), not general revenue.
The danger is that, ASA being a (ATC) Centre centric organisation, will be pushing for approach controllers based in Melbourne doing multiple approach functions, down to about 1500 ft, and handing over to tower for basically an aerodrome/circuit function. A better solution would be to train and rate the tower guys/gals on radar, and still retain enough vertical airspace (around 6000 ft) to be able to manage and integrate traffic. This is particularly important when you have a wide range of performance mix, from ultralights, to slow lighties, turboprops, jets, military, etc. HB also has CBG, how would the sep be done on radar with that? Very clumsily. Sadly, very few if any senior management have any experience in stuff like this.
You can guess what we'll get in a few years, bet it won't be HB/LT (i.e. tower) based.

[Dick Smith]

GROWAHEAD - re your post #21 - at last the truth starts to come out.

First of all, your statement

Procedural control, Class D can often be more efficient and flexible than radar separation

Growahead, that is simply ridiculous! Can you give me one example of where it is more efficient?

It sounds as if the radar standards that are used by Airservices are probably as out-of-date as just about everything else in Airservices other than, perhaps, the ADS-B mandates.

I love your view that it’s a better solution to train tower controllers (who are not even there 24 hours per day) to do radar approach work rather than use people in the centre who are there 24-hours a day. This is classic resistance-to-change.

Surely you understand that over twenty years ago we decided to follow other leading aviation countries and have controllers who operate the low level enroute airspace to also do approach work. That is, we could start dropping the E airspace down to low levels at non-tower airports and give a superb separation service when IMC exists.

Of course, this has never happened. One of the reasons, I would imagine, is it means if you provide the service also to Class D towers it requires a certain amount of de-skilling – that is, the Class D tower controllers become VFR controllers as they are just about everywhere else in the world and the IFR separation duties are done from the centre.

And before you jump in and say we don’t have the radar coverage – that has nothing to do with it. In the USA, every single IFR approach is in a minimum of Class E airspace and 50% of the approaches have no radar coverage at the initial approach fix.

To train the tower controllers on radar would simply be ridiculous because they are not there 24-hours a day.

Growahead, I know your intentions are good but can you tell me if you have ever looked at how other modern aviation countries maximise the use of their radar and separation services for aircraft that are in IMC?

And OZBUSDRIVER – no, I’m not suggesting that you change Hobart and Launceston to Class C airspace. You would only need to do that if you stuck with the old Australian 1950s way of doing things. No-one can tell me that Aussie enroute controllers cannot be trained to do approach work - both procedural and radar - as happens in every other leading aviation country I know of.

[advo-cate]

The industry does not want a dividend of it's money going to the government at the distinct dis-benefit of the aviation industry.

ASA pays the government a handsome "dividend" every year. That dividend should be going to fund relevant infrastructure(such as surveillance), not general revenue.

The dis-benefit could not be shown more clearly than in Edward's case as exposed by the Australian article.

Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/flyers-burnt-by-air-safety-u-turn/story-e6frg95x-1227432909361)

[growahead]

Dick,
1/ Class D, controllers can use profile separation, basically using judgement, vs 5 min ring.
2/ Ever heard of Visual separation? You can get aircraft much closer than a radar standard.
3/ Use of geographic features can allow acft to operate much closer than a 5 mile radar standard (or even a 3 mile approach radar).
There are other flexiblilties available to D towers that the radar towers can't use. I suggest you book a visit to Hobart for a couple of hours, watch and ask for explanations of how D really works in practice.
I have visited control centres and towers in a few overseas countries. I know that tower based radar services are used in many places. I know that US has some great practices, but equally, some not so good. Personally, for example, I don't like a landing clearance being issued when the runway is occupied. That one has gone wrong a few times.
US has many differences, which makes ADSB a far better option than trying to install radars everywhere in Australia.
IFR calling VFR, climbing through traffic, see and be seen, how often has that gone wrong? How many jets have been lost due to the pilots thinking they are visually self separated from VFR traffic?
How many times have pilots on this forum been given specific traffic in close proximity, and either never seen it, or seen it at the last minute, causing a bit of a shock? Be honest! See and be seen shouldn't be relied on, especially when it involves large capacity jets, or even turbo props.
From listening to tapes, watching videos, I'd also say that non standard phraseologies, and extremely rapid speech are among other features I don't like in the US system.
What we should be doing is taking the best from everywhere, not just cloning the US.
When centre gets the approach function, you will have someone who is swapping chairs frequently, multi skilling, or combining as it is known, to save money, and little local knowledge. But, centre mandarins will get another bonus, more underlings and a bigger empire. Good luck to you.

[Capt Claret]

Growahead, that is simply ridiculous! Can you give me one example of where it is more efficient?

YMHB - Hobart. Never get asked to lose 10 minutes or more to fit into the sequence into HBA, unlike MEL.

YMHB - Hobart. Not often MEL Approach will approve a late offer of a left circuit to facilitate a departure.

[Dick Smith]

Growahead

Don’t get me wrong – I think Class D towers are fantastic, especially Hobart. Some of the best movement of lots of traffic including helicopters I have seen anywhere in the world. I’d love to see those procedures used in another Class D tower in Australia but I won’t mention where because I might get delayed next time!

Yes, I have heard of visual separation of course, but how I understand the US system works is that if you are in IMC you remain with the centre controller who has the radar. The minute you are visual you go to the tower and the tower uses all of the visual techniques that we have in our Class D towers now – and more.

From my experience there are no Class D towers with tower-based radar services in the USA. Yes, places like Aspen have a small TRACON in a separate room in the tower and that gives a full approach service. However, what I am talking about is Class D towers offering visual separation and doing it in a really effective way and when IMC exists using the 24-hour controllers in the centre. From my experience it works superbly in the USA, however in Australia we have pilots changing to the tower frequency when they are in good radar coverage and in IMC. This seems ridiculous to me.

