Alternatives to Trident: New Paper [Archive]

Not_a_boffin

16th Feb 2015, 09:00

For Leon - Tube-launched TLAM (as can be used by UK SSN) is highly likely to be out of service by the mid to late 20s - unless we pay to retain that capability. Plus (as ever) you risk nuclear alerts every time you want to give someone the good news with a conventional one.

On the paper :

Apparently a single RAF squadron is going to be able to hold sufficient targets at risk by delivering 30 weapons. At 2 buckets per Dave, that means a 15 ship successful penetration, so if you factor in attrition from a half decent Russian IADS, that's a lot of cabs launched - and more to the point, a lot of tankers we ain't got. Doesn't smell like a single RAF squadron to me - or a second RN squadron for that matter. Particularly not if launching from UK and proceeding at a sedate 450kts or thereabouts. 3-4 hour run to get to St Petersburg?

All of it rests on this rather ethereal idea that the Moscow criterion is no longer valid. Given that nice Mr Putin seems to be a bit short on manners atm, I'd personally want him to be sure we'd be able to entomb him if we had to, rather than just incinerate several million Russian civpop.

There's also the rather quaint idea that we'd be able to defend our "dispersed" force from attack. There's a limited amount of dispersal options which would be known to opfor. It doesn't take a genius to go after a large part of that subset (by a number of means) which immediately reduces your oppos defensive problem. They're almost inviting an attack on the UK, something you don't really get with CASD.

That's before you get to the warhead design issues, additional force structure etc etc.

I'm afraid it all smacks of "I don't like Trident and I want to find a way of presenting binning it as a cut to the deficit without pain in social spending or tax rises. How can we get it cancelled without looking like unilateralists and promise more defence while achieving savings (which we may or more likely may not actually put towards defence)?"

Lima Juliet

16th Feb 2015, 09:21

TLAMs can also be shot down. Tridents with MIRVs can't.

Nothing is guaranteed to reach the target as some other bugger always has some capability:

http://spyhunter007.com/Images/missile_command11a.gif

^^^ Declassified Version^^^ :}

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 09:42

Thanks to all for taking the time to engage with it, esp. ShotOne reading late last night. And yes, the LDs official position is risible, though Nick Harvey appears to have modified it in his speech in the Trident debate on 20 Jan.

RP noted

The problem with that 'stand out point', is that money not spent on maintaining a SSBN fleet is highly unlikely to then be considered as 'money now available' for lots of other nice new defence equipment!

This is why we present it as a force package, and make very clear on pages 72 - 73 that the savings have to stay in the MoD budget. We should be holding the Treasury's feet to the fire.

Leon Jabachjabicz said,

You haven't thought of the option of nuke-tipped TLAM from Astute Class. I think this would further disperse our nuclear forces if needed. They already carry TLAM and so this would be a no-brainer for me. You would now have free-fall and submarine based deterrence.

TLAM-N is being retired for the reasons Prof Jeffrey Lewis sets out on his blog (http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2560/why-the-navy-should-retire-tlam-n). The other problem is one of nuclear signalling that we don't currently have as all UK CMs are conventional.

FA18

F-35s with nukes can be shot down, assuming they even get off the ground. TLAMs can also be shot down. Tridents with MIRVs can't.

There is no better deterrence than a boomer.

Quite true, but the issue here is of minimum deterrence versus the gold standard, and crucially, of the opportunity cost of SSBNs. Trident will consume 25 - 33% of the equipment budget from 2018-32, denuding the conventional forces. This is why a dual capable model we propose provides a credible minimum nuclear force - but at the same time substantially improves the UK's conventional capability.

rh200

the ability to bring fire from the heavens is the only sure fire way of defending your freedom.

Against what threat, rh200? Trident can't deter ISIL, stop Russia going into Crimea or sort out the Taliban.

Not_a_boffin

Apparently a single RAF squadron is going to be able to hold sufficient targets at risk by delivering 30 weapons. At 2 buckets per Dave, that means a 15 ship successful penetration, so if you factor in attrition from a half decent Russian IADS, that's a lot of cabs launched - and more to the point, a lot of tankers we ain't got. Doesn't smell like a single RAF squadron to me - or a second RN squadron for that matter. Particularly not if launching from UK and proceeding at a sedate 450kts or thereabouts. 3-4 hour run to get to St Petersburg?

The plan is for all RAF and FAA F-35C squadrons to be dual capable. The paper provides nuclear IOC based on one squadron but it would be rolled out across the F-35C fleet.

All of it rests on this rather ethereal idea that the Moscow criterion is no longer valid. Given that nice Mr Putin seems to be a bit short on manners atm, I'd personally want him to be sure we'd be able to entomb him if we had to, rather than just incinerate several million Russian civpop.

Is Putin madder than Brezhnev or his pre-Gorby successors? I doubt it. And that is why we've used the declassified 1978 Duff Group minimum deterrence criteria, which were reaffirmed in 1982 as Duff Mason. The Moscow Criterion has been dead in UK policy circles since 1978, though no one mentioned it until the files were released under the 30 year rule.

There's a limited amount of dispersal options which would be known to opfor. It doesn't take a genius to go after a large part of that subset (by a number of means) which immediately reduces your oppos defensive problem. They're almost inviting an attack on the UK, something you don't really get with CASD.

So we are in a position with 18 ORPs hosting 4 x F-35C each on QRA, with one or both carriers out and about. What are you going to attack them with that is a bolt from the blue that will destroy them all? Oh, and make the US rescind it's NATO Art V guarantee? Nothing credible springs to mind, N-a-B.

Thanks again,

TTr

Jimlad1

16th Feb 2015, 10:28

But in doing the nuclear dave mission, you've essentially lost access to your carrier force as it'll have to permanently stooge around in striking distance and dedicated to the nuclear role. Its worth noting that this would cost a fortune, create a complex logistics chain that is vulnerable (why sink the carrier when you could sink the RFA?), and also means that you'd need the ability to keep 1-2 CVBGs on station permanently and with sufficient crews able to fly the nuclear mission which dont exist.

I remember when you came here for help you got a lot of people like myself who've spent years on this advising you that the Dave option was a complete non-starter and would cost far more than the current options. It is a shame you've disregarded expert advice, and it feels like you had pre-determined that F35 was the answer, regardless of the practicalities involved.

rh200

16th Feb 2015, 10:32

Against what threat, rh200? Trident can't deter ISIL, stop Russia going into Crimea or sort out the Taliban.

Its not about the threats we have now, or any other half baked ones. The fact is, we seem to think things get easier, they don't they get harder. Having an arsenal that can keep things to low level conflicts is imperative if we want to stop having wars between the major players.

By wars amonsgts the major players, I'm talking about world wars, with the death tolls in the tens if not hundreds of millions. In effect, it just regulates us to what we have now, pain in the @rse conflicts.

The problem being, the Yanks seem to be on shaky ground, and I'm not sure how long they can be relied to be the foundation of our defense. This is where the problem comes in, what does the modeling show if the yanks are taken out of the equation.

Human nature dictates that when there is a power vacuum there will be a stampede to fill it. So the question becomes, do you have enough deterrent to make it hurt enough, so that another larger player will leave you alone? Factor in, the potential that other major player may control their media and are prepared to loose a city or two?

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 11:06

JimLad,

The carriers would not be expected to be within striking range at all times. In the same way as QRA numbers varied in line with the international situation, the carrier deployment would be modulated. Of the three scenarios we model in the paper (http://centreforum.org/assets/pubs/retiring-trident.pdf), only one (UK versus North Korea) requires the carrier; in the others (Middle East, Russia), the carrier increases flexibility and adds a threat axis.

This is expressly designed to be a lower cost, lower capability system than Trident, albeit one that meets the Duff-Mason minimum deterrence criteria.

It also significantly enhances RN / FAA conventional capability....

TTr

Not_a_boffin

16th Feb 2015, 11:15

Sorry Toby

If you want to get into the detail of the Duff Criteria, you'd need a proper debate over time. You say the Moscow criterios has been dead in policy circles since the late 70s. I think I'll need a bit more evidence than the word of a former RAFR IntO, DFiD CS or an academic study. More pertinently, just going for Options 3a and 3b from the Duff report and dismissing everything else as gold-plating may suit your thesis, but misses the import of option 2 - which was to go after C2 facilities as well. Messrs Khruschev, Brehznev, Andropov and Chernenko were well aware they were personally vulnerable, as did Gorby.

