Tornado TFR question

[Thelma Viaduct]

Just seen a documentary that said the GR4 lost its terrain following radar capability.

Panavia Tornado: http://youtu.be/YJvffQrk81g

So I'm just wondering how effective the tfr in GR1 was?? Would it be routinely used in training sorties, was it truly hands off, did it work with autopilot and waypoints, could it be relied upon? Could it be used say through the lake district or was it limited in hilly areas, did it work over the sea. Cheers.

[99 Change Hands]

It was surprisingly good for the date of the technology. We used it on training sorties because we were required to but it really came into its own at night. Really hands-off but with hands near; in 1982 kids like me took to it readily but I always made my F104 pilot fly with his hands in sight so he didn't do something silly.

Used autopilot and waypoints, I will never forget the first TF sortie at Cottesmore (always done day into night) I pressed a cursor on the centre of a round lake in Wales on a map in the planning room,then, 2 hours later, as dusk fell, watching that lake appear in front of us and the world seeming to rotate around the aircraft as it turned to the next waypoint.

Sorties were planned along the line of valleys and the narrow field of view didn't see the sides. I do remember watching the anti-collision light flashing off the granite beside me once in Scotland.

Entering cloud as a 4-ship in card at low level in Goose Bay and popping out the far side still in formation is another fixed memory.

I seem to recall that over the sea, with no returns painting on the pilot's scope, it would enter a gentle climb so we just used radar height hold.

Did once have a rather severe pull-up from low level when the radar saw a glider that had briefly crested a ridge some distance ahead.

[Stuff]

the GR4 lost its terrain following radar capability

Was this documentary prepared by the Phoenix Think Tank?

[Thelma Viaduct]

Sounds like a good system, did it auto disengage on a pull up or stick input?

[exMudmover]

TFR in the GR1 worked more or less as advertised. At the GR1 Trinational OCU in the 80s we flew night TFR in most weather, except heavy rain showers, which the system would attempt to climb over. All TFR had to be with A/P engaged. Manual TFR was not permitted in peacetime. The system worked fine over the sea, even if the sea was calm (i.e. no radar returns), in which event the system reverted to Radar Altimeter Override. This was a back-up mode using the Rad Alt output.

During Tornado Instructor training sorties I used to demonstrate Rad Alt Override by finding a bit of calm water and carrying out a TF letdown with A/P engaged. The jet would level off OK at the Set Clearance Height you had entered, although the pull-out would be a bit late.

Day TFR in IMC was not permitted, merely because it violated the Low Flying weather minima. However, with experience many of us were happy to TFR into low cloud and trust the system to work safely. This could be a slightly ball-grabbing exercise, especially in turns in mountainous terrain. Every now and then the cloud would clear slightly to give a heart-stopping view of rocks and trees flashing past uncomfortably close, before you plunged once again into the white stuff.

Not an exercise for the faint-hearted.

The Tornado A/P was sophisticated and reliable. In Auto TFR the system would follow the waypoints in Track Hold and if Heading hold was selected it would fly on any course set by the pilot on the HSI heading knob. This feature was useful for letting down into narrow valleys through cloud at night.

AFIK no Tornado crew was ever flown into the ground by the TF system. Some crews crashed who had not engaged the system properly and/or were not carrying out the correct monitoring procedures.

During Automatic TFR the pilot ‘guarded’ the stick lightly and gave a running commentary on the indications on the E-scope, which gave a dynamic, graphic representation of how the system was reacting to obstacles. This was done merely to give the pilot something to do to earn his flying pay, while it may have reassured some Navs that the pilot had not gone to sleep!

Actually it also reassured the Nav that the system was engaged properly and he was not going to be flown into the ground by some dumb pilot.

In wartime the jet could Auto TF hands off at 0.9M and 200ft agl in Hard Ride

[MG]

[QUOTE]did it auto disengage on a pull up?/QUOTE]
It certainly did when we dropped our JP233 on the first night of GW1. Lesson learnt - don't have radalt height hold engaged when dropping bl@@dy great canisters!

[just another jocky]

As of 2010 (the last time I flew a GR4), it could Auto TFR. Something may have happened between then and now though, I don't know.

Agree with everything exMudmover says above. :ok:

Always enjoyed passenger flights showing off the Auto-TFR descent into low-level, hands off....well actually waving my hands above my head where he could see them whilst we were descending quite rapidly towards the ground.