Re. the USA – yes, I am sure there are some things we do better. If you remember when I was CAA Chairman in 1990 I arranged for air traffic controllers to go to San Francisco and look at the systems there and then write a report. Many came back with lots of suggestions and lots of comments on what they thought the US does better and what we do better. My success in life is simply the result of going around the world and copying the best of each. If we could do that in aviation we would become leaders in the world.

I would love to see a really good multilateration system working in Tasmania that gives (as was planned) a radar-like surveillance service right to the runway. That is actually what was originally intended if you look at the old Airservices Annual Reports. If it needs a few more multilateration transceivers, let’s wack them in and get a really good service.

It only needs a minor error on the part of a pilot and the ground proximity system not working properly and we could have a classic controlled flight into terrain – say, an aircraft coming in from Flinders Island to Launceston over Mt Barrow.

They don’t swap chairs frequently in the USA – they use the enroute controller to do the approach work and it works superbly.

[Dick Smith]

And if you wish to rely less on see and avoid in Australia put in some lower class E airspace. This brings in a mandatory transponder requirement fo all aircraft so you get the double extra safety of mandatory radio and mandatory transponder so the TCAS will work.

[Dick Smith]

Growy. You state

" TASWAM was not intended to provide terminal survailance at HB and LT. "

Why wasn't it? It's completely against commonsense to spend $6 m on the latest form of Multilateration in Tasmania and then not use it for control purposes where the risks are highest- that is closer to the aerodrome .

Sounds to me more like a deal has been done to keep the local controllers with the maximum amount of airspace .

As a pilot I want to be under radar control when in IMC whenever possible because I know that will make my flight safer.

It's not logical that Airservices would spend so much of our industries money to provide a surveillance service for en route aircraft above 8000'. Where are they going? Antarctica?

I believe the people of Tasmania have been conned. I will do everything I can to get the equipment working properly and a proper surveillance service going. Hopefully before another accident like Lockhart River.

[thorn bird]

Unfortunately Dick unless we fix up our regulations first, there won't be any aviation left to use the airspace, only things flying will be the RAAF and RPT, no doubt flown by ex RAAF pilots, because nobody will be able to afford to learn to fly.

[Dick Smith]

Ah yes. That's why they have ex military people running everything!

[Capn Bloggs]

And if you wish to rely less on see and avoid in Australia put in some lower class E airspace. This brings in a mandatory transponder requirement fo all aircraft so you get the double extra safety of mandatory radio and mandatory transponder so the TCAS will work.
Mandatory Radio? Announce in potential conflict? Based on what information? All those self-announcements that IFR are making in E?

Glad to see you have finally admitted that TCAS is an integral component of the safety of your Class E...because See and Avoid doesn't work!

[Dick Smith]

You are so positive it doesn't work that no doubt you don't bother to keep a good lookout.

Your poor passengers !

[Capn Bloggs]

Lookout? I'm a realist, Dick. If my passengers knew the primary method of preventing midair collisions was me looking out the window, they wouldn't be happy.

So how about answering the question? How does VFR "Continuous Two Way" work in Class E?

[sunnySA]

Dick Smith
I would love to see a really good multilateration system working in Tasmania that gives (as was planned) a radar-like surveillance service right to the runway. That is actually what was originally intended if you look at the old Airservices Annual Reports. If it needs a few more multilateration transceivers, let’s wack them in and get a really good service.

I looked at some old Airservices Annual Reports, creative writing perhaps.

Annual Report 2010-2011
Airservices also introduced the first phase of surveillance approaches to Launceston and Hobart airports in June 2011. These enhanced air traffic control services build on the introduction of advanced air traffic control surveillance technology known as Wide Area Multilateration (WAM), which was commissioned in Tasmania in June 2010.
Not entirely sure what is meant by surveillance approaches, open to debate, interpretation and mis-interpretation.

Annual Report 2009-2010
In June 2010, Airservices commissioned Australia’s first Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) radar system in Tasmania. The $6 million system is one of the largest geographical deployments of WAM in the world. The system provides enhanced en route surveillance of air traffic across Tasmania and radar-like coverage down to the surface at Hobart. The same technology will be deployed in Sydney later in 2010 to enhance parallel runway operations.
En route surveillance and radar-like coverage down to the surface at Hobart. Whilst this is true, the statement is silent on who would be providing the service, Centre vs Tower. Once again, open to debate, interpretation and mis-interpretation.

Airservices is very Centre-centric, two major centres - that is where the $ are earnt (en route charges), Towers have been the poor cousins, in fact for a number of years the Towers were a separate business unit (to the rest of the ATC Group). As I recall, they had been set-up as a separate business unit (Airport Services - Towers and ARFF) as there were indications that the Towers and ARFF could be sold to the highest bidder (Serco, DSE et al) or at the very least "Airport Services" would be contestable. It didn’t happen but there was a huge and expensive divide that needed to be repaired and during the "lost years" there was very little spent on the Towers.

Going from TSAT (the Tower Situational Awareness Tool) to CASR Part 171&172 compliant radar displays in all Towers wouldn’t be cheap. I guess INTAS (Integrated Tower Automation Suite) will deliver that technology but a retro-fit into all existing Towers will be a long and painful process.