Your "attrition" analysis covers only SAM in the target area. We have forgotten that a working IADS starts killing threats much further out than that. Specifically long range radars of various frequencies and interceptors / CAPs. LO is not a magic cloak as I'm sure you're well aware, it just forces more defensive resources to counter it, through reducing reaction time. But frankly, if your attack run is 1200nm, that's plenty of time to organise.

Your force structure seems to indicate something like 100+ F35 ready to go. Which is a bit of a stretch to maintain from a buy of 138 cabs - something by the way, which will cost additional money that you haven't included in your costs. I don't believe that a UK buy of 138 is in the EPP, but am happy to be convinced otherwise.

As for vulnerability of the dispersed force, I don't have to kill them all, nor do I have to kill them at the same time. I'm just reducing my defensive problem. If I'm in a state that requires me to have my nuclear force dispersed, it's likely that I'm expecting a bit of a pagga with someone. If that someone decides to use non-nuclear means to hit a number of my ORPs, not only is my deterrent reduced, but I have to think hard about whether that strike actually merits a nuclear response. Am I in use it or lose it territory? Article V does not commit the US to a nuclear response as a response to a conventional attack by the way.

HAS ain't all that these days - Granby showed that over 20 years ago. PGM can be mounted on a number of stand-off conventional systems and unless my skim read has missed something you haven't got local SAM defences for your ORP - or expansion of the RAFReg to provide FP against ground attacks.

There's a whole lot of "we won't worry about that" and " it's all gold plating" woven through your arguments, all of which tend to assume out any thought that F35C couldn't actually do the job. All of which re-inforces my initial impression that it's an artifice to provide a policy option (read coalition trade item) that appears to retain a deterrent and strengthen conventional forces, but which can be conveniently dropped once the decision to bin Trident has been taken.

And no, it doesn't significantly enhance RN / FAA conventional capability..... What it does is tie a signficant amount of that to a deterrent mission, which will incur a significant training and operational burden. Which reminds me that you haven't included modifying QE/PoW for SW provision.

Pontius Navigator

16th Feb 2015, 11:42

NaB, the only bit I want to comment on is the risk from an attempted coup de main on the nuclear forces by non-nuclear assets.

This is indeed use it or lose it territory. Enhanced force protection, at additional cost, is essential if we want to slacken the trip wire. The V-force FP, in today's terms was risible - 2 RAF police with 9mm and VP with a couple of trainees with pickaxe handles. Main gates with a simple knife rest and perimeter hedge with a couple of strands of hard wire. Post QRA things did improve but still on the cheap with armed, but barely trained, RAF airmen, no RAF Regt.

Jimlad1

16th Feb 2015, 11:51

The problem with relying on carriers to deliver deterrence is that you actually have one in the right place at the right time.

Like I said, this 'study' feels like a fairly shambolic piece of poorly contrived 'research' which ignores any inconvenient truths to instead put across a fairly poorly written, frankly ignorant, piece of work which is far too long, and only good for getting face time for the authors career and not a serious piece of work.

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 11:51

N-a-B

Always good to debate. Can I suggest that you have a look at John Ainslie's meticulous paper (http://www.swordofdamocles.org/pdf/UnacceptableDamage.pdf) on Unacceptable Damage?

What does the UK's conventional force look like when Successor is consuming such a large proportion of the procurement budget 2018-32? What do we do with an Army of 60,000? RN with <20 FF/DDs?

The point here is choice. And given that no government is going to increase defence spending, then I choose to meet the minimum deterrence criteria (especially within an NATO setting) and spend more on our conventional forces rather than getting stuck with a very capable, but massively expensive, single-role asset to meet a Tier 2 threat.

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 12:00

You're welcome to you opinion, JimLad, but (i) you're completely wrong on my motivation in writing this and (ii) others don't agree with you.

From the Media Release (http://centreforum.org/index.php/14-news/releases/720-replace-trident-with-cheaper-deterrent)

Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), said:

"The government thought they had sunk the debate over any credible alternatives, but overstretched their credibility when claiming that like-for-like replacement of Trident is the only viable option. This report demonstrates more clearly than any other that a new government must reopen the review and properly consider all options and capabilities afresh, placing national and international security at the heart of the discussion."

Dr Jeffrey Lewis, Director of East Asia Non-Proliferation Program, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, said:

"Finding the funds to pay for Trident replacement is shaping up to be a major challenge for the next UK government. It doesn't have to be, as CentreForum demonstrates in this smartly argued brief for a credible but much more cost effective nuclear deterrent relying on aircraft delivered gravity bombs."

Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer, International Security, University of York, said:

"CentreForum has produced a very timely report that challenges Whitehall's political fixation on Trident and its proposed replacement. It builds an authoritative case that if the UK remains committed to deploying nuclear weapons then it makes strategic and fiscal sense to opt for an air delivered system based on the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 Lightning II). In doing so CentreForum opens up the debate on Britain's nuclear future as we head into the general election in terms of whether to retain nuclear weapons at all, if so, what a UK nuclear arsenal might look like."

Which comes back to the question of choice. What UK conventional force are you prepared to live with to retain CASD?

Martin the Martian

16th Feb 2015, 12:23

At the risk of making the conversation a bit less tense, I think I have the answer. And it will keep the crabs and the fish heads happy. Possibly:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Wos5e_WlYs

Out Of Trim

16th Feb 2015, 12:29

And given that no government is going to increase defence spending,

Apart from a UKIP lead one!

On leaving the EU, instant cash available to pay for a proper defence.

:ok:

Not_a_boffin

16th Feb 2015, 12:51

PN - sorry couldn't resist

armed, but barely trained, RAF airmen, no RAF Regt

That's no way to talk about Strike Command!:}

Toby

Not going to debate endlessly on here. Suffice to say IMO your case does not stand up, either in credibility or cost saving. Endorsements by a self-avowed nuclear disarmament lobbying group or a couple of UK academics do not constitute a valid argument.

As for what to do with a 60000 strong army, I'd suggest much the same as we do with an 82000 strong army. Neither are strong enough to sustain significant scales of ops for any length of time. You may not have noticed, but we're already at 19 DD/FF.

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 12:56

N-A-B

I had noticed the paucity of the surface fleet, which is one of the reasons the plan funds an additional 4 x T26. Not enough, but a start. And calling people names isn't a particularly strong argument.

I come back to my question: how are you proposing to fund CASD and the conventional force when no party forming the next government is going to increase defence spending?

TTr

Not_a_boffin

16th Feb 2015, 13:15

Wasn't aware I was calling people names, Toby.

Best hope I don't start - it can get colourful.

As far as your direct question goes, there is a budget for CASD and one for the AF overall in the EPP. While no-one likes everything that's in it (or rather not in it), I'd suggest that it is at least a costed plan, with some credibility.

Which I'm afraid is more than can be said for your proposal, even on the rather optimistic assumption that any CASD "savings" would be ploughed back into defence.

On that note, endex.

LowObservable

16th Feb 2015, 13:23

One issue here: what will be given up to retain Trident? At the very least, current planning will lock-in SDSR10 force levels. If (as Mr Boffin suggests) there is no plan to buy 138 F-35s (in which case someone needs to notify the JSFPO), the idea of a replacement for Tornado becomes unrealistic, particularly if SDSR15 restores two carriers; a smaller F-35B force will be largely devoted to maintaining the sea-based capability.

Not only that, but Trident will squeeze out the systems needed for its own survival - see our MPA thread.

It's also worth noting that the USN can't afford Ohio Replacement without a direct raid on another service's budget.

ORAC

16th Feb 2015, 13:44

Estimates of the one-0ff costs of replacing Trident range around £20bn. Add that to an assumed annual running cost of £2bn and some updates you reach a total of around £80Bn over 30 years - about £2.5Bn a year. Assume an alternate deterrent would save around 40%, that's a saving of £1Bn a year at great technical risk of obsolescence and reduction in capability. And, please, don't insult my intelligence by suggestion such a saving will be "ring fenced" for defence.

In the meantime wee are due to spend around £200bn this year on welfare, if you lump state pensions and benefits together; and another $11Bn in foreign aid (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/03/uk-meets-foreign-aid-target).

So we take all those risks for such a small saving? Why?

Pontius Navigator

16th Feb 2015, 14:15

N-a-B,

In the interests of accuracy:

Post QRA things did improve but still on the cheap with armed, but barely trained, RAF airmen, no RAF Regt.

RAF Bomber Command disbanded on 1 Apr 1968 and the V-Force relinquished QRA on 30 Jun 1968. Post-QRA, less 3 months, was Strike Command.

Not_a_boffin

16th Feb 2015, 14:45

I may have been too subtle in my attempted p1ss-take......

