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typerated
4th Jul 2015, 22:14
I remember reading a long time ago (I can't remember where) the idea that the RAF would have been better fighting WW2 with just combat two types: Spitfires and Mossies.

It is an obviously flawed idea but I am intrigued by the thought of how the bomber campaign would have worked out with just Mossies rather than the heavies.

Very low loss rates for Mossies (at night) would have been attractive.
perhaps we could have maintained a much larger number of aircraft on ops. I assume the tactics would have changed from area bombing as I'd expect they could have bombed from lower altitude.

Anyone have any thoughts on this?

TR

Planet Basher
4th Jul 2015, 22:33
The first problem I see with the Mossie solution is weight of delivery, how many more aircraft would have been needed?

The argument of precision only works with detailed target information which would have required far more detailed intelligence.

Finnpog
4th Jul 2015, 22:38
I could understand the efficiency regarding the Merlins and aircrew - however as others have said, the precision type raids echo more modern mindsets and technologies than existed in WWII.

Perhaps if they had had a BL755 equivalent munition, this may have proved some use over troops and vehicles.

The Mosquito was an effective weapon on Coatal duties as well if I remember correctly, even though it wasn't a Beau.

typerated
4th Jul 2015, 22:48
PB,


I think you would be surprised how much it could carry and how far.


Especially at night when it does not need to use speed as a defence to the same degree.


Bomb load and range compare pretty well with B-17s

air pig
4th Jul 2015, 22:49
TR,

Unfortunately Spitfire did not have the legs of the Packard Merlin powered P51D Mustang so fighter sweeps into Germany would have been difficult before the invasion. The change from 8 machine guns to a mixture of cannons and machine guns was a big step forward. the initial introduction of the FW 190A spurred the development of the Mk9, probably the greatest variant as the Mk 5 had to have clipped wings and cropped superchargers to try to maintain some parity. All in all I believe that the Spitfire was the finest fighter of its generation, but there again I'm biased.

Mosquito's did have the equivalent bomb load of the B17 and the range, just it did not have the capacity to go up to the bomb load on a Lancaster with 12,000 and 22,000lb Tallboy and Grand Slam respectively. The main problem with the Mosquito was it could could not really be deployed in places of heat humidity and believe it or not termites, the Beaufighter served in these places. The speed and agility and as precision low level bomber was unmatched in WW2 and the Luftwaffe even produced a version of the FW 190 in the form of the FW TA152 to try to combat the Mosquito, albeit unsuccessfully. Goering was forever raging about the Mosquito ability to reach Berlin and drop bombs.

For longer range maritime operations, the Sunderland and Liberator came into their own, as the Mosquito could carry out anti-shipping strikes using the Teste modification, but the main aircraft was the Beaufighter and the Beaufort.

All combat aircraft have good and bad points, the Mosquito had range speed and operational height but was a very difficult to land with only one engine and many crew were killed, but when you consider it was a fighter, night fighter, precision bomber, area bomber, pathfinder and anti-shipping strike, then it was a damn fine aircraft, sort of a Tornado F3/GR1/4 today. Combat aircraft is a case of horses for courses and in the words of General Le May 'you can only go to war with what you have on the day.'

Looks as if we are all of the same thoughts up to now, unusual on here.

thing
4th Jul 2015, 23:48
I read an interesting article about the Lanc a while ago. The Lanc would have been about 50 mph faster without any turrets and their associated weight, ammo, drag etc. Plus it would have had two less crew. Someone far cleverer than me (that's everyone then) applied their statistical minds to it and worked out that far less Lancs and crew would have been lost had it been produced sans turrets.

Regarding the Mossie performance it also had a high Vmca at operational take off weights which sadly caught a few crew out, and I believe the Beaufort was an absolute dog of an aircraft all round.

Danny42C
5th Jul 2015, 01:24
air pig,

Your: "Unfortunately Spitfire did not have the legs of the Packard Merlin powered P51D Mustang so fighter sweeps into Germany would have been difficult......"

Perhaps it would be better (for the uninitiated) to point out that both aircraft had almost identical engines (Rolls Merlins 60 series in the Spit IX, of which the Packard Merlin was the US-built version which went into the P-51D); it [as the Mk.266] also powered the post-war Spit XVI, which was no more than a re-engined IX. (One-third of all the 150,000 Merlins built were by Packard) - [Wiki].

The P-51 "had the legs of" the IX simply because it carried so much more fuel, the engine had nothing to do with it. The Spitfire was designed for the defence of Britain: it was never intended to go to Berlin. Consequently, fully loaded, the P-51 was almost 2,000 lbs heavier than the Spit IX. The Mk.V was no match for the FW 190, we had to wait for the M.IX to achieve parity.

"All in all I believe that the Spitfire was the finest fighter of its generation, but there again I'm biased"....Join the club ! Sadly, after doing my OTU on Mk.Is and IIs in '42, I was sent to India, where there were no Spits at the time, and never touched them again until returning to the RAF in '49, after which I flew Mks. XIV, XVI (mostly) and XXII until '51, which was pretty well the end. :{

Danny42C (a Liverpudlian from '21 to '41 !).

Hempy
5th Jul 2015, 03:15
I'm pretty sure the Germans tried to go down the 'tactical only' route. From memory that didn't go too well.

layman
5th Jul 2015, 03:39
While we're playing "what if?" ...

Optional fuselage tank for longer-range Spit?

Lancaster with rear turret, but optional front/mid turrets (needed for LRMP?)

Still need decent transport, communication, training, ground attack, etc aircraft

cheers
layman

typerated
5th Jul 2015, 03:49
Hempy,


I'd suggest you are mistakenly associating strategic with big aeroplanes
and tactical with small ones.

Hempy
5th Jul 2015, 04:11
typerated, not at all. Are you telling me the Germans had a strategic bomber, or that the Mosquito was capable of being one?

typerated
5th Jul 2015, 04:57
That it is more about target choice than airframe.

Bombs from a Mossie on a factory are just as stragetic as from a Lancaster or B-17

typerated
5th Jul 2015, 04:58
and vice versa - Lancasters bombing tanks are just as tactical as Typhoons rocketing them!

Danny42C
5th Jul 2015, 05:21
hempy,

Your #8: "I'm pretty sure the Germans tried to go down the 'tactical only' route".