On the GR1, there was a peacetime 350ft/day, 500ft/night minimum, though we all "knew" it worked below that as all we had to do was rotate the switch to get a lower altitude. Fortunately, when the GR4 came into service, all the restrictions had been removed and it could be legally flown to its lowest level. It also had HOTAS so the Auto-TFR could be engaged/disengaged with 3 finger presses on the control column.

In GW1, the GR1 flew Auto-TFR to its lowest level, and lower when flown manually.

[just another jocky]

Sounds like a good system, did it auto disengage on a pull up or stick input?

It had certain fail-safe modes when critical failures occurred. This would inevitably involve what was called an Open Loop Pull-Up....a 3-4G pull up with a gradual disengagement of the autopilot. Not the sort of thing you want to occur in badlands.

So I'm just wondering how effective the tfr in GR1 was?? Would it be routinely used in training sorties, was it truly hands off, did it work with autopilot and waypoints, could it be relied upon? Could it be used say through the lake district or was it limited in hilly areas, did it work over the sea. Cheers.

Very effective, I totally trusted it. Used routinely on the Gr1, less so on the GR4 due to it's NVG/FLIR capability. Yes, it was truly hands-off and it could either follow the computer demanded route or you could manually steer it using the heading bug on the pilots HSI. It was usually reliable, though in the early days of the GR1, less so. It could be used in hilly terrain though had natural limitations the steeper/higher the terrain became. Worked well over all but the calmest of seas and had a back-up if the radar could not see the surface.

HTH

[jungleboy]

The GR4 has not lost the TFR system. It is still widely used and gives the Tornado it's unique all weather day and night strike capability. Where did this rumour come from?

[Just This Once...]

I had total faith in the TFR, even set to its lowest setting at silly speeds. I can testify that the line gets pretty flat once you go supersonic....

I must admit that TF-Loft-TF was less than enjoyable at times but it is a pretty neat capability.

[Thelma Viaduct]

Thanks for the stories, all very interesting. Must take massive balls to trust it, I'm bad enough with the Mrs driving the car, let alone a computer flying me in clag at 500kts and 100ft next to walls of granite.

No rumour, as per the first line, just stated in a docu on utube. (24:45 ish)


Panavia Tornado: http://youtu.be/YJvffQrk81g

[Thelma Viaduct]

Are there any decent Tornado themed gw1 books available?? I'd be very interested in any JP233 and other low level stories. The ultra low level desert training flights pre-kickoff must have been fun.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Pious Pilot - since that video also states, among other things, that the F3 has an Aden cannon (it's actually made by Mauser), there was no suitable alternative to the F3 (F-15, F-14 were both proposed and suitable), and that the RAF website tells you the GR4 still has TFR*
RAF - Tornado GR4 (http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/tornado.cfm)

One might conclude the average youtube video is a load of cr@p.

Please do a little checking before posting.

Then there's Jungleboy posting from Lossiemouth telling you otherwise. Hint: Lossiemouth is a GR4 base.

*Mind you, that page has a picture of two F3s - God save us, is everything on the Interweb total sh!te these days? (rhetorical)

[tartare]

Some of you have made reference to TFR being used in manual mode.
Does that mean the radar advises path and altitude to be flown, and the pilot manually flies it - as opposed to the AP being slaved to the radar?
It sounds like it must have been a hell of a ride in automatic mode.
200 feet at 500+ knots - wow.

[Thelma Viaduct]

I'm not checking everything in the video before I ask questions about it you lunatic. It's their mistake, take it up with them if you're that bothered by it.

[Al R]

Was this relatively early phase technology subsequently outstripped by AAA SAM developments or did it ever have genuine relevance - Granby showed flaws in the fast and low approach. Would it have worked better in a hilly European Central Plain where the odds of evasion were far better? If so, it shows how tightly defined and restrictive the designers thinking was.

Was pilot workload lessened at all, I can't imagine by much. What have we done with all those mission planning cassettes - come on, own up.. who recorded the Top 30 on Sunday afternoon on one?

[MAINJAFAD]

Al R

Most of the Tornado's shot down during Granby were not at low level when they were hit. Only one was shot down while carrying JP233 and that was after it had attacked the target. The rest (bar one) were in the process of lofting 1000lb bombs when they where hit (or in one case fragged by one of it's own VT fused bombs which exploded as soon as it armed). The last one was killed at medium level by an optically guided SA-2.

