Centaurus
24th Jun 2015, 08:19
On this Forum and in another thread a contributor requested advice on instructing as a career. The replies were well considered and sensible and I am sure the contributor appreciated them. One reply suggested that flying schools with clean maintenance release documents on their aircraft might indicate new aeroplanes and therefore a good mob to work for.
We all know the adage don't judge a book by its cover. The following report to the then BASIS is a instructive example. The aircraft owner at the time of the report was a captain with a reputable Australian domestic airline
From an old CAIR report: Circa 1994
The aircraft was a Piper Navajo engaged on a charter flight. The aircraft was based in Victoria. The maintenance release was squeaky clean of all endorsements and the aircraft had a shiny new paint job on the outside.
It took only 15 minutes to find the following defects seen from a pilot’s point of view but almost one hour to write them down. Starting with:
1. A placard on the pilot’s side-consul states that the aircraft is limited to a maximum landing flap setting of 25 degrees. The Flight Manual has a similar notice with a requirement that 2 knots be added to the flight manual Vref speed for 40 flap when landing with 25 flap. The flap indicator shows a white sector band from up to 15 flap –and nothing else on the gauge to indicate exactly what flap setting in degrees is available beyond 15. When selecting the flap to down, the needle goes beyond 15 by ¾ inch into the unmarked areas and there is no indication if the flap micro-switch stops the flaps (via a limit switch) at 25 or 40. There is no external mark on the wings to indicate current flap position. This is common to many Navajos. In short, the flap indicator is misleading and impossible to comply with the flight manual restriction because there are no markings beyond 15 flap.
2. The rear baggage compartment aft of the rear door has no tie down net. However, the operator has thoughtfully supplied a brightly coloured carpet to throw over any cargo or bags. This rug has eyelets and tape attached to the retaining hooks in the floor. In other words there is no effective restraint.
3. The nose baggage compartment is not equipped with tie down devices or floor restraints. In this compartment are three metal wheel chocks, several empty soft drink bottles, a small metal ladder and various debris. The metal ladder is firmly wedged against thin electrical wiring emanating from behind the instrument panel and disappearing into the nose cone via the sidewall of the front baggage compartment. Everything in the baggage compartment is unrestrained and would float freely in turbulence.
4. Numerous oil leaks are visible through the front of the left engine cowl area with oil running from under the engine nacelle and through to the top surface of the flap area inboard of the engine. The operator is aware of the oil leak but says it is due to over-filling of the oil tank. He directs that that the contents should be 9 quarts maximum to minimize perceived oil loss. Both wheel wells also show signs of excess engine oil leaks.
5. Strong smell of fuel in the fuselage area when the aircraft is stationary. In the immediate vicinity of both cross-feed drains there is wet fuel stains on the fuselage belly with flow patterns extending several inches. The operator was previously advised but no action was taken. The problem of fuel leaks in this area are long-standing. Two wing fuel tank water drains drip fuel at one drop per 30 seconds on to the tarmac.
6. Autopilot when engaged causes very sudden in-flight manoeuvres and has to be hurriedly disengaged. There is no placard indicating an unserviceable autopilot and nothing in the MR The Century 111 autopilot control panel has a missing knob for roll mode – it is just a bare metal rod on which the knob is supposed to be attached. The calibration wheel on the autopilot box has unreadable graduations thus it is not possible to note a specific setting in daytime – worse at night, of course. There is a knob called “Auto Pilot Nav Selector” which can be selected to Nav1, Nav 2 or Off. There is no documentation on the specific use of this section of the autopilot.
The operator’s policy is not to make the system serviceable because he deems it too expensive to rectify. The aircraft flies single pilot IFR with no autopilot. This is apparently legal on passenger charter operations but not on RPT flights. Passengers should be entitled to the same degree of safety regardless of the category of flight. The operator crews RPT flights with two pilots, with the second pilot paying for the right seat under the guise of in command under supervision – but logging the total flight as “in command”. The autopilot has been unserviceable for 9 months and no action taken to rectify the problem. Single pilot IFR/IMC with no auto pilot is not conducive to a safe operation, regardless of the legalities.