Annual Report 2004–2005
During the year, we began setting up Australia’s network of Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS–B) ground stations. When the network is complete early in 2006, ADS–B will allow high quality surveillance of suitably equipped aircraft in upper airspace (above 30,000 feet) over the entire continent.
We are working with the industry and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) towards mandatory ADS–B in certain airspace from 2009. CASA published a regulatory change discussion paper for comment late in 2004, and a notice of proposed rule making is expected in 2006. With ASTRA and Access Economics, we developed a cross-industry business case and cost–benefit analysis for mandatory ADS–B in Australia, changes to navigation equipment of smaller aircraft and extended comprehensive surveillance coverage. Subject to government consideration, this could extend ADS-B into lower airspace.
CASA has approved a five nautical mile separation standard for aircraft operating in the Burnett Basin trial whose positions are derived from ADS–B. This is a significant milestone in our objective to introduce ADS–B surveillance nationally.

Annual Report 2005–2006
During the year, Airservices continued the introduction of ADS–B aircraft surveillance technology, with five of 28 ground stations commissioned.
ADS–B technology provides:
• low-cost air traffic control that can replace en route radars and allow surveillance to be provided where there is none today
• for pilots, the ability to be aware of nearby air traffic, which reduces risk
• base upon which advanced air-to-air applications can be built, improving efficiency and safety.
ADS–B is an enabler for the future of air traffic management worldwide and will allow air traffic controllers to provide more efficient separation services to suitably equipped aircraft in upper airspace (above 30,000 feet).
After successful trials during the year in the Burnett Basin in Queensland, four new ADS–B stations came on line in June 2006 at Longreach, Bourke, Esperance and Woomera.
The introduction of ADS–B for lower airspace, in lieu of en route radars, is now the subject of consultation with the aviation industry and the government to consider the likely costs involved, the timeframe for introduction and the possible phasing of implementation.

The above two quotes highlight that ADSB has been discussed in the Airservices Annual Reports for more than a decade.

[advo-cate]

Good on you Sunny

[Capn Bloggs]

So how about answering the question? How does VFR "Continuous Two Way" work in Class E?
No answer yet, Dick? C'mon, you have plenty of criticism for me, help me to understand how Airpsace 2015 will work...

[Dick Smith]

I simply don't understand the question. Under ICAO there is no mandatory radio requirement for VFR in E ,F or G.

It will work like the way it does in the USA. Canada and. Europe.

But safer because we have a mandatory transponder requirement for VFR in all E. And far lower traffic density.

Advocate " and radar like coverage down to the ground at Hobart". So why is AsA claiming it was never planned to work below 6000'? I know. They are not telling the truth.!

I hope I can get some support in getting that Tassie system to work as planned. Will make these places safer without doubt.

[Capn Bloggs]

Somebody give me a slapping... :{

Dick, a few posts back you said:

put in some lower class E airspace. This brings in a mandatory transponder requirement fo all aircraft so you get the double extra safety of mandatory radio
(my bolding)

and now you're saying
I simply don't understand the question. Under ICAO there is no mandatory radio requirement for VFR in E ,F or G.

Are you serious? Are you saying that you really don't understand how to use the radio in Class E works here, the airspace you should be an expert in and which you are making so much noise about?

As an aside, ICAO needs it's head read if it thinks No-Radio should be mixing it with RPT jets in CTAFs. Or do you, Dick, think that ICAO assumes that RPT jets would always be operating in controlled airspace ie Class D, and would you support that for all of our RPT jet airfields in the regions?

I hope I can get some support in getting that Tassie system to work as planned. Will make these places safer without doubt.
Done your CBA on that?

[PLovett]

Well according to Rupert's weekend rag we are all about to get the US system. Airspace that is, not regulations. Yes, it must be true, its on page 1, "Radical overhaul to deliver safer skies". All supposedly revealed to the rag by Jeff Boyd.

If true, if implemented and if it works like it says on the box we will have safer skies for less and less traffic. Those who are flying will be paying more (c'mon, the cost of all this has to be recovered you know) for the privilege of having controlled airspace down to an instrument approach.

What is so completely funny is that Rupert's rag is claiming the credit for their sustained campaign, along with several notable aviation figures (yes, you know who).

Without regulatory reform the rot will continue. Period.

[Piston_Broke]

My interpretation of Mr. Boyd's comments is that he is an astute fellow, saying exactly what you would expect i.e. we'll look in to things (lowering CTA, ADS-B equipage, UNICOM etc. etc.) and on a case by case basis make a call what is appropriate or not.

All that is entirely appropriate for the regulator, and what they have been doing anyway with their aeronautical studies.

[growahead]