Roland Pulfrew

16th Feb 2015, 15:22

Think Tanker

I've only had a chance to skim read the paper but a couple of things spring to mind:

1. F-35C is the carrier variant and is probe and drogue refuelled so no need to add the cost of converting Voyager to boom refuelling, which is just as well as

2. You have understimated the costs for providing a new long-range MPA. Once training systems, additional new build facilities, maintenance and crews for your MPA you would need to at least double your costs, and maybe treble them. Particularly if you wanted the UK to remain a 1st world player in the ASW/ASuW business.

Like others on here, I think the biggest flaw in the paper is the assumption that anything "saved" by cancelling successor would be reinvested in the rest of Defence. It won't be, it will be spent on the sacred cow that is the NHS, or on education, or on keeping the feckless, lame and lazy in benefits.

Pontius Navigator

16th Feb 2015, 15:49

N-a-B, not at all.

The peripheral point is that the system cost is one thing, infrastructure and force protection something else.

There are some many variables of course with a deployed SSBN having by far the best protection, reaction time and reach. Dave, OTOH, can be deployed as a very visible deterrent, a la V-Force during Confrontation, but a deployment time in days and a response time in hours (flash to bang).

Taking out one SSBN would reduce the deterrent by a minimum of 25%. Neutralizing 25% of the F35 deterrent should be impossible.

Heathrow Harry

16th Feb 2015, 16:33

"much more cost effective nuclear deterrent relying on aircraft delivered gravity bombs.""

ye Gods - even the Vulcan wasn't asked to do that by 1963

I hope he intends to be one of the crew.................

Pontius Navigator

16th Feb 2015, 17:30

HH, wrong. We didn't get lay down until 1966. The Mk1a' s remained into 1967 with that bundle of joy ,Yellow Sun, with a rapid climb into the valley of death.

Flying level across an enemy airfield at 200 feet in broad daylight would have seen the guns volley and thunder.

Biggus

16th Feb 2015, 17:31

ThinkTanker,

In post 20 of this thread you include three quotes, from no doubt learned and respected individuals, written in support of your paper - it might have been more even handed if you had also perhaps pointed out that 2 of these 3 people were also thanked by you on page 2 of your paper for their help in producing it! :=

To most people it would appear that, as contributors to the paper they are commenting on, their opinion of it is almost certainly likely to be biased in favour!!

Ah - I've just found the name of the third person you quoted in your list of acknowledgements! So none of the quotes on post 20 comes from an unlinked, unbiased, source!! All of them contributed in some way to the paper.

PhilipG

16th Feb 2015, 17:59

This thread could get more amusing if we started discussing why Dave C, as yet nowhere near IOC nor with a nuclear role model, or a standoff weapon, is better than say a Rafale for the carrier born, hose and drogue, solution. Not that I particularly think that an aircraft borne deterrent is the answer.

Biggus

16th Feb 2015, 18:41

ThinkTanker,

I must admit that I haven't read every word of your paper yet, and probably never will, but I have come across the following.

You state that the unrefuelled operational radius of the F-35C is 615nm. However, you then go on to say that multiple in-flight refuelling can give a radius of action (based on an aircrew fatigue limit of 12 hours, which presumably equates to 5000nm flown) of 2500nm. It therefore appears you are not planning one way missions, but expect our gallant aviators to be able to return.

The supposed logic of this argument then allows you to conveniently draw 2500 nm circles around various possible operating bases to show the global coverage of such a force. However, you don't seem to mention (unless I've missed it?) the issue of taking a non stealthy tanker through hostile air defences until it is somewhere within 600 odd miles of your intended target? For example Figure 11 on page 69, which you use to illustrate targets in Russia being attacked from Akrotiri. Then of course the tanker has to loiter somewhere for a couple of hours for our gallant F-35 pilot(s) to return post strike and be refuelled on the way home.

I'd be indebted to anyone who can tell me where to look in the paper for the answer to my question if I've missed it.

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 19:38

N-a-B

As far as your direct question goes, there is a budget for CASD and one for the AF overall in the EPP. While no-one likes everything that's in it (or rather not in it), I'd suggest that it is at least a costed plan, with some credibility.

Fine, N-a-B. But you've still not answered the question of "how small a conventional force are you prepared to tolerate to have CASD Trident?" It's a fair question, as asked by LO.

ORAC wrote

Estimates of the one-0ff costs of replacing Trident range around £20bn.

The MoD continues to use a capital cost figure of £15-20bn in 2005/6 prices. Inflated to today's prices, and with an allowance for the historical cost overruns of UK submarines, you come to a cap of £33bn today. It's not the through life costs that are that high (c.£2-3bn a year), but the capital spending is compressed into 2018-32, where like SSBN(X), it eats everyone's else lunch.

And since no-one is going to increase defence spending (or even commit to keeping it at 2%), then you've got to make choices.

Roland Pulfrew

1. F-35C is the carrier variant and is probe and drogue refuelled so no need to add the cost of converting Voyager to boom refuelling, which is just as well as

It's not required, but it is in there to enhance overall conventional force projection, especially in NATO Europe. The role in the nuclear mission is to keep RIVET JOINT on station at range.

[/Quote]2. You have understimated the costs for providing a new long-range MPA. Once training systems, additional new build facilities, maintenance and crews for your MPA you would need to at least double your costs, and maybe treble them. Particularly if you wanted the UK to remain a 1st world player in the ASW/ASuW business.[/Quote]

Indeed, it is the capital costs, as it says. Without access to the MoD LTCs, this was always going to be hard, so there are over-estimates in there too - e.g., assuming UK B61-12 production is *twice* the unit cost of the US, no savings from cancelling Crowsnest, £1bn to reinstate nuclear C2 amongst others.

Biggus: Yes, they did all see it, and support the conclusions. These were their reasons why.

Thanks to all!

Willard Whyte

16th Feb 2015, 19:41

Gonna need more carriers. If we were to declare our carriers as the deterrent, you can bet your ass that the Russians will assign a couple of attack submarines to each deck. Slightest hint of trouble: glug glug glug.

henra

16th Feb 2015, 19:57

If we were to declare our carriers as the deterrent, you can bet your ass that the Russians will assign a couple of attack submarines to each deck. Slightest hint of trouble: glug glug glug.

+1
Replacing SSBN as the only really guaranteed second strike capability assurance by something Carrier/Aircraft based is as stupid as it gets.
You want nuclear deterrence:
You need SSBN.
End of Story.
The US found this out in the 60s. And they stick to it. That is why they scrapped MX/Peacemaker and kept Minuteman without worrying too much. Their real Nuclear Deterrence is Trident/Ohio anyway.

This is not to be mixed up with what you need for regional squirmishes. Horses for courses.

cornish-stormrider

16th Feb 2015, 20:15

ThinkTaker - have a read of "command and control"
It's a factual account of the Damascus Titan whoopsie ( and no disrespect to the dead, they were the poor brave bastards at the bottom)

In the book you will read an awful lot about the numbers and the close calls
And you are advocating going from the most reliable system we have ever had to a less reliable one - and I use reliable here in the sense of less likely to have a whoopsie

ThinkTanker

16th Feb 2015, 20:29

Henra / Willard: I've never claimed that this offers the same level of capability/survivability as CASD Trident. But that's not the exam question here, which is "what's the cheapest way of delivering credible minimum deterrence (so that we can spend the saved cash on the conventional forces)?"

If money were no object, then 4-boat CASD would be uncontentious. It is, so it isn't.

Cornish-Stormrider: it's a good book, referenced at notes 107 & 109, actually. Brave boys indeed at Damascus. But the UK forces' nuclear safety record has been good, so what makes you think it will get worse now?

Jimlad1

16th Feb 2015, 20:41

"what's the cheapest way of delivering credible minimum deterrence (so that we can spend the saved cash on the conventional forces)?"

Trident, trident, trident. No idea how you can possibly think its anything else to be fair!

Pontius Navigator

16th Feb 2015, 20:48

Biggus, the 2500 mile hypothesis ignores how the V-force actually planned to execute the mission. There was no requirement to recover to their departure airfield; indeed it was prudent to assume that one's home base would have been destroyed.

Then the OP' s paper makes the unwarranted assumption that St Petersburg was an easy target as SAM would not be able to defend a coastal target. Now Kronstaft, last time I looked, no longer had a defensive complex but that could soon be rectified.

The Gulf of Finland is narrow and SAM on either shore can cover the whole Gulf. Finish neutrality is irrelevant.

rh200

16th Feb 2015, 22:52

what's the cheapest way of delivering credible minimum deterrence

And thats the point, credible, its all about how you define the metric and who's crystal ball you want to follow. Another words future prognostics.