7. Normally a green light appears when there is electrical power to the turn-coordinator. The light is inoperative. Next to the u/s light is an empty un-labelled lamp socket.
8. The two position voltage regulator switch is labeled only Main. There is apparently a second position hopefully for the Aux regulator if indeed one is installed. There is no Aux label on the switch assembly.
9. The circuit breaker panel has many obliterated decals or words with one or more letters missing. At night it is difficult to read the decals due grime and dirt or simply non-existent labels. The autopilot circuit breaker was out and easily reset because there is a piece of plastic or broken collar surrounding the circuit breaker shank. Nothing about this in the m/r. If the circuit breaker is inoperative or permanently collared out, then as a protection against circuit breaker resetting it is useless and potentially dangerous fire risk.
10. The green glide slope engaged light is inoperative on press-to-test.
11. There is a decal on the circuit breaker panel which on close scrutiny (impossible at night) says “Turn and Bank Left/Right”. There is however only one turn coordinator – not a Turn and Bank Indicator which is situated on the left instrument panel in front of the left seat pilot. There is no similar instrument in front of the RH seat pilot – only a couple of plugged holes where instruments were once installed.
The circuit breaker marked “Left Turn and Bank”, appears to be a false circuit breaker as it does not pull out and on closer inspection it is merely a black painted knob which looks exactly like a circuit breaker in shape and size. The circuit breaker labeled “RH Turn and Bank” is a real circuit breaker but there is no RH instrument for it to supply power to. One can imagine the confusion in event of electrical smoke or fire when the pseudo circuit breaker is found to be jammed.
11. There is a Stormscope installed. It is well advertised by a decal situated on the fuselage near the entrance door which says “Stormscope equipped.” An identical decal advertising the presence of the Stormscope is situated on the left fuselage sidewall adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. Maybe this is to give an added sense of security to the pilot. However, above the actual instrument is a decal marked Radar. There is also a circuit breaker marked Radar. Only problem is that the aircraft is not equipped with weather radar.
12. There is a set of normal looking rudder pedals for the copilot position. They are identical in size and shape to the pilot’s rudder pedals. However, there are no brakes on the copilot’s pedals. There is no decal warning of this, nothing in the Flight Manual or the Operations Manual and no mention in the maintenance release. Simply, one would not know if the brakes were either not working from the RH side, or if they were not installed.
One endorsement was carried out on this particular aircraft where the instructor was not aware that brakes were not installed on the right hand seat pedals, until after the flight with a student undergoing conversion training. The pilot under training had commented on the heavy nosewheel steering problems, so the instructor took control to “free up” the nosewheel steering by applying alternate foot pressure to each pedal on his side. The brake “pressure” appeared to lock solid on his pedals and the aircraft started to veer off the tarmac towards a nearby obstruction. The instructor quickly told the student to take over control. Later it was discovered that the copilot’s pedals indeed had no braking capability. The aircraft had flown for hundreds of hours and previous pilots had been unaware of the lack of RH seat brakes.
13. There are two engine gauges. Each gauge has an integral oil pressure, oil temperature and CHT sub gauge. In this aircraft the colour coding of the various instruments within the main gauge display do not agree with each other. For example, one oil pressure gauge shows 10 PSI red line limit for the left engine while the right oil pressure gauge shows 25 PSI red line limit. The green normal oil pressure operating range is quite different between the two oil pressure gauges.