The Japanese Army command in Burma were similarly blinkered. Although they had a number of the excellent Nakajima "Oscars" (almost unknown now), which were (on paper) at least as good as their better known marine counterparts, the "Zeros", at their disposal, they frittered them away on "hit and run" LL attacks on opportunity targets.

Their main effort was directed against our airfields (most of these were just "kutcha"strips bulldozed out of the paddy-fields). As our aircraft were always well dispersed, they did little damage. Whereas, if they'd have put them up to 10-12,000 over the ground battle areas, and waited for a box of our six VVS to come along, they would have got rich pickings.

Right to the end, this never occurred to them (AFAIK), which was just as well for us. "Why not" was another of the many unsolved mysteries of war.

Danny.

Hempy
5th Jul 2015, 06:41
That it is more about target choice than airframe.

We can agree to disagree to an extent. I understand what you are saying about 'target choice in regards the mission being classified as tactical strike/strategic area etc, but the choice of airframe is completely relevant to the task at hand.

Heavy bombers were used strategically for a reason. They were optimised for the role. They could penetrate heavy enemy ground and air defenses, take a heap of punishment, and still fulfil the mission objectives and get the crews home.

Light bombers/tactical ground attack aircraft were used tactically for 'bombing tanks' etc because they were optimised for that role. Using a Lancaster would have been a complete misallocation of resources and would have produced poorer results.

As would have a Mosquito bombing Dresden.

TBM-Legend
5th Jul 2015, 07:06
No talk about the Mossies that had structural issues in the tropics and the Med.

The late Bill Warterton, RAAF, DFC, flew Mossies in the Med area and told me of several 'coming apart' in the air and he said that put the wind up the crews much more than the enemy...

typerated
5th Jul 2015, 07:41
Hempy,


Yes I disagree - history showed the Mossie is much more survivable getting to a target at night than a Lancaster - faster than the night fighters. They did a certain amount of work at night as well as pathfinding - very successfully.


BTW, Lancasters were very successful bombing tactically in the breakout from Normandy

Wander00
5th Jul 2015, 07:54
Mossies - Light Night Striking Force, 100 (Bomber Support) Group

ShyTorque
5th Jul 2015, 08:09
My late father was based in Aden just after the war and he told me that the glue used to construct Mosquitos was failing out there in the heat.

tornadoken
5th Jul 2015, 08:24
It's a fun what if, but is ahistorical: we now know that, with constant techno-evolution - in kit as much as in the platform - these 2 types remained operationally effective into 1945...but those tasked with applying UK's industrial and financial resources in 1938/39 to Defence did not know that. In June, 1940 what they did know was that too many munitions plants were about to be Heinkel-hammered, that much of the Air Production Programme was, ah, wrong: Westland Whirlwind, Blackburn Botha, Saro Lerwick, everything to be carrier-borne...and that 1936's decision to prioritise investment in Bloody Paralysers had produced exactly nothing.

We were blessed with luck that: Merlin and Hercules came good from shadow sites that were only modestly bombed (all UK Merlin crankshafts came off very few machine tools); and that a force of factory-fresh labour, inexperienced in production of anything, subject mostly to random-batch Inspection, could produce fit kit after walking in bleary-eyed over rubble. That kit was made serviceable by and operated by very young men who could not drive a car, many could not ride a bike. It was kit-in-hand plus motivation that did the business. If only with Hurricane+Halifax, they would probably have done (nearly) as good.

Lima Juliet
5th Jul 2015, 10:39
Tornado F3/GR1/4

Don't forget that Mosquito was the original Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) and probably the best out of Mosquito vs Tornado. You could add GR1B for anti-shipping and GR1A for recce for the British list plus also the German ECR variant for a HARM shooting EW focussed version as well; so its probably a close run thing...IMHO of course :ok:

But then there is the F4 Phantom - bomber, fighter, wild weasel and target drone (one of its better uses! :E)

LJ

Pontius Navigator
5th Jul 2015, 16:43
What that argument overlooks is the Mozzie didn't arrive till 1942 and the Lanc likewise.

If the choice was limited to extant aircraft in 1940, what if the Wimpy or Whirlwind?

PPRuNeUser0211
5th Jul 2015, 18:20
The other thing one has to remember is that we, in the future, have the benefit of hindsight knowing that the axis failed to develop something to counter either of the 2 a/c (mkV/IX vs FW190 not withstanding). At the time the powers that be had no such luxury so it was probably wise to keep all the arrows in one's quiver (so to speak).

As an example, the mossie relied on speed for defence. If that then is the main problem for the axis, and they develop a radar-equipped jet-powered night fighter, then, politely, you're buggered and have nowhere to go. By having a full spectrum of aircraft you give the enemy a variety of problems to counter and something to fall back on yourself.

rolling20
6th Jul 2015, 08:26
I am late on this one and having read through, I can still add my bit.
It has been mentioned before here re the Mosquito being made available in greater quantities.
The biggest issue was that the Mossie was actually built a bit like a 'Cottage Industry'. Piano workshops, coach builders, furniture manufacturers , small carpentry workshops all played their part. There was not sufficient trained 'craftsman' available.
Industry was geared up for heavy bomber production and that was how it was going to remain. Throughout the war it was deemed better to produce what we had in quantity than interfere with production. Two cases in point were the modifications to the Halifax rudder, which HP originally refused to do because it would interfere with production schedules. Secondly a revised Short Stirling was on paper a much better proposition than the Lancaster, but again it was deemed preferable to continue with what we had.
Another view is that even if we had had an all out Mossie force, then the Germans would have adapted their defences and produced faster types to counter it. They already had special versions of the Me410 and nitrous oxide versions of the Ju88 to combat it.

Pontius Navigator
6th Jul 2015, 08:45
By having a full spectrum of aircraft you give the enemy a variety of problems to counter and something to fall back on yourself.
And that was a Russian strength in the Cold War. Never throw anything away.

Rakshasa
6th Jul 2015, 08:50
The Germans did try to develop 4 engine strategic bombers. Fortunately, military production had become a political football by 1942 and their procurement shenanigans make Wokka Mk3 and FRES look positively successful.

See Ju290 and the various "Amerika Bombers".