Pontius Navigator

17th Feb 2015, 06:35

There is an implicit assumption that dual-capable means you get a second mission cheap. An SSBN is dual-capable as were the Tornados and V-force before that.

What is conveniently forgotten is "nuclear withhold". That part of the force held back as part of a nuclear deterrent is essentially not dual role, like an SSBN in fact.

As said earlier, that held back force becomes part of the use-it or lose-it argument, an argument more likely wit h an aircraft based deterrent.

Not_a_boffin

17th Feb 2015, 09:02

Fine, N-a-B. But you've still not answered the question of "how small a conventional force are you prepared to tolerate to have CASD Trident?" It's a fair question, as asked by LO.

Actually that's not the question LO or yourself asked. Both of you postulate that FF2020 levels will be cut as a result of replacing the V-boats and eventually Trident. Without any evidence to support that.......

As far as any actual evidence goes, the EPP funds FF2020, which answers the question of what the conventional force level will be. As I noted previously, no-one is particularly happy with that, but we'll have to live with it. It's certainly more credible than a proposal with so many holes in it, it can get picked to pieces in half a day on t'internet.

Speaking of which, as Biggus notes - endorsements from active contributors and nuclear disarmament pressure groups are hardly an independent critique.

If further cuts are required to fund Successor, which btw is pure speculation, not fact, then it will get looked at. One might argue that an 82000-strong army is too large for supporting a Bde over a sustained period, which is probably the max effort we would look to commit to. But that's getting ahead of ourselves.

Now speaking of unanswered questions, perhaps you'd like to detail why the Duff option 2 isn't required, or how you calculated ingress attrition (not just your SAM defence ivo the target) and how much fuel (and hence tanker support) is required to get the resulting number of Dave-C from the UK to Western Russia? Or how much local ORP defence and FP is going to cost? Or how much the additional FJ squadrons (how many does this need?) are going to cost in terms of manpower, infrastructure etc? Or are you assuming F35 replaces Typhoon, in which case who or what is providing for UKAD while your Dave force is dispersed, sitting in ORP HAS getting bombed up?

Take a B for effort, you've obviously put a lot into this. It's just a shame it started with a desired answer and then conducted a study to support that conclusion.

cornish-stormrider

17th Feb 2015, 09:51

Ok, so we get enough Dave's to carry out the mission.
We develop our own new air carried bucket of sunshine.

We end up in the terrible unthinkable position of having to use it at say........
Manila, ( who knows what the world will bring) any other number of nations could have been chosen but that was picked at random.

So, do we sail the PoW or the Tin Lizzie all the way out there to be in reasonable striking range or do we overfly a whole load of other countries carrying said sunshine?

This Credible deterrent - not worth the paper it's written on.
And in reply to your question ThinkTanker, what about the 177 that was rolled into the ditch? What about the accidents all throughout the deterrence history of the RAF with specials.

You have three options - replace Trident, modify the Astute and develop either a new TLAM-N or fit an ICBM into it, or third option is to develop a new air weapon and hopefully have a Dave to hang it off.

I hate the damn things, but I know I am glad we have the bomber.

The whole point of deterrance is to say, it is always there, always safe and always available.

This spurious argument over funding is a red herring, how about we sort out welfare, and the billions wasted in business welfare rather than giving the other budgets more of a kicking.

The shiny arses at Westminster need to decide on national priorities and fund accordingly, and if they are going to keep sending the troops out then they have to pay for it properly.

A maritime nation with 19 FF/DD, no MPA and Gordys vote winners still not finished and no jets for them........

We should have just bought the designs for the Ford class from Chinese hackers and built one of them and fitted it with Rhino's

One more thing- where would we home base the new bombs and their jets, coz Pompey won't have them in the yard when either of the ships are home....
Can't store them at Guzz as there is no way to get them into the air and onto the carrier, and the carrier won't fit all the way up to Ernesettle......

No point storing the bombs at Coulport......

So you need all those dispersed air bases that are basing Dave to be upgraded and equipped to carry the bombs, properly dispersed.

Your plan, sir, is laughable......

BillHicksRules

17th Feb 2015, 12:39

I have read this thread and perused quickly the document in question, with great interest.

IMHO we need to get out of the nuclear weapons business.

We should see the end of Trident as an opportunity to rid ourselves of these unnecessary items.

ThinkTanker

17th Feb 2015, 13:49

Thanks to all for their comments. I'm away for a couple of days and will respond Thursday/Friday.

TTr

henra

17th Feb 2015, 18:22

But that's not the exam question here, which is "what's the cheapest way of delivering credible minimum deterrence (so that we can spend the saved cash on the conventional forces)?"

If we look at which possible Opponents would warrant deterrence (Russia, maybe China) since they might be in a realistic position to pose a credible threat to Western Europe then I carefully suggest the only credible thing is an SSBN considering their Air Defence Systems, Size and Distances.

Pontius Navigator

17th Feb 2015, 18:52

If we look at which possible Opponents would warrant deterrence (Russia, maybe China)
.

And therein lies the truth. It is wholly unconscionable that we would threaten a regional or non-nuclear power with nuclear weapons.

And is China a credible global nuclear threat? China's global economic domination makes nuclear war both unlikely, unnecessary and economically suicidal.*

Russia,OTOH, might benefit from nuclear blackmail, but would the threat be viable?

*China-US confrontation however is a different matter and should not be an element in British deterrent policy.

ORAC

17th Feb 2015, 19:14

China's global economic domination You're having a laugh, right?

People claimed Japan was going to do that in the 1970s, fell apart. China faces the same problems in greater measure - ageing population; lack of infrastructure and rising wages as system cannot catch up; price of external raw resources.

Similarly India is postulated as the next great power - but the same issues are arising.

Don't right off the 21st century as that of the USA just yet.

*I can paste various links if people are to lazy to do their own research...

LowObservable

17th Feb 2015, 19:37

This spurious argument over funding is a red herring, how about we sort out welfare, and the billions wasted in business welfare rather than giving the other budgets more of a kicking.

That is a bit of a dead end. You can go and campaign for more GDP for the military, which would solve all of your problems. But if it doesn't happen you still have to set priorities.

N-a-B - I understand that under the current plan, Successor is funded. However, that doesn't address the likelihood of overruns, let alone the fact that the current plan (as it will emerge from SDSR15) is apt to leave many unhappy as it is: No MPAs, 48+N Dave B to support carriers (one or two? One is a bit silly) where once there were Tornados and Harriers.

rh200

17th Feb 2015, 19:37

And is China a credible global nuclear threat? China's global economic domination makes nuclear war both unlikely, unnecessary and economically suicidal.*

At the moment, though they are on a reasonable trajectory at the moment, that could easily change. Ignore the possibility at your peril.

China-US confrontation however is a different matter and should not be an element in British deterrent policy.

Should and doesn't can be to different things. When dealing with things on these scales there are no real borders apart from political, and the world is small. The enemys will try and wedge you and your partners, relying on the weak within you to go, not our problem.

History is a merry go round.

Pontius Navigator

17th Feb 2015, 20:28

ORAC, no I am not. Look at virtuality any product, it is made in China. European wholesalers source supplies from the lowest cost provider. Increasingly that provider is Chinese.

RH,no doubt true but would our esteemed leader stand to the threat?

cornish-stormrider

18th Feb 2015, 07:29

I agree we have to set priorities - isn't that the job of our wonderful elected representatives ?

It is also their job to spend our money - and to do so wisely....
Neither of the major parties have done either of these things for a very long time

Now should they say your defence budget is C then it is the job of our leaders to say " in that case we can give you Y. Should you want 2X then the budget is 2Y "

But we are living in a fools paradise if for one minute we thought wow, we have saved three billion on this capability - we have three billion to spend on this. What will happen is it will be usurped by the pet project of the hour to win votes.

I do wonder how many votes the new carriers gained Gordy and whether or not it would have made more fiscal sense to say to all the voters - vote for me and I will give you a cheque for a thousand pounds tax free.....

It is just a shame that the Green Party are a bunch of fruit loops that I wouldn't trust to run a church fete stall as at the moment they are the only party I would vote for.

Not_a_boffin

18th Feb 2015, 08:56

I do wonder how many votes the new carriers gained Gordy and whether or not it would have made more fiscal sense to say to all the voters - vote for me and I will give you a cheque for a thousand pounds tax free.....