The CHT left engine gauge indicates 200F as the lower limit on the needle while the right engine CHT lower limit shows 100F. The varying size of temperature in degrees F scales on the two CHT gauges means that the needle positions are not generally parallel, thus requiring careful scrutiny of the actual readings – rather than a normal scan which looks for similar parallel readings within average temperature parameters. The left oil temperature gauge has no numbers – just a green arc and one red temperature limit mark. The right oil temperature gauge has graduations from 50F to 250F plus – with three colour codes of green, yellow, and red. This means that a normal scan of engine temperatures and pressures in flight is not possible in terms of normal or abnormal needle positions. Instead a close scrutiny of each needle is needed which becomes a problem at night where cockpit directional lighting is poor by even automobile standards.
14. It is impossible to read the Directional Gyro at night because the internal lighting is inoperative. One needs to shine a torch on the instrument or have cat’s eye vision to read compass headings.
15. The upper switch panel over the pilot’s head houses the magneto switches. On the panel is a sign which says “Alternators Press-to-Test”. This refers to alternator test buttons that were presumably once installed. Instead there are two empty holes drilled into the vinyl roof and no buttons to press.
16. Both mixture controls are misaligned. The rear limit (idle cut-off position) actually coincides with a decal marked “Lean” that itself is supposed to indicate typical cruise position of the mixture control when leaned correctly. In other words, if the pilot leaned the mixture levers to the position marked “Lean” both engines would stop. Similarly the full forward rich mixture limit stops one and a half inches from the forward stop. The available movement of the two mixture controls is only slightly more than half of the total quadrant distance between ICO and full rich lever position.
17. There is intolerable noise in the No 1 VHF set and it sounds like a parrot squawking. The No 2 ADF volume control (Bendix) has no decal indicating volume direction. The HF volume control knob is un-marked and the decal obliterated. Similarly the circuit breaker panel has various switches such as landing and taxi light controls. There is no decal showing on/off positions which is confusing, particularly as the alternator field switches lay fore and aft.
18. The metal vertical cover which protects the left engine fire fuel shut-off handles (behind the pilot’s seat) from inadvertent actuation, does a good job indeed. It is tightly jammed and no amount of effort could move it in event of an engine fire - apart from using a set of pliars or a screw driver. The right engine fire fuel handle cover plate is not jammed. It is so loose that it is normally left laying on the cockpit floor.
19. On top of the right engine cowl a crack is evident adjacent to the hinge line of the oil cap cover. The crack is proceeding nicely but there is no stop drilling present.
20. Exposed and unprotected electrical wiring is readily visible coming from behind the left fuselage vinyl wall covering, and running behind the copilot’s seat and leading to the fuel system panel. The wiring is partially secured by masking tape which has peeled away. As the gap between the copilot’s seat and the passenger compartment wooden separation panel is used for maps, brief cases etc, it is easy to snag the wiring.
21. There is an electrically operated passenger seat belt sign attached to a portable wooden bulkhead. The box in which the sign is installed has a thick dark brown plastic cover. The seat belt signs are not visible in daylight, but with much peering one can just see the sign at night. It is quite useless for its task in daylight and only marginally better at night. There is no sign to indicate to passengers that the box displayed to their view is indeed a seat belts fastened device. It is just looks like a dark coloured box with no function.
22. Now here is a real beauty. Above the front right passenger window there is some light coloured masking tape. A closer inspection reveals the faded word EXIT in red but under the masking tape. It would be impossible to read at night in a dim passenger cabin. It is difficult to see in bright daylight. The emergency exit handle is covered by very tough plastic that requires a heavy pull to break in order to get at the handle. Lacerated fingers would occur. The handle assembly is situated in a position between two windows. There is no positive indication which of the two passenger windows is the emergency exit – especially as the small red EXIT sign is covered over with masking tape.
There is a decal which displays the following instruction: Emergency Exit – Lift Latch – Pull pin-Push window out. Which window? So there are two contradictory directions; one says Pull Pin, Lift Latch and the other says Pull handle Down. Very confusing even for the pilot, let alone a passenger at night. There is no doubt that the emergency exit window should be clearly outlined and the decal confusion sorted out.