GeeRam
6th Jul 2015, 08:58
Despite the issues with its structure in the Far East, the Mossie still had a pretty effective combat record.
The early structural failures were found to be a combination of poor mate-up of some structural elemants & poor gluing practices leading to failed glue joints. This was most apparent among Far East aircraft after prolonged outdoor storage. It was also apparent that swelling of the top skin could lead to the securing screws pulling through. Examination of ETO aircraft found a much lower prevalence of joint defects and no skin lifting. Further testing and investigation done in India identified 2 main issues, the wing spar scarf joints and the spar boom joints with the plywood skin and other ply elements, leading to the lifting of the surface plywood skin.
As a result, Mod 638 was adopted which added a spanwise plywood strip to seal the upper surface skin joint along the length of the front spar. Adoption of aluminium dope finish to Far East theatre aircraft was also adopted in 1945 to help.
This improved things greatly, although the combination of heat and water soakage in the tropics causing shrinkage and swelling, did still plague Mossie ops well in the mid 50’s.

Union Jack
6th Jul 2015, 09:21
Right to the end, this never occurred to them (AFAIK), which was just as well for us. - Danny

Their loss, our gain!:ok:

Jack

A and C
6th Jul 2015, 09:49
As Gee Ram says the wooden construction did not stand up well to being left in the open in tropical conditions, recently I looked at a light aircraft was of more or less the same type of construction as the Mossie, after two years outside storage you could put your fist through the main spar as it had the strength of wet cardboard, IMO glue failure was not usually a Mossie problem as it is the wood that seems to fail first when using Aerolite & aerodux glues, glue failure was a common problem with earlier glues that aircraft such as the Magister employed.

The aircraft was a write off but the fuselage is now in service with an air cadet unit as the basis for a flight simulator.

Returning to the subject I think that the only major error during ww2 was the balance between the numbers of Mossies and the four engine types. More Mossies and less four engine aircraft would have reduced the appalling crew loss rate but the four engine types could do jobs that the Mossie could not and so there was a large requirement for these.

Wensleydale
6th Jul 2015, 09:54
"I read an interesting article about the Lanc a while ago. The Lanc would have been about 50 mph faster without any turrets and their associated weight, ammo, drag etc. Plus it would have had two less crew. Someone far cleverer than me (that's everyone then) applied their statistical minds to it and worked out that far less Lancs and crew would have been lost had it been produced sans turrets."

..and this of course was the crew used for the Vulcan (co-pilot replaced the FE and the BA renamed as "radar nav") where speed and height precluded the need for self defence. The problem with "de-arming" the Lanc was that it was felt that the weight saving would not be used for height and speed but to carry extra fuel and weapons load as in the late war "specials". Another thought was to remove the guns/ammunition and just to have look-out positions (akin to the later Shackletons) as good lookout probably saved more aircraft than shooting down an attacker, bearing in mind that the Lanc had .303 MG compared to the night-fighters' 20mm cannon.

Tankertrashnav
6th Jul 2015, 10:00
Re tactical v strategic - the Soviets had a highly effective tactical air force which contributed greatly to the Red Army's relentless Westward progress in the last year of the war. The downside was their almost complete absence of a strategic bombing capability meant they contributed very little to the airborne destruction of German industrial targets, a fact that is glossed over in the standard Russian version of how they won the Great Patriotic War.

Pontius Navigator
6th Jul 2015, 12:21
Over 13,500 Halifax and Lancaster and 6,700 were built. Now assuming fewer heavies and more light bombers were built what might that mean?

Swop the numbers around. You could have had 1,000 Mozzie raids and presumably less losses. Your heavies might have sustained the same percentage loss and the attrition replacement rate. It would appear there would have been fewer aircrew lost.

However, faced with 1,000 bomber raids by the heavies the German air defence would have been optimised for the greater threat. If that threat had been from faster bombers at greater heights then you could assume a high altitude defence would have been a higher priority.

The defence might have evolved to include rockets, missiles, and more jets and rocket AC.

Hempy
6th Jul 2015, 12:25
TTN, you make a salient point. The Soviets didn't need a strategic bomber force, that job was being provided by the US/UK. The USSR provided the 'boots on the ground.'

It was a team effort. No single nation 'won' WW2.

rolling20
6th Jul 2015, 12:34
It was Freeman Dyson who suggested that turrets be removed. ( I have quoted him several times on here re that subject in the recent past).

As Wensleydale has said no doubt the bombers would have been made to carry more tonnage to the enemy, thus cancelling the advantage that the weight/aerodynamic savings made. Some Bombers were stripped of all their armour plate to carry more tonnage, despite the pleas of the crews. It must be remembered that 'Tonnage ladders' were published and it was a competition between Squadrons/Groups to see who could deliver the most. I daresay many a senior promotion was won on that data and one wonders at what cost to aircrew lives?

Bomber doctrine ment that gunners and turrets would not be removed, as it was of great psychological value. Later in the war Dysons team interviewed evaders to get an idea of how they were shot down. The information they got was of limited value, they never saw a fighter, just a burst of cannon fire, then the bomber on fire around them. They had not realised that the bomber was a victim of Schrage Musik.

Wensleydale
6th Jul 2015, 12:54
There was also debate leading to different tactics between 1 and 5 Groups....I don't remember which group did which, but one of the groups used a greater bomb load and fewer aircraft to get the tasked weight of explosives onto target. The argument was that although you lost a higher percentage of aircraft because of their reduced manoeuvrability due to increased weight, there were less aircraft to attack and therefore number of aircraft/lives lost on each target was actually less. This did not help the crews of course, because they still had to fly their 30 Ops to complete a tour and the percentages of loss were higher on each of their missions - its just that because a tour took longer, statistically they lived longer before being shot down.

Pontius Navigator
6th Jul 2015, 13:19
While a 10% attrition would be 10 losses per 100 and 100 per thousand, it was never that simple.

Defence saturation reduces the number of potential successful attacks so the loss rate reduces as numbers increase, admittedly the collision risk increases.