Dick: #22/#28

I'll start with the basics. I agree it's past time surveillance was introduced to Tasmania. You want the US system, there are other options, such as tower based approach. You really should spend some time watching a sector when there is moderate to busy traffic. Oz sector controllers have huge airspace, are are already working to or beyond maximum at times. If the sector controllers get the approach function, I can bet it will be limited to clearing the approach and handing off to the tower, probably with directed traffic info gained from the radar. HB and LT can get sequences of around 6 or more jets (it's not uncommon, couple or few arrivals from Vic, another from FLI, and one or two to depart in the meantime), which need separation, sequencing, holding, before being sorted out with the local traffic. There is no way an en route controller could possibly have the time to do this with the current staffing and organisation. Then, we have the same sector guy/gal running two real sequences, one into HB, another into LT, forget somewhere else that could be happening like DPO or even Victoria.
Let me remember the history a little. Until a grand new plan about 20 years ago, aircraft in CTA were separated. Then "someone" had the great idea that light aircraft operation VFR could transit over head airports with jet operations, and all they had to do was listen out, maybe announce their presence, and maybe deviate a little if the pilot thought it was necessary. Class E over D. Works great in US, why not here, with no, niente, nulle nixt surveillance. Despite serious concern from pilots and controllers, the idea was introduced. So now the safety of hundreds depended on a VFR pilot with possible less than 100 hours, determining the threat, then the reaction. That lasted about 3 weeks, if I recall, until the already mentioned Virgin encounter near LT. Now, tell me again, that I or my ideas are ridiculous. Really, you should have quietly pulled your head in over that one, and thanked someone that it wasn't a noisy aluminium shower.
I also recall "someone" again, in an airspace review/restructure arguing for more space for lighties, which would be so incredible that flying training would flourish, creating jobs and wealth for everyone. One result of that gave us CTA steps AO85 at 30 miles. What's wrong with that? Nothing really, just that many times every day of the year, RPT jets have to apply power, waste fuel, and often cause the approach to be above profile, because they are held to AO90 until 30 miles. Why, well, because of all that VFR traffic beneath them. How many VFR, less than a handful a year; how many jet approaches stuffed around, conservatively 1000 a year, just for a place like HB. Any jet drivers here want to dispute that, arriving from Clark with a good tailwind, but landing on 12 because of the every present sea breeze.
Just a couple of examples of a little knowledge, from a well meaning, high profile amateur.
Now, tell me again that I'm being ridiculous.
Back to the story. After the LT E airspace event, a portable radar was installed in LT. This was at the time when aircraft numbers were taking off, pun intended. Accordingly, TASWAM was introduced, which gave en route pretty well a picture of en route airspace; aircraft were, from memory, separated by "radar" (not really radar) from above about AO60, lower in some areas.
Lets look at a couple more of your statements. You suggested that ASA are running airspace management with the priority of giving a few mates in HB a job. Are you serious?? ASA would sack every controller if they could manage, the controllers are pushed pretty hard in the new world. I know, I'm just being ridiculous.
You admitted in one of your posts, that you didn't even know the radar separation standard, but you are ready to reorganise Oz airspace.
You also said CFIT was the major threat. It was, but until recently, at least, the major threat has been related to runway occupancy. Now, at Hobart, still no taxiways to the thresholds, so backtracks, prolonged time on the active are normal every day. Using logic and statistics, the greater threat to safety at HB is the taxiway/runway situation. You would be better pushing for taxiways than radar.
Back to sector controllers providing approach function. In US, I'll bet the sector/approach controller will be providing directed traffic, based on paints he/she observes on the screen. The same information could be gained by the pilots from their own TCAS display, if acft in the area had transponders. I'll get flamed for this, but mandatory transponders would save a lot of time, talk, etc. ASA would save a pile, get the same result, if they paid or heavily subsidised the fitting of transponders. If ASA were to run with the sectors providing the approach function, there will be quite a few extra controllers needed, believe me.
I'll repeat, I agree that surveillance in TAS is an idea long overdue, it's a matter of consultation and consideration, and there are other pressing issues.

[Dick Smith]

I introduced mandatory transponders for all aircraft in class E and I have pushed for 25 years to update selected class G terminal airspace to class E. So we get a double safety improvement.

Yet it has'nt happened because you claim it will cost a little more money . How come other developed countries can afford this basic safety issue and not Australia?

The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.

You have forgotten that the Tower and the airline pilots never sited the VFR aircraft. It appeared on the TCAS because it was transponder equipped. In the USA there is no transponder requirement in E below 10,000' over D . So it would not have been an incident. The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear . Are you suggesting radio alerted see and avoid doesn't work? Then how about our 100 or more G airports which use that in the terminal area? If it's not safe why don't you insist on a minimum of class E with mandatory transponder.?

You don't because it's all about resisting change .

[LeadSled]

One result of that gave us CTA steps AO85 at 30 miles. What's wrong with that? Nothing really, just that many times every day of the year, RPT jets have to apply power, waste fuel, and often cause the approach to be above profile, because they are held to AO90 until 30 miles.

Growahead,
Having grown a head, how about putting some facts in said head.

Every jet I have flown, 9000 at 30 track miles to run would be on or below profile.

Any pilot who didn't account for such a step in his aircraft handling, so that power application was not needed to pass 9000 @ 30 is taking money under false pretenses.

As for the rest of your posts, maybe you are an example of what is wrong with ATC in Australia, and a complete inability to believe that it is done far better in a number of countries, of which US is one.

By far better, I mean better separation assurance standards combined with more efficient traffic handling.

Tootle pip!!

[growahead]

Dick,
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.

Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.

I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.

Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.

[Awol57]

Growahead,
Having grown a head, how about putting some facts in said head.

Every jet I have flown, 9000 at 30 track miles to run would be on or below profile.

Any pilot who didn't account for such a step in his aircraft handling, so that power application was not needed to pass 9000 @ 30 is taking money under false pretenses.

As for the rest of your posts, maybe you are an example of what is wrong with ATC in Australia, and a complete inability to believe that it is done far better in a number of countries, of which US is one.

By far better, I mean better separation assurance standards combined with more efficient traffic handling.

Tootle pip!!

What is the definition of a separation assurance standard? I'm all over a separation standard but since everyone does the assurance standard better than us I am curious.

[Dick Smith]

Grow ahead. You don't even know the facts.

I will quote from the ATSB report.

" the 737 crew did not see the Tobago at any time "

So now give me a correct answer now that you know this fundamental point!

[Dick Smith]

And they didn't come close enough to count rivets. All a con. The jet never saw the Tobago and the Tobago pilot said they were never in any risk of a collision. It was a giant con to prevent australia from allocating airspace on a risk based formulae.

[growahead]

Dick,
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.

Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.

I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.

Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.