You do realise that is a myth? The Great Financial Genius fought tooth and nail against ordering the ships, right up until the last moment when he realised that he was going out on his @rse and was clutching for anything to save it. Given the build plan had been Rosyth since 2003-4 at the latest, the myth doesn't hold water. Not that it stops its Pongo originators from repeating it ad nauseum.

However, that doesn't address the likelihood of overruns, let alone the fact that the current plan (as it will emerge from SDSR15) is apt to leave many unhappy as it is: No MPAs, 48+N Dave B to support carriers (one or two? One is a bit silly) where once there were Tornados and Harriers.

LO - it doesn't address alien invasions or the outbreak of zombie pandemics either. Or increased european tensions for that matter.....

FF2020 FJ force structure as of now is 7 squadrons - 5 Typhoon, 2 Dave. There are no like for like numerical replacements for the Tonkas or puffer jets. If we're lucky, there may be a realisation that won't cut it, but actually funding that is likely to be an SDSR 2020 issue. Whatever you think you might save by binning CASD would be swallowed up by any non-CASD deterrent replacement.

So you'd still have a funding issue. And a non-credible deterrent if you bin CASD.

A and C

18th Feb 2015, 09:19

Politics is no longer the turf of men of vision who want the best for the county and its people, the men who take tough decisions with the long term prosperity of the nation have all gone to be replaced by selfish moral pigmys who just hang on to power to keep a job.

Just to look at the cheapest to implement policy of the current Govenment, they told us the war on the motorist would stop but bigger and better speed cameras are back and I see no 80mph speed limit ....... All this because some focus group has told them it might offend some minority group of voters.

No one will take the desperately needed decision on new runways at the London airports.

With this bunch of low life in power how do you expect to get any decisions that require backbone and vision made ? In May we have a tough choice, in that we have to pick the party who is the least worse for the future of the nation.

The only thing I can garentee is the politicians will see tham selfs alright and will do that by squeezing the defence budget even tighter.

Heathrow Harry

18th Feb 2015, 16:55

"Politics is no longer the turf of men of vision who want the best for the county and its people, the men who take tough decisions with the long term prosperity of the nation have all gone to be replaced by selfish moral pigmys who just hang on to power to keep a job."

When was it ever any different?

Read Trollope, read a biography of Disraeli, or Churchill before 1935

they're all the same and always have been

theonewhoknows

18th Feb 2015, 17:45

Short-range aircraft with nuclear weapons, offering a viable deterrent against a near-pear or peer adversary? If you think so, then I suggest that you do not have a clue about the threats that are out there. That a civilian organisation, with all the so called academic clout it espouses, really thinks it can conduct useful analysis is, frankly, preposterous.

I await your informed and valid responses.

ShotOne

18th Feb 2015, 18:00

Without disagreeing with your point about the relative capability of F35, why should the the fact that it's a civilian organisation disqualify the analysis? The official govt intelligence agencies didn't exactly excel when we last relied on their analyses, dodgy dossier and all.

Willard Whyte

18th Feb 2015, 18:43

Indeed, one organization that springs to mind is the RAND Corporation, including RAND Europe.

PeterGee

18th Feb 2015, 20:51

Sorry guys but either the author does not understand deterrence, or I don't! Assuming Russia is the prime threat, surely they say, "do as we say or Brum (or other large city) is flattened". We say no, they launch and we try and send some F35s to retaliate. The carrier has a Russian SSN in tow (crikey knows where it would need to be to raid St Petersburg,but not anywhere safe) and every RAF tanker is well and truly marked. Likely outcome is we can't afford the risk and we agree to the Russian demand. Deterrent failed!

So this only really works for roque now nuclear states that acquire longer range rockets. Is that really what we intend the deterrent to provide?

The core thing is do we spend money on successor, or go without and trust the USA to look out for us. (Like Italy, Germany, Spain etc) They are the only sensible choices. And if we choose to go without, the money is more likely to go away from defence. When we spend £50 billion a year on interest, it would be wrong to spend money just because we cut a programme.

My belief is we are a much safer nation with the deterrent. However, whether we can afford a replacement is a real question that needs an answer. Spending money on a watered down non-effective alternative is a nonsense.

The only other route I see is agreeing with the USA that we provide a core non nuclear capability they rely upon, in return for providing our cover. This may hold some water as their Ohio replacement costs really do make the eyes water!

rh200

18th Feb 2015, 22:59

That a civilian organisation, with all the so called academic clout it espouses, really thinks it can conduct useful analysis is, frankly, preposterous.

Not at all, one that doesn't account for all the variables is. Its all about how they see the future. There are no shortage of retired military people of good caliber to provide input. Also no shortage of useless ones.:p

The metrics they use is the same problem we have with every thing else we are doing these days, colored by politics and personal philosophies.

theonewhoknows

19th Feb 2015, 07:04

There are some very good think tanks and ex-military people that are able to advise on future conflict scenarios etc. I'm unaware of any that have access to, or can use, classified information on potential adversary capabilities. Wrong information in, wrong answer out.

It has been stated before, the stand-off required in some scenarios will dictate the systems needed. Add to that adversary defensive capabilities, then any relevant analysis conducted must be able to stand up to scrutiny.

Genstabler

23rd Feb 2015, 23:22

The CentreForum paper offers some interesting perspectives. At the moment we are faced with the prospect of spending a vast sum of money to replace Vanguard, which, while absorbing a large proportion of the defence budget, is totally inflexible and has actually no military relevance. At the same time it prevents us in the foreseeable future from deploying capabilities which have real strategic and tactical flexibility and military relevance, such as proper aircraft carriers, effective naval and airforce combat aircraft, MPA, proper AAR etc.

In my opinion, as we already possess it, the UK would be foolish not to retain some measure of independent nuclear deterrent as a last ditch card that also delivers some political advantages. However, I also believe that a Vanguard submarine based deterrent, while making some sense in the Cold War threat scenario, is no longer purposeful. Who or what is the threat to the UK alone that it is supposed to deter?

If we proceed as currently planned we will end up for the coming decades with two vast, expensive helicopter carriers which can carry a single, expensive, high risk, second best fighter type with which the RAF will also be saddled, no effective escorts to protect them, no useful means of on board aerial replenishment or AEW, and no MPA. We might, however, be able to deter Russia from taking over Europe using nuclear weapons, though not if they stick to conventional weapons and if that is their intention.

Does that really make proper sense? Better to reduce the mirage of a strategic nuclear deterrent to a more realistic minimum to permit our conventional military capabilities achieve a proper footing.

Dryce

24th Feb 2015, 00:32

At the same time it prevents us in the foreseeable future from deploying capabilities which have real strategic and tactical flexibility and military relevance, such as proper aircraft carriers, effective naval and airforce combat aircraft, MPA, proper AAR etc.

The defence of the UK? We seem to have forgotten how to go about doing that. Carriers have limited relevance to the defence of the UK.

Against an adversary with SSNs they'll last a few days in the open ocean. Against an adversary with SSKs and strike aircraft on the continental shelf the clock will also be ticking. They're just bigger more valuable targets. They require a lot of manpower - compromised aircraft - and a long logistic trail.

They're not about defence but politics or going after an adversary without submarines and strike aircraft.

If that's tactical flexibility - then it's a luxury to have after you sorted out defence of UK. Worse - it's a tactical flexibility that can within the next decade probably be delivered by other means using a smaller carrier designed to operate drones and backed by SSGNs.

And in the midst of this we seem to have forgotten the issue of confidence. The deterrent is ultimately one big shreiking hysterical "we will F*** you if you come near us" - that works if your adversary is convinced that you will use it. And if it comes to it as long as they have food and enough life left in the kettles they can skulk off to whereever they need to in order to deliver some instant sunshine to somebody you decide not to like on the other side of the planet. In a really nasty world that's real flexibility.

Lonewolf_50

24th Feb 2015, 12:25

"what's the cheapest way of delivering credible minimum deterrence (so that we can spend the saved cash on the conventional forces)?" First off, your exam question is wrong. It is important to understand what effective deterrence is.
Cheap may get you a "we can claim we have deterrence" but it may not give you what you are trying to achieve.
So, what is the most cost efficient EFFECTIVE deterrence. To be effective, it must be credible.
Deterrence is by its nature a DEEP fight. The TACAIR answer is risible. "Stealth" is as much a marketing ploy as capability, which erodes over time in its ability to "try not to be seen."
The TLAM-N deterrent model might be viable against mid to low tech enemies. For example, if you were a mid to low level power and had as your deterrent object a mid to low level nation, you might get away with X number of diesel subs able to carry X dozen TLAM-N equivalents.
Against any significant EW/IAD architecture that deterrent doesn't fly. (Pun intended)

As this is a Brit topic, I'll back out now. I am also a few years beyond being involved in such theater strategic level issues to be current in my thinking.