[Just This Once...]

It has always had relevance. Kosovo demonstrated that not all profiles flown could be achieved from medium level.

Regrettably the Taliban do not provide a radar service to achieve VFR below and GR4s have used the TFR to get below the weather to achieve the mission. The weather is usually very favourable in AFG; when it isn't favourable it is amazing to see how many shiny capabilities evaporate because of cloud.

[Al R]

MAIN,

Many thanks for the clarification. My faded memory is that we changed the attack profiles because they were 'reckless' somehow and out of date. I imagine they would have been but were the bombs lofted from low level and if so, how far away from the SAM/AAA ring? Forgive the noddy questions.

[Just This Once...]

Not really the case; the prime reason for the move to medium level was that the threat changed as a result of successful missions. The US also flew many low-level profiles before the switch and has already been mentioned the move to medium level was not without risk. Clearly the GR1 force would have liked a better medium level capability at the outset but the funded role was predicated on something else. The force had recognised the need to have a medium level capability, hence TIALD was not that far away and had to be somewhat rushed into service.

Incidentally it was not a complete switch to medium level - the combined efforts of II(AC) and 13 Sqn remained at low-level.

[Wrathmonk]

Day TFR in IMC was not permitted,merely because it violated the Low Flying weather minima.

You could in Goose Bay....couldn't you? And, unless my memory is playing tricks on me, I thought there was an area in Scotland ('moon country') that could be booked (or had set periods allocated) for IMC TFR operations.

[ExRAFRadar]

Okay my memory may dull as I get older but here goes

Back in Mid 80's at Spade. We were in the Ops room waiting for a 2 or 4 ship GR1 flight doing a FRA on the make believe field at Prior Lancy

They had checked in and the straight away went blind to our state of the art Search Radar - the AR-15.

Anyway the Range Controller, who may have been Pancho Painting (RIP Sir), had MUTES, T3 and the Prior Lancy chaps scanning and sweeping.

Now this is where my memory gets a bit dull. But the gist of it is true.

We had a Jammer called the T2 I think. I'm not sure if was just one of it's modes or it was dedicated to TFR jamming. Anyway, the T2 guy in charge says over the net "I have them bearing 287, another one bearing 289" or something like that.

The boss asked him how he had detected them and why no range to targets. GIC at T2 says "Our kit detected the TFR emissions"

Long story short, we had to send a signal to Strike detailing how and where the Tornado TFR was picked up and details of the engagements.

The rumor network at Spade went mad. "We had found how to track and kill TFR equipped a/c, and no one on the Tornado project had thought about it etc etc"

Of course we hadn't but I do remember some behind very closed doors meetings with the Range Occifers and the Int Flt Lt (AEO if I remember correctly)

Being a bit of a cabbage back then I loved it all. :ok:

[glad rag]

Thats because the TFR was running in a peace time mode. No I'm not saying anything else :ouch:

[Phil_R]

Apropos of nothing, Tornado obviously has a fairly capable ground mapping radar - does the TFR use the same radar system, or is it a separate bit of hardware?

P

[ExRAFRadar]

Being a cabbage I always thought something along those lines.

We had done some trials work with the Tornado chaps when they were carrying some new jammer pod, name escapes me.

Basically they trolled up and down a race circuit while we laid various stuff onto them. We were plotting them on the Radar Bomb Scoring system and when they called 'Gadget On' (or similar) we lifted the pen to mark the call, the sites called out the jamming levels they saw and we recorded them

I do recall it being very very boring.

But one of the sites said something like "We are burning through this easy" only for someone with greater knowledge to say "They are not on the Wartime setting"

Next on my 'Pull up a sandbag" posts - "How we saw UFO's over LFA 13 during a Mallet Blow"

[Timelord]

TFR and GMR are independent radar systems. GMR and its operator (back seat) can monitor TFR and its operator (front seat)

[Duplo]

GR1/4 TFR rather good. Always know as 'double top secret VFR'..!!.. you could even use it to creep up on the tanker… apparently..!

[RAFEngO74to09]

Pious Pilot,
You might be interested in RAF - Operation Granby (http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/OperationGranby.cfm) which includes a Campaign Diary. Also, the book Thunder & Lightning by Charles Allen HMSO ISBN 011 701 625 X was put together drawing on the personal experiences of 150 RAF personnel who were involved at all relevant locations - there is even a pic of me in it !