[growahead]

Dick,
If the report says the 737 crew didn't sight, I'll accept that. However, the captain, in an agitated tone, transmitted that he had half (meaning one side) of the passengers seeing the Tobago. That may or may not be included in the transcript, but take it from me.
If you can't accept that this was a very serious incident, then there is no point talking about it any further, we are universes apart.
The whole concept of allowing light aircraft to transit overhead an airport with frequent jet movements, and not needing to announce, and being completely invisible electronically, is unbelievable. In the states the model worked because there was surveillance.
Oz controllers do a pretty good job with the available resources. A major reason traffic moves better in some overseas countries is because of infrastructure. Pretty every airport I'll flown into in the US, which is reasonable number, has had multiple parallel runways, crossing at that. Places like San Franscisco, where you are on final with two other aircraft next to you, with three lined up on the crossing ready to roar. As you know, we have nothing like that in Oz.
At the end of the day, the traffic, meaning delays also, is determined by the runway availability, something like one a minute. Then we have other pieces such as high speed taxiways, allowing minimum time on the runway.
We also have political issues like curfews. Come on, back in the 727 days, a valid concern. Today, modern jets make more aerodynamic noise, which is very little, on approach, an not that much more on departures. So we have the artificial bottleneck every morning around 6 am as the internationals arrive. Seriously, any train line makes more noise these days, why not put a curfew on trains?
If we had multiple crossing runways in the major airports, it would make a huge difference. But no, it's those overpaid, lazy, leftie controllers deliberately delaying the pilots.
Anyway, you have convinced me that I am an idiot, so you can sit on the top of the sandpile in the playground. It's all yours. Ciao ciao

[yarrayarra]

Growahead: I'm with you. The two biggest waste of time, effort, staffing and money in the history of aviation in OZ have been NAS airspace and SDE. It still astounds me that there is this surveillance and controlled airspace down to 1500ft over Tasmania during the night with only two or three regular week day movements for the whole shift when Canberra airspace, during the same time, is uncontrolled Class G to 8500ft. Now there's security for you over the nation's capital when Joe Lunchbucket can load his aircraft up with fertiliser and fly it to Canberra and plunge it into Government House and nobody would know - or dare I say care!!

[Capn Bloggs]

For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man?
Some really bad stuff! That statement from Dick sums up this whole farcical situation. Dick, you're the one who needs to open your eyes.

[Dick Smith]

Grow. We have many class G airports with RPT jet services and VFR traffic flying through the terminal area without survailance and without transponders. Ballina is an example. Don't even have a Unicom radio operator to report a plane taxiing on the wrong frequency as they all do for safety in the USA.

If we upgrade them to class E we get full Separation of all aircraft in IMC and also mandatory transponder so TCAS will work. But Bloggs is happy with the status quo at these airports because " that's how we did it in the 1950s and nothing must change"

[Dick Smith]

If the VFR aircraft did not have a transponder requirement - say as at Ballinna today- no incident would have been reported as the VFR pilot has always maintained that he had the jet visual and was not going to run into it. That's how alerted see and avoid works all around the world

[le Pingouin]

If we upgrade them to class E we get full Separation of all aircraft in IMC and also mandatory transponder so TCAS will work. But Bloggs is happy with the status quo at these airports because " that's how we did it in the 1950s and nothing must change"But who is going to pay for all the extra controllers and consoles we're going to need, and more fundamentally where the hell are we going to get them from? You never answer these questions.

Stop trotting out the "change resistance" bull**** Dick. You and your mates are the ones so stuck in a rut your ears are clogged with dirt. Show us the money!

[Quoll]

I'm struggling to follow your logic Dick, let me briefly explain

Ballina Area

In the Newspaper and on here you say you want Class E CTA and a Unicom;

In the Newspaper it mentions a possible lowering of the CTA base to 5,000ft (from 8,500ft); What do you want to happen between 5,000ft and the circuit? Installation of radar? Multlat, ADS-B Mandate for IFR and VFR? Cost v's Safety Benefit?

The Unicom. Who would man it and when? What training? Who pays for it, Who insures it (Strict Liability – Not agreeing it is right, just asking)? Will it need things such as recorders for liability, investigation etc? Will it operate on the CTAF frequency? How would you ensure the Unicom did not impede pilot to pilot Comm's that may be of and urgent or critical nature on either CTAF or AREA ATC?

You saidI introduced mandatory transponders for all aircraft in class E and I have pushed for 25 years to update selected class G terminal airspace to class E. So we get a double safety improvement.
Lets assume for argument that Class E over Ballina is put in place down to 700ft
VFR non-transponder aircraft are immediately excluded – OK
VFR transponder equipped aircraft could neglect to turn the transponder on (Unicom won't know, ATC won't know, TCAS RPT won't know – OK
The cost or ATC terminal services would cost extra – OK
I assume from your previous comments regarding the necessity of Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit processes, you will of course support those processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.

In contrast to the Ballina Class G to E debate. It seems a completely different issue to that of the controlled Tasmanian terminal airspace as that is much busier and is currently Class C and D (full ATC control of VFR and IFR traffic).

Tasmanian Airspace

I am struggling with your arguments as things don't add up. You say
The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24413/aair200305235_001.pdf
From 27 November 2003, the airspace in which the 737 and Tobago were operating at the time of the occurrence was classified as Class E airspace (see Appendix B). In the Class C airspace operative prior to 27 November (see Appendix C), both aircraft would have been subject to an ATC airways clearance and would have been separated in accordance with prescribed standards.
Prior to the NAS class E airspace in which this Airprox occurred, The Airspace was Class C which requires an ATC clearance via Radio and Transponder carriage and use, and the aircraft would have been separated (presumably vertically 1,000ft or an amended route) by Air Traffic Control. You say
The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear .
From the ATSB Final
the 737’s cabin crew reported to the pilot in command that passengers saw the aircraft on the left side of the 737. The pilot in command reported that based on the TCAS display, the aircraft passed slightly to the left, and certainly within both 1 NM from the 737 and 200 ft below.