On the Halifax/Lancaster argument, it was said that it was easier to bail out from a Halifax.

rolling20
6th Jul 2015, 14:04
Pontius, Freeman Dyson again. He and members of his team (Mike O'Loughlin) found that the Lancaster main escape hatch was 2 inches smaller than the Halifax. This he estimated cost 10,000 lives! They tried to get Bomber Command to address the issue, but the war was practically over by the time they did. He came to the conclusion Bomber Command just didn't care. (Although Harris did try to implement changes, I guess it comes back to what I mentioned earlier Officialdoms reticence to interrupt production)
The Halifax was a lot sturdier in construction. The Lancaster had a tendency to break up in flight, one of the reasons why 68% of Lancaster losses had no survivors. 25% of shot down Halifax crews survived, compared with 15% of Lancasters.

Tankertrashnav
6th Jul 2015, 15:59
Quite correct Hempy. But having been to Russia and attended lectures on the Great Patriotic War, a little recognition of the allied efforts wouldnt come amiss. When I asked a history lecturer who had just given us the party line on the heroic actions of the Red Army what she thought of US/ British/Commonwealth contribution in the West I was basically blanked. Mind you, maybe she didn't understand my Russian!

megan
6th Jul 2015, 16:08
For Danny especially, and all the other Spit lovers That's everybody, right?

SPITFIRE P9374 (http://www.christies.com/spitfire/interactive/index.html?cid=EM_EML541010chr)

seafire6b
6th Jul 2015, 16:41
Thanks megan, that's a great clip from Christie's, including lovely air-to-air footage and with some interesting background info. Unfortunately however, my credit card's busy on 9th July, so I'll be unable to attend the auction!

Pontius Navigator
6th Jul 2015, 17:12
On striping down and streamlining, how about the Wellington?


Two interesting versions were then developed, the Marks V and VI. Both were intended for high-altitude operations and had a completely redesigned forward fuselage with a pressurised compartment for the crew and small bubble canopy for the pilot. Both versions had engines fitted with superchargers (Hercules' and Merlins) to provide the additional performance required to achieve the higher altitudes, but neither was flown operationally, although a pair of Wellington VIs did join No 109 Squadron for a short time.
IIRC a Wellington achieved an altitude of 42,000ft. It wouldn't have been very fast but it would have made the Luftwaffe' s eyes water.

Innominate
6th Jul 2015, 18:55
Given that an all-Mosquito bomber fleet would have required more aircraft to deliver the same tonnage, that would mean training more pilots. Could we have produced enough of the right standard?

Prospective aircrew were streamed PNB (Pilot, Navigator or Bomb Aimer) or Wireless Operator/Air Gunner - some of the Bomb Aimers would have been capable of qualifying as pilots (it was their secondary duty in the event of the pilot being incapacitated) but was the available pool of talent sufficient to provide enough pilots?

Danny42C
6th Jul 2015, 18:59
layman,
Your #9: "Optional fuselage tank for longer-range Spit?......"

Ans:

[from The Aviationist (27 May 2015) ...]

"....Of course, the Spitfire was outfitted with quite a range of sizes of 'Slipper Tanks'. These were really only a glorified Ferry Tank, but could be dropped in extremis. They slowed the a/c and had to be dropped for any combat..."

[authority misplaced]

"The Spitfire XIV is a short range medium-high altitude fighter, armed with 2 x 20 mm cannon and 4 x .303 Browning guns in the wings. It is fitted with a Griffon 65 engine of approximately 2,000 h.p. Pick-up points are provided for carrying of 30 gallon, 45 gallon or 90 gallon drop tanks".

Cheers, Danny.

CoffmanStarter
6th Jul 2015, 19:33
Just to add to Megan's link ... More cracking pics of Spitfire Mk1 P9374 during her recent installation outside the Treasury in London :ok:

Spitfire 1/P9374 in London ~ 02Jul15 ? FighterControl ? Home to the Military Aviation Enthusiast (http://www.fightercontrol.co.uk/forum/viewtopic.php?f=18&p=732049)

Image Credit : Brian A Marshall

Superb pictures :D

Danny42C
6th Jul 2015, 20:05
CS,

Lovely pics ! Minor cavil: jemmy and terry clips which held it not on door.

Plus factor: one of the few early Spitfire pics which clearly show the little "u/c down and locked" finger sticking up on the wing panels both sides a foot or two out from fuselage.

Fantastic restoration job, looks better than new !

Now where can I lay my hands on £1.5 to £2m in a hurry ? (reckon I could still get it off the ground - putting it back might be more problematical, but would have a lot of fun in between !)

Danny.

Pontius Navigator
6th Jul 2015, 21:01
Innominate, what you say would be true for a steady state peacetime force, for example the Typhoon force requires half the number of aircrew compared to the Tornado force (simplistically).

Now assume 1500 Mosquitoes and 500 heavies or 500 Mosquitoes and 1000 heavies.

Now assume monthly attrition of 5% and 10% respectively.

In the first case you would lose 125 pilots. In the second you would lose the same.

Now consider engines. First would lose 350 engines compared with 450 in the latter.

Clearly in this simple scenario the Light bomber force is much more economical in aircrew and engine attrition and neutral for pilots. I would submit though that it would not have been an impossible force structure.

Danny42C
7th Jul 2015, 00:01
TBM-Legend,

Your #16: "The late Bill Warterton, RAAF, DFC, flew Mossies in the Med area and told me of several 'coming apart' in the air and he said that put the wind up the crews much more than the enemy..."

Didn't know that this trouble went further than India/Burma. Frightened us, too and killed a few - including (ca May 1944), the C.O. of one of the new Squadrons. :eek:

D.

megan
7th Jul 2015, 03:27
Minor cavil: jemmy and terry clips which held it not on door.The notes for the IIA and IIB (July 1940) contain the following statement, "On aeroplanes not fitted with a jettison type hood, a crowbar is provided to assist in jettisoning the hood". Presumably the Mk. I would be the same. ie Not all Spits had a jemmy fitted.

Wetstart Dryrun
7th Jul 2015, 14:37
...Airfix would never have happened.

wets

Danny42C
7th Jul 2015, 15:17
megan,

You're never too old to learn ! Obvious, really - they might nick the jemmy, but they'd have to break off the clips.

Thanks, Danny.