[Thelma Viaduct]

Thanks RAF Eng, I'll take a look.

On a side subject, what was the thinking behind IDS having wing mounted boz pods ecm chaff and flare whilst the ADV is tail and fuselage mounted? I realise the later ADV jets got phimat?? Just interested in the reasons rather than classified technical specifics.

I'd have thought the ADV solution freeing up wing space would be better??

Again, not a statement, just a question.

[RAFEngO74to09]

Pious Pilot,

Tornado GR1 was designed from the outset to carry a Skyshadow ECM pod and BOZ 107 chaff/flare pod on under wing outboard stations with other under wing and under fuselage stations being used for the required combinations of weapons and fuel drop tanks. The fitment of these pods also mitigated fatigue consumption by relieving wing bending - when insufficient Skyshadow pods were available, 2 BOZ pods were fitted for ballast.

Tornado F2/F3 was not originally provided with any chaff/flare capability. AN/ALE-40 chaff/flare dispensers were fitted for Op GRANBY / Gulf War 1 scabbed onto the rear engine doors. The function of the Radar Homing Warning Receiver (RHWR) fitted to Tornado F3 was to alert the crew to threats - not jam them.

AN/ALE-40 on Tornado F3:
http://i973.photobucket.com/albums/ae212/zotbox/ALE-40.jpg

[Thelma Viaduct]

So the F3 had no ECM at all?

Is there much info about on the EF-3? I remember reading about it being a great natural platform for SEAD owing to its rhwr suite.

I've always wondered why it was required seeing as the GR1/4 could carry more ALARM. Also why did some GR ac carry ALARM on the outer tank pylon and not all of them. The deployment of ALARM must have been very novel too, direct attack or parachute loiter, seems an ideal weapon and why was it taken oos?? Would like to read about the choices that presented the operator, was loiter mode given pre or post takeoff, did it have to be launched in a time/location window, what happened if you didn't launch, could it be reprogrammed during flight? How long would it take to designate and get a missile away at a target of opportunity (classified I bet), how would a target be designated, via aircraft systems or missile itself?

Apologies for the questions, getting carried away now. :ok:

[Onceapilot]

We could have a "classified" section of pprune with all the juicy stuff for people to talk about?

OAP

[MAINJAFAD]

ExRAFRadar

T2 was a bit of kit if memory serves, Never saw it myself, but knew a guy who worked on it at the time and he told me he had successfully jammed a F-111 TFR with the aircraft doing a high G pull up and a rather loud 'Oh Sh!t' coming out of the aircraft on the radio. I would be surprised if we didn't have such a device on one of the EW ranges seeing the Russians are into that type of ground based ECM. Look at SPN-40 Dog Cart on the link below.

Russian/Soviet/WarPac Ground Based ECM Systems (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-REB-Systems.html)

[Whoosh1999]

In the GR1 the back seat could not monitor the TFR. The TFR display was via a Scope just below the coaming on the left hand side of the front instrument dash. There were differences in display between RAF, German and Italian machines.

When using TFR the whole process was a crew effort. The nav would monitor what was coming up on the GMR, pylons, hills and valleys, and the pilot would then try to rationalise these as they were displayed on the TFR coming in from 8 miles. There was a constant commentary between both seats as to what was going on.

I never used the TFR to find a tanker: I always used the GMR to find the tanker when flying in the back seat.

We did use auto TFR both IMC and at night. As previously mentioned, IMC TFR was usually used in Goose Bay, where entering cloud as a 4-ball at 200' and coming out the other side after some serious turning in the correct place was always entertaining.

Regarding ALARM, the mission was planned using the desired mode: we didn't change the mode of firing in flight although it was possible.

[RAFEngO74to09]

Found this on-line which might be of interest to anyone who wants to compare Tornado GR1/GR4 to the F-111: F-111 Aardvark Pilot's Flight Operating Manual - United States Air Force - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=of0lJiN3XiEC&pg=SA1-PA106&lpg=SA1-PA106&dq=f-111+tfr+operation&source=bl&ots=E5q0JiFH5I&sig=P3b-8k7r1XrI-pSYgstzXXcBA-M&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Pm1CVOS8MYOeyQSHiYHQCQ&ved=0CFoQ6AEwCg#v=onepage&q=f-111%20tfr%20operation&f=false)

[JMP6]

Wrathmonk

That was EGR610, or the Highland Restricted Area.