The pilot of the Tobago was monitoring the Launceston and Melbourne Centre ATC frequencies and heard the initial transmission from the crew of the 737 to Launceston ATC. He noted from that transmission that the 737 was inbound to Launceston on the 009 radial of the Launceston VOR and also believed that the 737 had been cleared to track direct to right base runway 32L. As the pilot of the Tobago was tracking via the 007 VOR radial he considered that there would be sufficient lateral spacing with the 737 on the 009 VOR radial at the point where they were likely to pass each other7. He also considered that the lateral distance between them would increase if the 737 was tracking direct to right base rather than tracking inbound on the 009 VOR radial.

The pilot of the Tobago reported that he had selected the aircraft’s navigation, strobe and landing lights ‘ON’. He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. The pilot reported that he flashed the Tobago’s landing lights at the 737 several times, but become concerned when the 737 appeared to turn to the right across the nose of the Tobago. The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend. A review of track and heading information from the 737’s flight data recorder (FDR) did not reveal any indication of a tracking change8 , although there was a minor heading change of 4 degrees.and;
The Tobago pilot subsequently advised ATSB investigators that he was aware that the appearance of cross-tracking was probably an illusion which resulted from the strong wind.and;
ANALYSIS

Throughout this analysis it should be noted that the pilots of the aircraft involved in this incident were operating in accordance with the rules and procedures for operation in Class E airspace associated with the NAS phase 2b, implemented on 27 November 2003. The closing speed of the aircraft was approximately 360 kts. The reason the Tobago passed to the left of the 737 could not be conclusively determined (see footnotes 6 and 7). The investigation found that the aircraft came within such close proximity at about the time of the RA alert provided by the TCAS on board the 737 as to constitute an ‘airprox’ serious incident and the response by the crew to that alert, may have averted a mid-air collision.
I trust you can see the difficulty in reconciling your comments, both in accuracy and context.

I am sure I am not the only reader troubled by the mixing of two very different change agendas. The efficacy of changing G (uncontrolled) to E (half control) in Ballina is a very different thing to changing C (full control) to E (half control) in Tasmania irrespective of the availability of ATC surveillance.

Along the same lines, I can't imagine good outcomes are assisted at all by megaphone diplomacy that invokes responses such as this;

https://newsroom.airservicesaustralia.com/releases/response-to-the-australian-4
We have responded to numerous questions from your journalist on both of these issues over several days. Despite extensive information being provided by Airservices, these articles do not give a fair and balanced perspective, which is contrary to News Limited’s own Code of Conduct.

We ask that you refrain from repeating these inaccurate and misleading claims and publish corrections at the earliest opportunity.
As others have indicated, if change is necessary in Ballina, Tasmania, or elsewhere, then so be it. You will of course support the necessity for open, transparent Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit (and the like) processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.

Regards

Q

[Dick Smith]

So the USA , Canada and many other countries can provide this safer system but not Australia. At the present time we get an ATC service where the risks are minimal but when the risks go up- in the terminal area- pilots have to become their own " ATCs" . Pathetic system at busy non tower airports most would reckon.

How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?

I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.

This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?

And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .

But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.

[advo-cate]

Come on, let Dick place his argument.

I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.

Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.

Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."

Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]

[advo-cate]

Come on, let Dick place his argument.

I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.

Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.

Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."

Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

The AFP seen at most airports in the states are state police dressed in AFP uniforms.
If this is meant to be a reference to Aussie airports, it may have been true a few years ago, but is not now. If you want to get rid of waste in aviation, there is a humdinger. A complete duplication of existing police services. I understand most airports remain "federal" land, but the bureaucracy and infrastructure created to police these little "islands" is astonishing. And the airports are charged by the govt for the service.

[Capt Claret]

the big benefit (not) for any airside police need in HBA is that the local Tassie Police don't have ASIC, don't have airside access, and have to be met by a Duty Manager and escorted to the place of need.

No escort, no police. Not to mention that if, say, the police were busy with a siege of some sort, an aerodrome issue is put down the priority list, and the flight crew & aeroplane can just wait.

[le Pingouin]

So the USA , Canada and many other countries can provide this safer system but not Australia. At the present time we get an ATC service where the risks are minimal but when the risks go up- in the terminal area- pilots have to become their own " ATCs" . Pathetic system at busy non tower airports most would reckon.

How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?

I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.

This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?

And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .

But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.

"Some circumstances", "some claim" - that's a lot of qualifiers Dick. Your problem is because it might be possible with existing resources in some areas some of the time (there's that "some" word again) that it will be possible in all areas all the time with existing resources. Many of them have all or nothing type workloads - you're either bored rigid or can barely keep up.

As to your ludicrous workload claim - you clearly have no idea.

Show us the money! Show us the resource!

[le Pingouin]

Come on, let Dick place his argument.

I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.

Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.

Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."

Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]

Rice bowls? You do realise this is going to increase the number of controllers not decrease them?

Dick has been having his say for a very long time - he makes all manner of ridiculous claims that should not go unchallenged.

Where's the safety case for Dick's proposed changes? Things have moved on since the last time so it needs a new one. Hang on a sec, was there ever one in the first place?

[Dick Smith]

Le Ping. I have never said or implied that the FAA system could be introduced at all time and all places. Quite the opposite.

I reckon we could test one or two locations. We may be pleasantly surprised how well our Aussie en route controllers can perform approach work even without radar like their US counterparts .

[LeadSled]

Folks,
The latest in The Australian.
Tootle pip!!