23. The rear door can be used as an emergency exit. There is no decal indication that it can be used for this purpose. A passenger briefing card is available but the Navajo door opening procedure for the rear exit is complicated. In this aircraft the vital “Press-to-Release” knob which allows the main hatch to be operated that unlocks the exit door, is painted in faded white with what appears to be a faded red touch to it. There is no indication of the importance of that button to release the latch mechanism.
24. There is also a chain and bolt attached to the door area which is supposed to be attached after the door is locked closed, in order to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight. With the chain in place the door can only open an inch or so. There is no mention on the passenger briefing cards of the function of this bolt and chain and no decals or instructions adjacent to the door of the vital need to undo the chain and bolt before attempting to operate the exit mechanism. In other words the whole emergency exit policy in this Navajo is shambles. But all is not yet lost because to balance things up there is a very clearly displayed sign opposite the rear exit which says “Thank you for not smoking”.
25. In front of the copilot position are situated the cockpit heat controls. Next to the levers is a decal marked “Fuel On”. But there is no switch to associate with the decal –just another empty hole where presumably there was once a switch.
26. The fuel tank caps have a red decal stating that 100 octane fuel should be used. However the decal stating fuel tank capacity is missing on all caps.
27. The passenger emergency exit windows are not marked on the outside of the fuselage for ingress into the cabin. There is also no instruction on the outside of the rear door on how to open the door from the outside in event of an emergency.
28. In cruise the No 2 fuel pressure needle shows 3 PSI in excess of the red line limit.
28. The taxi light gives only five metres forward illumination – about the same as the parking lights on a car. In other words useless for obstacle illumination.
29. The right windscreen has numerous small nicks, cracks and crazed areas. Landing at night, runway lights show very diffused patterns through the windscreen and would be impossible to have adequate vision towards the sun.
30. The left oil pressure gauge shows a green band 30 to 60 PSI. The right oil pressure gauge shows a yellow caution band 30-60 PSI – then a green sector. Very confusing.
31. DME inoperative on last leg. Common defect on this aircraft.
32. Both pilot’s sun-visors flop down during take off, and in flight they dangle loosely and apparently have been like this for months.
But all is not lost. On the plus side, the maintenance release for this aircraft is squeaky clean....
We all know the adage don't judge a book by its cover. The following report to the then BASIS is a instructive example. The aircraft owner at the time of the report was a captain with a reputable Australian domestic airline
From an old CAIR report: Circa 1994
The aircraft was a Piper Navajo engaged on a charter flight. The aircraft was based in Victoria. The maintenance release was squeaky clean of all endorsements and the aircraft had a shiny new paint job on the outside.
It took only 15 minutes to find the following defects seen from a pilot’s point of view but almost one hour to write them down. Starting with:
1. A placard on the pilot’s side-consul states that the aircraft is limited to a maximum landing flap setting of 25 degrees. The Flight Manual has a similar notice with a requirement that 2 knots be added to the flight manual Vref speed for 40 flap when landing with 25 flap. The flap indicator shows a white sector band from up to 15 flap –and nothing else on the gauge to indicate exactly what flap setting in degrees is available beyond 15. When selecting the flap to down, the needle goes beyond 15 by ¾ inch into the unmarked areas and there is no indication if the flap micro-switch stops the flaps (via a limit switch) at 25 or 40. There is no external mark on the wings to indicate current flap position. This is common to many Navajos. In short, the flap indicator is misleading and impossible to comply with the flight manual restriction because there are no markings beyond 15 flap.
2. The rear baggage compartment aft of the rear door has no tie down net. However, the operator has thoughtfully supplied a brightly coloured carpet to throw over any cargo or bags. This rug has eyelets and tape attached to the retaining hooks in the floor. In other words there is no effective restraint.
3. The nose baggage compartment is not equipped with tie down devices or floor restraints. In this compartment are three metal wheel chocks, several empty soft drink bottles, a small metal ladder and various debris. The metal ladder is firmly wedged against thin electrical wiring emanating from behind the instrument panel and disappearing into the nose cone via the sidewall of the front baggage compartment. Everything in the baggage compartment is unrestrained and would float freely in turbulence.