It is interesting to watch the discussion.
Any number of mid sized powers are keen to establish a deterrent capability: Iran, for one. I daresay they want a legitimate deterrent, not a paper tiger deterrent. For that matter, the NorKor goons are striving mightily to establish a credible deterrent that goes beyond the local theater in reach.

Genstabler

24th Feb 2015, 15:44

A national nuclear deterrent is only of use in deterring other nations who possess their own nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them and the ideology and intent to countenance their apocalyptic use. Can you name any?

However, there are many nations and ideologies that are capable and willing to employ lethal conventional force to further their aims and are constantly doing so.

As a nation we in the impoverished UK need carefully to balance our capability to combat both threats. It is not logical, sensible or cost effective to put massive funding into the former when it is at the expense of the latter.

Lonewolf_50

24th Feb 2015, 16:02

Genstabler

24th Feb 2015, 16:07

That ain't necessarily so. Not all deterrent is based on MAD.
But a nuclear deterrant will only be used by a civilised society in the event of a nuclear attack.

Heathrow Harry

24th Feb 2015, 16:36

Actually the deterrent value is "might only be used etc etc"

If you have them the bad guys have to think that someone MIGHT fire back at them - you are increasing their downside a longggggggg way

Treble one

24th Feb 2015, 16:43

Surely the credibility of the deterrent would be in question with an air launched system?

There is little doubt that such as system would be cheaper compared to SSBN (and their replacement), but the whole idea of going down that route to replace the V Force was because the system became too vulnerable to an attack.

Genstabler

24th Feb 2015, 17:42

"Vulnerable to attack by ICBMs". Unless we are attacked by Russia, France or the US that is an unlikely scenario post-Cold War.

In the post-Cold War scenario the threat has changed and there is no longer the justification to maintain a vastly expensive SSBN force which can only come at the expense of conventional defence capability, for which there is a constant requirement.

Genstabler

24th Feb 2015, 17:49

HH
"Actually the deterrent value is "might only be used etc etc""

No. The deterrant is only effective if the perception is "will be used".

ORAC

24th Feb 2015, 19:27

HH
"Actually the deterrent value is "might only be used etc etc""

No. The deterrant is only effective if the perception is "will be used".

ESIJ_C9mUBI

Lonewolf_50

24th Feb 2015, 20:03

But a nuclear deterrant will only be used by a civilised society in the event of a nuclear attack. I don't think you understand that deterrence is a living concept, not confined to the East and West Bloc. Your assertion about "only be used" is a guess, at best, since so far all that deterrence has done is made people reluctant to use the weapons at all, be it for tactical or strategic reasons.
It's a multi polar and far less rational world nowadays. I offer as exhibit A Pakistan's nuclear capability. :mad:
The deterrant is only effective if the perception is "will be used.
Wrong again. "Is likely to be used" is far more accurate, and "will be used" is a simpleton's explanation.

The very uncertainty is an advantage: will they or won't they?

Some will argue that Ronald Reagan introduced greater uncertainty when he was in office and that uncertainty scared people on BOTH sides of the wall.
THAT is effective deterrence, of one form, but it isn't the only one.

PS: never show your hold card.
Never rule out first use.
Make the bastards sweat.

Genstabler

24th Feb 2015, 21:54

Lonewolf.

While I find you dismiss my views rather condescendingly, I suppose I understand where you are coming from.

http://www.youtube.com/embed/Vt7FDTpzGvo?rel=0

Lonewolf_50

25th Feb 2015, 15:13

Gen, apologies if the tone came across as harsh, but your repeated use of an outdated trope, and assumptions/assertions that don't fit the year 2015, evoked comment. I know (and you know) how the old model of deterrence was constructed. The world has changed, including deterrence and (which you acknowledge) the perception element. To be clear, we agree on the importance of perception.
What does the object of deterrence believe? That applies to conventional as well as nuclear models of that tool.
As another thought experiment for you, consider the deterrent as applied by the Israelis -- it doesn't fit the narrow confines of your assertions as posted.
Neither does that of the NorKors.

And no, you don't get where I'm coming from.
PS: Apologies to all for staying in thread longer than intended, but I suppose deterrence ends up being an alliance thing, not just a given nation's thing ... Charles De Gaulle's point considered.

Bigpants

25th Feb 2015, 15:21

I don't think you could replace Trident with one made of Paper, new or otherwise.

Paper planes and Paper Tigers maybe!

Lonewolf_50

25th Feb 2015, 15:56

Or a paper deterrent, such as the kind Saddam Hussein had. :p
PS:
Or no deterrent, which is what the Ukraine has/had (http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/534511-ukraine-crisis-2014-a-48.html#post8866672).

Heathrow Harry

25th Feb 2015, 16:29

But Saddam DID have "weapons of mass destruction" we just haven't found
them yet (source T Blair, The Bush memorial Library etc)

I'm with Wolf on this one

"The very uncertainty is an advantage: will they or won't they?"

I know Ronnie R scared the s*** out of me and I suspect he REALLY spooked the Russians...............

Lonewolf_50

25th Feb 2015, 16:46

Harry, while the usual anecdotes in re Saddam's guessing incorrectly on two Bush's intentions are popular, what I had in mind with that sound byte is based on some of the output of the interview / interrogation with Saddam after he was captured and before he was hanged.

One of the points raised was why he'd been playing the whole shell game with the UN / Sanctions / Cease Fire Agreement / Inspections of 1991 and beyond. Among other things it had to do with his bluff/deterrent posture towards Iran, and providing them with 'uncertainty' in his posing / posturing vis a vis his major regional rival.

Granted, that's not a nuclear deterrent in the classic sense of when someone knows for darned sure that you have nukes, but he had used chemical weapons on them before ... so perhaps that is a lesser included case of "deterrent" if he could convince them of possession of that level of nastiness.

I may be a lone ranger in the following, but I cannot stand the use of the imprecise term "weapons of mass destruction" and never have liked it, preferring the older term 'NBC' which addressed the Nuke/Bio/Chem weapons. While all are nasty, each is nasty in a particular way and I don't like the semantic games people played with the general term.

A "WMD" deterrent isn't as clear a deterrent posture as a nuclear deterrent.
I might gas you.
I might nuke you.

Two significantly different threats/challenges to address, two very different risks to manage.

Apply this point to the actual topic of the thread, which is a submarine based deterrent force.
It really doesn't do the trick if it's gas.

Genstabler

26th Feb 2015, 10:12

Several posters cite the uncertainty of response as strengthening the deterrent value of a national nuclear capability. That is neither logical nor credible. Faced with the options that a potential target MAY respond to an attack, or WILL respond to an attack, which is the more likely to make an aggressor think twice?

Uncertainty is only an advantage if it concerns the question of whether or not you actally possess the capability, as in the case of S Hussain.

Lonewolf_50

26th Feb 2015, 12:16

Disagree.
That is neither logical nor credible. Faced with the options that a potential target MAY respond to an attack, or WILL respond to an attack, which is the more likely to make an aggressor think twice?
In the case of nuclear, it's equivalent, since you don't know and the damage of guessing wrong is prohibitive.
If other sorts of nastiness, the risk of being wrong doesn't exact the same price.

You can't demonstrate with complete certainty that "you will use nukes" without actually using them or so demonstrating. Any assertion is political rhetoric/speech, and must be treated as such (because that's the level at which this whole thing operates). What adds credibility to your deterrent is having systems that work, and that are known to work.
Why would anyone go to the expense of making and maintaining them if you won't use them under at least one circumstance, if not a variety of scenarios?

Will use? Certainty?

The only people who have used nukes are the US in 1945 before the deterrence game was even begun. Thus, from your expressed point of view, nobody has a credible deterrent (to achieve your absurd credibility standard) other than the US ... who has used two.

We both know that isn't how nuclear deterrence works.

As to any advantage Saddam's uncertainty provided, that didn't seem to work, now did it? :p

Genstabler

26th Feb 2015, 12:58

Lonewolf

I think we are divided by a common language to the point that we will never really understand what the other is saying. There's a useful lesson there.

As for:

"As to any advantage Saddam's uncertainty provided, that didn't seem to work, now did it?"

That demonstrates the weakness of trying to bluff your opponent when you don't have a hand. If he knows you can and will respond in kind, he will be deterred.

Dryce

26th Feb 2015, 19:55

Several posters cite the uncertainty of response as strengthening the deterrent value of a national nuclear capability. That is neither logical nor credible.