Mechta
7th Jul 2015, 23:19
Rolling 20 wrote:

Bomber doctrine ment that gunners and turrets would not be removed, as it was of great psychological value. Later in the war Dysons team interviewed evaders to get an idea of how they were shot down. The information they got was of limited value, they never saw a fighter, just a burst of cannon fire, then the bomber on fire around them. They had not realised that the bomber was a victim of Schrage Musik.

Does anyone know at what date the Allies positively identified what 'Schrage Musik' was, and did they come up with any tactics to counter the nightfighters so equipped?

MAINJAFAD
8th Jul 2015, 01:35
Not before the later half of 1944, that for sure as a JU-88 night-fighter landed by mistake at Woodbridge in July of that year and nothing in the intelligence report on the aircraft mentioned any thing about it (The aircraft wasn't fitted with it, but was fitted with the window (Chaff) resistant SN-2 Radar and the Flensburg homering system that allowed the aircraft to home on aircraft using the Monica tail warning Radar. The only active defensive measure would have been some form of ventral turret, which was fitted to some versions of the Lancaster and Halifax, but suffered from poor coverage and a very small field of view for the gunner. Ball turret was not an option as most of the bombers had the H2S scanner located in the only place it could have been put. The role of the gunners in the heavy bombers were just not to engage enemy fighters but also to give warning of their approach so that the pilot could initiate evasive maneuvers like the Corkscrew which was designed to take the bomber outside of the fixed field of view of the radar in the German Night fighters and was quite effective according to an article about gun turrets in RAF aircraft by Jeef Jefford in the RAF Historical Society Journal No. 45. In fact the said article covers most of the pros and cons of the turrets fitted all RAF aircraft from WWI through to the 1950s and is well worth a read.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F1792791_5056_A318_A8F14492D41C7406.pdf

rolling20
8th Jul 2015, 07:56
Ventral turrets had been part of the equipment of pre war Wellingtons and Whitleys. They were rarely used as they affected performance.

Schrage Musik was first used on the Peenemunde Raid 17/18th Aug 43. There are reports in 1943 of crews claiming that they were being stalked from below by nightfighters. Analysis of damage done to bombers also revealed attack from below. (these attacks were usually fatal, so one wonders how many there were to analyse). As usual Bomber Command was slow to react. It has a history throughout the campaign of ignoring threats that came its way.
It was mainly the Canadians who continued with ventral defence , but at what benefit we have no real record of. Each Squadron tended to do its own thing, the addition of a downward firing machine gun, being fitted 'unofficially'.

Wensleydale
8th Jul 2015, 08:25
Counter to Schrage Musik...


467 Sqn at Waddington experimented with a .50 calibre under gun in Mid 1944. The gun was fitted into a ball mount similar to that in a tank, and a panel was removed in the floor of the Lancaster to give the gunner visibility. The installation was not a success however, and quite a few "under-gunners" listed in the ORB were killed as the No 8 in the crew. Amongst them was a high proportion of Squadron Gunnery Leaders who were carrying out the experiment. I believe that the practice ceased in Autumn 1944 (but don't quote me on that).


The Avro Manchester was originally fitted with a ventral turret, but this was deemed ineffective and was not manned after the early few operations. The turret was eventually removed to save weight - eventually to be replaced by a dorsal turret (similar to that in the Stirling) later in 1941. The prototype Lancaster, and some of the early production models, were also fitted with a ventral turret in addition to the dorsal - this fit did not last long into the war and the ventral turret was soon removed - weight being reserved for bombs and fuel. The photograph shows the second Lancaster prototype with its ventral turret.


http://static.thisdayinaviation.com/wp-content/uploads/tdia//2013/01/Avro-Lancaster-BT308-prototype.jpg

TorqueOfTheDevil
8th Jul 2015, 11:40
What everyone apart from air pig has missed is that the RAF Command which did the most to prevent defeat and win the war was Coastal. Neither Spitfire nor Mosquito, fine as they were at their other roles, could have provided the range or endurance to cover the Atlantic Gap. The introduction of the true long-range aircraft (primarily Sunderland, Liberator, Catalina) turned the tables - in two months - in the Battle of the Atlantic.


Bomb load and range compare pretty well with B-17s


Well of course it does - the B-17 was meant to a twin-engined bomber. It's just that Boeing decided to hang four engines on it

I'm pretty sure the Germans tried to go down the 'tactical only' route. From memory that didn't go too well.


Quite the opposite - it went very well indeed until the Germans declared war on the two most powerful nations on Earth! At which point no amount of heavy bombers (or anything else) would have saved them.

The Germans did try to develop 4 engine strategic bombers. Fortunately, military production had become a political football by 1942 and their procurement shenanigans make Wokka Mk3 and FRES look positively successful.

See Ju290 and the various "Amerika Bombers".


Much more so the Heinkel He 177, of which more than 1000 were built and (eventually) entered large-scale service. Luckily the aircraft's usefulness was severely limited by the various teething troubles and then, by the time these were sorted out, the lack of fuel.

rolling20
8th Jul 2015, 12:28
What everyone apart from air pig has missed is that the RAF Command which did the most to prevent defeat and win the war was Coastal. Neither Spitfire nor Mosquito, fine as they were at their other roles, could have provided the range or endurance to cover the Atlantic Gap. The introduction of the true long-range aircraft (primarily Sunderland, Liberator, Catalina) turned the tables - in two months - in the Battle of the Atlantic.


I think that is over simplifying it a bit.
At the start of the war Coastal couldn't even defend home based convoys, that job was given to Fighter Command.
As the war progressed, the Convoy system improved with American help, technology got better, aircraft launched from merchantman, long range Liberators plugged the gap and intelligence in the form of the captured Enigma machine all played their part.
As Bomber Command crews would tell you re bombing of U Boat yards: 'prevention is better that cure!'

TorqueOfTheDevil
8th Jul 2015, 15:59
I think that is over simplifying it a bit.


True!

At the start of the war Coastal couldn't even defend home based convoys, that job was given to Fighter Command.


At the start of the war, Bomber couldn't attack Germany without losing half the aircraft, so the task was stopped.

As the war progressed, the Convoy system improved with American help, technology got better, aircraft launched from merchantman, long range Liberators plugged the gap and intelligence in the form of the captured Enigma machine all played their part.


All valid - but I don't see much mention of Spitfires or Mosquitoes!