4. Numerous oil leaks are visible through the front of the left engine cowl area with oil running from under the engine nacelle and through to the top surface of the flap area inboard of the engine. The operator is aware of the oil leak but says it is due to over-filling of the oil tank. He directs that that the contents should be 9 quarts maximum to minimize perceived oil loss. Both wheel wells also show signs of excess engine oil leaks.
5. Strong smell of fuel in the fuselage area when the aircraft is stationary. In the immediate vicinity of both cross-feed drains there is wet fuel stains on the fuselage belly with flow patterns extending several inches. The operator was previously advised but no action was taken. The problem of fuel leaks in this area are long-standing. Two wing fuel tank water drains drip fuel at one drop per 30 seconds on to the tarmac.
6. Autopilot when engaged causes very sudden in-flight manoeuvres and has to be hurriedly disengaged. There is no placard indicating an unserviceable autopilot and nothing in the MR The Century 111 autopilot control panel has a missing knob for roll mode – it is just a bare metal rod on which the knob is supposed to be attached. The calibration wheel on the autopilot box has unreadable graduations thus it is not possible to note a specific setting in daytime – worse at night, of course. There is a knob called “Auto Pilot Nav Selector” which can be selected to Nav1, Nav 2 or Off. There is no documentation on the specific use of this section of the autopilot.
The operator’s policy is not to make the system serviceable because he deems it too expensive to rectify. The aircraft flies single pilot IFR with no autopilot. This is apparently legal on passenger charter operations but not on RPT flights. Passengers should be entitled to the same degree of safety regardless of the category of flight. The operator crews RPT flights with two pilots, with the second pilot paying for the right seat under the guise of in command under supervision – but logging the total flight as “in command”. The autopilot has been unserviceable for 9 months and no action taken to rectify the problem. Single pilot IFR/IMC with no auto pilot is not conducive to a safe operation, regardless of the legalities.
7. Normally a green light appears when there is electrical power to the turn-coordinator. The light is inoperative. Next to the u/s light is an empty un-labelled lamp socket.
8. The two position voltage regulator switch is labeled only Main. There is apparently a second position hopefully for the Aux regulator if indeed one is installed. There is no Aux label on the switch assembly.
9. The circuit breaker panel has many obliterated decals or words with one or more letters missing. At night it is difficult to read the decals due grime and dirt or simply non-existent labels. The autopilot circuit breaker was out and easily reset because there is a piece of plastic or broken collar surrounding the circuit breaker shank. Nothing about this in the m/r. If the circuit breaker is inoperative or permanently collared out, then as a protection against circuit breaker resetting it is useless and potentially dangerous fire risk.
10. The green glide slope engaged light is inoperative on press-to-test.
11. There is a decal on the circuit breaker panel which on close scrutiny (impossible at night) says “Turn and Bank Left/Right”. There is however only one turn coordinator – not a Turn and Bank Indicator which is situated on the left instrument panel in front of the left seat pilot. There is no similar instrument in front of the RH seat pilot – only a couple of plugged holes where instruments were once installed.
The circuit breaker marked “Left Turn and Bank”, appears to be a false circuit breaker as it does not pull out and on closer inspection it is merely a black painted knob which looks exactly like a circuit breaker in shape and size. The circuit breaker labeled “RH Turn and Bank” is a real circuit breaker but there is no RH instrument for it to supply power to. One can imagine the confusion in event of electrical smoke or fire when the pseudo circuit breaker is found to be jammed.
11. There is a Stormscope installed. It is well advertised by a decal situated on the fuselage near the entrance door which says “Stormscope equipped.” An identical decal advertising the presence of the Stormscope is situated on the left fuselage sidewall adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. Maybe this is to give an added sense of security to the pilot. However, above the actual instrument is a decal marked Radar. There is also a circuit breaker marked Radar. Only problem is that the aircraft is not equipped with weather radar.