It is actually logical.

And it doesn't just apply to the deterrent. As an example people are advised to keep their car keys out of sight from external observers. The reason being that providing a perpetrator certainty as to their location allows them to exploit that knowledge to evaluate the effort/risks in overcoming your security based on the confidence of acquiring them.

So uncertainty can increase the effectiveness of your security.

As it can increase the effectiveness of your deterrent.

ORAC

12th Mar 2015, 08:54

UK Boosts Submarine Assessment Funding (http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/03/11/uk-boosts-submarine-assessment-funding/70156332/)

LONDON — Britain's Defence Ministry has increased spending on the assessment phase for a new generation of Royal Navy nuclear missile submarines.

The £285 million (US $429 million) deal primarily involves BAE Systems, but nuclear power plant builder Rolls-Royce and support provider Babcock also have small contracts. The deal covers the final phase of design work on the successor submarines to the four Vanguard-class Trident missile boats currently providing Britain's nuclear deterrent. The subs are planned to begin entering service in 2028.

A decision is due next year by the new government on whether to go ahead and build the new missile boats. "The successor program is the largest and most complex project we have ever faced. This funding will now allow us to mature the design over the next 12 months to enable us to start construction in 2016," said Tony Johns, the managing director at BAE Systems' Submarines.

More than £2 billion had been spent on the submarine's concept and assessment phase work by the end of the financial year 2013/2014 and that total continues to grow as part of a planned £3.3 billion spend ahead of approval for construction.......

Pontius Navigator

12th Mar 2015, 09:54

Lone wolf, I have been told one of our premiers said he would retaliate but, my words, regretted it. That parties previous Minister of Defence, a former card carrying member said he would not.

Apparently one TB turned white after his election when he was briefed and given the codes. This is one of the first things when you enter #10 for the first time.

Would anyone ever have doubted Maggie?

Lonewolf_50

12th Mar 2015, 12:54

Pontius, I'd say Dame Thatcher would have been more likely to not balk at the prospect. But I don't know for certain.

What bothers a lot of people about the nuclear deterrent game is that it very much resembles a poker game with some cards up and some hold cards.

And a lot of bluffing.
Gen:
We aren't in as much disagreement as one might think, but I do not agree with you here.
If he knows you can and will respond in kind, he will be deterred. If he knows you can, me may be deterred.

Nobody knows if you will. All anyone knows is if you can or can't.
That is how having in one's possession working kit establishes the baseline for deterrence.
Do I want to risk him/her hitting that button?
I think we can agree that in Saddam's case, his only "WMD" of known quantity and/or use was gas, and the fear some folks had was that he was trying to establish a non bluff nuclear deterrent. Hence my point on his being a paper deterrent, which isn't a deterrent at all. He didn't have working kit.

If one looks at the efforts in Iran to establish working nuclear weapons, I will ask (returning to the opening post and this thread's actual topic) ...

Does Iran establishing the capability change the UK's nuclear deterrent posture? If not, whose does it influence?

Fox3WheresMyBanana

12th Mar 2015, 13:25

The issue of uncertainty with nuclear use relates to the timing and necessary trigger actions, not whether they will be used at all. Potential enemies must be certain you will use nukes at some point, but not what that point is. Thus an enemy thinking of attempting to escalate gradually, or push the limits of what would cause a nuclear response would be less likely to do so if they could not be sure where the boundaries were.

I can't find the reference now, but I'm sure I read that it was official policy to portray the US President as slightly unstable for this reason. I'm pretty sure this started in the mid-1980's.

Of course, any propaganda is unnecessary if one's leader is actually senile, power-crazed, or liable to lash out randomly under pressure. This has been the case for quite a lot of nuclear armed countries most of the time since the mid-1980's ;)

The question of a nuclear response is constantly on the minds of Russia, Iran, etc. However they probably regard the current incumbent as highly unlikely to order a first use in any circumstances, which is actually more dangerous in the longer run than the prospect that he might.

Capt H Peacock

12th Mar 2015, 14:13

One of the policy objectives of MAD was how to addess an adversary with a military command authority who was either insane enough or stupid enough to think he could go get away with it, without his command structure deciding to isolate him before he did anything highly consequential.

It's often said of Kruschev that he never understood how JFK, a man whom he considered to be a young Turk, was able to stand up against him. Actually, Kruschev was nothing more than an ill-educated bar room brawler,and a man of the soil, and it was his entourage who were able to finally defuse the situation by skilful posturing and managed withdrawal.

Whether ISIS too could be measured against the same pattern. Foolish hotheads, but backed by rational wealthy patrons in another ME entity, able to take the toys away when they start getting dangerous remains to be seen.

For the UK though; we have cut material defence whilst leaving the civilian element extant. Throwing White Papers at the enemy is about all that's left.

The fact that the enemy were able to put a submarine into Holyloch should be warning enough, the fact that we had no counter is a national disgrace.

That's what you get with a generation of professional politicians, rookies who know nothing abaout anything, and spin doctors who care only about the public perception of their actions.

I look forward to the rise of the professional soldiers who have spent the last 25 years in combat, and who know what it means to send a man to his death. When they step up and take the levers of power, I shall be able to sleep again.

For the UK, I fear it's too late.

BillHicksRules

12th Mar 2015, 14:17

Cap,

"The fact that the enemy were able to put a submarine into Holyloch should be warning enough, the fact that we had no counter is a national disgrace."

When did this happen?

Fox3WheresMyBanana

12th Mar 2015, 14:51

November last year

Britain forced to ask Nato to track 'Russian submarine' in Scottish waters - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11283926/Britain-forced-to-ask-Nato-to-track-Russian-submarine-in-Scottish-waters.html)

The report only mentions "off the West coast of Scotland". That could be just off the dock at Holy Loch or 400nm off the Outer Hebrides, I don't know. If the latter, I suspect this would have been indicated by some form of words as 'no significant intrusion', which was not said. Maybe Cap knows more.

Lonewolf_50

12th Mar 2015, 15:58

Fox, while one of the assumptions in the linked paper is IMO fanciful (that is would be "easy" for India to head north and take on Pakistan with conventional forces, thus evoking a nuclear response from Pakistan) the follow on "what if Pakistan or India uses nukes and the other responds" analysis is pretty grim reading (http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf).

How does that apply to the UK's nuclear posture? Sad thing is that even if the traditional nuclear exchange that we all worried about in the Cold War never happens, the impact of even a local nuclear exchange that isn't aimed at the old school MAD, Eurocentric model, is still going to screw the whole globe.

The failures of the NPT, or maybe I should say its current status of decay, is indeed a grim prospect for the whole of civilization. :uhoh: :eek:

That overarching worry doubtless informs President Obama's current attempts at a deal with Iran. What I wonder at is why old Vlad isn't walking in lock step with us, and the leadership in China. I would think that the Chinese would be very concerned with nuclear proliferation. It would have a marked impact on them.

If you look at the linked analysis, the devastation to Asian, in general, and Chinese agricultural output is macabre should local powers in the South Asian and Asian sphere start lobbing buckets of sunshine at one another.

Not_a_boffin

12th Mar 2015, 16:26

Hmmm.

Holy Loch.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holy_Loch#/media/File:Holy_Loch_06.jpg

Why?

Fox3WheresMyBanana

12th Mar 2015, 16:44

I'm aware of the details of a local nuclear conflict, and consider it a risk which needs to be taken seriously.
India could well get fed up with Pakistan failing to rein in its religious nutters, indeed even one more Mumbai could do it. Of course, they would have to be some kind of headcase to start anything, but the region is full of them.

Holy Loch - sorry, strictly speaking I mean HMNB Clyde in Gare Loch and RNAD Coulport just round the corner in Loch Long. Holy Loch is just across from them, where the Yanks used to be.

Not_a_boffin

12th Mar 2015, 17:23

Fox3

I know where and what Holy Loch is/used to be. I was merely wondering why the good captain was so adamant there was a boat in it and vexed about it.

Fox3WheresMyBanana

12th Mar 2015, 17:46

Adamant there was one there? I know not.
Vexed about it? Just about the only chance of tracking a 'boomer' is to follow it out of home port. Bye, bye second strike capability.

ORAC

22nd Aug 2015, 05:23

BAE kicks off major nuclear submarine yard upgrade (http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/08/21/bae-starts-upgrade--yard-building-trident-missile-submarines/32114815/)

BAE kicks off major nuclear submarine yard upgrade

LONDON — An eight-year redevelopment scheme enabling BAE Systems nuclear submarine facility to build a new generation of nuclear missile boats for the Royal Navy has got underway in northwest England. The rebuilding program at the Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria, nuclear submarine yard has started with the construction of a £23 million ($36.1 million) logistics facility, BAE announced Aug 20.