I've been out of the loop for 4 years now though.

[exhorder]

A 1984 GAF Tonka crash in Bavaria is believed to have been caused by interference from a large radio transmitter nearby. At the time of the incident, the aircraft had been flying at low level in TFR automatic mode. The No. 2 crew observed their formation leader suddenly and violently veering towards the ground.

The Tornado crewmembers here probably know more about this.

[JFZ90]

Exhorder, I remember being told about that.

Rather than an interference with the TFR I had understood it was more a case or EMC/EMI issues from the transmitter coupling with the wiring controlling the rear tailerons - leading to some sort of full deflection command or similar with disasterous consequences.

I understood the Tornado TFR was Texas Instruments in the end, despite the pioneering work by Ferranti & TSR-2. Was this TI kit fundamentally the same as that in the F-111, or a derivative?

Who made the Vulcan TFR - which I recall was in the bulb under the IFRProbe?

[just another jocky]

The Bavaria crash was, AFAIK, not a problem with the TFR but the CSAS (Command Stability Augmentation System) which was the link between the stick & the flying controls.

The Tornado TFR was a TI derivative of the F-111 TFR.

[glad rag]

Was it not a unanticipated maneuver alongside a somewhat agitated aircrewmember with a paranoia over high power transmissions?

Having said that, my first task [after getting my haircut under the auspices of a certain deranged WO ;) ] at Rects Sqdn TTTE, was to man a cordon around the back end of a GAF GR as experiments were being carried out to the susceptibility of said CSAS system to external EMF's.
Oddly enough, when you backed the aircraft up to the main power input lines of the hanger the tailerons were actually twitching :}........that aside, fantastic times, being right on the cutting edge of NATO aircraft capability improvements. :ok:
Now you could ask about all the retrofits carried out to the avionics "crate" re emc, but hey that's an post OSD tale :ok::ok:.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

As contemporaries of a sort, how did the Tornado TFR compare to that on the F-111?


Pretty similar and closely related, as far as I can tell. The F-111 had 2 TFR units rather than one, so that if the active one failed, the other could take over without having a fail-flyup. Handy in war, but for peacetime the second unit was generally run in a ground mapping mode so that any failure would get the jet away from the ground. Dunno about the Fin, but in the -111 500' SCP (set clearance plane) was a weather mode, where the TFR didn't look above the aircraft (to try and avoid flying up into heavy rain etc). This meant a limit of M.85. For the other SCPs, down to 200', the TFR was cleared out to M1.2.

With a very different flying environment in Australia, we could (and did) TFR in IMC or at night pretty much anytime, provided we'd deconflicted properly with other operators. The TFR was a very good system, once you got used to seeing car headlights above you and having things go whizzing past very close laterally.

[GreenKnight121]

In other words, glad rag - having maligned and slandered one of the crew members, you then admit that the crash was due to the EM interference susceptibility of the Tornado as built, and not in any way the fault of the crew.


You might want to look up the crash of a US Army UH-60 in Germany in 1987 (and 4 others from 1982-1987) - which caused the Army to modify all of its Blackhawks to provide some level of EM protection.

The USN, on the other hand, from the start demanded that its Sea Hawks be heavily shielded from electronic interference.

Apparently there are radar and radio transmitters close to where Navy helicopters are operating when aboard ship... imagine that.

Ordinary Radio Waves Allegedly Can Knock Down Combat Copter - Los Angeles Times (http://articles.latimes.com/1987-11-09/news/mn-14533_1_black-hawk-crashes)

The Risks Digest Volume 5: Issue 56 (http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/5.56.html#subj1)

[glad rag]

In other words, glad rag - having maligned and slandered one of the crew members, you then admit that the crash was due to the EM interference susceptibility of the Tornado as built, and not in any way the fault of the crew.




TORNADO (http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/aircraft_by_type/tornado.htm)

"I don't think the information on ZA603 is altogether accurate - my memory from the accident report
was that the navigator had been reading an article on the effect of high power HF transmissions on
'fly by wire' aircraft (the HF radios on Tornados were at one time inhibited because transmitting
caused the right hand engine to go into reheat) just prior to the sortie and noted that the routing
took them quite close to some radio masts.