12. There is a set of normal looking rudder pedals for the copilot position. They are identical in size and shape to the pilot’s rudder pedals. However, there are no brakes on the copilot’s pedals. There is no decal warning of this, nothing in the Flight Manual or the Operations Manual and no mention in the maintenance release. Simply, one would not know if the brakes were either not working from the RH side, or if they were not installed.
One endorsement was carried out on this particular aircraft where the instructor was not aware that brakes were not installed on the right hand seat pedals, until after the flight with a student undergoing conversion training. The pilot under training had commented on the heavy nosewheel steering problems, so the instructor took control to “free up” the nosewheel steering by applying alternate foot pressure to each pedal on his side. The brake “pressure” appeared to lock solid on his pedals and the aircraft started to veer off the tarmac towards a nearby obstruction. The instructor quickly told the student to take over control. Later it was discovered that the copilot’s pedals indeed had no braking capability. The aircraft had flown for hundreds of hours and previous pilots had been unaware of the lack of RH seat brakes.
13. There are two engine gauges. Each gauge has an integral oil pressure, oil temperature and CHT sub gauge. In this aircraft the colour coding of the various instruments within the main gauge display do not agree with each other. For example, one oil pressure gauge shows 10 PSI red line limit for the left engine while the right oil pressure gauge shows 25 PSI red line limit. The green normal oil pressure operating range is quite different between the two oil pressure gauges.
The CHT left engine gauge indicates 200F as the lower limit on the needle while the right engine CHT lower limit shows 100F. The varying size of temperature in degrees F scales on the two CHT gauges means that the needle positions are not generally parallel, thus requiring careful scrutiny of the actual readings – rather than a normal scan which looks for similar parallel readings within average temperature parameters. The left oil temperature gauge has no numbers – just a green arc and one red temperature limit mark. The right oil temperature gauge has graduations from 50F to 250F plus – with three colour codes of green, yellow, and red. This means that a normal scan of engine temperatures and pressures in flight is not possible in terms of normal or abnormal needle positions. Instead a close scrutiny of each needle is needed which becomes a problem at night where cockpit directional lighting is poor by even automobile standards.
14. It is impossible to read the Directional Gyro at night because the internal lighting is inoperative. One needs to shine a torch on the instrument or have cat’s eye vision to read compass headings.
15. The upper switch panel over the pilot’s head houses the magneto switches. On the panel is a sign which says “Alternators Press-to-Test”. This refers to alternator test buttons that were presumably once installed. Instead there are two empty holes drilled into the vinyl roof and no buttons to press.
16. Both mixture controls are misaligned. The rear limit (idle cut-off position) actually coincides with a decal marked “Lean” that itself is supposed to indicate typical cruise position of the mixture control when leaned correctly. In other words, if the pilot leaned the mixture levers to the position marked “Lean” both engines would stop. Similarly the full forward rich mixture limit stops one and a half inches from the forward stop. The available movement of the two mixture controls is only slightly more than half of the total quadrant distance between ICO and full rich lever position.
17. There is intolerable noise in the No 1 VHF set and it sounds like a parrot squawking. The No 2 ADF volume control (Bendix) has no decal indicating volume direction. The HF volume control knob is un-marked and the decal obliterated. Similarly the circuit breaker panel has various switches such as landing and taxi light controls. There is no decal showing on/off positions which is confusing, particularly as the alternator field switches lay fore and aft.
18. The metal vertical cover which protects the left engine fire fuel shut-off handles (behind the pilot’s seat) from inadvertent actuation, does a good job indeed. It is tightly jammed and no amount of effort could move it in event of an engine fire - apart from using a set of pliars or a screw driver. The right engine fire fuel handle cover plate is not jammed. It is so loose that it is normally left laying on the cockpit floor.
19. On top of the right engine cowl a crack is evident adjacent to the hinge line of the oil cap cover. The crack is proceeding nicely but there is no stop drilling present.