As Bomber Command crews would tell you re bombing of U Boat yards: 'prevention is better that [sic] cure!'


Again, very true, but more U-boats were sunk at sea by Coastal than in their pens by Bomber Command.

Wensleydale
8th Jul 2015, 16:44
In early 1942, there was much argument between the Admiralty who wanted the new 4 engine heavies for Coastal and the U-boat war, and Harris who wanted his 4,000 strong Bomber force to attack Germany. Churchill favoured Harris as the greater task and therefore the majority of the heavies went to Bomber Command (although only to maintain a 1,000 bomber force). The upshot was the Augsburg raid on 17th April 42, when 12 Lancasters attacked the MAN U-boat engine factory in daylight in order to pacify the Admiralty. Despite being attacked by a squadron of BF-109s early in the transit over France, leading to the loss of 4 of the 6 Lancasters from the 44 Sqn formation, S/L John Nettleton elected to continue with the raid even though he was under instructions that he could return if he lost one of a vic of 3 aircraft. Continuing for a further 3 hours in daylight (Augsburg is near Munich), knowing that the Germans were aware of their existence, he attacked Augsburg at dusk: his wingman, John Garwell, was shot down by flak over the target leaving Nettleton's aircraft as the sole surviving Waddington aircraft. Of such things, Victoria Crosses are awarded. The physical results of the raid were small - politically they were huge.

rolling20
8th Jul 2015, 19:00
Torque, Bomber Commands early loses were against German naval ships, bombing of the German mainland was forbidden.
Not sure what you are referring to re Spitfire and Mosquito.
If you read my last post I state Yards,not pens. As Wensleydale mentions the Augsburg raid, a substantial part of Bomber Commands war was directed at the industries associated with Uboat production and the prevention of their construction.

TorqueOfTheDevil
10th Jul 2015, 07:45
Bomber Commands early loses were against German naval ships, bombing of the German mainland was forbidden.


Indeed - if bombing German ships proved so costly, bombing Germany itself would probably have been at least as costly if not worse.


Not sure what you are referring to re Spitfire and Mosquito.


The whole premise of this thread is "Would the RAF have been better off fighting WWII with only these two types instead of the plethora of types which were actually employed?". My point is that neither of these types was remotely suitable for clsing the Atlantic Gap therefore the answer has to be no.

If you read my last post I state Yards,not pens. As Wensleydale mentions the Augsburg raid, a substantial part of Bomber Commands war was directed at the industries associated with Uboat production and the prevention of their construction.

My mistake - but I can't agree with 'substantial' as an accurate description of less than 5% of Bomber Command's effort.

Wander00
10th Jul 2015, 08:42
Quite a few graves and memorials round this part of the world of crews that died bombing the U-boat pens at La Rochelle and St Nazaire

rolling20
10th Jul 2015, 08:57
Torque, not too sure where you get your facts from.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production.

TorqueOfTheDevil
10th Jul 2015, 10:19
Torque, not too sure where you get your facts from.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production.


I think that, in a strange way, we actually agree on much of this, and it's important to bear in mind that this whole thread is merely fantasy/speculation in any case!


Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.


I'm well aware of the leaflet raids and the early attempts to bomb Germany at night - which were a direct result of the heavy losses sustained in the early months of the war on daylight forays.

Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.

Well exactly! Perhaps one has to assume, for the fantasy nature of the thread, that both types would have been available from the start of the war.


The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production


I would observe that the Battle of the Atlantic absorbed a great deal of time and effort (and sacrifice) from both sides right up to the end of the war. But would you agree that, when we did start to prevail in the spring of 1943, what caused the U-boat offensive to falter at that crucial point was not lack of boats arriving from the factories, but rather the ability of Allied aircraft and ships to sink/restrict the effectiveness of the U-boats which were already at sea?

Danny42C
11th Jul 2015, 00:19
Don't forget the marvellous input of Ultra (Bletchley Park). I believe the U-boat commanders were required to pass a Position Report to the Kriegsmarine every 24 hours.

Once the codebreakers had broken into the German Naval "Enigma", this enormously simplified our task in the Battle of the Atlantic.

D.

air pig
11th Jul 2015, 01:10
tDon't forget the marvellous input of Ultra (Bletchley Park). I believe the U-boat commanders were required to pass a Position Report to the Kriegsmarine every 24 hours.

Once the codebreakers had broken into the German Naval "Enigma", this enormously simplified our task in the Battle of the Atlantic.


Breaking Triton had a big impact but you have to figure in convoys and long range air support in that. There was a time lag in decrypting ultra material. As the war progressed the U-boatwaffe started to loose its most experienced commanders.

Union Jack
11th Jul 2015, 11:03
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production. - Rolling20

The turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic is generally regarded as being 23 May 1943, the date on which Admiral Dönitz is believed to have realised that he was obliged to alter his U-boat strategy, coinciding as it did with the arrival in the Mersey of Convoy HX238 from New York and Halifax NS the same week, having incurred fewer losses than almost any other in the previous year.

The anniversary is celebrated in great style in Liverpool every year - as I know to my cost! :ok:

Jack

Danny42C
12th Jul 2015, 01:20
Jack,

Although we won the Battles of the Atlantic in both WWI and WWII, it still true that a submarine blockade is the means by which this country can be brought to its knees in a future war.

It was our good fortune that both the Kaiser and Hitler were land animals, neither appreciated that, if they had only put sufficient resources into their U-boat campaigns, they would have had a good chance of cutting the lifeline which supplied us with food, raw materials and war supplies. As we cannot ourselves produce the food the country needs, all an enemy needs to do then is to wait until we are starved into submission.

Even as it was, Dönitz wasn't doing too badly. Churchill said that this was always his worst worry of the war. Admittedly "Ultra" information was delayed by the time needed by the cryptographers and translators of Bletchley Park, but there were times when Churchill had on his desk a transcript of Hitler's orders to some General in the field before the recipient himself had seen them.

This was particularly useful in the U-boat war: it enabled the Admiralty to re-route convoys away from the "Wolf Packs"; and on occasion, when a U-boat "mother ship" had been located, it was arranged for a recce Catalina to "spot" it (purely by "chance", of course) so that the subsequent fatal attack would be obviously the result of the "sighting". The "chicks", deprived of fuel, stores and torpedo replacements, had no choice but to cut their sorties short and return to port.