Subject to parliamentary approval, the Conservative government is expected to decide next year to give the final go ahead to the Successor program aimed at replacing the four Trident missile equipped, Vanguard-class submarines, which have provided Britain's nuclear deterrent capability since 1995. The government is committed to build four Successor submarines, with steel for the first boat being cut at the BAE yard in 2016 and an inservice date of 2028.

To equip the yard for construction of the largest submarines it has ever built, between £300 and £400 million is being spent expanding and upgrading the yard. In it's 2014 update to Parliament on progress in the future nuclear deterrent, the overnment outlined its part in financing the facilities upgrade program.

The report said the Ministry of Defence had brought forward, or reprofiled, £261 million of funding into the current assessment phase offering better value for money investing in facilities at the yard. The reprofiling also allowed for long lead item ordering. "The MoD is able to re-pay the company for the cost of the facilities as building work progresses, rather than recovering the costs across the build programme as a whole. This approach is expected to reduce the cost by some £42 million from that originally planned," said the report.

BAE said the work will include a "mixture of new build projects and the refurbishment of existing facilities in what is the most significant redevelopment of the site since the 1980s." The company wouldn't provide details of the redevelopment but previous reports list a new quayside, extension of the Devonshire Dock Hall building, two new pressure hull unit facilities and refurbishing the main fabrication facility as being among the projects alongside the new logistics center. At nearly 300 meters long and over 50 meters high, the Devonshire Dock Hall where BAE assembles the submarines is already one of the largest buildings in northern England. .

Allan Day, the director of the redevelopment program at BAE Submarines, said "the infrastructure this redevelopment will provide, together with our highly skilled workforce, will be critical in delivering these submarines to the Royal Navy."

The improvement to facilities in support of the Successor program is not limited to BAE. Nuclear propulsion unit supplier Rolls-Royce is updating and refurbishing it's aging factory at Raynesway, Derby, to build the new PWR3 power plant.........

barnstormer1968

22nd Aug 2015, 09:23

While this thread has had some very detailed or technical replies, the basic fact that Britain couldn't rely on ANY aircraft borne deterrent can't be changed.
If we were talking of North Korea then the airfields would be secure places, and would be protected by an IADS. We are talking about the UK, with carriers that would require most of their air compliment to protect themselves from a major adversary and airfields that are very easy to disable.

It seems to always come as a surprise to some that the RAF could be stopped in its tracks very quickly. I've heard lots of tales of tactics using low, medium and high altitude. Heard about DAS and evasive manoeuvres but none of these worried me. I still knew the UK was a free democracy, had only a few air bases and nowhere near enough RAF regiment to protect them from organised attack.
The RAF regiment/RAF FP don't even have enough manpower to protect airfields from rifle/grenade attack, let alone anything a bit more powerful of with a slightly longer range.
The new F35 may have super duper stealth and an advanced DAS suit, but sadly that won't help an aircraft that needs to fly from a known I'm moveable base, and use a known immovable runway.
Even something that could realistically disperse like the harriers could (with non heavy loads/fuel weights) are easy to find and track in today's western society with nothing more complex than an iPhone.

Let's not kid ourselves that in an all out conflict against an organised opponent that any RAF airfield would be operational for very long. The saddest part is that by only causing very limited damage the effects would be disproportionate as the RAF has been being stripped of its damage repair capabilities in successive defence budgets.

Many of you will have seen for yourselves that SF can quite easily get themselves inside an RAF station. Some posters here have come face to face with SF on top of or within buildings on the station during exercises. When the SF are using live rounds and have indirect fire weapons it's easy to see just how vulnerable an RAF station really is.

An airborne deterrent in a Western society with free movement just isn't a credible option IMHO. It's not even a question of numbers or cost, it's simply the fact it wouldn't work. The fact we don't have an air delivered weapon, enough aircraft or a training system seem to pale in comparison.

TaranisAttack

22nd Aug 2015, 19:54

Some people have convinced themselves that abolishing Trident means more money for conventional forces. In reality, the conventional forces will just continue to be cut as they always do, and BOTH lots of money will go into paying for things that buy Tory votes like pensions or a national care service.

ORAC

21st Dec 2016, 21:02

New UK Defense Agency to Oversee Nuclear Missile Subs Construction (http://www.defensenews.com/articles/new-uk-defense-agency-to-oversee-nuclear-missile-subs-construction)

LONDON - A new British Ministry of Defence agency being set up to oversee the construction of a fleet of nuclear missile submarines for the Royal Navy will start operations next April with ex-railway construction boss Robert Holden named as the interim chairman.

In an annual update to Parliament on progress with Britain’s £31 billion (US $38.4 billion) nuclear deterrent program, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon said that subject to formal approval staff currently employed on the project at the Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) organization will start moving across to the new executive agency from April 1.

“The new body will undergo a process of transformation and be optimized for submarine delivery and support under the leadership of a new CEO that MoD now intends to recruit. To assist in the process of establishing the body, Robert Holden has been appointed as interim chairman,” Fallon told lawmakers in a report Dec. 20.

Holden’s LinkedIn entry describes him as holding a number of non-executive and consultancy roles. His assignments in the UK cover some of the nation’s largest infrastructure programs, including work on High Speed 1 and High Speed 2 rail programs. He was also chairman of Crossrail, a major project involving the construction of a new rail line across London. The executive has also worked on projects associated with the Royal Navy Type 26 frigate and Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier programs and has been involved in several aspects of the nuclear industry, including in his early career working at what is now BAE Systems submarine yard in northwest England.....

Heathrow Harry

22nd Dec 2016, 11:49

there's another 6-12 months wasted while they get new emails, business cards, offices and titles....................

msbbarratt

22nd Dec 2016, 11:59

So, if we can do this for a sub procurement, what's stopping us doing it for a carrier or fighter or MPA? I suppose it's one way of focusing attention on the job in hand. I wonder what DE&S think of this?!

Guzz

22nd Dec 2016, 16:18

Apologies if this has been mentioned. I've skim read the thread and don't think I've seen it...

The UK government has gone down the road of Trident because it is a credible 'second strike' system the whole point of which would only be used in the event of a nuclear attack on the UK or one of its allies that warrants a full scale nuclear response. An aggressor does not know where the return volley will come from therefore can never target it as part of the first strike. There in lies the deterrent. If the Nuclear deterrent lies with aircraft carriers, the whereabouts of which are easily found, then they can be targeted, which destroys the actual deterrent part. I guess what I'm saying is, that if we want a deterrent (and I think we definitely should have one!) then it has to be a second strike system to be effective and therefore has to be a boomer.

ORAC

22nd Dec 2016, 16:41

That's because it has been done to death. If you can't be bothered to read this and the other extant threads on the subject, and want to start to regurgitate the same vast amount of discussion on the subject again, please don't.......

Otherwise it will end up being retitled the "Trident Hamsterwheel".....

salad-dodger

22nd Dec 2016, 17:27

Yes, please desist from discussion and leave the thread clear for ORAC to continue with his pasting of news articles.

Hangarshuffle

22nd Dec 2016, 20:54

Trident replacement? How much? I've just driven home on an unlit A road where the white lines have long ago faded out, no cats eyes and everyone except me drives at 80.
Better spent public money......

AnglianAV8R

23rd Dec 2016, 09:58

tanimbar

23rd Dec 2016, 10:46

You don't know you're born!

Our potholes are sold in Australia as fish ponds.

ORAC

26th Sep 2018, 06:31

POLITICO:

The next big Labour row: Terrific scoop this morning (https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/labour-frontbencher-s-plan-to-scrap-trident-to-be-considered-by-shadow-cabinet-1-9366685) from the Yorkshire Post’s Arj Singh, who reveals a plan is being hatched by Jeremy Corbyn’s Shadow Peace Minister Fabian Hamilton to shift the party’s position on Trident.

Labour’s current policy — heavily guided by trade unions like Unite — is to back the renewal of Trident even though Corbyn himself is a veteran anti-nukes campaigner. But Singh reveals Hamilton is working on a “defense diversification strategy” in which high-skilled defense workers would be retrained for industries like health technology.

Asked if that could pave the way for unions to change position and support the scrapping of Trident, Hamilton says: “I sincerely hope so. I have always said party policy says we should renew Trident, but I say we should scrap it. That is also the view of the leader of the party.”

One to watch.