He was actually looking down at his knee pad map when the pilot made an aggressive manoeuvre to
avoid the A10 and thought the aircraft had gone out of control. He immediately ejected and as the
command ejection system was set to 'both' he ejected the pilot as well. "

Funnily enough that was what we, at the crash scene, were briefed on as well; the most impressive aspect was the distance the gun barrels went. :eek:The shockwave went over the top of the hill and struck some houses on the down slope causing considerable damage, however the "locals" were not too fazed and we were made very welcome, at least having the Brits around made a change from the septics driving over everything in their Abrams and Bradleys.....we just dropped a tonka on their heads :hmm:

[GreenKnight121]

So can anyone call up the actual accident report - instead of someone's second-hand "recollection" of what it supposedly said?

[tartare]

If I remember correctly, the radio transmitter tower that said Tonkas flew close to actually belonged to Radio Free Europe - am I right?
Somewhat ironic if so...

[MAINJAFAD]

GK121

The RAF Tornado crash was in Nov 84 (Aircraft was ZA603 from 27 Sqn) Navigator ejected both crew from the serviceable aircraft on command ejections having been head down in the cockpit when pilot took sudden maneuvering actions to avoid an A-10 that suddenly appeared in front of them. Accident report is below.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/DF858597-628A-42B4-A434-88B7244D647F/0/maas84_19_tornado_gr1_za603_8nov84.pdf

The Luftwaffe Tornado that crashed due to suspected HIRTA was an IDS(T) 'twin stick trainer' 43+93 from JBG31 on 6th July 1984. Both crew Major Manfred Wegenast (Pilot) and Hptm Wolfgang Klupp (WSO) were killed.

ASN Aircraft accident 06-JUL-1984 Panavia Tornado IDS(T) 43+93 (http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=55702)

There was a bit of a scandal about the crash in the German press as because from what I can work out from this article, the British had found that there was a possible problem with the Tornado control systems and HIRTA before the German Tornado crash.

DER SPIEGEL*33/1986 - An die Nieren (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13518844.html)

The google translation is as follows:

AIRFORCE
The renal
Defense Wörner delayed the investigation of a "Tornado" -Absturzes. His house had been forewarned. *

Shortly before his holiday in France instructed Defense Minister Manfred Wörner his armor-Secretary of State, to answer a letter which had lain for five weeks pending on his desk.

Manfred Timmermann did as he was told. "Dear Mr. Deputy," he wrote last Monday the SPD defense expert Horst young man, "the Minister has to decide whether and which confidential documents of the house is transferred to the Defence Committee, even reserved." Therefore, the Member should be patient.

But this does not do Jungmann: "My patience is torn."

For over two years, CDU and SPD deputy strive in vain defense committee to clarify the mysterious Tornado crash on July 6, 1984 at the Upper Bavarian wooden churches in the vicinity of the station "Radio Free Europe". The first report was the "General Aviation Safety" parliamentarians on September 19, 1984:
"The on 06 07 84 in Wooden churches in the vicinity of"
"Transmitter" Free Europe "accident happened one falls out of the"
"framework. During this accident was the tactical number. 1 a"
"Duo performances by overflight of the transmitter from the"
"Straight flight abruptly into a descent over, rolled"
"Simultaneously strongly to the left and crashed. The"
"Rescue system was not activated. The crew was"
"Killed."

The pilot of the second machine, the Major Jochen Both, confirmed this account: The formation was, as then, regulation, flown at 500 feet above the antenna system, warning lights would not blink. Both: "The 136 points that we no longer allowed to fly over now been announced in the squadron until later."

The CDU deputy Willy Wimmer wanted to then know if there were warnings before the accident, to fly over the transmitting equipment. The responses of the Air Force Inspector Eberhard Eimler ("An unhappy marriage of circumstances") were as soft as wax, that the Defence Committee requested a new report.

But the left says Wimmer, many questions unanswered. He knew now that the British had warned before the accident. Wimmer according to the minutes:
"The information is also on the German Luftwaffe"
"Gone., But the implementation in the flight planning"
"Pilots and entry in the cards had so"
"Delayed that the pilots who had crashed, no"
"Would have been possible, the circumstances in their plans"
"Integrate."

Wimmer wanted "to the day" know when warning the British and discussed what had happened.

Now the Tornado crash was suddenly declared to be a "top priority". Eimler advised the Minister to put the Defence Committee all the documents on the table, Wörner hesitated - for whatever reason.