Danny.

Pontius Navigator
12th Jul 2015, 08:56
Anyway, other than the Spit and Mossie, what other aircraft were essential?

We have mentioned the Lanc and Sunderland, was the Halifax essential or should more Lancs have been built?

What of the Wellington? It lasted the war and beyond.

Hurricane and Beaufighter, should we have discarded these as tank busters? And Typoon and Tempest?

Hempy
12th Jul 2015, 10:02
The BoB would never have been won without the Hurricane. As for the war in general? From a UK perspective, the Lancaster.

my 2 bobs worth anyway.

typerated
12th Jul 2015, 11:42
The Hurricane design was flawed with thick wings - Farnborough gave Sydney Camm incorrect data.
I believe the Miles aircraft -which was cheaper and quicker to build outperformed the Hurricane.

Pontius Navigator
12th Jul 2015, 13:30
Apart from getting more kills than the Spitfire, what were the two force numbers kills per aircraft?

The aircraft had a better track width than the Spit. 2x40 mm cannon was something else.

Danny42C
12th Jul 2015, 23:50
typerated,

Your #70 made me gasp:

"I believe the Miles aircraft - which was cheaper and quicker to build outperformed the Hurricane"

(You can't mean the poor old Master, which was a nice, comfortable ride, and that was about all ???). Never heard of anything else at the time ('42), but Wiki was ready with the answer:

Miles M-20 ! (Eh?),

"......aerodynamically advanced for their time; the M.20 emergency production fighter prototype outperformed contemporary Hawker Hurricanes, despite having fixed landing gear......"

".....In the event, due to dispersal of manufacturing, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Spitfire and Hurricane factories did not seriously affect production, and so the M.20 proved unneessary and was cancelled".

Ounce of demonsration, etc


M-20


https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/49/Miles_M.20.jpg/300px-Miles_M.20.jpg (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Miles_M.20.jpg)Second prototype https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3e/IWM-COL198-Master.jpg/300px-IWM-COL198-Master.jpg (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:IWM-COL198-Master.jpg)Miles M.27 Master III (W8667)




https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/Hurricane_mk1_r4118_fairford_arp.jpg/300px-Hurricane_mk1_r4118_fairford_arp.jpg (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hurricane_mk1_r4118_fairford_arp.jpg)Hurricane Mk I (R4118), which fought in the Battle of Britain

PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS


MILES M-20



Maximum speed: 333 mph (290 knots, 536 km/h)
Range: 920 mi (800 nmi, 1,481 km)
Service ceiling: 32,800 ft (10,000 m)
Climb to 20,000 ft (6,100 m): 9 min 36 s
(2221 ft/min)

Armament
Guns: 8 × .303 inch Browning machine guns



MILES MASTER



Maximum speed: 242 mph (389 km/h)
at 6,000 ft (1,830 m)
Range: 393 mi (342 nmi, 632 km)
Service ceiling: 25,100 ft (7,650 m)
Armament

Guns: 1 × .303 in Vickers K machine gun




HURRICANE I


Max Speed: 328 mph (529km/h)
at 20,000 ft (6,095m)
Armament: Eight .303 in Browning
machine guns mounted in wings


HURRICANE IIC


Maximum speed: 340 mph (547 km/h)
at 21,000 ft (6,400 m) [N 12]
Range: 600 mi (965 km)
Service ceiling: 36,000 ft (10,970 m)
Rate of climb: 2,780 ft/min (14.1 m/s
Wing loading: 29.8 lb/ft² (121.9 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.15 hp/lb (0.25 kW/kg)

Armament

Guns: 4 × 20 mm (.79 in)
Hispano Mk II cannon
Bombs: 2 × 250 or 500 lb (
110 or 230 kg) bombs



Note: The Master is shown with the instructor's section of the "glasshouse" swung forward, and his seat raised, to see over his pupil's head.


Danny42C.

typerated
13th Jul 2015, 06:33
Yes that's the one Danny!

megan
13th Jul 2015, 14:19
The Hurricane design was flawed with thick wings - Farnborough gave Sydney Camm incorrect datatyperated, can you elaborate or point to a source? Interested because have not seen the inference prior. Always something interesting to be found.

TorqueOfTheDevil
13th Jul 2015, 16:41
what other aircraft were essential?

We have mentioned the Lanc and Sunderland, was the Halifax essential or should more Lancs have been built?



Liberator/Catalina (Sunderland alone unable to counter U-boats in mid-Atlantic).

Pontius Navigator
13th Jul 2015, 18:33
TotD, I excepted these as, like the Kittihawk, Hudson, Mustang, Mitchell, Maraurder, B17, these were not part of British aircraft production.

Of course there was also the Merlin engine, Beaufighter and Mosquito that went the other way.

Danny42C
13th Jul 2015, 23:17
Ain't hindsight a wonderful thing !

D.

megan
14th Jul 2015, 02:31
what other aircraft were essential?How about that other British inspired aircraft, the P-51. Albeit, built in the US, it was designed at the behest of the British, and they paid with hard coin for its development and production, until lend lease cut in. It was because of Rolls Royce test pilot, Ronnie Harker, that the Merlin was introduced, and the Merlin version was seen as a counter to the FW 190. Consideration was even given to setting up a production line in Britain. And it was the sole aircraft to perform the long range escort, both in Europe and the B-29 raids on Japan. An essential aircraft? In my books, the best, and all thanks to the British. Without them the aircraft would not have existed, and I wonder what course the war may have taken without it.

Danny42C
14th Jul 2015, 04:11
megan,

And we chanted:

"And now that we're at it, let us never forget
That Radar was British, and so was the Jet!"

(not entirely true, but near enough). :ok:

D.

wonderboysteve
14th Jul 2015, 12:50
I believe there is a reference to the Hurricane's overly thick wing design in:

The United Kingdom's contributions to the development of aeronautics Part 3.The development of the streamlined monoplane (the 1920s-1940s)

Ackroyd, J. A. D. in AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL; 106; 217-268, AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL by ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY; 2002

Although I don't have a working link......