Airservices Australia fails to follow own safety plan
Airservices Australia’s failure to provide reliable radar coverage to runway level at Hobart airport is an apparent breach of its own target. The airspace safety body has repeatedly dismissed concerns about the lack of reliable radar below 7000 feet at the Hobart and Launceston airports as unjustified.
This is despite warnings from experts that a tragedy is inevitable unless the situation is rectified — and the revelation that Airservices itself intended to provide radar coverage to ground-level at Hobart airport in a 2010 project developed in *response to a wave of earlier safety concerns.
Outlining the goals of a $6 million TASWAM (Tasmania Wide Area Multilateration) radar system in its 2009-10 annual report, Airservices said the project intended to provide radar surveillance “down to the surface at Hobart”.
But the system it actually *delivered cannot be relied upon below 7000 feet — despite the presence in Hobart of mountains and hills — because its coverage at lower levels is deemed inadequate by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
CASA yesterday confirmed that it had refused to approve the system’s use below 7000 feet because the “surveillance coverage below this altitude does not meet the coverage requirements”.
Asked if this was due to Airservices’ failure to provide a sufficient number of ground stations to support full coverage, CASA communications manager Peter Gibson declined to comment and said: “This is a question for Airservices.”
Airservices did not directly answer the question when contacted by The Australian but *insisted the system did work to ground level, despite not being accepted by CASA as sufficiently reliable in Hobart.
According to one air-traffic insider, who posted on the industry chat site pprune.org, Air*services reneged on its promise of reliable radar “down to the surface” to cut costs on the project. “(They) decided to try and save some money on the installation by using fewer ground stations than recommended by the suppliers,” he posted. “You get what you pay for.”
Airservices denied it had failed to deliver its own plans. “Below 7000 feet, aircraft are separated using ‘procedural’ standards (pilots reporting their location), however (they) remain displayed (on the radar system) and can be seen by air traffic controllers in Hobart, Launceston and our Melbourne air traffic control centre,” an Airservices spokesman said.
“The TASWAM was a successful project that delivered on its key objectives in a cost efficient and timely manner.”
But businessman and pilot Dick Smith, a former CASA chairman, told The Australian he believed Airservices had bungled the project by failing to install sufficient ground stations.
It was now trying to “cover-up” its failure, instead of installing more ground stations to satisfy CASA and deliver the long-promised radar coverage to the runway level. “It’s outrageous that $6m would be spent and Tasmanians are still getting a 1930s system — and it’s not safe,” Mr Smith said. “If they’ve got 90 per cent towards putting in a radar system, why not do the other 10 per cent? No one can say that having mountains and bad weather and not using radar is safe. It’s not safe. Luckily, we’ve got away without an accident. It (collision with hills and mountains) is the most common form of serious accident, and the cause of our last serious accident (in 2005) at Lockhart River (Queensland) that killed 15 people.”
Instead of radar to the runway, pilots inform air traffic control of their location below 7000 feet.
Mr Smith said he believed the system would inevitably lead to a disaster in Hobart similar to Lockhart River.
Airservices insists air traffic operations in Tasmania are “safe”. It says the system of pilots reporting their location to air-traffic control below 7000 feet is used at large regional airports, including Broome, Rockhampton, Alice Springs, Karratha, Coffs Harbour and Tamworth.
Mr Smith said few if any of these locations had the combination of mountainous topography and weather conditions of Tasmania. “They put this WAM radar system (in Tasmania) because we had some scares — two near-misses where planes were flying around in cloud — that were quite serious near-accidents,” he said.

[Capn Bloggs]

First sign of desperation...double posting in different threads. Tut tut, totle pip! :}

[LeadSled]

Bloggsie,
Quite deliberate, actually, there seems to be distinct differences in the readers of both threads.
Come to think of it, tell me you are not having conniptions at the statement of the President of AFAP re. supporting Class E
Tootle pip!!

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

This is despite warnings from experts that a tragedy is inevitable

Which experts?

Mr Smith said he believed the system would inevitably lead to a disaster

Ahh, those ones.

Also, hills and mountains have been around a lot longer than aeroplanes, and procedures have been developed to avoid them, but pilots f#cking up the approach and running into said hills (eg Lockhart River) isn't the fault of the system.

[The name is Porter]

I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.

Rice bowl? That's a funny one :D ASA is as busy as a one legged man in an arse kicking competition. They don't need work practices protected, they are a monopoly provider with steady increases of traffic year on year plus major projects. They provide separation in mandated airspace, any more of it and you are creating more work for them. :eek: Charged back to you of course. ;) Apart from the fact that as much as you'll hate to hear it, Australian controllers are probably the most productive considering the size of their sectors and the traffic numbers. :eek: again

[Dick Smith]

Traffic. I don't believe I have ever blamed common pilot errors on " the system".

I simply believe that if we can put procedures in place to help reduce the chance of pilot errors that it's a good idea.

Radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area.

[Capn Bloggs]

Radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area.
Obviously. Only flying in VMC makes operations safer too. I would like radar approach services at all the ports I fly to, but I'm a realist; they're just not necessary. You know, Affordable Safety. You may have plenty of dosh, but you have also been ranting on about costs to industry. My operation certainly doesn't need radar control at most of the places I go to; would you be prepared to pay for the service, assuming of course you have done a cost-benefit analysis to work out how much it will actually be...haven't you?

[Capn Bloggs]

tell me you are not having conniptions at the statement of the President of AFAP re. supporting Class E
Not at all, tittle pop. You see, people are entitled to voicing their opinions, a concept which you seem to have trouble with. I don't agree with him, but I'm not going to have a meltdown about it as I suspect he is an honourable chap who will understand other's positions without sledging them, unlike some around here.