If it had, the investigation Hardthöhe, not only one but two warnings from the British.

The first was from March 1984, the second on 12 June 1984. sender of the second was the technical department of the London Ministry of Defence, the receiver NAMMA in Munich, which manages the development and production of the German-British-Italian fighter aircraft. The NAMMA-clerk took the recommendation to continue to fly around the transmitter in a greater safety margin, after all so seriously that he forwarded without delay to Bonn and Rome.

Who on the Hardthöhe receive this message and what he has then caused, nor stood in the third report, which was discussed on 25 June 1986 at the Defence Committee (SPIEGEL 27/1986).

The Air Force leadership had in fact, as it turned out in the meeting, must shorten the report of 120 on 28 pages. The transfer had come to the surprise of the officers directly from the ministerial office. Justification: The Deputies should not be bothered with "technical details". _ (For wooden churches (Upper Bavaria).)

The indignation of the deputies was unanimous. After all, the Minister and the Air Force officers had to admit that warning the British was, split of 12 June 1984 on July 10, four days after the crash of wooden churches, without any modification to the squadron.

If the accident was therefore to be avoided if the British considered and recommendations had been passed immediately after the principle of "safety first" to the pilots?

Eimler any case clarified:
"The accident investigation found that the crash"
"By an electromagnetic disturbance in the flight control system"
"Due to the strong short-wave radiation from the transmitter Free"
"Must be caused Europe."

The suspicion that something could be wrong with the tornado-control was evident come the leaders even before the British recommendations; they had been given in 1981 its own investigations in order. In August 1984, six weeks after the accident, the System Supervisor for the Tornado was in a "progress report" report, the "testing of (electromagnetic interference) further hardened flight control system" was close to completion. The pilots but knew nothing of all this.

On June 25th of this year Wörner promised the deputies finally, he would now consider really exactly who did what, when known, and caused or prevented. The matter finally go him just to the kidneys as the deputies. Done but he has nothing so far.

Wörner was the young man-letter lie on 27 June, was between a regimen of 3 to July 24th and the beginning of the holiday on August 3, but time to pursue his greatest pleasure of flying. Wörner turned with an American F-16 in "Top Gun" style again some loops.

The deputy young man wants to crash again on the agenda of the Committee: "Wörner disregarded the parliamentary rights of control." It would come to suspect that the Minister "cover up their own failures" may.

On the Hardthöhe another version, however, is heard. The Jet Pilot Wörner ("Dear one hour in the 'Starfighter' than ten hours at a desk") protect his aviator comrades on the Hardthöhe, because that would have given him back the military pilot's license, to his predecessor Hans Apel had once revoked. Reason: "The Aviator fun of some parliamentarians is too expensive MPs belong to Parliament and not to the cockpit.."

In Holzkirchen (Upper Bavaria).

[tornadoken]

#24, 42: origins of Tornado TFR.

You will find assertions that TFR was: developed by Ferranti for TSR.2; or: invented by Texas Instruments and patented in 1959. I now tell you that, in UK, Basic Research in airborne radar was led by RAE/RRE, inc. flight trials at Pershore on quite odd platforms like a taildragger HP Hermes. In this sector, as in almost all, UK Defence Establishments worked closely with US', such that it is pointless to try to DNA-any paternity. Suffice that by 1957 UK judged that strike missions could be flown in the weeds and Specified TSR.2; US did ditto in 1960, to be F-111A.

Ferranti won TSR.2 TFR, chopped 6/4/65; dribbled on as a Research exercise. Texas won F-111A/B/E TFR (AN/APQ-110: the Mark I system, GE mapper), into combat, 3/68 (not happily); radar systems on F-111C/D (and abortive F-111K, the Mark II system) were Autonetics+Sperry; by 1971 a Mark IIB system was in development for FB-111/F-111F (GE+TI).