Hempy
14th Jul 2015, 13:57
That 'overly thick wing' also made the Hurricane an excellent gun platform, and easily adaptable to cannons and it's 'tank busting' role later in the war. It wasn't so bad.

megan
14th Jul 2015, 16:29
Thanks for the pointer wonderboysteve, found a piece in an Ackroyd paper on Spitfire wing design.

After the unsatisfactory drag characteristics of the earlier Type 224 had become evident, Supermarine’s urgent need with the Spitfire design became drag reduction. As Shenstone’s comments imply, part of the problem was thought to lie in the thick aerofoil section used on that aircraft - 18% thickness-chord ratio at the root - and, as he says, “we wanted to improve on that”. Earlier experience with the S.6 and S.6B Schneider Trophy floatplanes using RAF 27 aerofoil sections of 10% thickness-chord ratio had been far happier. Consequently, Supermarine became inclined to ignore official advice that thickness-chord ratios of up to 20% showed no appreciable increases in drag. Cole is scathing on this advice but the situation deserves rather more explanation.

After the First World War it was realised that a major problem in wind tunnel testing lay in achieving Reynolds numbers more representative of those at full-scale in flight. In a move to deal with this problem, the NPL built a large Compressed Air Tunnel which came into operation in 1932. The results obtained from this facility provided the basis of the above advice on drag. Unfortunately, what was not realised at the time was that this tunnel possessed a high level of turbulence which obscured the actual drag decrease with reducing thickness-chord ratio.

Sydney Camm at Hawker followed the official advice in selecting relatively high thickness-chord ratios for the Hurricane (19% at the root to 12% at the tip) and Typhoon and later passed the scathing comment that he had been “conned by the aerodynamists [sic]” when he learned the truth

typerated
14th Jul 2015, 19:29
Megan,


There is a bit of a fuller account in "Sydney Camm and the Hurricane"
published by Airlife , written by John Fazard- It's a very good book BTW


Think wing and good gun platform - why would there be a correlation? A good gun platform would be more about stability and control sensitivity I'd have thought.


I think you would have to have rose tinted specs to suggest that the Hurricane was anything but outclassed and obsolete as a fighter from the start of the war. it's successes a testament to skilled pilots rather than it's capability as a useful mount. It was (just) good enough to do a job in 1940 - I think it's reputation has been enhanced by being on the winning side.


Putting cannons in them made them even slower - I also understand they had shocking loss rates while employed in A-G.

Hempy
15th Jul 2015, 03:48
Think wing and good gun platform - why would there be a correlation? A good gun platform would be more about stability and control sensitivity I'd have thought.

Every pilot who flew the Hurricane said it was an excellent gun platform, not least because of its rock-steady aircraft stability. In addition, the Hurricane's sturdy wings provided solid bracing for the guns which were mounted in twin batteries of four, closely grouped together in each wing, as close in to the fuselage as they could be placed to clear the propeller. Because of its thin wing, the Spitfire's armament of machine guns had to be spread out along the wing, with the outboard gun a third of the way in from the wingtip, then a group of two and then an inboard gun on each side. The wings would flex in turbulence or when pulling G and so the guns could be slightly out of line from their ground harmonisation when they were fired, making them less accurate especially over range. Although there is no difference in the armament between the Battle of Britain Hurricanes and Spitfires, the Hurricane was clearly the better gun platform.

Issue 6 - Battle of Britain: Spitfire or Hurricane - Aviation Classics Magazine (http://www.aviationclassics.co.uk/news/issue-6-battle-of-britain-spitfire-or-hurricane)

During and following the five-day El Alamein artillery barrage that commenced on the night of 23 October 1942, six squadrons of Hurricanes, including the 40 mm cannon-armed Hurricane Mk.IID version, claimed to have destroyed 39 tanks, 212 lorries and armoured troop-carriers, 26 bowsers, 42 guns, 200 various other vehicles and four small fuel and ammunition dumps, flying 842 sorties with the loss of 11 pilots. Whilst performing in a ground support role, Hurricanes based at RAF Castel Benito, Tripoli, knocked out six tanks, 13 armoured vehicles, 10 lorries, five half-tracks, a gun and trailer, and a wireless van on 10 March 1943, with no losses to themselves.

At ease
15th Jul 2015, 05:37
Megan says:

And it(P51) was the sole aircraft to perform the long range escort, both in Europe and the B-29 raids on Japan.You are forgetting the P38 Lightning and various marks of the P47D Thunderbolt in Europe, and the P47N very long range version in the Pacific.

This later aircraft, designed for the B29 escort role in the Pacific, was able to operate from Saipan in the Marianas against the home islands before the P51 was operating in the same capacity from Iwo Jima.

It was the longest ranging single engined fighter of WW2.

TorqueOfTheDevil
15th Jul 2015, 10:32
You are forgetting the P38 Lightning and various marks of the P47D Thunderbolt in Europe, and the P47N very long range version in the Pacific.

This later aircraft, designed for the B29 escort role in the Pacific, was able to operate from Saipan in the Marianas against the home islands before the P51 was operating in the same capacity from Iwo Jima.

It was the longest ranging single engined fighter of WW2.


Neither the P-38 nor the P-47D had the range to escort the bombers anywhere in Europe (hence Megan's comment about 'long range escort'), and the P-47N, impressive though it was, appeared far too late to serve in the European war. The P-51B/C/D became available from the end of 1943, well over a year before the P-47N saw combat. As the P-51s entered service, the P-47s were steadily withdrawn from escort duty leaving the 56th FG as the sole 8th AF operator of the P-47.

megan
15th Jul 2015, 12:46
P47N very long range version in the Pacific.

This later aircraft, designed for the B29 escort role in the PacificI stand to be corrected, but my understanding is that while the 47N was intended for the B-29 escort role in the Pacific, it was a function for which it was rarely used. Predominately they engaged in attacking shipping, and ground targets, such as railways and airfields. The N's I believe were stationed on Ie Shima (Okinawa) and Iwo Jima, and D models in the Marianas. It's a bit difficult to pin down the N's history, the 318th Fighter Group ferried their N's from Oahu to Johnston Island, to Majuro, to Eniwetok, to Saipan, to Ie Shima. They mention carrying some attack mission on Truk during the ferry, and one mission to Marcus Island escorting bombers.