20. Exposed and unprotected electrical wiring is readily visible coming from behind the left fuselage vinyl wall covering, and running behind the copilot’s seat and leading to the fuel system panel. The wiring is partially secured by masking tape which has peeled away. As the gap between the copilot’s seat and the passenger compartment wooden separation panel is used for maps, brief cases etc, it is easy to snag the wiring.
21. There is an electrically operated passenger seat belt sign attached to a portable wooden bulkhead. The box in which the sign is installed has a thick dark brown plastic cover. The seat belt signs are not visible in daylight, but with much peering one can just see the sign at night. It is quite useless for its task in daylight and only marginally better at night. There is no sign to indicate to passengers that the box displayed to their view is indeed a seat belts fastened device. It is just looks like a dark coloured box with no function.
22. Now here is a real beauty. Above the front right passenger window there is some light coloured masking tape. A closer inspection reveals the faded word EXIT in red but under the masking tape. It would be impossible to read at night in a dim passenger cabin. It is difficult to see in bright daylight. The emergency exit handle is covered by very tough plastic that requires a heavy pull to break in order to get at the handle. Lacerated fingers would occur. The handle assembly is situated in a position between two windows. There is no positive indication which of the two passenger windows is the emergency exit – especially as the small red EXIT sign is covered over with masking tape.
There is a decal which displays the following instruction: Emergency Exit – Lift Latch – Pull pin-Push window out. Which window? So there are two contradictory directions; one says Pull Pin, Lift Latch and the other says Pull handle Down. Very confusing even for the pilot, let alone a passenger at night. There is no doubt that the emergency exit window should be clearly outlined and the decal confusion sorted out.
23. The rear door can be used as an emergency exit. There is no decal indication that it can be used for this purpose. A passenger briefing card is available but the Navajo door opening procedure for the rear exit is complicated. In this aircraft the vital “Press-to-Release” knob which allows the main hatch to be operated that unlocks the exit door, is painted in faded white with what appears to be a faded red touch to it. There is no indication of the importance of that button to release the latch mechanism.
24. There is also a chain and bolt attached to the door area which is supposed to be attached after the door is locked closed, in order to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight. With the chain in place the door can only open an inch or so. There is no mention on the passenger briefing cards of the function of this bolt and chain and no decals or instructions adjacent to the door of the vital need to undo the chain and bolt before attempting to operate the exit mechanism. In other words the whole emergency exit policy in this Navajo is shambles. But all is not yet lost because to balance things up there is a very clearly displayed sign opposite the rear exit which says “Thank you for not smoking”.
25. In front of the copilot position are situated the cockpit heat controls. Next to the levers is a decal marked “Fuel On”. But there is no switch to associate with the decal –just another empty hole where presumably there was once a switch.
26. The fuel tank caps have a red decal stating that 100 octane fuel should be used. However the decal stating fuel tank capacity is missing on all caps.
27. The passenger emergency exit windows are not marked on the outside of the fuselage for ingress into the cabin. There is also no instruction on the outside of the rear door on how to open the door from the outside in event of an emergency.
28. In cruise the No 2 fuel pressure needle shows 3 PSI in excess of the red line limit.
28. The taxi light gives only five metres forward illumination – about the same as the parking lights on a car. In other words useless for obstacle illumination.
29. The right windscreen has numerous small nicks, cracks and crazed areas. Landing at night, runway lights show very diffused patterns through the windscreen and would be impossible to have adequate vision towards the sun.
30. The left oil pressure gauge shows a green band 30 to 60 PSI. The right oil pressure gauge shows a yellow caution band 30-60 PSI – then a green sector. Very confusing.
31. DME inoperative on last leg. Common defect on this aircraft.
32. Both pilot’s sun-visors flop down during take off, and in flight they dangle loosely and apparently have been like this for months.
But all is not lost. On the plus side, the maintenance release for this aircraft is squeaky clean....