What I am laughing at is your about-face on the AFAP; a few days you intimated they were the worst, most ratbag bunch of rednecks on earth, now you are singing their praises. A Visa moment...priceless! :D

[aroa]

"radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area"

'Terminal' is right.
Wasnt publicised much and only Lockhart and Benalla seem to get a mention but in the recent decades out of Cairns in radar/transponder controlled airspace 2 aircraft flew into hillsides. Que?? Anybody say anything?
Aero Comander into Thorntons Peak. Aztec into Bellenden Kerr.
WTF. !!

[topdrop]

out of Cairns in radar/transponder controlled airspace 2 aircraft flew into hillsidesOne aircraft was VFR and flew up the wrong valley apparently avoiding weather - IFR charts were found in the wreckage, but no VFR charts. The other was IFR category, planned at a level above lsalt, but when airborne asked for a visual level, but nevertheless flew into cloud and then into Thornton's Peak which was in Class G and outside Approach terminal airspace. In both cases, terrain avoidance was a pilot responsibility. Pilot's don't like controllers getting into the cockpit, the same as controllers don't like pilots trying to take over air traffic control.

[aroa]

is...were these two aircraft on the radar screen, never mind the airspace type or altitude ?

And if they were giving a tsp blip with alt. and seen to be off track, too low etc.
why didnt anybody make comment.

And if it had been an ADS B blip...would it have made any difference.?

Just asking.

[Awol57]

I am not a radar controller but if they were visually operating below the LSALT what would you want a controller to say? Remind you every 2 minutes you are below LSALT? The radar screens don't typically have all the terrain marked on them so if the pilot is flying visually what exactly would you like ATC to do in that situation?

[topdrop]

They were on radar.
The VFR aircraft was slightly right of cleared route, but at about 15NM South deviated further to the right. The radar paint disappeared a short time later. Terrain shielding around Cairns is a regular occurrence, especially in this area.
Also, VFR aircraft in Cairns area are often maneuvering due terrain and weather, you can't constantly be checking all is OK.
As for IFR cleared at visual level at pilot request, what are we supposed to do?
Our system does not give terrain alerts for VFR aircraft or for IFR aircraft cleared visually.

[LeadSled]

What I am laughing at is your about-face on the AFAP; a few days you intimated they were the worst, most ratbag bunch of rednecks on earth, now you are singing their praises. A Visa moment...priceless!Bloggsie,
Merely acknowledging a major reversal of policy by AFAP, credit where credit is due. Probably something, with which you have some difficulty. It does represent somewhat of a seachange from the days AFAP members on the east coast refused to fly in E at all, and threatened industrial action against E.

As John Maynard Keynes said: " When the facts change, I change my mind, what, Sir, do you do?"

Tootle pip!!

[Dick Smith]

Do the multilateration stations in Tassie also receive ADSB? If not. Are there any ADSB stations in Tasmanian?

What level does ADSB operate down to at Devonport? Or is there no ADSB coverage at low level in Tasmania ? Surely someone must have this info.

[growahead]

Fifteen seconds on ASA website:

ADS-B services are being implemented in stages during which time surveillance coverage will progressively increase. Currently, the system is supported by more than 60 duplicated ADS-B ground stations nationwide plus 14 ADS-B capable multilateration sites in Tasmania and 16 sites in the Sydney basin. These are now delivering continuous surveillance of aircraft operations high level airspace across western, central and northern Australia where radar coverage does not currently exsist. A further 14 ground stations are being considered to support the needs of airlines, regional and general aviation.

[Capn Bloggs]

Good stuff. While the yanks are gnashing their teeth, we're getting on with it. Lead, follow or get the hell out of the way! :ok:

[Dick Smith]

Do the controllors responsible for traffic information to IFR aircraft at Devonport actually see an ADSB return on their screen in the Melbourne Centre?

If so - to what level AGL?

Has AsA ever released a map of the Multilateration/ ADSB stations in Tassie? I don't think so. Why would this be?

[growahead]

Ten seconds on the ASA website:

ADS-B coverage | Airservices (http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/projects/ads-b/ads-b-coverage/)

The evil empire at ASA, withholding information, secretive.

This is year 5 research effort. I reckon a bit more is expected of Chairman material.

[CaptainMidnight]

Do the multilateration stations in Tassie also receive ADSB? If not. Are there any ADSB stations in Tasmanian?

What level does ADSB operate down to at Devonport? Or is there no ADSB coverage at low level in Tasmania ? Surely someone must have this info. Why don't you ask Airservices?

[LeadSled]

While the yanks are gnashing their teeth, we're getting on with it.

Bloggsie,
You really don't get it, do you. The FAA ADS-B coverage now in place ( have a look on the FAA web site, 600+ ??, I haven't checked recently) gives coverage to low levels, effectively ground level in medium/high density traffic areas, throughout the lower 48.

The reticence of the airlines to spend billions to make the 2020 mandate is quite transparent, nobody has demonstrated to them what the cost/benefit results of spending all this money is going to produce. Hence the ATA lobbying to delay the mandate, they would like to spend their money on something with a return on capital.

Given that shortage of runways is the main generator of traffic bottlenecks in US or Europe (or AU, for that matter), any realised benefits of ADS-B on en-route operations are marginal, at its most optimistic.

That GA in Australia is going to be forced to wear the costs of a far broader ADS-B mandate than US or EU, despite minimal traffic levels, can only be justified in the dictatorial Australian approach, devoid of genuine risk analysis, let alone cost/benefit justification.

If there was a supportable cost/benefit case, AsA and CASA would be shouting it from the rooftops.

Tootle pip!!

[Dick Smith]

Growy. That chart is not clear re Devonport. Does anyone know what the ADSB useable lowest level is at Devonport? . Or doesn't it work at all there?

[CaptainMidnight]

Does anyone know what the ADSB useable lowest level is at Devonport? . Or doesn't it work at all there?

Marge and Sir Angus are waiting to take your call, Dick :)