In 1970 tenders were invited for (to be) Tornado: TFR+Ground Mapping Radar, constrained into a small space. Autonetics bid a single antenna solution; TI, 2 dishes and boxes. Hughes (who?) bid, GE did not. W.Germany caused Electronique M.Dassault (who?) to bid. UK shot-gunned a bid, Ferranti-led (TFR)+Elliott (GMR). Both were stalwarts of the Electronics Engineering Association, which as policy opposed Govt's Requirement that (Tornado) bids must be collaborative, aligning with Project funding % (W.Germany, 42.5%, Italy 15%). EEA said neither Nation possessed an avionics industry, so their bids would be as US Trojan Horses: Ferranti ignored tender terms, bid solo-UK, effectively cost-plus in Development, and what-it-might-be in Production. So they were deleted. Elliott fired 500 staff. Autonetics and TI did as asked, offering fixed price development+ licenced production. TI was cheaper, so won.

Systems Integration was a collaboration between the 3 airframers comprising Panavia, plus 3 Systems Houses, EASAMS, ESG, SIA, who were owned by black box firms. That was the job which so delayed RAAF F-111C. So, whether the TI kit was good or not, what mattered was making the boxes on the bus talk to each other. Tornado was the first to do so, digitally. Very low level was the job of the Command and Stability Augmentation System, jointly Elliott and (FIAT's avionics Unit) FIAR, who were nobody's Trojan Horse.

[Tashengurt]

Pious Pilot,
You might be interested in RAF - Operation Granby which includes a Campaign Diary. Also, the book Thunder & Lightning by Charles Allen HMSO ISBN 011 701 625 X was put together drawing on the personal experiences of 150 RAF personnel who were involved at all relevant locations - there is even a pic of me in it !

Thanks for the tip. Just got my copy of Thunder and lightning and I think I'm in it too.


Posted from Pprune.org App for Android

[tartare]

Gents - there was an earlier reference to using TFR in manual mode.
What does that mean?

[GreenKnight121]

So, posts #38-#40 were referring to the GAF EM interference crash. Then in post #41 glad rag - without mentioning that he is suddenly talking about a completely different accident in a different nation's air force (RAF), says "Was it not a unanticipated maneuver alongside a somewhat agitated aircrewmember with a paranoia over high power transmissions?"!

It was completely logical to think he was referring to the German aircrew.

Now that we have established that there WAS a GAF EM-caused crash, and an aircrew-error-caused RAF crash, I finally understand just what the $^&%$$&^%$ glad rag was talking about.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

Gents - there was an earlier reference to using TFR in manual mode.
What does that mean?


At least in the case of the F-111, the 'Auto TF' switch was independent of the TF radar switches, so you could have the TFRs on but still be hand flying. You'd get pitch commands on the flight director, and also high & low pitched beeps which corresponded to pitch up/down commands. You could also just fly off the e-scope by keeping the ZCL (zero clearance line) above the terrain returns, but that wasn't something you'd make a habit of. Generally we'd either be hand flying with the TFs off (because it was day VMC and we could see where we were going), or on full auto TF (because it was night or IMC and we couldn't see where we were going).

[just another jocky]

At least in the case of the F-111, the 'Auto TF' switch was independent of the TF radar switches, so you could have the TFRs on but still be hand flying. You'd get pitch commands on the flight director, and also high & low pitched beeps which corresponded to pitch up/down commands. You could also just fly off the e-scope by keeping the ZCL (zero clearance line) above the terrain returns, but that wasn't something you'd make a habit of. Generally we'd either be hand flying with the TFs off (because it was day VMC and we could see where we were going), or on full auto TF (because it was night or IMC and we couldn't see where we were going).

That's CEFGW to the Tornado system.

In the GR1, the switchery was a bit mandraulic but the HOTAS in the GR4 means that once you've set the system up, it's a one-handed/3-button job to turn the TFR ON/Off & route it through the autopilot.

[HTB]

Tornado Manual TF - simple: pilot uses ski slope to avoid obstacle paints on E-scope, flying manually. Nav goes into verbal overdrive about upcoming terrain, GMR cutoffs and increased height monitoring.

Incidentally, during GW1 the II(AC)/13 recce misions were flown by some crews down to 100' agl using manual TF, supplemented by NVGs (both crew memebers). Reason for being so low - the recce kit (IRLS/SLIR) was not configured for medium level. On the other hand I personally considered that 100' was unnecessarily low, especially as the speeds flown (520-540) could lead to gaps in the imagery (V/H).

Ken: if you're getting a bit historical, don't forget that the Vulcan had a little nipple on the nose to provide (rudimentary) TFR (again supplemented by nav commentary from both radar and plotter); it was quite effective.

Mister B

[uglyee]

Did the terrain mapping radar have any A-A capability on say a fighter size target?